

# A History of The Idea of Pakistan


In 1858 the Muslims of India ceased to be the rulers and became a problem. During the next 82 years this problem and the means of solving it determined the course of Indian politics. Several constitutional devices and arrangements were tried and a series of reforms was enacted. Political parties were established to watch over Muslim interests, which claimed safeguards, separate electorates, weighted representation, quota in the public services, and preservation of religious liberties and cultural values. Most of these demands were conceded. Yet, in the end, all shields and concessions failed to secure their future, and, in March 1940, the Muslim League was forced to adopt the partition of India as its goal — belatedly, reluctantly, halfheartedly.

This is the commonplace version of the "Pakistan movement", and in historical perspective an extremely perfunctory explanation of the creation of Pakistan.

Coterminous and simultaneous with this march of political events was the continual and persistent search for a satisfactory solution of the problem through a re-arrangement, re-distribution, division or partition of India on religious lines. Between 1858 and 1940 there appeared 170 such plans and suggestions, ranging from vague hints to carefully drawn up schemes. Their authors were the real makers of the idea of Pakistan, individually and collectively. The Muslim League was presented with a ready-made solution in the making of which it had played virtually no part. There could have been no Pakistan without the idea.

In this path-breaking, monumental book, Professor Aziz studies the history of the idea in exhaustive detail. Based on an extensive corpus of sources in 6 languages (Urdu, Persian, Arabic, English, French and German), meticulously documented, and impeccably written, this massive study is a major and abiding contribution to modern historiography.

Professor **KHURSHEED KAMAL AZIZ** is Pakistan's top historian and the author of over a dozen books on Pakistan. He has been on the academic staff of the Government College, Lahore, and of the Universities of the Punjab, Bonn, and Heidelberg, and has delivered occasional lectures at Hull, Newcastle-upon-Tyne, Germany.



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By K.K.Aziz

A History of The Idea of Pakistan

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By K.K.Aziz



**A HISTORY OF  
THE IDEA OF  
PAKISTAN**



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TO

MY WIFE

Z A R I N A

"The fairness of her face as fair  
As a true believer's soul"



## PREFACE

This book has been in the making for over 20 years, and yet in its present form it represents only one-third of the original project in scope and size. A constellation of factors has conspired to cause the delay and the diminution. I don't feel free to spell out the nature and dimensions of all the obstructions put in my way, but a partial explanation can be attempted.

Soon after completing a study of the two-nation theory in 1963 (*The Making of Pakistan: A Study in Nationalism*, Chatto and Windus, London, 1967), I had started thinking, in a vague, irregular, orderless and desultory sort of way, about investigating the origins of the idea of a division of India on "communal" lines. In the November of the same year I moved from Karachi to Khartoum, and for some time all my attention and energies were absorbed by the process of adjusting to a totally different society, making a new home, and lecturing at what was then a university of a deservedly high reputation.

The Sudanese I found to be a mentally healthy people, relaxed in their ways of life and thought, and honest to themselves and to others. An inbred reserve and an instinctive dignity marked their conduct and behaviour. They were good nationalists, but did not talk so much about their country. They were good patriots, but did not parade their love of the land on every occasion. Nor did they show off their religion in florid and unnecessary gestures. They talked less of Islam and practised more of it: they lived Islam. There were no *mullas* to replace a vibrant and telling religion with sterile dogmatism. No sects divided them, no theologians split them, no schools broke the unity and simplicity of their faith.

This contrast between the even and placid (but by no means passive) tenor of the Sudanese society and the hysterical nationalism and snarling sectarianism of the society that I had just left set me thinking. I spent some time in acquainting myself with modern Sudanese history and discussing its various aspects with well-informed scholars and intellectuals. When they questioned me



in return, the burden of their inquiry was the background of the 1947 partition of India and the creation of Pakistan. The more perceptive among them were interested less in the general political and constitutional developments preceding the partition than in the whys and whereofs of the separation. The usual Pakistani argument that the Muslims could not live together with the Hindus in one country did not convince them, partly because of their own religious configuration (though the non-Muslim South was soon to erupt into a long-drawn out rebellion), partly because of their attachment to an Arab nationalism which did not distinguish between a Muslim and Christian Arab, and partly (perhaps principally) because they had no means of acquiring even a modicum of knowledge about Pakistan, thanks to our inactive scholars and indifferent diplomats.

The first stirrings to attempt a history of the idea of Pakistan appeared in my mind during these discussions with my Sudanese friends. I had already written something on the political situation obtaining in imperial India, and was planning several more books on the same theme. But a history of the idea caught my fancy in 1964, and I began to read around the subject. A concentrated spell of study on this topic was not possible, as I had to write other books, there was virtually nothing on India in the Khartoum libraries, and I was lecturing in an entirely different field (principles of political science, comparative government in Europe, political parties and pressure groups, and the like).

After more than three years of reading and making notes I felt that I could attempt a preliminary draft in the winter of 1967-68. This was done, but I was not satisfied with the result. There were far too many gaps in my knowledge. On my request the University of Khartoum granted me a sabbatical term consecutive to the summer vacation, so that in 1969 I was able to spend six months of undisturbed calm in Switzerland, re-writing the rough draft, putting in some of the missing pieces, and enlarging the treatment. I was pleased with the progress made, though the new manuscript was still far from being anything worth sending to a publisher. But it was not its imperfections which stopped further work on it. Rahmat Ali stood squarely in the way, and refused to move until I had dealt with him first.

The writing of the first complete draft had brought me up against the realization that Rahmat Ali occupied the central

position in the origin, development and consummation of the idea of Pakistan. So overpowering was the impact of his opinions and so seminal his role in modern history that I set the manuscript aside and began to study his life and ideas more closely. For the next two years I concentrated on Rahmat Ali, working in Khartoum and Cambridge, and from 1972 onwards the two books occupied my time and attention in almost equal proportions. The story of the writing of Rahmat Ali's life is related in the preface to my forthcoming *Rahmat Ali: A Biography* (Heidelberg and Lahore).

As far as the present work is concerned, the draft written in Switzerland received further additions and emendations in 1973. After that for several years I had no opportunity to re-consider it, not to speak of completing it. I returned to Pakistan in December 1973, on the request of the Government of Pakistan, to establish and run the National Commission on Historical and Cultural Research. The increasing volume and pressure of official work, the pains of adjustment to new surroundings after a decade of living abroad, and the absence of adequate libraries combined to deprive me of any time, energy or inclination for serious academic work. Besides other imperative calls on my attention, there was the agony of dealing with problems created by a bureaucracy whose ignorance, insensitiveness, *hubris* (which never led to Nemesis), insolence and inefficiency were as great as its assumed authority and airs of infallibility, and the exercise of that authority a cardinal article of its faith.

In 1977 a bitter personal crisis and the consequent breakdown of my health overwhelmed all faculties of consideration and reflection, and my pen and I were strangers for several years. I was forced to go back to Khartoum in 1978 to earn a living, but it was not till 1982 that I felt normal enough in nerve and flesh to resume my writing. The old manuscript, by now a faithful companion, was then taken in hand and entirely re-cast and re-written in February-July 1982 in Khartoum and Heidelberg. In the winter semester of 1983-84 I taught a course based on the book at the South Asia Institute of the University of Heidelberg. As every teacher-writer knows, this exposition of my findings and conclusions before an educated and well-informed audience and the ensuing discussion and exchange of ideas clarified several points and taught me, not for the first time, to realize the difference in perspective and



formulation between expressing an idea in writing in the study and expounding and defending it in speech in the lecture-hall. This necessitated a further revision of the manuscript, which was undertaken in the autumn of 1984.

Had conditions been normal this book should have been completed in 1972 and published soon after. But life is not always normal, and sometimes there intervenes a period when it is a sentence without pardon and amnesties. Such a spell overwhelmed me in 1977, and it took me a long time to gather all the parts of my mind together which the event had knocked apart. There were also other restraints on my publishing anything at all of which I am not free to speak at present. Indeed, the loom of time weaves fine and coarse.

In addition to other troubles, the person in whose care I had left my private collection of books, journals, papers and press-clippings when I was forced to leave Pakistan refused to send it to me either in Khartoum or in Heidelberg, in spite of innumerable requests, appeals and entreaties, and although I had arranged the required export permit and removed all other impediments in the way of its dispatch. This added immensely to my burden. I had to now, once again, seek, locate, read and take notes from books which I owned but could not reach. Some of the documentary material I had collected in the last 15 years, especially the files of cuttings from Indian newspapers and old journals, was not readily available in any European public or private library. I could have augmented the evidence presented in this work had I gained access to my own collection.

Another obstruction of the same kind was created by the National Commission on Historical and Cultural Research by its suppression or at least refusal to send me a copy of my own book which it had undertaken to publish. Long before I left Islamabad, the Commission had accepted for publication my 2-volume collection of documents on the condition of the Muslims in the Congress-ruled Hindu-majority provinces in 1937-39. My letters and reminders to the publication officer and the Chairman of the Commission (and, when its status was lowered and it was put under a mere Director, to this officer) regarding the book were not even acknowledged. After waiting for three years I wrote to the Minister of Education who was the controlling authority of the Institute, and the letter was sent through a close

friend who was then in the Cabinet. There was no response. A dozen reminders were sent to the Minister (the last one a month ago), but without effect. To this day I don't know if the book has been published. Every historian of modern Muslim India knows how effectively this taste of Congress rule goaded the Muslims on to the idea of Pakistan. I have not been able to deal with this important aspect of the subject or to support my assertions with contemporary documents relevant to the topic because the Institute lacked the ordinary courtesy (even a sense of its contractual obligation) to send me copies of my own publication, or even to inform me that the book was or was not brought out for "reasons of state". Common decency is indeed an uncommon virtue.

This list of sombre and disheartening factors is not yet complete. The art (or science) of history is not practised seriously in Pakistan. We do not have an authentic and reliable biography of any of the Indian Muslim makers of the idea of Pakistan studied in this book. Muslim leaders have shown no disposition to remember and record their own part in the public life of their own day or to chronicle the activities and achievements of others. Private papers are a rarity. With the single and happy exception of Khaliqzaman, no leader has left an autobiography, journal or diary. The dark corners of our history (and there are so many of these) remain hidden, and there appears to be little chance that our journey into them will be lightened up by any spark or flame, glow or gleam, ray or beam. Are we doomed to roam the hazy corridors of our past and grope for clues to our identity? In the absence of relevant source material I have not been able to answer substantial questions on several points. For example, why did Mawlana Muhammad Ali fail to opt for a separatist solution of the Hindu-Muslim problem in spite of his repeated statements in support of the separationist sentiment? Why did the Khairi brothers propose a partition in 1917? And, above all, why did the Muslim League top leadership exhibit such stubborn reluctance to accept the idea of Pakistan and the name as its policy?

In the hope of receiving some new information from somebody who had it, in 1969 I drafted a letter to the editor containing ten specific questions. It was published in six national dailies (*Dawn*, *The Pakistan Times*, *The Pakistan Observer*, *Jang*, *Hurriyat* and *Tamir*) on 18 October. There was barely any response. Simultaneously I was exploring another avenue. I wrote personal letters to



237 persons in Pakistan between December 1969 and December 1973. The list of the addressees included all university professors of history who had earned doctorates in or were teaching modern Indian Muslim history, some of their junior colleagues, heads of all research organizations with an interest in national history, senior journalists who were writing copiously on Pakistan's history in English and Urdu newspapers and magazines, politicians who had witnessed the nationalist struggle, sons and descendants of some of the persons mentioned in the book, everyone who was expected to have some knowledge of the subject, and one gentleman who had actually prepared one of the major schemes discussed here (Dr. Afzaal Husain Qadri). A mere 28 wrote back to me, of whom only 12 sent me information which was both relevant and accurate. Dr. Qadri did not reply. During my Chairmanship of the National Commission on Historical and Cultural Research (1973-78) in Islamabad I tried to meet more scholars and to create in them an interest in what I was doing. But nothing could pierce their armour of indifference. Such unconcern smote me to silence, and the only feeling I had was one of chagrin at my apparent inability to move others with my own convictions or their real needs.

This long tale of woes should not be construed as a plea to look kindly at the shortcomings of my work, but as a warning to other scholars who might be toying with the idea of writing something serious on national history with the help of Pakistani scholars and resources.

The circumstances listed above also affected the original plans and dimensions of this book. Between 1966 and 1970 I had planned an extensive and comprehensive treatment of the subject running to four massive volumes. The first was to provide a substantial and detailed history of Muslim politics in India between 1858 and 1940, and was to be entitled "The Problem". The second, to be called "In Search of a Solution", was to furnish a full description and an analysis of all the suggestions, plans and schemes prescribed to solve the Muslim problem. The third, to be given the title of "The Solution", was to be a thorough study of the Lahore Resolution. The fourth was to put together all the major and significant documents and declarations used in the second volume. Measured by the notes I had taken from the literature I had read and the unpublished sources I had consulted,

and the documents I had collected, each volume was expected to be about 1,000-page long. The title of the entire work was to be *A History of the Idea of Pakistan*. But this ambitious programme had to be given up for the reasons outlined above. I must confess that it hurt me a great deal to abandon the original plan and to leave unutilized the bulk of the source material I had collected at so much cost to my time, health and pocket. But the chain of harsh necessity dragged me to this decision. How long could I go on ploughing a lonely furrow? The present book is only volume II of the projected series, but now it must perforce stand alone in its own right and self-sufficiency. I wish I could present the reader with the whole work, but, alas! life is like a man with a chalice of wine in his hands and a chain around his feet.

This book was in the press when I came across three recent publications. Mr. Sarfraz Husain Mirza sent me from Lahore his compilation of documents on the foundation, activities and achievements of the Majlis-i-Kabir-i-Pakistan (*Tasawwur-i-Pakistan say Qarardad-i-Pakistan tak*, Pakistan Study Centre, University of the Punjab, Lahore, 1983), containing a valuable 42-page introduction by himself. Professor Rothermund lent me his copy of Stanley Wolpert's *Jinnah of Pakistan*, and Mr. Najam Sethi presented me with a copy of Ayesha Jalal's *The Sole Spokesman*. How much I wish I had been able to use these books in the writing of my own! But it is gratifying to discover that all the three authors support fully and illustrate amply my findings about the very minor and subordinate role of the Muslim League in the growth of the idea of Pakistan. Both Miss Jalal and Professor Wolpert write with authority derived from the use of the All India Muslim League Papers, the Jinnah Papers, and the British Archives. Mr. Mirza reprints documents and correspondence which pinpoint the subsidiary role of the Muslim League and its policy-making organs. They confirm what I have discovered in and construed from an entirely different corpus of sources. As Mr. Fateh Muhammad Nasib wrote in his review of Mr. Mirza's book, it is now incumbent upon the historians of Pakistan to go further back than the Lahore Resolution in order to realize the historical untenability of their standard thesis that the Pakistan movement amounted to nothing except the constitutional struggle of the All India Muslim League under Jinnah's leadership and that Pakistan owes its creation to one political party alone (*South Asian Studies*, Lahore,

July 1984).

But such myths die hard. When professors write timidly and doobiously or not at all and official textbooks contain more fancies and untruths than facts, history is bound to be borne on the wing of legend. Everybody writes on the Pakistan movement who has energy, a set of opinions to plead and an ambition to see his name in print. Everybody writes confidently, insistently, speedily, voluminously, passionately, shrilly, even fanatically, but not truthfully. Undaunted by the brutal reality of facts, he continues to use his rich arsenal of epigrams, slogans, invectives and stereotypes. One marvels at the fossil frigidity of his prejudices and assertions. Dates are wrong. Facts are inaccurate. Documents are misquoted and garbled. Texts are tampered with. Secondary sources are preferred to the elementary. Conclusions are unsound and false. He trips and stumbles, he reasons in a circle, he offers controvertible arguments with sophistical efficiency, he takes the shadow for the substance — with only one aim in view: to prove his point. A complete collection of these errors of fact and logic will fill a volume of respectable size. I have illustrated all kinds of such aberrations with a few hundred quotations in my text and notes.

These flaws and fallacies, passing from book to book, circulating from newspaper to newspaper, repeated by writers who do not know better and by scholars who should have known better, are in the danger of becoming history. Both the general writer and the historian bow too much to the idols of the market place. But to hold strong views and feel deeply about what is outside the range of one's knowledge is not to qualify oneself to be a historian. The historical muse of Pakistan wears a gaudy apparel, gestures without elegance or effect, and is either mute or speaks in strident accents. Platitudes worn smooth by years are presented as scholarship. Emotion usurps reason, and a shadow falls between the reality and history. In this calmour of tongues inflamed rhetoric takes the field. What can one do? It is impossible to debate with an exclamation mark.

In this book I have tried to peel away those encrustations of legend and myth and assumption and fantasy and plain lie that cannot find confirmation in the evidence of the original word or of the trustworthy contemporaries.

I am aware of the slight anachronism in the title of the book: there was no idea of Pakistan before 1933, or, if the Muslim

League thinking is accepted, before 1940, or even some later date, as the Lahore Resolution avoided deliberately the use of the word "Pakistan". But a technically precise and fully self-explanatory title would have run to something like this: A History of the Idea of and the Plans for Partitioning, Dividing, Rearranging and Readjusting the Territories of the Sub-continent of India aimed at Safeguarding the Rights and the Communal and National Sentiments and Aspirations of the Muslim Population. Such a clumsy and impossible title would have been a joke. I hope the theologians of style will overlook the transgression of an ordinary mortal.

The first complete draft of this book was written in the gloriously-situated village of La Forclaz in the Canton of Vaud in Switzerland, where my wife and I lived in desirable comfort and rural quiet in the commodious chalet belonging to our good friends Mon. Leon Badoux and Madame Aimee Badoux. The other half was composed in the well-appointed and roseflower-covered apartment built on the edge of Lac Lemman in Clarens and rented out to us by Mon. W. Altorfer. I thank the Badoux family and Mon. Altorfer for providing ideal surroundings and creature comforts for writing a book. The final manuscript has been prepared at the South Asia Institute of the University of Heidelberg, where I am enjoying more than the usual German hospitality combined with excellent research facilities. I take this opportunity to acknowledge the favours bestowed upon me by the Director and staff of the Institute.

The late Professor Aziz Ahmad of the University of Toronto read parts of an early draft of the book in Islamabad, and my friend Professor Dr. Dietmar Rothermund of the South Asia Institute has been good enough to go through the entire final typescript with enviable patience. I remember Aziz Ahmad's kindness with pleasure and pray for his soul. I thank Dietmar for his interest in my work and for all the fine things he has been doing for me; his consideration and solicitude continue to make my academic and personal life rewarding.

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All my thanks and acknowledgements must be taken as a debt owed and (but partially) discharged, not as a shuffling off of responsibility upon other shoulders. For every fact chronicled here I have cited the original word or contemporary testimony, and every opinion and speculation, for which I take full responsibility, is based on historical evidence.

All translations from Urdu, Persian, Arabic, French and German are my own, unless the context indicates otherwise.

The greatest debt that I have owed, and not merely in the writing of this book alone, is to my wife. As is her wont and grace whenever I am writing, she has not only done all the tiring and arduous chores of copying notes from books and periodicals, comparing what I type with the original, filing all notes and papers, arranging all documents and sources, but, in this case, achieved the almost impossible feat of making me forget that a half-blind man can work as much as the one with both eyes unimpaired. During the two odd years in which this book and Rahmat Ali's biography were finally written only one of my eyes was functional and my general health was far from normal. In these circumstances, she directed and controlled my daily routine with such a firm though loving and tactful hand that I made the happy discovery that there were more working hours in a day than I had imagined possible in my state of health and ocular disability. The dedication of this book to her is only a puny effort on my part to clothe in borrowed numbers a conviction that lies beyond all phrasing. Words caress the contour of our thought, they don't mould it.

K.K. Aziz

South Asia Institute,  
University of Heidelberg,  
January 1985.

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K.K. Aziz

## ABBREVIATIONS

AIKC	All India Khilafat Conference
AIMC	All India Muslim Conference
AIML	All India Muslim League
CMG	<i>The Civil and Military Gazette</i>
col(s)	column, columns
comp.	compiled, compiler
ed.	editor, edited, edition
eds.	editors
enl.	enlarged
FI	<i>The Friend of India</i>
fn.	footnote
IAR	<i>Indian Annual Register</i>
INC	Indian National Congress
IQR	<i>Indian Quarterly Register</i>
MG	<i>Manchester Guardian</i>
M.L.	Muslim League
n.d.	not dated
n.p.	no publisher mentioned
n.p.p.	no place of publication given
NW	<i>Nawa-i-Waqt</i>
NWFP	North-West Frontier Province
PNM	Pakistan National Movement (Cambridge)
pseud.	pseudonym
pub.	published
rep.	reprint, reprinted
rev.	revised
RTC	Round Table Conference(s)
TET	<i>The Eastern Times</i>
TMM	<i>The Madras Mail</i>
TPT	<i>The Pakistan Times</i>
TSI	<i>The Star of India</i>
TTI	<i>The Times of India</i>

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## PROLOGUE

In the evolution of every idea we find two tendencies running side by side: one negative, the other positive. Often it is difficult to determine which came first and which came later; sometimes, it is irrelevant. What is important is to remember that both contribute to the development, and to guard ourselves against the common inclination to dismiss the negative aspect as insignificant, shallow and ineffectual. Language is an instrument fashioned by man to aid his expression; but at times the creation dominates the creator, and we permit linguistic definitions and symbols, made strictly for our convenience, to interfere with our thought processes. But language was made for man, not man for the language. It is not difficult to lose sight of this truth; it is easy to run after the form and ignore the content.

In the case of the Indian Muslims, the two tendencies appeared during the same period. It was soon after the revolt of 1857 that the two sentiments began to agitate the Muslim mind. There was a fear of Hindu rule and a feeling of separateness from other Indians. The first grew out of the loss of Muslim sovereignty over India and the emergence of an alien power under whose aegis the principle of majority rule was to be gradually applied.<sup>1</sup> This was a negative factor, but one of incalculable force. Man is capable of doing anything out of fear, and ten thousand years of civilization will not stand in his way. Fear has immense power to move men; for men love security and want to keep what history, accident, the strength of their arms, the luck of their stars or the favour of God has given them. So the Muslim decided to stand against the coming of a Hindu rule with the tenacity of the primitive and the sophisticated argument of the modern. Every weapon in the arsenal of human ingenuity was to be put to use to oppose, blunt, avert and finally to destroy this threat.

The feeling of separateness was perhaps older,<sup>2</sup> but now it gained in significance in order to fortify the Muslim's resolve

to remain an entity to himself. The followers of Islam could not lose themselves in the wide waters of idolatry which splashed around them, sometimes too dangerously close, and which seemed bent upon carrying away a portion, however small, of this foreign rock which, only a little while ago, had stood so strong, so dominating and so impregnable. Now, perhaps with the help, or at least the encouragement, of the British rulers, the Hindu tradition of absorbing all kinds of alien forces and doctrines would at least succeed in breaching the weakening ramparts of Indian Islam. The threat was dire, and opened long vistas of unending gloom at the end of which it saw the annihilation of every shred of its spiritual heritage. The conquerors of India, the proud inheritors of the triumphs and glories of the Mughal court, could not merge themselves in the drab greyness of the vast Indian millions and still call their past their own. They had always been different from other Indians, but in the days gone by none had questioned this difference. The subjugated don't ask questions of the rulers on the throne, particularly if the ruler comes from far away and professes another faith. But now that the former rulers and the former ruled tasted the dust of a common humiliation, the danger was lest time and a shared destiny might obliterate this difference in the eyes of others and, what portended even greater danger, with the passing of the years, might make the Muslims themselves strangers to their own identity. This was a fear as hateful as that of a Hindu rule. Therefore, the differences must be emphasized. The separate feeling must be made conspicuous. The identity of a people must be shown to be a stark reality.

The play of these two factors upon each other was destined to create Pakistan. In separate analysis, the fear of Hindu rule inspired the demand for a partition of India, and the feeling of separateness led to the development of a separate nationalism. But this culmination was the work of many years. The fear of Hindu rule was slowly but regularly fed by a series of reforms which led India towards the final reckoning of majority rule in a single state. The feeling of separateness was deepened by the march of political events, the indifference, insularity and arrogance of the Indian National Congress, the opinions and ideas of political thinkers, and the policies and decisions of politicians. In the 1930s the two tendencies merged. The coming of the 1935 constitution, which ignored the plural nature of the Indian society in the

exuberance of its federal experiment, and then its operation in the Congress-ruled provinces from 1937 to 1939, convinced the Muslims that their dread of a Hindu rule was not an empty fear, and made them decide that the only practicable way out of this blind alley was complete separation.

Parallel to this, the national spirit, which had been abroad at least since the days of Sayyid Ahmad Khan, now blossomed forth as an unmistakable nationalism which brooked no talk of unity or compromise and demanded a territory to enshrine its personality. The combination of the two tendencies proved irresistible, and within a few months it had consummated into a formal demand for a partition.

But it was only a formal demand which was now being made. The substance of it had been enunciated and repeated by several tongues long before these bents and drifts became visible to more than a few discerning eyes. Starting from the year of the mutiny itself, we find statements and claims which at times came close to demanding or prescribing a division of India on Hindu-Muslim lines. Sometimes the language is vague and uncertain as if the author is not sure of himself and is groping for a solution which fitfully escapes him. Sometimes the words, and the purpose behind them, are ambiguous as if the suggestion is being made with only half a heart, and the author himself is not convinced of the rightness or the practicability of his recommendation. But as the nineteenth century moves to its close the voices multiply, the words wax stronger and the arguments expand, until in the twentieth the solution by partition is prescribed by many more in language which is clear and firm and with arguments which foresee lucidly those of Rahmat Ali and Jinnah. The mind is no longer split with doubt, the words no longer bear two meanings, the arguments no longer present a two-edged sword, the voices no longer falter. Everyone knows what he is suggesting and why.

The diversity of those who speak for partition is impressive. All kinds of men bring their contributions: the Muslims naturally, with their fears of the future, their pride in past glories, their hopes for the best, their flowing language dripping with rich analogies and symbols; the British diffidently, with their circum-spect phrases, their pragmatic arguments, their personal experience; even the Hindus, with all their orthodoxy, their dislike for Islam and its stronghold in the north, their anxiety to settle the communal

problem once and for all. These prophets of separation come from a variety of circles: there are, not unnaturally, politicians, like John Bright and Sardar Gul Khan; there are leaders of culture, like Sayyid Ahmad and the Kheiri brothers; there are writers and poets, like W.S. Blunt and Abdul Halim Sharar and Muhammad Ali and Hasrat Mohani; there are religious-cum-political leaders, like Jamaluddin Afghani and Bhai Parmanand and the Aga Khan; there are journalists, like Bambooque and Fazl Karim Khan Durrani; there are Hindu orthodox leaders, like Lajpat Rai; there are lawyers, like Nadir Ali; there are aristocrats, like Sayyid Sardar Ali Khan and Nawab Sir Zulfiqar Ali Khan; there is even a palmist, Cheiro. Nor is this activity limited to the British and the Indians. Several foreigners are reported to have tried their hand and offered the fertility of their mind to the service of India: the Iranians in the person of Jamaluddin; the Turks, who sent two journalists to India; the Russians, whose supreme leader, Joseph Stalin, propounded his own vision.

Some of the ideas of this group are more valuable than others, but all are relevant to the search for a solution of the Hindu-Muslim problem on the basis of a physical division. Some proposals are clear and reach us through documentary evidence of undeniable authority. Some are found in second-hand reports, but the accuracy of the chronicler is beyond suspicion. Some come to our notice through channels which are of doubtful veracity. Some reach us *via* a passing reference or a tantalizing aside, and their origin or truth cannot be traced with any certainty. However, all these schemes and proposals and plans are treated in the following pages: each according to its authenticity, influence and originality. Even the occasional report, however frustrating in its lack of documentation, is examined briefly, for it was a straw in the wind, and in this kind of study the straws cannot be ignored.

## NOTES

- I. In part this fear was aggravated (perhaps, in the first place, even caused) by the emergence of a feeling of unity and nationalism among the Hindus. This can be traced back to the beginning of the nineteenth century, but I will, for the present purpose, cite some evidence from the 1840s onwards.

In 1845, the Hindus considered the Hindu law of inheritance to be "one of the strongest bulwarks of the national Hindu creed", *FI*, 17 April 1845. Next year a magazine wrote that "from a single family up to the whole nation the prevailing spirit among the Hindus at present is the enmity against Christianity. There is an enmity in each family, and there is a national enmity . . . ye, the whole nation is moved from its very bottom and filled with implacable hatred, and bent upon the utter destruction of Christianity", *MNH*, December 1846. Repeated references to nation and nationalism are worthy of notice.

During 1848-50, Gopal Hari Deshmukh, popularly known as Lokahitavadi, hoped that when Hindus were ready for self-rule, the British would leave India, and threatened that if the British did not, the Hindus would fight for independence as the Americans had done in America (A.K. Pirotkar (ed.), *Lokahitavadikrt Nibandha Sangraha*, Bombay, 2nd ed 1967, p. 138, quoted in Mahadev L. Apte, "Lokahitavadi and V.K. Chiplunkar: Spokesmen of Change in Nineteenth-Century Maharashtra", *Modern Asian Studies*, April 1973, p. 195). This he had written in his letters to the editor of the daily *Prabhakar* between 1848 and 1850, labelled *Satapatre* (hundred letters). In 1866 these letters were published as a book.

The general feeling was that the Hindus preferred British to Muslim rule. "More liberty and a larger share of the loaves and fishes, every man of course desires, but there is not one among them . . . we are speaking of the Hindus . . . who would vote for the displacement of Sir Henry Pottinger and the restoration of the Nawab of the Carnatic, if the question were made an open one tomorrow", *Spectator* (Madras), 6 June 1853.



2. "The Hindoos and the Mahomedans may be said to constitute two different nations in India, between whom there is no affinity of interests, and not the smallest sympathy of feeling . . . In all the movements which the Hindoos have made of late years in opposition to their present rulers, and in all those appeals which have been preferred by them against particular measures, though the grievances put forward were common to both classes, the Mahomedans have never united with them on any occasion, and as the Mahomedans are by far the most independent, and united, as well as redoubtable section of the community . . . however disproportionate in numbers . . . this circumstance has always served in no small degree to weaken the representations of the Hindoos", *FI*, 17 May 1855; this paper, issued from Serampore, was, in its general policy, by no means sympathetic to the Muslims. A modern Hindu historian has called it "a highly tendentious article" (S.R. Mehrotra, *The Emergence of the Indian National Congress*, Delhi, 1971, p. 213).

# I

## THE EARLY BEGINNINGS: 1858-1899

### John Bright (1858-1877)

Two speeches of John Bright may be cited to indicate that the concept of a divided India coincided, at least in some minds, with the transfer of power from the East India Company to the British Crown.<sup>1</sup> Speaking during the debate on the bill providing for such a transfer in the House of Commons, on 24 June 1858, Bright suggested some remarkable changes in the structure of British India. He wanted the office of the governor general to be abolished. With a view to bringing the government closer to the governed, the unitary structure of the British Empire in India was to be replaced with five presidencies, each, equal in rank and status to the others, with its own council, financial and revenue system, police force, judicial administration and military power. The five presidencies were to be constructed around five capital towns: Calcutta, Madras, Bombay, Agra and Lahore.<sup>2</sup>

That this re-grouping was meant to be more than the genesis of a mere federal system is clear from what he said in elaboration of his recommendation. "If that were to go on for a century or more, there would be five or six Presidencies of India built up into so many compact States; and if at any future period the sovereignty of England should be withdrawn, we should leave so many Presidencies built up and firmly compacted together, each able to support its own independence and its own Government; and we should be able to say we had not left the country a prey to that anarchy and discord which I believe to be inevitable if we insist on holding those vast territories with the idea of building them up into one great empire."<sup>3</sup> He was convinced beyond any doubt that the disunity of India ruled out the possibility, then or in any distant future, of founding or leaving behind a compact and

lasting empire or union. "But how long does England propose to govern India? Nobody answers that question, and nobody can answer it. Be it 50, or 100, or 500 years, does any man with the smallest glimmering of common sense believe that so great a country, with its twenty different nations and its twenty languages, can ever be bound up and consolidated into one compact and enduring empire? I believe such a thing to be utterly impossible. We must fail in the attempt if ever we make it, and we are bound to look into the future with reference to that point."<sup>4</sup>

It is true that speakers in parliamentary debates are liable to throw out startling ideas and then to forget them as if they had never given expression to them. *Hansard* is replete with such novel statements, either clothed in tantalizing brevity or dressed up in full array of logic and argument, wrung out of the members' lips by the atmosphere of the house, the exuberance generated by the attention being paid to their words or a momentary effort to show originality of mind. But with Bright this was not a passing thought spoken to suit time, place and opportunity.

Speaking on 11 December 1877 to the Indian Association in the Town Hall of Manchester, he repeated what he had said in 1858, making it clear that he foresaw several independent and sovereign States in India when British withdrawal had been effected. To appreciate his emphasis on such a culmination it is necessary to quote him *in extenso*: "And thus if the time should come—and it will come—I agree with Lord Lawrence that no man who examines the question can doubt that some time it must come—when the power of England, from some cause or other, is withdrawn from India, then each one of these States would be able to sustain itself as a compact, as a self-governing community. You would have five or six great States there, as you have five or six great States in Europe; but that would be a thousand times better than our being withdrawn from it now when there is no coherence amongst those twenty nations, and when we should find the whole country, in all probability, lapse into chaos and anarchy, and into sanguinary and interminable warfare. I believe that it is our duty not only to govern India well now for our own sake and to satisfy our own conscience, but so to arrange its government and so to administer it that we should look forward to the time—which may be distant, but may not be so remote—when India will have to take up her own government, and administer it in her own fashion.

I say he is no Statesman—he is no man actuated with a high moral sense with regard to our great and terrible moral responsibility, who is not willing thus to look ahead, and thus to prepare for circumstances which may come sooner than we think, and sooner than any of us hope for, but which must come at some not very distant date. By doing this, I think we should be endeavouring to make amends for the original crime upon which much of our power in India is founded, and for the many mistakes which have been made by men whose intentions have been good. I think it is our duty, if we can, to approach this great question in this spirit, and to try rightly to discharge the task committed to us, as the Government and rulers of the countless and helpless millions of that country."<sup>5</sup>

It will be noticed that Bright starts with the fundamental fact of the disunity of India. Repeatedly he refers to the "twenty nations" and the "twenty languages" of the country. From this spectacle of diversity he concludes that a united India—compact, homogeneous and enduring—is an impossibility of which no man has the right to dream. Thus far he is saying nothing new. Countless British politicians, journalists, historians and administrators have pointed this out from the day of British arrival in India till the hour of their departure.<sup>6</sup> But they failed to pursue the logic of their observations. After pointing out that the wild disarray in which they found India, they sat back and either complimented themselves on giving some kind of unity to this land of discord or hoped that it would, at some future date, for some mysterious reason, transcend its differences and emerge a corporate an united entity. To deny such a possibility was to cast doubt upon British intentions and efficiency. Bright was free of such self-esteem and false optimism. He was also more relentless in the application of logic to what lay before his eyes. India had been a conglomeration of nations, peoples, religions and races since none knew when. The imperial sword of the Turkish Mughal had imposed an orderly arrangement on these disparate elements, but as soon as the Mughal will faltered, anarchy and disunity returned to plague this vast land. The British rescued it from complete disaster and chaos. Bright realized that such order and peace dealt out by an alien hand could not be a permanent remedy of the Indian ill. He saw the disunity as a permanent phenomenon born of history. In this he went far beyond any other Englishman of

his time. His contemporaries acknowledged the disunity but were reassured by the hope that it was the destiny of British rule to eradicate it. This was a comforting thought. It heightened their self-regard and brought the satisfaction that a good deed was in the process of being done.

Bright<sup>7</sup> asked the same question, but found a totally different answer. The question was: how to deal with Indian disunity? The answer, by now common place, was: create unity on the basis of whatever is available. Such vague optimism did not attract Bright. He felt that the disunity was beyond repair. The British might be able to maintain the Queen's peace for as long as they chose to stay in India. But once they were gone, discord and anarchy would return. Prudence and statesmanship demanded that what could and would happen after the British withdrawal should be foreseen now. British responsibility did not end with the ceasure of their rule. To avoid post-withdrawal anarchy he prescribed certain steps which ought to be taken right away, at the commencement of Parliamentary responsibility for the affairs of India. Divide India into five or six viable, fairly-sized presidencies. Give each of them complete autonomy, abolish the centre, build up regional unities, and make a Europe out of India. Thus, by the time the British came to wind up their rule a half dozen states would be ready to take up the reins of sovereignty. Instead of an amorphous mass of many millions artificially divided into heterogeneous areas of purely administrative convenience, there would be a few well-knit entities which had learnt, under British guidance and supervision, the art of self-government and had built up traditions and loyalties peculiar to themselves. When independence came there would be no division, partition or disruption. Instead of an artificial monolith which would soon be brought down by its inherent weakness the British should create, develop and leave behind them a set of independent, separate and sovereign states which would last, bring peace to the area and some credit to those who had fashioned their creation.

Two further points in Bright's proposal deserve notice. He was not taken in by the idea, which began to win popularity during his own time, that the British should make a fetish of their having created a united India and further that this unity, whatever its worth and its endurance, should always be proffered as their lasting achievement. It may be that he was more far-sighted than

his contemporaries. It may be that he was less under the influence of the Anglo-Indians who had turned the unity of India (their own handiwork) into a vested interest and had persuaded the politicians that this achievement of the administrator was worthy of being raised to the dignity of a political principle. It may also be that in Bright's day the emphasis on unity was still in its infancy; this was the time when the sheer size, variety and novelty of the East excited the Western mind so much that no room was left for any feeling save that of wonder and awe. Whatever the reason may be, Bright stands alone, not in drawing attention to the Indian state of disunity, but in declaring it to be a permanent feature and in suggesting the creation of a number of potential states on the sub-continent.

In the second place, Bright did not pay the British Indian empire the tribute of eternity. In doing so he was not alone, but he was a little behind the time and also a little before it. In the first half of the nineteenth century several people in Britain and India voiced the opinion that the tenure of British rule could not be indefinite and that the day of its termination might be far away but was in no doubt. Then came the mutiny and the feelings hardened. For some time there was an uneasy silence on the issue, but as the sun of British imperialism mounted higher the hour of relinquishing authority receded farther. In the twentieth century, and astonishingly up to the 'thirties, it was not uncommon to hear the British say that India was certain to remain a part of the empire for as long as could be foreseen. Bright came in the middle of these two attitudes, in terms of time. But he had more in common with his predecessors than with his successors. To his mind, British withdrawal was distant but by no means remote. It is profitless to attempt to define the measure of such terms. What is relevant is that he did not stand with those who hoped to see the empire last for ever but with those who foresaw the end, and he went further in wanting to provide for that "distant" day.

It is true that Bright did not talk of the Hindus and Muslims; though their rivalry and differences were implicit in his belief in the country's disunity. Nor did he base his re-grouping of India on religious lines; though two of his presidencies, those with capitals at Calcutta and Lahore, could by reasonable extension lead to the creation of two Muslim states, very roughly coinciding with the later-day East and West Pakistan. But, as far as can be ascertained,



Bright was the first to suggest the immediate creation and later perpetuation of a number of states in India with a view to avoiding a future war of succession. Judged by what happened during the closing years of British rule and by the 1947 partition, his prescience is astonishing. We have no certain knowledge of what led him to this conclusion: whether it was a reading of history, or a flash of intuition, or mere foresight refined to the level of near-prophecy, or deep thinking on the future of British rule in India, or anxiety to save India from reverting to the anarchic days of the eighteenth century. It is difficult for the thinker himself to spell out every step which takes him to the concluding thought. For us who can look only at the finished idea the search for antecedents and motives is bound to be incomplete and but partly successful. But this difficulty should not be allowed to stand in the way of acknowledging the originality of his suggestion.<sup>8</sup>

### Sayyid Ahmad Khan (1867–1888)

With Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan begins the period of Muslim self-awakening.<sup>9</sup> The implications of his ideas may be a matter of controversy, but there is little doubt that he gave a new turn to Muslim thinking and that his influence was immense and lasted for a long time. In education, he emphasized the importance of combining Western knowledge with Islamic values, and, with a view to providing such instruction to his people, founded the Muhammadan Anglo-Oriental College at Aligarh. In religion, he argued that Islam was a creed of nature and embodied rational principles to which none could object. In social matters, he stood for simplicity of living, high ideals and regard for the rights and welfare of others. In politics, he advocated aloofness from political activity which was then predominantly Hindu-inspired and Hindu-led and co-operation with the British rulers.

Shrewd, industrious, enterprising, learned, and with a personal magnetism which few of his contemporaries could equal, he changed the course of Muslim thinking and laid the foundations of modern education for his community. Some of his teachings are now being questioned. His great emphasis on giving uncritical support to British policies and decisions seems today to be too one-sided. His radical interpretation of Islam is not acceptable to many today, just as it was sternly disapproved by some in his own time.<sup>10</sup>

Here, however, our concern is not with these controversies, but with his contribution to the evolution of the idea of separatism in Muslim political thinking. This can be traced to the early 1860s. At this time the Hindus of the United Provinces, and particularly those of Benares, were demanding that Hindi should replace Urdu and Devanagiri script the Persian script in all courts and government offices of the province. This shocked Sayyid Ahmad, who so far had been an enthusiastic advocate of Hindu-Muslim unity and had done much to promote it. Now Hindu disregard of Muslim sentiments surprised and pained him. According to Altaf Husain Hali, the Sayyid's most observant and meticulous biographer, this incident convinced him that it was no longer possible for the Hindus and Muslims of India to live together as one nation or to join hands in promoting the interests of their country. This was the beginning of his separatist thinking. Hali quotes a conversation between Sayyid Ahmad and his friend Shakespeare, the Commissioner of Benares, which took place in 1867. "During these days, when Hindi-Urdu controversy was going on in Benares, one day I met Mr. Shakespeare who was posted there as Divisional Commissioner. I was saying something about the education of Muslims, and Mr. Shakespeare was listening with an expression of amazement, when, at last, he said, 'This is the first occasion when I have heard you speak about the progress of the Muslims alone. Before this you were always keen on the welfare of your countrymen in general.' I said, 'Now I am convinced that both these nations will not join wholeheartedly in anything. At present there is no hostility between the two communities, but on account of the so-called educated people it will increase immediately in future. He who lives will see.' Mr. Shakespeare thereupon said, 'I am also extremely sorry, but I am confident about the accuracy of this prophecy'."<sup>11</sup>

Once convinced that the Hindus and Muslims had different interests and that more things separated them than joined them, Sayyid Ahmad never veered round from his course. He reiterated this opinion in several important pronouncements.

In 1883 he spelt out the reasons for his opposition to the introduction in India of the principle of election to representative institutions. He acknowledged that "the principle of self-government by means of local representative institutions" was "perhaps the greatest and noblest" lesson that England would teach India.

But it was necessary to recall that Indian conditions were so different from the British that to borrow this principle and apply it in such a different context was to invite trouble. "India, a continent in itself, is inhabited by [a] vast population of different races and different creeds: the rigour of religious institutions has kept even neighbours apart: the system of caste is still dominant and powerful. In one and the same district the population may consist of various creeds and various nationalities, and whilst one section of the population commands wealth and commerce, the other may possess learning and influence. One section may be numerically larger than the other, and the standard of enlightenment which one section of the community has reached may be far higher than that attained by the rest of the population. One community may be fully alive to the importance of securing representation on the local boards and district councils, whilst the other may be wholly indifferent to such matters." In such circumstances and under these conditions "It is hardly possible to deny that the introduction of representative institutions in India will be attended with considerable difficulty and socio-political risks."<sup>12</sup>

He has still not used the word "nation" for the Muslims of India, though he is emphasizing racial and religious differences. Were the people of India one nation? At this stage his answer was a yes. Replying to the address of welcome from the Indian Association at Lahore in 1884, he declared: "By the word *qawm* I mean both Hindus and Muslims. That is the way in which I define the word nation (*qawm*). In my opinion it matters not what be their religious belief, because we cannot see anything of it; but what we see is that all of us, whether Hindus or Muslims, live on one soil, are governed by one and the same ruler, have the same sources of our benefits, and equally share the hardships of a famine. These are the various reasons why I designate both the nationalities (*qawamun*) that inhabit India by the term (*ayk lafz*) Hindu—that is the nation (*qawm*) which lives in India."<sup>13</sup>

But this did not make him oblivious to the awkward (because permanent) minority status of the Muslims. He is quoted as pointing out, at the end of 1886, that the Indian National Congress wanted representative legislative councils and it hinted at a future parliament of India, but in any such parliament the Muslims would be "in a permanent minority" and would always be outvoted as

the Irish members were at Westminster.<sup>14</sup>

This problem of being a minority worried him a great deal, and he referred to it in some detail in his address to the All India Muhammadan Educational Conference, which he himself had founded, at Lucknow on 28 December 1887. "Every one can understand that the first condition for the introduction of competitive examination into a country is that all people in that country, from the highest to the lowest, should belong to one nation. In such a country no particular difficulties are likely to arise. The second case is that of a country in which there are two nationalities which have become so united as to be practically one nation. England and Scotland are a case in point. . . . But this is not the case with our country, which is peopled with different nations. Consider the Hindus alone. The Hindus of our Province, the Bengalis of the East, and the Mahrattas of the Deccan, do not form one nation. If, in your opinion, the peoples of India do form one nation, then no doubt competitive examination may be introduced; but if this be not so, then competitive examination is not suited to the country. The third case is that of a country in which there are different nationalities which are on an equal footing as regards the competition whether they take advantage of it or not. Now, I ask you, have Mahomedans attained to such a position as regards higher English education, which is necessary for higher appointments, as to put them on a level with Hindus or not? Most certainly not. Now, I take Mahomedans and Hindus of our Province together, and ask whether they are able to compete with the Bengalis or not? Most certainly not. When this is the case, how can competitive examination be introduced into our country? Think for a moment what would be the result if all appointments were given by competitive examination. Over all races, not only over Mahomedans but over Rajas of high position and the brave Rajputs who have not forgotten the swords of their ancestors, would be placed as ruler a Bengali who at sight of a table knife would crawl under his chair. There would remain no part of the country in which we should see at the tables of justice and authority any face except those [*sic.*] of Bengalis. I am delighted to see the Bengalis making progress, but the question is—What would be the result on the administration of the country? Do you think that the Rajput and the fiery Pathan, who are not afraid of being hanged or of encountering the swords of the police or the bayonets

of the army, could remain in peace under the Bengalis? This would be the outcome of the proposal if accepted . . . . Now, let us suppose the Viceroy's Council made in this manner [through an election by the people]. And let us suppose first of all that we have universal suffrage, as in America, and that everybody, *chamars* [a very low caste] and all, have votes. And first suppose that all the Mahomedan electors vote for a Mahomedan member and all Hindu electors for a Hindu member, and now count how many votes the Mahomedan member has and how many the Hindu. It is certain the Hindu members will have four times as many because their population is four times as numerous. Therefore we can prove by mathematics that there will be four votes for the Hindu to every one vote for the Mahomedan. And how can the Mahomedan guard his interests? It would be like a game of dice, in which one man had four dice and the other only one. In the second place, suppose that the electorate be limited. Some method of qualification must be made; for example, that people with a certain income shall be electors. Now, I ask you, O Mahomedans! Weep at your condition! Have you such wealth that you can compete with the Hindus? Most certainly not. Suppose, for example, that an income of Rs. 5,000 a year be fixed on, how many Mahomedans will there be? Which party will have the larger number of votes? I put aside the case that by a rare stroke of luck a blessing comes through the roof and some Mahomedan is elected. In the normal case no single Mahomedan will secure a seat in the Viceroy's Council . . . . Now, we will suppose a third kind of election. Suppose a rule to be made that a suitable number of Mahomedans and a suitable number of Hindus are to be chosen. I am aghast when I think on what grounds this number is likely to be determined. Of necessity, proportion to total population will be taken. So there will be one member for us to every four for the Hindus. No other condition can be laid down. Then they will have four votes and we shall have one."<sup>15</sup>

Early in the following year, he went further and now did not hesitate to call the Indian Muslims a "nation", though some vague idea of the entity of one Indian people was still in his mind. "I have often said that India is like a bride whose two eyes are the Hindus and the Mahomedans. Her beauty consists in this—that her two eyes be of equal lustre. . . . I have often given my nation to understand that slaughtering cows for the purpose of

annoying Hindus is the height of cantankerous folly. . . . But when my Hindu brothers and Bengali friends devise such a course of action as will bring us loss and heap disgrace on our nation, then indeed we can no longer remain friends. Without doubt it is our duty to protect our nation from those attacks of the Hindus and Bengalis by which we believe that she will be injured. . . . Of a truth our nation has fallen into the pit of disgrace, but if my Bengali friends wish to trample this prostrate nation under their feet, then let them not cherish the hope that we can endure it. . . . The Congress is in reality a civil war without arms. The object of a civil war is to determine in whose hands the rule of the country shall rest. The object of the promoters of the National Congress is that the Government of India should be English in name only, and that the internal rule of the country should be entirely in their own hands. They do not publicly avow that they wish it for themselves: they speak in the name of the whole people of India; but they very well know that the Mahomedans will be unable to do anything, and so the rule of the country will be monopolized by them. We also like a civil war. But not a civil war without arms. If [the] Government want to give over the internal rule of the country from its own hands into those of the people of India, then we will present a petition that, before doing so, she pass a law of competitive examination, namely, that that nation which passes first in this competition be given the rule of the country; but that in this competition we will be allowed to use the pen of our ancestors, which is in truth the true pen for writing the decree of sovereignty. Then he who passes first in this shall rule the country. If my friends the Bengalis pass first, then indeed we will pick up their shoes and put them on our heads; but without such a civil war we do not want to subject our nation to be trodden under their feet. Let my Hindu fellow-countrymen and Bengali brothers understand well that my chief wish is that all the nations of India should live in peace and friendship with one another; but that friendship can last so long only as one does not try to put another in subjection."<sup>16</sup> The reader will notice the repeated use of the word "nation" for the Indian Muslims in this piece of writing. This was to continue to the end.

The Indian National Congress was established in 1885, and forthwith its founders began to make strenuous efforts to enlist Sayyid Ahmad's approval and, through it, the support of the



Muslims at large. When these bore no fruit, Badruddin Tyebji,<sup>17</sup> an influential Bombay Muslim who had joined the Congress and presided over its December 1887 session held at Madras, wrote to Sayyid Ahmad, pleading the Congress case, making it out to be a national organization and asking for his assistance. The Sayyid snubbed him. In public he expressed the views which have been reproduced above.

On 14 March 1888, Sayyid Ahmad delivered two long speeches at Meerut, one in the morning and the other in the evening. These addresses embody his public reply to Tyebji's defence of the Congress and a reiteration of his conviction that the Muslims formed a nation by themselves. To understand the development of the Sayyid's thinking we must study these speeches at some length; hence the long quotations that follow.

In the morning speech he declared: "It has never been my wish to oppose any people or any nation who wish to make progress, and who have raised themselves up to that rank to which they wish to attain and for which they are qualified. But my friends the Bengalis have made a most unfair and unwarrantable interference with my nation, and therefore it is my duty to show very clearly what this unwarrantable interference has been, and to protect my nation from the evils that may arise from it . . . . Our Mahomedan nation has hitherto sat silent. It was quite indifferent as to what the Babus of Bengal, the Hindus of these Provinces, and the English and Eurasian inhabitants of India might be doing. But they have now been wrongly tampering with our nation. In some districts they have brought pressure to bear on Mahomedans to make them join the Congress. I am sorry to say that they never said anything to those people who are powerful and are actually Raises [rich and influential persons] and are counted the leaders of the nation; but they brought unfair pressure to bear on such people as could be subjected to their influence . . . . We know very well the people of our own nation, and that they have been induced to go [to attend the Congress session] either by pressure, or by folly, or by love of notoreity, or by poverty . . . . When matters took such a turn, then it was necessary that I should warn my nation of their misrepresentations in order that others should not fall into the trap; and that I should point out to my nation that the few who went to Madras, went by pressure, or for some temptation, or in order to help their profession, or to gain

notoreity, or were bought . . . . Gentlemen, what I am about to say is not only useful for my own nation, but also for my Hindu brothers of these Provinces, who from some wrong notions have taken part in this Congress . . . . These proposals of the Congress are extremely inexpedient for a country which is inhabited by two different nations, who drink from the same well, breathe the air of the same city, and depend each on the other for its life. To create animosity between them is good neither for peace, nor for the country, nor for the town . . . . Now, suppose all the English and the whole English army were to leave India, taking with them all the cannon and their splendid weapons and everything, then who would be rulers of India? Is it possible that under these circumstances two nations—the Mahomedans and the Hindus—could sit on the same throne and remain equal in power. Most certainly not. It is necessary that one of them should conquer the other and thrust it down. To hope that both could remain equal is to desire the impossible and the inconceivable . . . . If we join the political movement of the Bengalis our nation will reap loss, for we do not want to become subjects of the Hindus instead of the subjects of the 'people of the Book'."<sup>18</sup>

In the evening speech he turned his attention to the amelioration of his "nation". "My friends, what is now the state of our nation? All the Musalman families of Hindustan are falling and are being ruined . . . . At the present time unless my nation unite and concentrate its forces, and collect all the requisites of education, and take the fact to heart that now without spending money it cannot acquire education, it will be impossible for it to become highly educated. Moreover, the old method was not adapted to the growth of those feelings of honour and national sympathy which are essential for our national progress . . . . The second thing that I wish to see established in our people is national feeling and sympathy; and this cannot be created unless the boys of our nation read together. At this moment, when all of us Mahomedans have come together the assembly itself has an effect on our hearts, and an involuntary emotion gives birth to the thought—'Our Nation', 'Our Nation'! — but when we separate the effect vanishes . . . . Before all things, my nation should preserve its honour and its self-respect, and should give such a training to its children as will cultivate these feelings . . . . I pray the Almighty that national sympathy may arise in my people, and that the nation may give

help, and may complete the glorious task we have undertaken for its improvement. I beg of you also to join in this prayer."<sup>19</sup>

Not content with writing privately to the Sayyid, Tayebji, in a letter published in the *Pioneer* on 2 April 1888, appealed to the Muslims to join the Congress and support its demands on the ground that it was a national organization and spoke for the whole of India. In reply to it, the Sayyid wrote a letter to the same newspaper, summarizing the reasons which kept the Muslims away from the Congress. "I ask my friends honestly to say whether out of two such nations whose aims and objects are different, but who happen to agree in some small points, a 'National' Congress can be created. No. In the name of God—No . . . . We are both desirous that peace should reign in the country, that we two nations should live in a brotherly manner . . . . We may be right or we may be wrong; but there is no Mahomedan, from the shoemaker to the Raiser, who would like that the ring of slavery should be put on us by that other nation with whom we live . . . . The Bengalis and those obscure Mahomedans who joined it at Madras may possess such strength. For them it may be a blessing; but the participation in it by our nation would be for us a curse."<sup>20</sup>

A long commentary on these forthright words will not add much to the reader's understanding. All this leaves little doubt that Sayyid Ahmad Khan regarded the Muslims as a separate nation. All his original writings and speeches are in Urdu, in which the standard, in fact the only, term equivalent of "nation" is *qawm*. He used this word, though occasionally he employed the English "nation" while writing or speaking Urdu. It is true that at no place did he enunciate the two-nation theory in a formal statement. It was assumed that the Muslims were a nation. Assertion was taken to be enough: it was not necessary to build up a case to prove it. It followed that the Muslims could not participate in the Congress, because they were not a part of the nation which it claimed to represent.

If once it is granted that the Muslims were a separate nation, how could they support plans for reforms based on the assumption that India was one nation? Sayyid Ahmad was the first to warn his people that in political terms they were a minority and were destined to remain that for ever.<sup>21</sup> As a minority with nothing important in common with the majority, they should know that majority-rule meant a Hindu rule. Therefore, on their behalf,

he opposed the introduction of the principle of election in the creation of representative institutions. He also objected to the holding of open competitive examinations for recruitment to public services. These things were very well suited to countries which were nations, but not to places like India where national, religious and caste differences would debase the laudable principle of equality and merit into a perpetual domination of one nation over another. This may be undemocratic, but who would support a democratic system if it subjected him to a permanent state of what he called "misery" and "degradation"? Thus, the Sayyid was the first to underline the two factors, the negative and the positive, to which we referred in the prologue: the fear of a Hindu rule and the feeling of separatism.<sup>22</sup>

In passing, it may be remarked that he over-emphasized the negative factor and said but little in elaboration of the positive element. This was a failing common to a great majority of the Muslims who argued for separatism. Again and again, they conjured up the devilish prospect of a Hindu rule to frighten their co-religionists. Much less attention was paid to the more demanding and important task of marshalling the factors and ingredients which made the Muslims a nation instead of a mere community. The difficulties and problems which Pakistani nationalism has faced since 1947 may be traced back to this desideratum. But of this more in the epilogue.

Sayyid Ahmad's failure lay in refusing to see the consequences of his argument. His own logic should have told him that if the Muslims were a separate nation and if they were not prepared to countenance Hindu rule, then the only alternative was to work towards some kind of a system under which they could rule themselves. He could, or would, not show this way, thus stopping in the middle of his argument. He neither suggested nor hinted at a territorial separation. Nor did he begin even to think on these lines: had he done so, he could have referred at least to the prospects or the need for the rule of the Muslims in their own provinces. Perhaps it was too early in his time to grasp the political scheme of things, for politics in the modern sense of the term had just begun. Or, perhaps the fact that he did not belong to a Muslim province hid from his view the possibility that this could offer a solution of the Muslim problem. Or, perhaps he really believed that British rule over India was eternal; for, did he not say in his

first speech at Meerut on 14 March 1888 that "it is, therefore, necessary that for the peace of India and for the progress of everything in India the English Government should remain for many years—in fact for ever!"<sup>23</sup>

Yet, this failing does not belittle his pioneering role or his vital contribution in revolutionizing Muslim political and cultural thinking. By telling the Muslims that their path ran separate from the highroad of Indian nationalism, by warning them of their minority status, by showing them the dangers of a majority-based democracy, and by holding them away from the Congress, he drove Muslim politics into a new channel. He did not say what lay in that direction, but he pushed "my nation" towards it, and left the rest to his successors.

We may bring our treatment of Sayyid Ahmad to a close with two quotations from a recent French historian of Indian Islam which sum up his impact on later thinking among his people. "Ce sont cette tendance de l'ame islamique et cette inconsciente 'dynamique' musulmane, nees des vertus ancestrales d'une race fiere, orgueilleuse, jalouse de son independance, qui ont determine en grande partie la naissance du Pakistan; et c'est dans ce sens qu'on peut considerer Sir Sayyid comme le precurseur du jeune Etat pakistanais."<sup>24</sup> Guimbretiere continues, "Si bien qu'a la fin de sa vie—sa mort survint en 1898—l'attitude rigide de Sir Sayyid face aux exigences hindoues etait devenue un modele de civisme musulman. Elle conduisit ses successeurs a demander un college electoral distinct et a revendiquer la formation d'un Etat specifiquement islamique."<sup>25</sup>

### The Myth of Jamaluddin "Afghani" (1880–1882)

A majority of Pakistani historians and writers who have put pen to paper on this subject asserts that the first Muslim to foresee, as also to suggest, a Muslim state in India was Jamaluddin, commonly but erroneously known as "al-Afghani" or, in Pakistan and India, where the Arabic definite article is not in use, simply as "Afghani".

Much mystery surrounds Jamaluddin's public career and his frequent comings and goings among the various Muslim countries. In some respects, portions of his ideas and opinions have been suppressed by Egyptian and Pakistani writers or edited in garbled

versions. Even the myth of his Afghan origin and birth has been accepted without inquiry or doubt. Wherever his opinions run counter to the rigidities of orthodoxy (not of Islam, but of received opinion), like his answer to Renan, or his ideas are inconsistent with the accepted national myths, like his stinging attack on Sayyid Ahmad Khan, there is a conspiracy of silence. In his case, history has more often than not been falsified in order to keep around him the untarnished halo of a great reformer and pan-Islamist.

Jamaluddin himself created the impression that he belonged to Afghanistan and was born there. He claimed this on several occasions, presumably because the fact of his Shia and Iranian antecedents would have proved a handicap to his activities and influence in Sunni lands like Afghanistan, India, Turkey and Egypt. Muhammad Iqbal, who was widely read in Islamic history and religious thought, believed that Jamaluddin was born in Afghanistan;<sup>26</sup> a pardonable mistake as all research about his origins took place after Iqbal's death in 1938. But no such explanation can be found for that large majority of Pakistani scholars and writers who insist even now that he was an Afghan by race and birth.<sup>27</sup> Recent research has shown that, on the contrary, he paid only one visit to Afghanistan in 1866-68.<sup>28</sup> There is abundant documentary evidence to prove that he was an Iranian by origin and birth, and not an Afghan.<sup>29</sup>

Our primary concern here is Jamaluddin's Indian connection. Available evidence dates his visit to India in 1854, and according to Qazi Abdul Ghaffar it lasted till 1857.<sup>30</sup> The theory that during this visit he came under the influence of the Mujahidin movement and imbibed an anti-British feeling from it<sup>31</sup> is discounted by Aziz Ahmad, who says that "whatever official 'Wahabi' records or private papers have been studied so far do not mention any one by the name of Jamal al-din or any of the names he assumed at various times". He adds that internal evidence leads to the same conclusion. "The conformist fundamentalism of the Mujahidin was exactly the antithesis of the margin of orthodoxy in Afghani's religious thought."<sup>32</sup> Nothing is known of his activities during this stay. His second visit is reported to have taken place in 1859. Again we have no information about his movements, and it is possible that this visit was an extension of the first.

He came to India for the third time in 1869<sup>33</sup> on his expulsion



from Afghanistan by Amir Sher Ali.<sup>34</sup> He could stay for only one month as the British sent him off to Egypt and did not allow the Indian *ulema* or leaders of Muslim opinion to approach or contact him.<sup>35</sup> Consequently this visit was of no significance.

His last visit was longer and produced some remarkable results. The official report of the Government of India says that he arrived at the "beginning of 1881",<sup>36</sup> but the Afshar documents prove that he was already in Hyderabad from April 1880 to October-November 1881.<sup>37</sup>

According to a Pakistani (Sharif al-Mujahid) who wrote his master's thesis on Jamaluddin, he found in India "a fertile soil to plant his ideas" and "made a deep impression on the people he came across, orienting some in his ideas, and making disciples of others".<sup>38</sup> The facile pen of Bipen Chandra Pal, a Hindu politician of Bengal of the early years of this century, also draws an exaggerated picture of Jamaluddin's activities and impact on India. He came from Kabul, he says, "inspired with the vision of an All World Confederacy of the Princes and Peoples of Islam", and "passed through India inoculating many a leader of Muhammadan thought in Calcutta and Bombay and other cities with this new virus" of pan-Islamism. The result was "a new self-consciousness of our Moslem neighbours, a new conceit of separate communal interests, and a new desire to revive, in the name of purity, the old iconoclastic spirit of the Islamic faith and thereby to work a new religious cleavage between the Mahomedans and their Hindu neighbours. The political conflicts between educated Hindus and Moslems were attributed to the natural jealousy of rival aspirants to office and rank, and the religious feuds to a desire to revive the original ideals of Islam and reorganize the old propagandist activities of that faith. But nobody ever suspected these as the slow and silent development of the seed that Jamal-ud-Din had sown in his confidential conferences with the Moslem intellectuals of Calcutta and other places."<sup>39</sup> In his memoirs, written many years after the above, Pal repeated the same thing. "Before Jamal-ud-Din's advent the educated Indian Muhammadans, particularly in Bengal, had been loyally co-operating with their Hindu fellow-subjects for the common advancement of national political interests. But with his visit they commenced to draw themselves away from the political activities of their Hindu fellow-subjects until gradually a wide gulf was created between the

Hindu and the Moslem intellectuals in the country in regard to our national endeavours."<sup>40</sup>

While Sharif al-Mujahid is innocently optimistic, Pal is subtly insinuating. The best answer to such heightened and misleading accounts is to see what Jamaluddin said during his last Indian stay. While in India he wrote several articles and delivered a number of lectures which were later published. All these were in Persian. Six of these articles were written for the first issues of a Hyderabad (Deccan) journal, *Mu'allim-i-Shafiq*. It was then edited by one Muhibb Husain, a conservative reformer and one of the earliest advocates of female education, but one opposed to Sayyid Ahmad Khan's religious speculation. Five others were published along with the original six in the first edition of the collected articles of Jamaluddin, the *Maqalat-i-Jamaliyyeh*, published in Calcutta in 1884.

This collection, the only original and definite record of Jamaluddin's Indian ideas, stands as a permanent reproach to the enthusiasm for re-writing history which is so much at work in many minds. In it there is no mention of pan-Islam or of any scheme to unite the Muslims behind one leader, or in one state or grouping or commonwealth or what you will. Even the defence of Islam usually comes in only as a part of an attack on Sayyid Ahmad Khan. In fact, the three main themes of these articles are: advocacy of nationalism of a linguistic or territorial variety, meaning a unity between the Muslims and Hindus of India (who in Jamaluddin's knowledge spoke one language; so much for his ignorance about India), and with nothing on the unity of the Indian Muslims with foreign Muslims; emphasis on the inestimable benefits of philosophy and modern science; and attacks, strong worded and virulent, on Sayyid Ahmad Khan as a hateful tool of the British.

Far from speaking of Indian Muslim unity or community of interest, in one of his lectures he says, "There is no doubt that the unity of language is more durable for survival and permanence in this world than unity of religion, since it does not change in a short time in contrast to the latter." There is nothing here or elsewhere of Muslim separatism, communalism or identity of interest or outlook. Nowhere does he address himself specifically to Muslim affairs. In fact, he appears not to be able to distinguish between Muslims and other Indians. The following extract from his "Lecture on Teaching and Learning", delivered at Albert Hall,

Calcutta, on 8 November 1882 (a Thursday), leaves no reasonable doubt about his thinking on Indian (as opposed to Muslim) unity and its glorious Hindu past: "Certainly I must be happy to see such offspring of India, since they are the offshoots of that India that was the cradle of humanity. Human values spread out from India to the whole world . . . These youths are also the sons of a land that was the source of all the laws and rules of the world. If one observes closely, he will see that the 'Code Romain', the mother of all Western codes, was taken from the four *vedas* and the *Shastras* . . . [The Indians] reached the highest level in philosophic thought. The soil of India is the same soil, the air of India is the same air; and these youths who are present here are fruits of the same earth and climate. So I am very happy that they, having awakened after a long sleep, are reclaiming their inheritance and gathering the fruits of their own tree."<sup>41</sup>

In his Paris journal he wrote: "A religious bond does not exclude national links with people of different faiths. In countries like Egypt and India, Muslims should co-operate with the Non-Muslims, and there ought to be good relations and harmony in affairs of national interest between the Muslims and their co-patriots and neighbours of different religions."<sup>42</sup> His belief in Hindu-Muslim unity, not in separate Muslim action in India, is clearly expressed in one of his articles in *L'Intransigeant* of Paris.<sup>43</sup> In the words of his earliest Indian biographer, Qazi Abdul Ghaffar, "though the Shaikh was mostly engaged in the service of Islam, as far as India was concerned he made no distinction between Hindus and Muslims. . . . He realised that the destiny of India was linked with the awakening and progress of both Hindus and Muslims".<sup>44</sup> His view that Hindus and Muslims must unitedly administer a death-blow to British imperialism in India was expressed clearly and emphatically.<sup>45</sup>

And yet, the majority of Pakistani intellectuals, trained in the out-of-date tradition of Jamaluddin's reputation as a pan-Islamist, continue to attribute to him pious and heart-warming opinions on ideals which he did not express or hold. According to Iqbal's son, a scholar in his own right, "there was one school of thought which believed in keeping the national organization of Muslims separate from that of the Hindus. Afghani belonged to this school".<sup>46</sup> Dr. A.S. Khurshid, after taking those historians to task who spin imaginary stories around Jamaluddin's personality (like

the scheme of creating a Muslim state in the north-west of India), delivers his own judgment: "The truth is that Afghani had no idea that there was a Muslim-majority area in the north-west of the sub-continent, nor did he wish to establish a united Muslim republic. If you analyse the articles written by Afghani, you will know that he wanted to free the whole Indian sub-continent from British imperialism and bring it under the standard of Islam (*Islam ke parcham tale lana chahte the*)".<sup>47</sup> Others repeat similar assertions, or make no mention of his attacks on Sayyid Ahmad Khan or of his views on Hindu-Muslim unity.<sup>48</sup>

Aziz Ahmad provides a balanced view of Jamaluddin's impact on Muslim India. "Pan-Islamic trends developed in India independently of Afghani's influence; it was much later that he came to be accepted as their symbol. The Urdu press of the 1870s already reveals pan-Islamic, especially pan-Ottoman, trends before Afghani's first works were published in India and long before the publication of *al-Urwa al-wuthqa*."<sup>49</sup> The correspondence between Jamaluddin and his Indian friends, editors, translators and publishers, like Abdul Ghafur Shahbaz and Azududdin, shows that in almost all important cases the initiative was Jamaluddin's. Unless some new documents come to light, it is safe to say that "by 1885 contact between Afghani and his Indian admirers had begun to fade".<sup>50</sup> His influence was limited. The *Haqiqat-i-Mazhab-i-Necheri* (which contained his detailed assault on Sayyid Ahmad) was published twice in Persian and once in Urdu translation in 1883-84, but this "shows more a trend of religious rejection of Sayyid Ahmad Khan's radical reformist views than acceptance of any positive message or credo of Afghani". The *Mu'allim-i-Shafiq* had a "limited circulation of only local significance".<sup>51</sup>

If any doubt still lingers about his attitude to Muslim India, his intemperate and mean attack on Sayyid Ahmad Khan should remove it. In his essay commonly referred to as "Refutation of the Materialists" (a polite, neutral title indicating a philosophic reply), but whose original Persian title is "The Truth about the Necheri Sect and an Explanation of the Necheris", he indulged in an offensive and irritating criticism of Sayyid's person and views. The point of attack was not the Sayyid's rationalism, nor his schemes of social and religious reform, nor his want of orthodoxy, for in all these things Jamaluddin was not only at one with the Indian's opinions but, in some respects and on certain issues, held



even more unorthodox views—views like those expressed in his debate with Renan, which a Mawdudi of that day would unhesitatingly have judged to be mischievous, even heretical, and on good authority. No; there was no religious or philosophical quarrel between the two men. What stung Jamaluddin was the Sayyid's policy of co-operation with the British. He saw it solely through the eyes of an incorrigible anti-imperialist, for whom any friendly or well-disposed feeling for the British, however political in nature and expedient in need, was an unmistakable proof of the worst kind of anti-nationalism bordering on treachery.<sup>52</sup> The element of hypocrisy in Jamaluddin's argument will emerge later when we come to analyse the nature of his much-vaunted anti-imperialism and his relations with the British.

His longest Persian article on Sayyid Ahmad is "A Description of the Aghuris". The choice of the title was deliberate and aimed at humiliating and insulting the followers of the Sayyid. The Aghuris were a small Indian sect, one of the most despised in society. He applied this term to the Muslim leader, and by natural extension to the Muslim community, to show his utter contempt for his and their policies. The Sayyid's followers were attacked for disrupting the unity of the community. It is not clear from his flowing but convoluted nineteenth-century Persian style whether their sin consisted in undermining the unity of the Indian community as a whole or that of the Muslim community. Corroborative evidence from his other lectures and articles of this period indicates quite clearly that his concern lay with the Indians as one community rather than with the Indian followers of Islam.<sup>53</sup>

One short paragraph on Sayyid Ahmad is enough to show Jamaluddin's abusive vindictiveness and gross discourtesy: "The dog indulges in flattery to get a bone; wags his tail; and places his head on his benefactor's feet, may he be from his own people or a foreigner. Man is worse than a dog. What a surprise! He should leave the dog miles behind in flattery and self-abasement. If he has no tail, well, he has got a beard [Sayyid Ahmad Khan had a long beard]. Nasatuda-i-Marg Khan [i.e., Sayyid Ahmad Khan] had understood the point: he was always ready, on the call of his master, to wag his beard in order to earn the crumbs of bread thrown to him. May God reward his expression of gratitude with more kindnesses from his masters!"<sup>54</sup>

Even the British were taken aback by Jamaluddin's ignoble

and malicious attacks on the Sayyid. A contemporary secret report said: "He was in Hyderabad for about 20 months; during his stay he associated chiefly with the rising generation of free thinkers, the followers of Sayed Ahmed of Aligarh. But in spite of all their kindness and hospitality towards him, he published a book in Persian against their doctrines."<sup>55</sup> Two generations later, a Frenchman commented that Jamaluddin "fut l'ennemi declare violent, parfois injuste, de Sir Sayyid".<sup>56</sup> Even after leaving India, Jamaluddin did not forgive or forget Sayyid Ahmad. In March 1889, he wrote a letter to his friend, the Master of the Mint, from St. Petersburg, saying in his usual arrogant vein that God had punished the Ottomans, the Khedive of Egypt, Sir Sayyid Ahmad and others who had opposed him.<sup>57</sup>

How can we explain the depth of Jamaluddin's animus against the Sayyid? Several reasons occur to mind, though none, or their combination, provides a complete answer. With his high (but dubious, as we will see shortly) claims of being an anti-imperialist, he had to castigate the Sayyid who was preaching loyalty and acquiescence to his followers. He looked at the Indian Muslim's view as nothing but a British-instigated plot to weaken Islam. He also saw it as "a new expression of a way of thought which had always endangered true religion".<sup>58</sup> This argument is weak, partly because Jamaluddin showed no understanding of the predicament of Indian Islam, but mainly because, as Keddie points out, the religious reform ideas of the two men "were almost identical, and where they differed, as on Afghani's stress on holy war, the difference was a political one".<sup>59</sup> This receives confirmation from an original source. Jamaluddin's chief point of attack was the Sayyid's identification of Islam with Nature (hence the "Necheri" in the title). But, towards the end of his life, in a letter to the *ulema* of Iran, Jamaluddin wrote, "Nature is your friend, and the Creator of Nature your ally".<sup>60</sup> This contradicts his earlier criticism of Sayyid Ahmad's "natural" approach to Islam.

It may well be that, far from influencing Muslim India, he was "in a real sense" reacting to the "compromising efforts of Sayyid Ahmad Khan in India".<sup>61</sup> That gives a new complexion altogether to his pan-Islamic ideas.

I think enough evidence has been given above to enable us now to sum up and pass some sort of judgment, however provisional, on Jamaluddin's role in the development of Indian Muslim political



thinking. The first thing to strike the reader of his Indian pronouncements and writings is his ignorance of Indian conditions in general and of the peculiar problems and circumstances of the Muslims in particular. Before he came to India, for twenty years or so the Muslims had been bearing the brunt of British vengeance for their alleged instigation of the mutiny. All well-informed persons of that day who were interested in imperialism, and especially in the British empire, knew this, as they also knew of the growing Hindu-Muslim tension in India and of the efforts of men like Sayyid Ahmad, Ameer Ali and Nawab Abdul Latif to keep their community united and aloof from the majority-led political movement. Jamaluddin should have known this, for he had made the cause of anti-imperialism the ruling passion of his life. But it seems from his own words that he either did not know this or deliberately ignored it. It is difficult to believe in his total ignorance. He was in Bengal for some time and there he met and talked to Abdul Latif and Ameer Ali and other Muslim leaders. He must have read Indian newspapers (some were published in Persian, so there could have been no language problem), and at least some of them must have been Muslim. He was on friendly terms with several Englishmen, who must have told him about what was happening in India. He certainly read Sayyid Ahmad's writings, for how else could he have answered them, if he answered them at all?

We don't know how Sayyid Ahmad Khan reacted to Jamaluddin's strictures. According to Aziz Ahmad "there is no evidence that Sayyid Ahmad Khan read any articles by Jamal al-din al-Afghani relating to himself, whether published in Hyderabad, Calcutta or Paris".<sup>62</sup> I cannot bring myself to believe that material of such explosive nature, which must have shocked the Sayyid's followers, written in Persian (a language in which all Muslim leaders and educated classes were perfectly at home) and printed and published in Calcutta and Hyderabad (which were among the major centres of Muslim education and culture), failed to come to the notice of the man who was the target of the caustic critique. The mystery deepens when Aziz Ahmad tells us at the same time that "in the 1880s, the writings of Jamal al-din al-Afghani were well known in Muslim India. *Al-Urwa al-wuthqa* reached the Nadwat al-'ulama and converted Shibli; it reached the stronger orthodox citadel of Deoband and converted Mawlana Mahmud

al-Hasan".<sup>63</sup> But for some reason Sayyid Ahmad never came to know of these writings, nor did *al-Urwa al-wuthqa* reach Aligarh which was not far from Deoband.

What Jamaluddin preached in India was in tune with the general trend of his thoughts on religion and nationalism. He was a great believer in the cementing power of language. Even the religious community, he said, would be stronger if it had a common language; had the Turks adopted Arabic, their empire would have been stronger and more united.<sup>64</sup> At times he made it clear that nationalism took priority over religion. National solidarity was a more effective instrument than faith in winning and maintaining political power. A national unity based on a common language was not only more powerful but also more lasting than one based on a common religion. The main argument was that men may easily change their religion, but not so easily their language.<sup>65</sup> It is reported that he had added a few lines in Arabic on the top of the article, which contained this sentence, "There is no happiness except through nationality (*al-jinsiyya*) and no nationality except through language".<sup>66</sup> A number of references to these ideas are to be found in the articles carried by *al-Urwa al-wuthqa*.<sup>67</sup>

Jamaluddin's views on imperialism are riddled with contradictions. In 1878 he penned a bitter attack on the British, which first appeared in the Arabic journal, the *Misr* of Alexandria. It was translated into English by the Rev. George Percy Badger and published in *The Homeward Mail* of London. Extracts of the English translation were reproduced in *al-Nahla* of 1 December 1878. Under the title of "L'opinion d'un Afghan sur les Anglais", Kudsî-Zadeh has translated it into French.<sup>68</sup> It is a stinging piece of writing, sparing nothing and none. Again, in an interview with Mon. A.E. Badaire, the editor of *La Correspondance Parisienne*, in 1885, he said that he had seen many administrations and governments, but never a government carried on with such "perfidy", "cruelty" and "barbarism" as British rule over its colonies. All groups and classes in British India, rajas, nawabs, the *ulema*, the rich and the poor, had of one accord decided to put an end to this infamous oppression. On the first signal, a general uprising would take place and, *alors*, there would be a massacre. He went on in this tone for a few paragraphs.<sup>69</sup> It may be pointed out that at this time even the non-Muslims in India were vying with each

other in professing loyalty to British rule.

In the same year, however, he suggested to Randolph Churchill, the Secretary of State for India, a bold scheme for an alliance between the British, the Afghans, the Persians, the Turks, the Egyptians and the Arabs, to drive the Russians out of Merv.<sup>70</sup> Pan-Islam was put at the service of British imperialism to ward off Britain's deadliest enemy in Asia. Ten years later he was writing to the British Government from Constantinople, seeking British protection against the hostile Ottoman Sultan: "I am an Afghan (Cabul) and I depend on England. I have passed a great part of my life in the Orient with the single aim of uprooting fanaticism, the most harmful malady of this land, of reforming society and establishing there the benefits of tolerance."<sup>71</sup> The Foreign Office called for files on the man from the India Office, and after studying them rejected his request.<sup>72</sup>

Another amusing aspect of his anti-imperialist campaign is the special place he allotted British imperialism in his list of *betes-noires*. There is little in *al-Urwa al-wuthqa* about French, Dutch or Russian imperialism, except a passing reference to the French occupation of Indo-China.<sup>73</sup> If he vent his spleen on Britain for having occupied Egypt and the Sudan and tried to subjugate Afghanistan (all Muslim lands), why did the well of his pan-Islamic sympathies dry up in the similar case of Russian domination of Central Asia? Further, he frequently asserted, assuring the Russians in the process, that Indian Muslims placed "their sole reliance on Russia to free them from the British yoke".<sup>74</sup> Indian Urdu newspapers of 1870s and 1880s contain no expression of such views or of any sympathy for or expectations from Russia.<sup>75</sup>

It was a strange pan-Islamism which made Jamaluddin seek friends and associates among all kinds of non-Muslims. On his Paris newspaper he collaborated with the Jewish *Sanua*. In Constantinople he associated himself with Babis, agnostics and atheists. In Russia he worked closely with the Procurator of the Holy Synod, Pobedonostsev.<sup>76</sup> In India he carried favour with the Hindus by asking Muslims to become a part of the Indian nation. He called Sayyid Ahmad a dog for his pro-British views, and yet he himself begged British protection against the *khalifa* of the age.

Jamaluddin's claims to have been an enemy of autocracy and an inspirer of revolutionary movements also arouse one's suspicion. There is no truth in the story that he was in opposition

to Sultan Abdul Hamid or that he inspired the Young Turk movement. If he had stood up against the Persian Qajars' policies of repression and granting monopolies to foreign investors, what stopped him from opposing the Hamidian autocracy and the Ottoman policy of granting monopolies and railway concessions to imperialist powers? Charles Adams' assertion that "the successful Young Turk movement of 1908 was prepared by [Afghani's] agitation during the years he spent in Constantinople"<sup>77</sup> is denied by modern Turkish historians. Niyazi Berkes points out that the first Young Turk organization was established in 1889, three years before Jamaluddin came to Turkey. Had he known such young Turks as Abdullah Cevdet and Ahmed Riza "he would certainly have denounced them as the most abominable *nacharis* and *dehrijs*".<sup>78</sup>

In the light of these facts, and of the new ones unearthed by recent scholars like Afshar and Mahdavi, Homa Pakdaman, Nikki Keddie, Aziz Ahmad and others, it is difficult to accept the hyperbolic estimates of his personality and influence made by a number of Muslims and non-Muslims in the twentieth century.<sup>79</sup> Two sober assessments may be nearer the truth. His influence did not emanate "from his deepest convictions but from his myth, as created by himself and his friends".<sup>80</sup> On his pan-Islamism, Majid Khadduri remarks that "his writings seem to stress reform rather than unity".<sup>81</sup> On his reform, Khadduri's comment leaves no doubt about the close affinity between Jamaluddin's and Sayyid Ahmad's views: "So Afghani urged Muslims to acquire European scientific and technological skills, the adoption of which, he argued, had never been opposed by Islam; but, in the meantime, he advocated the preservation of Islamic religious and moral values. His combination of European materialism with Islamic spiritualism was, perhaps, his most important contribution to Islamic thought..."<sup>82</sup>

Now we turn to the association of Jamaluddin's name with the origin of the idea of Pakistan. Here again we meet a well-constructed myth. The popular belief that he conceived the idea of the creation of a Muslim state in India has no truth. Such claims on his behalf have been made before and after the creation of Pakistan.

A book issued on behalf of the All India Muslim League in 1943 blandly stated, without offering any evidence, that "the

Pakistan idea was first conceived by Sayed Jamalud Din Afghani, an old Muslim patriot of world fame".<sup>83</sup> Another work published on the eve of independence made a slightly different claim when it said that "a greater and broader Pakistan was conceived . . . by the international Muslim figure of Jamal-ud-Din Afghani, who for the first time visualized the linking up of the north-western parts of India with the adjoining Muslim countries and forming a pan-Islamic federation".<sup>84</sup>

Among reputable historians, I.H. Qureshi was the first to enter such a claim on behalf of Jamaluddin in 1958.<sup>85</sup> When Aziz Ahmad asked him for his evidence, Qureshi mentioned a book by Tufail Ahmad Manglori (probably *Hindustan men Musalmanon ka Rawshan Mustaqbil*) which similarly quotes no source.<sup>86</sup> Qureshi's next assertion, though qualified, appeared in 1962. He wrote that Jamaluddin "is reported to have dreamt of a Muslim republic embracing the present Central Asian Socialist republics, Afghanistan and the Muslim majority areas in the north-west of the subcontinent".<sup>87</sup>

Aziz Ahmad's treatment of Jamaluddin on this point has traversed a full circle from confident assertion to complete repudiation. In 1960, talking about Iqbal's scheme for a partition of India, he said that this was "a solution which had been first proposed by Jamal al-din al-Afghani, who had envisaged a Muslim state incorporating the north-west Muslim majority provinces of India, Afghanistan and Muslim Central Asia."<sup>88</sup> In support he quoted Qureshi. In 1963, he reiterated that it was Jamaluddin who "concut le premier vers 1880 l'idée utopique d'un état musulman comprenant des régions d'Asie Centrale et le nord de l'Inde".<sup>89</sup> No authority was cited this time. In 1967, he made a more careful statement: Jamaluddin is "probably quite eponymously credited as having first conceived the idea of a Central-Asian-and-north-west-Indian state in the 1880s".<sup>90</sup> Again no evidence was given. In January 1971, in reply to my inquiry if he had any first-hand evidence to prove that Jamaluddin had suggested such a plan, he wrote: "The legend that Afghani ever wrote about the creation of a Muslim state in the north-west of the sub-continent including Afghanistan and Central Asia originated with Tufail Ahmad. I.H. Qureshi (*Muslim Community*) got it from him and I got it from Qureshi in my *Studies in Islamic Culture*. Since then I have had the occasion to study all the writings of

Afghani and I have come across no evidence of his ever having thought or said anything about the formation of such a state."<sup>91</sup> Earlier, in answer to a similar inquiry, Nikki Keddie had told me that "there is no primary evidence that Afghani advocated an independent state of NW India, etc. The Pakistani authors all copy it from each other, with no reliable source."<sup>92</sup>

Professor Keddie's remark about authors copying each other is apt. Syed Sharifuddin Pirzada quoted Qureshi in 1963;<sup>93</sup> but in 1968, still quoting the same source, he amended "the Muslim majority areas in the north-west of the sub-continent" to "the Muslim majority areas of the sub-continent"<sup>94</sup>—which is saying quite a different thing. Two years later he repeated the amended statement, citing Qureshi's *The Muslim Community* as his evidence.<sup>95</sup> Lesser writers have followed the standard historians,<sup>96</sup> thus perpetuating the myth.

Do we have any *original* evidence to uphold this oft-repeated tale? There is none. The only item of information which may be called reliable, albeit second-hand, is al-Makhzumi's report that Jamaluddin had suggested the division of the Ottoman empire into several "Khedival states", with *khilafat* to be continued to be vested in the Ottoman rulers. He hoped that Iran, Afghanistan and Muslim India would join these semi-autonomous states in a pan-Islamic union.<sup>97</sup> It must be remembered that this is a reminiscence of a talk he had had with Jamaluddin over thirty years earlier. That hardly constitutes a first-hand source. Even as it is, it does not confirm the popular conviction about the creation of a state in north-west India.<sup>98</sup>

The very spectacle of so many variations on the theme, so much ambiguity and vagueness, so much lack of faithful detail and so much enthusiasm to quote one another, is a proof of the absence of any original and reliable testimony.

Even if it is assumed (the academics often assume things to exercise their minds) that Jamaluddin suggested such a Muslim state, several pertinent questions still face us. It is said that he made this proposal in 1879. He came to India after this, and, as we have seen, there is absolutely no indication in his Indian announcements and statements that he wanted the Muslims of that country to be separated and placed in a different territorial arrangement. Not only that, but such a proposal was meaningless without a prior conviction that the Indian Muslims formed a



distinct entity and wanted to separate from other Indians. Of this again there is no hint or indication in his works. On the contrary, he specifically asked them to unite with the Hindus and trampled upon the separatist followers of Sayyid Ahmad Khan for disrupting the unity of India. Muslim separateness, which he neither acknowledged nor supported, was based on religion. But, in one of his lectures and some of his articles, quoted above, he expressed his studied opinion that nationalism should be founded on language, which is not subject to quick changes, rather than on faith.

One thing is definite and clear. The state he allegedly envisaged was to consist of certain Central Asian areas, Afghanistan and certain areas of north-west India. By no means could the entire community of Indian Muslims be accommodated in this state. Further, his reported reference to the Muslim majority areas of the north-west shows that at the most he only took account of what later became West Pakistan. The Muslim majority area in the north-east of India was outside his calculations.

Is it unreasonable to deduce from this that he did not want to create a separate Muslim state for the Muslims of India, but merely to attach certain unspecified portions of north-west India, where the Muslims predominated, to a Central Asian state of his dreams? And, does this not mean that his interest lay, not in the Indian Muslims as such, but only in the Pathans or Afghans? His faith in language as the only viable basis of an enduring nationalism, combined with his belief that religion did not make an effective source of nationalism, supports the theory that he was working for an "Afghan" nationalism with a view to creating an Afghan or Central Asian republic. Muslims on the north-west of India were linked with the Afghans by religion, language, culture, background and history. To take them out of India into a Central Asian state was not the same thing as creating a separate state for the Muslims of India. On the other hand, it amounted to detaching from India the areas where Muslim majority was overwhelming, thus weakening Muslim strength over the whole of India, and, at the same time, leaving a very large number of Muslims in the Hindu-dominated India at the mercy of the majority. Some may feel justified in claiming him as the prophet of a "Pakhtunistan"; but Indian Muslim independence nowhere came into the picture. But all this is speculation.

Unless new documents come to our hand, Jamaluddin can be called the originator of the idea of Pakistan only by the wildest stretch of an imagination which is obsessed with seeking the origin of Pakistan in the most unlikely places. As a roving messenger of anti-imperialism and pan-Islam in the uneasy and venture-some years of the second half of the nineteenth century, he is a romantic figure of some attraction, much mystery and uncertain influence. As a prophet of a separate state for the Muslims of India, he is a myth.<sup>99</sup>

### Wilfred Scawen Blunt (1881, 1883)

Wilfred Scawen Blunt is another of those early Englishmen who looked into the future and did not see any prospect for a united India. Like Bright, he realized the immense diversity of India; but, unlike him, he saw the main line of division running between the Hindus and the Muslims. On two separate occasions he expressed the implications of this division for the future polity of India.

In one of his five articles in the *Fortnightly Review* of 1881-82,<sup>100</sup> which were later published as a book with the title of *Ideas about India*, he pointed out the hidden strength of the Indian Muslims and gave a hint about their future plans: "The stronghold of the Muhammadans in India is the North-West and there Islam is far from hopeless or disposed to perish. Intellectually th equals and morally the superiros of their Hindu neighbours, the Muhammadans of the Upper Ganges Valley have not forgotten that till very lately administration of India was almost entirely in their hands and they look upon their declining fortunes as neither deserved nor irremediable."<sup>101</sup>

In another article in the same series, he examined the question of political and constitutional reform for India. He knew that Indians desired an advance on the road to self-government, and as a man of liberal convictions he was not prepared to thwart such wishes. But the heterogeneity of India was a barrier against the development of self-governing institutions, the like of which was then in process in other parts of the British empire. In any case, he did not favour the creation of an imperial parliament, or one central legislature, for India. "India is far too vast a continent and inhabited by races for too heterogeneous to make amalgame-

tion in a single assembly possible for representatives elected on any conceivable system . . . any attempts of the sort at present would find for themselves the inevitable fate of the Tower of Babel. With the Provinces, and for all provincial affairs, self-government is a growing necessity, and the present age is quite capable of witnessing it in practice. I would like to see each province of India entirely self-managed as regards civil matters."<sup>102</sup>

Two points in this suggestion are very farsighted. In emphasizing the futility of one Indian assembly to represent the will of the people, or rather the wills of several communities, he anticipated the future Muslim demand for separate representation. In fact, he went much further than this. Such an assembly would not be serviceable, whatever system of election was devised, and therefore the whole idea of a single legislature, and with it of a single Indian government, should be given up. In its place the more practicable and rational system of provincial governments should be operated. Each province was to be "self-managed" in all civil matters.

This suggestion for development on provincial lines brought Blunt close to Bright. The only notable difference lay in their conception of what was a province. Bright had more radical plans: to divide India into a few large presidencies and then to train and prepare these areas, so that one day each would be an independent state. Blunt was more modest in his scheme. He took the provinces as they stood in his time as the unit of constitutional and political development, and vested them with the plenitude of civil power. As yet, however, there was no mention of Muslim or Hindu provinces.

In December 1883, while in Calcutta, Blunt developed his earlier provincial plan into a momentous suggestion. According to it, the country had to be partitioned on religious lines. All the northern provinces, which were Muslim, should be brought under one government, and all the southern provinces, which were Hindu, should be assembled under another government. Thus India should be split up into two parts, one part to be put under a Muslim government, the other under a Hindu government. But, presumably for some time to come, British overlordship over the whole of India was to continue. Each government was to be run by Indians themselves, with complete freedom of control over "civil administration, legislation and finance". But British soldiers would be stationed in each area, and through them the imperial

authority would maintain its military power and guarantee the defence of the sub-continent against external attack.<sup>103</sup>

With Blunt we leave the realm of vague speculation and oblique hints and enter the world of definite, matter of fact proposals. Conjecture, surmise and assumption about the meaning and significance of the motives of a John Bright, or the intentions of a Sayyid Ahmad, or the words of a Jamaluddin no longer strain the mind. Here is a clear, straight-forward scheme, though still in the embryo. The facts of Indian diversity, Muslim separateness and political feasibility have been dovetailed into each other to produce a plan which foresees much of what was destined to happen in India. Some minor points still need elaboration and clarification. What sort of relationship was envisaged among the several provinces, each of which was to form a separate government? Was this to be a federation on American lines: the only major and successful federal system known in Blunt's day? Or, was it to be a unitary system, in which provincial divisions were to be mere administrative areas, as it was in British India until 1935? More importantly, was any connection to subsist between the proposed Muslim and Hindu governments? Was Blunt suggesting a loose confederation with some kind of a shared agency at the top? Or, was the presence of a common imperial military power meant to be the only tenuous, temporary and purely expedient link between Muslim India and Hindu India?

We are unable to answer these questions, for Blunt did not draw up a constitution. He was not offering a ready-made constitutional scheme of reform or re-grouping. He was suggesting a solution to a problem which, in his opinion, was being underrated in his day, but which he had seen to be the fundamental problem of India, one to be ignored only at the peril of Britain and India. We should not cavil at the absence of details, but rejoice at his understanding and his ability to prescribe a remedy of such breathtaking novelty.

Though we may not be able to go so far as to say, with Ian Stephens, that Blunt outlined "pretty clearly" the "Pakistan demand of the future",<sup>104</sup> yet none can deny that he was the first to suggest a partition of India on Hindu-Muslim lines. Bright had foreseen several sovereign states in the India of the future, but not necessarily Muslim and Hindu states. Sayyid Ahmad, the first to perceive and announce Muslim separateness and the first

to warn the Muslims against the coming danger of a Hindu rule, did not go where his argument should have led him, and refused to see territorial division as a logical consequence of religious and national division. Jamaluddin, a fiery but ineffectual prophet of pan-Islam and a defender of the rights of the subject peoples against the rigour and immorality of the imperial system, was not moved by the plight of Indian Islam. Blunt followed the logic of his observation all the way, and ended up with a separate Muslim state in India. This was a partition on Hindu-Muslim lines. This was a suggestion set down without reservation, uncertainty or doubt.<sup>105</sup> Here was a problem which indifference could not minimize, which ignorance could not wish away, and which time would not solve by itself. And here was a solution which might be shockingly new but which tackled the problem once for all, without leaving loose ends all over the place and without trusting the shape of things to come to nothing more substantial than far-off hopes of good-will and a happy day.<sup>106</sup>

#### Muharram Ali Chishti (1888)

Sayyid Ahmad Khan had used words and phrases which can reasonably be construed to indicate a belief in the two-nation theory. But, as always with him, he was reluctant to take the next necessary step. If the Muslims formed a separate nation, it followed logically that they should have organized themselves into a separate political party to safeguard their interests and formulate their demands. In the political world then opening its portals to an Indian stampede this was a necessity. In particular after the establishment of the Indian National Congress, and in the light of its claim to speak for the whole of India, the Muslim nation should have taken steps to assert its identity and demand its special rights. But Sayyid Ahmad turned his back resolutely upon all such activities and continued to preach total aloofness from political action.

Mawlawi Muharram Ali Chishti, the founder, owner and editor of the *Rafique-i-Hind*,<sup>107</sup> a weekly of Lahore, saw the unwisdom of this course. Believing strongly that the Muslims constituted a nation by themselves, he felt the need for establishing a Muslim party to give substance to their national status and claims. He went to Calcutta in February 1888 and, it has been reported, succeeded

in converting Sayyid Ameer Ali to his point of view. A large meeting was organized under Ameer Ali's chairmanship in which Chishti explained the two-nation theory and called for accepting its political implications. It has been claimed by some that this incident and the persistent advocacy of the *Rafique-i-Hind* were responsible for the establishment of a "Muhammadan National Conference" at Calcutta in January 1889.

Chishti's views are well reflected in the editorial of 19 May 1888. After reminding his readers that his journal had always opposed the Congress and tried to save the Muslims from its "vile influence", he made it clear that "nothing is further from our intention than to convert our countrymen to the habits of bureaucratic yes-men and to make them toadies". Turning to Muslim needs and fears, he said: "The very constitution of the British Commonwealth is such that unless we unite to claim our rights, there is no way out . . . . Is it not true that Muslim national rights are suffering due to the dominance of another nation? . . . We repeat that if the Musalmans are prepared to submit to a life of slavery in India, then they will prove a curse to India, a disaster for their nation and a nonentity in the eyes of the Government."<sup>108</sup>

The importance of the *Rafique-i-Hind* lies in that, as far as we know, it was the first journal to propound the two-nation theory in clear terms, to criticize Sayyid Ahmad Khan for his policy of opposing Muslim political activity, and to advocate the establishment of a Muslim political organization which should protect Muslim "national rights".

#### Abdul Halim Sharar (1890)

It is curious to find that the first Indian Muslim proposal for solving the Hindu-Muslim problem by some kind of territorial re-arrangement and exchange of population (not by creating a Muslim state, be it noted) was inspired by recurring communal riots, not by the two-nation theory. This scheme was suggested by the well-known novelist and journalist, Abdul Halim Sharar.

As one of the founders of the novel in India, Sharar is an important figure in Urdu letters. He was a prolific spinner of historical-cum-romantic tales, and could easily turn out a piece of fiction at remarkably short notice. Such rapid industry put his name to nearly fifty books. Reading Sir Walter Scott's *Talisman*



during a train journey, he was struck by the bias of European fiction in its treatment of Islam. As a riposte he decided to write novels set in the times of the crusades to inform the reading public of Muslim India about their heroes and their religious history. The first issue of this resolve came off the press in 1886. Then began a veritable cascade of novels on the age of the crusades, the Islamic empire in Spain, the Arabia of the days of ignorance, Islam in Arabia, early days of Islamic rule in India, and Muslim India of the nineteenth century. This was historical fiction rather than fictional history. Events took place in history, but heroes and heroines were mostly created by the artist's imagination. The idea was to convey the spirit of Islamic history to the general reader, to tell him of the great past of Islam, to keep his pride alive, and to save him from the despondency and despair which encompassed him at the sight of contemporary events, foreign rule and Hindu hostility. He is not a major figure in the history of Urdu literature, but as one who kept the Muslim buoyant on the dark waters of those days he merits the attention of the historian.

But he was not a mere novelist. His versatility would have been astonishing had it not been in keeping with the literary tradition of Urdu literature of that time. He wrote some historical pieces; he published many essays; he was an accepted literary critic of his age; he wrote on education, politics, reforms, social problems and other issues which were then engaging popular attention. But, above all these miscellaneous activities, he was the founder and editor and sometimes sole writer of several magazines, and a journalist of considerable courage and much enterprise at a time when this art (or profession) was in its infancy and the fear of laws made by an alien government kept the journalist's natural *elan* in severe check.<sup>109</sup>

Born, brought up and mostly living in Lucknow, where the court of Oudh and later its admirers were striving to maintain some of the glories of Mughal cultural achievements, his memories of the days of Muslim rule made him feel the pain of present degradation the more. For such a man the frequency of Hindu-Muslim disturbances<sup>110</sup> and the minority status of the Muslims were presages that could not be ignored. A series of uncommonly sanguine communal riots in the late 1880s shook him and compelled him to seek a lasting remedy for this recurring calamity. At this time he was editing a weekly journal, *Muhazzib*,<sup>111</sup> from Luck-

now. In its leader of 23 August 1890 he set down his solution of the Hindu-Muslim problem: "Times are such that the religious rites of one nation cannot be performed without injuring the susceptibilities of the other. Nor is there the element of patience to ignore insults. If things have reached such a stage, it would be wise to partition India into Hindu and Muslim provinces and exchange the population. The Hindus seem to be of the view that they should not allow Muslims to be their neighbours. Neither do they like to convey the jingle of their temple bells to the Muslim infidels, nor they themselves like to hear the Azan [the Muslim call to prayer]. Surely this position would be acceptable to Muslims because they too seem to be tired of Hindus."<sup>112</sup>

Evidently, Sharar subscribed to the two-nation theory; though we don't know the exact word he used to describe the Hindus and the Muslims separately as a "nation". It is also obvious that he was not suggesting the creation of a Muslim state. Nor, strictly speaking, was he advocating a partition. The quotation given above is an English translation of the Urdu original, and clearly the translator has taken liberties with his task. The original text is given by him in three different places in three different versions,<sup>113</sup> but the variations are unimportant. The key-word used by Sharar in all versions is *azla* (singular: *zila*), districts. He wanted the Hindus and Muslims to distribute the districts between themselves: "*Hindu aur Musalman Hindustan ke azla ko apas men taqsim kar len*". In the English article, Dr. Khurshid had used the word "provinces" without saying that the original Urdu word was quite different; consequently all those who did not see his quotations of the original Urdu believed that Sharar had taken the province as the unit of partition.<sup>114</sup> In his articles in the *Mashriq* and *Imroz*, however, he added, in passing and with challenging curtness, that "it must be remembered that at that time the word '*zila*' was used in the sense of 'province'". This explanation was not only belated and casual, but also had no warrant in history or language. In Urdu a district is a *zila* and a province a *subah*. Both are old words and were in common use in the nineteenth century. There is no justification for translating *azla* as provinces. Not only that, but Dr. Khurshid seems to have taken further liberties with the sense of the original editorial when, in a book published in 1964, he stated that Sharar had suggested a partition of India between the Hindus and the Muslims.<sup>115</sup> By failing to mention the unit of

re-distribution he was misleadingly broadening the scope of Sharar's proposal.

But, apart from this mistranslation of an operative word on which the substance of the suggestion hinges, is it reasonable to deduce from these few sentences of the editorial that Sharar was really advocating a partition? Dr. Khurshid, who was the first to bring this editorial to public notice, thought so, for he prefaced the quotation by a single magisterial sentence: "strangely enough the earliest to make the proposal for the partition of the sub-continent was Abdul Halim Sharar, a novelist and a journalist".<sup>116</sup> As he seems to be the only person in possession of the original editorial, and perhaps also of the issues of the *Muhazzib* of that period, students of history would have been grateful for some further details. But they have not been given anything beyond the English translation of one extract from the leader. Perhaps there is nothing else to give.

The exact meaning of Sharar's suggestion has to be construed from attendant circumstances and corroborative evidence. What was the general tone of the editorials of the *Muhazzib* before and after the date on which this proposal was made? Did Sharar later refer to what he had suggested, in elaboration, clarification, amendment or even repetition of it? Did his suggestion produce any reaction in the columns of this journal or elsewhere? These are questions which must be answered before determining the significance and value of his plan. In the absence of any information of this character, we have to take the available extract, as it stands, for what it is worth.

A partition means a clear division of a country or province or area into two or more parts, with the parts being allotted to or given under the control of different parties, nations or governments. In this sense Sharar definitely made no suggestion for a partition. His language is vague, but there is no confusion about what he was aiming at. Tired of every-day Hindu-Muslim riots and mutual intolerance and dislike, he said that the problem could be solved by separating the two communities, so as to avoid common living which caused these disturbances. Therefore, he suggested movement on a large scale so that all Muslims migrated to certain districts and all Hindus to certain others—he took the district as his basis because of the obvious reason that, under British rule, it was the most important unit of administration.

After thus sorting out the two communities into separate districts, there would come into being districts which were completely or at least overwhelmingly Muslim and those which were completely or overwhelmingly Hindu. As most people spent their entire life within the district, their property lay within it, their profession or vocation was practised within its boundaries, and local elections took place on the district level, a Muslim district would bring much security, physical and moral, to its population. Moreover, the administrator would welcome such a change, for it would free him from the inconvenience of keeping peace between communities, of controlling local bodies which were split on communal lines and turned local councils into arenas of competing interests, and of receiving delegations and deputations from rival communities and trying to pacify angry protests flowing from contradictory claims. This was the sweet dream of every district officer, and its advantages were incontrovertible.

But then so was its impracticability. To ask millions to move to another place in peacetime without any dire pressure to goad them is to ask for the impossible. Men moved in millions in 1947, but then stark, naked fear of death hounded them and they were fleeing from what they believed to be a calamity without parallel. In the East where regional loyalties are intense, where local roots go deep and where land is the centre of life, people don't leave their homesteads and settle down a few hundred miles away because the government asks them to do so. Only two things will make them surrender their hearth: fear of death and love of money. Even the first is not all powerful; for some will die rather than go, as many did in the cataclysm of 1947. The second will send a man far away to amass wealth, but in most cases he will return to the ancestral scene, even if only to breathe his last in the family circle. No, the suggestion of a transfer of population on such a scale was a fantastic proposition and ran counter to the human grain.

It may be that Sharar had only his province in view. It was a Muslim minority province, but its Muslims had strong traditions of culture and powerful memories of their rule. They dominated the cities and played a part far beyond their numbers in the political and social life of the area. It was relatively easy to group them together into Muslim districts, but only relatively. It still would have been a task of immeasurable difficulty. In any case, this

would not have offered a solution of the Hindu-Muslim problem over the whole of India.

Granting for a moment that Sharar wanted the whole of India to be re-arranged into Muslim and Hindu districts, it would still not amount to a partition. Unless all Muslim districts were made contiguous to one another, it would not even make a partition of the future a feasible proposition. Anyway, going by the actual words used by Sharar, it is plain that he was advocating separation, not partition. Till we have more information about his proposal this conclusion should be able to stand scrutiny.

### Theodore Beck (1887, 1894)

Theodore Beck was a principal of the MAO College, Aligarh, during Sayyid Ahmad's life, and several pro-Congress Muslim politicians and writers have attributed much in the Sayyid's pro-British attitude to his influence. But it is beyond the scope of the present study to examine this controversy. Here we are concerned with Beck's views on Indian Muslims.

He was confident that a parliamentary system of government made no sense in "a country containing two or more nations tending to oppress the numerically weaker".<sup>117</sup> On the lack of affinity between Hindus and Muslims he wrote that "not less than the physical difference between the burning plains of Mecca and the snowy heights of the Himalaya is the difference in thought and feeling between the Mahomedan and Hindu worlds".<sup>118</sup> The impact of this difference on the governance of India was clear. "The divergence between Hindus and Mahomedans is the crucial difficulty in the formation of this [an Indian] nationality, and though the Hindus outnumber the Mahomedans, the latter showed themselves for six centuries not inferior in physical force."<sup>119</sup> The day "of fusion into a common nationality, seems far distant enough to allow at any rate the present generation of Anglo-Indian statesmen to leave it out of account in their policy".<sup>120</sup> The Muslims "if not a nation in the strictest sense of the term, are united by a feeling very like national feeling, and derived from the religious and social bond".<sup>121</sup>

He then worked out the implications of the presence of two nations for the future polity of India. If majority rule was instituted, "the Hindu party, being in a majority that would fear no

change of religion in the voters, would be absolute masters, as no Mahomedan Emperor ever was".<sup>122</sup> "The action of a free parliament in the North-West Provinces [the later United Provinces] would tend, I imagine, to exclude from appointments and extinguish the political influence of the race that were masters here for six centuries, the superb monuments of whose taste now remain as the finest spectacle offered the visitor to India—a race that still remembers the past, and that counts among its allies not only men in every province in India, but the hardy Afghan beyond the frontier, the Turkoman, and the Arab."<sup>123</sup> The growing hostility to the Muslims among the newly-educated Hindus was not "an amiable feature of the times". The Muslims had refused to join the Congress, not because they were backward in education, as alleged by some in Britain, but because they had no "wish to put a rope round their own necks and place themselves at the mercy of those who have hold of the other end".<sup>124</sup>

In these words in 1887 (when these essays were written for several newspapers in India), Beck confirmed the two-nation theory, explained the Muslim absence from the Congress, rejected the principle of majority rule in India presumably for all time to come, and reiterated the Muslim resolve never to live under the Hindu majority.

Later, in 1894, commenting on the British plan for a system of recruitment by open competition to the public services in India, Beck calculated that such a system would give the majority of the posts to the Hindu Bengalis and the remainder chiefly to Brahmans of Bombay and Madras. He pointed out the dilemma in which the reforms of 1892 had put the Muslims. If they did not make a turmoil the House of Commons would not believe that they disliked the proposed scheme of competitive tests, and would thus see their interests suffer grievously. If they agitated "they may hurry the people towards the British bayonets".<sup>125</sup>

### Theodore Morison (1899)

Next we come to another Englishman in the line of Bright, Blunt and Beck, but one of different antecedents. Sir Theodore Morison was a close friend and a great admirer of Sayyid Ahmad Khan, a principal of the MAO College of Aligarh, and later a member of the Council of the Secretary of State for India. He



spent many years in India in the service of Muslim education. He knew the Muslim mind well, and his intimate association with nearly every Muslim leader of that period, particularly in northern India, gave him an insight into the contemporary trend of Muslim thinking. He was familiar with Muslim character, Muslim consciousness of separateness and Muslim fear of Hindu rule.

Unlike Bright, he emphasized the fact of Hindu-Muslim division more than the general diversity of India. Unlike Blunt, he was sympathetic to the Aligarh movement and the Muslim aspirations. In England he was for a long time one of the few influential voices in support of conceding separate electorates to Muslims, of granting special protection to the Indian minorities and of elevating the Aligarh College to the status of a Muslim university.<sup>126</sup> To acknowledge his services to Indian Islam is to pay an outstanding debt.

His *Imperial Rule in India* was written in the year before he took over as principal of the Aligarh College, and was published in 1899. This is significant; the ideas he expressed were formed before he came to Aligarh. One passage of this book puts him among those who contemplated the future of Indian Muslims on separatist lines. Echoing Beck, he wrote: "The Muhammadans are in some ways the most definite and homogeneous political unit in India; they are heirs of a common civilization and common traditions of glory, and they are conscious to an extent unsurpassed in India of their corporate existence. If the 57 million Muhammadans of India were all collected in one province or tract of country, if for instance, the North of India from Peshawar to Agra were inhabited exclusively by the Muhammadans, a national spirit associated with those territorial limits would already be in process of formation, which would suggest a practical solution of the present problem. But the Muhammadans are, as a matter of fact, scattered in isolated groups all over the peninsula, and in consequence such sentiment of nationality as they do possess links them not with Sikhs and Bengalis, with whom they share the soil, but with their co-religionists wherever they are found, be it in Arabia or Persia or within the frontiers of India. So little do the Muhammadans regard India as their own country that their great poet, Hali, has compared his people to guests who have outstayed their welcome, and lamented that they ever left their native homes for India." Here Morison quotes three verses from Hali's *Musaddas*,

and then continues, "The views held by the Muhammadans (certainly the most aggressive and turbulent of the peoples of India) are alone sufficient to prevent the establishment of an independent Indian Government. Were the Afghan to descend from the north upon an autonomous India, the Muhammadans, instead of uniting with the Sikhs and Hindus to repel him, would be drawn by all the ties of kinship and religion to join his flag."<sup>127</sup>

Here we find all the ingredients of a separate Muslim nationalism in India. The Muslims regard themselves separate from the Hindus and Sikhs in spite of sharing the same soil with them. They don't look at India as their country. They have more in common with the Muslims of foreign lands than with the non-Muslims of India, so far so that if an Afghan invasion of an independent India would take place they would side gladly with the Muslim invader against the Indians. The establishment of an independent government in India, run by Indians, is therefore impossible as long as the Muslims think on these lines. Further, the collective attitude of the Muslims clearly marks them out as a distinct nationality. They possess a feeling of "corporate existence" to such an extent that they would be a nation but for the absence of a territory of their own. Had they all been living in one area, the "corporate existence" would have combined with territory to produce a "national spirit". In other words, they had all the makings of a nation except a territory which they could call their own. This was an invitation, if it could be called that, to the Muslims to start thinking about a territory for themselves. It was a clear indication that the Hindu-Muslim problem could be solved by physically separating the Muslims from other Indians.

### Conclusion

Thus, by the close of the nineteenth century certain ideas about the future of India were in the air.<sup>128</sup> Indian diversity was now taken for granted by every one, except the Hindus, whose claims on behalf of India as a nation could not permit such acquiescence. The future shape of India could not emerge from the mould of a rigid, unitary and united society. Therefore, a united, independent India was improbable, if not impossible.

Above all, there were the Muslims, in swift motion towards a nationalism of their own, and fearfully afraid of the coming

majority rule which, imposed in the name of the blind majesty of democracy, would place them firmly and for all time under the Hindus. Some sort of re-arrangement, re-grouping or separation was beginning to appear in the thoughts of several men. No transparent idea was yet in sight. No clear-cut schemes were yet drawn up. No definite proposals were yet offered to the public for comment, consideration, acceptance or rejection. The language was ambiguous and uncertain. Arguments were involved and confused. Intentions were not expressed conspicuously. Motives were difficult to disentangle. It was as if people were groping in the dark for a solution, but it eluded them. They knew that something was seriously wrong somewhere, but the remedy seemed not to lay in their hands. The wish to change the scheme of things was asserting itself, but the direction of change, even its nature, was beyond their vision.

But people had at last begun to talk of separation, and that was a momentous development. It is strange that ideas about separation, however vague and spasmodic, should have preceded the establishment of the first proper, all-India Muslim political party. It shows that radical political thinking is possible without the formal apparatus of an organization. It also shows the depth of Muslim concern for their future: thinking about their destiny came first and founding parties and winning elections came afterwards.

The most important development of the nineteenth century was that separation, definitely political, perhaps territorial, was being talked about without creating consternation or evoking mockery. The very familiarity of the idea, without its acceptance, was big with consequences. In the century which was now dawning, it was destined by swift stages to open a new era in the history of this ancient and restless mass of land.

## NOTES

1. Technically, India was not ruled by the British Government before 1858, though the Parliament had made certain charter acts for the good administration of the country.
2. Apart from representing important regions, these cities were also geographically the five nodal centres of the sub-continent: Calcutta in the east, Madras in the south, Bombay in the west, Lahore in the north, and Agra (approximately) in the centre.
3. *Select Speeches of Rt. Hon. John Bright on Public Questions*, London, 1907, p. 14. This was a selection from two earlier volumes: *Speeches on Questions of Public Policy* (2 vols, 1868) and *Public Addresses* (1879), both ed by J.E. Thorold Rogers. The 1858 speech was issued as a 36-page pamphlet by Edward Stanford of London in the same year under the title of *Speech on Legislation and Policy in India, Delivered in the House of Commons on the Second Reading of the Indian Bill, 24 June 1858*.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 13. A committee of the British Indian Association of Calcutta reported on this speech as follows: "The tendency of centralization... is uniformity, but the distinguishing feature of the Indian communities is variety. A single nation may thrive under centralization, for there the principle of the unity of action has a wide field for play. But centralization for a number of nations, each at a different stage of progress and with various degrees of intelligence, can have no principle for its basis, for it is the practical confusion of all principles imaginable. Hence in India centralization is an anomaly", quoted in *The Englishman*, 29 January 1859.
5. *Select Speeches of Rt. Hon. John Bright on Public Questions*, London, 1907, p. 51.
6. For details see K.K. Aziz, *Britain and Muslim India*, London, 1963.
7. There is very little material on Bright, except a few old and old-style biographies. See B.G. Gokhale, "John Bright and India (1848-1861)", *Journal of Indian History*, April 1963, pp. 57-67; and J.L. Sturgis, *The Ideas and Activities of John Bright in Relation to the Empire, 1843-1889*,



unpublished M.A. thesis, University of London, 1963.

8. Between Bright's and Sayyid Ahmad Khan's times, Muslim fear of Hindu rule received substance from various Hindu threats and claims. In 1864, for instance, Rajendralal Mitra, in a paper on "The Origin of the Hindvi Language and its Relation to the Urdu Dialect" read before the Asiatic Society of Bengal, asserted that Urdu was nothing but an Aryan dialect overlaid with Persian influence, and that Indians could not even imagine giving up the Devanagiri script in view of their "patriotic feeling for the alphabet in which the Vedas are preserved"; quoted in Stuart McGregor, "Bengal and the Development of Hindi, 1850-1880", *South Asian Review*, January 1972, p. 140. In the same vein, Indian nationalism and Hinduism were identified as one in Dyananda's efforts to remodel Indian society on the basis of the Vedas, in Raja Ram Mohan Roy's founding of Brahmo Samaj, and in Devendranath Tagore's successful attempts to establish a number of Indian-Hindu associations; see R.P. Dua, *The Impact of the Russo-Japanese (1905) War on Indian Politics*, Delhi, 1966, pp. 7-8.
9. His important political writings are: *An Account of the Loyal Mohammedans of India*, Meerut, 1860; *Review on Dr. Hunter's Indian Mussalmans*, Benares, 1872; *The Causes of the Indian Revolt*, Benares, 1873; *Sir Sayyid Ahmad on the Present State of Indian Politics*, Allahabad, 1888; and *Akhiri Mazamin*, Lahore, 1898. On him there is much more than can be cited here. A varied selection: Rajendra Prasad, *India Divided*, Bombay, 1946, pp. 90-104; I.H. Qureshi, *The Muslim Community of the Indo-Pakistan Sub-Continent*, The Hague, 1962, pp. 236-252; A.H. Albiruni (S.M. Ikram), *Makers of Pakistan and Modern Muslim India*, Lahore, 1950; J.M.S. Baljon, Jr., *The Reforms and Religious Ideas of Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan*, Leiden, 1949, rev ed, Lahore, 1958; *Eminent Musalmans*, Madras, n.d.; G.F.I. Graham, *The Life and Work of Sayyid Ahmad Khan*, London, 1885, and *Reviews on Sayyid Ahmad Khan's Life and Works*, Aligarh, 1886; *Indian Nation Builders*, Madras, n.d., Vol. III; G.D. Khanna, *Great Men of India*, Calcutta, 1940, pp. 52-63; *Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan: A Sketch of His Life and Work*, Madras, n.d.; L.F. Rushbrook Williams (ed),

*Great Men of India*, Bombay, n.d., pp. 606-615; Aziz Ahmad, *Islamic Modernism in India and Pakistan, 1857-1964*, London, 1967; Abdul Hamid, *Muslim Separatism in India*, London, 1967; M.S. Jain, *The Aligarh Movement*, Agra, 1965; Hafeez Malik, *Moslem Nationalism in India and Pakistan*, Washington, D.C., 1963; M. Mujeeb, *The Indian Muslims*, London, 1967; Yusuf Husain (ed), *Selected Documents from the Aligarh Archives*, Bombay, 1967; C.W. Troll, *Sayyid Ahmad Khan: A Reinterpretation of Muslim Theology*, New Delhi, 1978; S.M. Ikram, *Mawji-Kausar*, Lahore, 1970 rep., pp. 73-110, 155-166; Hafeez Malik, *Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan and Muslim Modernization in India and Pakistan*, New York, 1980; Shan Muhammad (ed.), *The Aligarh Movement: Basic Documents, 1864-1898*, New Delhi, 1978; Abdul Hamid, *Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan and the Genesis of the Muslim Separatist Movement in Politics: An Interpretation*, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of the Punjab, 1953; Rahmani Begum Muhammad Ruknuddin Hasan, *The Educational Movement of Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan, 1858-1898*, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of London, 1959; and Margaret H. Case, *The Aligarh Era: Muslim Politics in North India, 1860-1910*, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Chicago, 1970. For further references and periodical literature on him see K.K. Aziz, *The Historical Background of Pakistan, 1857-1947: An Annotated Digest of Source Material*, Karachi, 1970.

10. *Indian Musalmans: Are they bound in conscience to Rebel against the Queen?*, Benares, 1872, Appendices I and II.
11. Altaf Husain Hali, *Hayat-i-Javed*, Lahore, n.d. p. 263. A recent historian has claimed that in 1869, during his stay in London, Sayyid Ahmad "came to believe that the separation of Muslims from Hindus might be beneficial for the Muslims"; Hafeez Malik, "Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan's Contribution to the Development of Muslim Nationalism in India", *Modern Asian Studies*, April 1970, p. 139. But he offers no evidence for the statement. On 19 April 1870, Sayyid Ahmad wrote to Nawab Mohsinul Mulk: "Hindu language demands have made Hindu-Muslim unity an impossibility. The Muslim will never agree to own Hindi, and if this Hindu demand continues to be made, one



day the Hindu will irrevocably reject Urdu, and the result will be that one day the Hindus and the Muslims will separate from each other completely"; quoted in Salahuddin Nasik, *Tahrik-i-Azadi*, Lahore, n.d., p. 159.

12. Quoted in Choudhry Khaliquzzaman, *Pathway to Pakistan*, Lahore, 1961, pp. 269–270.
13. Sayyid Iqbal Ali, *Sayyid Ahmad Khan ka Safar-i-Punjab*, Aligarh, n.d., pp. 140–167, quoted and translated by Hafeez Malik, "Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan's Contribution to the Development of Muslim Nationalism in India", *Modern Asian Studies*, April 1970, p. 138.
14. Quoted in an article by Jamiluddin Ahmad in *MN*, 23 March 1960.
15. *Sir Sayyid Ahmad on the Present State of Indian Politics, consisting of Speeches and Letters reprinted from the 'Pioneer'*, Allahabad, 1888, pp. 2–24.
16. *Ibid.*, pp. 25–28.
17. For sympathetic reviews of Tayebji's life see *Indian Nation Builders*, Madras, n.d., Vol II; H.B. Tyabji, *Badraddin Tyabji: A Biography*, Bombay, 1952; and "The Late Mr. Badruddin Tyabji", *Indian Review*, November 1906, pp. 814–818 (a fulsome tribute).
18. *Sir Sayyid Ahmad on the Present State . . .*, pp. 30–53.
19. *Ibid.*, pp. 63–71.
20. Quoted in Ram Gopal, *Indian Muslims*, Bombay, 1959, p. 67.
21. However, similar views were expressed by Sayyid Ameer Ali; see K.K. Aziz, *Ameer Ali: His Life and Work*, Lahore, 1968.
22. It is a habit of all Hindu and Indian Muslim historians to attribute Sayyid Ahmad's separatist ideas to the "imperialist" influence of his British friends and colleagues, particularly to that of Theodore Beck. Sayyid Abid Husain repeated this in his *The Destiny of Indian Muslims*, Bombay, 1965, p. 39. Two years later he confessed to Hafeez Malik "that no authentic evidence was available supporting the contention that Sir Sayyid was thoroughly dominated by Beck, and that he formulated his policies on Beck's suggestion. Dr. Husain also regretted the fact that instead of doing his independent research on this issue, he relied excessively

upon [Sayyid Tufail Ahmad] Manglori's assertions", Hafeez Malik, *op. cit.*, p. 142, fn. 36.

23. *Sir Sayyid Ahmad on the Present State . . .*, p. 40. My emphasis.
24. Andre Guimbretiere, "Le reformisme musulman en Inde", *Orient*, no 16 (1960), p. 27.
25. *Ibid.*, p. 30.
26. Shamloo (comp.), *Speeches and Statements of Iqbal*, Lahore, 1948 ed, pp. 130, 132.
27. There is no room to list all of them. As types, see S. Hyder, *Progress of Pakistan*, Lahore, June 1947, p. 23; Sharif al-Mujahid, "Pan-Islamism", in *A History of the Freedom Movement*, Karachi, Vol. III, Part I, 1961, p. 96; Ghulam Husain Zulfikar, *Zafar Ali Khan: Adib awar Shair*, Lahore, 1967, p. 35; Parveen Feroze Hasan, *The Political Philosophy of Iqbal*, Lahore, n.d., p. 214; Mirza Abid, *Jamaluddin Afghani*, Lahore, 4th ed 1966, pp. 12, 14, 16, 19.
28. This is supported by the Afghan documents themselves. For details see Nikki R. Keddie, *An Islamic Response to Imperialism*, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1968, pp. 6–7.
29. For this evidence see Iraj Afshar and Asghar Mahdavi, *Documents inedit concernant Seyyed Jamal-al-Din Afghani*, Tehran, 1963; Nikki R. Keddie, "Afghani in Afghanistan", *Middle Eastern Studies*, July 1965, pp. 322–349; H. Pakdaman, *Djamaled-Din Assad Abadi dit Afghani*, Paris, 1969; Mirza Lutfullah Asadabadi, *Sharh-i-hal wa Asar-i-Sayyid Jamal el-Din Asadabadi maruf be "Afghani"*, Tabriz, 1947, Arabic tr. by S. Nash'at and A. Hasanayn, *Jamal al-Din al-Asadabadi*, Cairo, 1957; and Volume on Afghani (F.O. 60/594) in the India Office Library, London. "A despatch from the United States Minister to Egypt dated March 17, 1936 (no. 883.91/I) records the researches of the Secretary of Legation, J.R. Childs, while on a visit to Persia, into the mystery of al-Afghani's origin. Childs satisfied himself, on the evidence of published investigations of Persian scholars and the presence of al-Afghani's relatives in Iran, that al-Afghani was a native of Iran. . . ." (Sylvia G. Haim (ed), *Arab Nationalism: An Anthology*, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1962, rep 1976, Introduction, p. 7 fn.). The authenticity of the Afshar-Mahdavi documents is beyond doubt.

During his second journey in Iran (1889) Afghani was the guest of a big Iranian merchant, Haji Muhammad Hasan Amin Zarb. Before his expulsion from Iran, Afghani left with Zarb his library and some personal documents. Zarb's grandson, Asghar Mahdavi, a professor at the Tehran University, in collaboration with Iraj Afshar, published some of these personal documents. The complete collection is now in the Majlis Library, Tehran. How amusing to find that in Afghanistan, Afghani was known as al-Rumi and was thought to be from the Ottoman Empire (Vartan Gregorian, *The Emergence of Modern Afghanistan*, Stanford, 1969, p. 86 fn., quoting Mahmud Tarzi's article in the *Siraj al-Akhar*, 6th year, no. 5).

30. E.G. Browne, *The Persian Revolution*, London, 1966 ed, p. 5; Ghulam Jilani Azami, "Jamal al-Din Afghani", *Kabul*, 7 July 1931; Qazi Abdul Ghaffar, *Asar-i-Jamaluddin Afghani*, Delhi, 1940, pp. 32-37; Nikki R. Keddie, "Sayyid Jamal al-din al-Afghani's First Twenty-Seven Years: The Darkest Period", *Middle East Journal*, Winter 1966, pp. 526-527; Aziz Ahmad, "Afghani's Indian Contacts", *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, July-September 1969, p. 476.
31. Nikki R. Keddie, *op. cit.*, *Middle East Journal*, Winter 1966, p. 527.
32. Aziz Ahmad, *op. cit.*, *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, July-September 1969, pp. 477-478.
33. Afshar and Mahdavi, *op. cit.*, pp. 5, 156.
34. *Proceedings of the Government of India in the Foreign Department*, Political (Calcutta), 1869, "Cabul Diaries"; Nikki R. Keddie, *op. cit.*, *Middle Eastern Studies*, July 1965, p. 336.
35. C.C. Adams, *Islam and Modernism in Egypt*, London, 1933, p. 5.
36. A.S. Lethbridge, General Superintendent, Thagi and Dakaiti Department, Government of India, *Memorandum*, copy printed by the F.O., London, no. 55, dated 1896, Public Records Office, London, F.O. 60/594.
37. Afshar and Mahdavi, *op. cit.*, pp. 12, 157.
38. Sharif al-Mujahid, *op. cit.*, pp. 104-105. It must be noted that in partial support of this he depends on W.S. Blunt's account. But Blunt is a biased witness, for he intensely

disliked Sayyid Ahmad Khan and was therefore glad to praise Jamaluddin who had been abusive in his attacks on the Sayyid.

39. Bipen Chandra Pal, *Nationality and Empire*, Calcutta, 1916, pp. 370-371.
40. Bipen Chandra Pal, *Memories of My Life and Time*, Calcutta, 1932, p. 417.
41. Jamaluddin Afghani, *Maqalat-i-Jamaliyyah*, Calcutta, 1884. The whole collection is relevant and provides a fine window into his mind. The extracts quoted here are from the translation given in Nikki R. Keddie, *An Islamic Response to Imperialism*, pp. 101-108.
42. *Al-Urwa al-wuthqa*, Vol. I, pp. 151 ff.
43. See his "Lettre sur l'Hindoustan", *L'Intransigeant*, 24 April 1883.
44. See Qazi Abdul Ghaffar, *op. cit.*, pp. 120-155.
45. G. Allana, *Our Freedom Fighters, 1562-1947*, Karachi, 1969, p. 144.
46. Javed Iqbal, *Maey Lalafam*, Lahore, 2nd ed 1973, Foreword, p. xxviii.
47. Abdus Salam Khurshid, "Sayyid Jamaluddin Afghani", *NW*, 16 March 1978.
48. See, for instance, S.A. Vahid, "Introduction", to Parveen Feroze Hasan, *op. cit.*, p. xiii. Mirza Adib's *Jamaluddin Afghani* (in Urdu, first pub in 1946, 4th ed 1966, Lahore) omits all reference to his activities in India; this slim volume is addressed to high school students, hence its frequent reprinting.
49. Aziz Ahmad, *op. cit.*, *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, July-September 1969, p. 476.
50. *Ibid.*, p. 489.
51. *Ibid.*, p. 490.
52. Taken from the English tr. of the full text in Nikki R. Keddie, *An Islamic Response to Imperialism*, pp. 130-174. The original Persian title of the essay was "Haqlat-i-Mazhab-i-Neicheri wa Bayan-i-Hal-i-Neicherian". It was first pub in Hyderabad in 1880, and a second ed, with an introduction by the editor of the *Farhang*, at Bombay in the same year. An Urdu tr, under the same title, by Sayyid Abdul Ghafur Shahbaz, was pub at Calcutta in 1883 (Aziz Ahmad, *op. cit.*,



- Journal of the American Oriental Society*, July–September 1969, p. 480 fn. 43). The first ed is included in the Afshar-Mahdavi documents. The popular title under which it is known, "Refutation of the Materialists", is taken from the Arabic tr, *ar-Radd 'ala al-dahiriyyin*, by Muhammad Abduh and Abu Turab, Beirut, 1885, Cairo, 1894, rep 1935. Pakdaman says that Jamaluddin himself had translated it for the first time into Arabic in 1880 (Homa Pakdaman, *op. cit.*, p. 68); she gives a list of differences between the Persian original and the Arabic tr by Abduh and Abu Turab (pp. 68–70). It was tr into French by Mlle. A.M. Goichon, *Refutation des materialistes*, Paris, 1942. There is a Turkish tr in manuscript form by Yakub Efendi-zade Muhammad Munir, deposited at the Istanbul University Library, Yildiz Collection.
53. The original title was "Sharh-i-Hal-i-Aghurian". It appeared in the *Muallam-i-Shafiq* of September and October 1881 in two instalments. The target of the assault is a person referred to by Afghani as "Nasatuda-i-Marg Khan", i.e., one rejected or unglorified even by death; easily identifiable with Sayyid Ahmad Khan.
  54. For the Persian original and its Urdu tr see S.M. Ikram, *Yadgar-i-Shibli*, Lahore, 1971, pp. 384–385.
  55. India Office printed confidential report on Afghani, 6 March 1896, quoted in Nikki R. Keddie, "Religion and Irreligion in Early Iranian Nationalism", *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, April 1962, p. 282.
  56. Andre Guimbretiere, *op. cit.*, p. 34.
  57. Homa Pakdaman, *op. cit.*, pp. 233–234.
  58. Albert Hourani, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 1798–1939*, London, 1962, p. 125.
  59. Nikki R. Keddie, *op. cit.*, *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, April 1962, pp. 279–280.
  60. Letter tr and rep in E.G. Browne, *The Persian Revolution of 1905–1909*, London, 1910, pp. 28–29.
  61. Wadi Z. Haddad, reviewing Keddie's *Sayyid Jamal ad-Din 'Al-Afghani': A Political Biography* in *The Muslim World*, LXVI (1976), p. 229.
  62. Aziz Ahmad, "Sayyid Ahmad Khan, Jamal al-din al-Afghani and Muslim India", *Studia Islamica*, (1960), p. 63.

63. *Ibid.*, p. 69.
64. See Muhammad al-Makhzumi, *Khatirat Jamal al-Din*, Beirut, 1931, p. 232. This book is a record of the conversations which Afghani had with al-Makhzumi during his last years in Istanbul.
65. The original article arguing this position was in Persian and is not available to me at the time of writing. I am using a partial French tr: Mehdi Hendessi, "Pages peu connues de Djamal al-Din al-Afghani", *Orient*, no. 6 (1958), pp. 123–128.
66. Sati al-Husri, *Ma hiya al-qawmiyya?*, Beirut, 1959, p. 225.
67. Afghani and Abduh had organized a secret society of Muslims in Paris, and published *al-Urwa al-wuthqa* to spread and popularize their ideas on the unity and reform of Islam. Abduh wrote the text, Afghani supplied the ideas (Rashid Rida, *Tarikh al-ustad al-imam al-shaikh Muhammad Abduh*, Cairo, Vol I, 1931, p. 289). The first issue appeared on 13 March 1884 and the last on 16 October 1884. All the 18 issues are preserved in the Bibliotheque Nationale of Paris. For the photostate of the first page of the first issue see *Orient*, no. 21 (1962), page facing p. 89. It has been asserted that the journal "was published at the expense of a number of Indian Muhammadans" (*Shorter Encyclopaedia of Islam*, eds Gibb and Kramer, Leiden, 1953, pp. 85–86), but I have found no other evidence in support or against this statement.
68. See A. Albert Kudsi-Zadeh, "Les idees d'Afghani sur la politique coloniale des Anglais, des Francais et des Russes", *Orient*, nos. 47–48 (1968), pp. 200–206. The *Misr* was pub by two of Afghani's Egyptian disciples, Adib Ishaq and Salim al-Naqqash. *Al-Nahla* was a bilingual journal pub in London by the Rev. John Louis Sabounji, a Roman Catholic priest, which preached Islamic reform "with an Arab nationalist colouring" and denounced Sultan Abdul Hamid as "an usurper of the title... Caliph" (Albert Hourani, *op. cit.*, p. 268). Blunt says that there was a mystery about its financing and suspects that the funds to support it came, in part at least, from the ex-Khedive Ismail (W.S. Blunt, *The Secret History of the British Occupation of Egypt*, London, 1923, p. 66).
69. "Une conversation du directeur de la *Correspondance Parisi-*



- Journal of the American Oriental Society*, July–September 1969, p. 480 fn. 43). The first ed is included in the Afshar-Mahdavi documents. The popular title under which it is known, “Refutation of the Materialists”, is taken from the Arabic tr, *ar-Radd ‘ala al-dahiriyyin*, by Muhammad Abduh and Abu Turab, Beirut, 1885, Cairo, 1894, rep 1935. Pakdaman says that Jamaluddin himself had translated it for the first time into Arabic in 1880 (Homa Pakdaman, *op. cit.*, p. 68); she gives a list of differences between the Persian original and the Arabic tr by Abduh and Abu Turab (pp. 68–70). It was tr into French by Mlle. A.M. Goichon, *Refutation des materialistes*, Paris, 1942. There is a Turkish tr in manuscript form by Yakub Efendi-zade Muhammad Munir, deposited at the Istanbul University Library, Yildiz Collection.
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  56. Andre Guimbertiere, *op. cit.*, p. 34.
  57. Homa Pakdaman, *op. cit.*, pp. 233–234.
  58. Albert Hourani, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 1798–1939*, London, 1962, p. 125.
  59. Nikki R. Keddie, *op. cit.*, *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, April 1962, pp. 279–280.
  60. Letter tr and rep in E.G. Browne, *The Persian Revolution of 1905–1909*, London, 1910, pp. 28–29.
  61. Wadi Z. Haddad, reviewing Keddie’s *Sayyid Jamal ad-Din ‘Al-Afghani’: A Political Biography* in *The Muslim World*, LXVI (1976), p. 229.
  62. Aziz Ahmad, “Sayyid Ahmad Khan, Jamal al-din al-Afghani and Muslim India”, *Studia Islamica*, (1960), p. 63.
  63. *Ibid.*, p. 69.
  64. See Muhammad al-Makhzumi, *Khatirat Jamal al-Din*, Beirut, 1931, p. 232. This book is a record of the conversations which Afghani had with al-Makhzumi during his last years in Istanbul.
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  66. Sati al-Husri, *Ma hiya al-qawmiyya?*, Beirut, 1959, p. 225.
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  69. “Une conversation du directeur de la *Correspondance Parisi-*

- enne avec le scheik Djamaal-Eddin", *La Correspondance Parisienne*, 20 May 1885. For photographs of the original see Afshar and Mahdavi, *op. cit.*, facsimiles 158–163.
70. Jacob M. Landau, "Al-Afghani's Pan-Islamic Project", *Islamic Culture*, July 1952, p. 51, citing W.S. Blunt, *Gordon at Khartoum*, pp. 466–468, who relates this Churchill-Afghani interview.
  71. Letter dated 12 December 1895, Public Records Office, F.O. 60/594, quoted in Nikki R. Keddie, *op. cit.*, *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, April 1962, p. 282.
  72. *Ibid.*
  73. For this passing reference see *al-Urwa al-wuthqa*, Vol. I, p. 52.
  74. Despatch from Morier, St. Petersburg to London, 20 July 1887, no. 253, Secret, in F.O. 60/594, quoted by Aziz Ahmad, *op. cit.*, *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, July-September 1969, p. 490.
  75. *Ibid.*
  76. Nikki R. Keddie, *op. cit.*, *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, April 1962, p. 283, who relies on British Foreign Office sources.
  77. C.C. Adams, *Islam and Modernism in Egypt*, London, 1933, p. 12.
  78. Niyazi Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*, Montreal, 1964, p. 266 fn.
  79. Some examples of the hagiographic approach: "No other man in our time has stirred the soul of Islam more deeply than he" (Iqbal; in Shamloo (comp), *Speeches and Statements of Iqbal*, Lahore, 1945, p. 132), and "if somebody deserves to be called renewer after Aodul Wahab. . . it is Jamaluddin Afghani" (Iqbal, in Shaikh Muhammad Ata, *Iqbalnamah*, quoted in Annemarie Schimmel, *Gabriel's Wing*, Leiden, 1963, p. 21); "a celebrated religious teacher and prophet" (N.D. Harris, *Europe and the East*, Boston, 1926, p. 176); his "life touched and deeply affected the whole of Islamic world in the last quarter of the nineteenth century" (Albert Hourani, *op. cit.*, p. 108); "by the time he died most of the Islamic world had felt, directly or indirectly, some of the impact of his powerful personality and had been exposed to his ideas" (A. Albert Kudsi-Zadeh,

- "Islamic Reform in Egypt: Some Observations on the Role of Afghani", *The Muslim World*, January 1971, p. 1); "what al-Afghani did was to make Islam into the mainspring of solidarity, and thus he placed it on the same footing as other solidarity-producing beliefs" (Sylvia G. Haim, *Arab Nationalism*, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1962, 1974 rep, p. 15). A Pakistani biographer, who writes anonymously, even invents a meeting between Jamaluddin and Iqbal in India, in which Iqbal "was much impressed by his political views" (Naz, *Iqbal*, Lahore, 1970, p. 48). At the time of Jamaluddin's last visit to India Iqbal was a 4-year old child. The curious reader will find similar fabrications and imaginary virtues in all articles pub in the Urdu press of Pakistan since 1947; their number exceeds a hundred.
80. A.C. Niemeijer, *The Khilafat Movement in India, 1919–1924*, The Hague, 1972, p. 36.
  81. Majid Khadduri, *Political Trends in the Arab World: The Role of the Ideas and Ideals in Politics*, Baltimore, 1970, p. 57 fn.
  82. *Ibid.*, p. 58.
  83. M.R.T. (ed), *Pakistan and Muslim India*, Bombay, 1943, 2nd ed 1946, p. 14.
  84. S. Hyder, *Progress of Pakistan*, Lahore, June 1947, pp. 22–23.
  85. See his contribution in W.T. de Bary (ed), *Sources of Indian Tradition*, New York, 1958, p. 827.
  86. Nikki R. Keddie, *Sayyid Jamal al-Din 'Al-Afghani': A Political Biography*, Berkeley, 1972, p. 155 fn. 27.
  87. I.H. Qureshi, *The Muslim Community of the Indo-Pakistan Sub-Continent (610-1947): A Brief Historical Analysis*, The Hague, 1962, p. 295, citing as his authority *A History of the Freedom Movement*, Karachi, Vol. I, 1960, pp. 48, 49.
  88. Aziz Ahmad, "Sayyid Ahmad Khan, Jamal al-din al-Afghani and Muslim India", *Studia Islamica*, (1960), p. 67, quoting as his source I.H. Qureshi in de Bary's *Sources of Indian Tradition*.
  89. Aziz Ahmad, "Remarques sur les origines du Pakistan", *Orient*, no. 26 (1963), p. 21.
  90. Aziz Ahmad, *Islamic Modernism in India and Pakistan, 1857–1964*. London, 1967, p. 168.



91. Letter to me from Toronto, dated 15 January 1971. His italics.
92. Letter to me from Los Angeles, dated 3 September 1970. Her italics.
93. Syed Sharifuddin Pirzada, *Evolution of Pakistan*, Lahore, 1963, p. 42.
94. Syed Sharifuddin Pirzada, *The Pakistan Resolution and the Historic Lahore Session*, Karachi, 1968, p. 3.
95. Syed Sharifuddin Pirzada (ed), *The Foundations of Pakistan*, Karachi, 1970, Vol II, p. xiii.
96. Two instances from among dozens: "On one occasion Jamaluddin Afghani had made a clear reference to the possibility of making the entire area from Russian Turkestan to West Pakistan into a strong and united Muslim state" (Professor Muhammad Khalilullah, "Do Qawmi Nazria awr Iqbal", *Jang*, 31 September 1977; repeated in exact words in his "Iqbal awr Do Qawmi Nazria", *ibid.*, 23 March 1978); and Jamiluddin Ahmad, *The Final Phase of Struggle for Pakistan*, Lahore, 2nd ed 1968, p. 152.
97. Muhammad al-Makhzumi, *op. cit.*, pp. 237-241; Hisham Sharabi, *Arab Intellectuals and the West*, Baltimore, 1970, pp. 109-110.
98. Iqbal, though mistaken about Jamaluddin's origins, was sure that, in spite of the close association of his name with "what is called Pan-Islamic movement", he "never dreamed of a unification of Muslims into a political State" (statement issued on 19 September 1933, Shamloo, *op. cit.*, p. 204).
99. Besides the works cited above, the following throw additional light on Jamaluddin: Ruchi Ram Sahni, *The Awakening of Asia*, Lahore, n.d., pp. 39-41, 75-81; H.A.R. Gibb, *Modern Trends in Islam*, Chicago, 1947, pp. 27-32; Muhammad Iqbal, *Islam and Ahmadism*, Lahore, 1936, pp. 30-31; W.C. Smith, *Islam in Modern History*, Princeton, 1957, pp. 47-51; Sharif al-Mujalid, Sayyid Jamaluddin Afghani: His Role in the Nineteenth Century Muslim Awakening, unpublished M.A. thesis, McGill University, 1954; Elie Kedourie, *Afghani and Abduh*, London, 1966; T. Cuyler Young, "Pan-Islamism in the Modern World", in J.H. Proctor (ed), *Islam and International Relations*, London, 1965, pp. 194-219; I. Goldziher, "Djamal al-Din al-Afghani",

- Encyclopaedia of Islam*, first ed; Abd al-Qadir al-Maghribi, *Jamal al-Din al-Afghani*, Cairo, 1968; Nikki R. Keddie, *Religion and Rebellion in Iran*, London, 1966; A.J. Toynbee, *A Study of History*, London, 1954, Vol VIII, pp. 692-695. For the Afghani-Renan debate see Renan, "L'Islamisme et la science", *Journal des Debats*, 30 March 1883; Afghani, "Reponse a Renan", *ibid.*, 18 May 1883; "Reponse de Renan a Jamal-ed-Din" *ibid.*, 19 May 1883. The most important articles pub in *al-Urwa al-wuthqa* have been tr and pub by Marcel Colombe in *Orient* (Paris), no. 21 (1962), pp. 87-115, no. 22 (1962), pp. 125-159, no. 23 (1962), pp. 169-198, and no. 24 (1962), pp. 121-151. For a comprehensive bibliography on Afghani see A. Albert Kudsi-Zadeh, *Sayyid Jamal al-Din al-Afghani: An Annotated Bibliography*, Leiden, 1969.
100. W.S. Blunt, "The Future of Islam", *Fortnightly Review*, August 1881, pp. 204-223, September, pp. 315-322, October, pp. 441-458, November, pp. 585-602, and January 1882, pp. 32-48.
  101. W.S. Blunt, *Ideas about India*, London, 1885, p. 89.
  102. *Ibid.*, p. 163.
  103. W.S. Blunt, *India Under Ripon: A Private Diary*, London, 1909, pp. 107-108.
  104. Ian Stephens, *Pakistan*, London, 1963, p. 70. He does not cite any source.
  105. Blunt was not given to entertain doubt. He was accustomed to make forthright statements. For example, "The British Empire is a structure that might crumble at any moment, the sooner the better, say I", W.S. Blunt, *My Diaries: Being A Personal Narrative of Events, 1884-1914*, London, 1932, entry of 26 November 1897, p. 285.
  106. See also his "Ideas about India: The Mahomedan Question", *Fortnightly Review*, November 1884, pp. 624-637, and "The Future of Self-Government" *ibid.*, March 1885, pp. 386-398. On Blunt see Edith Finch, *Wilfred Scawen Blunt, 1840-1922*, London, 1938, esp pp. 112-114 and 180-191 on his Indian visits of 1879 and 1883; Earl of Lytton, *Wilfred Scawen Blunt: A Memoir by His Grandson*, London, 1961; Lepel Griffin, "An Indian Thersites", *Fortnightly Review*, March 1885, pp. 371-385, for a strong



criticism of Blunt's ideas on India; and G. Scott, Wilfred Scawen Blunt—Anti-Imperialist, unpublished B. Litt thesis, University of Oxford, 1961.

107. The *Rafique-i-Hind*, founded, owned and ed by Mawlawi Muharram Ali Chishti, began publication as a weekly from Lahore on 5 January 1884. A paper of high quality, it supported Sayyid Ahmad Khan's ideas and movement till 1888. When it differed from the Sayyid's religious views, it became the major focus of attacks on him in the Punjab, and pub some vulgar pieces on him and on Mawlawi Nazir Ahmad. This led to litigation between Nazir Ahmad and Chishti, as a result of which Chishti had to render an apology on 19 June 1893. It ceased publication in 1904. Information from Imdad Sabiri, *Tarikh-i-Sahafat-i-Urdu*, Vol. III, Delhi, n.d., A.S. Khurshid, *Sahafat Pakistan wa Hind men*, Lahore, 1963, pp. 280–281, and his letter to me from Lahore, dated 21 October 1969.
108. Rep in Pakistan Caliphate, "The Genesis of Pakistan", *CMG*, 6 August 1942.
109. For Sharar's literary activities see Ram Babu Saksena, *A History of Urdu Literature*, Allahabad, 1927, 2nd ed 1940, pp. 334–341, and Muhammad Sadiq, *A History of Urdu Literature*, London, 1964, pp. 339–344.
110. He wrote in *Dilgudaz* (one of his journals): "Whether we support Congress or not, one very sad thing which we notice about its activities is that it seems to be creating more differences between Hindus and Muslims than existed previously", Abdul Halim Sharar, *Lucknow: The Last Phase of an Oriental Culture*, tr and ed by E.S. Harcourt and Fakhir Hussain, London, 1975, "A Note on Abdul Halim Sharar", p. 23. No date is given, and it may have been written at any time between January 1887, when *Dilgudaz* began to appear, and the 1910s when it ceased publication.
111. The first issue of *Muhazzib* came out on 1 August 1890. Made up of 16 pages, it mainly comprised of editorial comments and articles, with brief notices of national and foreign news. See A.S. Khurshid, *Sahafat Pakistan wa Hind men*, pp. 270–271.
112. Quoted in A.S. Khurshid, "Origin of Pakistan: Trends that Led to Partition", *TPT*, 23 March 1962. Another scholar

calls this journal *Tahzib*, Waheed Qureshi, *Pakistan ki Nazriyati Bunyaden* Lahore, 1973, pp. 102, 116.

113. In *Sahafat Pakistan wa Hind men*, p. 272; "Pakistan ka Bani Kaun?", *Mashriq*, 1 April 1964; "Pakistan ke Qyam awr Baqa Men Sahafion ka Kirdar", *Imroz*, 14 August 1970.
114. For example, Syed Sharifuddin Pirzada, *Evolution of Pakistan*, p. 58, and *The Pakistan Resolution and the Historic Lahore Session*, p. 4.
115. A.S. Khurshid, *Karwan-i-Sahafat*, Karachi, 1964, p. 67, quoted in M. Rafique Afzal, "Origin of the Idea of a Separate Muslim State", *Journal of the Research Society of Pakistan*, January-April 1966, p. 177 fn 2.
116. A.S. Khurshid, in *TPT*, 23 March 1962.
117. Theodore Beck, article in *The Pioneer*, 2 and 3 November 1887.
118. Theodore Beck, *Essays on Indian Topics: Reprinted from The Pioneer and Other Papers*, Allahabad, 1888, p. 45.
119. *Ibid.*, p. 46.
120. *Ibid.*, p. 47.
121. *Ibid.*, p. 48.
122. *Ibid.*, pp. 82–83.
123. *Ibid.*, pp. 83–84.
124. *Ibid.*, p. 84.
125. Theodore Beck, "The House of Commons and the Indian Civil Service", *National Review*, May 1894, pp. 372–389. See also his "Native India and England", *ibid.*, November 1894, pp. 375–391, which is the text of his address to the Anjuman-i-Islam of London delivered on 8 September 1894. I have found nothing on him except "The Late Mr. Theodore Beck", *Calcutta Monthly*, September 1899, pp. 239–240, and Alfreda Elizabeth Meyers, Theodore Beck and Sayyid Ahmad Khan: The Myth of Provocateur and Puppet in Muslim Separatism, 1875–1909, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, American University, Washington, D.C., 1973.
126. See his *The History of the MAO College, Aligarh, from its Foundation to the Year 1903*, Allahabad, 1903; "A Descendant of the Prophet", *National Review*, June 1898, pp. 578–586 (on Sayyid Ahmad Khan); "A Muhammadan University", *ibid.*, October 1898, pp. 243–249 (on Aligarh);

"An Indian Renaissance", *Quarterly Review*, April 1906, pp. 553-570 (the Aligarh movement); "The Association of Indians with the Government of India", *The Englishman*, 27 November 1906; "Can Islam be Reformed?", *Nineteenth Century*, October 1908, pp. 543-551 (a reply to Cromer); "England and Islam", *ibid.*, July 1919, pp. 116-122; "The Outlook for India", *Contemporary Review*, April 1931, pp. 409-415; "The Hindu-Muslim Problem in India", *ibid.*, June 1931, pp. 710-717; and "The Government of India and Civil Disobedience", *ibid.*, February 1932, pp. 137-143. I am not aware of any material on him except some passing references and the entries in the *Who Was Who* and the *Dictionary of National Biography*.

127. Theodore Morison, *Imperial Rule in India: Being an Examination of the Principles Proper to the Government of Dependencies*, London, 1899, pp. 4-5.
128. For some contemporary reports on the Hindu-Muslim issue and on the thinking of the two communities see W.W. Hunter, *The Indian Musalmans: Are They Bound in Conscience to Rebel against the Queen?*, London, 1871, 2nd ed 1872; E.C. Moulton, *Lord Northbrook's Indian Administration*, Bombay, 1968; Muhammadan Literary Society of Calcutta on Muslim Education, quoted in *The Englishman*, 22 October 1873; Peter Townsend, *The Last Emperor: Decline and Fall of the British Empire*, London, 1975; *Sadharani* (a leading Bengali weekly), editorial, 5 January 1878; John Gallagher, Gordon Johnson and Anil Seal (eds), *Locality, Province and Nation: Essays on Indian Politics, 1870 to 1940*, London, 1973; Francis Robinson, *Separatism among Indian Muslims*, London, 1974; Peter Hardy, *The Muslims of British India*, Cambridge, 1972; *Mahomedan Observer*, 1 January 1887; *The Times*, 16 January 1888; Leonard A. Gordon, "Party-Building under the Raj: Bengal, 1875-1918", *South Asian Review*, January 1971; F.W. Thomas, *The Mutual Influence of Muhammadans and Hindus*, Cambridge, 1892; Swami Sharddhanand, *Inside Congress*, Bombay, 1946; Indian National Congress, *Annual Reports*, for 1894, 1895 and 1896, Allahabad; *Moslem Chronicle*, 9 January 1897; A.C. Lyall, "India under Queen Victoria", *Nineteenth Century*, June 1897; and contem-

porary issues of *Bharat Fiwan* and *Kavi Vachar Sudha* of Benares, *Hindustan*, *Prayag Samachar* and *Hindi Pradip* of Allahabad, *Arya Darpan* of Shahjahanabad, and *Hindustani* of Lucknow.

# 2

## THE INNER MOMENTUM : 1900-1924

### The State of Hindu-Muslim Relations (1900-1910)

The first decade of the twentieth century is something of a puzzle. It witnessed a number of significant developments, like the partition of Bengal, the Hindu agitation against this, the Muslim deputation on separate electorates, the founding of the All India Muslim League, the Minto-Morley reforms which gave the Muslims what their deputation had demanded, and increasing Hindu-Muslim friction. But these ten years are devoid of any contribution to the growth of the idea of Pakistan. This odd circumstance will be examined later. Let us begin the study of the new century with a quick look at the state of Hindu-Muslim relations as reflected in contemporary reports and other evidence.

In April 1901, the well-known Hindu leader Bal Gangadhar Tilak wrote in his *Marahatti* paper that it was "wrong to conclude . . . that the Marathas, Punjabis, Bengalis, etc., all these different people have one nationality".<sup>1</sup> As if to confirm the belief of their leader, the Hindus of Moradabad, after having won a majority in the city council in 1903, treated the Muslims as their subjects.<sup>2</sup> In early 1906, Sister Nivedita underlined the Hindu character of Indian nationalism when she wrote that "service for the nation was a duty—a duty as taught in Gita".<sup>3</sup> When the Muslim deputation saw the Viceroy at Simla and requested separate and weighted representation in all elected bodies, and received a sympathetic reply, the entire Hindu and Congress press criticized the Muslims for making such a suggestion and the Viceroy for supporting it.<sup>4</sup>

Indian diversity and Muslim separateness were acknowledged in the House of Commons in June 1907 by Lord Percy: "India is not a homogeneous nationality but a congeries of races animated by antagonistic ideals. Muslims are physically superior but numeri-

cally inferior and the Hindus physically inferior but numerically far superior. Therefore government by majorities in India must mean the government of the strong by the weak."<sup>5</sup> The increasing Hinduizing of nationalism was noticed by the sharp eye of C.F. Andrews, who wrote to the Viceroy's private secretary in 1908: "There is a rapid Hinduizing of 'national' ideas going on among the younger men . . . and a Hindu religious colouring is given to National ideas."<sup>6</sup>

Hindu-Muslim differences were implicit in this religion-dominated nationalism. During the anti-partition agitation in Bengal, Rabindranath Tagore wrote in the same year: "When our speakers failed in Mymensingh and other areas to win the heart of the Mussalman peasantry, they felt very indignant. They never thought for a moment that we have never given proof of our real interest in the welfare of the Mussalmans or of the common people of our country. We cannot, therefore, blame them if they are rather suspicious of our professions of goodwill. A brother does, of course, suffer for the sake of another brother, but if somebody just turns up from nowhere and introduces himself as a brother, he is not very likely to be straight away shown into his share of the inheritance. Our people do not yet know that they are their brothers, and our conduct has not so far been such that we can claim to have fraternal feelings in relation to them surging in our mind."<sup>7</sup>

Another top-ranking Hindu leader was of the same opinion. Gokhale told Blunt in 1908 that Muslims were all against the Congress and would constitute a danger in any reconstruction of India on a national basis, because, though much less numerous and less rich, they were united. Blunt asked him if his (Blunt's) appealing to the Muslims to join the Congress would do any good, but was told that it would be useless.<sup>8</sup> Contemporary Hindu opinion, specially in the Bengali circles, was that Muslims were "treacherous enemies who could not be trusted with the work of securing political freedom".<sup>9</sup>

In an article written at the end of 1909, C.F. Andrews brought out the close connection between Hinduism and Indian nationalism of his day. "Today it [religion] is probably, in many Hindu minds, one of the strongest emotional forces evoking love of country. . . . Today many of the noblest among the younger Hindus are finding in a revival of their sentiment a partial satisfaction of their rising national instincts. They don't strictly distinguish in their thoughts



—perhaps they hardly wish to distinguish—between mother India as the object of their devotion and that Motherland within the Divine Nature itself of which Hindu saints and philosophers have spoken, and which had become embodied in popular legend as a religion of the common people. . . . No Mussalman could join with a Hindu on this religious basis, however patriotic he might be, however he might love India as his own native country. This fact should be clearly recognized by those who wish Indian patriotism to be all-embracing and inclusive, and not merely confined to Hinduism.”<sup>10</sup>

This was confirmed by official communications reaching the government from the administrators. The Commissioner of Lucknow told the government on 18 May 1909 that throughout the province the Hindus were attacking their rivals where they could, and Hindu *taluqdars* were dismissing Muslims from their service. The Hindus of Agra even went so far in 1910 as to renounce the charms of their Muslim courtesans. Harcourt Butler wrote to the Viceroy's private secretary on 25 November 1910 that “never in my experience has Hindu-Mahomedan antagonism been so intense as it now is in Northern India. People there are beginning to ask for separate courts of justice, separate schools, etc. . . . for the two communities. Most municipal elections turn on this question. The Mahomedans have got too much, say the Hindus; we must get back a bit”. The Commissioner of Agra reported to the government on 21 February 1911 that Hindu merchants were considering stopping credit to Muslims, and Muslim pleaders and physicians were being boycotted by their Hindu clientele.<sup>11</sup>

### Three Vague Proposals (1904, 1905, 1907)

In an atmosphere of so much friction and enmity one would have expected several Muslim attempts to solve the communal issue by separation. In fact, we find practically none. I think this can be explained by three factors. Bengal was partitioned in 1905, and a separate province of Eastern Bengal and Assam was brought into being which contained a very large majority of Muslims. On 1 October 1906, the Muslims demanded separate and extra representation in all elected bodies and got it under the new reforms of 1909. In December 1906, the All India Muslim League was

established in Dacca. These momentous developments gave Muslims a confidence which they had lacked earlier. The government had created a new Muslim province. Their own representatives would now sit in the councils, free of any obligation to Hindu voters, and their number would be larger than their strength in the population allowed. They had their own national organization which would act as a counterpoise to Congress claims. Things were going smoothly. They had achieved much in ten years. More benefits would flow in coming years from a beneficent government and their own unity and determination. This is the way their mind was working, and for the time being (the qualification is important) their thoughts did not contemplate the marking out of a separate path for themselves.

On 15 and 16 February 1907, Mawlana Muhammad Ali gave two lectures at Allahabad on “The Present Political Situation” and “The Muhammadan Programme”. I read their substance after I had written the above; they seem to endorse the optimism which I have indicated in my analysis. He said: “The Muslim League was not an effort at disintegration but at integration. He compared the Congress of the Hindus and the League of the Mussalmans to two trees growing on either side of the road. Their trunks stood apart, but their roots were fixed in the same soil, drawing nourishment from the same source. The branches were bound to meet when the stems had reached their full stature, and shade the passerby. The soil was British, the nutriment was common patriotism, the trunks were the two political bodies and the road was the highway of peaceful progress.”<sup>12</sup> This picturesque and clever analogy hovers between unity and separation. Separation is implied by the two trees: they are planted on opposite sides of the road, and will never become one. Unity is underlined by the common soil and by the happy prospect when the branches of the two trees would embrace one another and provide welcome shade to the whole nation. Muhammad Ali is sitting on the fence; he would practise this art in all the years to come.

In these ten years, three suggestions are *reported* to have been made for a partition of India on a religious basis, but the reports are so vaguely worded and so casually mentioned without citing any original source that nothing definite can be said about them until further information comes to hand. They are briefly noted

here to keep the record complete.

One recent study mentions in passing that in 1904 Bhai Parmanand, an orthodox Hindu leader of the Punjab (whom we will meet again), advocated a division of India on Hindu-Muslim lines. No details are given, no evidence is produced, and a mere secondary source is mentioned.<sup>13</sup>

The second amounts to two sentences in an autobiography, stating that in 1905 Akbar Allahabadi, the well-known poet of humour and biting satire, used to tell the author that, as Muslims found it difficult to live with the Hindus, the two nations would be able to exist in peace if India north of the Jumna river was given to the Muslims. The exact words used in the report are: "*Jumna darya tak agar uper ka hissa Musalmanon ko de diya jaye to donon qawmen itminan ki zindagi basar kar sakti hayn*."<sup>14</sup> It may be noted in passing that Akbar was a harsh critic of the Aligarh movement and mocked at modern education and living.

On the third report we have more definite information but no verifiable authority. "About 1907", we are told by a modern scholar of Iqbal (S.A. Vahid), "two Turkish statesmen visited the sub-continent, and they were so depressed to read about Hindu-Muslim riots all over the sub-continent that, in a book they wrote, they suggested that the sub-continent should be sub-divided into Hindu India and Muslim India."<sup>15</sup> The names of the visiting statesmen are not given, nor is the exact date of their visit provided, nor is the title of their book mentioned, nor is any supporting evidence quoted. It would have been interesting to know what impelled them to advocate a partition, and under the influence of which Muslim leaders, if any, they formulated this radical solution. We are not even told whether the book in question was written in English or Turkish, and where it was published. Further confusion is created by the use of the word "sub-divided" by the author of this report. What does it mean? Is he quoting the Turkish statesmen's word or translating what they had said, presumably, in Turkish? It is not impossible that these Turks showed concern for the Muslim problem in India because they themselves were Muslims and had a peculiar and troublesome minority problem in the Ottoman empire. But there is so little mention of any Turkish interest in India in contemporary literature that it comes as a surprise to find such a novel idea being propounded by the Turks. In the absence of any further information it is not possible to

pursue this interesting line of inquiry.

In response to my inquiry on this point, Mr. Vahid wrote: "I read the book to which I have made a reference sometime in 1925. I forget much about it. But so far as I can remember the name of the book was 'Cross versus Crescent', and one of the authors was Khalil Khalid Bey, who was for some time Turkish Consul General in Bombay."<sup>16</sup> This book is not available to me at the time of writing this study.

### Muhammad Ali (1911, 1912)

In 1911 Muhammad Ali,<sup>17</sup> while giving vent to his dissatisfaction with the condition of the Muslims, expressed certain opinions which could be interpreted as a confession of faith in Muslim separatism and an agreement with the two-nation theory. On 14 January he wrote in his *Comrade*: "We have no faith in the cry that India is united. The problems of India are almost international. But when the statesmen and philanthropists of Europe, with all its wars of interests and national jealousies, do not despair of abolishing war and placing Pax on the throne of Bellona, shall we despair of Indian nationality? We may not create today the patriotic fervour and fine national frenzy of Japan with its forty millions of homogeneous people. But a concordat like that of Canada is not beyond the bounds of practicability. It may not be a love-marriage born of romance and poetry. But a *mariage de convenance*, honourably contracted and honourably maintained, is not to be despised."<sup>18</sup>

A fortnight later he returned to the subject: "... the problems of India are not so national as international. And in international law, the strength of a country or Power does not count, for the basic principle of that law is the equality of all nations. The Musalmans stand on a par with the smaller Powers of Europe, and can even claim like those Powers an absolute equality in all inter-communal controversies. But they do not do so, and limit their demand to such a representation as is adequate and effective for the preservation of their existence and their honour."<sup>19</sup>

And again, a year later, he still believed in the absence of a united India. "... a united India does not exist today. We have to create it and the first necessary condition before it can be created is to recognize that it does not exist."<sup>20</sup>

Muhammad Ali knew his mind, and these words have the qualities of clarity and strength. But they need to be placed in their context. The *Comrade* used, by habit, strong words and delighted in being provocative. Nevertheless, it was the first English journal of quality in Muslim India, and succeeded in moulding the public opinion of the elite as nothing had done before. Its immense influence on Muslim thinking is undeniable. It formulated new ideas as well as it reflected Muslim fears and hopes. The dates of the appearance of these editorials must be kept in mind. Between 1905 and 1911 Muslim politics was in a ferment. In the course of these seminal years several notable developments came tumbling down one after another, as we have mentioned in the opening section of this chapter. The Hindus had taken umbrage at the division of Bengal, and had answered it with a virulent agitation which was as much anti-British as it was anti-Muslim. Hindu-Muslim relations had deteriorated swiftly. The Hindus and the Congress had also looked with utter distaste at the Muslim demand for separate representation and additional seats in councils. They had reacted similarly to the establishment of the Muslim League. The Congress had never been able to win the support of any large section of the Muslims, but the founding of a separate Muslim party was a public demonstration of the Congress's failure to speak for India. In the meantime, the first major instalment of reforms was on the anvil in London, and when it came in its final shape in 1909 it contained a provision for separate Muslim representation, a concession which every Hindu politician, group, party and newspaper opposed vociferously.<sup>21</sup>

The feeling of separateness was fast growing among the Muslims and coming to the surface. A few years of hectic politics had set a seal on Hindu-Muslim alienation, and India never recovered from the effects of these developments. All the basic issues were formulated during this period, opposing stances were taken, and attitudes were struck. There were some changes of detail in later years, some appearance at bargaining, some softening or hardening of attitudes; but fundamentally the mould created in this half decade continued to shape Hindu-Muslim relations until the late 'thirties, when the final demand for a clear partition was decided upon.

Thus Muhammad Ali wrote at a time when the Bengali Hindu agitation was in full spate. He wrote in support of the Muslim

demand for separate representation, which was still being criticized by the Hindus though the India Act of 1909 had conceded it, and this should have silenced the controversy. He also wrote in defence of Muslim League policies, for he was not only a member of the League but one of its founding-fathers. As a politician Muhammad Ali is not an easy man to understand or portray. He changed his parties and views several times; others did so too, but his *penchant* for candid talk and sturdy language did not leave him convenient loopholes to evade the charge of inconsistency. Postponing our judgment on him, for we will meet him again a few years later, let us look more closely at his words quoted above.

It is a merit of Muhammad Ali that he went straight to the heart of the problem. Of course, he wrote when Hindu-Muslim relations were at an uncommonly low ebb; but then so did other Muslim leaders and journalists. He was alone among them to state in clear words that the Hindu-Muslim problem was an international one; that the two communities, in spite of the difference in their size, were like nations which are recognized by status, not by numbers; and that the two communities were absolutely equal in political terms. Twenty-two years later Rahmat Ali was to employ these very words in justification of his Pakistan plan; and twenty-nine years later Jinnah was to use them in support of his demand for a partition.

But Muhammad Ali did not go that far. Like his other contemporaries and like some of his predecessors mentioned in the last chapter, he walked almost to the edge of his argument and then retraced his steps. In India there was an international problem waiting to be solved. The Muslims were a nation. They were right in claiming absolute equality with the Hindus. They had no faith in the existence of a united India. *But* they were prepared to give it a try. They would not assert their equality to its logical end and demand parity (that was to come later with Jinnah); they would content themselves with adequate representation. They might fail to create a spirit of nationality in India, as the homogeneous Japanese had done; but they would strive to create a sort of a Canada in India. This would not be a marriage born of passion and romance, that was impossible; but they would accept an arranged marriage as all Indians did in their personal life.

That was the limit to which Muhammad Ali could go—an arranged marriage, brought about by mutual convenience, and



the nuptials to be managed by the British. He was still hopeful of better days. Probably the couple would settle down in conjugal peace and quiet, and years of companionship and also of occasional tiffs would bring that mature attachment, if not flaming love, which frees from impediments the path of married life. Such are the hopes of all Indian parents who arrange their children's marriages, and of the children who have to hope because there is nothing else to do. But suppose conjugal love failed to blossom? Suppose the arranged match did not work out? What then? Here Muhammad Ali fell silent. Like the Indian father answering his doubting son (the daughter does not have even that privilege), he talked of hope and assurance. What was the point in contemplating dark days? Why think of despair? Things were bound to turn out well!

Perhaps Muhammad Ali was an optimist at this stage. He genuinely believed that the future would vindicate his hopes. Or, perhaps, he had his doubts but preferred not to give them tongue. If he was a sceptic, had he given thought to alternatives? What would happen if the arranged marriage collapsed? Would he have suggested a fresh attempt and renewed his assurance? Or, did that make separation unavoidable? If so, what kind of separation? We don't know. He did not return to this subject again with such clarity. He did not mention division or partition, but he came near doing it. He saw the possibility without facing it.

### Joseph Stalin (1912)

The Communist theory of nationalities, particularly in its application to India, has been cited by some writers as evidence of an early belief in the formation of several national groups in the sub-continent. In a book on India, published in 1947, R. Palme Dutt, the half-Indian leader and publicist of the British Communist Party, referred rather vaguely to a statement made by Stalin in 1912. He introduced Stalin's quotation with the imprecise remark that "Communist writers say that in 1912 Stalin was foreseeing the break-up of India into several nationalities". Then the words of Stalin are given as: "In the case of India, too, it will probably be found that innumerable nationalities, till then lying dormant, would come into life with the further course of bourgeois development."<sup>21</sup>

It will be noticed that Dutt does not give the source of this quotation either in this book or in its second edition, but relies for this information on some unnamed "Communist writers". This, however, is usual practice with him, and in all his works are to be found statements, assertions, reports and quotations unsupported by references to their origin.

But, apart from that, there is nothing startlingly new in Stalin's reported declaration. The principle of nationalities, as propounded by Communist theoreticians, is by now quite a familiar feature of Communist political thinking. Inspired by the incredible heterogeneity of Russia and impelled by the need for some kind of a principle to deal with a country containing a score of national groups, the makers of the Soviet revolution were quick to see the value of a theoretically liberal doctrine of nationalities, not only for Russia where they were attempting their first experiment, but also for all other countries with large and amorphous populations. The break-up of such countries into nationalities was prophesied with a view to showing the disruptive character of the development of capitalism, winning the support of such national groups which wanted to be independent, and presenting Communism as an attractive and effective solution of the nationality problem.

Apart from being the pronouncement of a front-rank Communist thinker and statesman, no deep and hidden meaning should be sought in Stalin's words. Prospects for a break-up of India in the future had been mentioned by many persons before him. The possible emergence of a number of nationalities out of the numerous Indian mass of humanity had been foreseen much earlier by men like Bright, Blunt, Strachey, Morison and several other British observers of the Indian scene, not to speak of some Indians themselves, particularly the Muslims, whose patriotism for India or dislike of the British did not blind them to the disunity, diversity and heterogeneity of their country. From the point of view of the present study, Stalin's belief in the disunity of India and his prophecy of the eventual birth of more than one nationality have no significance. He made no reference to the Hindu-Muslim problem; probably he did not know much about it. There is no mention of it even in one of his later statements made in 1924 before the students of the University of the Peoples of the East: "Now-a-days India is spoken of as a single whole, yet there can be hardly any doubt that in case of a revolutionary

upheaval in India, many hitherto unknown nationalities will emerge on the scene."<sup>23</sup>

To refer to Stalin in connection with the history of early thinking about a partition of India and to pass on can be misleading. The attitude of the Communists, inside and outside India, to the creation of a separate Muslim state, is an interesting study in confusion and contradiction. In spite of Stalin's reported statements and the general theory of nationalities enshrined in the Communist doctrines of Soviet Russia, Soviet attitude to the Pakistan demand before 1947 and to the state of Pakistan after independence has been one of unreserved hostility, not so much on political and diplomatic levels as in historical understanding. Soviet writers on South Asia have believed consistently that the demand for Pakistan was instigated by the British and had its roots in the imperialist policy of divide-and-rule, and that its creation owes much to British interests. Histories of India and Pakistan which have appeared in Moscow during the last thirty years, bearing the imprint of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, contain as much misinformation, sweeping generalities unsupported by evidence, distortion of facts and deliberate misrepresentation of history as one can find in the accounts of the most biased among Hindu historians.<sup>24</sup>

Similarly, the Communist Party of Great Britain did not conceal its hostility to the Indian Muslims, and opposed the Pakistan demand with arguments borrowed from its Hindu critics. All of this cannot be explained by the half-Indian origin of its foremost leader and propagandist, R. Palme Dutt. It is obvious that the British Communists chose to follow the Moscow line. What is, to a great extent, inexplicable is the different course adopted by the Communist Party of India. The Indian Communists were almost neutral in the Hindu-Muslim struggle, choosing to attach more importance to the exploitation of the poor by the capitalists and landlords of both religions than to the substance of their political differences. With the opening of German-Soviet hostilities, however, their attitude took a swift turn in favour of the British war effort, for now the war was declared to be a "people's war". Following this, they became harsh and relentless critics of the Congress which was obstructing the war effort and thereby endangering Soviet ability to repel the Nazi invasion. By the logic of the Indian politics of that period, hostility to the Congress

was taken to be automatic support for the Muslim League; this was helped by the League's neutral, in practice favourable, attitude towards war effort. But the Indian Communists went further, and came out in support of the Pakistan demand, justifying it by the Communist doctrine of nationalities with their right to independent existence.<sup>25</sup> By doing so they made the Congress their enemy. But more important was the fact that here the Indian Communists were using a principle enunciated by the Soviet leaders in justification of a policy which was totally opposed to the Soviet attitude to the Pakistan demand. This rebellion remains one of the minor mysteries of Indian politics as well as of the world Communist movement.

### Bhai Parmanand (1912)

We have already seen that in 1904 Bhai Parmanand is reported to have suggested a division of India on Hindu-Muslim lines. According to another account (by Abdul Hamid), he made this (or another such) suggestion in 1912. In his *Apbiti*, said to have been published in Urdu in Lahore in 1923, he wrote that "the police searched his house in 1912 and seized some of his private papers which included the rough draft of a letter addressed to Lajpat Rai containing a blue-print of a constitution for free India together with a proposal to push the Muslims across the river Indus".<sup>26</sup> In the same year was published his *Arya Samaj awr Hindu Sangathan* from Lahore, in which he "reiterated the proposal in a somewhat different fashion".<sup>27</sup> Hamid neither quotes from the two books he has apparently consulted nor gives direct references to their pages. He also fails to elaborate the "somewhat different fashion" in which in 1923 Parmanand repeated his 1912 proposal.

On this amended proposal, however, we have some further information at another place. In his second book, Parmanand stated that Hindu-Muslim unity was unthinkable. "According to him", Pirzada tells us, "the solution lay in either the Hindus assimilating the entire Muslim population of the sub-continent or being eventually assimilated by the alien intruders. Rejecting both as impracticable, he proceeds to outline a solution of his own: 'It struck me a long time ago that the only satisfactory avenue to unity is to effect complete severance between the two

peoples. India could be partitioned in such a manner as to secure the supremacy of Islam in one zone and that of Hinduism in the other'.<sup>28</sup>

It appears that Parmanand's plan of 1912 hardly left anything to the Muslims. According to Hamid, his earlier proposal was to push the Muslims "across the river Indus". This reminds us of Jamaluddin's alleged scheme of detaching a part of north-west India and amalgamating it with Afghanistan and some areas of Central Asia to create a Muslim republic. The details of the Parmanand plan are not known. It is reasonable to assume that he expected the Indian region lying beyond the Indus to merge with Afghanistan. Otherwise, how could the tiny, resourceless, land-locked north-west frontier province and the tribal areas be converted into an independent state? And, how could it accommodate more than a fraction of the total Indian Muslim population? The 1912 proposal was clearly not for a partition of India (the term is not used in Hamid's account), but for extending Hindu control over the whole of India, including the Punjab, minus the north-west frontier.

The 1923 scheme is certainly one of partition. He wants the creation of two zones, one Muslim, the other Hindu, to be effected by a division. We are unable to say what kind of a partition he was suggesting, for no details are available. What is beyond any doubt is that this is the first clear proposal for a partition of India on religious lines made by a Hindu. It is significant to note that he belonged to the orthodox school and the right wing of Hindu politics, being one of the founders of the All India Hindu Mahasabha.<sup>29</sup>

Here dates are important. Parmanand's solution by partition did not come till 1923; the 1912 plan was not one of division. Between 1912 and 1923 partition was suggested by several Muslims, though no serious notice was taken of them.

### Characteristics of the Post - 1912 Period

From 1912 onwards our search for the origins of the idea of a separate Muslim state is conducted in a relatively unclouded atmosphere. The groping is over and done with. Now there is more light, and the goal is better marked. Doubts and uncertainties begin to dissolve as the concept of a partition rises into view.

The search for a permanent solution grows intense. Thoughts turn more frequently to separation. The assumption of a united India and the hopes of arranging things within its compass recede. There are some who still fear to cross the Rubicon, and continue to pin their hopes on a less radical solution. But the mounting wave of new thinking sweeps along with gathering volume and speed, and leaves the remiss conservatives with nothing but a feeling of their inadequacy.

The idea of partition seems to have been the third and final stage of a process of thought which, in perspective, looks simple and undeviating. First came the realization of the gravity of the communal problem. It was a very serious affair, but no effort was made to find a permanent solution. Such was the thinking of Sayyid Ahmad's period. His contribution to this thought process was his emphasis on the existence of the problem. For the first time, Muslims, and others, began to take a serious view of the future of Islam in India. As the problem grew in gravity and communal riots multiplied, the idea of segregation struck some minds. Blunt was the first to suggest it among the British, Sharar among the Muslims. Physical separation was the only way to avoid constant friction and bring moral and material prosperity to the Muslim minority. From physical separation to political division was a revolutionary step which most feared to take. But the march of events made such reluctance out of date. When an idea begins to develop and grow it generates an inner momentum of its own, and those who try to halt its march with words of caution labour in vain. A time had to come when the concept of separation would ripen into the idea of a partition. The consummation may have the appearance of being the work of one mind, but in reality it was not so. (That is what makes nonsense of the general Pakistani assertion that Iqbal conceived the idea of Pakistan and Jinnah achieved it). Many small hints contributed to the ultimate commitment. Several minds were working to the same end and harbouring similar thoughts. When the feeling of a nascent nationalism coincided with the disappointment at all ready-made ameliorative expedients, partition was found to be the only solution possessing the merits of permanence, security and national advancement.

With these contours of the thought process fixed on our mind, we may proceed with the story of the idea. But, first a brief look



at the state of Hindu-Muslim relations and the sentiment of separatism on both sides in the years 1911-20 is in order.

### The State of Hindu-Muslim Relations (1911-1920)

In his presidential address to the Indian National Congress in 1911, Bishan Naryan Dhar pointed in clear words to the threat posed to Indian nationalism by the current separatist tendencies. "The idea of a united Indian nation", he said, "may not be alluring to some people, and a section of the Muhammedans may, for the present, fail to realize its true significance; but the instructed classes do care for that ideal and they see that it is menaced by separatism".<sup>30</sup>

Some Muslim voices were now raised in favour of Hindu-Muslim parity, a sure guidepost to partition. Muslims were afraid that if, with the advance of democracy on the local level, the official element was squeezed out of district boards and town municipalities, the Hindu majority was bound to crush the Muslim minority. This posed a special danger for the Muslims of the Hindu-majority provinces. A note written on 2 September 1911 by Shaikh Zahur Ahmad of the United Provinces points to this problem. "In these circumstances to give preponderant influence to one community would mean grave injustice to the other; and it would be an evil day for India if the mass of any community comes to think that its interests have been left at the mercy of the other and the British Government has in any way deviated from its well established principle of holding the balance even in India. In these circumstances, since it is the majority of votes that decides all questions in municipal and district boards, a community whose members are less than 5% will naturally be at the mercy of the predominating community and this in the absence of the personal *dabao* [pressure] and influence of the official president means the sacrificing of the interests of the minority to those of the majority. The only solution of such a difficult problem lies in giving equal representation to both the communities or distributing the number of representatives in such a way that if the non-partisan members voted with the Muhammedan members the issue may be decided accordingly."<sup>31</sup> It took the Muslim League 34 years to make such a demand, and that on the executive side, not the legislative; it was in 1945 at Simla that Jinnah demanded equal Muslim and

non-Muslim representation on the Viceroy's Executive Council.

It will be recalled that in 1908 Gokhale had told Blunt that the Muslims were keeping themselves away from the Congress. Four years later, when Sarojini Naidu told Gokhale that Hindu-Muslim unity would be achieved in five years, he replied, "Child, you are a poet, but you hope too much. It will not come in your life-time or mine. But keep your faith and work for it if you can."<sup>32</sup>

Some prominent Hindu leaders were so terrified of a Muslim revival in India and its possible linkage with foreign Muslim countries that they were prepared, their hatred for the British empire notwithstanding, to forge an alliance with the British rulers in self-defence against such an Islamic gathering in. B.C. Pal of Bengal illustrates this trend, and his words are worth reflecting upon. "Pan-Islamism and Pan-Mongolianism offer, therefore, the greatest menace to India's future and to the realization of the dream of the Indian Nationalist. . . . And the real strength of this Pan-Islamic outburst will come from Egypt and India. . . . Indian Nationalism, in any case, has, I think, no fear of being permanently opposed or crippled by Great Britain. On the contrary, the British connection can alone offer it effective protection against both the Pan-Islamic and the Pan-Mongolian menace . . . The sixty millions of Mahomedans in India, if inspired by Pan-Islamic aspirations, joined to the Islamic principalities and powers that stand both to our west and our north-west, may easily put an end to all our nationalist aspirations, almost at any moment, if the present British connection be severed. . . . One is forced to recognize the absolute need of keeping up the British connection in the interest of Indian Nationalism itself, for the very simple and sufficient reason that there is absolutely much greater chance of this Nationalism fully realizing itself with rather than without this connection. . . . Indeed, the backbone of Pan-Islamism is not in Persia or Afghanistan, much less in Algeria or Abyssinia [?], but in India and Egypt. This sentiment is the strongest among Egyptian and Indian Muslims. . . In her own interest, therefore, Great Britain will have, before long, to come to term with Egyptian Nationalism, on the one side, and cure the conceit of separate political interests and superior political claims of the Indian Mahomedans, on the other, and lead the Indian Muslims to recognize that their future is absolutely bound up with that of the larger and composite Indian Nation. This is the only remedy against the Pan-Islamic menace so far as it affects

Great Britain."<sup>33</sup> This was written in May 1913.

In August-September of the same year, he wrote with equal clarity: "It was never more true than it is today, that India and Great Britain must stand or fall together. . . . A reasonable compromise between Indian Nationalism and British Imperialism is, therefore, as much of an imperious necessity for Great Britain as it is for us."<sup>34</sup> Such clear words need no commentary. The important thing to bear in mind is that Pal was not one of the pro-British, self-seeking, second-class politicians, but a mass leader of more than considerable influence and prestige.

On the other side, the British administrators and public men of Indian interest and experience were stressing Muslim fears of a Hindu rule. Sir James Meston, the Lieutenant Governor of the United Provinces, wrote to the Viceroy on 25 March 1915 that the Muslims "know that, if they lost us, the Hindus would eat them up".<sup>35</sup>

In Britain, Curzon warned the Cabinet of the implications of granting "self-government" to India. In his memorandum of 2 June 1917 he wrote: "What do we mean by self-government for Indians? We do not mean that India, either now or in any future that can be reasonably predicted, will become a single autonomous unit. . . . Such an aspiration, in the present phase of Indian evolution, is the wildest of dreams; and the belief that it can be attained is doomed to irretrievable disappointment. Neither do we mean that India can be resolved into an organized federation of Autonomous states under the control of a Federal Government of Delhi or elsewhere. That also is an impracticable ideal. . . . It may be that in the march towards the self-governing ideal the political unity of India may be disintegrated and assume different shapes."<sup>36</sup> At the same time, Montagu thought that "ultimate self-government in India" would be "a Commonwealth of self-governing provinces or countries united to the Home Government and to one another and to the Native States".<sup>37</sup>

The Muslim feeling in this decade is summed up by a modern scholar in these words: "The most striking fact in this account is the Muslims' assertion, at every point, of their community's right to a separate political existence. The strategies of politics, as we have seen, were not constant; the type of Muslim politician with influence varied; and the political system underwent radical change. But this determination to maintain a distinct political

identity was throughout the basic factor in Muslim thinking. The suggestion that the community should take its place simply as one religious and cultural group in a diverse Indian nation was never entertained."<sup>38</sup>

### Wilayet Ali "Bambooque" (1913)

Muhammad Ali, as we have seen, had come near to entertaining thoughts of a partition but had preferred not to voice them, and, instead, had held out a hope of moulding a new nationality on the Canadian model of an English-French-cum-Protestant-Catholic concordat. But some of his colleagues dared to go where he himself had feared to tread.

One of his close associates on the staff of the *Comrade* was Wilayet Ali, an old boy of the Aligarh College and at this time a practising lawyer at Barabanki.<sup>39</sup> Every issue of the journal carried a very readable column entitled "Gup" (gossip: the predecessor of "Over a Cup of Tea" and "From Here and There" of later newspapers); and this was written by Wilayet Ali under the pseudonym of "Bambooque". For the issue of 10 May 1913, he wrote up "The Interview", an imaginary conversation with "a gentleman who owns dubious brains but refreshingly original views". One question and the answer to it ran as follows:

"Q. How would you solve the Hindu-Muhammadan problem?

A. The Hindus and the Muhammadans should be segregated—northern India to be assigned to the Moslems and the rest to the Hindus. (When it was pointed out to the gentleman that unenlightened opinion, deriving support from the vulgarity of Census records, did not consider his classification of the Indian population to be exhaustive, he added readily but without apparent compunction, 'The Sikhs and Jains and other castes and creeds will go with the Hindus'.)"<sup>40</sup>

The talk is still about segregation without leading to partition, and the proposal, perhaps made in jest as it appeared in a column given to humour, recalls Blunt's suggestion of a Muslim north and a Hindu south. But it shows that at least the idea of physical separation was catching on. It is an improvement on Muhammad Ali's own picture of the future and on several other suggestions which found even segregation too venturesome to contemplate.



### Lovat Fraser (1914)

Following our chronological order and to make the story as complete as available information renders it possible, a reference may be made to another allusion, though its strict relevance is doubtful. I.H. Qureshi tells us that "one Lovat Fraser, who had been editor of *The Times of India* published in the early days of the First World War, in *The Daily Express* of London, a map in which an arrow was drawn from Constantinople to Saharanpur (now in the Indian State of Uttar Pradesh) showing 'a Muslim Corridor', because the population of this area was overwhelmingly Muslim. Muhammad Ali, in supporting a resolution for the introduction of reforms in the North-Western [*sic.*] Frontier Province, mentioned the existence of such a corridor".<sup>41</sup> No source is cited. The body in which Muhammad Ali introduced his resolution is not named. Anyway, it is difficult to see any connection between this and the idea of a separate Muslim state in India.

### Choudhary Rahmat Ali (1915)

Rahmat Ali occupies a very important place in the history of the origin of the idea under study, and has one later chapter to himself. His first public statement on the need for a separate Muslim state was made in January 1933, but in his book he has made a claim that such an idea first occurred to him in 1915.

The trials through which the Muslims had been passing since 1909 convinced Rahmat Ali that their salvation lay in the creation of a Muslim state in north India. In 1915, when he was an undergraduate at the Islamia College, Lahore, he founded in the College a society called the Bazm-i-Shibli. In his inaugural address to it he said: "North of India is Muslim and we will keep it Muslim. Not only that. We will make it a Muslim State. But this we can do only if and when we and our North cease to be Indian. For that is a pre-requisite to it. So the sooner we shed 'Indianism', the better for us and for Islam." He tells us that "the immediate occasion for this statement was the negotiations which were then afoot between Hindoo and Muslim leaders for an understanding on the basis of the national unity of India, and which culminated in the perilous Lucknow Pact of 1916".<sup>42</sup>

No corroborative evidence has so far turned up in support of

this claim. Rahmat Ali does not say why he established the Bazm-i-Shibli. Nor does he mention any names associated with the Bazm. Nothing has yet been discovered in contemporary newspapers about this society. The College does not answer inquiries. Nor do we know much about Rahmat Ali himself between 1915 and 1933. But by all reports Rahmat Ali was a man of integrity, and there is no room to believe that he invented this claim of 1915. In any case, considering what had gone before that date in Indian thinking, his idea of a Muslim state in north India was not such an improbable suggestion. Yet, some more evidence and details should have been welcome.

There is no direct external evidence to bear out Rahmat Ali. But circumstantial evidence, admittedly of an indirect nature, may be found in the fact that the idea, or ideal, or dream, of a Muslim state was in the air in these years. F.K. Khan Durrani, whom we will again meet in the following pages, reminds us that, around 1916, "when we were boys at college, we used to debate about the desirability of division of the country and exchange of populations". He confesses that "those were idealistic dreams of isolated individuals and not practical politics". He adds, "I mention it only to show that the consciousness that grows in time into the feeling of nationhood was already dawning upon the minds of individual Muslims".<sup>43</sup>

It is possible that Durrani was a student when Rahmat Ali inaugurated his Bazm-i-Shibli and floated the idea of a Muslim state in north India; or, perhaps he was a reader of the *Comrade* (a very likely distraction for the Muslim students of that period) and knew what "Bambooque" had written. He might even have heard about Blunt's suggestion. Whatever we may think of Rahmat Ali's claim, it offers some confirmation of the fact that the idea was now being discussed in young circles, even if it wore the appearance of a vision seen by some individuals.

### The Kheiri Brothers (1917)

This group of stray, individual minds was soon joined by two men who led a strange life of travel and adventure, suffering and persecution, and ultimate vindication. The two Kheiri brothers, Abdul Jabbar and Abdus Sattar, played a prominent role in advancing the idea of a Muslim state in India.



The family was Arabian by origin, and the first Kheiris arrived in India in the time of Shahjahan to teach Arabic to Mughal princes. The earliest arrival was one Khairullah, but we don't have complete information on all the generations. We know, however, that the ancestry of the Kheiri brothers can be traced in an unbroken line to one Abdul Khaliq, who had a son called Abdul Qadir. This Abdul Qadir had two sons; the elder was Abdul Wajid (whose son was the Urdu writer, Rashad-ul-Kheiri), the younger was Abdul Hamid. Abdul Hamid had three sons in this order: Abdul Jabbar, Abdul Ghaffar and Abdus Sattar. To take the middle brother first, for he had no public life, Abdul Ghaffar got himself employed in the irrigation department. At some point in this humdrum career he beat up his English superior and lost his job. Since then he remained unemployed, and after 1947 migrated from India to Pakistan. In appearance he was slim and tall with a long beard.

Sometime in 1908-11 the three brothers left India—one of them because of an unhappy marriage—and went to Beirut. During their stay there, which lasted for a few years, they inaugurated a Muslim boy scout movement which they called the *kashshaf* (explorers). They also established a Madrasa-i-Hindia. At this stage Abdul Ghaffar returned home and the other two went on to Istanbul, where they were actively involved in the Turkish war against the Allied powers and later in the Khilafat movement. As supporters of the *khalifa* and defenders of his office and power they were naturally not in the good books of Mustafa Kamal, who referred to them in one of his speeches as "the two mad Indians". Finding the new Turkey of Ataturk uncongenial, they moved on to Germany sometime in the mid-'twenties where they lived for about ten years. In Germany they established an Islamic society, joined the National Socialist Party, and were much influenced by Fascist ideas. They left Germany a little before Hitler came to power.

Abdul Jabbar, the eldest brother, wished to return home but was disallowed by the Government of India. Questions were asked in the House of Commons on this interdiction, but permission was not granted. He settled in London and cultivated the Labour Party. After some time, when he was permitted to enter India, he came to Delhi and lived the rest of his life as a gentleman of private means. A bitter opponent of the Congress, he welcomed

the Pakistan demand when it was made. Some of his ideas betrayed the influence of his stay in Germany: once he tried to organize a para-military movement, which for a time impressed the Aligarh students. He sported a long beard and used to insist that every Muslim ought to do the same. A great lover of books and the proud possessor of a vast library, he refused to come to Pakistan in 1947 because he had no means of bringing this treasure safely with him. He died a bachelor in Delhi in the early 'fifties.

Abdus Sattar, the youngest brother, returned to India from Germany in the early 'thirties and began to teach German and French at the Aligarh University, where he died in 1945. Like his brothers he, too, was bearded. In Germany he had married a German lady, who went to live in London after his death. He left two daughters and one son, who live in Pakistan.

The dates of birth of the three brothers cannot be ascertained; probably they were born between 1870 and 1880.<sup>44</sup>

We have some more details about Abdus Sattar's later life. On his return to India he was shadowed by the police, partly because of his stay in Germany and partly because of his political views expressed while he was in Turkey and Germany. In spite of this, he gathered a few of the staff and students of Aligarh and established the Muslim League branch of the Muslim University.<sup>45</sup> When the second world war broke out he was interned in the Dehra Dun jail for about two years.<sup>46</sup> He kept in touch with the Muslim League during the incarceration and used to write to Jinnah. In September 1940, the Council of the Muslim League, at a meeting in Delhi, passed a resolution regretting that he was being detained as a B class prisoner without trial, and urging the government to free him. It also authorized the president of the party in the central legislature to take up the matter of his release with the government.<sup>47</sup>

In 1917 a conference of the Socialist International was held at Stockholm, and the Indian delegation to this gathering consisted of four students: Virendranath Chatopadhyaya, M. Acharya, Abdul Jabbar Kheiri and Abdus Sattar Kheiri.<sup>48</sup> The two Kheiri brothers submitted a written statement to the Conference in which they urged a partition of India into a Hindu India and a Muslim India. A summary of this statement was published in the official proceedings of the Conference which were edited by Camille Huysmans of Belgium and issued in French from Uppsala in the beginning of 1918.

In 1941, when nobody remembered this and when Hindu propaganda about the British instigation of the Pakistan demand was rampant, Abdus Sattar wrote from the Dehra Dun jail to Camille Huysmans, asking him to confirm that a proposal for partition had been made at the Conference in 1917. In his letter of 22 August 1941, Kheiri wrote, "One could hardly expect you to remember an event which took place about twenty-four years back. But the peculiar circumstances of the time, place and occasion will probably help you to remember it easily. Those were the times of the Great War I. A meeting of the Socialist International was to take place in Stockholm to consider the possibility of peace. You were the General Secretary at that time. It was the year 1917, the month of September or October. Two Indians belonging to an Indian Patriotic League met you and discussed with you the Indian Problems. You took very keen and sympathetic interest. Then you asked them to write on paper their idea for the best solution of the Indian Problems. A few days later they submitted to you a written statement. It was the partition of India into a Muslim India and Hindu India. I am sure you will have remembered it for at that time you were much surprised with the idea."<sup>49</sup>

This letter was sent by Abdus Sattar to Clement Attlee, Lord Privy Seal in Churchill's war cabinet, for transmission to Huysmans whose address was unknown to him. On 30 December 1941 Huysmans, in a letter to Attlee which was forwarded to Abdul Jabbar and Abdus Sattar, confirmed what had happened at Stockholm. "I remember very well their visit", he wrote, "and in my book on the Stockholm Conference, published in the beginning of 1918, at Uppsala in French language, with the title Stockholm, you will find, pages 407-408, a summary of the report of the Central Committee of Mahommedan Industanies. It is only a summary, but you will see by the text, and I remember by my good memory that the delegates write truth in the letter, forwarded by you: they suggested in 1917, in their full text, Partition of India into a Muslim India and a Hindu India. As they write also, I seemed surprised with their idea, at the moment, but not so surprised as the two delegates think; as this idea was so strongly connected with some of our own political solutions in Europe. The very aggressive tone of statement proves further that it is childish to suppose any British influence in the matter."<sup>50</sup>

Here, for the first time, we reach firm ground. There is incontrovertible evidence that a partition of India into Hindu and Muslim states was suggested in 1917 by the Kheiri brothers. They were not suggesting a mere re-arrangement of authority by which the imperial power would make north India a Muslim area and south India a Hindu area (a construction which could reasonably be put on Blunt's scheme and on some other later plans). Their violent anti-imperialist attitude rules out that possibility. They wanted a partition as a means to independence.<sup>51</sup>

Unfortunately we don't know what inspired the Kheiri brothers to make this suggestion. Was it their stay in Turkey, or their anxiety to save Islam in India? Their prolonged absence from home may not have kept them in touch with the growing Hindu-Muslim rivalry. In fact, however, this was the time of a general co-operation between the two communities, of their coming together in support of the Khilafat movement, of their collaboration in the formulation of the Congress-League scheme of reforms and of the Lucknow Pact of 1916. It would be of much value to know the source and nature of the influences which worked on them in these years. It appears that at least one of the brothers, Abdul Jabbar, was in London in the early 'thirties. It should be interesting to know if he ever met Rahmat Ali, for if he did it is possible that Rahmat Ali drew a hint from the Kheiri plan for his own suggestion of 1933.

Above all, one should like to know why the brothers did not renew their 1917 proposal until as late as 1938. What explains this silence? Between 1917 and 1938 much was said and written about this idea and during the 'thirties it was mentioned and debated in several newspapers for prolonged periods of controversy. But not a word from the Kheiris is on public record. This is one of the important unanswered questions relevant to our inquiry.

Their name appears once again in 1938 in the story of the idea of partition. In May, Abdus Sattar Kheiri wrote a letter to Jinnah which makes interesting reading, for Jinnah's conversion to the two-nation theory was yet to come, and he was not used to receiving such forthright communications. "We, here in Aligarh", wrote Abdus Sattar, "have the fullest faith in you. We feel that the interests of not only 90,000,000 Indian Muslims are secure in your hands but also those of the generations to come. BUT it is rather disquieting to hear that pressure is being brought on you to



bring about an understanding at any cost, provided some selfish members may be able to get a few big jobs. . . . The most fundamental fact and right that the 90,000,000 of Indian Muslims are in THEMSELVES A GREAT NATION and A SEPARATE POLITICAL ENTITY must not be sacrificed."<sup>52</sup>

This was quite a strong statement coming from the president of a constituent branch of AIML, for the League had not yet committed itself to the two-nation theory or to a formal demand for a separate state. But Kheiri's pioneering spirit and unusual courage took no notice of the League's tardy thinking or cautious attitude. Two months after writing the above-quoted letter, he circulated an open letter among the members of the Muslim League Council, which, coming officially from the president of the Muslim University Muslim League, "clearly expounded" the "two-nation concept and the demand for a separate homeland for the Muslims".<sup>53</sup> Six months later, at the Patna session of the League in December, he distributed leaflets "propounding the two-nation concept".<sup>54</sup> Apparently, he was running ahead of the official League policy.

### The Aga Khan (1918)

At about the same time as the Stockholm Conference, the Aga Khan<sup>55</sup> was dreaming quite a different dream. In his *India in Transition*, published simultaneously in England and India in 1918, he made suggestions which were both startling and far reaching. What he seemed to be trying to plan was a huge federation of South Asia with India as its nucleus and centre.

He started with the assumption that India, "with her vast population, her varied provinces and races, her many sectarian differences (brought to the surface by the present search for the lines of constitutional advance)", would never be fit for "a unilateral form of free government".<sup>56</sup> Constitutional reform should be so worked out that provinces were groomed ultimately to make up a genuine Indian federation. ". . . for some years to come each Indian province in the critical stages of federalism, must have a constitution that provides, on the one hand, for an independent and strong executive, responsible to the Viceroy and the Secretary of State for tenure of office and appointment; and, on the other, for elective assemblies to control finance and

legislation. Thus will be built up the future United States of India within the British Empire".<sup>57</sup>

Coming to the shape and size of the provinces he proposed some very significant changes. He was strongly opposed to, what he called, "the suggested sub-division of the existing provinces into a considerable number of self-governing states".<sup>58</sup> His main argument against this was that "such small administrations would unduly narrow down national effort". The general criterion he had in mind was the unit of provincial self-government being equal "at least to a medium European state". Bengal, as then constituted, was a good example of a "suitable and reasonably homogeneous" area for federal autonomy. Two or three districts on the west of the United Provinces were to be handed over to the Punjab to which they "belong by affinity". Sind would be detached from the Bombay Presidency and, with the North-West Frontier Province and Baluchistan, would form the Indus Province, with Quetta as its capital.<sup>59</sup>

He believed that "by such a scheme of redistribution there would be much greater approximation than at present to provinces which could honestly be called nationalities, each having an importance and coherence ranking with those of at least some European States".<sup>60</sup>

From this point onwards his dream begins to expand to fantastic proportions. The creation of an Indian federation was not the final goal: it was only the first step. Once this "internal federation" was complete, and it began to develop its economic influence northwards and westwards, Afghanistan would "seek association" with it. She would not be sacrificing her independence by entering the federation. And he saw no reason for stopping there. The group of small principalities from Arabia and the southern littoral of the Persian Gulf would reasonably be expected to become members of the projected union, for would this not ensure them "peace and liberty, freedom and order"? With these areas coming in, Persia would naturally be attracted.<sup>61</sup> The northward thrust of the federation would in time take it to the boundaries of China when Nepal, Bhutan and Tibet attached themselves to it. In the south, Ceylon was "naturally and historically" a part of India.<sup>62</sup>

In this manner a great South Asian Federation was to be erected on the foundations of justice, liberty and a "recognition for every



race, every religion, and every historical entity".<sup>63</sup> The India of this future—"a progressive, satisfied and happy India"—would be "the strongest pillar, next to the United Kingdom, of the British Empire".<sup>64</sup>

What can one say of this scheme except that the grandeur of its design stretched far beyond the possibility of its realization? The Aga Khan seems to have set no limit to his imagination. It has been his misfortune that he exerted immense influence on the shaping of Indian reforms and on several day-to-day problems, while each one of his long-term plans was completely ignored by those for whom it was fashioned. He played an important part in the elevation of the Aligarh College to the status of a Muslim university; his role in the Muslim struggle for winning separate representation was vital and extended from the 1906 Simla deputation to the working of the 1935 reforms; his exertions in the direction of uplifting the community were generous, commendable and sincere; his sustained and anxious efforts to extract safeguards for the Muslims from the British government were often successful and brought much security to the community. These are valuable services which every unprejudiced historian will acknowledge gladly and readily.

But his foresight did not match his practical common sense. To lift the gaze beyond the horizon and see what possibilities the years would bring, to co-ordinate reason and imagination, to dip into the future and distinguish between the practicable and the fanciful—this was beyond his strength. He was intelligent, shrewd, indecently rich, immensely powerful, dangerously well connected, a citizen of the world whose cosmopolitanism was a thing of marvel, a well-informed internationalist who found himself at home in the East and the West, and also a minor prophet whose word was law unto his followers. But he was not a statesman. He lacked that quality of political divination which lifts the statesman and the seer above the mere politician. In him were also absent that tenacity of purpose, that single-minded devotion, that concentrated effort, which enable one to see the future and to fight for it as if there was no alternative.

And that explains the nature of his 1918 proposals. He wanted India to be a federation, not a unitary (or in his quaint language "unilateral") state. This was dictated, on the one hand, by the diversity and size of the country, and, on the other, by the need

of fitting the princely states into an Indian pattern.<sup>65</sup> But he seems to have entertained some curious ideas about what a federal system could do. For one thing, he could not foresee the difficulties of harnessing native states and provinces under one federal yoke: he was to know later what complications such an experiment could create and what hopes it could frustrate. For another, he had no clear conception of the federal system itself. Talking about the entry of Afghanistan into the projected Indian federation, he said, "The fact that Bengal and Bombay, Hyderabad and Kashmir were enjoying full autonomy, would be a guarantee to the Afghans of no risk of loss of independence in entering the federation."<sup>66</sup> Did he really believe that independent countries could come into a federation without loss of independence? Was he confusing federation with a confederation? It is true that Afghanistan was not, in 1918, a sovereign country in the strict meaning of that term: though matters were set right by Amir Amanullah in another two years. But then neither was she a province of the British Indian Empire. Even if we disregard this constitutional confusion, only ignorance (unpardonable in such a well-informed man) or misdirected enthusiasm (unexpected in such a shrewd person) could have made him believe that the Afghans, who loved freedom as one loves a woman and who had fought a war of independence against the greatest empire of the time because of the stationing of a British mission in Kabul, would agree to lose their identity in the welter of "these Hindustanis". The Aga Khan's expectation of Persian membership of the federation of his dreams is even more astonishing. He himself was of Persian origin and, notwithstanding contemporary instability and weakness, was it not absurd to hope that such an ancient and proud civilization would not think it degrading to enter a union where India was the dominating figure and Great Britain the helmsman?

Presumably the Aga Khan was greatly impressed by the successful working of the American federal system, and saw no reason for the failure of a similar model to bring South Asia into unity. He ignored what every student of political science learns in his first lessons: that a federation will not work until there is a minimum level of homogeneity among its people and a voluntary desire for a union. Both those characteristics were absent from the South Asian scene. To see anything even vaguely common between a Kuwaiti and a Tibetan or an Iranian and a Madrasi might have

been an act of humanity and nobility, but political schemes based on nobility alone have a nasty habit of exploding in disaster. The brotherhood of man is a virtuous ideal, but nationalism and political ambitions prefer to work without it.

But it would be wrong to think that the Aga Khan was moved by these high ideals. There was a clear and obvious reason behind his plan of uniting such a variegated mass of humanity: it lay within, or within the sphere of influence, of the British empire. He made no secret of what had inspired his plan. It was to make India—so far the brightest jewel in the imperial crown—"the strongest pillar" of the British empire. The hold of British imperialism in Asia was to be energized by widening the physical area of its scope and strengthening the political unity of its possessions. This was an act of piety: of imperial piety.

No attempt has been made here to make a detailed examination of his proposals. Much can be said, but that will take us far afield. We have seen enough to understand the motive and the range of the scheme. Now we return to our subject.

What is important from our present point of view is the slight attention paid to the Muslim problem of India in the making of this scheme. He shows no concern for the Hindu-Muslim problem, and no anxiety for the future of Islam in India. It is possible that time and circumstance shaped this attitude. When he was thinking out his ideas and putting them on paper, the Hindus and Muslims of India seemed to be sinking their political differences and closing their ranks against British rule. The Lucknow Pact had been signed in 1916, and currently the Congress and the League were co-operating in drafting a constitutional scheme in opposition to the coming official instalment of reforms. Communal peace had nearly arrived. On the other side, the violent Khilafat movement was in the offing, and it posed a dangerous problem to the British. The great war was still raging, though the end was in sight. In these conditions he might have forgotten that a Muslim problem did exist in India. If so, he sinned in good company. There were many then, in England and in India, who saw in the abatement of communal fever the lineaments of a bright and eternal peace. But there were, even then, some voices who protested against the acceptance of a temporary phase as the end of all trouble, and warned the complacent of future perils: The Aga Khan, with his long Indian experience and intimate acquaintance with the pre-

dicament of the Muslims, should not have let immediate events cloud his judgment.

Of course, there is nothing in his ideas about the two-nation theory or the awakening national spirit of the Muslims. He is still thinking on the lines of territorial nationalism and regional loyalties. He believes that the Indian provinces would, under his scheme, mature into "nationalities". He deems Bengal to be a "good example" of a homogeneous area to be developed into a nationality. He shows no special interest in the Muslim Provinces or in the matter of ensuring Muslim majority rule in them. On the contrary, his suggestion for a larger Punjab, augmented by some areas of the United Provinces, would have reduced its slight Muslim majority to a minority. The only useful point in his plan is the creation of a large Muslim province, to be called the Indus Province, by amalgamating Sind, Baluchistan and the NWFP—an idea which later Iqbal was to develop into a suggestion for a yet larger Muslim province including the Punjab, and which still later Rahmat Ali was to make into an independent state with the new name of Pakistan. But there is no indication in the Aga Khan's statement that he suggested the Indus Province with a view to consolidating Muslim power or saving Sind from Bombay-cum-Hindu rule. In fact, there is no direct reference to Muslim interests in the entire plan. The only concession he makes to them is the declaration that "everywhere beyond the areas where it is the principal vernacular Urdu would be the recognized tongue of the Mahomedans".<sup>67</sup>

The Aga Khan's scheme appears to have evoked no reaction among the Muslims of India. I have not come across any mention, favourable or otherwise, of it in the contemporary literature I have consulted. Among the Hindus, much later, some saw in it a device to enslave the Hindus, or to enthrone the Muslims with the help of the British. One Hindu writer, in the course of the historical introduction prefacing each issue of the *Indian Annual Register* (which, incidentally, was intended as an objective and neutral collection of current statistics, figures and documents), recognized in it "the organization of an Anglo-Muslim alliance". He interpreted the proposed South Asian Federation as an arrangement "wherein Muslims will be junior partners in the firm at present, hoping to rise in time to the senior partnership".<sup>68</sup> A similar fear was expressed in later years by Dr. Ambedkhar, the untouchable leader, who wrote, "what a terrible thing it would have been



if this South Asiatic Federation had come into being? Hindus would have been reduced to the position of a distressed minority".<sup>69</sup>

It is not easy to see any ground for these apprehensions. The Muslims were one quarter of the Indian population. The population of the Gulf principalities was negligible and that of Afghanistan very small. Even with the inclusion of Iran, Muslims could not have matched the numerical superiority of the Hindus of India. Moreover, the Hindu percentage, too, was to be increased with the entry of Ceylon, Nepal and Bhutan. If Tibet was neither Hindu nor Muslim, still the Hindus could be far from being a minority. On the contrary, they would remain a majority, though less overwhelming than in India proper. There is no evidence, external or internal, that the Aga Khan was advancing the interests of the Indian Muslims by urging this scheme.

### Two Vague Reports (1919)

As the Aga Khan was looked upon as a major representative and spokesman of Indian Muslim interests, and in fact acted as one for many years, some of his readers might have felt that his 1918 plan reflected Muslim opinion or at least implied Muslim approval. As if in refutation of this, a number of definite suggestions emanated from India in the five years following the publication of his book, and they pointed to quite a different direction.

Sir Arthur Keith records that about 1919 he noticed a tendency among the Indian Muslims which reckoned upon a partition. "Among the Muslims also", he wrote, "there was propagated a wild but not negligible scheme for the creation of a Muslim state based on Afghanistan and embracing all those north-western areas where the faith is strong." Then he added his own unfavourable comment to the report, "Such a state would inevitably form a permanent source of danger in India."<sup>70</sup>

Many years later, Dr. Beni Prasad, who had been watching the communal problem for some time, declared that "the idea of an Islamic state in the North-West had floated in an amorphous form in a few minds in the general ferment of 1919 . . .".<sup>71</sup> He quotes no authority for this, and might have derived his information either from contemporary observers or from Keith who was the only writer before him to mention the precise year of 1919.

Beni Prasad's use of the words "Islamic state" is probably an unconscious failure to distinguish between an Islamic and a Muslim state; the point is unimportant. But both he and Keith mention the north-west, and the latter is sure that the state was to be based on Afghanistan. This may have been an echo of the influence of Jamaluddin. It is more probable, however, that Afghanistan was brought into the scheme by the circumstances prevailing towards the end of the war. There was serious unrest in India in this period, and in 1918 a "Provisional Government of India" was formed in exile in Kabul by a few Indians, including Barkatullah, who had disappeared from India after expressing culpable anti-government views. The British were terrified of Afghanistan since their disastrous experience of the Afghan wars, and were easily persuaded to believe in a Muslim plan of separation embracing Afghanistan. The Hindus, too, often talked of the danger of an Afghan invasion of India with the connivance of Indian Muslims, and made it a ground for charging the latter with anti-Indian and extra-territorial loyalty.

But contemporary evidence does not support this theory. In all plans suggested before this date, or after it, north or north-west India is mentioned as the Muslim area to constitute the future separate state, without any mention of the inclusion of Afghanistan. Of course, Afghanistan was the only nearly-independent country next door to India; historically it had been the highway of all Muslim invasions; culturally and linguistically it was allied to a large portion of north India; and it was also more accessible. Persia, too, was contiguous, but it lay along a province, Baluchistan, which was politically dormant, and an uncrossable desert lay between the Indian frontier and the inhabited parts of Persia. Nor had the Persia of that day a strong enough record of anti-British feeling to attract the Muslims of India. For these reasons it is quite possible that some Muslims in India looked at Afghanistan with affection and, if no alternative was forthcoming, were prepared to combine with her rather than live in a Hindu India. But as far as is known such views were not publicly aired by any responsible person.

### Abdul Qadir Bilgrami (1920)

In the March and April 1920 issues of the *Zulqarnain*, an



Urdu journal of Badayun in the United Provinces, was published an open letter to Gandhi from a Muslim who called himself Muhammad Abdul Qadir Bilgrami. His real name was Muhammad Azizuddin Ahmad Bilgrami, and he belonged to district Hardoi, near Lucknow. Educated at the Aligarh College, he served in the United Provinces Civil Service, and later as a minister in the Baharatpur State. He had to use an assumed name because government servants were debarred from publishing any political or controversial matter.

The article was reprinted in the form of a pamphlet in December 1925.<sup>72</sup> Pirzada says that a second edition of the original letter was published from Badayun in 1922;<sup>73</sup> I have not seen it, but in that case the 1925 pamphlet should be the third edition or reprint. The point is of no real importance as there is no indication in the last reprint that it is a third, or whatever, edition. I think the article was reprinted, we don't know how many times, without any emendation or revision. I use the 1925 reprint, the only one available to me.<sup>74</sup>

The 62-page letter opens with the sentence: "Mahatmaji, no problem in Indian politics is as important as that of Hindu-Muslim unity, because it is one of the accepted facts that the success of all schemes for the future welfare and progress of this country depends on this, that the two nations (*qawmen*) treat each other with tolerance."<sup>75</sup> Gandhi should not, he emphasizes, gather the impression from this writing that "I am opposed to Hindu-Muslim political unity (*itteliad*)", because "in my opinion, the welfare of this country depends on the two nations working together (*mil jul kar*) in politics".<sup>76</sup>

Then, for the next 53 pages (5-58), he argues in justification of the ritual slaughter of cows by Muslims on the Eid-uz-Zuha—this being the major source of communal friction and rioting in India. Some of the points he makes must have been music to the ears of the fundamentalists and the *mullas*, but they were certainly not intended to achieve communal unity or peace. "It is our belief", he says, "that the Hindus are heretics (*kafirs*) and polytheists (*mushrik*), and we are forbidden by our religion to entertain any feeling of friendship or affection for them. . . . In the light of these Divine injunctions, the Hindus should not expect the Muslims ever to behave towards them with genuine love. But we can, without hesitation, make agreements with them for

national and political reasons or for the sake of common interests".<sup>77</sup>

Ritual sacrifice is one of the duties imposed upon the Muslims, and they are not free to abandon it. To the Hindu argument that Islam nowhere orders the Muslims to slaughter cows and that they can equally well slaughter a goat or a sheep or a camel, thus fulfilling their duty without hurting the sentiment of the Hindus, his reply is uncompromising and provocative: "Every person has the right to choose the animal he wants to slaughter; but if any Muslim, at the time of choosing the animal, takes into consideration the possibility of pleasing the Hindus, and decides to sacrifice a goat with the intention that his act will be looked upon by the Hindus with appreciation and will become a means of effecting closer relationship and mutual unity, then his sacrificial offering will no longer be purely in the way of God, and will not be acceptable in the eyes of the *sharia* (Islamic law)."<sup>78</sup>

He criticizes those Muslim leaders who had appealed to the Muslims to voluntarily give up cow slaughter in the interest of national unity and communal peace. He singles out Mushir Hussain Qidwai, Mazharul Huq, Hasrat Mohani, Hakim Ajmal Khan, Muhammad Ali, Shawkat Ali and Mawlana Abdul Bari Farangimahalli, for special mention in this connection. He tells Gandhi that, except the last-named, all of them are unacquainted with *fiqh* and therefore "ignorant" (*juhala*) by the standard of the *sharia*.<sup>79</sup> He devotes the next 8 pages to proving the desirability of sacrificing cows, quoting several sayings of the Prophet,<sup>80</sup> and ends by laying down that "if a person sacrifices a cow with the avowed purpose of hurting the feelings of the Hindus, there is nothing objectionable in it".<sup>81</sup>

After quoting classical Hindu sources, including the *Vedas*, supporting cow killing and beef eating,<sup>82</sup> he returns to Islamic legal teaching on the issue. The *fiqh* lays down that if any permitted act or the Prophet's *sunnat* is obstructed or a forcible attempt is made to stop its practice, this may result in allowing the disallowed. "Therefore, when the Hindus insist on putting a stop to (cow) sacrifice, and we are compelled, for your sake, not to slaughter a particular animal whom you worship, it becomes religiously binding upon us to sacrifice the cow, in place of a goat, lest our right might be lost through want of practice."<sup>83</sup>

On the strength of an alleged Prophetic tradition (*hadith*),

he sums up Islam's attitude to the Hindus in these words: "It is clear that in the present age it is impossible for us to stop with force the falsehood-worship of another nation. That leaves us only two ways: to express in words the evil of the practices of the *kafirs*, and to have a hatred for them in our hearts."<sup>84</sup>

Finally he comes to his own scheme of re-grouping which ought to be quoted in full in his own words:

"After accepting the principle that religion should be separated from politics and the faiths of the two sides should not be interfered with, it is necessary that a high-powered Commission consisting of representatives of Hindus and Muslims in equal number be appointed to consider the scheme that follows so as to produce a practicable and acceptable decision on the following lines:

- (1) 'India should be partitioned anew on the basis of nationalism (*qawmiyyat*) in such a manner that areas be set apart for the majority of each nation and these be regarded as the spheres of influence of each nation. For example, the following three provinces can be created for the Muslims:
  - (a) The NWFP and ten districts of West Punjab, namely, Rawalpindi, Attock, Jehlum, Gujrat, Shahpur, Mianwali, Jhang, Muzaffargarh, Dera Ghazi Khan and Multan.
  - (b) In Bengal the districts of Bogra, Rangpur, Najpur, Jessore, Nadia, Faridpur, Dacca, Rajshahi, Pabna, Mymensingh, Baqarganj, Noakhali, Patra and Chittagong be constituted into a separate province.
  - (c) Sind should be separated from the Bombay Presidency and constituted into a third Muslim majority province.
- (2) The principle should be accepted that after this division (*taqsim*) the administration would be carried on in accordance with the interests of the majority of the population in these provinces.
- (3) Regulations should be framed for the protection of minorities in all such areas which are the spheres of influence of the other nation. These should extend to the freedom for practice of religious rites, and should guarantee the right of employment to the minorities. . .
- (4) Facilities should be provided for the exchange of minority populations which may wish to move from their homeland (*watan*) in one area of influence to the other, so that such people may migrate with the minimum of loss.

- (5) The decision of the Commission should be given the form of a National Agreement, and should be placed before the Government as a united, agreed demand for implementation.
- (6) Till such time as this agreement is drawn up
  - (a) Hindus should not oppose the right of separate Muslim electorate.
  - (b) In the Punjab and Bengal, Muslim representation should be on the basis of their population.
  - (c) National *panchayats*, with equal numbers of Hindus and Muslims, should be set up to resolve disputes; only such persons as enjoy the confidence of their nation should be put on these bodies."<sup>85</sup>

This scheme and the reasons given for putting it forth make an interesting reading. Bilgrami talks of cow slaughter for 58 pages, and then abruptly adds 3 pages spelling out the solution of the problem. There is no profit in commenting upon his distasteful language, his aggressive attitude towards the Hindu religion, and his dubious use of alleged prophetic traditions. Few Muslims would share his interpretation of Islam.

As a separationist (and possibly partitionist) he stands alone among the Muslims in insisting upon a division simply in order to safeguard their right to sacrifice cows on one particular day in the year. He calls the Muslims a nation, and probably believed in the two-nation theory, but nowhere does he say that they want a state (if it is a state that they want) because they are a separate nation. Not to speak of arguing for Muslim nationalism, he does not even mention it as a basis for his demand. The right to continue to practise a religious rite (as he interprets it) determines his entire approach. What counts with him is not even the negative factor of a fear of Hindu rule, but merely a burning hatred for the other community.<sup>86</sup> His aim is not communal peace, as it was with Sharar.

Bilgrami goes further than any of his predecessors in not only naming the provinces he wants separated from the rest of India (if that is what he wanted; his description is so vague), but also in demarcating the districts which would make up these provinces. But in the Punjab, he deprives the Muslims of such Muslim majority districts as Montgomery, Lahore and Sialkot; one wonders if he was quite familiar with the Punjab. He is also the first to suggest and accept a division of the two major Muslim provinces,



Bengal and the Punjab; a problem which was to lead to much confusion, controversy and misunderstanding in the last years of British rule. Another fresh departure from the standard view is his suggestion of merging the Punjab and the NWFP. But he does not refer at all to Baluchistan; and to let Sind stand as a separate province made little economic sense.

We fail to grasp the exact nature and extent of his plan because he uses an unclear and ambiguous terminology. "Areas", "provinces" and "spheres of influence" are used without defining them. He wants three provinces for the Muslims; and he uses the word *taqsim*, which can equally mean division or partition. Does he envisage these three provinces to form one state or two states (as Bengal was not congruous to the other two)? Or, is he aiming at perpetuating the rule of a Muslim majority in these provinces? The term "sphere of influence" (*halqa-i-asar*) is meaningless in the national context. Does he want an independent Muslim India, free of British rule; or three Muslim provinces guaranteed to be governed by the majority community, as a part of British India? Nowhere do we find him employing the word "states" or even "countries". Is he arguing for segregation?

Segregation is suggested by his reference to the possible movement of the members of one community to its own "sphere of influence". But this transfer is not made obligatory. Even if it were, the three provinces could not accommodate all the Muslims of India. And that nullifies the entire *raison d'être* of his scheme: if Muslims would still continue to live in Hindu areas and at least some Hindus in Muslim areas (a great many in Bengal, in fact), the problem of cow sacrifice, which had started the whole train of argument, stands unresolved. It is difficult to understand him, but I doubt if he planned or suggested a division of India and the creation of a separate Muslim state in the subcontinent, as I.H. Qureshi<sup>87</sup> appears to believe. It is another variation on the theme of separatism.

### The Widening of the Communal Gulf (1921-1924)

Before proceeding with our story of the development of the idea it is imperative to notice the worsening communal situation in India in the 'twenties. In spite of the unifying influence of the Khilafat movement, fissures in Hindu-Muslim unity began to

appear. As the momentum of the movement slowed down, the fissures widened. Some Muslims had already been suspicious of Gandhi's and Congress's all-out support to a purely Muslim agitation; the fading away of the Khilafat zeal redoubled their lack of confidence in the majority community. Some Hindus had criticized the Congress for allying itself with the Khilafat Conference; now they came out with the *Shuddhi* and *Sangathan* movements, which aimed at converting Muslims who had once been Hindus to their old faith and at strengthening Hindu social and political structure. The Muslims answered this trend with their *tabligh* and *tanzim* movements: the first to preach Islam and convert more Hindus, the second to consolidate Muslim unity.

In this *milieu* communal relations deteriorated rapidly. This deterioration is chronicled briefly in the following statements from both sides taken at random from contemporary literature. Their importance lies in the fact that they reproduce the atmosphere in which current and later separatist plans were thought of and publicized.

A Hindu wrote in 1921: "In spite of all the demonstrations of affection that have taken place in many parts of India between Hindus and my Mahomedan brethren, I am afraid, when the evil day dawns the sword of Islam will not lie idle in its scabbard. I deeply grieve to say this: but rather say it than not say it. Educated Muslim India may not, and I feel it will not, draw the sword for Delhi and the glory of Islam, but the lower orders will unquestionably be the tool of men athirst for ambition or led astray by false ideals."<sup>88</sup>

Even Gandhi said at the height of the Khilafat movement that "I know there is much distrust of one another as yet. Many Hindus distrust Muslim honesty. They believe that swaraj means Muslim raj, for they argue that without the British, Muslims of India will aid Muslim powers to build up a Muslim empire in India. Muslims, on the other hand, fear that the Hindus being in an overwhelming majority will smother them."<sup>89</sup> Such an enlightened Congress leader as Jawaharlal Nehru took decisions which were bound to alienate even Congress-minded Muslims. On his becoming the chairman of the Allahabad Municipal Board in 1923, he persuaded the members to pass an order to the effect that in future Tilak Day (1 August), the anniversary of his death, and Gandhi Day (18 March), the anniversary of the day on which he was sent



to jail, were to be public holidays in the city.<sup>90</sup>

A Bengali Muslim leader, Abdul Karim, expressed the community's views towards the end of 1923 or early 1924 in these words: "The Musalmans of India owe allegiance to Islam in respect of religious principles, to their countrymen in respect of social obligations and to the particular party of which they are members in respect of political ideals. A Musalman in this country cannot, therefore, say that he is an Indian first and Musalman next. All that he can say is that he is an Indian Musalman first and a member of the wider Islamic brotherhood afterwards."<sup>91</sup>

Such moderation of sentiment or expression was absent from the statements of the founders and upholders of the *Shuddhi* and *Sangathan* movements. Their announcements were extremely provocative. A few examples of their thought and style will prove this.

Swami Birajik wrote on 1 May 1924: "The struggle for swaraj is mainly a struggle of Hindus, because this country belongs to Hindus. Its name is Hindustan. All its mountains, rivers, and holy places have got Hindi names. The outside world also calls the Christians and Muhammadans of India, Hindus. . . . Hindu community is the chief community with which all other communities will be amalgamated by means of Shuddhi. . . . I assure you that today the greatest religion of India is nationalism. The people who go against the spirit of nationalism shall be expelled for good from India."<sup>92</sup>

Lala Har Dayal had already, in 1915-18, condemned pan-Islamism as "a fraud and a hoax" and as "one of the most curious farces of the last decade". Fully aware of Muslim India's devotion to Turkey, he yet declared that "the Turks, as a nation, are utterly unfit to assume the leadership of the Muslim world"; they had no brains. It was an "evil day" when the Caliphate was entrusted to the Ottomans. "If this be Islam, I should blush for the faith of 70,000,000 of my fellow Indian citizens." "If the Muslims of India wish to appear in company with their Hindu brethren on the public platform of the civilized world, they must first wash their hands clean of Ottomanism in all its shapes and disguiss." "There is nothing but dirt, and dead dogs, and scheming rascals in Stamboul." Now, in May 1924, he turned his attention to the Muslims of India. "Hindu Sangathan should make it their principle to give their National jewels [Hindu literature, civilization, gods,

etc.] to every Indian child, whether Muhammadan or Christian. If the followers of other religions refuse to follow them and spread disaffection in the country, they should be opposed by law, or sent back to the Arabian desert to eat dates. What right have they to eat mangoes or oranges of our India?"<sup>93</sup> Next year he repeated the message in yet stronger terms. "So long as the Punjab and Hindustan do not get rid of foreign religions we will not be able to sleep peacefully. . . . The Hindu who does not admit this is degenerate, lifeless, dead-hearted and unwise. Every true-hearted Hindu should have an ambition to free this country of Christianity and Islam. . . . In the Punjab and Hindustan two communities cannot live together. Either all the Hindus should accept Islam, or all the Muhammaedans should be made Hindus by conversion. . . . Islam is such a curious religion that Muhammedans cannot live conjointly with other nations in any part of the world. For unity and peace it is essential that either there should be only Islam or no Islam at all in the world. Even 20% of Islam creates agitation and disturbances. . . . Islam can never mix with other nations and religions. This is a historical truth."<sup>94</sup>

This was extremist enough, but Swami Birajik went even further. In June 1924 he pontificated: "Personally I do not believe that any book is inspired; but if there be a question of the comparison of Veda and Quran, I shall declare it in plain words that, so far as religion and civilization are concerned, it is necessary that the teachings of Quran should be abolished from the nations of the world, and in its place Muhammedans should be given the teachings of the pure Rashtrya religion."<sup>95</sup>

In the meantime, Muslims were laying down the minimum terms on which they would be prepared to co-operate with the Hindus in working for self-government. Four such conditions were mentioned in October 1924: (1) The number of seats for Muslims in legislatures and all other elected bodies be fixed in excess of the present number, preserving the existing system of separate electorates; (2) The number of Muslims in all public services should be fixed, and the proportion be not less than one-third, with posts open to competition to be similarly apportioned; (3) Some special facilities be provided for Muslim education; and (4) Muslims should enjoy absolute liberty with regard to their religious duties and their performance.<sup>96</sup> Another Muslim leader repeated these, adding the important proviso that the powers of the Governors of

provinces for protecting minorities should be strengthened.<sup>97</sup>

Simultaneously, Bhai Parmanand was warning the British against the dangers of a Muslim north-west and pointing out their need for Hindu help in such a contingency. "Even now if the British Government see any danger from the north-west, they will have to look forward to the help of the Hindus. To extend the supreme power of Muhammedans from the extreme frontier to the NWFP, and therefrom to the Punjab, cannot be the policy of a sane government."<sup>98</sup>

The *hubris* of the Congress may be judged from a minor constitutional incident that occurred in the Indian Legislative Assembly in March 1925. After the debate on the Muddiman Report, Pandit Motilal Nehru and his party withdrew from the house. On this, the president of the assembly, a Congressman, declared that by this walk-out the house had ceased to retain that representative character which the constitution required it to have, and that it was now for the Government to consider whether the assembly should be allowed to continue to function. He added that if the Government introduced any controversial legislation now "he might be forced to use the extraordinary powers given to him under the Act of adjourning the House *sine die*".<sup>99</sup> At this time the Congress membership in the country was less than twenty thousand.

In the face of such actions, one Muslim was forced to conclude that "these things will never cease until they [Muslims] give up their religion and become the pariahs of Hindu society".<sup>100</sup>

Undisturbed by the consternation their announcements were creating among the minority community, the Hindu right wing went merrily along enunciating their doctrine of a pure Hindu rule. "No other raj than Hindu Raj can last for ever in India", proclaimed one. "The day must come when all the Muslims of India will become Aryas by Shuddhi, Adi Andolan, etc. [does "etc." mean force!] . . . This is our ambition; this is our desire."<sup>101</sup>

Lala Har Dayal echoed this sentiment in June 1925. ". . . if India ever gets liberty, we will have Hindu raj here. . . . If the Hindu nation reawakens in future, the result would be that not only will we establish Hindu raj in India, but our ambition of converting the Muhammedans, and conquering Afghanistan, and other such ambitions, etc., will also be realized." Next month he came out with this solemn proclamation: "I declare that the future

of the Hindu race, of Hindustan and of the Punjab, rest on these four pillars: (1) Hindu Sangathan, (2) Hindu Raj, (3) Shuddhi of Muslims, and (4) Conquest and Shuddhi of Afghanistan and the frontiers. So long as the Hindu nation does not accomplish these four things, the safety of our children and great-grandchildren will be ever in danger, and the safety of the Hindu race will be impossible. The Hindu race has but one history, and its institutions are homogeneous. But the Mussalmans and Christians are far removed from the confines of Hinduism, for their religions are alien and they love Persian, Arab and European institutions. Thus, just as one removes foreign matter from the eye, Shuddhi must be made of these two religions. . . . Just as there is Hindu religion in Nepal, so there must be Hindu institutions in Afghanistan and the frontier territory; otherwise it is useless to win Swaraj. . . . Some Hindus say that when the English leave India, the Indian Mussalmans and the Afghan Pathans will read the fine speeches of the Congress-wallahs and sing 'Bande Mataram' and embrace the Hindus like affectionate brothers! . . . As long as Islam survives in India and Afghanistan, so long will the mouth of these brothers water to see the wealth and belongings of the Hindus, and so long will their leaders wish to establish Muslim Raj in India and live in luxury. As long as the Afghans and the Pathans remain Muslims, so long will the passion to loot India be strong in their veins. . . . Those who preach Hindu Sangathan on the one hand and on the other sing the tune of Hindu-Muslim unity are making a grave blunder. In this way neither will be achieved, nor will Hindu-Muslim unity be attained—even if such unity were possible." It is important to remember that this apostle of revolutionary Indian nationalism had already, in March 1919, renounced his anti-British creed, and declared that the British Empire was a "fundamentally beneficent and necessary institution" and "all Britishers—Englishmen, Scotchmen, Irishmen, Indians, Egyptians, Burmese, Zulus, Baluchis, and others—should work and fight together".<sup>102</sup> He could offer his admiration and loyalty to the Christians of England, but for the Christians of India he had only Shuddhi. For the Indian Muslims he had nothing but an implacable hatred.

In mid-1925 an Englishman with long Indian experience described the Muslim predicament in these words: "As for early Indian Home-Rule (Swaraj), within or without the British Empire,

various possibilities present themselves to the reflective Muslim. With relations, religious, social, political and economic, such as subsist at present between his own and the Hindu community, and as they are likely to remain for a long time to come, he sees only two alternatives under a regime of complete Swaraj with British authority removed or reduced to a shadow; on the one hand, the submergence of his community in Hinduism, on the other Muslim political domination, at all events in certain regions of India; and domination to be secured by a struggle which will probably not be confined to discussion and negotiation, but will involve the use of physical force, and in which assistance may or may not be received from sources situated beyond the North-West frontier of India, though in that direction he must, in view of past history, look with the utmost misgiving.<sup>103</sup>

The Muslims were now beginning to convey their dread of Hindu rule to the British. No political advance in India was to be decided upon without proper safeguards for Muslims, "otherwise the Government of India will only be a Hindu Government".<sup>104</sup>

What was the nature of Hindu rule that the people cited above were forecasting? Swami Birajik summarized its features in a public speech. When the Hindus would be sufficiently strong they would put up the following conditions to the Muslims:

1. Do not regard the Quran as an inspired book.
2. Do not call Muhammad the Prophet of God.
3. Forget your Arabic, etc.
4. Instead of the works of S'adi and Rumi (famous Persian poets) study the works of Kabir and Tulsi Das.
5. Instead of observing Islamic festivals and holidays, observe Hindu festivals and holidays.
6. Observe the festivals of Rama and Krishna and other Hindu gods.
7. Give up Islamic names and christen your children as Ram Din and Krishna Khan, etc.
8. Offer your prayers in Hindi, instead of Arabic.<sup>105</sup>

The Muslims went on protesting, but evidently to no avail. In his presidential address to the Muslim League Aligarh session on 29 December 1925 Sir Abdur Rahim bitterly complained against the public Hindu threats to drive the Muslims out of India. In return, he warned that "Musalmans would be too big a mouthful for their Hindu friends to swallow. Thanks to the artificial con-

ditions under which they lived they had to admit that the Hindus were in a position of great advantage and even the English had learnt to dread their venomous propaganda. Hindus were equally adept in the art of belittling in every way possible the best Muslims in public positions, excepting only those who had subscribed to the Hindu political creed. They had in fact by their provocative and aggressive conduct made it clearer than ever to Muslims that the latter could not trust their fate to Hindus and must adopt every possible measure of self-defence."<sup>106</sup>

In short, the Muslims, "with their cultural coherence and an essential community of thought", were opposed to any further modification or extension of reforms "unless the interests and position of the Muslim community are carefully safeguarded".<sup>107</sup>

As year succeeded year more and more Muslims turned their vagrant thoughts to separation, division, partition, or any other avenue that held some promise of security from the burgeoning growth of a nationalism which fed on the Hindu faith. This section has been written to prepare the reader to expect an increased Muslim interest in the exploration of such avenues.

### Nadir Ali (1921)

In 1921 a reference to a possible partition of India is reported to have been made by one Nadir Ali of Agra. According to Khali-quzzaman, Nadir Ali published a pamphlet in which "as one of the methods of settlement of the Hindu-Muslim problem he discussed partition of India".<sup>108</sup> This is irritatingly vague and brief. Did he mention or discuss a plan of partition? Did he suggest a partition of his own fashion, or review the current plans without expressing his own opinion or preference, or just examine the question of partition in abstract terms?

The fact that Khali-quzzaman has mentioned him probably means that he suggested a partition and therefore merited a notice. But the title of the pamphlet is not given, nor anything said about its contents or circulation or popular reaction. About the person himself no real information is given. We are told that he was "a great admirer of the British" and was "violently opposed to the Khilafat movement"; both might be subjective judgments. Nadir Ali is said to have been "a local practitioner of Agra", which again does not help us. In India the word "practitioner" was in use for



both a practising physician and a practising lawyer; though here it is a reasonable assumption that he was practising law.

### Hasrat Mohani (1921, 1924)

With Hasrat Mohani we take a step backwards and scrutinize the possibilities of a federation for satisfying Muslim aspirations. Mohani is a tragic figure in Indian politics and Urdu literature. He suffered much without achieving anything. He was a man of many parts: a poet of considerable merit, a powerful prose writer, a pioneering journalist, a prominent politician who joined and often led all major parties (Congress, Khilafat Conference, Muslim League, Communist Party of India), and an unrelenting critic of British rule for which in he spent several years in various prisons.<sup>109</sup> He was the first Indian to move a resolution demanding "complete independence" for India from the Congress platform during its 1920 annual session.<sup>110</sup>

In his presidential address delivered before the Muslim League annual session at Ahmedabad in December 1921, he spoke of an independent India and of the place of the Muslims in it. Referring to the professed aim of the major Indian political parties, which was generally termed *swaraj* or self-rule or self-government or independence, he said that from the Muslim point of view "it is not enough that we should stand for complete independence alone". It was "necessary to decide upon the form that it should take, and, in my opinion, it can only be an Indian Republic on the lines of the United States of America". He realized that the Hindu-Muslim unity of his day, born of the euphoria of the Khilafat agitation rather than of any identity of interests, had not removed Muslim fears. The Muslims still "suspect that on the achievement of self-government the Hindus will acquire greater political powers and will use their numerical superiority to crush the Mussalmans". This feeling was widespread. "The generality of Mussalmans, with a few exceptions, are afraid of the numerical superiority of the Hindus and are absolutely opposed to an ordinary reform scheme as a substitute for complete independence." The "primary reason" for this was the presence of an alien ruler. In the absence of complete independence and under a merely reformed constitution, Muslims would be under a "double subjection". They would be subject to a Government of India controlled by the

British: a common slavery shared by Hindus and Muslims. But they would also experience a second subjection "to the Hindu majority which they will have to face in every department of the Government". With the removal of British control, however, they would be left with only one fear: the fear of the Hindu majority. This fear could be removed by the establishment of an Indian Republic. This was possible because "while the Mussalmans, as a whole, are in a minority in India; yet nature has provided a compensation; the Mussalmans are not in a minority in all the provinces. In some provinces such as Kashmir, the Punjab, Sind, Bengal and Assam [*sic.*], the Mussalmans are more numerous than the Hindus. In the 'United States of India' the Hindu majority in Madras, Bombay and the United Provinces will not be allowed to overstep the limits of moderation against the Mussalmans".<sup>111</sup>

This was the concept of a set of Muslim provinces balancing another set of Hindu provinces, thus vouchsafing some security to the Muslims. It implied that the Muslim provinces would be firmly and unreservedly ruled by definite Muslim majorities: an implication which, as we have seen, was far from being unquestionable. What is even more important, Mohani paid no attention to the crucial problem of the powers of the federal government. The removal of Muslim fears of domination by a Hindu majority could be reduced to a meaningless farce if the Muslim provinces were open to interference by a central administration in which the Hindus had an upper hand. This question, too, was later to prove so intractable as to leave no alternative to partition. Federalism in general and without qualifications was no remedy of the Indian problem. Mohani said that the American system was his model, and his reference to Muslim provinces presupposed as complete a provincial autonomy as was possible or practicable, but, we presume, that he also knew how the federal government of the United States had grown in power at the expense of State rights, and how all the difficulties in the formation of Hindu-Muslim administrations in the provinces were bound to be reproduced in the federal centre of his scheme. How was he going to guarantee that the Hindu provinces and the Hindu majority would not, as he put it, "overstep the limits of moderation against the Mussalmans"? If constitutional devices could be of any avail the Muslim problem would have solved itself long ago.

Three years later Mohani is said to have presented a slightly

amended form of the same proposal. Rejecting dominion status as a profitless objective and offering complete independence as a goal worth fighting for, he announced that the Muslims would fully co-operate with the Hindus in the task of winning this independence provided that they were assured that free India would be a "bi-communal" federal state with "Muslim States united with Hindoo States under a National Federal Government of India". The Hindus were called upon to recognize the bi-communal basis of the future system. The federal government was to be a "Supreme National Government composed of Hindoos and Muslims".<sup>112</sup>

There is hardly any substantial difference between this and the 1921 proposal. Raising Muslim provinces to the level of Muslim states had no meaning: they were to remain units of a federation. And all the objections against his first scheme can be raised against this one, too. On one point, however, Mohani opened a new door. In insisting on Hindu recognition of the "bi-communal" nature of the new state he was anticipating the parity issue, which appeared officially for the first time at the 1945 Simla Conference and which Jinnah had begun to raise in 1939. In this could be seen the first seeds of the two-nation theory, but the theory had been enunciated in unmistakable terms a long time before; and one would have expected Mohani to take for granted at least the awareness of it. His interest in Muslim provinces was a valuable straw in the wind; this had never been said before so clearly from the Muslim league platform; though, as we have seen, it was not altogether a new idea. He did not make any attempt to re-group or re-arrange the provinces with a view to giving them greater homogeneity or firm Muslim majorities.

The importance of Hasrat Mohani lies in his enunciation of the goal of complete independence. No significant figure before him, Hindu or Muslim, had rejected a self-governing status within the British empire and argued for a total severance of the colonial connection. He did this on two grounds: no country could be really free under dominion status, something which the very words should have conveyed to other politicians; and Muslims would receive a better deal under an independent federal structure. But there is no sanction at all for the claim, made by some writers,<sup>113</sup> that he foresaw partition or urged a division of India on religious grounds.

### Wahabuddin Kamboh (1923)

Second-hand and tantalizingly brief reports abound in this chronicle, and now we come across another such account. One Chaudhri Wahabuddin Kamboh suggested his "Nuristan" scheme in 1923 under which the Muslim provinces in the north-west were to separate from India and form a Muslim state.

Wahabuddin had a respectable lineage. One of his ancestors, Shaikh Enayatullah, was a *mir munshi* in Shahjahan's court and wrote the famous *Bahar-i-Danish*. Another, Muhammad Saleh, was the *diwan* of the Lahore province. With the coming of anarchy to the Punjab in the later Sikh period, the family lost its estate and official position, and shifted to a small place called Hir Kamboh near Amritsar where it began to earn a living through farming.

Sometime towards the end of the nineteenth century Wahabuddin's father joined the provincial police department, but died in 1900 while still in service. The son, who was then eighteen and a vernacular middle school student, abandoned his studies and took up his late father's post to keep the family away from a tight purse. In the service he picked up some English and taught himself Arabic. He retired in 1934 as a sub-inspector, and returned to live in his village. In mid-1938 he joined the small group of young Muslim activists in Lahore who had recently taken it upon themselves to propagate and popularize the concept of Pakistan. In 1947 he fled from Amritsar and found refuge in a village in district Lyallpur, where he died on 11 October 1964. He was the author of the *Tarikh-i-Kambohan*, which ran to three editions.

After witnessing communal rivalry and bloodshed at close quarters as a policeman, he felt strongly that it was impossible for the Muslims to live together with the Hindus. In 1923 he thought of a plan to solve the problem: the areas which later formed West Pakistan should cut themselves off from India and establish an independent state to be called "Nuristan" (land of light).<sup>114</sup>

This is all we know about the scheme and its author. Wahabuddin had promised the writer of the article which gives us this information to put full details on paper for publication, but within a year he died, and we have to content ourselves with whatever has been given above. Apparently, going by the words of the report, he gave no thought to Bengal and was in favour of dividing the Punjab. Further comment is impossible till we know more of the plan.



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### Sardar Gul Khan (1923)

In the same year, a Pathan from the NWFP opted for a straight separation. The occasion was an official inquiry into the question of extension of reforms to that province ordered by the Government of India. The committee, headed by Sir Denis Brey, heard many witnesses. Among them was one Sardar Gul Khan, the president of the Islamic Anjuman of Dera Ismail Khan. The exact words of his evidence have been preserved in the minority report of the committee by N.M. Samarth:

- "Q. The idea at the back of your Anjuman is the Pan-Islamic idea which is that Islam is a League of Nations and as such amalgamating this (Frontier Province) with the Punjab will be detrimental, will be prejudicial, to that idea. That is the dominant idea at the back of those who think with you? Is it so?
- A. It is so, but I have to add something. Their idea is that the Hindu-Muslim unity will never become a fact, it will never become a *fait accompli* and they think that this province should remain separate and [a] link between Islam and [the] Britannic Commonwealth. In fact, when I am asked what my opinion is—I, as a member of the Anjuman, am expressing this opinion—we would much rather see the separation of the Hindus and the Muhammadans, 23 crores of Hindus to the South and 8 crores of Muslims to the North. Give the whole portion from Raskumari to Agra to Hindus and from Agra to Peshawar to Muhammadans, I mean transmigration from one place to the other. This is an idea of exchange. It is not an idea of annihilation."<sup>115</sup>

To this interrogation Samarth added his own comment on the witness: "There was not before the Committee another witness who could claim to speak with the authority of personal knowledge and experience of not only the North-West Frontier Province and Independent territory but Baluchistan, Persia and Afghanistan, which this witness could justly lay claim to."<sup>116</sup>

Like most of his predecessors, Gul Khan is not above using loose and ambiguous language. But one thing is beyond doubt. He stood for physical separation, for segregating the two communities throughout the sub-continent, so that North India was turned

into a Muslim area and South India into a Hindu area. Probably he meant to say that the alternative to this exchange was nothing but annihilation. This was his solution of the Hindu-Muslim problem. But the rest of his statement is open to several interpretations. Was he arguing for a division (constitutional, *not* sovereign) of India into a Muslim government in the north and a Hindu government in the south, as Blunt had done in 1883? Or, was he merely urging a transfer of population on religious basis with a view to avoiding communal friction, as Sharar had suggested in 1890 and Bilgrami in 1920? There is no mention in his evidence of independence or even self-government. The idea of an independent future might have been in his mind, but he did not put it in words. If he was merely suggesting a Muslim and a Hindu government whose writ ran in separately demarcated territories but under an over-all British control, then he was repeating nineteenth century ideas. But much had happened since then, and, even if he was unaware of the various proposals adumbrated in past years, the contemporary political scene might have suggested to him that the physical and territorial separation he was demanding would well perpetuate itself and, at some future date when foreign rule was withdrawn, lead to the creation of two states in India.

This, of course, is speculation. What is certain is that he did not suggest in clear words a division of India or the creation of a Muslim state, though his thoughts appear to run in that direction; and to that extent, but only to that extent, he may be said to have indicated something that could be seen to lead to a future partition.<sup>117</sup>

### Ubaidullah Sindhi (1924)

Ubaidullah Sindhi was another of those Indian Muslim political adventurers who spent several years in Afghanistan and Turkey (in his case also Russia), hiding, travelling, intriguing, scheming and meeting all sorts of anti-British personalities.

According to his manifesto, issued from Istanbul in 1924, each region of India was to be called "Swarajiya Republic", and these regions' collection (India) was to be known as "Indian Federal Swarajiya Republican State". Each "Republic" was to be a free member (*azad rukan*) of this federation in preservation of its economic, cultural and political freedom. The federal capital

was to be at Delhi. Two secondary "centres" (*marakaz*) of the federal government would be situated at Agra and Lahore; similar secondary centres would be established in north-eastern India and the Deccan. In this federation religion and state would be separated. The government would have nothing to do with any particular religion.<sup>118</sup>

He believed that in politics no distinction should be made between Hindus and Muslims, but he was not in favour of "eradicating completely" (*sire se mitane*) their religious differences. He wanted to bring the two communities into one unity (*wahdat*), like the branches of one tree. This idea stemmed from his belief in the doctrine of *wahdat-ul-wajud*.<sup>119</sup>

This statement begs so many questions that no intelligent or useful commentary is possible. There is not enough to interpret. Republics and regions and areas are heaped together in the same sentence. Secondary centres are scattered round the sub-continent. A federation is established without detailing its jurisdiction. The religious approach, the fundamental factor in the whole situation, is muddled by refusing to see any political differences between Hindus and Muslims or to remove their differences in religious beliefs. In any case, he did not talk of a partition or a separation; on the contrary, he was after a *wahdat* of the two communities.

A brief look at his later ideas and plans shows that he allowed political and doctrinal confusion to govern his suggestions till the end. On 24 December 1939 he formed the Jumna-Narbada Sind Sagar Party at his home village, Goth Pir Jhanda in Sind. One clause in the basic programme of the party proclaimed that just as the area watered by the Ganges and the Jumna is the source of Hindu civilization, the valley of the Indus is the "mine (*ma'dan*) of Muslim civilization". Once these two glorious tracts are brought into agreement with "our ideology" (*nazria*), we would have the key to the solution of this difficult problem.<sup>120</sup>

In a statement entitled "National Unity of India: Is it National or International?", issued on 3 September 1940, after the Lahore resolution had been adopted by the Muslim League, he asserted that India was a country of several nationalities. His party wanted to create, in the Muslim majority provinces, an "atmosphere of true Islam and humanitarianism".<sup>121</sup> But he did not support the Pakistan demand. In fact, he toured India in 1941, speaking

against partition and against making religion a basis of nationalism.

Addressing the Anti-Separation Conference at Cumbakunam in Madras in June 1941, he declared that people should dismiss from their minds all thoughts of an international unity or alliance of Islam. There was no possibility that the Muslim League would realize the wishes for which it was demanding a partition of India. Nationalities were born of language and territory, not of religion.<sup>122</sup> He asked the Muslim League to negotiate with the Congress and submit its Pakistan plan to it. The Congress might amend, change or alter the plan, and the Muslims had to accept these changes. Then the plan should be placed before the British parliament on behalf of the Congress, and all amendments considered necessary by the Government should also be accepted.<sup>123</sup>

On 17 April 1944 he told the Sind Students Federation at Hyderabad that "in Sind we want a permanent Sindhi government, and in this connection we will not allow any religious issue to be raised. We deem Sind a 'permanent' country (*mustaqil mulk*), and we will join the other countries of the sub-continent in a federation".<sup>124</sup>

His other opinions germane to the Muslim problem can be listed briefly. The Sindhi language should be written in the Roman script, not the Arabic. He believed in "nationalism, democracy and secularism". Iqbal was a "communalist", and in practice his Islam was one of an "Indian communalist, rather of a Punjabi Muslim". He was severely critical of Iqbal's imaginary "*hayula*" (fabrications) of Islamic culture and Islamic civilization. It was a misfortune that, under Sayyid Ahmad Khan's propaganda and pressure, the Muslims of India had kept away from the Congress.<sup>125</sup>

### Muhammad Ali (1924, 1925)

As we have seen, Muhammad Ali had, twelve years ago, come very near to suggesting a partition but had somehow never brought himself to utter the necessary words. He seems to have gone through a similar experience during 1923-25. His conviction about the essential disunity of India persisted. In 1923 he announced, "Unless some new force other than the misleading unity of opposition united this vast continent of India, it will remain a geographical misnomer."<sup>126</sup> It is of some significance that these words

were spoken in his presidential address before the Indian National Congress, a party with which the unity of India was an article of faith.

During the next two years he made a number of statements which are often quoted by Pakistanis in support of his ability to have foreseen a division of India. The occasion for these announcements was often the problem of the NWFP, and especially the conclusions of the inquiry committee appointed to study it.

In the sixteenth annual session of AML, held in Bombay in December 1924, a resolution was passed urging upon the government to introduce such reforms in the NWFP as would bring it into "a position of equality with the other major provinces of India".<sup>127</sup> It was moved by Sahibzada Aftab Ahmad Khan, seconded by Abdul Aziz of Peshawar and supported by Muhammad Ali. In his speech Muhammad Ali said: "If a line be drawn from Constantinople to Delhi on the map of the world it would be found that at least right up to Saharanpur there was a corridor of purely Muslim people or Muslims were in clear majority. This gave them the clue for understanding the backward condition in which the Frontier and the Punjab were purposely kept by those in power."<sup>128</sup> It will be recalled that this corridor had been brought to public attention by Lovat Fraser in a map which he had published in the *Daily Express* of London in 1914 or 1915. A mere reference to the Muslim majority of this area did not mean anything, nor is there any clear connection between the two sentences of this passage.

Sardar Gul Khan's proposal, for whatever it was worth, drew some very significant comments from Muhammad Ali. On 22 May 1925, he wrote in his journal: "If this partition was practicable, instead of this suggestion being an indication of the treachery harboured by Muslims against their Hindu neighbours, and of the probability of their letting in and assisting a foreign Power beyond our frontiers to conquer India, it would rather be an indication that Musalmans had no desire to rule over Hindus, to whom they were willing to consign the whole of India from Agra to Cape Comorin. Is that not exactly what the Turkish exchange of population indicates? The Turks were sick of foreign intervention in their affairs on the pretext of securing justice for Christian minorities in Turkey, and in their exasperation they said to Europe: 'We don't want to rule over your Christian minorities.

Take them and be done with it. Let us have in exchange the Muslim minorities in Greece, and after that let us develop such area as is left to us, and let Christian Greece and other Christian States in the Balkans develop such areas as they have.' Turkey had despaired of Christian and Muslim unity as some Hindus and Musalmans despair of Hindu and Muslim unity. But despair was anything but indicative of a desire to conquer territories inhabited exclusively by Christians."<sup>129</sup>

A careful study of this passage reveals several interesting things. First of all, Muhammad Ali apparently looked at Gul Khan's proposal as one suggesting a partition of India which, on the construction of the Pathan's own words, is, as already said, rather a far-fetched interpretation. It appears that some Hindus had read in Gul Khan's evidence a proof of Muslim intention to conquer India with foreign, presumably Afghan, help. Muhammad Ali denies this and thinks that, on the contrary, Gul Khan's plan was an indication of Muslim willingness to be fair to the Hindus in inheriting the imperial bequest in such a way that the two communities took control of their respective areas. His analogy from Turkish experience of her Christian-cum-European minorities is a good answer to the Hindu and British attitudes to the Muslim minority in India. The Hindus claimed that the Hindu-Muslim problem was due to the presence of a third party, the British; that as soon as foreign rule departed all would be well; and that therefore instead of harping on the need for safeguards Muslims should unconditionally and unreservedly join with the Hindus in expelling the imperial power. Such logic found no favour with Muhammad Ali, and in this he followed the general Muslim opinion. The British turned the Indian communal problem to their own advantage when they contended that their presence was essential in view of the Hindu-Muslim lack of unity, and that their neutral overlordship was required to keep the balance even between the two communities. Here again the recent Turkish example was relevant. If the third party claimed a perpetual lease on its occupation on ground of protecting the minority, and if the minority and the majority were not able to resolve their differences, then let the minority and the majority be separated. Thus at one stroke the Muslims would shed their fear of the majority and get rid of British rule.

I am here paraphrasing what Muhammad Ali said in answer



to Hindu criticism and in elaboration of his arguments. But this does not mean that he subscribed to Gul Khan's theory, for his words indicate that he was not one of those who had despaired of finding a solution to the Hindu-Muslim problem. "Some" Muslims had despaired of this, he says, not all. There is no clear expression of his own opinion in this passage. He is merely commenting on public issues; though we must confess that his reference to Turkey is significant. All the same, he is not arguing in favour of a partition, or even supporting it by a hint. However, he makes a most valuable point in saying that the partition proposal of Gul Khan shows that the Muslims have no ambition to rule over the Hindus.

We have not yet finished with Muhammad Ali, nor has he with Gul Khan. A fortnight later he returned to the subject. In the issue of 5 June he discussed the right of the various provinces of India to separate when freedom came. "Because at one time in the very remote past the empire of the Hindu Mauryans included these territories, or because in more recent times the Sikhs held possession of them, their inhabitants should now be deprived of their right to determine whom they could have as their rulers? The British have taken possession of Burma; and, though many Indians have settled there, and while benefitting themselves, have helped in the development of Burma, there is no organic unity between India and Burma, and the only bond between them is that of our common slavery. Would any one on that account deny to the Burmans the right to determine whether they would keep Burma a Province of India, when the British yoke has been lifted from the neck of both the countries, or separate from India altogether? There are a good many Ceylonese who would like to have a federation of Ceylon with the provinces of India when both countries are free. Others, perhaps, although anxious to free themselves from the British yoke, would not like such a federation, but would prefer entire separation, and nobody can question their right of self-determination. Is this right only to be denied to the people living on our borders? If so, why? For our part we think it essential that all the border people should exercise this right when India herself is free, and that no compulsion should be used on our side to keep the inhabitants of any portion of our frontier tied to us by force. Even if the Mauryans, the Mughals and the Sikhs had kept them so tied to India, or if the Muslim Generals of the Abbasid Khulafa and several Ghazanevid Kings

had kept them so tied to some other Empire or Kingdom."

He continued: "It may be that, following the will-o-the-wisp of 'a scientific frontier', Indians may like a particular river-bank or a mountain-top to remain within the confines of India. But the only way in which we can secure such river-bank or mountain-top is to offer to the inhabitants of the coveted area such inducements as would incline them to affiliation with India. It may be that some of us would like Burma to remain part of free India; and others may like to have Ceylon federated with India's provinces. Others yet may like a similar federation of Nepal and Bhutan with ourselves. These wishes may be dictated by economic reasons or strategic ones, by religious reasons or cultural ones. But in any case it would not be right to use force. We can only try persuasion and inducement, and, instead of compulsion, we could only aim at carrying conviction to the people whom we desire to attach to ourselves. The problem is a very different one in the case of the areas situated in the heart of India, for separation is not physically possible. But we are even doubtful of the morality of the North keeping the South tied to itself as the result of the Civil War in America; and similarly the ethics of compelling every portion of Ulster to be tied to the rest of Ireland is very doubtful. But it is quite a different case where areas on the periphery of India are concerned. If the inhabitants of those areas have need of us, they will no doubt come to us unasked. If, on the contrary, it is we who have need of them, we must offer them sufficient inducement to remain in or become affiliated to India."<sup>130</sup>

This was to be Muhammad Ali's last word on the subject, though he lived another six years. He did not refer to the issue of separation again, though in 1931, just before his death in London, he warned that if a solution to the Hindu-Muslim problem was not found there would be a civil war in India.

The above-quoted passage shows that he had finally lost faith in Indian unity. There is no longer a hope that a common nationality may emerge, or a concordat may solve the problem. The right of self-determination is now demanded, not for India as a unit as in the past, but for its various provinces and areas. No portion of India should be forced to affiliate itself with the future Indian state or its acquiescence taken for granted. The emphasis is on the future of the north-west frontier; in fact, that was the occasion for writing these editorials.

Separation is now the obvious trend, and there is hardly any doubt that it has won Muhammad Ali's approval.<sup>131</sup> But the question is: what kind of separation was he advocating or foreseeing, and on what grounds? It is noticeable that he does not mention religion as the only or even the principal basis of separation. Anticipating the wishes of the people, he thinks they may be dictated "by economic reasons or strategic ones, by religious reasons or cultural ones". This is a general, comprehensive political statement of the grounds on which a demand for separation might possibly be made when the time comes. The two-nation theory or the special Muslim position or the prospects for a separate Muslim state have nothing to do with the argument.

The creation of a Muslim state is not even indirectly mentioned, not to speak of being defended.<sup>132</sup> On the contrary, he speaks in the name of India, from which others may secede. "We" must offer inducements to inhabitants of areas which India covets. "Some of us" would like Burma to remain in India. "We" must use persuasion instead of force to keep people within India. The frontier people will come to "us" if they have need of "us", but if "we" need them "we" must offer them good reasons to remain with India. This is not the language of a Muslim who argues for his own separation from India, but of a Hindu who is trying to stop others from leaving India. The "we" stands for India, not for the areas wanting separation. With such irrefutable evidence from his own lips it is not easy to see how some historians make him out to be one of the originators of the idea of Pakistan and, to add surprise to surprise, quote this passage in support of their case.

Muhammad Ali's repeated emphasis on the necessity of conceding the right of self-determination to the "border people" is not easy to understand. In the case of other areas of India he was merely examining the future possibility of a demand for their separation, but in that of the north-west frontier (presumably his "border people") he actually argues for the exercise of self-determination, and seems to be of the opinion that the result of this exercise would be separation. He must have known that the frontier province, even with the addition of Baluchistan (another frontier area), could not possibly stand as an independent state. Was he then taking it for granted that this area, along with the tribal belt, would join Afghanistan? This is what Jamaluddin had suggested nearly half a century ago, but Muslim politics in India

had in these intervening years advanced to a point where such a proposal would surely have repelled a majority of the thinking people; for it amounted to weakening the total Muslim strength of India. If it was, as has been suggested, a reply to Sardar Gul Khan's scheme, it was a case of shooting at the wrong target, because Gul Khan's vision was not confined to his own province or race.

## NOTES

1. B.G. Tilak, in *Kesari*, 25 April 1901, pp. 2-3.
2. Francis Robinson, *Separatism among Indian Muslims*, London, 1974, p. 82, citing *Rohilkhand Gazette*, 24 February 1903, and *Sahifa*, 12 June 1904 and 5 August 1903.
3. Sister Nivedita, in *The Indian Review*, March 1906, p. 165.
4. See *Hindu Patriot*, 5 October; *Sanjvan*, 11 October; *Hitavadi*, 12 and 14 October; *The Amrit Bazar Patrika*, 2 and 3 October; *Bengalee*, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 9 October, all of 1906.
5. *H.C. 175. 4S.* 6 June 1907, cols. 890-891.
6. Quoted in Penderel Moon, *Gandhi and Modern India*, London, 1968, p. 276.
7. Quoted in Hirankumar Sanyal (ed), *Young Tagore for Today*, Bombay, 1945, p. 25.
8. W.S. Blunt, *My Diaries*, London, 1932, p. 635.
9. Gordon Johnson, "Partition Agitation and Congress: Bengal 1904 to 1908", in John Gallagher, Gordon Johnson and Anil Seal (eds), *Locality, Province and Nation*, London, 1973, p. 255.
10. C.F. Andrews, "Nationalism and Religion", *The Indian Review*, January 1910, pp. 10-11.
11. All quoted from official unpublished papers by Francis Robinson, *Separatism among Indian Muslims*, p. 194. For specialized inquiries into the Hindu-Muslim problem in this period see Shan Muhammad (ed), *The Indian Muslims: A Documentary Record, 1900-1947*, New Delhi, n.d., Vol. I, pp. 175-280; Pardaman Singh, *Lord Minto and Indian Nationalism, 1905-1910*, Allahabad, 1976; and the following doctoral theses: Barbara S. Chaudhry, *Neo-Hinduism and Militant Politics in Bengal, 1875-1910*, Hawaii, 1971; G. Johnson, *Indian Politics, 1888-1908*, Cambridge, 1967; Janet Mary Rizvi, *Muslim Politics and Government Policy, 1885-1917*, Cambridge, 1969; and W.M. Myrums, *Hindu-Muslim Relations in India, 1900-1924*, Wisconsin, 1954.
12. History Sheet of Muhammad Ali, comp by F.H. Vincent, Deputy Director, Criminal Intelligence, Government of India, quoted in Afzal Iqbal, *op. cit.*, p. 43.
13. Waheeduzzaman, *Towards Pakistan*, Lahore, 1964, p. 199,

who refers the reader to Humayun Kabir's article on "Muslim Swing to Nationalism", which appeared in the *Hindustan Standard* of Calcutta on 17 October 1945.

14. Naqi Muhammad Khan, *Umar-i-Rafia*, Karachi, 1958, p. 198. On Akbar Allahabadi see Muhammad Sadiq, *A History of Urdu Literature*, London, 1964, pp. 304-315; Abdul Qadir, *Famous Urdu Poets and Writers*, Lahore, n.d.; Qamaruddin Ahmad Badayuni, *Bazm-i-Akbar*, Delhi, 1944; S.M. Ikram, *Mawj-i-Kausar*, Lahore, 1970 rep., pp. 212-220. Ebadat Brelvi, "The Poetry of Freedom", *Pakistan Quarterly*, Spring 1962, pp. 54-61; and Margaret H. Case, "The Social and Political Satire of Akbar Allahabadi", *Mahfil*, no. 4 (1964), pp. 11-20.
15. S.A. Vahid, *Studies in Iqbal*, Lahore, 1967, pp. 300-301.
16. S.A. Vahid's letter to me from Karachi, dated 3 December, 1969.
17. Muhammad Ali wrote *Thoughts on the Present Discontent*, Bombay, 1907; *My Life: A Fragment*, Lahore, 1942. See also Afzal Iqbal (ed), *Selected Writings and Speeches of Mawlana Muhammad Ali*, Lahore, 1944, and Ali Brothers, *For India and Islam*, Calcutta, 1922. On Muhammad Ali see S. Moinul Huq, "Maulana Muhammad Ali", in *A History of the Freedom Movement, 1707-1947, Vol III, 1906-1936, Part I, 1906-1928*, Karachi, 1961; A. H. Albiruni (S.M. Ikram), *Makers of Pakistan and Modern Muslim India*, Lahore, 1950; *The Ali Brothers: A Sketch of Their Lives and Careers*, Madras, n.d.; *Muhammad Ali: His Life, Services and Trial*, Madras, n.d.; W.J. Watson, *Muhammad Ali and the Khilafat Movement*, unpublished M.A. thesis, McGill University, 1955; Rais Ahmad Jafri (comp), *Selections from Maulana Muhammad Ali's Comrade*, Lahore, 1965; K.K. Aziz, *The Indian Khilafat Movement: A Documentary Record*, Karachi, 1970; Afzal Iqbal, *Life and Times of Mohamed Ali*, Lahore, 1974 (the best treatment so far); and Abdul Majid Daryabadi, "Mawlana Muhammad Ali", *Kya Khub Adami Tha*, Delhi, 1966, pp. 87-96.
18. *Comrade*, 14 January 1911. He was the founder and editor of this quality journal, the first and last of its kind in Muslim India.
19. *Ibid.*, leader entitled "Separate Electorates". 28 January 1911.



20. *Ibid.*, leader, 6 January 1912.
21. For details of the agitation against the partition of Bengal and its effect on Hindu-Muslim relations see K.K. Aziz, *Britain and Muslim India*, London, 1963; Shan Muhammad (ed.), *The Indian Muslims: A Documentary Record, 1900-1947*, New Delhi, n.d., Vol. I, pp. 77-174; and M.K.U. Molla, *The New Province of Eastern Bengal and Assam, 1905-1911*, an unpublished Ph.D. thesis, London University, 1965. On the founding of the Muslim League and the controversy about separate electorates some new material is available in S.R. Wasti, *Lord Minto and the Indian Nationalist Movement, 1905-1910*, Oxford, 1964; and Shan Muhammad, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 1-280.
22. R. Palme Dutt, *India Today*, London, 1947, p. 385. This is repeated in the 2nd ed of this work, *India Today and Tomorrow*, London, 1955, p. 239.
23. Extracts from this address were pub by the All India Muslim League (AIML) newspaper, *Dawn of Delhi*, on 31 December 1945; quoted in Syed Sharifuddin Pirzada, *Evolution of Pakistan*, Lahore, 1963, p. 84.
24. See, for example, V.V. Balabushevich and A.M. Dyakov (eds), *A Contemporary History of India*, New Delhi, 1964.
25. See G.M. Adhikari, *Indian National and Hindu-Muslim Unity*, Sydney, n.d. (which contains the party's resolution of 19 September 1942 on "Pakistan and National Unity"); John H. Kautsky, *Moscow and the Communist Party of India*, New York, 1956, pp. 16-45; M.R. Masani, *The Communist Party of India: A Short History*, London, 1954, pp. 7-98; and S. Roy (ed.), *Communism in India: Unpublished Documents, 1935-1945*, Calcutta, 1976; S. Pradhan (ed.), *Marxist Cultural Movement in India: Chronicles and Documents, 1936-1947*, Calcutta, 1979; and P.C. Joshi, "The Economic Background of Communalism", in B.R. Nanda (ed.), *Essays in Modern Indian History*, New Delhi, 1980, pp. 167-181.
26. As quoted in Abdul Hamid, *Muslim Separatism in India*, London, 1967, p. 206.
27. *Ibid.*, p. 206.
28. Syed Sharifuddin Pirzada, *The Pakistan Resolution*, Karachi, 1968, p. 5, quoting Bhai Parmanand, *Arya Samaj awr Hindu*

*Sangathan*, Lahore, 1923, page number not cited.

29. See Bhai Parmanand, *Hindu National Movement*, Lahore, 1929, and *Story of My Life*, Lahore, 2nd ed 1937, tr from the Hindi by N. Sundar Iyer. On him there is M.L. Bhardwaj, "Bhai Parmanand", *CMG*, 23 March 1941. According to still another report, Dr. Muhammad Alam said, in his speech at the AIML Lahore session of March 1940, that Bhai Parmanand had made a proposal for a partition of India in 1914-15 on behalf of the Ghadar Party; Dr. Alam repeated this on the floor of the Punjab Legislative Assembly on 4 March 1941; see Syed Sharifuddin Pirzada, *The Foundations of Pakistan*, Karachi, 1970, Vol. II, p. 345.
30. Quoted in M.A. Karandikar, *Islam in India's Transition to Modernity*, Bombay, 1968, p. 163. In 1918, Gandhi wanted cow slaughter to be stopped by force. "So far as I know Hindu religion", he said, "I am sure that Hindus would not hesitate to compel their religious enemies, the English and Muhammadans, to give up cow-killing even by the force of sword", quoted in *Al-Fazl* (Qadian), 9 March 1918.
31. Note in the National Archives of India, quoted in Francis Robinson, "Municipal Government and Muslim Separatism in the United Provinces, from 1883 to 1916", *Modern Asian Studies*, July 1973, p. 428.
32. B.R. Nanda, *Gokhale, Gandhi and Nehru: Studies in Indian Nationalism*, London, 1974, p. 17.
33. B.C. Pal, *Nationality and Empire*, Calcutta, 1916, pp. 91-96.
34. *Ibid.*, pp. 224-226.
35. *Hardinge Papers*, quoted in J.M. Brown, *Gandhi's Rise to Power*, Cambridge, 1972, p. 139.
36. Curzon Memorandum to Cabinet on Indian Self-Government, 2 June 1917, *Chamberlain Papers*, AC 21/4/23, quoted in Richard Danzig, "The Many-Layered Cake: A Case Study in the Reform of the Indian Empire", *Modern Asian Studies*, January 1969, p. 69.
37. Memorandum to Cabinet, in *Chamberlain Papers*, AC 15/5/5, quoted in *ibid.*, p. 70.
38. J.H. Broomfield, "The Forgotten Majority: The Bengal Muslims and September 1918", in D.A. Low (ed), *Soundings in Modern South Asian History*, London, 1968, p. 218. Details of Hindu-Muslim conflict in 1911-20 are available in

- Janet Mary Rizvi, *op. cit.*; W. M. Myrum, *op. cit.*; Ivy Cheatham, The Government of India and the Montagu Report, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Columbia University, 1919; Robert Shane Ryland, The Making of the Government of India Act, 1919, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Duke University, 1970; P.G. Robb, *The Government of India and Reform: Policies towards Politics and the Constitution, 1916-1921*, London, 1976; and Algernon Rumbold, *Watershed in India, 1914-1922*, London, 1979.
39. These biographical details are taken from Syed Sharifuddin Pirzada, *Evolution of Pakistan*, p. 85. It is a pity that we don't know any more about him. He died in 1918.
  40. Bambooque, "The Interview", *Comrade*, 10 May 1913.
  41. I.H. Qureshi, *The Muslim Community*, The Hague, 1962, p. 296.
  42. Choudhary Rahmat Ali, *Pakistan: The Fatherland of the Pak Nation*, Cambridge, 3rd ed 1947, pp. 213-214.
  43. F.K. Khan Durrani, *The Meaning of Pakistan*, Lahore, March 1944, rep March 1946, p. 108.
  44. For all this information I am indebted to Mr. A.S. Kheiri, a former Pakistan ambassador in the Sudan and a grandson of Rashad-ul-Kheiri. When the ML started a serious propaganda campaign in favour of the Pakistan demand, Abdus Sattar Kheiri wrote the first pamphlet in the "Pakistan Literature Series" entitled *National States and National Minorities*, Lahore, 1945.
  45. Syed Abid Ahmad Ali, "Quaid-i-Azam and Aligarh", in Jamiluddin Ahmad (comp), *Quaid-i-Azam as Seen by His Contemporaries*, Lahore, 1966, p. 194.
  46. G. Allana, *Quaid-i-Azam Jinnah*, Karachi, 1967, p. 298.
  47. AIML Council Resolution no. 6 of 29 September 1940, *Resolutions of the All India Muslim League from April 1940 to April 1941*, Delhi, n.d., p. 24.
  48. G. Allana, *op. cit.*, p. 297.
  49. Kheiri-Attlee-Huysmans correspondence is rep in Pirzada, *Evolution of Pakistan*, pp. 86-89. It was made available to him by Mrs. Zainab Makhdum, daughter of Abdus Sattar Kheiri.
  50. *Ibid.*, p. 89. For an English tr of the relevant extracts from the report of the proceedings of the Stockholm Conference

see G. Allana (ed), *Pakistan Movement: Historic Documents*, Karachi, 2nd ed May 1968, pp. 48-50. But he does not cite the source from which he had taken the extract.

51. According to one account, "it was during their stay in Germany that they propounded the theory of a separate homeland in India", Syed Abid Ahmad Ali, *op. cit.*, p. 194. But if Mr. A.S. Kheiri's chronology is correct they were in Turkey, not Germany, in 1917.
52. Full text of the letter in G. Allana (ed), *Pakistan Movement: Historic Documents*, pp. 177-178. The capitals are in the text. Allana does not date this letter. Pirzada also reproduces it and gives it the date of 23 May (S.S. Pirzada (ed), *Quaid-i-Azam Jinnah's Correspondence*, Karachi, 2nd ed 1966, pp. 175-177). Pirzada's compilation also carries two other letters from Abdus Sattar to Jinnah, one written from the Dehra Dun jail on 12 August 1941 and the other from Aligarh on 29 October 1944, along with Jinnah's replies to these.
53. Syed Abid Ahmad Ali, *op. cit.*, p. 194.
54. *Ibid.*, p. 194. There is some confusion of time sequence here. The author mentions the distribution of leaflets "at the Patna Session" first and then says that "afterwards" an open letter was circulated to the Councillors "in July 1938". The occasions are dated incorrectly: there was a Council meeting at Delhi on 30 and 31 July 1938, and the annual session met at Patna on 26-29 December 1938. The Council meeting did not come after the Patna session. Perhaps he has confused the sessions, of which there were two that year: a special session at Calcutta in April and the 26th annual session at Patna in December.
55. The Aga Khan, in spite of a full life and a high stature, still awaits a biographer. In the meantime, one may consult N.M. Dumasia, *A Brief History of the Aga Khan*, Bombay, 1903, and *The Aga Khan and His Ancestors: A Biographical and Historical Sketch; Eminent Musalmans*, Madras, n.d.; H.J. Greenwall, *His Highness the Aga Khan: Imam of the Ismailis*, London, 1952; *Indian Leaders of Today*, Karachi, 1942, Part II; Stanley Jackson, *The Aga Khan: Prince, Prophet and Statesman*, London, 1952; Sardar Iqbal Ali Shah, *The Prince Aga Khan: An Authentic Life Story*,

London, 1933; Hamshad Rahim, *The Aga Khan and the Khojas of India*, unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Chicago, 1958; and, of course, his own *The Memoirs of the Aga Khan: World Enough and Time*, London, 1954.

56. Aga Khan, *India in Transition: A Study in Political Evolution*, London, 1918, p. 37.
57. *Ibid.*, pp. 41–42.
58. I have not been able to find such a “suggested subdivision” to which he refers. Who suggested it and when?
59. *Ibid.*, p. 45.
60. *Ibid.*, p. 46.
61. *Ibid.*, p. 170.
62. *Ibid.*, p. 171.
63. *Ibid.*, p. 172.
64. *Ibid.*, p. 301.
65. “By what other system can the Native States be brought into active union with the rest of India?” he asked himself rhetorically, *ibid.*, p. 167.
66. *Ibid.*, p. 170.
67. *Ibid.*, p. 46.
68. Suresh Chandra Dev, “India in Home Polity”, *IAR* 1938; Calcutta, n.d., Vol. II, p. 48.
69. B.R. Ambedkar, *Pakistan or Partition of India*, Bombay, 2nd ed 1945, p. 292 fn; see also D.R. Jatava, *Dr. Ambedkar's Role in National Movement, 1917-1947*, New Delhi, 1979.
70. A.B. Keith, *A Constitutional History of India, 1600-1935*, London, 2nd ed 1936, p. 287.
71. Beni Prasad, *India's Hindu-Muslim Questions*, London, 1946, p. 77.
72. Muhammad Abdul Qadir Bilgrami, *Hindu-Muslim Ittihad par Khula Khat Mahatma Gandhi ke Nam*. The publisher's name is omitted. It was printed by Muhammad Muqtadi Khan Sherwani at the Muslim University Press, Aligarh.
73. S.S. Pirzada, *The Pakistan Resolution*, p. 4.
74. The Urdu text was pub by the Pakistan Historical Society, Karachi, in 1970, with an introduction in English by Muhammad Ziaul Islam, and with the English title of *An Open Letter to Mahatma Gandhi*, with the following words added in parentheses under the title: “containing a scheme

for the partition of the sub-continent written and published in 1920”. All references in my account are to the pages of this reprint. I am grateful to the late Dr. I.H. Qureshi and the late Mr. Ziaul Islam for sending me an advance copy of it.

75. *An Open Letter to Mahatma Gandhi*, p. 3.
76. *Ibid.*, p. 4.
77. *Ibid.*, pp. 5–6.
78. *Ibid.*, p. 9.
79. *Ibid.*, pp. 16–20.
80. *Ibid.*, pp. 21–29.
81. *Ibid.*, p. 26.
82. *Ibid.*, pp. 38–44.
83. *Ibid.*, pp. 48–49.
84. *Ibid.*, p. 54.
85. *Ibid.*, pp. 59–61. Ziaul Islam's English tr of these pages in his introduction is at places grossly misleading.
86. With such an opinion about the Hindus, one wonders why he chose to serve the Hindu ruler of Bharatpur State at the end of his career.
87. I.H. Qureshi, *The Muslim Community*, p. 295; see also Akhtar Waqar Azim, “Tasawwar-i-Pakistan: Manzil be Manzil”, *Imroz*, 14 August 1968.
88. An Indian, *India's Destiny*, Allahabad, 1921, pp. 57–58.
89. Quoted in Ram Gopal, *Indian Muslims*, Bombay, 1959, p. 152.
90. Sarvepalli Gopal, *Jawaharlal Nehru: A Biography*, Vol I, London, 1975, p. 92.
91. Abdul Karim, *Letters on Hindu-Muslim Pact*, Calcutta, n.d., p. 13.
92. Swami Sat Deo Pari Birajik, in *Tej* of Delhi, 1 May 1924, quoted in M. Fazl-i-Husain, *Plans of Hindu Raj*, Calcutta, 1932, pp. 229–230.
93. The quotations for the earlier period are from Har Dayal, *Forty-four Months in Germany and Turkey*, London, 1920, pp. 29–54. The latter opinion is from *Paigham-i-Sulha* (Message of Peace) of Lahore, 13 May 1924, quoted in M. Fazl-i-Husain, *op. cit.*, p. 234. On Har Dayal see L.P. Mathur, *Indian Revolutionary Movement in the United States of America*, Delhi, 1970; Dharmavira, *Lala Har Dayal and*



- Revolutionary Movements of His Times*, New Delhi, 1970; Emily C. Brown, *Har Dayal: Hindu Revolutionary and Rationalist*, Tuscon, 1975; Anup Singh, "Har Dayal", *New History*, 1 April 1939, pp. 1-6; and C.F. Andrews, "Lala Har Dayal: A Noble Patriot and Truth Lover", *Modern Review*, April 1940, pp. 469-470.
94. Lala Har Dayal, in *Tej*, 26 March 1925, quoted in M. Fazl-i-Husain, *op. cit.*, pp. 234-235.
  95. Swami Sat Deo Pari Birajik, in *Tej*, 20 June 1924, quoted in *ibid.*, p. 236.
  96. Sayyid Sardar Ali Khan, letter, *The Times*, 25 October 1924.
  97. Dr. Ziauddin Ahmad, address to the Royal Colonial Institute, London, 26 November 1924, *ibid.*, 27 November 1924.
  98. Bhai Parmanand, *Regeneration of Indian Nation*, Lahore, n.d., p. 9.
  99. C.H. Setalvad, *Recollections and Reflections: An Autobiography*, Bombay, n.d., pp. 263-264. According to Gandhi, total membership of the Congress in the country in November 1924 was a mere 15,000 (V.N. Naik, *Indian Liberalism—A Study*, Bombay, 1945, p. 8).
  100. A Correspondent, in *Muslim Herald* of Madras, April 1925, quoted in An Indian Mahomedan (Sayyid Sardar Ali Khan), *The Indian Moslems*, London, 1928, p. 195.
  101. Lala Dhanpat Rai, in *Parkash* of Lahore, 26 April 1925, quoted in M. Fazl-i-Husain, *op. cit.*, pp. 128-129.
  102. Lala Har Dayal, in *Milap* of Lahore, 23 June 1925, quoted in *ibid.*, p. 110. The proclamation of July 1925 in *TTI*, 25 July 1925. His changed views on the British Empire are in "Mr. Har Dayal's Confession of Faith", *India*, 28 March 1919, pp. 107-108.
  103. Sir Patrick Fagan, "Some Thoughts on the Future of Islam", *Asiatic Review*, July 1925, pp. 369-376.
  104. Sayyid Sardar Ali Khan, letter, *The Times*, 31 August 1925.
  105. Swami Sat Deo Pari Birajik, speech at Sagar (Central Provinces), quoted in *Wakil* of Amritsar, 9 December 1925.
  106. Reported in *The Times*, 30 December 1925, and *IQR* 1925, Vol II, p. 356.
  107. M.R. Titus, "The Reaction of Muslim India to Western Islam", in John R. Mott (ed), *The Muslim World Today*,

- London, 1925, pp. 93-108. For the widening Hindu-Muslim gulf during 1921-25 see W.M. Myrum, *op. cit.*; Shan Muhammad, *op. cit.*, Vol. III, pp. 1-343; David Page, *Prelude to Partition: All India Muslim Politics, 1920-1932*, unpublished D.Phil thesis, Oxford, 1974; Gail Minault Graham, *The Khilafat Movement: A Study in Indian Muslim Leadership, 1919-1924*, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Pennsylvania, 1972; and G. Robert Thursby, *Hindu-Muslim Relations in British India: A Study of Controversy, Conflict and Communal Movements in Northern India, 1923-1928*, Leiden, 1975.
108. Khaliqzaman, *Pathway to Pakistan*, Lahore, 1961, p. 238.
  109. On Hasrat Mohani see Muhammad Noman (ed), *Our Struggle, 1857-1947*, Karachi, n.d.; Jamil Ahmad, "Hasrat Mohani", *Dawn*, 9 March 1952; Abida R. Rizwi, "Hasrat Mohani", *ibid.*, 18 May 1958; Ebadat Brelvi, *op. cit.*, pp. 54-61; Zeno (Safdar Mir), "Hasrat Mohani", *TPT*, 18 May 1963; Tahir Majid, "Hasrat Mohani: A Dauntless Freedom Fighter", *Dawn*, 13 May 1967; and Nurulain Ahmar Lari, *Hasrat Mohani*, Gorakhpur, 1973 (in Urdu). The only full treatment in English is K.H. Kadri's doctoral thesis submitted at the SOAS, University of London.
  110. In 1920 M.N. Roy and U.N. Mukherji issued from Moscow a signed appeal in the name of the Communist Party of India and esp addressed to the Congress. Copies of this manifesto were sent to India through Nalini Gupta. It was said that this appeal induced Hasrat Mohani to move the "complete independence" resolution (see David N. Druhe, *Soviet Russia and Indian Communism*, New York, 1959, p. 51).
  111. *IAR* 1922, pp. 403-404.
  112. Choudhary Rahmat Ali, *op. cit.*, p. 216. He cites no source, saying that this proposal was put forward by him in his conversations with Hindu leaders in 1924.
  113. For example, Pyam Shahjahanpuri, "Nazria-i-Pakistan ke Awwalin Dai Mawlana Hasrat Mohani The", *Kohistan*, 14 August 1968, who claims that in 1924 Mohani demanded (*matalaba kya tha*) that India be divided into two parts, a Hindu India and a Muslim India. He goes on to suggest that this demand inspired Iqbal to put forward his 1930 "demand for a division of the country". Of course, he gives

no authority for these statements.

114. "Nuristan", *Sayyara Digest*, January 1966, pp. 65-68. The article carries Kamboh's photograph. No author is mentioned, but Mr. Khurshid Alam, who sent me the article, told me that he had written it from personal knowledge.
115. The North-West Frontier Enquiry Committee, *Report*, Government of India, Delhi, 1924, pp. 122-123. Sardar Gul Khan's words are reproduced in a slightly different version in The North-West Frontier Enquiry Committee, *Memo-randa and Evidence*, Government of India, Delhi, 1923, Vol. I, pp. 729-730.
116. The North-West Frontier Enquiry Committee, *Report*, p. 122.
117. There is no justification for the assertion that he had demanded "a partition of India" and "the creation of a separate Muslim state" made by Akhtar Waqar Azim, *op. cit.*
118. Muhammad Sarwar, *Afadat wa Malfuzat-i-Hazrat Mawlana Obaidullah Sindhi*, Lahore, 1972, p. 144.
119. *Ibid.*, p. 146.
120. *Ibid.*, p. 108.
121. *Ibid.*, pp. 108-109.
122. *Ibid.*, pp. 149-150, 159.
123. *Ibid.*, p. 160.
124. *Ibid.*, p. 147.
125. *Ibid.*, pp. 239, 305, 429-435, 503. Obaidullah wrote *Shah Waliullah awr unka Falsafa*, Lahore, 1944; *Shah Waliullah awr unki Siyasi Tahrir*, Lahore, 1944; *Ilham al-Rahman* (commentary on the Quran in Arabic), Karachi, n.d.; and *Khutbat-o-Maqalat-i-Mawlana Obaidullah Sindhi*, Lahore, 1970 rep. On him see Muhammad Sarwar, *Mawlana Obaid-ullah Sindhi: Halat-i-Zindagi, Talimat awr Siyasi Afkar*, Lahore, 1943, 3rd. ed. 1967; Zafar Hasan Aybek, *Ap Biti*, Lahore, n.d. (? 1966), 2 Vols.; J.M.S. Baljon, "A Comparison between the Koranic Views of Ubayd Allah Sindhi and Shah Wali Allah", in Hamida Khuro (ed.), *Sind through the Centuries*, Karachi, 1981, pp. 183-190; and Khalid Duran, "Ubayd-Allah Sindhi in Turkey: First Contacts between Pakistani and Turkish Nationalisms", *Journal of the Regional Cultural Institute* (Tehran), Vol. VI, nos. 1-2 (undated), pp. 29-42.

126. Muhammad Ali, Presidential Address to the INC session, 1923, full text in *IAR 1923*, Vol. II, Supplement, pp. 19-97.
127. *Resolutions of the All India Muslim League from May 1924 to December 1936*, Delhi, n.d., Resolution no. 3, pp. 9-10.
128. *IAR 1923*, Vol. II, p. 478.
129. *Comrade*, 22 May 1925.
130. *Ibid.*, 5 June 1925.
131. There is no mention, direct or indirect, of Muhammad Ali's suggestions for separation in S. Moinul Huq's chapter on "Maulana Muhammad Ali" in *A History of Freedom Move-ment*, Karachi, 1961, Vol. III, Part I, pp. 140-174. A sur-prising omission in a book which is generally regarded in Padistan and outside as the "official" history of the nationalist movement and was planned and executed by a panel containing all prominent or influential historians of the country. Similarly, there is hardly any reference to the subject in S. Moinul Huq (comp.), *Mohamed Ali (Life and Works)*, Pakisan Historical Society, Karachi, 1978, a collec-tion of 8 essays by various scholars written for the centenary celebrations of Muhammad Ali's birthday.
132. Khaliquzzaman claims that in 1924 Muhammad Ali "in one of his speeches at Aligarh said, 'If the Hindu-Muslim problem is not settled, India will be divided into Hindu India and Muslim India,'" (Khaliquzzaman, *op. cit.*, p. 238). I have not been able to locate this speech in any published record, and no one else has quoted it or referred to it. Khaliquzza-man does not cite his source.

# 3

## IN SEARCH FOR A HOMELAND: 1925-1929

### Development of Communal Separatism (1925-1929)

The last years of the second decade witnessed sharper communal rivalries than before. The right wing Hindus continued their campaigns of *shuddhi* and *sangathan*; Muslim leaders went on reiterating that life with the Hindus would be impossible without special safeguards and guarantees. There were more and more separatist plans as the decade drew to its close—a reflection of Muslim feeling of insecurity. A summary of contemporary thinking on the communal problem follows, based on documented sources and information.

Raj Kumar Ametti declared in March 1926 that "without *shuddhi* Hindu-Muslim unity is impossible". When "all the Indian Muslims are converted to Hinduism, we would see only Hindus around us. Nobody can, then, prevent us from getting freedom".<sup>1</sup> Suspicion grew to such proportions that the Hindu movement for the abolition of untouchability was characterized as a campaign to organize the untouchables and set them up against the Muslims by no less than the official organ of the pro-Congress Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Hind, *Al-Jamiat*.<sup>2</sup> In Bengal, Hindu politicians started belittling the Muslim majority in the province and asserting that the Hindus really formed the bulk of the voting strength.<sup>3</sup> In a speech at Cawnpore in September 1926, Pandit Motilal Nehru, stung by the taunts of the right wing publicists like Pandit Malaviya, announced that he was a good Hindu and "I can go one step further and say that even the Congress is a Hindu body. Some Muhammedans had certainly joined it in 1920-21, otherwise it has been all along a purely Hindu body from its very start".<sup>4</sup>

Sir Abdul Qadir, in his presidential address to AIMA Delhi session of December 1926, told the Muslims "to ask for a restora-

tion of our majority strength in Provinces where our numbers are larger than others".<sup>5</sup> While the Muslim League was talking about legislative majorities, some Hindu parties were planning to reduce the Muslim population to a status lower than that of the lowest cast. An editorial in a Maharashtran paper spelled this out: "If the foundation of *swaraj* is laid upon the unity of these two communities in India, the building thus raised cannot last long. Its foundation will be shaky. This opinion is based on facts. The social boycott of Muslims for the sake of *sangathan* will not be harmful to Hindus. For the upkeep of a tree, it is necessary to lop off its branches and boughs and cut its superfluous portions. For a good work we have to make sacrifices, and so we should not mind a little loss." Then followed these instructions to the Hindus: "1. We should not take any part in the religious or other ceremonies of the Muslims.

2. We should not enter into transactions with Muslims in our trade and commerce, and we should especially avoid purchasing goods from them.

3. For cultivation purposes, lands should be given to Hindus alone.

4. Muslims should not be engaged for private service.

5. We should not enter into lending or borrowing transactions with Muslim moneylenders.

6. No Hindu lawyer should appear on behalf of any Muslim in any case.

7. No cattle should be sold to Muslims.

8. We should not buy meat from Muslims.

9. Hindus should not buy medicines from Muslim physicians, nor should the Hindu physicians and doctors sell medicines to Muslims."<sup>6</sup>

The year 1927 brought no relief. In January, Dr. B.S. Moonje told a Hindu Conference in Dacca that *swaraj* meant nothing less than Hindu raj.<sup>7</sup> One of his colleagues said in a public meeting in Sind in April that "there should not be any feeling of pity in your hearts against those who pull their knives upon the throats of our cow-mother".<sup>8</sup> Hindu-Muslim unity was no doubt necessary, said another, but "this unity can be had only by means of *shuddhi*, because unity means intermingling . . . so long as the Muslims and the Christians of Hindustan are not converted, you cannot get *swaraj*".<sup>9</sup> Moonje again advised his people: "From today it should be the duty of every Hindu to leave the Muslims



in their condition, at the mercy of Englishmen, so that they might realize their folly, and in dejection should throw themselves at our feet, and should then help us in our struggle for *swaraj* without putting up any selfish demands. Such a unity would be more solid and durable."<sup>10</sup> In June, Professor Ram Deo announced that the Hindu flag "shall be hoisted on each and every mosque in India".<sup>11</sup>

An editorial comment in the *Arya Vir* of 25 June sums up the Hindu extremist opinion so well that it deserves a long quotation: "The time is not far when this Islam shall be abolished for ever from India and anybody, even Mahatma Gandhi, who will help directly or indirectly in the propagation or defence of Islam, shall be regarded as the enemy of this country and *swaraj*, and no true-hearted Hindu shall keep any relations with such persons. . . . Now we will practically show to Muhammedans and some of their *swarajist* friends that if they are desirous of seeing an atmosphere of peace and unity in India, it must be their first duty to drown this Islam in the Ganges for ever; Hindus cannot tolerate Islam for long, because it has not only caused a great harm to the Hindu nation, but has also prevented India from getting *swaraj*. So long as the present Islam is not reformed and it is an obstacle in the path of the welfare and freedom of this country, Hindu-Muslim unity is utterly impossible. . . . Time will come when this country will have Aryan rule once more. Then Islam will be properly reformed or people will be heard calling Abdul Rashid and Muhammad Amin by the name of Ram Sarup and Ram Das . . .".<sup>112</sup>

In July, the *Milap* of Lahore wrote that "for the safety of India it is essential to conquer Afghanistan (which is a part of India) and unite it with India. If the government thought it necessary and advanced towards Afghanistan, all the Hindus will help them".<sup>13</sup> Lala Har Dayal summed up the future of "Hindu Nation, Hindustan and the Punjab" in four imperatives: Hindu *sangathan*, Hindu raj, conversion of Muslims and Christians, and conquest of Afghanistan and the frontier provinces and the conversion of its inhabitants.<sup>14</sup> The *Milap* warned King Amanullah that "Hindustan does not want any religious government in Afghanistan, nor can it allow a religious or Islamic kingdom. Why should it put itself in danger by having a fanatic government in its neighbourhood?"<sup>15</sup>

Muslim leaders continued to call for protection and a genuine

federal system. Sir Muhammad Shafi told the Muslim League session at Lahore in December 1927 that "the federal India of the future should be built up on the lines of the United States of America, the Central Government possessing such powers as are expressly vested in it by the constitution and all residuary powers being left to the individual states".<sup>16</sup> Simultaneously, Abul Kalam Azad, the Congress leader, told the Muslim League Calcutta session (there were two sessions of the party that year due to a split) that "if the Muslims did not recognize this great step they were not fit to live. There would now be nine Hindu provinces against five Muslim provinces, and whatever treatment Hindus accorded in the nine provinces, Muslims would accord the same treatment to Hindus in the five provinces. Was not this a great gain? Was not a new weapon gained for the assertion of Muslim rights?"<sup>17</sup> Another Muslim reiterated that his community was "united by the common tie of religion, the social tie of equality, the cultural ties of language, and the historical tie of a glorious past, and is homogeneous and compact".<sup>18</sup>

In April 1928, Moonje again declared that "as England belongs to Englishmen, France to the French, and Germany to Germans, in the same way Hindustan belongs to the Hindus. Hindus want *swaraj*, but not at the cost of their religion. If the Musalmans want to co-operate with us, without making any demands for rights, the Hindus will also advance shoulder to shoulder with them; if not, the Hindus should be prepared to fight their way to freedom without the help of other communities, for the simple reason that Hindustan belongs to Hindus alone".<sup>19</sup>

In spite of such provocation and also because of lack of any organized thinking about alternatives, Muslim parties went on repeating that a federal system in India would suit their needs.<sup>20</sup>

Motilal Nehru, in the course of his Congress presidential address at Calcutta in December 1928, claimed for the party the status of an all-parties conference. It was its duty "to deal with every question coming before it from the point of view of the greatest good of all the parties and the people of India".<sup>21</sup>

The Muslims were obviously anxious but did not know what they could do beyond asking for a federation and provincial autonomy. No party was yet prepared to mention separation. The Aga Khan, speaking to the first AIMC session at Delhi on 31 December 1928, called the Muslims a nation, but haltingly and

circumspectly. "In regard to the implications of the term 'communal', I may remark in passing that the Muslims of India are not a community, but in a *restricted, special sense* a nation composed of many communities."<sup>22</sup>

In December 1928, the All India Khilafat Conference demanded a "federation of Free and United States of India", consisting of "fully autonomous" provinces and large Indian (native) states or groups of smaller native states, each unit having its own elected governor and assembly. The federal parliament would consist of representatives elected by the units, and would have jurisdiction only over such subjects as concern the whole of India and are entrusted to it by the constituent units. "The Musalmans of India will not accept any constitution which would not be framed on the principles stated above."<sup>23</sup>

Khwaja Hasan Nizami, unlike the Aga Khan, did not hesitate to give his community the appellation of nation. "Muslims are separate from Hindus; they cannot unite with the Hindus. . . . The Muslims are one united nation and they alone will be masters of India. They will never give up their individuality."<sup>24</sup> Dr. Shafa't Ahmad Khan, though not going that far, echoed the feeling that the Muslim community was united, compact and homogeneous.<sup>25</sup> The first AIMC dutifully passed a resolution on 1 January 1929, demanding a federal system with residuary powers vested in the provinces.<sup>26</sup>

Candid statements of their views continued to pour forth from Hindu lips in 1929. In a speech in Karachi, Malaviya advised all Hindus to strive for *swaraj* and achieve it as quickly as possible so that they might be able to stop cow killing.<sup>27</sup> The *Hindu* of Lahore carried a passionate and ringing editorial on 21 October: "Oh, young Hindu brethren of India, alas, where is the brave Pratap who was a terror to emperor Akbar; where is that lion-hearted Shivaji who paralyzed Aurungzeb; where is that Banda Bairagi whose sword cut the Muhammedans to pieces? Alas! alas! where have they all gone, where are they hidden?"<sup>28</sup> On 27 October, *Milap* joined the chorus: "The young Arya wants neither the rule of the English, nor of the Muslim, but only Ram Raj."<sup>29</sup>

General Muslim feeling, still far from making a formal demand for separation, may be gathered from a few statements made towards the end of 1929. Mushir Husain Kidwai denied the charge that Muslims were too communalistic in their outlook and an

obstacle to the progress of the country on democratic lines. They would "go a step forward than their Hindu brethren" provided that they "are assured that the rule by the non-Muslim majority will not result ultimately in the expulsion of muslims from India as it did from Spain". They had been forced to be on the defensive "to safeguard themselves from the prospective rigid, centralized, bureaucratic aggressive Hindu Raj which the Hindu all-Parties' Report has delineated". They had been given every reason to fear "that the majority, if let unchecked, would not hesitate to take wrong advantage of its ballot-box majority and power, and would trample down under its feet the traditions, the language, the culture of the minority".<sup>30</sup>

Muhammad Ali told the Round Table Conference on 19 November: "Let me assure every British man and woman who thinks of shaping our destinies that the only quarrel between the Hindu and the Muslim today is a quarrel that the Muslim is afraid of Hindu domination. I want to get rid of that fear."<sup>31</sup>

Dr. Abdullah Al-Mamun Suhrawardy made it clear on 29 December that Muslims shall, on no account, tolerate the substitution of British rule by Brahmin rule or by the tyranny of the majority.<sup>32</sup> In the words of a non-Muslim, "*Swaraj* is a Hindu demand aimed at saving Hinduism from Western influence".<sup>33</sup>

No constitution, warned Sir Azizuddin Ahmad, shall work even for six months unless the Muslims were given that "honour and power in it which is their due". They had ruled India for centuries, and they would never consent to pass under the domination of the Hindu majority. "There can be no compromise on the point." Any solution "must be an equal partnership at the least", and any other arrangement "will end in total failure". To "the Hindus there can be no submission; and this fact must be realized by British constitution-makers, or there can be no peace in India". "In short, the Muslims refuse to accept a Hindu raj: that is the long and short of it." He minced no words on this point; "the least attempt on the part of the Hindus to use their majority tyrannically would lead to civil war. The Muslims are of fighting stock, and they will stand no nonsense."<sup>34</sup>

### Lala Lajpat Rai (1924)

As mentioned in the last chapter, Bhai Parmanand had stated

in 1923 in his autobiography that in 1912 or before he had written a letter to Lala Lajpat Rai enclosing a scheme for a division of India under which the Muslims were to be driven across the Indus. This letter was seized by the police when it took possession of Parmanand's papers. We don't know if this letter was delivered to Lajpat Rai or not; probably it was, because there was nothing to stop Parmanand from writing it again and posting it to the Lala.

In any case, the two Hindu leaders whose opinions and views were so similar were often meeting each other and exchanging notes on the Muslim problem. Either as a result of Parmanand's letter of 1912, or of his book of 1923 in which a certain proposal had been mentioned, or under the influence of contemporary developments, Lala Lajpat Rai gave serious attention to the Muslim issue in the autumn of 1924. The fact that he mentioned Hasrat Mohani's proposal in elaborating his own suggestions shows that he was trying to solve the Hindu-Muslim problem in the context of the political developments of his day.

Though not in the first line of Indian leaders, Lajpat Rai<sup>35</sup> was a very well-known figure in north India and wielded vast influence over the Hindus of the Punjab. Firmly anchored to the Arya Samaj doctrine, he was a Hindu of the orthodox school and later joined the Hindu Mahasabha. But he was equally active in the Congress, and for some years the party hierarchy accepted him as its principal source of information on the affairs of north India. The views of such a man therefore carry considerable weight.

In November and December 1924 he wrote several articles on the Hindu-Muslim problem and on Pan-Islamism which appeared in a number of Hindu newspapers—*The Hindustan Times*, *The Tribune*, the *Bombay Chronicle* and the *Swarajya*. The core of his proposal was expressed in an article in *The Tribune* of 14 December, which also contained the principal argument which led him to his conclusions.

He was convinced that the demand for, or a continuation of, separate representation for Muslims based on separate electorates was completely inconsistent with Indian nationalism and a united India. He failed to see how those who spoke in favour of it, and he specially mentioned Jinnah among them, could claim to be nationalists. Nationalism and communal representation were irreconcilable. Not only that, but those who said that separate representa-

tion was a temporary political expedient of which time would gradually see the end were indulging in cruel self-deception. It could never be abolished, except through a civil war. And a civil war would again result in the supremacy of one community over the other. That is why some Hindus feared that at least some Muslim leaders were planning to establish Muslim rule throughout India with the help of "foreign Muslim states". This made the Hindus even greater opponents of the system of separate electorates. But this opposition, however determined, was useless in the face of the government's resolve to maintain separate representation. Thus it came about that the system had become "the most effective reply to the demand for *Swaraj*, and the surest way of India never getting it". As long as the Muslims insisted on it, the British would never leave India. As the Muslims seemed to have no intention of foregoing it the prospects for independence looked remote. This was the heart of the Hindu-Muslim problem and the stalemate to which it had brought India.

How to deal with the problem? Now Lajpat Rai came to his concrete proposal. "My suggestion is that the Punjab should be partitioned into two provinces, the Western Punjab with a large Muslim majority to be [a] Muslim-governed province; and the Eastern Punjab with a large Hindu-Sikh majority to be [a] non-Muslim-governed province." On Bengal he held his judgement. To him it was "unimaginable" that the "rich and highly progressive and alive Hindus of Bengal" would ever agree to work with the Bengali Muslims under the Das Pact. If they chose to do so, he had nothing to say about them. If his hope was proved right, he would divide Bengal into a Muslim province and a Hindu province. The future of other provinces was in no doubt for they were clearly either Muslim-majority provinces or Hindu-majority provinces. "Under my scheme", he said in final conclusion, "the Muslims will have four Muslim States: (1) The Pathan Province or the North-West Frontier; (2) Western Punjab; (3) Sind; and (4) Eastern Bengal. If there are compact Muslim communities in any other part of India, sufficiently large to form a province, they should be similarly constituted. But it should be distinctly understood that this is not a united India. It means a clear partition of India into a Muslim India and a non-Muslim India."<sup>36</sup>

In clarity, detail and firmness this proposal is a landmark in the evolution of the idea of Pakistan. There is no vagueness or con-



fusion about the suggestion. This is the first clear scheme of partition to appear of which we have full details, and in some respects it goes beyond what anybody had suggested before or was to suggest in future until we come to Rahmat Ali. It is strange that it should have come from a Hindu, and one of orthodox and extremist views. One would have thought that as a consequence of protracted Muslim thinking on separation a Muslim would be the first to make such a definite proposal. Bilgrami and Nadir Ali are reported to have suggested a partition, but we have no detailed accounts of them. Other Muslims were mostly talking about a federal solution or a general separation which never seemed to result in partition. It might also have been expected that a radical solution of this kind would emanate from the Congress, which prided itself on its political ingenuity and might have tried to incorporate the trend of current Muslim opinion in a new plan of its own, at least to attract more Muslims if for no other reason. But it had attached itself so indissolubly with the concepts of a united India, a single nationalism and majority rule, that far from conceding any degree of separation it was not prepared to consider even a looser form of federation. Pluralism of any variety was anathema to it. This harsh rigidity and high ambition were to cost it what it held closest to the heart—the unity of India.

Lajpat Rai, too, believed in a united India, but he was enough of a realist to see that this ideal was not shared by the Muslims. He realized that a compromise which brought much, though not all, was to be preferred to a dream which never coincided with reality. He was a *pukka* Hindu, and therefore unable to compromise with communal electorates. But, instead of continuing to repeat his condemnation of the system, he decided to try to get rid of it by a revolutionary process. He wanted independence for India, and wanted it so badly that he was willing to set up a Muslim state in India if this was the only way to win freedom. It is important to grasp this point. He did not advocate the setting up of a Muslim state because he was in love with the Muslims; in that case he would have agreed to separate electorates, an infinitely lesser evil. He disliked separate Muslim representation so much that he preferred a broken-up India to its retention. His anxiety to see India as a free land is not in doubt, his sincerity as an Indian nationalist is not in question, his ability to compromise is not at issue. Equally his hatred for the Muslims is beyond doubt.<sup>37</sup> He disliked them so

much that he was prepared to see them secede and set up a new state rather than have them in India with their own independent spokesmen in legislatures and local councils. And he made no secret of this hatred. He hoped that the Hindus of Bengal would not agree to live in peace with Muslims and make a success of the Das agreement which gave the Muslims some adequate safeguards in popular representation and public services. Thus does good sometimes come out of evil.

Other features of Lajpat Rai's plan can be mentioned more briefly. Almost every Muslim and Hindu had so far kept his eye on north India, and every mention of separation had drawn a line between the north and the south. Lajpat Rai, on account of his deep interest in the future of the Bengali Hindus, was the first to include the Bengali Muslims in his calculations. (Bilgrami had done so, too, but it is uncertain if he wanted a partition). Lajpat Rai put Eastern Bengal into the Muslim state and saved his Hindu brethren from what he considered a perilous destiny. That in doing so he was making nonsense of the agitation against the 1905 partition of Bengal, of which he himself had been a violent apostle in the Punjab, did not enter his head. In including Bengal in his re-arrangement of India he also went beyond the Allahabad proposal of Iqbal, to be made six years later, which not only restricted its scope to the north-west of India but also did not advocate a partition. He also forestalled Rahmat Ali by eleven years, for it was not till 1935 that the Pakistan National Movement of Cambridge turned its attention to the Muslims living in the east of India.

Another aspect of his scheme connects him with Rahmat Ali. His suggestion for the creation of Muslim states in other parts of India, besides the Muslim areas named in the scheme, was later to be taken up by Rahmat Ali in excess of zeal, and developed into a demand for several large and small sovereign enclaves inside India. But Lajpat Rai's proposal carried a rider which negated the suggestion. He posed the condition that such a Muslim state would come into existence only where there was found a "compact" Muslim community "sufficiently large to form a province". By this standard there was nothing left for the Muslims to claim in addition to what Lajpat Rai had already given them. His line of demarcation followed closely the boundaries drawn in 1947. He omits the name of Baluchistan from his list of Muslim States, but this is probably an oversight and has no importance.<sup>38</sup>

## Cheiro (1925)

Within a year of the publication of Lala Lajpat Rai's scheme a palmist and astronomer confirmed the future emergence of a Muslim state in India.

Count Louis Hamon, who wrote under the name of Cheiro, practised the sciences (if that is the proper description) of palmistry and astronomy for long years and became a figure well known throughout the world. Combining chiromancy (from *kheir* in Greek meaning hand, *mancie* in Old French meaning divination = divination by hand, hand-reading, palmistry), numerology or the science of numbers, and astrology, he made several predictions which startled the world by their accurate fulfilment. Among other things, he correctly forecast the exact date of the death of King Edward VII of England when he was still the Prince of Wales, the outbreak of the Boer War, the assassination of King Humbert of Italy, the fall of Oscar Wilde, the beginning and end of the first world war, the warning of coming death to W.T. Stead of *The Review of Reviews*, and the death by drowning of Kitchener.<sup>39</sup>

In 1925 Cheiro compiled his *World Predictions* and the manuscript was handed over to the publisher in October, though the book did not come out till 1927. On India his forecasts make an interesting reading today. "There is no likelihood of peace in India. On the contrary, sedition and upheavals of all kinds will be more prevalent than ever. Any attempt at [a] settlement of the Indian question by the British Government will be frustrated and come to nothing." This may be taken to refer (in the future, of course) to the work of the Simon Commission and to the unsuccessful attempts made by Lord Irwin to reach a settlement with the Indian parties on constitutional advance. "Thousands upon thousands will suffer prison gladly in their effort for Indian independence. They will prevent and block, in every imaginable way, plans made by the British administration; bringing disorder and chaos in all departments of Government." In this one may choose to read the coming of the 1930 campaign of civil disobedience called by Gandhi, and again the Congress agitation of 1932-33. "... one thing that becomes more and more evident is that England will not be able to hold that country in subjection as she has done in the past."

Then he came to the future of India in respect of the Muslim problem. "That Buddhists and Mahomedans will join together to make India a united nation, is out of question. The utmost one can hope for is that, in a native government, they would form opposition parties and so rule the country together [*sic.*]. The danger is, however, a form of religious-civil war that will keep the country in a state of continual upheaval." And then, finally comes this: "In this coming War which is by no means far off, England will be attacked in all her Mohammedan possessions. She will give India her freedom, but religious warfare will rend that country from end to end until it becomes equally divided between the Mohammedans and the followers of the Buddha."<sup>40</sup>

It is a little strange that Cheiro should refer repeatedly to the "followers of Buddha" in India; perhaps, he meant Hindus by this phrase, or perhaps he shared the general Western ignorance about oriental religious systems. His statement also implies that Muslims made up half the population of India. Was it lack of information or just carelessness? If it was ignorance, it is astonishing in a man who knew the future; though the ability not to know the present should prove no bar to predicting the future.

However, the reader may choose to read in these words whatever he wants. Whatever scientific principles the astronomer or the palmist may claim for his practice, prediction is not history and forecasts are not arguments. Nor should the inclusion of Cheiro in this chapter be taken to mean that I subscribe to the truth of the arts or sciences Cheiro practised. The search for the origins and development of an idea leads one to innumerable directions, to highroads and by-ways made by many hands, and it is one's duty to describe each one of them. If a purely rational standard were to be applied to the selection of testimony, several so-called historical suggestions would turn out to be nothing more than plain hunches and intuitions, basically not far removed from predictions and forecasts. For, what is a wish but a prediction dressed up in a bit of logic!

## The First Aligarh Scheme (1925)

To return to the solid ground of contemporary politics, let us look at the next suggestion made by the Indian Muslims in the direction of separation or partition. According to one report, some

teachers and students of the Aligarh Muslim University prepared a scheme of partition in 1925. It is said to have been aimed at the creation of a separate state. Among those who were responsible for drafting it were Dr. Syed Zafar Hasan, pro-Vice Chancellor and head of the department of philosophy (who led the team), Raghīb Ahsan, Dr. Burhan Ahmad Faruqi, Dr. Afzaal Qadri, Dr. M.M. Ahmad and Syed Amiruddin Kidwai (who worked as secretary to the group). A pamphlet embodying the proposal was prepared and distributed on the occasion of the celebrations of the jubilee of the university and also at that year's annual session of the Muslim League.

It began by drawing attention to the real nature of the Hindu-Muslim problem, which, it was stated, was not merely a question of cow killing but covered such issues as Hindi-Urdu controversy, share in public services, separate representation through separate electorates, observance of religious rites, and the system of government suitable to India. These were proving to be obstacles in the way of unity, and the proposal being presented was intended to solve the problem. It was suggested that a commission composed of Hindus and Muslims should consider the scheme and try to reach an agreement which could then be placed before the government as a national demand.

The suggestions made were: India should be re-arranged on the basis of a new theory of nationality. For example, Muslims should be given the NWFP, the Punjab, Sind and Bengal. Rules should be framed in order to protect the minorities' freedom of religious observances and their right to a share in public employment. Further, in view of their political and national importance they should be given certain special centres: Amritsar and Ludhiana for the Sikhs and Sialkot for the Christians. In the United Provinces, which is the centre of Muslim culture, necessary arrangements should be made to safeguard Muslim interests. Transfer of population should be facilitated so that people finding themselves in minority areas may migrate to places where their community is in a majority.<sup>41</sup>

The reader will notice how closely the proposal follows the details, even the phraseology, of Bilgrami's scheme. It will be recalled that Bilgrami's article of 1920 was reprinted as a pamphlet in 1925 from Aligarh.

The author of this report calls the plan the "Aligarh Scheme"

and dates it in 1925. We know that a scheme bearing this title was prepared by two Aligarh teachers, Dr. Syed Zafar Hasan and Dr. Afzaal Qadri, and published in 1939 (it is studied in chapter 12). But the details of this 1939 scheme differed in several important respects from what has been described above. It is not possible to discover if our source is talking about the later scheme under the wrong impression that it was issued in 1925: it looks as if he is, because he says that this scheme was referred to by Rajendra Prasad in his *India Divided*, Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan in his *Martial Law se Martial Law tak* and Khaliquzzaman in his *Pathway to Pakistan*. But all these writers have talked about the 1939 scheme. The confusion might have been removed if we knew for certain that he had merely mistaken the date and that 1925 should read as 1939. But the account of this scheme appears between those of other pre-1925 schemes and just before that of Lala Lajpat Rai's. Moreover, the 1925 scheme, as described here, does not advocate complete separation or the creation of a Muslim state. Though the author began with the statement that a scheme for a separate state was presented at Aligarh in 1925, he ended the account with the bland statement that nowhere in it is to be found the theory of a division of India and that actually it aimed at a united central government. Thus the confusion is about schemes, not about dates.

It is possible that the Aligarh dons prepared such a scheme in 1925 as the first stage of their thinking on the future of Muslim India, and that it was only later that they were convinced that partition offered the only solution, and said so in their new scheme of 1939. But there is no reference to their 1925 plan in the later scheme, nor has anybody else mentioned it.

### Sayyid Sardar Ali Khan (1928)

Barring the years 1938 and 1939, if any one year is to be singled out as showing the greatest public interest in the idea of Muslim separation it must be 1928. At least seven references reflecting Muslim feeling of insecurity and search for a solution can be discovered in these twelve months. Some of them contain suggestions which, after what we have recorded of previous years, seem out of date; others keep pace with the tenor of events and point more confidently to what was to come. All deserve a brief glance.



teachers and students of the Aligarh Muslim University prepared a scheme of partition in 1925. It is said to have been aimed at the creation of a separate state. Among those who were responsible for drafting it were Dr. Syed Zafar Hasan, pro-Vice Chancellor and head of the department of philosophy (who led the team), Raghib Ahsan, Dr. Burhan Ahmad Faruqi, Dr. Afzaal Qadri, Dr. M.M. Ahmad and Syed Amiruddin Kidwai (who worked as secretary to the group). A pamphlet embodying the proposal was prepared and distributed on the occasion of the celebrations of the jubilee of the university and also at that year's annual session of the Muslim League.

It began by drawing attention to the real nature of the Hindu-Muslim problem, which, it was stated, was not merely a question of cow killing but covered such issues as Hindi-Urdu controversy, share in public services, separate representation through separate electorates, observance of religious rites, and the system of government suitable to India. These were proving to be obstacles in the way of unity, and the proposal being presented was intended to solve the problem. It was suggested that a commission composed of Hindus and Muslims should consider the scheme and try to reach an agreement which could then be placed before the government as a national demand.

The suggestions made were: India should be re-arranged on the basis of a new theory of nationality. For example, Muslims should be given the NWFP, the Punjab, Sind and Bengal. Rules should be framed in order to protect the minorities' freedom of religious observances and their right to a share in public employment. Further, in view of their political and national importance they should be given certain special centres: Amritsar and Ludhiana for the Sikhs and Sialkot for the Christians. In the United Provinces, which is the centre of Muslim culture, necessary arrangements should be made to safeguard Muslim interests. Transfer of population should be facilitated so that people finding themselves in minority areas may migrate to places where their community is in a majority.<sup>41</sup>

The reader will notice how closely the proposal follows the details, even the phraseology, of Bilgrami's scheme. It will be recalled that Bilgrami's article of 1920 was reprinted as a pamphlet in 1925 from Aligarh.

The author of this report calls the plan the "Aligarh Scheme"

and dates it in 1925. We know that a scheme bearing this title was prepared by two Aligarh teachers, Dr. Syed Zafar Hasan and Dr. Afzaal Qadri, and published in 1939 (it is studied in chapter 12). But the details of this 1939 scheme differed in several important respects from what has been described above. It is not possible to discover if our source is talking about the later scheme under the wrong impression that it was issued in 1925: it looks as if he is, because he says that this scheme was referred to by Rajendra Prasad in his *India Divided*, Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan in his *Martial Law se Martial Law tak* and Khaliqzaman in his *Pathway to Pakistan*. But all these writers have talked about the 1939 scheme. The confusion might have been removed if we knew for certain that he had merely mistaken the date and that 1925 should read as 1939. But the account of this scheme appears between those of other pre-1925 schemes and just before that of Lala Lajpat Rai's. Moreover, the 1925 scheme, as described here, does not advocate complete separation or the creation of a Muslim state. Though the author began with the statement that a scheme for a separate state was presented at Aligarh in 1925, he ended the account with the bland statement that nowhere in it is to be found the theory of a division of India and that actually it aimed at a united central government. Thus the confusion is about schemes, not about dates.

It is possible that the Aligarh dons prepared such a scheme in 1925 as the first stage of their thinking on the future of Muslim India, and that it was only later that they were convinced that partition offered the only solution, and said so in their new scheme of 1939. But there is no reference to their 1925 plan in the later scheme, nor has anybody else mentioned it.

### Sayyid Sardar Ali Khan (1928)

Barring the years 1938 and 1939, if any one year is to be singled out as showing the greatest public interest in the idea of Muslim separation it must be 1928. At least seven references reflecting Muslim feeling of insecurity and search for a solution can be discovered in these twelve months. Some of them contain suggestions which, after what we have recorded of previous years, seem out of date; others keep pace with the tenor of events and point more confidently to what was to come. All deserve a brief glance.

Sometime in 1928 was published in London a book called *The Indian Moslems* by someone who wrote under the pseudonym of "An Indian Mahomedan". The identity of the author, who had already written a volume on *British India from Queen Elizabeth to Lord Reading*, was disguised by the publisher in a note saying that "the writer of this work is an Indian Nawab holding a responsible official position". For some years the anonymity was maintained successfully, but now we know that he was in fact Nawab Sayyid Sardar Ali Khan of Hyderabad Deccan.

In *The Indian Moslems* he concerned himself with the problem of Muslim fears and insecurity but did not suggest a partition or division. He did not even refer to a physical separation, which was by now a familiar idea.

However, he did speculate on a possible "subdivision" in one passage: "... and no doubt if India ever comes again to be subdivided, as was her usual lot before the Mogul arrived, they [Muslims] will be entitled to obtain their share in a general partition. But it would not be in any India that preserved its unity. In default of British control, resigned in weariness or disgust, that unity could only be revived and sustained by the Muslims recruited as they would be by their kinsmen and co-religionists from the regions beyond the north-west frontier. It is the appreciation of these facts, which do not seem to be understood by English politicians, and the consciousness of their own worth and dignity that makes the Muslims of India so tenacious of their rights, so resentful of their attempted infraction by races for whom, in the historical sense, they can only feel contempt and derision. To tell them that the Hindus are to be the future masters of India inspires them with wonder as to the mental calibre of the persons who can credit such fairy-tales. Not only are the Muslims fully conscious of their innate power, but the Hindus have not been so completely imbued with the indulgence of their newly developed megalomania as to be unaware of it, or to persuade themselves that a purely numerical total has ever sufficed to support a sway. If so, lions would have no chance among sheep. It is the sense of this inferiority—for it is nothing else—that makes the Hindus so clamorous and energetic in urging the British public, and the leaders of that public, to suppress and humiliate the Muslims and to regard themselves as the sole spokesmen of India.

He also believed firmly in the two-nation theory: "Within the

frontiers of India live two nations, the Muslims and the Hindus, which entertain for each other the same feelings as do, for instance, French and Germans, and who differ from one another more profoundly than any two nations in Europe."<sup>43</sup>

He made two or three points which were new or were given a new emphasis. "Concessions to Hindus, direct or indirect, must be accompanied and balanced by corresponding concessions in just proportion to Muslims, so that their relative position shall remain undisturbed and the same. This will be the foundation on which Muslim opinion in India will stand."<sup>44</sup> This was, in other words, a demand for treating the Hindus and Muslims as equals and bringing the majority and the minority on a par. He made it clearer a few pages later: "... the classification of the Muslims as a minority is based on many fallacies. In common fairness and just proportion, the Muslims should be placed on an absolute equality with the Hindus. That is, perhaps, the only sure way of obtaining full justice for the followers of Islam."<sup>45</sup>

One minor point that he made betrayed the utter impossibility of the Muslims ever reposing any trust in the Hindus. The demand for a proportionate quota in public services was already a commonplace. He now demanded that all British officers working in India should debar their Hindu subordinates from submitting personal reports on Muslim candidates for employment. This should only be done by their Muslim subordinates.<sup>46</sup> If mutual confidence was at such a low ebb the chances of political co-operation and common, undisturbed living were indeed remote. From such premisses, rooted in everyday experience, it was not difficult to build a case for a complete separation.

### Srinivasa Sastri's Report (1928)

The fact that by 1928 Muslim thinking on partition had come to be acknowledged by Indian opinion in general is borne out by a statement made by Srinivasa Sastri in that year, in which he is reported to have said that "the Muslim demand for the creation of autonomous Muslim States along the north-west border is actuated by a desire to acquire means of exerting pressure in emergencies on the Government of India".<sup>47</sup> By "autonomous Muslim States" here Sastri could not have meant independent states, for why should there have been in existence a Government of India

after the sub-continent had been divided and freed? Nor could he have been referring to pressure on an independent and sovereign India's government, for how could such a government be open to the pressure of neighbouring countries? His use of the word "autonomous", instead of sovereign or independent, also points the same way. He was obviously referring to Muslim wishes to enjoy complete autonomy in their own provinces.

### *The Times Report (1928)*

However, Sastri's statement faithfully reflects contemporary Muslim opinion. Another source, which cannot be dismissed as uninformed or biased, not only confirms it but actually goes beyond it in explanation of Muslim ambitions.

In March 1928 "a correspondent in India" sent a dispatch to *The Times* containing his view of the situation. "Throughout not only the Punjab, but also the valley of the Indus and its tributaries", he wrote, "there is a practical vision of a constructive future, based on history. This is the vision of effective Muslim rule. From Sind to Lahore and Peshawar this vision is near and clear; in the South it is an abstraction. . . . The Muslims—urban and rural—are practically solid in the intention to co-operate with the Royal Commission<sup>48</sup> for the presentation of their claims for a dominant position in the Punjab proper, the extension of representative institutions to the NWFP and Baluchistan, and the separation of Sind from Bombay. These claims are obviously controversial even in matters of comparative detail, but the motive behind them is of world significance. . . . Once the claims put forward are implemented there would come a move for augmentation of the present Delhi enclave into a major administration, by transferring to it the predominantly Hindu districts of the Eastern Punjab which adjoin it. From the point of view of a common culture and administrative convenience such a step would find many supporters, and it is thoroughly practicable. We should then have a solid Muslim *bloc* from the Peshawar valley to the mouths of the Indus. Its supporters hold that this policy is practicable, and that it not only secures the interests of the Muslim majority in the area immediately affected but is the best—in fact, the only—constructive plan for guaranteeing safe development to an independent Hindustan. . . . Established as they wish to be, the Muslims

of the North would view with comparative unconcern the efforts of Hindustan to develop self-government on lines compatible with Brahmanism. Their position of strategical predominance would enable them to assure fair treatment to the minorities of their own religion in the other provinces. . . . It is not to be supposed that things will work out immediately just as the Muslim leaders would wish. It does not seem logical, however, or compatible with our avowed intentions towards India to discountenance out of hand a plan which is constructive and contains many elements of a practicable structure."<sup>49</sup>

The whole, they say, is more than the sum of several parts. In the foregoing pages we have been looking at individual minds cogitating on the Muslim problem and at individual schemes and plans presented to solve it. But here, in this dispatch, we have the first general picture of Muslim aspirations. Partly it was the passage of time which had brought together the various threads of the argument, partly it was the cumulative effect of many political moves on the Indian chess-board which had brought separation into focus, and partly it was the appointment of the Simon Commission which had forced the Muslims to co-ordinate and clarify their aspirations. Undoubtedly, there were still many schools of thought among them. The long march to Pakistan had not yet begun. The Muslim League had yet to give its official blessings to the two-nation theory and to the demand for partition. But the process, it seems, had begun. The stirring of the mind always precedes the formulation of demands. Public opinion is first moved and moulded and then comes the final act of embodying the wishes in specific terms.

The great merit of this dispatch is the generality of its observation. By moving among people, attending political meetings, talking to leaders and reading newspapers, the correspondent was able to draw the broad lines of Muslim policy. And the canvass presented an entirely new scene.

What did Muslim India want? And why did it want it? It was seeing the vision of an effective Muslim rule in its own areas. It saw in it not only a secure and constructive future, but also a fulfilment of the historical process. The Punjab could be split because a province with so narrow a majority would be but a liability. Let there be one solid Muslim country from beyond Peshawar up to Karachi. It would be a fortress as well as a haven of peace. Not



only would the Muslims thus find themselves again and live a life of their own, but this would also leave the Hindus free to pursue their own ideals in their own way without the political necessity of dragging the unwilling Muslims in their wake. The strength and internal coherence of the Muslim *bloc* would be a guarantee that the Muslims left behind in Hindudom were not ill treated. The prospects for achieving this end were not brilliant; but neither were they dark and remote. Things were moving fast—how fast is only now clear in perspective—faster than men had hoped, even faster than their thoughts. They were to gather even greater speed as some politicians made mistakes and others gained by them, as the contradictions of British policy became apparent, as the comforting prospect for a united India receded into oblivion as it had always receded during its long history, as the stirrings of the Muslim soul reached that highest note where music ends with a crashing throb and leaves the heart ready to achieve the impossible, and as a leader of iron resolution emerged to lead his flock to the summit of freedom.

#### Ashraf Ali Thanawi (1928)

But, let us leave aside the contemplation of historical future and once again step into the confusion of historical evidence. A claim has recently been made that in June 1928 Mawlana Ashraf Ali Thanawi suggested the establishment of a separate Muslim state in India.<sup>50</sup> Here is another example of an important statement being made without any supporting proof or quotations from the original source. It is not impossible that the Mawlana, a very well-known theologian and a widely revered figure, made such a suggestion in the course of a public utterance or a private conversation or a letter to a friend or a follower which has not been published. Considering the contemporary trend of thought in Muslim politics, it is quite probable that he might have done so. But we must have definite information and at least some details before accepting the claim as a fact and examining the nature and scope of the proposal.

#### The Aga Khan (1928)

In 1918 the Aga Khan had sketched a plan for a huge South

Asian Federation with India at its heart. The future of Islam in India had no central place in his scheme of things, and he had mainly adopted the principle of territory in the shaping of its structure and the principle of loyalty to the British empire in the formulation of its politics. It speaks well of the transformation in Muslim opinion in India that ten years later he was recommending a substantially different plan in which religion and history took the place of territory as guiding principles, and the setting up of a Muslim state was indicated (though not demanded). The imperial connection with Britain was still retained and the ruling power again received a warm tribute of devotion.

Apart from the sweeping force of events which had the strength of thawing the chill off the most devoted conservatives, the immediate cause of this change in the Aga Khan's views was the publication in India of the Nehru Report. This handiwork of the Congress and its supporters had steadfastly and totally refused to see any change in Muslim politics which merited notice. The framers of the Nehru Constitution had, with studied arrogance and incredible shortsightedness, dismissed from their consideration all Muslim safeguards which were by then a part of the established arrangements and hardly open to renewed controversy. They had also rejected the Muslim demand for a genuine federal structure, not realizing in the zeal of their "nationalist" faith that Muslims were already on the point of forsaking federalism and embracing partition.

The Aga Khan took the pre-1914 Bavaria as his model for framing the future arrangements in India. "Each Indian province", he said, "must enjoy to the full the freedom and independence" of old Bavaria. The provinces would thus be converted into "Free States", resembling the self-governing British dominions, and "ultimately held together by the bond of Monarchy, represented by the present British Sovereign and his heirs". The existing provinces were not to be accepted as entities for this treatment. Extensive re-casting and regrouping were called for, and this was to be done on new principles. "Each free state would be based, not on considerations of size, but on those of religion, nationality, race, and language—plus history." Then he specially referred to the Muslim areas and looked forward to a state of their own. "... the Muslim provinces of the North and the West would probably coalesce and make one important free state". He made it clear that these free

states were not going to make up an Indian federation: that would not have been a very novel idea, and events and convictions had already rendered it obsolete. "The free states would not be mere provinces with Legislatures and Executives liable to be overruled by a Central Government in which the Hindus would have a permanent majority. They would be secure from all kinds of interference, except in matters in which they would be freely associated with the other states."<sup>51</sup>

Evidently the Aga Khan had made a long journey since 1918. This is the most radical plan we have so far got from any influential Muslim figure. Its radicalism is also its realism. It ought to be remembered that in 1928 India was not a federation. Federalism had first been suggested as a possible solution of Indian diversity by Edwin Montagu in the report he had prepared with Lord Chelmsford in 1918. Several Muslims were currently demanding a federation—a true federation which would safeguard provincial autonomy. Another seven years were to pass by—a long time in this period of swift change—before a federation would be ready, and another two before it would be partially implemented.

The great merit of the Aga Khan's proposal is that it looked beyond the coming federation and fixed its gaze on a loose alliance which could be so loose as to be non-existent. In practical terms India was to be divided into a number of near-independent states. Some of them would combine together to make a large state. All of them would be associated in an alliance, but this association was to be free and only in those matters which were willingly and voluntarily put into the pool by each free state. It is implied that once British rule had withdrawn, this alliance would cease to function.

From the narrower point of view of discovering the origins of the Pakistan idea the Aga Khan proposal came very near to it. Once the principle of the creation of free states had been established and put to work, he thought it probable that the Muslim provinces in the north-west would merge to make a large free state. This is more than Iqbal was able to foresee in 1930. But both he and the Aga Khan did not mention the east. In the case of the Aga Khan, perhaps there was no point in making a specific reference to eastern India because under his principle Bengal would be a free state, and obviously with a Muslim majority.

## A New Delhi Province (1928)

*The Times* dispatch of March had referred to certain plans for converting Delhi into a larger administrative area. Its author must have been privy to some inside information, for it was reported in early September from Delhi that a resolution sent to the Delhi Municipal Committee for consideration suggested a garden party hosted by the Committee to entertain the Viceroy and to present addresses to him and the Chief Commissioner of Delhi. Both addresses would urge the creation of a proper and larger Delhi Province, having the same form of government as that enjoyed by other provinces.<sup>52</sup>

Ten days later it was reported from Delhi that for some time past a committee consisting of representative citizens of the city had been engaged in drawing up a scheme for the extension of Delhi province. This scheme was accepted at a meeting held on 17 December, and would be presented at a public meeting to be held in the town hall on the 18th. It recommended the formation of a province consisting of the existing enclave together with the Agra, Rohilkhand and Meerut divisions of the United Provinces and the Ambala division of the Punjab. The projected province would have a population of about 18 million, the majority of which would be Hindu; Muslims would number about 22%.

It was argued that such a province would create a homogeneous and united area with common linguistic, cultural and historical ties. Figures had been worked out to show that it would be financially self-supporting. In terms of communal proportion, the creation of this province would reduce the Hindu population of the Punjab by 10%, thus making the latter a fully Muslim majority province. The Muslim population of the United Provinces would be reduced by about 2%, which would not have mattered much as the existing ratio of Muslims was very low. The framers of the scheme claimed that "it will constitute a strong buffer province between the predominantly Mahomedan NWFP and the Punjab, as it will then be, on the one side and the predominantly Hindu United Provinces".<sup>53</sup>

Nothing came out of the suggestion. The last sentence of the report is interesting for its implications. Provinces are not international entities which can serve as buffers between two hostile states. Creating a buffer province between the Muslim north-west

and the rest of Hindu India could only mean one thing: contemplating a future division of the sub-continent on religious lines. Still several questions occur to mind. Would a buffer province with a 22% Muslim population not create complications for the new Hindu India? Should a buffer province contain nearly a quarter population of an "alien" people? How could the new province ease the relationship between the two future Hindu and Muslim independent states? Whatever the answers to these questions, the suggestion was a clear pointer to the direction of a partition of the Punjab. Even without counting future gains, the exclusion of the Ambala division from the Punjab would have given the Muslims of the province a comfortable and assured majority which would have brought them considerable security and peace of mind.

### F.K. Khan Durrani (1928)

In going beyond federalism and in indicating a more far-reaching and realistic approach, the Aga Khan was reflecting Muslim opinion more accurately than were the Muslim party leaders of the time. This is further demonstrated by two firm proposals which were made soon afterwards.

Fazal Karim Khan Durrani, an Ahmadi missionary by vocation and a journalist by profession, used to edit a journal called *Muslim India* from Lahore in the 'twenties (in the 'thirties he issued another weekly, *The Truth*, from 66 Railway Road, Lahore). From the two books he published<sup>54</sup> we can see his fanatic devotion to Islam and his gnawing anxiety to be able to do or suggest something to revive its ancient glories. It is a pity that copies of his journal are no longer available, for in its columns we should be able to trace the development of his mind and the full stretch of his argument. It seems that he was an under-graduate in about 1914 for, as we have seen above, he recalled in one of his books that while in college he had heard his fellow-students talk about a Muslim state in India, and that he shared their hopes and dreams with the unbounded zeal of the young.

However, the first time that he put his plans on paper was towards the end of 1928. From *The Future of Islam in India*, which appeared in February 1929<sup>55</sup> but must have been written at least a few months before that, we find that his solution of the Muslim problem was unique in its scope and novelty. Till now

people had been trying to find a solution within the flexibility of a federal system; a few, blessed with longer foresight or convinced of the inadequacy of any political device, had pointed towards separation and urged a partition. But it was evident that division, granting that it did materialize, would fail to protect Islam in India as a whole, for it would still leave millions of Muslims in Hindu hands. A total transfer of population, embracing the entire sub-continent and touching every single Muslim, did not make practical sense. A Muslim state would have two weaknesses if one judged it by the higher standard of saving Islam in India. It could not be in itself an Islamic state since it could count a large number of non-Muslims in its citizenry. It would be a Muslim state, but that was a different matter. Secondly, it would be able to save only a portion, admittedly a large portion, of the followers of Islam in the sub-continent.

It would be quite wrong to think that these aspects of the problem did not occur to Muslim leaders: it would be a poor tribute to their common sense. They were men of ability and experience, and most of them were trained lawyers who well understood limitations inherent in constitutional contrivances. They also loved Islam and would certainly have preferred to bring into their ring of protection every Indian Muslim if it were but possible. But they were politicians who dealt with majorities and minorities, concessions and safeguards, democratic principles and electoral arrangements, administrative measures and political devices. They were not missionaries of Islam; they were Muslim politicians. They could only speak of political solutions, perhaps revolutionary in nature, but still political. To rise above the circumscribed plane of politics, to see the problem not in terms of Indian Muslims but in those of Indian Islam, to aim not at protecting a minority but at redeeming a people, to fix the gaze not at reviving a part of lost sovereignty but at recreating the past in all its puissant completeness—this was not in the power of politicians. Only a missionary, who had no end in view but the service of Islam and no purpose in life but the advancement of his faith, could view the problem in its devout reality: that Islam was in dire peril in India, that it must be saved, and that the creation of a Muslim state in one corner of India would not help.

These must have been Durrani's thoughts for many months or may be years. Tortured by anxiety and yet buoyed by hope, he



finally came to the conclusion that Islam must once again conquer India and re-establish the suzerainty which had fallen from its grasp with the decline of the Mughals. To the advocacy of this he turned in his aptly titled *The Future of Islam in India*.

For a man of such views the hopes of Hindu-Muslim unity must have sounded no more than the fancies of a silly old woman. Right in the beginning he put it down as th first premiss of his argument that "Hindu-Muslim unity is impossible".<sup>56</sup> The reasons for this, so different from those pleaded by polite and dissimulating politicians, were plain. "So long as the Hindus and the Muslims keep their separate identities, they cannot unite. The only solution of India's problem is that one of them must go. Either Islam must re-conquer Hindustan and with greater thoroughness than it did before, or Hinduism must wipe Islam off India's surface. There is no other solution possible."<sup>57</sup> Showing more realism than constitutional experts and inventors had exhibited, he commented sharply and shortly on the prospects for a state based upon a Hindu-Muslim agreement. "No state has ever in the history of the world come into being through pacts. States are based upon power, not upon pacts. The creation of a state by Hindu-Muslim unity would be a wholly new experiment in the history of the world, which will call for its success the highest morals on both sides. These do not exist and failure of the experiment is a foregone conclusion."<sup>58</sup>

Assimilation would not do. Elimination was the answer. "The true solution of the communal problem lies in the elimination of one of the two contending elements. Before independence can be achieved, one community must wipe out the other or reduce it to such helplessness that it ceases forever to count as a factor."<sup>59</sup> It needed no saying that Muslims were not prepared to be eliminated or reduced to an impotent and suppressed factor in a Hindu India. Neither their religion nor the natural instinct of self-preservation allowed such acquiescence. If the choice lay between elimination and domination, who did not know what to choose? So he finally arrived at the conclusion which was implicit in his first premiss. "For years and years I have been cherishing a dream and the time has come that I should put it before my brethren. It is the dream of a MUSLIM INDIA. I have never been a believer in Hindu-Muslim unity. . . . the events that have happened in India during the last ten years have made it plain for all who have eyes to

see that the dream of a MUSLIM INDIA is the only alternative that has been left to the Muslims of this country."<sup>60</sup> And again, as if to emphasize the point: "The true solution of India's problem is elimination of one of the two elements. Either the Muslims should commit suicide and remove themselves from the stage (or grow tufts of hair on their heads and become Hindus, which means the same thing) or assert themselves like Muslims and make a bid for the empire of India. There is no other alternative."<sup>61</sup>

Of course, Durrani represents an extreme view, but one which a great many Muslims must have applauded had it been widely publicized, its impracticability notwithstanding. Even if the Hindus had not been arrogant and anxious to impose majority rule on the non-Hindus, and even if the British had not appeared to lend support to the introduction of "democracy", Muslims would still have found themselves honour bound to favour such a point of view. It did not lie in the mouth of a believer to oppose a scheme which aimed at the glory of Islam, nor today does it create anything but admiration in the hearts of Pakistanis who had set up an independent state professedly to save as much of Indian Islam as was possible.

If Durrani's was an extreme view, it must also be remembered that a similar outlook had found favour with the Hindus earlier. We have seen above that *shuddhi* and *sangathan* movements had appeared in the mid-twenties: omens of things to come under Hindu rule when British stewardship would disappear. Besides, there had recently been other signs of expanding Hindu ambition which took no notice of national frontiers or past history when the glory of Hinduism was the object.

Four years before the publication of Durrani's book, Lala Har Dayal, a Punjabi Hindu leader (whom we have quoted above in the opening section of this chapter), had put forth his own ideas in his *Mayrai Vichar*, which were not a whit less uncompromising than Durrani's. In his opinion all Indians were Hindus provided that their faith sprang from the Indian soil. By this definition he at once classified all Sikhs and Jains as Hindus, and all Christians, Parsis and Muslims as non-Hindus and therefore foreigners. His plan, aiming at ensuring the future of the Hindu race, of Hinduism and of the Punjab, involved four stages. First, the Hindus must be organized on a separate platform; he called it Hindu *sangathan*. Secondly, they must run the government and administration of

India; this was Hindu *raj*. Thirdly, all Muslims of India should be converted to Hinduism in order to create national homogeneity; this was Hindu *shuddhi*. Finally, as if even a completely Hindu India was not enough, Afghanistan and the north-west frontier tribal belt must be conquered and their inhabitants converted to the Hindu faith so that the defence of India was secure; this was Hindu *expansionism*.<sup>62</sup>

It would be contrary to facts to dismiss Har Dayal as a solitary apostle of Hindu ambitions. The Hindu Mahasabha was expressing very similar opinions from public platforms throughout the country.<sup>63</sup> Then there were several individual Hindu writers and polemicists<sup>64</sup> who offered in all seriousness, as their solution of the Hindu-Muslim problem, such recommendations as would have made the Muslims Hindus in all but name, and in some cases not even in name. We have to conclude, therefore, that in the context of those times Durrani was hardly the odd man out. It would be more prudent and historically more accurate to accept him as a Muslim counterpoise to Hindu extremism. In every society and in every age there are men who inspire their people with unattainable visions, and whose idealism should be judged as an essential ingredient in the making of a nascent nationalism rather than as a vain dream. At best Durrani was an idealist who inspired the Muslims by setting his sights so high. At worst he was the equal of many a British empire-builder who deemed every part of the globe a just inheritance of the British imperial crown.

Here it is relevant to recall that to the average Indian Muslim, whose faith in Islam was sound and pure and who looked at political games as irrelevant, Durrani represented a part of that historical force which directed all human movements and which had once raised Islam from its humble origin of a small community in Medina to the level of a mighty world power. He marvelled at the strange sight of the Muslim theologians of Deoband and Farangi Mahal preaching the gospel of an "Indian" nationalism, and the religious stalwarts of the Jamiat-ul-Ulema urging Muslim co-operation with Gandhi's Congress party. In his eyes such unfaithfulness to religion was as much plain heresy as a call to national suicide. That Durrani spoke for a great majority of the Muslims is evident from the scanty following of the Jamiat-ul-Ulema and other similar organizations which chose to throw their lot with the Congress.

But the contrary is not true. The Muslim League and the Muslim Conference, the two parties which then spoke on behalf of the Muslims, did not support Durrani's views and certainly did not make them their own. This may partly be accounted for by his membership of the Ahmadiyya sect. (In the present-day Pakistan his views would be regarded as a non-Muslim's, as the Ahmadiyya followers have been declared legally to be outside the pale of Islam!). In formal political terms his influence was negligible: that is to say, no political organization owned his ideal or stood forth to publicize and defend it, nor did he himself establish a party to further his plans. But ideas have the power to mould the thinking of a people without the equipment of formal organization. In this sense his influence on the Muslim community would seem to have been considerable. It does not matter if many people did not go all the way with him in the hope of establishing a Muslim empire in the sub-continent. But what he successfully did was to draw the attention of his people to the necessity of saving Indian Islam from Hindu domination. He brought the Muslim problem into focus and made people think about it. If his own scheme was impracticable, it could at least convert some to the idea of a separate state where a part of Islam would live again in self-respect and honour. This was his great service to Muslim India, and it is sad to record that so far it has not been acknowledged.

As far as Durrani's influence on some contemporary better-known figures is concerned, we have only circumstantial evidence to go by. A fair amount of such evidence is available. To take Iqbal first, both were living in Lahore at the same time, though Durrani was younger in age. Iqbal was intensely interested in Islam and kept himself abreast of Muslim opinion. It is reasonable to assume that he was familiar with Durrani's journal, even if he might not have read it regularly. Innumerable people met him and he discussed all kinds of problems with them. Some of them may have told him about Durrani's ideas. In fact, it is not at all improbable that the two men often met, for a few years later Durrani wrote a book on Iqbal. It is certain that Iqbal had read Durrani's *The Future of Islam in India*. He was a voracious reader and this was a field in which he had a special interest. The one point they had in common was their devotion to Islam and their anxiety about its future in India. From this was born Durrani's ideal of once again enthroning Islam in the sub-continent, and from this emerged

Iqbal's 1930 suggestion for consolidating the Muslim north-west in the face of Hindu ambition. Would it be too far-fetched to assume that Iqbal was influenced by Durrani's ideas in formulating the views he expressed at Allahabad less than two years later? Durrani's book was published in February 1929; the Allahabad address was delivered in December 1930.

The point of difference between the two men is also significant. Durrani was aiming higher and wanted the whole of India to be brought under Islam. Iqbal was arguing from a shorter tether, and wanted the Muslims of the north-west to be strengthened and protected. Both started from the same premiss: how to save Indian Islam. The different conclusions reached reflect the difference in their attitudes. Durrani was a missionary, a younger man, and full of unlimited zeal. Iqbal was a philosopher, mature in intellect, and without that *political* single-mindedness which is vital for upholding a new cause. Iqbal was also a politician for several years, and it was as such that he prepared and delivered the Allahabad address. That explains more than anything else the smaller but more realizable scope of his scheme. In spite of his unfathomable love for Islam he could not have followed Durrani all the way because he was a politician speaking from a responsible platform. But he was also a poet and, had he wished, could have sung the higher ideal in verse without making himself liable to political accountability. Much could have been said in verse, where imagination soars beyond prim logic and timorous caution, and where the earthly restrictions of prose do not shackle the free mind. But Iqbal chose not to say it.

Rahmat Ali's work shows greater affinity with Durrani's ideas. We know so little about the early years of both that it is difficult to say if they had met in their youth. If both were educated in Lahore there is a possibility that they knew each other. However, speculation apart, their published words converge on some points. Both were deeply involved with the future destiny of Islam in India. While Durrani stood for an Islamic India in the sense of making India Muslim, Rahmat Ali demanded such a revolutionary re-drawing of boundaries as would result in Muslim rule over a large part of India. Both were aiming at rehabilitating Muslim sovereignty in the sub-continent: one by leaving nothing to the Hindu, the other by taking much away from him. It is easy to see a connection between Durrani's passion for saving Indian Islam and

Rahmat Ali's dislike for what he called "Indianism"; and also between Durrani's ideal of Muslim hegemony in India and Rahmat Ali's plan for a series of Muslim states scattered all over the sub-continent. Each was attempting to give the maximum scope to Islam. We know that Rahmat Ali was in Lahore from his undergraduate days till his departure for England. Probably he had read Durrani's book and had been influenced by it. If this happened, it took him a few years to formulate his ultimate scheme: his plan for the north-west state (Pakistan) in 1933 and for other states in and after 1935.

In order to avoid any misunderstanding it must be repeated that all this is speculation. But speculation is a legitimate instrument in historical reconstruction. Chronology determines the dissemination of ideas, and no rational standards are violated in indicating that an idea first expressed in 1929 had a good chance of influencing those formulated in 1930 and 1933, as also in remembering that the 1929 concept could have owed much to what had gone before. That is how one generation stands on the shoulders of the other and thus sees more and farther away.

When the Muslim League made its demand for a partition in 1940 Durrani gave it his wholehearted support and wrote a book in defence and explanation of it entitled *The Meaning of Pakistan*. But he had not given up his earlier ideal, for, as we have seen above, in 1946 he said that he was still of the same opinion. His ideal, he was now careful to say, was a long-range one. Probably he looked forward to the creation of Pakistan as a first step towards the fulfilment of a vision which had come to him in 1928-29.

### Murtaza Ahmad Khan Maikash (1928)

But we have not yet finished with the prolific year 1928. Still another demand for a Muslim state in the north-west was made in December by a Punjabi journalist, Mawlana Murtaza Ahmad Khan Maikash. In a series of four articles which appeared in the *Inqilab*, an Urdu daily of Lahore, he "stated in very clear-cut terms that the solution of [the] Hindu-Muslim problem lay in the establishment of a Muslim national homeland consisting of [the] Punjab, Sind, Baluchistan and the NWFP". *Partap*, a contemporary Hindu newspaper appearing in Urdu from Lahore, took exception to this proposal and attacked it in strong words. In



reply to this criticism, Maikash reiterated his scheme and said that the establishment of such a state "on the basis of the internationally recognized principle of the right of self-determination was the only goal for which Muslims could make sacrifices".<sup>65</sup>

This is a clear enunciation of a demand for a sovereign state in the north-west. The names of the provinces claimed make it clear that Maikash was thinking only of the western wing of what was one day to be Pakistan. There is no reference to Bengal. We don't know whether Durrani had publicly or privately expressed his views before December 1928 (he might have done so in the columns of his journal). On the published evidence available there is no doubt that Maikash's proposal came first. In the light of this, there should now be no controversy about Iqbal's not being the first to suggest a Muslim north-west. Further, Maikash's scheme was for an independent state, for so it looks from the use of the word "homeland" and from the argument of the right of self-determination, while there is much doubt if in 1930 Iqbal was arguing for complete separation and independence.

### The Silence of the Politicians

A fascinating aspect of the scene so far revealed is the stunning silence of the tribe of politicians. It is the journalists and other private individuals who are venturing into new realms of thought and voicing startlingly fresh ideas. The politicians knew very well that these radical attempts were aimed at tackling the very problem they were trying to solve. But they chose to hold their peace—a miracle of self-abnegation in a game where words matter much and silence is a sign of failure. We know of no clear reasons for this. It is possible that they still had good hopes of a Hindu-Muslim agreement; though that was a prospect which events were increasingly pushing out of sight. It is also possible that they knew the hopelessness of their attempts but were not prepared to confess their despair in public. Or, it may be that they were waiting for public opinion to show the way. They had not yet thought up a solution which could command general approval. They heard voices beckoning towards partition but were not sure if they represented the popular will. They decided to tarry a while and judge the trend of public opinion before putting their influence behind it.

This is understandable. But politics is also a game of "feelers". Unless a politician throws out an idea in order to see how others, particularly the enemies, react to it, how is policy going to make a headway? Granted that the major leaders, the top figures, might not have been able to do this "throwing", but usually this task, not altogether unpleasant, is entrusted to the second rung of leadership. It is the local or provincial politicians who are often directed by the supreme leadership to float a *ballon d'essai*. This strategy enables the national leaders to save their face if the idea proves abortive or unpopular. Such repudiation of failed "kites" by the higher leadership is a common practice in politics. What strikes one as odd is that in India all the kite flying was done by the non-politicians on their own initiative: which does not make it kite flying at all!

The politicians came round to the idea of separation very late and very hesitantly. The uttermost to which they were prepared to commit themselves at this stage was the concept of Muslim provincial autonomy. Make the provinces strong, and you will have a few Muslim strongholds which would protect a majority of the Muslim population against Hindu control and interference. Considering the schemes and plans sketched in earlier pages this outlook seems insipid and almost retrograde. But it was the limit beyond which they could not venture—yet.

### Abdullah Suhrawardy and Zulfiqar Ali Khan (1929)

This comes out well in a joint opinion expressed by two Muslim politicians in 1929. In a minute of dissent attached to the Report of the Indian Central Committee (which had been appointed to co-operate with the Simon Commission), Dr. Abdullah Al-Mamun Suhrawardy of Bengal and Nawab Sir Zulfiqar Ali Khan of the Punjab wrote: "If Sind, Punjab, Bengal, NWFP, and Baluchistan had their own Governments, which would necessarily be Moslem in character, with the rest of the Indian provinces having Hindu Governments, it will create a *balance of power* in India which is highly desirable."<sup>66</sup>

This was quite an advance on the hitherto generally accepted proposition that an Indian federation, if and when it came into being, would be a purely constitutional convenience without any reference to the religious affiliation of the populations of its con-

stituent units. Though Muslim politicians had been demanding strong provincial governments in a not too rigid federal system, and though the idea at the back of their minds was obviously one of Muslim consolidation, yet this is the first time that they officially came out with the idea of a "balance of power" between Hindu and Muslim provinces.

This decidedly introduced a new concept into Indian politics. The Hindu-Muslim problem was now being attacked from a new angle. In a few years it would not be difficult to convert this angle into a line of partition. In reality, the very use of the phrase "balance of power" implied that a line of demarcation had already been drawn mentally and morally. It could be transferred on to the map if public opinion gave the political leaders another push in that direction.

### Sir Ross Masud (1929)

Towards the end of 1929 (most probably at the end of November) the Governor of the United Provinces had a talk with Sir Ross Masud, the Vice-Chancellor of the Aligarh University, in the course of which Masud told the following to the Governor (as reported in the latter's communication to the Viceroy): "The differences of the Muslims with the Hindus are deep-seated, and the Muslims felt that they would be swamped in a self-governing India. Their minds are turning more and more to the idea of a federation between modernized Afghanistan with Persia in the background and with allies in the frontier independent territories. The Punjab Muslims have long been talking among themselves of a union of the Northern Punjab, Sind, Baluchistan and Afghanistan. A generation ago, a union with Afghanistan would have been regarded with horror, for the Pathan was not a very popular person in Northern India; but the memory of his raids is dying out; and at present, at all events, it seems preferable to many of them to run the risk of engaging him as an ally rather than to accept the certainty of domination by a Hinduized Central Government."<sup>67</sup>

Ross Masud was a well-informed person and what he told the Governor must have had solid foundation. His friends and colleagues would have conveyed to him the views of the community. The reference to a union with Afghanistan reflects contemporary Indian Muslim interest in Amanullah's reform movement and the

King's broadening interest in neighbouring Muslim areas.

### Sir Zulfiqar Ali Khan (1929)

On the last day of 1929, Nawab Sir Zulfiqar Ali Khan, who had signed the above-quoted minute of dissent with Suhrawardy, propounded the two-nation theory and demanded a separate Muslim state in the north-west and Bengal from the platform of a national organization.

Zulfiqar Ali Khan of Malirkotla was a prominent member of the Muslim League, the Muslim Conference and the Khilafat Conference. A member of the Council of State, the upper chamber of the Indian central legislature, from 1921 to 1926, and of the Indian Legislative Assembly, the lower house, from 1926 till his death in 1933, he was also for several years president of the Central Muslim Party in the Legislative Assembly. In 1928 he was appointed member of the Central Committee, in which capacity he wrote the afore-mentioned minute, and in 1931 he was nominated to the Indian Franchises Committee. In 1930 he was among the Indian delegates to the League of Nations. He was a highly educated man with a scholarly taste and a magnificent private library, and a great friend of Iqbal. Author of a number of books, including biographies of Maharaja Ranjit Singh and Sher Shah Suri, he was a generous patron of art and letters in the Punjab, and his red-bricked mansion on the Queen's Road in Lahore served as a celebrated *salon* for literary gatherings and *musha'iras*.

When AIKC held its annual session at Lahore in December 1929, the Nawab was the chairman of the Reception Committee. It was his address in this capacity, delivered on 31 December, which contained his suggestion for the creation of a separate Muslim state. It is a 62-page Urdu speech, written in a colloquial, abrupt style; but the manner does not affect the clarity.

"At this stage of Indian politics", he said, "the separation of the Ali Brothers [Muhammad and Shawkat] from Mahatma Gandhi is, in principle, the separation of the entire Muslim nation (*qawm*) from the Hindu nation, and is a practical manifestation of the reality (*haqiqat*) that the two are separate nations. The one nation is not a mere part (*hissa*) or component (*juzw*) of the other, which may be merged with it in response to any demand of present-day democracy."<sup>68</sup> The Indian question is not "a problem

of one nation, but of two permanent nations. The Muslims may be killed off or forced to emigrate from India, but politically they shall never let themselves be absorbed into or dominated by another nation. Muslims can unite with the Hindus (*ittihad kar sakte hain*); they can guarantee permanent peace with them in the shape of a strong and durable agreement; but they cannot become a part of them".<sup>69</sup>

In view of the Asiatic temperament, India could be made into a nation in only one way. "And that way is that all her inhabitants adopt one religion. It is simply (*mehaz*) impossible to have one nation until there is one religion. . . . And to achieve that, they should all, by common consent, choose and embrace one of the current faiths, or invent a new religion, and abandon their ancient faiths. But never in the past were religions born of political purposes, nor shall it happen in the future."<sup>70</sup>

After having equally rejected, in this manner, the Indian claim to nationhood and the possibility of a Muslim merger with the Hindus, he prescribed his own solution. "But I want to put it to you that there is absolutely (*sire se*) no need to create one nationhood (*qawmiyyar*). Why can't we find such a solution of this political difficulty as will enable the two nations to enjoy separate existence without fear of absorption and annihilation, and to live a life of unity, progress and peace? Why don't all the nations, who are at present at one another's throat, agree to divide the various areas of the country in such a manner as to eliminate all Hindu-Muslim rivalries and all quarrels about separate and joint electorates? . . . I appeal to my Hindu and Sikh brethren to give up, for God's sake, their ambition to swallow up each other. This country is not too small for all of us to live in peace. . . . Let us do away, once and for all, with sectarian and national conflicts, and, after dividing the territories anew, settle down in our own separate provinces as distinct nations."<sup>71</sup>

Coming to the formation of a Muslim state or homeland, he concluded: "The freedom and progress of India depends on this: the Muslims should be given in northern India a territory containing two or three provinces, or one which could be made into one province, wherein their majority should not be less than 80%. Similarly, in eastern India, Bengal should be so divided as to leave the Muslims with an 80% ratio in the population. *The Muslims should demand a country or a homeland*, instead of asking for rights."<sup>72</sup>

The entire scope of Muslim politics in India is summed up in Zulfikar's brief argument. The fear of Hindu rule, the impossibility of solving the Hindu-Muslim question, and the conviction of being a separate nation: all have coincided and the event is proclaimed from an important public platform.

The logic of the argument is transparent. In India the concept of nationality is based on religion. Therefore Muslims constitute a nation by themselves. If India is to be made one nation it is paramount that all Indians should adopt one faith. But this is impossible. Consequently, the Hindu-Muslim problem is beyond any solution on the basis of current assumptions of political agreement and constitutional safeguards. Physical separation is thus seen to be the only possibility.

The provinces should be re-grouped and populations exchanged. This will solve the minority-majority question and make separate electorates superfluous. The two major provinces which are centres of communal rivalry and cause of much concern are the Punjab and Bengal. Luckily the two communities are so placed in these provinces that their separation offers no insuperable difficulty. The east of the Punjab is more Hindu than Muslim, and the east of Bengal is more Muslim than Hindu. So divide the two provinces following the religious line and you would have gone a long way in tackling the communal problem. But as soon as the newly redistributed provinces come into view a further possibility suggests itself. With a solidly Muslim Punjab lying contiguous to Sind and NWFP, which also are Muslim, a Muslim *bloc* in the north-west is automatically created. Similarly, in the east, Muslim Bengal wears the look of an area large and populous enough to stand as an independent bastion of Islam in that wing. With Muslim power and numbers thus consolidated within the bounds of two recognizable area, the next logical step is to sever all connections with India and declare their sovereignty. To all appearances this is the path by which Zulfikar arrived at the point where he urged his audience, and through them the Muslim masses, not to demand any more safeguards, but advance further and make a bid for the creation of a separate homeland.

It seems to have taken Zulfikar only about a year to advance from the theory of a balance of power between Hindu and Muslim provinces to the demand for a separate state. We don't know what brought about this change. The two public proposals made imme-



diately before his own were those of Durrani and Maikash, and either might have aided his thinking (this is not to discount the possible influence of such earlier suggestions as Lajpat Rai's). There is in this address an unmistakable echo of Durrani's opinion that the only method of bringing an Indian nation into being was the conversion of all Indians to one religion which may be Hinduism or Islam. Both he and Zulfiqar saw no hope in routine developments or ordinary political methods. From this conviction Durrani travelled to the vision of an Islamic empire embracing the whole of India and making ancient grandeur live again, while Zulfiqar was impelled to demand a partition on religious lines. Similarly, it was only a little while ago that Maikash had entered a plea for a Muslim *watan* (homeland) in the north-west. Zulfiqar accepted this idea with two amendments: a division of the Punjab to make the Muslim majority effective, and the inclusion of eastern Bengal to extend similar protection to the Bengali Muslim.

To see the influence of Durrani and Maikash at work in Zulfiqar's proposal is not mere speculation. All three were Punjabis living in Lahore. Durrani's book must have caught Zulfiqar's eye for he was a reader and a scholar. The *Inqilab* was a popular Muslim daily which every well-informed public man scanned each morning, and it was in its columns that Maikash had so recently argued for a separate state.<sup>73</sup> It is extremely unlikely that Zulfiqar was unaware of Maikash's suggestion. In those days there used to be much intimacy and close touch among Muslim journalists, politicians, scholars and men of influence in general, which did not survive the coming of independence.

Zulfiqar's proposal is a landmark in another sense also. It provides conclusive evidence against the general belief that Iqbal was the first person to suggest the idea of Pakistan from a public platform. As we will see in the following three chapters, Iqbal has been credited with much that history does not warrant. Though it is very doubtful if his proposal amounted to a demand for a separate state, yet a vast majority of Pakistani writers have tried to wring the last ounce of meaning out of his words with a view to proving that he alone was the harbinger of the idea of partition.

Postponing the details of this controversy to the following chapters, the short answer is that there is no clear indication in Iqbal's 1930 address of his having proposed a partition. The more

careful historians admit that Iqbal was not the first to think of a division, but then they go on to assert that he was the first to announce it from a public platform, and that it was the first time that a prominent politician had advocated such a solution. Even these limited claims can no longer be entertained in the light of Zulfiqar's 1929 address.

The adjectives "important" and "prominent" imply value judgements and may be used as "loaded" words. But it is hard to deny that as a politician Zulfiqar cut a more prominent figure than Iqbal. He had longer experience of public life and parliamentary activity. Equally energetic in all the three Muslim organizations of his time, he was in the public eye for far longer than was Iqbal. Iqbal's fame, stature and greatness rest on achievements other than the political. In the same way, it is invidious to claim that the Muslim League was a more important party than the Khilafat Conference in the late 'twenties. The Khilafat Conference had passed its heyday a few years before, and was now but a shadow of what it had been during 1920-23. The abolition of the *khilafat* by the new Turks had thrown Indian Muslims into an unparalleled confusion and at the same time pushed into oblivion the very *raison d'être* of the Khilafat Conference. The Muslim League, in its turn, enjoyed no greater prestige in 1930. During the Khilafat movement it had been superseded in effectiveness and policy-making by the Khilafat Conference. Later it was overwhelmed by the Muslim Conference. It was destined to shine in glory once again, but that was not to be till much later when Jinnah, on his return from England, breathed a new spirit into it. In 1930 it was a relatively unimportant, organizationally weak and politically ineffective body, whose decisions and pronouncements did not much ruffle the waters of Indian politics. According to one report the Allahabad session, at which Iqbal spoke the controversial words, was so poorly attended that the quorum of the meeting was continually threatened.

One practical standard of judging the importance of a party gathering is to look at the quality and standing of the leaders who assemble on the occasion. Their presence is bound to lend weight to the party's deliberations and influence. By this criterion the 1929 Lahore session of the Khilafat Conference provided a far more distinguished panel of participants than the 1930 Allahabad session of the Muslim League. Nawab Muhammad Ismail Khan was

in the chair, and among those who came to Lahore to attend the meeting were Muhammad Ali, Shawkat Ali, Seth Abdullah Haroon, Hasrat Mohani, Ghulam Bhik Nairang, Shafi Daudi, and Azad Subhani; Iqbal, Mian Sir Muhammad Shafi, Shaikh Abdul Qadir and Mawlawi Mahbub Alam attended from Lahore.<sup>74</sup> Dr. M.A. Ansari was also there.<sup>75</sup> It was an uncommon gathering for the annual session of an organization which was on its last legs.

It might have been an accident which brought so many of the top leadership to Lahore. It is possible that the organizers of the Conference were just lucky. But one cannot ignore the result. Zulfiqar was speaking before an audience which contained almost every important leader of every Muslim group.

In any case, the presence of Iqbal at the meeting leaves no doubt that he had listened to Zulfiqar's proposal before writing his own Allahabad address. Even if he had neither read Durrani's book nor looked at Maikash's suggestion in the *Inqilab*, he had surely heard Zulfiqar presenting his partition scheme to the Khilafat Conference session. Iqbal and Zulfiqar were very good friends—so good that Iqbal wrote a poem on him, and he a book on the poet. It is inconceivable that the two did not discuss the partition plan either before Zulfiqar's address was delivered or later. If personal contact and intimate association influence one's thoughts and mould one's attitude, it is very probable that Iqbal was directly inspired by Zulfiqar's 1929 proposal. However one may interpret the Allahabad address, to argue that Iqbal was the first to dream of a Pakistan or that he was the first to put across his dream from an important public platform is to fly into the face of history—a movement as unpleasant as it is inelegant.

## NOTES

1. Raj Kumar Ametti, speech in Delhi, *Tej*, 20 March 1926, quoted in M. Fazl-i-Husain, *Plans of Hindu Raj*, Calcutta, 1932, p. 175.
2. See *Al-Jamiat*, 18 June 1926.
3. See Asoke Chatterjee, "Are the Muslims of Bengal Really in an Effective Majority?", *Modern Review*, August 1926, pp. 125-127; and Ramananda Chatterjee, "The Voting Strength of Our Province in Legislative Assembly", *ibid.*, October 1927, pp. 479-481.
4. Speech at Cawnpore, *Sher-i-Punjab*, 19 September 1926. See also Herman I. Arthur, *The Political Career of Motilal Nehru*, unpublished Ph. D. thesis, Columbia, 1945.
5. *CMG*, 31 December 1926.
6. Editorial, *Sudhram* (a Maharashtra paper), cited in *Wakil*, 6 February 1926.
7. Speech at a Hindu Conference at Dacca, *Partap*, 21 January 1927.
8. Pratap Singh, speech at a public meeting in Sukkher, *Tanzim*, 4 February 1927.
9. Swami Wichar Anand, *Paigham-i-Sulha*, 6 April 1927, quoted in M. Fazl-i-Husain, *op. cit.*, p. 176.
10. Quoted in *Zamindar*, 24 April 1927.
11. Prof. Ram Deo, *Guru Ganthal*, 10 June 1927.
12. *Arya Vir*, 25 June 1927, quoted in M. Fazl-i-Husain, *op. cit.*, pp. 236-238.
13. *Milap*, quoted in *Inqilab*, 7 July 1927.
14. Lala Har Dayal, in *Milap*, 23 June 1928.
15. *Milap*, quoted in *Inqilab*, 7 February 1929.
16. *Presidential Address by Dr. Mian Sir Muhammad Shafi, KCSI, CIE, LL.D., D.Lit., Barrister-at-Law, Delivered at the Annual Session of the All India Muslim League held at Lahore on the 30th and 31st December 1927*, Lahore, 1927.
17. Quoted in B.R. Ambedkar, *Pakistan or Partition of India*, Bombay, 2nd ed 1945.
18. Mohammad Isa, *Indian Muhammadans*, London, n.d., p. 5.
19. Speech at the Third Hindu Conference of Oudh, Ayodhya, quoted in *Medina*, 5 April 1928.
20. For example, Sind Khilafat Conference resolution no. 1,

- Sukkher, 27-29 October 1928, quoted in Seth Haji Abdullah Haroon, *The Constitution of the Future Commonwealth of India and the Rights of the Muslim Minority*, Karachi, 1928, p. 28.
21. K.M. Panikkar and A. Pershad (eds), *The Voice of Freedom: Selected Speeches of Pandit Motilal Nehru*, Bombay, 1961, p. 63.
  22. *Report of the All India Muslim Conference held at Delhi on 31 December 1928 and 1st January 1929*, Aligarh, 1929, p. 22. My italics.
  23. *IQR* 1928, Vol II, pp. 403-404.
  24. Quoted in "Through Indian Eyes", *TTI*, 14 March 1928.
  25. Shafaat Ahmad Khan, *What are the Rights of the Muslim Minority in India?*, Allahabad, 1928, p. 66.
  26. *Report of the All India Muslim Conference...*, p. 26.
  27. Speech in Karachi, *Inqilab*, 18 June 1929. On him see S. Chaturvedi, *Madan Mohan Malaviya*, New Delhi, 1972, and S.L. Gupta, *Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya: A Socio-Political Study*, Allahabad, 1978.
  28. *Hindu*, 21 October 1929.
  29. *Milap*, 27 October 1929.
  30. Shaikh Mushir Husain Kidwai, letter, *The Times*, 29 October 1929.
  31. Quoted in M.R.T. (ed), *Nationalism in Conflict in India*, Bombay, n.d., p. 186.
  32. Presidential Address at the Bengal All-Parties Conference, Calcutta, 29 December 1929, *CMG*, 2 January 1930.
  33. See J.S. Hoyland, "An Indian View of Western Civilization", *Nineteenth Century*, December 1929, pp. 757-773.
  34. Sir Azizuddin Ahmad, *The Indian Minorities*, London, n.d., pp. 2-7. Hindu-Muslim relations in the years 1925-29 are studied in considerable detail in G. Robert Thursby, *op cit.*; David Page, *op. cit.*; Y.B. Mathur, *Muslims and Changing India*, New Delhi, 1972, pp. 180-190; J.T.F. Jordens, "Reconversion to Hinduism: the Shuddhi of the Arya Samaj", in G.A. Oddie (ed.) *Religion in South Asia*, New Delhi, 1977, pp. 145-162; and F.B. Wilmot, *The Communalization of Politics in India, 1926-1930*, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Duke University, 1974.
  35. His writings include *The Arya Samaj*, London, 1915; *Young*

- India: An Interpretation and A History of the Nationalist Movement From Within*, New York, 1916; *The Agony of the Punjab*, Madras, 1920; *The Political Future of India*, New York, 1921; *Ideals of Non-co-operation and Other Essays*, Madras, 1924; *Unhappy India*, Calcutta, 2nd ed 1928; and *The Call to Young India*, Madras, n.d. On him see O.P. Goyal, *Studies in Modern Indian Political Thought (The Moderates and the Extremists)*, Allahabad, 1964; Lajpat Rai: *His Relevance For Our Times*, Bombay, 1966; Lala Dhanpat Rai, *Life Story of Lala Lajpat Rai*, New Delhi, 1976; Ferozchand, *Lajpat Rai: Life and Work*, New Delhi, 1978; D. Argov, *The Ideological Differences between Moderates and Extremists in the Indian National Movement*, with special reference to Surendranth Banerjea and Lajpat Rai, 1883-1919, Ph.D. thesis, University of London, 1964, pub, Bombay, 1967; and Naeem Gul Rathore, *Indian Nationalist Agitation and the United States: A Study of Lala Lajpat Rai and the Indian Home Rule League of America, 1914-1920*, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Columbia, 1965. For his scattered writings see V.C. Joshi (ed), *Writings and Speeches of Lala Lajpat Rai*, Delhi, 1966, 2 vols. His autobiography in Hindi, *Lajpat Rai ki Atma Katha*, was pub in Lahore in 1932. It is not available to me at the time of writing, and I have not seen any Urdu or English tr.
36. See his articles of 30 November, and 5, 14 and 17 December 1924 in *The Tribune* of Lahore. The partition scheme is elaborated in that of 14 December.
  37. In his first public speech in April 1882 at Ambala, he opposed the use of Urdu and advocated the development of Hindi as a national language; though he expressed this demand in Urdu as "he did not even know the Hindi alphabet" (D. Argov, *op. cit.*, p. 60). In 1902, he "claimed that the historical and religious unity of India embodied the basis of Hindu nationalism" (*ibid.*, p. 91). When he was deported by the Government for his seditious activities in 1907, elated Muslims sent letters of congratulation to the only British newspaper of Lahore (see *CMG*, 11 May 1907), and Muslim newspapers, like *Azad* and *Watan*, published extracts from his speeches to demonstrate his guilt of sedition (*ibid.*, 28 June 1907). In December 1909, he told the Punjab Hindu



- Conference that "in the present struggle between Indian communities I shall be a Hindu first and an Indian afterwards" (*The Indian Review*, December 1909, p. 932). In 1911, he revived the Hindi-Urdu controversy and urged the Punjabis to boycott Urdu literature (*Zamindar*, 24 August 1911). In 1914 he was not elected president of the INC solely for the reason of his being *persona non grata* with the Muslims ("Congress Politics in 1914", *The People*, 14 November 1929). In December 1924, he declared that in contrast to Hindu toleration, Islam was dogmatic, doctrinaire and intolerant. As long as Islam regarded the Hindus as *kafirs* "all talk of unity between Hindus and Muslims is absurd" (*The Tribune*, 5 December 1924).
38. A misleading statement was made recently by a Bengali biographer of Fazlul Haq when he claimed that "in 1925" Lajpat Rai "proposed that a separate Muslim State be made in North-Western India comprising Western Punjab, Frontier, Baluchistan and Sind. He also visualized a similar Muslim State in Eastern India including Bengal and Assam" (A.S.M. Abdur Rab, *A.K. Fazlul Haq*, Lahore, n.d., p. 100). The reader will notice the misstatement (with its implications) in the second sentence.
  39. For information about these and other predictions which came true see his *You and Your Hand*, *Cheiro's Language of the Hand* and *Cheiro's Book of Numbers*, each of which went into several editions. Some additional information may be found in his *Memoires*.
  40. Cheiro's *World Predictions*, pp. 212-218, 166, quoted in S.S. Pirzada, *Evolution of Pakistan*, Lahore, 1963, pp. 113-115. In the same year, William Archbold, a former principal of the MAO College, Aligarh, foresaw "a powerful Muhammadan combination in the north-west in alliance with Afghanistan" (W.A.J. Archbold, "Some Indian Problems", *Contemporary Review*, July 1925, p. 46).
  41. This account is based solely on Anwar Qidwai, "Iqbal awr Tasawwar-i-Pakistan", *NW*, 21 April 1965. I have found no other reference to it.
  42. An Indian Mahomedan, *The Indian Moslems*, London, 1928, p. 21.
  43. *Ibid.*, p. 190.

44. *Ibid.*, p. 249.
45. *Ibid.*, p. 266.
46. *Ibid.*, p. 267.
47. Quoted in Pirzada, *Evolution of Pakistan*, p. 117, who does not give source, occasion or exact date of the statement.
48. The Simon Commission had been appointed in October 1927 and was soon expected in India to collect views on the next instalment of constitutional reforms.
49. A Correspondent in India, "The Indian Inquiry: Punjab and the Commission", *The Times*, 14 March 1928. The author of this piece was not the regular *Times* man in India, but an "outside contributor", one J.M. Ewart (information kindly supplied by Mr. W.R.A. Easthope, editor of the *Times Archives*, in his letter to me from London, dated 8 December 1969).
50. Munshi Abdur Rahman Khan, *Tamir-i-Pakistan awr Ulema-i-Rabbani*, Multan, 1956, p. 48, and *Iqbal awr Mister*, Lahore, 2nd ed. 1956, pp. 35, 37, 39, who insists that Thanawi was the first to make this suggestion; see also Ahmad Saeed, "Hazrat Mawlana Ashraf Ali Thanawi awr All India Muslim League", *Al-Balagh*, February 1970, p. 29. For the Mawlana's political opinions and activities see his *Afadat-i-Ashrafiyya dar Masail-i-Siyasiyya*, comp by Muhammad Shafi, Deoband, 1365 A.H., and Mawlana Zafar Ahmad Ansari, *Anwar-un-Nazzar fi Athar-uz-Zaffar*, Lahore, 1388 A.H. (1968).
51. The Aga Khan, "A Constitution for India, II: Grouping of Free States: The Bavarian Model", *The Times*, 13 October 1928.
52. *CMG*, 12 September 1928.
53. *Ibid.*, 20 December 1928.
54. *The Future of Islam in India*, Lahore, 1929, and *The Meaning of Pakistan*, Lahore, March 1944, rep March 1946.
55. This is his own testimony; referring to his 1929 proposal, he wrote: "I am still of the same mind, for I believe the ultimate political salvation of India lies in Islam only. But that is a long range ideal" (*The Meaning of Pakistan*, p. 109). Quite possibly he had expressed such ideas even earlier in his journal.
56. F.K. Khan Durrani, *The Future of Islam in India*, Lahore, 1929, p. 12.

57. *Ibid.*, p. 23.
58. *Ibid.*, p. 69.
59. *Ibid.*, pp. 69-70.
60. *Ibid.*, p. 85. The capitals are in the original.
61. *Ibid.*, p. 86.
62. In addition to the sources quoted in earlier notes, see I.H. Qureshi, "Hindu Communal Movements", in *A History of the Freedom Movement, 1707-1947, Vol III, 1906-1936, Part I, 1906-1928*, Karachi, 1961.
63. See Indra Prakash, *A Review of the History and Work of Hindu Mahasabha*, New Delhi, 2nd ed 1952; A.S. Bhide, *Veer Savarkar's Whirlwind Propaganda*, Bombay, 1941; N.C. Banerji, *At the Cross Roads, 1885-1946*, Calcutta, 1950; S.P. Mookerjee, *Awake Hindustan*, Calcutta, n.d.; and S.V. Savarkar, *Hindu Sangathan*, Bombay, 1940.
64. For example, see M.A. Buch, *Rise and Growth of Indian Militant Nationalism*, Baroda, 1940; Swami Dharma T. Maharaj, *The Menace of Hindu Imperialism*, Lahore, 1941; Pandit Tulsi Ram Misra, *My Advice to Young Hindus*, Benares, 1908; Radhakumud Mookerjee, *Nationalism and Hindu Culture*, London, 1921, and *Akhand Bharat*, Bombay, 1945; B.S. Moonje, *Hindu National Ideals and Ways to Achieve Them*, Poona, 1943; U.N. Mukerji, *Hinduism and the Coming Census*, Calcutta, 1911; K.M. Munshi, *Akhand Bharat*, Delhi, 1942; Bhai Parmanand, *Hindu National Movement*, Lahore, 1929; Gulshan Rai, *Hindu Problem in India*, Lahore, n.d.; L.L. Sundra Ram, *Cow-Protection in India*, Madras, 1927; B.K. Sarkar, *The Futurism of Young Asia*, Berlin, 1922; S.M. Datar, *Hindus and Muslimism*, Poona, 1928; M.K. Gandhi, *Hindu-Muslim Tension*, Ahmedabad, 1924, and *To the Hindus and Muslims*, Karachi, 1942; and Philip Spratt, *Hindu Culture and Personality*, Bombay, 1966.
65. This information comes to us from A.S. Khurshid, "Origin of Pakistan: Trends that Led to Partition", *TPT*, 23 March 1962, and his *Sahafat Pakistan awr Hind Men*, Lahore, 1963, p. 451. The series of Maikash's articles were entitled "Hindi Musalman ke liye Alag Watan" (Separate Homelands for Indian Musalmans). In a later article ("Pakistan ka 'Bani Kawn'", *Mashriq*, 1 April 1964), Khurshid says that Maikash

- made this proposal "in 1929".
66. *East India (Constitutional Reforms) : Report of the Indian Central Committee, 1928-1929*, London, 1929, Cmd 3451, pp. 6-72. My italics.
67. Hailey (Governor of the United Provinces) to the Viceroy, 3 December 1929, *Halifax Collection*, c. 125/5, quoted in Pirzada, *The Foundations of Pakistan*, Karachi, 1970, Vol II, p. xvi; also quoted from *Hailey Papers*, HYC/16, by Waheed Ahmad, *The Formation of the Government of India Act, 1935*, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Cambridge, 1969, p. 237. On him see Khawaja Ghulam-us-Sayyidin, "Sir Ross Masud", *Kya Khub Adami Tha*, Delhi, 1966, pp. 77-86.
68. *All India Khilafat Conference, Lahore, ka Khutba-i-Istaqbalia jo Nawab Sir Muhammad Zulfiqar Ali Khan Sahib ne Mazkurah Conference men 31 December 1929 ko Irshad Farmaya*, Lahore, 1929 (printed at the Gilani Electric Press), p.15.
69. *Ibid.*, p. 22.
70. *Ibid.*, pp. 22-23.
71. *Ibid.*, p. 24.
72. *Ibid.*, p. 26. My italics.
73. The *Inqilab* of 3 January 1930 carried the full text of Zulfiqar Ali Khan's address (M. Rafique Afzal, "Origin of the Idea of a Separate Muslim State; Nawab Sir Zulfiqar Ali Khan's Lahore Address, 1929", *Journal of the Research Society of Pakistan*, January-April 1966, p. 180 fn.). But I have quoted from the original pamphlet which is in my private collection.
74. M. Rafique Afzal, *op. cit.*, p. 179.
75. Rizwan Ahmad, "Allama Iqbal ka Khutba-i-Allahabad", *Jang*, 21 April 1979.

# 4

## A POET'S DREAM: 1930

### Introduction

More has been written on Iqbal than on any other Indian Muslim, ancient or modern. There is an Iqbal industry in existence which goes on producing books, articles, papers and collections of studies at an alarming rate.<sup>1</sup> The products range from the passably sophisticated and at times recondite studies of his philosophy and poetry to the most trivial articles in obscure newspapers. Every Pakistani daily issues a special Iqbal supplement on 21 April, the anniversary of his death, containing several articles of varying quality illustrated by a variety of pictures. There are some academies and societies devoted to studying his life and thought which contribute to this flow of literature. His book on the reconstruction of religious thought in Islam is a text book for the advanced students of religion and philosophy in the universities, and his poetry, in single pieces or edited selections, figures in the prescribed courses of study in every school, college and university. The anniversary of his death is a public holiday when meetings and symposia are organized in every town and city to pay him homage, and the head of state, provincial governors and some ministers issue messages to the public. Special programmes are broadcast on radio and television networks. His poems are sung on all possible occasions and functions. Many educated Pakistanis have read him, and some will quote him in writing and conversation. His portrait often appears on popular calendars which adorn shops, offices and homes. Every book shop and stall sells cheap editions of his poetry. Several roads and avenues and one university have been named after him.

There is no doubt that he is a public hero of exceptional standing, and receives an adoration which is denied to other

historical figures. It is not our business here to discover reasons for this. Every nation and country adopts its heroes and gives them the full adulatory treatment. There is always an element of dogmatism and irrationality in this hero-worship. The great man is made out to be the greatest. Minor incidents of his life are exaggerated into legends. A myth is created and put into the national pantheon. Criticism is condemned as disloyalty to his memory. Attempts to question the grounds of such fulsome praise are painted as perfidy. The mildest disapproval of this wild acclamation is construed as an attack on the "national ideology".

These are features common to hero-worship in every society. But what distinguishes the Pakistani sentiment is the total absence of any attempt at critical understanding. It is as if all the intellectuals have with one voice surrendered their right to seek the truth wherever it may be and are now rejoicing in the glory of this act of self-sacrifice. Experienced writers and able scholars vie with common journalists in keeping the myth aloft. The most irrational aspect of this phenomenon is the way in which Iqbal has been elevated to the level of a god or, if that description is unwelcome to a Muslim society, to that of an oracle.

He was a great poet and a great thinker. He was a great man. Because he was this, he must also have been a great politician. Therefore his political activities and pronouncements ought to be treated with the same reverence as is vouchsafed to his best poetry and ideas. Because he was a seer and a thinker, therefore his politics could not have been wrong. Because his poems shine with truth which time cannot tarnish, therefore his political ideas too are eternal verities. This is how his admirers argue; and they have persuaded the public to agree with them by using all the modern media of communication and all the tendencies for conformity in popular Islam. This transference of goodness from one field which is genuine to another which is not is not uncommon in human nature. And yet it is false in logic and common understanding. A little reflection will show the fallacy inherent in the extension of virtue. But there is no element of reflection in hero-worship, or it would not be what it is. The intolerance of criticism continues, and with it a perpetuation of false history.

Heroes and myths are a part of general history, and the objective historian will dismiss them as insignificant only at his peril. But when legends, popular images and hero-worship become



history, instead of throwing light on it, the story of the past becomes a fairy tale which amuses none save the creators of the myth. Something like that has happened to Iqbal the politician. What he actually said and did have been relegated to a secondary place. What people think he said is offered as history. His words are rarely quoted; paraphrases and interpretations occupy the centre of discussion. And the astonished critic is silenced by the admonition, which astonishes him even more, that one should not criticise such a great man (by which is primarily meant a great poet). Thus interpretations, readings, versions and theories pile upon each other while the poor original words gather dust at the bottom of a different heap.

This ignorance of fact and indifference to the original are illustrated by the nature and scope of the *Iqbaliat* itself.<sup>2</sup> In this flood of writings on Iqbal, so faithfully and assiduously produced by a cohort of uncritical admirers, there is not a single reliable and comprehensive biography based on original sources in any language; nor is there any properly edited and annotated collection of his political writings and speeches,<sup>3</sup> nor have his private papers been collected, catalogued and made available to the scholars. The most significant political testament of Iqbal was his presidential address delivered at the annual session of the Muslim League at Allahabad in December 1930. His popular image as the first dreamer of Pakistan rests on this address. It has never been reprinted, with or without any introduction or notes, except in three or four collections compiled by people like "Shamloo" and S.A. Vahid; the reproduction is not accurate. Similarly, apart from a few articles written for the daily press and on its level, there is no serious treatment in this vast literature of Iqbal's political career or of his political ideas and opinions. The result is that students of Iqbal's politics have to rely on the second-hand and in most cases superficial and misleading studies put forth by the faithful, rather than on the original *corpus*.

In this way errors, unknowingly borrowed from others, become permanent and, over the years, come to be embodied in history as "facts". It would be unfair to give the process the name of deliberate falsification: for nobody has manufactured imaginary facts or put invented words in Iqbal's mouth. Of course, there are examples of unmistakable bias, misleading argument, and presentation of opinion as if it were a fact. But by and large history

has been killed by over enthusiasm and by a childish desire to make a very great man look even greater.

In this chapter, or in the two following it, I do not intend to offer a study of Iqbal's political career or of his political opinions. My purpose is a limited one: to discover Iqbal's place among the originators of the idea of Pakistan, and to see when and where and in what terms (and, if possible, why) he suggested a division of India and the creation of a Muslim state. In this voyage of discovery there are two major ports of call. The 1930 Muslim League presidential address is the first recorded occasion when he referred to the prospects for a Muslim India within India. Then after an interval of several years we come to his letters to Jinnah in which he suggested a separation. This correspondence will be examined in chapter 8.

The Allahabad address is our starting point for several good reasons. It is his first announcement of any importance on the subject from the platform of a national organization. It has in recent years given cause for much controversy. It is the only evidence on which his supporters base their claim that he was the first to foresee the coming of Pakistan. It contains a number of valuable ideas which repay scrutiny. Therefore, we must study this address at considerable length, and try to separate the different influences working on his mind, to compare and contrast his suggestions with those of others who were concurrently making similar proposals, and to draw some conclusions about his place in the gallery of the precursors of the idea of Pakistan.

Two points should be made right away lest an ugly misunderstanding darkens the course of this inquiry. First, the investigation will be conducted without any assumptions, prior impressions or presuppositions. No argument will be accepted as inherently true simply because it concurs with the current of popular fashion. On the other side, no point will be ignored or minimized for the simple reason that it has been put forward by those who base history on hero-worship. Everything will be made to turn on Iqbal's own words. His own arguments will be followed, no matter where they lead. If we meet any ambiguities in him, and we will, conclusions will be drawn by the stark test of reason.

In the second place, no purpose will be served by judging the present study by the standards usually adopted in viewing Iqbal as a national shrine where nothing but wreaths of a certain quality

and shape are accepted. Iqbal is a great poet, the greatest in Urdu literature and Muslim India; greater than Ghalib in the sweep of his imagination and the quality of his vision. He shakes us by making us share the tumult of his mind. He shows us the half-hidden peaks of the future destiny of mankind through the play of that wisdom which poetry shares with prophecy. He sings of the rise and fall and another rise of Islam with a lyricism which touches our heartstrings. His hopes become our expectations. His despair becomes our dismay. His music is the music of another world: a world in which Plato heard the spheres sing and saw Divinity making itself manifest. His poetry is one of the greatest that has been given to mankind to enjoy. To deny this is to deny that the sun rises at dawn. He is a philosopher of the first rank; an Islamic thinker of the quality and worth of Ghazali; a maker of some revolutionary ideas about the interpretation of the Quran which the greatest living theologians are still in the process of understanding and digesting.

But here our concern does not lie with Iqbal the poet, but with Iqbal the Muslim League president. It is a totally different plane of activity, and it is on this plane only that he will be judged by us. If history confirms that he was as great a political hero in our annals as public opinion says he is, the fact will emerge and will be recorded. Equally, if history refuses this accolade to him, facts will set this down. The historian has done his work when he has made facts speak for themselves. It is not in his power to do more. He dare not do less.

### The Contents of the Allahabad Address

The presidential address delivered by Iqbal before the annual session of AIML at Allahabad on 29 December 1930 is, in some respects, an unusual utterance.<sup>4</sup> It is natural that each League address, from the first one given by Peerbhoy at Karachi in 1907 to the last ones by Jinnah, should bear the impress of the personality of the president and reflect the circumstances of the occasion. In Iqbal's address, however, we notice two important things. His comments derive their significance not so much from the timing of their delivery as from the personality of the speaker. The year 1930 was not one of the happiest in the history of the League. The Muslim Conference was at this time a larger, more representative

and more influential organization, and attracted more attention among the public and more consideration from the government. It is a measure of the League's declining fortunes in this period that the addresses delivered during the few years before and after 1930 were undistinguished, and today few people would be able to recall the names of the presidents of these lean years. The value of the Allahabad address lies not in the occasion but in the man.

The other unusual feature is contained in the substance of the first part of the address. Iqbal did not ignore contemporary developments; no president of a party could do this. But in the earlier portions of his speech he tried to see beyond tomorrow, and related the situation and problems of the Indian Muslims to the historical march of Islam. At the same time, he indicated the dangers inherent in accepting European doctrines and assuming that Islam was bound to repeat the experience of Christianity since its crisis of the Reformation. He was the first Muslim League president to stress the role of Islam in moulding the character of the Indian Muslims and also in determining their future destiny. There are passages which read like extracts from an academic discourse and appear out of place in a party pronouncement. But Iqbal was a Muslim and a thinker before he was a Muslim Leaguer. Ideas were the medium which he used to communicate with people. He could not, as the president of a political party, avoid completely making political demands and formulating political propositions of a practical nature: he did this in the second half of the address. But the abiding interest of his words lies in his description of the creative role of Islam in the evolution of the Indian Muslim society, and in his attempt to seek a place for this society in a plural India.

The 22-page address begins with the usual show of modesty at being called upon to fill a great office: a conventional gesture of respectable antiquity. Then abruptly he warns the audience against the unusual tenor of what he is going to tell them. "I have given the best part of my life to a careful study of Islam, its law and polity, its culture, its history, and its literature. This constant contact with the spirit of Islam, as it unfolds itself in time, has, I think, given me a kind of insight into its significance as a world-fact. It is in the light of this insight, whatever its value, that, while assuming that the Muslims of India are determined to remain true to the spirit of Islam, I propose, not to guide you in your

decisions, but to attempt the humbler task of bringing clearly to your consciousness the main principle which, in my opinion, should determine the general character of these decisions."<sup>5</sup>

Having thus administered a fair warning he directly goes to the heart of the problem as he understood it. Islam, as "an ethical ideal plus a certain kind of polity", has been "the chief formative factor in the life-history of the Muslims of India". It has given them those "basic emotions and loyalties" which unify individuals and make them into a "well-defined people, possessing a moral consciousness of their own". He believes that "India is perhaps the only country in the world where Islam, as a people-building force, has worked at its best". The structure of Indian Islam as a society "is almost entirely due to the working of Islam as a culture inspired by a specific ethical ideal". This society owes its "remarkable homogeneity and inner unity" to "the presence of the laws and institutions associated with the culture of Islam".<sup>6</sup>

In his opinion the great danger threatening the stability and coherence of this society is the impact of European political thinking. Ideas from the West are "rapidly changing the outlook of the present generation of Muslims both in India and outside India". He complains that "our young men" are anxious to see these ideas "as living forces in their own countries" without realizing that they had emerged in Europe under European conditions and from European causes. In Europe Christianity was taken to be a purely monastic order, not a system of polity of a secular nature, and Luther had revolted against this church-organization. The result was that "the universal ethics of Jesus" was displaced by several "national and hence narrower systems of ethics". Thus the "one" was broken up into "a mutually ill-adjusted many". The human outlook gave way to the national, which demanded and received for its accommodation a system of polity based on national lines—lines "which recognize territory as the only principle of political solidarity". Given the European conception of religion as a "complete other-worldliness" what had happened was quite natural. As a consequence, we find that in Europe today religion is considered a private affair of the individual, one to be kept out of his temporal life.<sup>7</sup>

What happened to Christianity in Europe cannot happen to Islam because Islam does not divide the unity of man into spirit and matter. "In Islam God and the universe, spirit and matter,

church and state, are organic to each other." For Islam "matter is spirit realizing itself in space and time". It is the mistaken separation of the spiritual and the temporal which has moulded European political thought and excluded Christianity from the life of European states. A Luther in the world of Islam is "an impossible phenomenon", because it has no church-organization inviting a destroyer. It is a universal polity whose fundamentals "are believed to have been revealed", but whose structure stands today "in need of renewed power by fresh adjustments".<sup>8</sup> He does not know "the final fate of the national idea in the world of Islam", but he knows that today the national idea "is racializing the outlook of the Muslims" and this "racial consciousness" may produce standards different and even opposed to Islam. But he is not despaired of Islam "as a living force for freeing the outlook of man from its geographical limitations". He believes that "religion is the power of the utmost importance in the life of individuals as well as states" and, finally, that "*Islam is itself Destiny* and will not suffer a destiny!" The problem of nationalism in Islam is a living problem on a proper solution of which alone "depends your future as a distinct cultural unit in India".<sup>9</sup>

In the second section of the address, entitled "The Unity of an Indian Nation", Iqbal gives his own answer to this problem. This is the most important part of his address for it has a direct bearing on his belief or the lack of it in the possibility and practicability of the existence of a separate Muslim nation in India, and consequently in the creation of a separate Muslim state.

The question he sets out to answer is phrased by him thus: "Is it possible to retain Islam as an ethical ideal and to reject it as a polity in favour of national politics in which religious attitude is not permitted to play any part?" The inquiry assumes additional importance in India where the Muslims are in a minority. The proposition that religion is the private affair of an individual has no sanction in the Quran. The religious ideal of Islam is "organically related to the social order which it has created". Therefore, "the construction of a polity on national lines, if it means a displacement of the Islamic principle of solidarity, is simply unthinkable to a Muslim". Then he quotes Renan on the making of a national feeling, and finds that by his definition India is not a nation. The various religious and caste groups "have shown no inclination to sink their respective individualities in a large whole".



The unity of the Indian nation cannot, therefore, be sought in Renan's "moral consciousness". But it "must be sought, not in the negation, but in the mutual harmony and co-operation of the many". It is "on the discovery of Indian unity in this direction that the fate of India as well as of Asia really depends". "If an effective principle of co-operation is discovered in India it will bring peace and mutual good-will to the ancient land which has suffered so long, more because of her situation in historic space than because of any inherent incapacity of her people."<sup>10</sup>

So far all attempts to seek a principle of internal Indian harmony have failed. But Iqbal is still hopeful and sees in the events a tendency "in the direction of some sort of internal harmony". Then he makes a firm announcement. "I have no hesitation in declaring that, if the principle that the Indian Muslim is entitled to full and free development on the lines of his own culture and tradition in his own Indian homelands is recognized as the basis of a permanent communal settlement, he will be ready to stake his all for the freedom of India." Fearing that he may be branded as a communalist, he defends himself. "The principle that each group is entitled to free development on its own lines is not inspired by any feeling of narrow communalism. There are communalisms and communalisms. A community which is inspired by feeling of ill-will towards other communities is low and ignoble. I entertain the highest respect for the customs, laws, religions and social institutions of other communities. . . . *Yet I love the communal group which is the source of my life and behaviour; and which has formed me what I am by giving me its religion, its literature, its thought, its culture, and thereby recreating its whole past, as a living operative factor, in my present consciousness.*"<sup>11</sup>

Thus communalism, "in its higher aspect", is "indispensable to the formation of a harmonious whole in a country like India". India is a continent of different races, languages and religions. There is no common race consciousness. The principle of Western democracy cannot be applied to India "without recognizing the fact of communal groups". The next sentence makes it clear that his conception of "a Muslim India within India" was a communal idea, not a national one. "The Muslim demand for the creation of a Muslim India within India is, therefore, perfectly justified." Then he refers to the resolution passed by the Muslim Conference in Delhi on 1 January 1929 as having been inspired by "this noble

ideal of a harmonious whole". He asks the session to "emphatically endorse" this resolution, and then goes on to make the famous statement which has been the cause of so much controversy. "Personally, I would go further than the demands embodied in it. *I would like to see the Punjab, NWFP, Sind and Baluchistan amalgamated into a single state. Self-government within the British Empire, or without the British Empire, the formation of a consolidated North-West Indian Muslim state appears to me to be the final destiny of the Muslims at least of North-West India.*"<sup>12</sup>

In reply to the objection against such a state, raised by the Nehru Committee before which such a proposal was, he says, put, that it would be too unwieldy, Iqbal agree that its size might be unmanageable, but argues that in population it would be smaller than some of the existing Indian provinces. He then suggests, presumably in order to meet the criticism of the Nehru Committee, that the Punjab be divided by the exclusion of the "Ambala division and perhaps some districts where non-Muslims predominate". This will make the state less extensive and more solidly Muslim.<sup>13</sup>

Then follow his arguments in favour of the re-distribution he has suggested. "The life of Islam as a cultural force in this country very largely depends on its centralization in a specified territory." It "will intensify their sense of responsibility and deepen their patriotic feeling". Thus "possessing full opportunity of development within the body-politic of India, the North-West Indian Muslims will prove the best defenders of India against a foreign invasion, be that invasion the one of ideas or of bayonets". He denies Srinivasa Sastri's allegation that the demand for autonomous Muslim states was actuated by a desire to acquire means of exerting pressure in emergencies on the Government of India, and says that it is inspired "by a genuine desire for free development which is practically impossible under the type of unitary government contemplated by the nationalist Hindu politicians with a view to secure [*sic.*] permanent communal dominance in the whole of India". To the Hindus who might foresee "a kind of religious rule" in these autonomous Muslim states, he replies by repeating what he has said about Islam in the earlier part of the address. Islam is not a church but a state "conceived as a contractual organism" and "animated by an ethical ideal which regards man not as an earth-rooted creature, defined by

this or that portion of the earth, but as a spiritual being understood in terms of a social mechanism, and possessing rights and duties as a living factor in that mechanism".<sup>14</sup>

After thus disposing of all Hindu objections and fears to his apparent satisfaction, he reiterates his proposal in clear terms. "I therefore demand the formation of a consolidated Muslim state in the best interests of India and Islam. For India it means security and peace resulting from an internal balance of power; for Islam an opportunity to rid itself of the stamp that Arabian imperialism was forced to give it, to mobilize its law, its education, its culture, and to bring them into closer contact with its own original spirit and with the spirit of modern times."<sup>15</sup>

The rest, which is the bulk, of his address is devoted to a discussion of the kind of federation he wants, the kind Sir John Simon had suggested in his report, and the kind the Round Table Conference was envisaging.

His own conclusion is unambiguous. "Thus it is clear that in view of India's infinite variety in climates, races, languages, creeds and social systems, the creation of autonomous states, based on the unity of language, race, history, religion and identity of economic interests, is the only possible way to secure a stable constitutional structure in India." The federal system suggested by the Simon Report involves two basic changes: the substitution of the existing central assembly with a legislature containing representatives of federal states, and "a redistribution of territory on the lines which I have indicated". This re-distribution must come before the federation is created, so that the controversy about separate electorates is given the final quietus. If the provinces are re-arranged as suggested, Muslims would be content with territorial electorates, and a great issue of friction would disappear for ever from Indian politics.<sup>16</sup>

What is the nature of the federations being proposed by the Hindus and the British? The Hindus want to retain a strong central authority which would be responsible to a central legislature in which, with the abolition of the nominated element, their majority would be further reinforced. The British, on the other hand, fearing that democracy in the centre would not be conducive to their interests want the experiment of democracy to be shifted from the centre to the provinces. The Muslim attitude is quite different from these two. "The Muslims demand federation

because it is pre-eminently a solution of India's most difficult problem, *i.e.*, the communal problem." Thus the Simon Report "virtually negatives the principle of federation in its true significance". By perpetuating a Hindu majority in the central assembly the Nehru Report gives India a unitary form of government in which Hindus would dominate all India. By creating an unreal federation the Simon Report retains the existing British dominance. Both these alternatives are unacceptable to Muslim India. "To my mind a unitary form of government is simply unthinkable in a self-governing India." The residuary powers must be left "entirely to self-governing states", and the "Central Federal State" will exercise only those powers which have been expressly vested in it by the free consent of the federating states.<sup>17</sup>

The issue of introducing a federal system in India had taken quite a different turn when at the Round Table Conference the Princes had surprisingly and unexpectedly announced their willingness to enter an Indian federation. The Hindu delegates, who till then had been uncompromising advocates of a unitary system, had at once changed their mind and begun to subscribe to the federal solution. The happy reception of the Princes' announcement by the British and Hindu delegates was a natural reaction and easily intelligible. The entry of the native states will have a double purpose. It will maintain British power in India practically untouched. On the other hand, because of the very small number of Muslim states, it will give to the Hindus an overwhelming majority in the federal legislature. It is clear that the Hindu-Muslim disagreement on the ultimate form of government is being cleverly exploited by the British through the agency of the Princes who, in their turn, see in the proposal much better prospects for the maintenance of their despotic rule. The acceptance of any such scheme by the Muslims will "simply hasten their end as a political entity in India". It is not difficult to see how such a federation would operate in practice. The Princes, a solid phalanx in the future parliament, will support the British in all matters of imperial concern and side with the Hindus in all matters of internal administration. "In other words the scheme appears to be aiming at a kind of understanding between Hindu India and British imperialism—you perpetuate me in India, and I in return give you a Hindu oligarchy to keep all other Indian

communities in perpetual subjection." For the Muslims this can have but one lesson. "If therefore the British Indian provinces are not transformed into really autonomous states, the Princes' participation in a scheme of Indian federation will be interpreted only as a dexterous move on the part of British politicians to satisfy, without parting with any real power, all parties concerned—Muslims with the *word* federation, Hindus with a majority in the centre, and British imperialists—whether Tory or Labourite—with the *substance* of real power." The best solution is to postpone the entry of the Princes in the federation and to make a start with a British Indian Federation only. This will eliminate two serious problems: the "unholy union between democracy and despotism" which will in practice keep India under the thumb of a unitary central government, and the Muslim fear of being reduced to a permanent minority in the federal legislature. The only federation the Muslims want is one in which they "get majority rights in five out of eleven Indian Provinces with full residuary powers, and one-third share of seats in the total house of the Federal Assembly".<sup>18</sup>

The prospects for a real federation also aroused another kind of fear among the Hindus and the British. With the installation of a genuine federal system and with autonomous Muslim provinces on the north-west border, the defence of that part of India would be in the hands of the Muslims. The Hindus do not like this because they mistrust the Muslims. The British might be opposed to it because of their deep concern with the future security of their stakes in India. Iqbal discusses this problem of the defence of India in some detail and then holds out an assurance on behalf of the Muslims. "I have no doubt that if a Federal Government is established, Muslim federal states will willingly agree, for purposes of India's defence, to the creation of neutral Indian military and naval forces. Such a neutral military force for the defence of India was a reality in the days of Mughal rule. Indeed in the time of Akbar the Indian frontier was, on the whole, defended by armies officered by Hindu generals. I am perfectly sure that the scheme of a neutral Indian army, based on a federated India, will intensify Muslim patriotic feeling, and finally set at rest the suspicion, if any, of Indian Muslims joining Muslims from beyond the frontier in the event of an invasion."<sup>19</sup>

The above summarizes Iqbal's view of the situation and the

solution he wanted. In his opinion, "a redistribution of British India, calculated to secure a permanent solution of the communal problem, is the main demand of the Muslims of India". This he calls "a territorial solution of the communal problem". If his own solution were to be ignored, he would "support, as emphatically as possible, the Muslim demands repeatedly urged by the All India Muslim League and the All India Muslim Conference".<sup>20</sup> These demands were: statutory majority in the Punjab and Bengal, separate electorates, residuary power with the provinces, one-third seats in the federal assembly, separation of Sind from Bombay, and full provincial status for NWFP and Baluchistan. These were the minimum demands on the fulfilment of which the Muslims would come into a federation.

The discussion of the Hindu-Muslim problem at the Round Table Conference has shown "more clearly than ever the essential disparity between the two great cultural units of India". The British Prime Minister "refuses to see that the problem of India is international and not national". "Obviously he does not see that the model of British democracy cannot be of any use in a land of many nations; and that a system of separate electorates is only a poor substitute for a territorial solution of the problem". To give to India a constitution based on the assumption that she is a homogeneous country or to apply to India principles dictated by British opinion and practice "is unwittingly to prepare her for a civil war". "As far as I can see, there will be no peace in the country until the various peoples that constitute India are given opportunities of free self-development on modern lines without abruptly breaking with their past."<sup>21</sup>

Those in charge of making a new constitution for India will ignore the Muslim entity at their own peril. "We are seventy millions, and far more homogeneous than any other people in India. Indeed the Muslims of India are the only Indian people who can fitly be described as a nation in the modern sense of the word. The Hindus, though ahead of us in almost all respects, have not yet been able to achieve the kind of homogeneity which is necessary for a nation, and which Islam has given you as a free gift. . . Nor should the Muslim leaders and politicians allow themselves to be carried away by the subtle but fallacious argument that Turkey and Persia and other Muslim countries are progressing on national, i.e., territorial lines. The Muslims of India are differently situated. The



countries of Islam outside India are practically wholly Muslim in population."<sup>22</sup>

For Iqbal the "sole test of the success of our delegates" to the RTC is the extent to which they can extract agreement with "our demands as embodied in the Delhi Resolution" of AIMC. What will happen if these demands are not conceded? Here, for the first time in his discourse, Iqbal is inflicted with ambiguity. Perhaps the best course is to reproduce his words as they were uttered and leave our examination of them to a later place. "If these demands are not agreed to, then a question of a very great and far-reaching importance will arise for the community. Then will arrive the moment for an independent and concerted political action by the Muslims of India. If you are at all serious about your ideals and aspirations you must be ready for such an action. . . I have got definite views on the subject; but I think it is proper to postpone their expression till the apprehended situation actually arises. In case it does arise leading Muslims of all shades of opinion will have to meet together, not to pass resolutions, but finally to determine the Muslim attitude and to show the path to tangible achievement. In this address I mention this alternative only because I wish that you may keep it in mind, and give some serious thought to it in the meantime. . . I am not hopeless of an intercommunal understanding, but I cannot conceal from you the feeling that in the near future our community may be called upon to adopt an independent line of action to cope with the present crisis. And an independent line of political action, in such a crisis, is possible only to a determined people, possessing a will focalised by a single purpose. Is it possible for you to achieve the organic wholeness of a unified will? Yes, it is. . . I do not wish to mystify anybody when I say that things in India are not what they appear to be. The meaning of this, however, will dawn upon you only when you have achieved a real collective ego to look at them."<sup>23</sup>

### An Analysis of the Address

Alert readers of the address will not fail to notice the several loose threads which Iqbal leaves behind him along the track of his argument. Let us look at the whole thing again, this time concentrating on the course of the argument rather than its content.

At the outset he declares that his intention is "not to guide you in your decisions" but to bring to "your consciousness the main principle which, in my opinion, should determine the general character of these decisions".<sup>24</sup> What is this main principle? In theoretical terms it is the inevitable and vital role of Islam in the life of the Indian Muslim society. In practical terms it leads to a territorial solution of the Hindu-Muslim problem. But his acceptance of the ideal of a territorial re-distribution of India does not mean an acquiescence in the territorial concept of a nation. This is a European concept rooted in the evolution of Christianity in the West, and taking its birth in the crisis which split the European society into its spiritual and secular aspects, and ended by building an impenetrable wall between church and state. In Islam such a development and such an outcome are inconceivable. In other words, Islam does not teach or sanction territorial nationalism. But, towards the end of the address, he has no hesitation in calling the Indian Muslims a nation. This is one major contradiction in his reasoning.

One of the things on which Iqbal takes an uncompromising stand is the unique character of Islam as a combination of the spiritual and the worldly. It is as much an ethical system as a polity. It is not a religion in the ordinary sense of the word; it is a way of life. "Islam does not bifurcate the unity of man into an irreconcilable duality of spirit and matter. In Islam God and universe, spirit and matter, church and state, are organic to each other. Man is not the citizen of a profane world to be renounced in the interest of a world of spirit situated elsewhere. To Islam matter is spirit realizing itself in space and time."<sup>25</sup> This is said to emphasize the fact that there is no place in Islam for a separation of religion and state, of things spiritual and things secular, of a private life and a public life. Yet, under his own proposal, Islam, with its singular ideals and principles, is made to reach an accommodation with Hinduism in so far as the two creeds would live together in one Indian federal state. How can Islam be a unique way of life and yet be prepared to exist in the same polity side by side with another way of life with nothing common between the two; what will happen to the ethical ideals of Islam, which are fundamental to its nature, in a state and a society where Islam will not be the only religion, in fact not even the dominating religion; is a refusal to believe in a territorial concept of nationalism suffi-

cient ground for refusing to see the consequences for Islam within a single Indian state; will the social and ethical ideals of Islam, which he accepts as an integral part of Islam, be realizable in such a state; if they are realizable, does it not make Islam far from a unique system of life; if they are not realizable, what is going to be the future of the Indian Muslim society? — these and similar other questions, which relate to the very fundamentals of his theory, not to minor details, are not faced by Iqbal. This is another important contradiction in his argument. We will return to it again in a while.

In his refusal to countenance territorial nationalism and in his appeal to the Muslims not to be taken in by fashionable Western political ideas, Iqbal's basic point is that nationalism racializes the Muslim outlook and de-humanizes Islam. Islam believes in universalism. Nationalism believes in particularism. Islam teaches the brotherhood of all men. Nationalism splits humanity into bits and pieces and ranges man against man. The adoption of nationalism will lead to the acceptance and practice of standards which are "different and even opposed to the standards of Islam".<sup>26</sup> Quite naturally and logically, therefore, he was opposed to a separate nationalism for the Muslims of India, to what we may call Muslim nationalism.

Up to this point the argument is feasible, though more academic than political and more theoretical than historical, for the *history* of Islam did not reject the national spirit and seemed to have had no use for the universal polity so nobly preached by the theologian and the theoretician. But, apart from history, Iqbal himself refutes his argument. If Muslim nationalism has no place in Islam, is there any point in declaring that the Indian Muslims are a nation, which he clearly does?<sup>27</sup> The Indian Muslims are a group of Muslims living on a certain clearly-demarcated piece of territory. To give them the designation of a nation cannot mean anything except a belief in territorial nationalism. If there is a Muslim nation in India, a Muslim nationalism (nothing if not territorial) is already there. To have a nation and to acknowledge its existence and yet to deny its nationalism is beyond the power of logic. This is yet another contradiction in Iqbal.

It is obvious to Iqbal that India is not a nation. He accepts the validity of Renan's concept of "moral consciousness", and by this criterion declares that India is not a nation. His references to the

failure of Kabir and of the divine faith of Akbar to seize "the imagination of the masses of this country" clearly show his conviction that religion is the basis of the nation. India is not a nation because "the various caste-units and religious units in India have shown no inclination to sink their respective individualities in a larger whole". But in some vague way he still seems to believe in an Indian nation. "The unity of an Indian nation, therefore, must be sought, not in the negation, but in the mutual harmony and co-operation of the many."<sup>28</sup> Thus, India is not a nation and yet it has a national unity. An added complication enters with his claim, mentioned above, that the Muslims of India are a separate nation. Such a confused picture does not encourage understanding. We will leave it at that.

The search for "the unity of an Indian nation" leads Iqbal to the most important statement of his address. This unity is to be sought in a "principle of internal harmony". This principle demands that each communal group, by which he means the Hindus and the Muslims, should have a "right to free development according to its own cultural traditions".<sup>29</sup> This, he says, is not narrow communalism. He has made communalism (a dirty word in Indian politics) respectable. Without it one cannot form "a harmonious whole in a country like India".<sup>30</sup> From this reasoning emerges his theory of "a Muslim India within India", that is, Muslim communal development within a Hindu-Muslim India.

With this we come to deeper waters. "The Muslim demand for the creation of a Muslim India within India is, therefore, perfectly justified. The resolution of the All-Parties Muslim Conference at Delhi is, to my mind, wholly inspired by this noble ideal of a harmonious whole. . .".<sup>31</sup> Thus the demand for a Muslim India within India is not his own; it was, according to him, made by AIMC in Delhi. The Delhi resolution, as we have already seen, amounted to no more than a demand for such Muslim safeguards as one-third representation in the central legislature, statutory majorities in the Punjab and Bengal, separation of Sind from Bombay, and full provincial status for NWFP and Baluchistan. In short, it was a plan for making the Muslim provinces autonomous and for some protection at the centre. The only thing Iqbal has done is to call it by a new name: "A Muslim India within India".

Then he offers his own amendment to the Delhi resolution. This is the oft-quoted passage which is generally understood to confirm

Iqbal's parentage of the Pakistan idea. The passage runs: "Personally I would go further than the demands embodied in it [the Delhi Resolution]. *I would like to see the Punjab, North-West Frontier Province, Sind and Baluchistan amalgamated into a single state. Self-government within the British Empire, or without the British Empire, the formation of a consolidated North-West Indian Muslim state appears to me to be the final destiny of the Muslims at least of North-West India*"<sup>32</sup> Does it contain any suggestion, proposal or hint of a separation, partition, division or the creation of a Muslim state in India?

The first thing to notice here is that this proposal was put before the Nehru Committee and rejected by it. Iqbal does not tell us who took it to the Committee: he does not say it was he. The Nehru Report does not add anything to our knowledge. But the point is unimportant. We know that several such proposals were being made in this period.

The Nehru Committee rejected the proposal on the ground that it would result in "a very unwieldy state". These are Iqbal's words, and should be enough proof of the fact that he was using the word "state" in the meaning of a province, a unit of an Indian federation. He was not asking for a separate country for the Muslims of the north-west. As if to eliminate any lingering doubt, he adds, "Thus, possessing full opportunity of development *within the body-politic of India*, the North-West Indian Muslims will prove the best defenders of India against a foreign invasion, be that invasion the one of ideas or of bayonets."<sup>33</sup> If any further proof is required it is furnished by Iqbal's reply to Sastri's criticism of the proposal. To quote Iqbal again, "The Right Hon'ble Mr. Srinivasa Sastri thinks that the Muslim demand for the creation of autonomous Muslim states along the North-West border is actuated by a desire 'to acquire means of exerting pressure in emergencies on the Government of India'. I may frankly tell him that the Muslim demand is not actuated by the kind of motive he imputes to us; it is actuated by a genuine desire for free development which is practically impossible under the type of unitary government contemplated by the nationalist Hindu politicians with a view to secure [*sic.*] permanent communal dominance in the whole of India."<sup>34</sup> He could not have said it in plainer words. He wants autonomous provinces for the Muslims to avoid the perils of a unitary system. Autonomous does not mean sovereign or inde-

pendent. Had Iqbal been advocating a separate, sovereign state he would have corrected Sastri's use of the word "autonomous".

Still another point reinforces this interpretation. In these "autonomous Muslim states", Iqbal assures the Hindus, there will be no religious rule.<sup>35</sup> How could there be an Islamic rule in *some* of the provinces of an all-India federation? They will be like other Indian provinces, except that their population will be predominantly Muslim. This again connects with the point mentioned above that his scheme of re-distribution contributed nothing to the realisation of his ideal of Islamic ethics governing the life of the Indian Muslims.

If any student of Iqbal still remains sceptical, his attention may be drawn to another sentence on the same page. "I therefore demand the formation of a consolidated Muslim state in the best interests of *India and Islam*. For India it means security and peace resulting from *an internal balance of power*. . . ."<sup>36</sup> An "internal balance of power" means a balance of power within India, not the creation of a Muslim state without it.

Not only is there to be no separation, but the re-distribution he suggests is not based on religious ground alone. For, he reiterates that "the creation of autonomous states, based on the unity of language, race, history, religion and identity of economic interest, is the only possible way to secure a stable constitutional structure in India".<sup>37</sup> Religion constitutes only one of the several factors governing the creation of autonomous provinces. We may recall here, however, that he also advocated a division of the Punjab, which cut across the lines of language and economic interest.

To make sure that people may not misunderstand him, he points out, while referring to the conception of federation underlining the Simon Report, that "it further demands *a redistribution of territory on the lines which I have indicated*".<sup>40</sup> He clarifies it once again when, towards the end of the same paragraph, he points out that his scheme will have the added advantage of eliminating the controversial question of separate electorates. "The Muslims of India can have no objection to purely territorial electorates *if provinces are demarcated* so as to secure comparatively homogeneous communities possessing linguistic, cultural and religious unity".<sup>41</sup> He goes on repeating that a federation is being demanded. "The Muslims demand federation because it is pre-eminently a solution of India's most



difficult problem, *i.e.*, the communal problem."<sup>42</sup>

When he comes to discuss the issue of Indian defence he again talks of a federal arrangement. "I have no doubt that if a Federal Government is established, Muslim federal states will willingly agree" to create a federal army. And, for the last time, "I am perfectly sure that the scheme of a neutral Indian army, based on a federated India, will intensify Muslim patriotic feeling..."<sup>43</sup>

Iqbal asserts that his own scheme of "a redistribution of British India", which is "a territorial solution of the communal problem", is different from the "demands urged by the All India Muslim League and the All India Muslim Conference"<sup>44</sup> But a closer examination of his proposal shows no very substantial points of difference. The only point which distinguishes his suggestion from the demands of the two political parties is the amalgamation of all the four Muslim provinces of the north-west into one large province. Later he also recommends a division of the Punjab with a view to making the new province more manageable in size and more homogeneous in population. On another occasion he also suggests a merger of Baluchistan with Sind.<sup>45</sup> In making a plea for these changes he was not making any revolutionary demands. Each of his proposals had been made before him in writing or in public.

The closest that Iqbal comes to enunciating the two-nation theory is towards the end of the address, when he accuses the British Prime Minister of having failed, at the RTC, to see that the problem of India is international and not national and that India is a land of many nations.<sup>46</sup> He also warns that a persistent attempt to impose Western democratic values on an India which is far from homogeneous will lead to a civil war.<sup>47</sup> And, finally, he makes the claim of nationhood on behalf of Indian Muslims, at the same time denying that the Hindus form one nation.<sup>48</sup> The first two points were later to become the standard arguments of the Muslim League leaders when the campaign for Pakistan was mounted.

It is relevant to mention one last word of testimony from Iqbal in support of our contention that he was not arguing for the creation of a separate Muslim state (as distinct from a province) in India. "I am glad to be able to say that our Muslim delegates [at the RTC] fully realize the importance of a proper solution of what I call Indian international problem."<sup>49</sup> Now, we know that the first RTC, about which he is talking, did not consider, debate or decide anything except a federal solution to the Indian problem,

and no Muslim delegate, at the table or in private conversation, made any reference to a partition. The Muslim leaders at the Conference wanted a genuine federation, safeguards for the Muslim minority and protection for Muslim provinces. Nor was there any talk of an international problem in India at the Conference. If Iqbal approved of the stand taken by the Muslim delegates, he was obviously supporting their demands and repeating them in his address; he was not proposing anything which they were not already pursuing in London.

The last three pages of the address carry several references to an "independent action" which would become inevitable if Muslim demands were not met by the RTC. When that contingency arises Muslims would be called upon, not to pass resolutions, but to advance to "tangible" achievements. What this "independent line of action" was he does not tell us. Our intelligent guess is as good or as bad as anyone else's. Was he threatening the British and the Hindus with unforeseen, unforeseeable and dire consequences arising from Muslim inability to get what they wanted? Was he warning the Muslim League, his audience, to be prepared to change its previous policy of constitutionalism and loyalty if conditions dictated such a course? Was he issuing a hint to the Muslims in general that they might be called upon, not in too distant a future, to start and run a revolutionary movement in pursuit of something which conventional political methods had failed to bring within their grasp? Or, did his "independent action" imply a demand for an independent Muslim state, a division of India, and a sovereign Muslim north-west? If it was this, we may ask what stopped him from announcing it in clear words. Was he waiting for something good to emerge from the deliberations of the RTC, which might end the Muslim search for security in the shape of a real federation with fully autonomous Muslim provinces? Or, was he reluctant to demand a partition until public opinion had showed that it supported such a radical proposition? we have no answer to these questions, and we will never have. Iqbal never returned to this point to clarify it. He sought a solution in other directions, and by the time he came to suggest a proper division of India the idea of a Pakistan had advanced so far in other minds that there was little new in his proposals.

This should not be taken to imply that the points raised in his address were new departures from the general thinking of the time.

Each one of his proposals can be traced back to many years before him. His insistence on the diversity and heterogeneity of India was as old as British rule in the sub-continent: Bright had talked of it in 1858 and Sir Theodore Morison in 1899. The unsuitability of Indian conditions for the successful working of a Western type of democracy was brought out by Sayyid Ahmad Khan in 1883. The refusal to see India as one nation is repeated in the statements of almost every Muslim leader from Sayyid Ahmad in 1888 to Zulfikar in 1929. The notion of the Indian Muslims' possessing a distinct identity amounting to a separate nationhood was first expressed by the founder of Aligarh in 1867, underlined by Muharram Ali Chishti in 1888 and acknowledged by Morison in 1899. Iqbal's concept of a separate personality of the north-west goes back to the time of Jamaluddin "Afghani". Redistribution of India on territorial lines in order to solve the communal problem was first suggested by Blunt in 1883 and then by Sharar in 1890. The conviction that Indian unity was a myth coined with the intention of giving a trial to a single Hindu-Muslim state was expressed by Muhammad Ali in 1911 and again in 1912, and it was Muhammad Ali who first called the Indian problem "international". The balance of power between Hindu and Muslim provinces which Iqbal seems to be seeking within the limits of a genuine federation was already thought of by Hasrat Mohani in 1921 and 1924 and by Zulfikar and Abdullah Suhrawardy in their minute of dissent of 1929. The amalgamation of the Muslim north-west to produce a consolidated Muslim province or state had been suggested or perceived so often during the last fifty years: vaguely by Blunt in 1883 and Bambooque in 1915; definitely by the Aga Khan in 1918; Sir Arthur Keith and Beni Prasad in 1919, Gul Khan in 1923, *The Times* dispatch and again the Aga Khan and Maikash in 1928, and Zulfikar in 1929. The idea of re-distributing India or re-arranging its provincial boundaries with a view to making Islam supreme in a clearly marked out area or zone appeared first in Bhai Parmanand's book of 1923 and later in *The Times* dispatch of 1928. Nor was the division of the Punjab on religious lines a fresh thought: Lajpat Rai had pointed it out in 1924, *The Times* had indicated it as a Muslim desire in 1928, and Zulfikar had demanded it in 1929.

What Iqbal did was to bring together all these ideas, preface them with a rather academic discourse on the concept of

nationalism in Islamic theory, and present the whole to the Muslim League session. He rightly thought that the first part of the address was the more important. Few Muslim leaders before him had cared to relate the rising surge of nationalism, which was a political fact, to the doctrines of Islam on this issue. It is not necessary to agree with him to sense the relevance of his argument or to appreciate his pre-occupation with a vital problem. Other people with different ideas on this subject were preaching their theories of Islamic nationalism, and other variations on the same theme. Abul Kalam Azad, Husain Ahmad Madani, Abul Ala Mawdudi and other lesser thinkers took an opposite stand. It is not our business here to scrutinize these various opinions and give a judgement.<sup>50</sup> It is, however, pertinent to remember that history (or, was it chance?) decided the issue in favour of none of these, including Iqbal. When Jinnah came to construct the ultimate argument on which the creation of Pakistan was demanded and won, he combined the concept of territory and the factor of religion so closely as to give a new theory of nationalism to the historical development of Islam.<sup>51</sup>

### Impact on Contemporary Opinion

Iqbal's address must have had some impact on Indian opinion, but contemporary and later reports present such contradictory evidence that no straight conclusion can be drawn or confirmed without reviewing the contents, background and motives of these reports. Unfortunately, Hindu reports suffer from their usual inability to see any good in Muslim declarations, and later Muslim reports put too bright a paint on his influence to be credible. Both ignore the necessity of quoting authorities or arguing the point. Few Urdu newspapers of that time are now available. The reader should bear with this and be prepared to accompany the author into this murk of confusion in search of the truth.

To start with, even the date and place of the Muslim League session are not always correctly given. One Hindu author was so much carried away by his zeal in composing a diatribe against Jinnah that he made Iqbal deliver his address at Lucknow<sup>52</sup>; the same mistake is repeated by a Congress member of the Punjab Legislative Assembly.<sup>53</sup> Beni Prasad, a scholar and a serious student of the Hindu-Muslim problem, dates the Allahabad session

in 1931: while a Pakistani lawyer, leader and minister transfers it to 1937.<sup>54</sup> A pamphlet put out by the Pakistan Muslim League to mark the 1964 independence day celebrations says that the Allahabad session met on 5 December.<sup>55</sup> Such errors are common in history writing and it would be wrong to exaggerate their seriousness, but some critics of Iqbal may interpret them as a measure of the importance of his address.

It is reported that the address was translated into Urdu at the suggestion of the *Sufi*, a journal then appearing from Pindi Bahauddin. The journal published the Urdu version "in thousands" and distributed it free of cost.<sup>56</sup> Iqbal was a well-known figure in 1930 and the Muslim League was a national organization which could not be ignored. There is no doubt, therefore, that the address must have been widely circulated. Contemporary newspapers published it in short or long summaries. Every one interested in public affairs must have taken notice of it and given it some thought. But this should not be exaggerated. The RTC was then in session and making important decisions. Naturally the Indian public and its leaders would have paid more attention to the news coming in from London than to the speech of the Muslim League president of the year.

We have no clear picture of its impact on the public mind. Few newspapers of national stature cared to pronounce editorial opinion. No Indian leader of any importance is recorded to have publicly commented on it. The opinion of those who then or later wrote about it bifurcates. Some assert that it exerted immense influence, others believe that it was ignored by almost every one.

Let us first consider the favourable reports. The *Inqilab* of Lahore wrote "about a dozen editorials" in January 1931 in defence of Iqbal's proposal. Taking him to have suggested a partition of India, the paper referred to similar proposals made earlier by Lajpat Rai and Parmanand, and asked why Iqbal should be criticised for making a like demand. On 11 January the newspaper repeated Iqbal's warning that a civil war would be the result of a failure to concede Muslim wishes. The *Hamdard* of Lucknow, in an editorial of 5 January, believed that "Islam's survival as a cultural force depended on the establishment of a Muslim National State in Northern India". This, it wrote, "will cause a patriotic fervour among Muslims and they would be in an ideal position to defend India with all the might at their command against a possible

attack from the Bolsheviks or the Afghans. This is the best solution of the Indian problem." Three student workers of Calcutta, Raghib Ahsan, Fazal Rasul Khan Afridi and S.M. Salim, supported Iqbal's address in a joint statement and "suggested the initiation of a 'Muslim Ideal Fund' in order to finance a vigorous propaganda drive in support of Iqbal".<sup>57</sup> No further favourable reports have reached us from contemporary sources. It is most probable that none exist, because those who present Iqbal as a prophet of partition have been assiduous in seeking, collecting and quoting every small item supporting their case.

Among later commentators, the *Islamic Culture* of Hyderabad, a highly respectable and respected Muslim quarterly, recorded in the autumn of 1939 that Iqbal's proposal "for the fullest cultural autonomy" was adversely criticised by the non-Muslim organizations of India but "it was much appreciated and supported by the Muslims".<sup>58</sup> In recent years this appreciation and support have swollen into hysterical admiration, and the influence of the address, the sum total of which has been indicated in our last paragraph, has been exaggerated to fantastic dimensions. In a book published in 1967 we find this: "The schemes suggested by others had not attracted any attention at all, but the one put forward by Iqbal attracted world-wide attention for the first time. Not only this, he worked for it and got the scheme approved by the majority of the Muslim leaders as well as British statesmen."<sup>59</sup> No comment is necessary.

Such incredible stories are not a monopoly of the Iqbal school. The detractors have made equally silly statements with similar disregard of the obligation to produce evidence. Two Hindu authors have discovered the fact that the total attendance at the Allahabad session was less than 75 persons, which was "not enough to make up the quorum".<sup>60</sup> If that is true, the 1930 session had no legal validity and all its proceedings should have been expunged from the Muslim League records. A modern American expert on Pakistan has made the startling statement that "Muslims throughout India were shocked" by Iqbal's proposal.<sup>61</sup> A Hindu writer, whom we have already quoted once, is responsible for the news that the delivery of the address was followed by "an all round denunciation of the proposal from all prominent Muslims, both inside and outside the League".<sup>62</sup> Apparently, these statements are not meant to be taken seriously. They refuse to cite their sources, they



don't care to argue the point, and their context betrays obvious bias.

Whatever the element of veracity in the reports referred to above and the touch of prejudice in the opinions expressed, at least one thing is clear. That Muslim League, as a party over whose deliberations Iqbal was presiding, met his proposals with a stony silence. There is no difference of opinion on this point. The League session "did not incorporate the presidential suggestion in any resolution".<sup>63</sup> The Subjects Committee of the League "did not consider it worth while to adopt Iqbal's proposal of 1930 in the form of a resolution".<sup>64</sup> In the words of Khaliqzaman, "it is a wonder that when this clarion call was made from the Muslim League platform no one took any notice of it and no one moved any resolution in the session approving the scheme enunciated at Allahabad"; and again, "it is strange that the Council of the Muslim League did not take any notice of the President's address nor put forward any concrete proposal touching the subject".<sup>65</sup>

This failure of the League is fully borne out by the official record of the resolutions moved and adopted at the Allahabad session. Seven resolutions were passed on subjects like condolences on the deaths of certain Muslim leaders, support to AIMC resolution of Delhi, condemnation of the white paper on reforms, demand for full provincial status for NWFP, adequate Muslim quota in the cabinets and the public services throughout India, statutory Muslim majorities in the Punjab and Bengal along with the separation of Sind from Bombay, and the appointment of a committee to revise and amend the party's constitution.<sup>66</sup> Several of Iqbal's suggestions were incorporated in these resolutions, but his most important proposal for the creation of one large, consolidated province in the north-west, or even that for joining Baluchistan with Sind, finds no place in the resolutions. Nor did anyone care to support his call for complete unity among the Muslims in the face of serious times ahead.

How can we explain this unanimous disregard of the president's wishes, suggestions, opinions and proposals by a party which normally paid respectable heed to the chair? It is true that Iqbal was not a strong president and could not impress his will on the League as some presidents had done before and as Jinnah was to do to a supreme degree in later years. All the same, he was a president voluntarily elected by the party and universally respected

throughout India. It is possible that in that year the League was influenced in its choice of the president by the absence of most of the front-rank leaders who were in London participating in the RTC. The names of the members moving and supporting the session resolutions, usually a correct index to the quality of the leadership present, speak of an unprecedented paucity of well-known public men. Rarely had a League session been reduced to such straits.

Two explanations have been offered as a solution of this mystery. One is that "the issue was so important that it could not be discussed in the absence of leaders" who were in London.<sup>67</sup> It is true that almost every leader whose voice carried authority was away. This supports the point made above that Iqbal's election as president for that year was due more to limited choice than to his standing as a politician.

But this explanation still leaves two points in doubt. First, the League session, could have, at least through a non-committal resolution, taken notice of the president's suggestion without going to the length of passing a judgment on it. Iqbal himself attached much importance to his proposal, for he had italicized it in the official text of the address, and the session was really extending him less than courtesy in so pointedly ignoring it. Secondly, if the League had postponed a discussion of his proposal because it was too momentous to be debated without the benefit of the presence of other leaders, why was no notice taken of it afterwards? There is no record of any deliberations of the League Council, Working Committee or other body on this issue at any date after the return to India of the RTC delegates. It was not taken up in the next annual session. None of the returning leaders made any comment on it; and this cannot be an accident, for it is inconceivable that they did not know the contents of the party's presidential address.

The other explanation for this conspiracy of silence is "the prejudice against Iqbal on the part of Muslim leaders in the Muslim-minority provinces, as a few months earlier he had declared his intention to call an Upper India Muslim Conference at Lahore representing Muslim leadership of Punjab, Sind, Baluchistan and NWFP on the plea that Muslim leaders of Muslim minority provinces failed to understand the problems of the Muslim majority provinces".<sup>68</sup>

This argument fails to carry conviction for five reasons. First, if the leaders of the Hindu provinces were opposed to Iqbal because of his lack of interest in the Muslims of those provinces, it is difficult to account for his election to the League presidentship which, as far as we know, was uncontested and presumably unanimous. If these leaders could support him in election to the highest office in the party, their prejudice must have been of a very peculiar variety. Secondly, it is true that Iqbal's proposal was confined to the north-west India and, so to speak, ignored the Muslim minorities in the rest of India, yet there had been, as we have seen in previous chapters, several persons from the Hindu provinces who had proposed similar action. It could hardly have been his Punjabi parochialism which gave birth to Iqbal's scheme. Thirdly, if the proposal was ignored by Muslim leaders of the Hindu provinces because it did not concern itself with their areas, what was it that stopped the Muslim leaders of the north-west from speaking out in his support and defence? Hardly any newspaper (except the *Inqilab*) or leader of the Muslims of upper India considered it worth the while to give serious attention to Iqbal's pronouncement. It could not have been prejudice by any means in their case; it could be ingratitude, but that is another matter. In the fourth place, if the Muslim leaders of the Hindu provinces refused to extend their support to Iqbal on the ground that his gaze was fixed on the narrow concept of a north-west India, how did it come to pass that a few years later they supported to a man the Pakistan plan of Jinnah which also left the Muslims of the minority areas in Hindu India? If their prejudice had the quality of consistency they should not have singled out Iqbal for their indifference. If the argument is that their prejudice was specific to Punjabi leadership, this is taken care of by my next objection to this explanation. Finally, if Iqbal had incurred unpopularity in the minority areas by his 1930 proposal, how does one explain his election to the presidentship of AIMC in 1932? During these years the Conference carried more weight and attracted more attention than the League, and Iqbal could not have been called upon to occupy its chair unless he had widespread support throughout India.

Such arguments will not solve the mystery of the wall of silence built round his address. The fact seems to have been that few people saw anything fresh in his proposal. The interpretation that

he was arguing for a separate independent state in the north-west was by and large of later growth. His contemporaries rightly saw that he was merely urging the amalgamation of a few provinces, so that a large, consolidated, overwhelmingly Muslim area could occupy an important place in the Indian federal union and thus afford more effective protection to Muslim interests. This was a commendable idea and a sincere effort to bring security to the anxious Muslims. But it came too late. For several years public opinion had been thinking on different, more radical, lines. A number of more advanced proposals had come before it and, though some might have looked no better than dreams, Muslim thinking was on the verge of reaching a momentous decision about the future. The details and implications of this decision were yet not very clear, but the anticipation of taking a new turn was exciting beyond measure. Partition may lead them to an untried terrain, but it could not be worse than the known perils of a united India under Hindu dominance. To such thinking Iqbal's faith in an Indian federation must have sounded old fashioned if not downright reactionary. By ignoring it public opinion was not insulting its author, but only pointing out its obsolescence and inadequacy.

Another factor should also be taken into account. At this time Muslim leaders were immersed in the affairs of the RTC and its deep involvement with the making of a federal system suitable for and acceptable to all India. They were negotiating with the British and the Hindus to extract the last meaningful concession out of the protracted political bargain. They had already, many years ago, made up their mind that Muslim rule in Muslim provinces was the minimum, fundamental principle on which the future Indian federation should be built. Iqbal's proposal brought no new grist to their mill. The idea of joining together certain provinces was a minor detail which could be taken up later when the vital principle of majority rule had been conceded; and, in any case, it could probably be realized without much ado. They could also have been surprised by Iqbal's indifference to the nature of the proposed federal centre. He had nothing to say about it except the already staked claim for a one-third representation in the central legislature. He paid no attention to the complicated and controversial points raised by the organization and structure of the centre and the nature and working of centre-units relationship. These

were matters of great concern to the Muslim negotiators and their neglect at the hands of Iqbal might have disappointed them. Anyway, they found little in his remarks that was outstanding and capable of furnishing them with a new argument in their debates with the Hindus and the British.

This seems to me the only reasonable and coherent explanation of Iqbal's failure to move public opinion on the strength of his Allahabad address. It is useless to blame the Muslim League alone for treating him with indifference. All over Muslim India, and even outside it, his suggestions either failed to arouse any interest because they were taken to repeat a commonplace demand or failed to sound a practical note because they were considered to be nothing more than the dream of a poet.

A contemporary observer noted that his scheme of a re-distribution of provinces received no support or sympathy from any quarter because Muslim political thinking was not prepared to accept either an Indian federation or a division of the Punjab.<sup>69</sup> It was ignored by everyone and "hardly made any impression on the public life of the country".<sup>70</sup> In the opinion of F.K. Khan Durrani, whose own love of Islam matched Iqbal's, the Allahabad scheme was "looked upon as no more than a political curiosity at the time, the idealist dream of a thinker and poet who had little contact, they said, with the world of realities, a dream which, to all appearances, had little bearing on what the common herd of politicians calls practical politics, and Iqbal was neither a propagandist nor the head of any party" [sic].<sup>71</sup>

Among the Hindus, however, Iqbal's address created a much stronger impact. It is not difficult to see why it was so. Proposals for a radical re-distribution of India had been made before, but now they saw them being officially expounded from the platform of the Muslim League. Those who took the event as a demand for a partition were naturally outraged. Even those who read it for what it was worth were upset at the prospect of a huge Muslim province in the north-west. They feared Muslim rule over a part of India, though they laughed at Muslim fears of Hindu rule over the entire country. Many Hindu circles were perturbed and some Hindu newspapers used unrestrained language in attacking Iqbal. *The Leader* published editorial comments entitled "Communalism and Nationalism" on 2 and 5 January 1931, which were followed by others throughout the month.

A.S. Khurshid, who has had access to contemporary Hindu newspapers, tells us how they carried on "a tearing and raging campaign" against the Allahabad address. They used every journalistic trick to smear his name. Statements were attributed to him which he had not made. Sensational and eye-catching headlines were blazed across the page. The *Paratap* of Lahore published an article on Iqbal, bearing the "horrible" title "A Dangerous Muslim of Northern India", which bristled with such abusive epithets as "fanatic, mischievous, dangerously prejudiced, venomous, narrowminded, and mean".<sup>72</sup> In the rather exaggerated language of a modern Hindu journalist, the "proposal stunned Hindus and Sikhs who, in the light of the utterances of some Muslim leaders during the previous two decades, had expressed apprehensions at the Muslims of the north-west of India making common cause with Afghanistan. They now whispered to each other that their apprehensions were not unfounded".<sup>73</sup> Only one Hindu commentator, writing in *The Times of India* under the pseudonym of "A Liberal Hindu", appreciated Iqbal's argument that with the inclusion of the native states in the federation Hindus would become much stronger *vis a vis* the Muslims. He hoped that his plea would receive sympathetic consideration.<sup>74</sup>

In terms of contemporary Indian politics Christian opinion may safely be taken to follow and confirm Hindu opinion. In all controversies between the Hindu and the Muslim the Indian Christians always sided with the Hindus.<sup>75</sup> As an example of Christian reaction to Iqbal let me quote Dr. S.K. Datta who, far from being a fiery politician or a popular demagogue in search of votes, was a highly-respected educationalist and later became the first Indian principal of the well-known Forman Christian College in Lahore. His comment on the Allahabad address, written soon after it was delivered, is a good exercise in imagination. "Dr. Iqbal and his followers have seen a vision", he wrote. "Who can tell but that this new state, if achieved, might not become the candidate for a restored caliphate, possibly not in a political sense, but one which will give the Islamic world a religious and cultural centre and will be prepared to repeat in its life the glories of Baghdad or Cordova?"<sup>76</sup> No better phrasing could have set the Hindu heart against the slightest possibility of such a consummation.

The only contemporary British, or rather Anglo-Indian, comment can scarcely be called perceptive. M.L. Farrar, writing in



a collection of articles on the future of Islam edited by Hamilton Gibb, said, "This proposal made a clear picture signifying that the leaders knew their minds; whether they could carry the masses with them depended on how quickly the latter took to education."<sup>77</sup> The first part of this sentence echoes the 1928 dispatch of *The Times* which we have quoted before, and goes to prove that Iqbal's words were more a reflection of a section of public opinion than an innovation. The latter part has no relevant connection with the former, unless the writer was thinking in very long terms and hoping that in some far-off distant day, when the Muslim community had perfected its intellectual equipment, Iqbal's dream would come true. He did not properly gauge Muslim sentiment, or he would have noticed how far it had travelled from the age of Sayyid Ahmad Khan when education was really the key to political advance. Education or no education, now it was a question of a nationalism coming to maturity in one nimble leap. The deficiencies of its equipment were no cause for worry. The stakes were now totally different and infinitely higher.

At the RTC, too, Iqbal's address made no impression; it was only a dying echo of it that was heard in the first two sessions, and that at the initiative of the non-Muslim delegates. It will be remembered that the Allahabad speech was made when the Conference was meeting in its first session in London. The delegates must have seen a summary of it in *The Times*, for on 1 January 1931 B.S. Moonje, the loudest Hindu voice in the London deliberations, referred to it in a speech in the Minorities Sub-committee, asking if the Muslim delegates agreed with Iqbal's suggestions. Sir Muhammad Shafi of the Punjab, the most energetic among the Muslim delegation and a friend of Iqbal, replied in the negative and denied that Muslim India wanted or supported separation. After pointing out that he could not pass a judgment on the address on the basis of a mere telegraphic summary carried by the London papers and that the full text was not available to him, he proceeded: "If Sir Muhammad Iqbal said that when there will be a Hindu State in the whole of India by reason of the Hindus being in a permanent and unalterable majority in the Central Government, when there will be 6 Hindu States out of the 8 Governors' Provinces, by reason of a similar unalterable permanent majority in those 6 Provinces, there ought to be 4 Musalman States, because the Musalmans in those 4 Provinces are in a

majority, I see nothing wrong in that. I myself am prepared to repeat that here before this Committee, for, after all, we are contemplating the bringing into existence of the United States of India. . . . But if he said anything in connection with the foundation of an independent Muslim State outside the British Commonwealth of Nations, in the ordinary sense in which such a phrase is used, then I, on behalf of the whole Musalman Delegation, repudiate that; I absolutely repudiate that on behalf of the whole Delegation. But, Mr. Prime Minister, I can well imagine a Muhammadan exasperated by pronouncements of the type that my friend Dr. Moonje has been making in different parts of India, possibly in a moment of thoughtlessness saying something similar."<sup>78</sup>

Thus it is clear that Shafi, along with all his colleagues in the Muslim delegation, took Iqbal to be advocating a federal India with so many Muslim provinces rather than a separate Muslim state. In case Iqbal really stood for a separation, all the Muslim leaders assembled in London refused to go along with him. It must be recalled here that these leaders, though not actually elected by the various Muslim organizations, were fully representative of Muslim public opinion, and spoke for every important Muslim party, including above all the Muslim League over which Iqbal was now formally presiding and the Muslim Conference over which he was to preside fifteen months later. There is no warrant for thinking that Shafi was misinterpreting Iqbal. Every contemporary Muslim leader read in his address a plan for a federal India with a strong emphasis on Muslim autonomy, which it really was. Moreover, Shafi himself was a Punjabi and knew Iqbal intimately. He was therefore not repudiating a friend, but denying a proposition which he felt Iqbal had not made.

Fear makes men very sensitive, and Hindu leaders, in contrast to the Muslim, found it easy to see in the address a scheme for separation or at least for a revived Muslim strength in an important and strategic part of the sub-continent. This does not mean that they were more perceptive. They were so implacably keen to retain their hegemony over the entire country that the slightest hint of a Muslim movement towards self-assertion caused them deep perturbation. That explains their opposition to Muslim statutory majorities in the Punjab and Bengal, though it sharply contradicted their faith in majority rule in all India. That also explains their

misconstruction of Iqbal's proposal as a demand for a separate Muslim state.

The non-Muslim leaders, particularly of the Punjab, continued to be agitated by Iqbal's suggestions. During the second session of the RTC, which was held in September-December 1931, the two Sikh delegates from the Punjab, Sardar Ujjal Singh and Sardar Sampuran Singh, returned to their fears of Iqbal in a memorandum submitted to the Conference as an official document. They wrote: "In view of the claim of the President of the All India Muslim Conference [sic.], we believe that to write the garrison Province of India [i.e., the Punjab] into the onstitution as an unalterably Muslim Province would be to make the dismemberment of India inevitable. That claim, it would be remembered, was that there should be a 'consolidated North-West State, within or without the British Empire', consisting of the Punjab, NWFP, Baluchistan and Sind."<sup>79</sup>

Anxiety is the mother of carelessness. It will be noticed that worry had rendered the two Sikh gentlemen incapable not only of distinguishing between the Muslim League and the Muslim Conference but also of quoting Iqbal correctly. These errors were pointed out and corrected by Shafi Daoodi in his note circulated on 14 November 1931, who also answered the Sikh objection by quoting Iqbal's letter to *The Times* of 12 October which he had written in reply to Edward Thompson's allegations.<sup>80</sup>

## NOTES

1. A complete bibliography will need a 1,000-page book to itself, and has not yet been attempted. The reader may find major references in K.K. Aziz, *The Background of Pakistan*, Karachi, 1970, and its forthcoming supplementary volumes.
2. *Iqbaliat* is a collective noun denoting the body of writings on Iqbal. It is now a current Urdu word, widely used in Pakistani literary circles.
3. Scholarly editing, with footnotes, citation of sources, annotation and biographical and bibliographical details, is rare in research in the Urdu language. Various attempts at biographical treatment are either contributions to hagiography, like Rais Ahmad Jafri's *Iqbal awr Syasat-i-Milli*, or slanted memoirs of the writer himself, like Ashiq Husain Batalawi's *Iqbal ki Zindagi ke Akhri Do Sal*. Iqbal's political writings and speeches in English were first collected by one "Shamloo" in a book which gives no dates, quotes no sources, provides no index, abounds in misprints and, on at least one vital point, misquotes the original text; a second, enlarged ed repeats all these faults. Another collection, prepared by S.A. Vahid, is only slightly better.
4. For contemporary accounts of the Allahabad session see *The Indian Review*, January 1931, pp. 45-46, and *IAR 1930*, Vol II, pp. 334-348. A short summary of the address was given by *The Times*, 30 December 1930. The whole address is reproduced in F.K. Khan Durrani, *The Meaning of Pakistan*, 1946 rep, pp. 149-175; Shamloo, *Speeches and Statements of Iqbal*, 2nd enl ed, Lahore, 1948, pp. 3-35; Muhammad Noman (ed), *Our Struggle, 1857-1947*, Karachi, n.d., pp. 1-18; Rais Ahmad Jafri (ed), *Rare Documents*, Lahore, 1967, Part II; S.A. Vahid (ed), *Thoughts and Reflections of Iqbal*, Lahore, 1964, Part I; and others. For obvious reasons, however, I have drawn upon the original issued by Iqbal himself, of which I have a copy.
5. *All India Muslim League: Allahabad Session: December 1930: Presidential Address by Dr. Sir Muhammad Iqbal, Barrister-at-Law, Lahore* (issued by the author, printed at the Kapur Art Printing Works, Lahore), p. 1.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 1.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 2.
8. *Ibid.*, pp. 2-3.
9. *Ibid.*, pp. 3-4. The italics are Iqbal's.
10. *Ibid.*, pp. 4-5.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 6. The italics are in the original.
12. *Ibid.*, pp. 6-7. The italics are in the address.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 7.
14. *Ibid.*, pp. 7-8.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 8.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 9.
17. *Ibid.*, pp. 9-11.
18. *Ibid.*, pp. 11-13. The words "word" and "substance" bear italics in the original.
19. *Ibid.*, pp. 13-15. The passage quoted is on p. 15.
20. *Ibid.*, p. 15.
21. *Ibid.*, pp. 18-19.
22. *Ibid.*, p. 19.
23. *Ibid.*, pp. 20-22.
24. *Ibid.*, p. 1.
25. *Ibid.*, p. 2.
26. *Ibid.*, p. 3.
27. *Ibid.*, p. 19.
28. *Ibid.*, p. 5.
29. *Ibid.*, pp. 5-6.
30. *Ibid.*, p. 6.
31. *Ibid.*, p. 7.
32. *Ibid.*, p. 7. Iqbal's italics.
33. *Ibid.*, p. 7. My italics.
34. *Ibid.*, p. 8.
35. *Ibid.*, p. 8.
36. *Ibid.*
37. *Ibid.*
38. My italics. Note the order of the words "India and Islam".
39. *Ibid.*, p. 9.
40. *Ibid.*, my italics.
41. *Ibid.*, emphasis added.
42. *Ibid.*, p. 10.
43. *Ibid.*, p. 15. What is a "neutral army", and how its formation "will intensify Muslim patriotic feeling", are questions which no student of Iqbal's politics has answered.

44. *Ibid.*, p. 15.
45. *Ibid.*, p. 17.
46. *Ibid.*, p. 18.
47. *Ibid.*, pp. 18-19.
48. *Ibid.*, p. 19.
49. *Ibid.*, p. 19.
50. This has been done by Aziz Ahmad, *Islamic Modernism in India and Pakistan, 1857-1964*, London, 1967; Manzo-  
oruddin Ahmed, *Pakistan: The Emerging Islamic State*,  
Karachi, 1966; E.I. Rosenthal, *Islam in the Modern National  
State*, Cambridge, 1965; Hafeez Malik, *Moslem Nationalism  
in India and Pakistan*, Washington, D.C., 1963; Z.H. Faruqi,  
*The Deoband School and the Demand for Pakistan*, London,  
1963; Waheeduzzaman, *Towards Pakistan*, Lahore, 1964; M.  
Mujeeb, *The Indian Muslims*, London, 1967; Kenneth Cragg,  
*Counsels in Contemporary Islam*, Edinburgh, 1965; Leonard  
Binder, *Religion and Politics in Pakistan*, Berkeley and Los  
Angeles, 1961; I.H. Qureshi, *The Muslim Community*, The  
Hague, 1962; Freeland Abbot, *Islam and Pakistan*, Ithaca,  
N.Y., 1968; and others.
51. On this point see K.K. Aziz, *The Making of Pakistan: A  
Study in Nationalism*, London, 1967.
52. G.B. Kaushik, *The House that Jinnah Built* Bombay, 1944,  
p. 114.
53. Virendra, *Pakistan: A Myth or A Reality*, Lahore, 1946, p.  
16. An American scholar makes it Lahore (Freeland Abbot,  
"Pakistan and the Secular State", in Donald E. Smith (ed),  
*South Asian Politics and Religion*, Princeton, 1966, p. 359 fn  
23).
54. Beni Prasad, *India's Hindu-Muslim Questions*, London, 1946,  
p. 77; Choudhry Nazir Ahmad Khan, *Kalam-i-Narm-o-Nazak:  
Ap Biti: Dastan-i-Pakistan*, Lahore, 1975, pp. 56, 86.
55. Pakistan Muslim League, *Qyam-i-Pakistan ka Pas Manzar*,  
Rawalpindi, 1964, p. 32.
56. S. Nazir Niazi, *Maktubat-i-Iqbal*, Karachi, 1957, p. 67.
57. All quoted in A.S. Khurshid, "Immediate Reaction to Iqbal's  
Allahabad Address", *TPT*, 21 April 1963.
58. M.A.C., "North-West India", *Islamic Culture*, October 1939,  
p. 499. The identity of the author is not known to me.
59. S.A. Vahid, *Studies in Iqbal*, Lahore, 1967, p. 302. Of



- course, he quotes no evidence for these assertions.
60. Asoka Mehta and Achyut Patwardhan, *The Communal Triangle in India*, Allahabad, July 1942, 2nd rev ed August 1942, p. 41.
  61. Richard V. Weekes, *Pakistan: Birth and Growth of a Muslim Nation*, Princeton, 1964, p. 81.
  62. G.B. Kaushik, *op. cit.*, p. 114.
  63. Ram Gopal, *Indian Muslims*, Bombay, 1959, p. 231. See also L.S. May, "Iqbal and His Philosophy", *Iqbal*, January 1958; Salahuddin Nasik, *Tahrik-i-Azadi*, Lahore, n.d., pp. 409-410; and M.. Raza Khan, *What Price Freedom*, Madras, 1969, p. 19.
  64. Ahmad Shafi, "Two Punjabee Musalmans", *The Indian Review*, August 1942.
  65. Choudhry Khaliquzzaman, *Pathway to Pakistan*, Lahore, 1961, pp. 108-109, 238. For contrary opinions see M.H. Saiyid, *Hamare Quaid-i-Azam*, Karachi, 1975, p. 34; Ajmal Siddiqui, "Allama Iqbal awr Tasawwar-i-Pakistan", *NW*, 4 April 1977; Waheed Qureshi, *Pakistan ki Nazriati Bunyaden*, Lahore, 1973, p. 70; and S. Zafarmand Ali Mazhar, "Pakistan awr Iqbal", *Jang*, 23 March 1978.
  66. See *Resolutions of the All India Muslim League from May 1924 to December 1936*, Delhi, n.d., pp. 47-49.
  67. A.S. Khurshid, *op. cit.*, *TPT*, 21 April 1963.
  68. *Ibid.* Iqbal's plans for the Upper India Muslim Conference are discussed below in chapter 5.
  69. Syed Nur Ahmad, *Martial Law se Martial Law Tak*, Lahore, 1965, p. 126. This book is in fact the autobiography of Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan, a Punjabi leader, written up from his memoirs after his death by Syed Nur Ahmad. It covers the period from 1919 to 1958, hence the title.
  70. Ahmad Shafi, *op. cit.*
  71. F.K. Khan Durrani, *The Meaning of Pakistan*, Lahore, March 1946 rep, pp. 109-110.
  72. A.S. Khurshid, *op. cit.*, *TPT*, 21 April 1963.
  73. Ram Gopal, *op. cit.*, p. 231.
  74. Cited in A.S. Khurshid, *op. cit.*
  75. The Indian Christian community condemned the Nehru Report, and also joined with the other minorities in putting up a demand for safeguards at the RTC. But on both these

- occasions it was fighting for its minority rights which the Hindus were withholding, not siding with the Muslims as against the Hindus.
76. S.K. Datta, *Asiatic Asia*, London, 1932, p. 181.
  77. M.L. Farrar, in H.A.R. Gibb (ed), *Whither Islam?*, London, 1932, pp. 235-236. Gibb himself made an astonishing statement at another place: in 1930 "the Pakistan project was definitely adopted as the political objective of the League" (article on Iqbal, in L.G. Wickham Legg (ed), *The Dictionary of National Biography, 1931-1940*, London, 1949, pp. 461-462).
  78. Mian Sir Muhammad Shafi, speech in the Minorities Sub-Committee on 1 January 1931, *Indian Round Table Conference, 12 November 1930-19 January 1931, Proceedings of Sub-Committees (Part II), Sub-Committees II-IX*, London, 1931, pp. 102-103. The following leaders were then in the Muslim Delegation: Sahibzada Sultan Ahmad Khan, Sir Akbar Hydari, Sir Mirza Ismail, the Aga Khan, Mawlana Muhammad Ali, Sir Shah Nawaz Bhutto, Nawab Sir Ahmad Said Khan of Chchattari, Raja Sher Muhammad Khan, A.K. Fazlul Huq, Sir A.H. Ghuznavi, Sir Ghulam Husain Hidayatullah, Hafiz Hidayat Husain, M.A. Jinnah, Sir Abdul Qayyum, Sir Sultan Ahmad, Sir Muhammad Shafi, Dr. Shafaat Ahmad Khan, Begum Shah Nawaz, and Muhammad Zafrulla Khan (*IAR 1930*, Vol II, p. 286).
  79. "Sikhs and the New Constitution", a Memorandum by Sardar Ujjal Singh and Sardar Sampuran Singh, *Indian Round Table Conference (2nd Session), 7th September 1931-1st December 1931, Proceedings of Federal Structure Committee and Minorities Committee*, London, 1932, Appendix IV, pp. 555-556.
  80. Muhammad Shafi Daoodi, "Note on Appendix IV", *ibid.*, p. 585. Edward Thompson's allegations and Iqbal's reply to them are discussed below.

# 5

## THE ALLAHABAD MYTH: 1930

### The Address Widely Misinterpreted

One would have thought that any one who read Iqbal's address with some care and attention and knew what had been stated, repeatedly and publicly, before the date of his speech, would have no reasonable grounds for misconstruing his meaning. Yet such misinterpretation has had a long history.

Journalists, politicians, popular writers, serious authors—all have played a part in this falsification of history. The propaganda has been done so efficiently that professional historians and scholars have come to accept the popular distortion as the truth. In modern historical writing and research the popularly held image appears as the only possible verity. The power of time is immense. It can confirm a flasehood as effortlessly as it can reject a truth. And yet new truths emerge as knowledge advances and prejudice recedes. It is a poor tribute to Clio to limit the writing of history to a repetition of convenient traditions. It is a poorer tribute still to Iqbal, whose greatness as a man is beyond cavil, to try to make him look greater by attributing to him what he neither said nor did.

But before history is cleared of such comfortable assumptions and truth is discovered and made to stand naked without the dubious raiment of borrowed glory, a short survey of the traditional outlook is advisable: it will reveal the methods and motives of the authors of these assumptions.

Between 1930 and 1940 there is not much to indicate that Iqbal's Allahabad proposal was being dressed up as a harbinger of separation.<sup>1</sup> As far as can be ascertained it was after the Muslim League had passed the Lahore Resolution in March 1940 that some League supporters began to cast a backward look in search of some justification for what they considered to be such a revolutionary

demand. Their gaze was at once fixed on Iqbal—not the Iqbal who had recently written long letters to Jinnah pleading the urgent necessity for a separate Muslim state (for these letters were not yet in public knowledge), but the Iqbal of 1930 and the Allahabad address. Was it not from the Muslim League presidential chair that he had spoken these prophetic phrases? What could be more pertinent than to quote a former president in defence of the new programme? His fame as a poet was an added attraction. Anyway, to attribute prophecy to a poet was not an act of recklessness. Was not the poet an oracle, too, who proclaimed truths hidden from the mortal eye?

The announcement that the idea of Pakistan had already been expressed by a great poet, who was also a president of the League, solved several problems at once. It gave the idea some measure of antiquity, and therefore of respectability, by tracing it back to at least ten years. It also made it the child of a seer, thus blessing a political plan with divine or semi-divine inspiration. It also brightened the image of the Muslim League by endowing it with the quality of a rare foresight which had seen the coming of freedom many years before. In one word, it made the idea respectable. It also brought a hero from the rarefied world of letters into the gallery of the nation's freedom-makers. In thus seizing upon Iqbal these people dismissed from their memory all those who had come before him, because he made a better hero. Others, though prior in time, were not prior in quality. Chronology, the only solid base around which the vine of history winds itself, was thus swept out of sight. To hope that a straight historical edifice could be erected on such foundations was to forget that the laws of nature are neutral and will not help those who run after the counterfeit.

But to take too severe a notice of these doings is to under-rate the play of myth in the creation of history. A part of history is always made by contemporaries, and they make it in their own fashion and in their own image. Muslim India is not unique in calling in a conceit in its aid if this appeared to advance the cause of national freedom.

The first summons seems to have gone out in the summer of 1940 when, writing in the *Eastern Times* of Lahore, I.H. Qureshi asserted: "The idea of Pakistan, it is well known, originated in the brain of the late Hazrat Allama Iqbal. . . Dr. Iqbal made articulate

what was so far struggling for expression." He added: "Of course, at first Dr. Muhammad Iqbal's idea was taken up by a few persons only. A person here and there was attracted to it; a person here and there was struck by it. But the idea grew and grew, and presently the whole Muslim nation was talking of it, discussing it and digesting it. And finally they became unanimous over it."<sup>2</sup> This was a general statement and did not specifically refer either to the Allahabad address or to Iqbal's letters to Jinnah (the existence of which could not have been known to Qureshi in 1940). It is possible that here Qureshi was writing only about later developments, but it is very improbable. His later interpretations of Iqbal, to which we will shortly refer, confirm that he traces the idea of Pakistan to the 1930 address.

This lead was followed by several other writers sympathetic to the Muslim League point of view. In 1941, Mian Kafayet Ali, writing under the pen-name of "A Punjabi", stated as a matter of fact that in 1930 Iqbal had placed before the Muslims "a scheme of separation in which their salvation lay".<sup>3</sup> A few years later, in a book which carried a foreword by Jinnah himself and reflected, almost officially, the Muslim League programme, the origin of the idea of Pakistan was traced back to Jamaluddin "Afghani". "Subsequently, it owed inspiration to late Sir Muhammad Iqbal who [at Allahabad] proposed the amalgamation of the North-Western Muslim Provinces into a single state."<sup>4</sup> With each repetition the tone of affirmation grew stronger. "Thus Iqbal was the father of the idea of independent and sovereign Muslim states in India", said one author.<sup>5</sup> It is "only Iqbal" who is "the real father of Pakistan"; the Allahabad proposal was "the first concrete shape of the latent demand for a Muslim India".<sup>6</sup>

When independence came Iqbal's was the only name associated with the idea of Pakistan. Most people knew of none other, and the few who did chose to keep this knowledge to themselves. The fear of incurring unpopularity by questioning the received opinion was stronger than the courage to tell the truth. Moreover, with the creation of Pakistan Iqbal had been made a part of the Establishment, and to cast doubts on his parentage of the concept of partition was reckoned as a criticism of the government and an attack on the official version of the national ideology. To this was added the first wave of enthusiasm at the newly-won freedom. All the compulsions for treasuring the myth were thus present. Iqbal

had become a vested interest, a national memory, a focus of patriotism. Every one who put pen to paper reiterated the accepted theory. It is always safe and often profitable to swim with the current.

Shamloo (it is a pseudonym), the first person to collect and edit Iqbal's English political writings and speeches, blandly stated in his introduction that Iqbal had in 1930 demanded a "separate sovereign state", and passed on to other matters without staying to argue the point.<sup>7</sup> The journalists and others popularized and perpetuated the idea and, in countless articles in English and Urdu newspapers, persuaded a great many of its truth.

When serious writers came to write on Iqbal they did not take the issue any further, and merely transferred the transient word of the daily newspaper to the slightly more permanent page of popular literature. Only a representative selection can be mentioned here out of the vast material available.

In a comprehensive survey of Iqbal's political activities we are told that in 1930 he "for the first time in Indian political history, and with much elaboration (*bauhat hi wazahat ke sath*), presented a scheme for the creation of an Islamic State".<sup>8</sup> "The fact is that the Allama had proposed an 'Islamic State', not an 'Islamic province', and this is clear to any one who has taken the trouble of reading his 1930 address".<sup>9</sup> And again, "it has to be conceded that the state contemplated in the scheme presented in 1930 was not to be a part of the Indian federation, but a separate, free and sovereign state".<sup>10</sup> And not only was Iqbal advocating a partition of India, but he was also asking the Muslims left behind in India to migrate to the Muslim state.<sup>11</sup> This was the interpretation of a former chief justice of Bhopal.

A lawyer from Lahore, who made a full-length study of Iqbal the poet, mentioned in passing that he "proposed the creation of a State— Muslim India, now known as Pakistan".<sup>12</sup> A politician, in the course of his 600-page polemic on the issue of the electorate in Pakistan, said that at Allahabad Iqbal "for the first time proposed [that] the North-Western British Indian Provinces (excluding Kashmir) might be constituted into a separate state. This was the genesis of the conception of 'Pakistan'"; and "he proposed a separate Muslim State in North-West India"; and again, Iqbal was "the architect of Pakistan".<sup>13</sup> In the words of a very successful popular novelist in Urdu and biographer of national leaders, Iqbal



advocated "Pakistan" and a partition of India.<sup>14</sup> These assertions appeared in a book on Iqbal's political career published by the Iqbal Academy of Karachi.

A recent biographer of Fazlul Haq, the Bengali leader who moved the Lahore Resolution, sees Iqbal at Allahabad giving "a clarion call to the Muslims of India to struggle for the creation of a separate homeland for themselves".<sup>15</sup> The word "homeland" also appears twice in this connection in a biographical study of Jinnah by G. Allana, who writes that "Iqbal boldly declared he was ready to stake his all for the freedom of India, if the Muslims of India were assured of their own homeland by the amalgamation of the Punjab, Sind, Frontier and Baluchistan into a single 'Muslim State'"; and again, he said that "the Muslim majority provinces of the Punjab, the Frontier, Sind and Baluchistan should be grouped together and made a single homeland for the Muslims of North-West India".<sup>16</sup> A prominent Iqbalite of Lahore confirmed that "one miracle which flowed from him is the creation of Pakistan of which he gave the concept".<sup>17</sup> A former chief justice of East Pakistan has said the same thing in the same words: "The political plan which he had propounded at the Sybilline session of the Muslim League led to the creation of Pakistan."<sup>18</sup>

It is interesting to see that Iqbal's son, a frequent speaker at meetings and symposia held on the death anniversary of his father and author of several articles on Iqbal, has refused to go all the way with these makers of public opinion. He prefers to call the Allahabad proposal Iqbal's "abstract and nebulous political ideal"<sup>19</sup>, and correctly paraphrases it: Iqbal "suggested that the Muslims of the Indian sub-continent should demand territorial specification in the form of a separate state on the basis of a distinct cultural unity".<sup>20</sup> The words are well chosen and give no aid and comfort to those who claim that Iqbal wanted a division of India, a sovereign Muslim or Islamic state, or an independent Muslim India.

Most historians have made a fatal choice. Instead of reading the address itself they have quoted one another. Interpretation of documents is a privilege of the historian, and he is free to read any reasonable and feasible meaning in the given words. But when he ignores the original source and even quotes it from a secondary source, he has surrendered his right of interpretation to the ease of borrowing conventional opinion.

As we saw above, Qureshi had in 1940 already committed himself to a certain view of Iqbal. He has held on to it consistently in his later writings (like his unchanging views on Jamaluddin "Afghani", as examined in chapter 1). He admits that in 1930 Iqbal's "ideas on the subject were still vague and aroused no immediate response", but proceeds to state that "this was the first time that the idea of a separate state for the Muslims had been put forward from the platform of a political party".<sup>21</sup> Iqbal told the Muslim League session "that he hoped to see the Muslim areas of the sub-continent become a separate state".<sup>22</sup> This is not merely a case of interpreting Iqbal in a certain way but of putting in his mouth words which he did not say. Irrespective of whether he wanted a *separate* state or not (he could have demanded a separate state as a unit of the Indian federation), he laid claim only to the north-west of India, not to "Muslim areas of the sub-continent". Again, in saying that separation was put forward for the first time "from the platform of a political party", Qureshi has ignored Zulfikar's address to the Khilafat Conference of December 1929.

Qureshi does not agree with those who contend that Iqbal wanted only an enlarged Muslim province within an Indian federation. His objection is based on two points. When Iqbal talked of this consolidated area being within or without the British Empire, he must have meant it as an independent state. This is not convincing. Iqbal was saying that whether India as a whole chose, at some future date, to leave the Empire or preferred to stay in the Commonwealth he would, in any case, like the north-western Muslim areas to be amalgamated into one large unit. Internal evidence is clear on this point. Separation or independence finds no mention anywhere in the address. To the argument that Iqbal was not urging separation because in the address he talked a great deal of other matters like federation, separate electorates, legislative quota, etc., Qureshi replies that he was doing this because "he was speaking from the platform of a body which had as yet not accepted the policy of complete separation from India". But his own proposition "could only mean independence".<sup>23</sup> This point has already been discussed in detail, and we have seen from Iqbal's own words that what he called his "territorial" solution amounted to no more than the creation of a large province. His reference to the Nehru Report's criticism of such a proposal and his reply to Sastri's allegation leave no doubt about it.

A great majority of Pakistani historians has presented a similar view of Iqbal, though, unlike Qureshi, without even trying to argue the issue. Aziz Ahmad is a principal example of this trend. In 1959, he wrote that Iqbal "est, en generale, considere comme le premier a avoir concu l'idee d'un Etat indien musulman autonome: le Pakistan". He has phrased the statement with caution: "he is generally considered to have conceived. . .". He quotes the correct word "*autonome*" from Iqbal's address, and then confuses it with Pakistan. He also writes that this address was delivered at "la Ligue arabe en 1930", but that must be a misprint.<sup>24</sup> In 1960, he connected Iqbal with Jamaluddin and said that "this made it possible for him to reduce al-Afghani's concept of a north-west-Indian-and-Central-Asian Muslim state to the practical limits of Muslim politics in India by suggesting in 1930 the creation of a separate Muslim state within the Indian sub-continent".<sup>25</sup> In 1961, he repeated that in 1930 Iqbal "proposa le premier la creation d'un Etat musulman separe en Inde".<sup>26</sup> Note the capital E of *Etat*. In 1967, he reiterated that Iqbal "first put forward a proposal for the creation of a separate state in India in 1930", and he "was the first explicitly to formulate the theory of the necessity of the creation of . . . a separate Indian Muslim state".<sup>27</sup> In the same year he wrote in another place: "Le separation politique trouva son expression la plus explicite" in the Allahabad address of 1930.<sup>28</sup>

S.A. Vahid, the foremost upholder of the Iqbal myth, is more dogmatic in his assertions. In the Allahabad address Iqbal "made a definite suggestion regarding the creation of a Muslim State on the sub-continent".<sup>29</sup> He was "one of the first men to declare from the platform of the Muslim League . . . the fact that the creation of a sovereign Muslim State provided the only solution of the political, religious, and communal troubles with which the country is faced".<sup>30</sup> The Allahabad address contained Iqbal's "proposal for the division of the sub-continent", for he "was now convinced that the only way for the Muslims to survive on the sub-continent was to have a homeland".<sup>31</sup> He also states, "It has been asked if it was really Iqbal who first suggested the name Pakistan. The question can be answered in one word 'No' ".<sup>32</sup> This question has never been asked, and to say that it has been is very misleading. Then, contradicting what he had said earlier, he goes on, "Iqbal was not the first to suggest this [a partition]. But it is to his credit that

Iqbal was the first to suggest a homeland for the Muslims from the platform of the All India Muslim League".<sup>33</sup>

Trained historians and political scientists echo the traditional theme. Abdul Hamid says that in his Allahabad address Iqbal "adumbrated the plan for an independent Muslim state on the north-west of India".<sup>34</sup> G.W. Choudhury asserts that "the vision of a separate state had already been expressed by the poet-philosopher Allama Iqbal in 1930" when he had proclaimed that the future of the Muslims of India "lay in a separate state".<sup>35</sup>

Such a persistent view of history was bound to travel abroad, and we find several foreign students of Pakistani history accepting it without demur. Rushbrook Williams's statement that in 1930 Iqbal "put forward the demand for an autonomous Muslim State" is a curious one, however it is interpreted. If Iqbal was asking for an autonomous state within an Indian federation the word should not be spelt with a capital S, for that implies an independent political entity, and Iqbal does not spell it like this. (This point is discussed fully in the following section). If Iqbal was asking for an independent state the word "autonomous" is misleading: autonomy is not sovereignty. But it is obvious from the rest of Rushbrook Williams's remarks that in his opinion Iqbal wanted an independent state, for he continues, "The idea spread; and although for some time Jinnah himself remained unconvinced, it began to attract increasing attention from the Muslim community".<sup>36</sup> It is unnecessary to point out that at no stage did Jinnah demand autonomy.<sup>37</sup>

A more cautious statement is made by Ian Stephens: "At the session in 1930 of the Muslim League in Allahabad, a rough first sketch of what became the Pakistan project was formally commended for attention, for the first time in the League's history."<sup>38</sup> The "rough first sketch" is a more prudent expression than the wild and exaggerated claims made by others, though it is still doubtful if the later Pakistan plan, embracing Bengal and Assam and seeking sovereignty, can reasonably be said to emerge from Iqbal's first sketch.

Percival Spear has made two statements in the course of the same year which are at odds with each other. According to one, Iqbal "came forward in 1930 for a separate homeland in the north-west".<sup>39</sup> According to the other, Iqbal "suggested the union of the Frontier Province, Baluchistan, Sind and Kashmir as a

Muslim state within a federation".<sup>40</sup> In the first, it will be noticed, Iqbal is demanding an independent state; a province or colony is far from being a homeland. In the second, he is demanding only a larger province in an Indian federation. Besides this contradiction, Iqbal is also misquoted in the second statement. The Punjab is omitted though Iqbal mentioned it specifically, and Kashmir is included though Iqbal did not refer to it.

The treatment of Iqbal by American scholars is no less cavalier. One of them calls him "perhaps the first important Muslim leader to suggest the idea of a separate Muslim state".<sup>41</sup> In spite of the happy qualification contained in the "perhaps", the claim for separation is affirmed. Another provides a rather over-imaginative picture of the state visualized by Iqbal. After assuming that an independent state was the objective, he says, "he offered no precise description of this state, but thought of it as a utopia. It was to be an ideal society guided by a disinterested class of intellectuals, Pan-Islamic in outlook".<sup>42</sup> At another place but at the same time, a different account is given by the same author. One year after his Allahabad address, Iqbal wrote of the need "to redistribute the country and to provide one or more Muslim states with absolute majorities".<sup>43</sup> This is offered as a quotation from Iqbal. I have not been able to discover its source or determine its difference from the Allahabad proposal.

After reading the above account of the history of what we may call the Iqbal myth, it is not at all surprising to find that popular and text book history has been made to conform to the accepted theory. Once the journalists and the popular writers had persuaded the general reader to believe in the traditional point of view and the historians had convinced themselves and one another of the truth of the idea (without reading the original), the next step was to condition the mind of the rising student generation. The task was taken up seriously and executed with some efficiency. Before looking at the following examples one must remember that education at all levels is under the strict control of the state.

In a text book prepared in 1955 by a board consisting of virtually every practising historian in the country it was stated that at Allahabad Iqbal "set before the nation the goal of a Muslim State".<sup>44</sup> Since then this book has been reprinted several times and placed on the compulsory or required reading list of nearly every college. A few years earlier, an introductory study of Pakistan

aimed at higher secondary students, and jointly written by a Pakistani and an Englishman, affirmed that it was Iqbal "who first conceived the idea of a separate Muslim State in the Indian sub-continent".<sup>45</sup>

The spectacle of even more incorrect information combined with much wrongly-placed enthusiasm is offered by two publications of the Government of Pakistan. In a short book on Jinnah, apparently meant for the young readers, we read the extraordinary statement that during his "four-year exile" in England Jinnah was thinking of Iqbal who "had suggested a separate homeland for the Indian Muslims".<sup>46</sup> And about this "homeland" we are confidently told that "as far back as 1930 he had suggested that all those areas where Muslims were in greater number than the Hindus should be grouped and made a separate homeland for the Muslims of the Indian sub-continent".<sup>47</sup> For the first assertion we have no evidence either in Jinnah's statements, or in the memoirs of those people who were meeting Jinnah during his stay in London, or in Jinnah's letters to Abdul Matin Chowdhury which have now been published. The second assertion is palpably false, for Iqbal was referring to the north-west and not to "all those areas" where Muslims were in a majority.

The second publication of this order is a brief account of the history of the Pakistan Movement which, the authoress tells us, is "meant for school children" and whose "main object" is "to give Pakistani children a picture of our historical past, the present and future" (Preface). This picture of the historical past shows that at Allahabad Iqbal "suggested that in those provinces of India where the Muslims were in greater number than the Hindus, a separate homeland for the Muslims should be created".<sup>48</sup> The statement reproduces, almost in exact words, the error contained in the earlier publication, viz., an unwarranted extension of Iqbal's claim from the north-west to the Muslim majority areas throughout India. The intention is clear: to present Iqbal as the 1930 prophet of the 1947 Pakistan, and as the only person to have inspired Jinnah to think on the lines of partition.

In a volume on the founders of Pakistan two young writers have similarly credited Iqbal with "the vision to foresee that the Muslims and the Hindus would be better [off] by living in separate states". This vision was presented "in a concrete form in the shape of the Presidential Address" which he delivered at Allahabad.<sup>49</sup>



The acceptance of the standard theory was not confined to school children, young students and under-graduates. Research work done on the post-graduate level showed similar acquiescence.<sup>50</sup> The myth had become authoritative history.<sup>51</sup>

### The Address Widely Misquoted

A major instrument in the perpetuation of this myth has been a straight misquotation of the most vital passage in Iqbal's proposal (which has already been quoted twice, but, if the reader permits, must be cited once again). The heart of his scheme is contained in these two sentences: "I would like to see the Punjab, North-West Frontier Province, Sind and Baluchistan amalgamated into a single state. Self-government within the British Empire, or without the British Empire, the formation of a consolidated North-West Indian Muslim state appears to me to be the final destiny of the Muslims of North-West India."<sup>52</sup> Besides the context of this passage and the contents of the whole address, an analysis of which has already been made, one principal indication of his intentions is given by the use of the word "state" with a small s at both places. It is not, of course, a conclusive argument. But generally when one is talking of units in a federation and using "state" to mean a component part of that federation the word is spelt without a capital S. There is no reason to believe that Iqbal was unaware of this distinction. Had he been envisaging an independent and sovereign state in the north-west, he would have used a capital S. That he did not do so is a further argument in favour of interpreting his suggestion as the creation of a larger province which would form a part of a federated India.

A very large number of historians and authors quote Iqbal wrongly, writing State in place of state at one or both places. The mis-reproduction may be deliberate or unwitting, but it does alter the meaning of the passage and gives the wrong impression that Iqbal was demanding an independent State, not a province. Since it is possible that the general misconception about Iqbal's scheme has arisen from this misquotation, it seems fair that the students of Iqbal should know the places where it occurs.

Part of the blame for spreading the error must go to Shamloo who was the first to collect and edit Iqbal's English political speeches and statements. He reproduced the second sentence

incorrectly, giving a capital S to the word state, while in the original it is in the lower case.<sup>53</sup> Every writer on Iqbal who took pen in hand and did not care to go to the original reproduced Shamloo's error. We don't know how or why Shamloo himself was led into committing this mistake. He does not cite the sources in his collection, and therefore gives us no opportunity to find out whether he was just careless or was provided with a corrupt text. A more recent and comprehensive collection of Iqbal's writings, put together by a well-known Iqbal scholar, suffers from the same defect. It puts a capital S in the second sentence, and refuses to give the source from where the address is taken.<sup>54</sup> In all probability he has copied from Shamloo.

One explanation of this distortion could have been that the original address was not available to Shamloo and Vahid. In that case, however, they were obliged to mention this in the preface and tell the reader the source from where they had taken the text. This is a universal practice among editors and compilers of documents who have had some training. The excuse that the correct text was not available cannot be pleaded by Shamloo and Vahid, because it was available to them at at least four places besides Iqbal's own original. The *Indian Annual Register*, a standard and well-used reference work available in several libraries in Pakistan, had reproduced the full text correctly in its second volume of 1930.<sup>55</sup> The special Pakistan issue of the *Aligarh Magazine* of 1944 also contained the correct text.<sup>56</sup> It is reported that AIML office reprinted the address in 1945, and presumably on its p. 12 the passage in question was correctly given, for Khalid bin Sayeed quotes from this source and his citation is free of this error.<sup>57</sup> In 1946, F.K. Khan Durrani reproduced the address in full in *The Meaning of Pakistan*;<sup>58</sup> and much later a publication of the Government of Pakistan did the same;<sup>59</sup> both reproductions are correct. Only a very few authors quote from these correct sources; and, to our astonishment, even they repeat the primary error by misquoting a correct text.<sup>60</sup> The rest go to Shamloo,<sup>61</sup> thus perpetuating the mistake, or cite no source at all to sustain their misquotation.<sup>62</sup>

Some treatments of Iqbal leave Shamloo behind in tampering with the text, offering the word State (with a capital S) in both sentences: Waheeduzzaman's *Towards Pakiatan* (p. 132), who professes to quote from Shamloo; S.A. Vahid's "Allama Iqbal" in

*A History of Freedom Movement* (Vol. III, Part II, p. 507), *Studies in Iqbal* (p. 281), and "Iqbal as a Politician" (*Dawn*, 23 April 1967), where no source is quoted; S.S. Pirzada's "The Lahore Resolution (1940)" in *A History of the Freedom Movement* (Vol. IV, Parts I and II, p. 82); Sir Reginald Coupland's *Indian Politics, 1936-1942* (p. 198), quoting the *Indian Annual Register*; H.R. Aiyer's *Why Pakistan?* (p. 3), quoting no one; and G. Allana's *Pakistan Movement: Historical Documents* (p. 87), giving no source; and one contemporary reference, Butshikan's "The Muslim World" (in the *Civil and Military Gazette* of Lahore, 19 October 1931). There is one other example of this category where the error is incomprehensible. In the *Struggle for Independence* issued by the Government of Pakistan, to which I have referred in the preceding paragraph, the correct text is fully reproduced in an appendix, but in the body of the book the misquotation appears in two different places.<sup>63</sup>

Then there are works which quote only the second sentence with a capital S, leaving the first one correctly intact: I.H. Qureshi's *The Muslim Community* (p. 297), and S.M. Ikram's *Makers of Pakistan* (pp. 180-181) and *Modern Muslim India and the Birth of Pakistan* (p. 181), both quoting Shamloo; W.C. Smith's *Modern Islam in India* (English ed. p. 254, Indian ed. pp. 307-308), who claims to quote from the original; Hafeez Malik's *Moslem Nationalism in India and Pakistan* (p. 240), who says he is quoting from Durrani; and Khaliqzaman's *Pathway to Pakistan* (p. 108), Abid Husain's *The Destiny of Indian Muslims* (p. 66), G. Allana's *Quaid-e-Azam Jinnah* (p. 216), S.S. Pirzada's *The Pakistan Resolution and the Historic Lahore Session* (p. 7), Muhammad Ali's *The Emergence of Pakistan* (p. 25), Abdullah Anwar Beg's *The Poet of the East* (p. 262), A.S. Khurshid's "Origin of Pakistan" (*The Pakistan Times*, 23 March 1962), and Riffat Hasan's "Iqbal and Pakistan" (*ibid.*, 14 August 1968), all these quoting without any reference.

Some studies quote only one sentence, either the first or the second, but add a capital S to the operative word. Examples of these are: Syed Mahbub Murshid's "The Pebbled Shore" in K.A. Rahim's *Iqbal: The Poet of Tomorrow* (p. 141), Mian Amiruddin's "More About the Forgotten Hero" (*The Pakistan Times*, 10 May 1964), and M.R.T.'s *Pakistan and Muslim India* (2nd. ed. p. 82).

Among all the works consulted in the preparation of the present study only six reproduce Iqbal correctly: *A Short History of*

*Pakistan* (Book Four, p. 205; this portion by Waheeduzzaman), Donald Wilber's *Pakistan: Yesterday and Today* (p. 99), Richard Symond's *The Making of Pakistan* (p. 36), Muhammad Noman's *Muslim India* (p. 312), S. Hyder's *Progress of Pakistan* (p. 35), and A.B. Rajput's *Muslim League Yesterday and Today* (p. 222). It is an interesting observation that out of these six authors two are foreigners, and of the four Pakistani writers only one (Waheeduzzaman) is a professional historian. Journalists and popular writers have for once set an example of correct reporting which the historians might well have emulated.

What is astounding in this affair of almost universal misquotation is the unanimity with which even trained scholars and historians have dependend on a secondary source for such an important passage from such a celebrated document. If the original text was not available in any library in Pakistan, copies could have been obtained from where it was. The fact that correct reproductions had already been made by Durrani and the official publication means that the true text was available to those working in Lahore and Karachi. Some of the historians quoted above were working in London or places in Canada and the United States where the original address is available. Yet they appear to have preferred Shamloo's clumsy editing to the original source. Further, even those who have quoted Shamloo have often quoted him wrongly, and compounded his mistake by putting in a capital S at both places. Sheer carelessness alone can explain this. Only W.C. Smith has gone to the original, and yet his quotations in both the English and Indian editions of the book are wrong, which shows that even the availability of the true word is no guarantee that it will be reported correctly. And then there is a large circle of authors who have just not cared to cite any source, thus making it easier to clothe their own interpretation in what are alleged to be Iqbal's words.

Iqbal himself has added to the confusion. In the address he italicized the passage in question, which shows the care and attention with which he must have phrased it. He could not have spelt "state" with a small s twice had he not meant it to stand for a federal unit: he should either have written it as "State" or added the word independent or sovereign had he meant a separate Muslim country. Nor can we take shelter behind the excuse of a misprint, for the whole text of the address is printed clearly in large type and

does not contain a single printing error. Thus it is clear that when he wrote "state" he meant exactly that. So far there is no difficulty.

The difficulty arises from the wording, or rather the lettering, of Edward Thompson's letter to *The Times* of 3 October 1931 and Iqbal's reply to it of 12 October. Thompson attacked Iqbal for making the Allahabad proposal and quoted the famous passage with a capital S at both places. In his reply Iqbal said that Thompson "has torn the following passage from its context in my presidential address", and then quoted the full passage itself, and the quotation showed a capital S in both sentences. Not only did Iqbal not correct Thompson for misquoting his passage, but he himself quoted it wrongly.<sup>64</sup> It is not easy to explain this. Unless Iqbal knew his address by heart, which is very improbable, he must have quoted from a written record, and this record could not have been any other but the text of the address. And that makes it harder to think of any explanation. Either he was careless in the draft of the letter he wrote or he did not correct the work of his typist—assuming that the letter was sent to the newspaper in typescript. It is also possible that he thought that it made no difference how the words were spelt. In any case, it remains a minor mystery. But, as we will see shortly, his answer to Thompson's letter does not at all encourage the general impression that he had advocated a separate state. On the contrary, it is one of the clearest proofs we have from his own hand that he had only suggested the creation of a Muslim province.

### The Arguments of the Myth-Makers

This study would remain incomplete without looking at the evidence produced by Iqbal's misinterpreters in support of their statements and assertions.

"Few thought at the time [1930]", wrote S.A. Vahid, "that Iqbal's foresight would lead to the creation of the independent and sovereign state of Pakistan. It may be said that while other people also might have thought that a solution of the political troubles of the sub-continent of India lay in the creation of Pakistan, to Iqbal must go the credit for having been the first to present to the world the scheme as a political proposition."<sup>65</sup> Having thus stated a "fact", he disposed of the matter of evidence in one magisterial

remark, "In view of the overwhelming and irrefutable evidence, documentary and otherwise, it should be unnecessary even to refer to attempts that are being made to belittle the part played by Iqbal in the creation of Pakistan".<sup>66</sup> This "overwhelming and irrefutable evidence" finds no place in the volume in which it is referred to with such finality. Let us try to seek it elsewhere.

In 1950 was published a book called *Makers of Pakistan and Modern Muslim India* by one who called himself "Al-Beiruni"; later it turned out that he was S.M. Ikram, a civil servant. It contained chapters on Sayyid Ahmad Khan, Hali, Mohsin-ul-Mulk, Viqar-ul-Mulk, Shibli, Azad, Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan. Iqbal was not considered worthy of a chapter to himself and was fobbed off with a few scattered references. Nor was there a chapter on Rahmat Ali.<sup>67</sup> A revised edition of this book under a changed title was brought out in 1965, and it made full amends for its earlier indifference to Iqbal. By now Ikram, who this time was writing under his own name, had not only come to realize Iqbal's importance in the movement for Pakistan, but had firmly subscribed his name to the list of those who believed that Iqbal had initiated the Pakistan idea and inspired Jinnah to make it his cause.

Like most claimants of Iqbal's exaggerated role in the movement towards partition, Ikram also provided no documentary evidence and made no attempt to examine the Allahabad address or to argue for his interpretation of it. A series of assertions were made, some of them very significant, but unfortunately no supporting testimony was produced beyond what might have been mere hearsay or his own memory (we are not even told which is which).

After participating in the by-now standard drill on the Allahabad address, viz., that Iqbal "set, for the first time, before the Indian Muslims, the national goal of what later came to be known as Pakistan",<sup>68</sup> he made a reference to Iqbal's visit to London in 1931 in connection with the RTC. In London, Iqbal "had, for one thing, many meetings with Muhammad Ali Jinnah, whom he was able to interest in his scheme for the future of India".<sup>69</sup> Here it should suffice to repeat what has been said before: that there is no material proof at all, documentary or otherwise, of Jinnah having shown any interest in Iqbal's suggestion at this date, not to speak of having allowed himself to be persuaded of its value, practicability or importance.



This treatment of Iqbal was rounded off by the remark that he "put forward the scheme in a concrete, tangible form at the principal political platform of Muslim India, gave the proposal the prestige of his illustrious name, and worked for its success".<sup>70</sup> Each of these four assertions is open to formidable doubt. Even those, like I.H. Qureshi, who interpret the Allahabad address as a demand for a partition, agree that at that time Iqbal's ideas were vague and nebulous; his son, Javid Iqbal, thinks the same; and any one with the slightest acquaintance with the text of the address is bound to reach the same conclusion. To call it concrete and tangible is to give a different meaning to language. Nor will any student of the politics of that time agree to call the Muslim League "the principal political platform of Muslim India". The League was then weak in organization and completely overshadowed by the Muslim Conference. We have seen above that the number of well-known and prominent leaders attending the 1930 annual session gave it the appearance of something even less than a provincial political conference. As for Iqbal's having given the scheme "the prestige of his illustrious name", it is sufficient to recall the cold indifference with which the Muslim League treated it and the eloquent silence with which Muslim leaders received it. Finally, we are not told how Iqbal "worked for its success". He did not repeat it at the RTC, he did not mention it before the 1932 AIMC session, and he did not reassert it in any public statement or private communication.

Another report of Iqbal having talked of partition in London comes from Frank Moraes, an Indian journalist. Moraes was in London during the second RTC, and he recalled the incident in 1973 as follows: "One evening I had dinner at Shafi's Indian restaurant in Gerrard Street, then a popular meeting place for Indians in London. It was during one of the sessions of the RTC, and at the next table was a group of Muslim delegates, among them the poet, Sir Muhammad Iqbal, who was advocating the partition of India. He mentioned the word Pakistan. It was the first time I had heard it. I told Jinnah about the episode when I next met him. He had a habit of throwing his head back when something amused or interested him. 'My dear boy', he chuckled, 'don't you know that Iqbal isn't a politician? He's a poet. Poets are dreamers'."<sup>71</sup> I find it hard to trust this tale. Moraes is not sure which session of the RTC it was. He is recalling an incident which happened 41

years ago. And in 1932 the word Pakistan had not yet been coined.

Some writers have quoted Iqbal's earlier views, on the impracticability and undesirability of Muslims being submerged in Hindu culture to a point where they would lose their identity, as evidence of his thinking on separatist lines. Our previous chapters have demonstrated that this was a commonplace opinion even in the nineteenth century, and can have no causal connection with a demand for the creation of a separate Muslim state. Nevertheless, it may help us to read Iqbal's mind if we look at these earlier expressions of his views. They may not lead us to a different interpretation of his Allahabad proposal, but they reflect Iqbal's general sentiment.

In the first decade of the twentieth century, the Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs of Amritsar had established a literary and learned organization called Minerva Lodge and issued a monthly journal *Minerva*. In March 1909, Munshi Ghulam Qadir Farrukh Amritsari invited Iqbal to the annual meeting of the Lodge to be held in April at Amritsar. In reply, Iqbal excused himself on the plea that the annual session of the Anjuman-i-Hamayat-i-Islam (a Punjabi Muslim philanthropic body of Lahore) was scheduled for the same time; and wrote that the Muslims of Amritsar did not think well of the Lodge. Farrukh wrote back, saying that undoubtedly the Hindus had joined the Lodge in much greater number than the Muslims, but all members practised brotherhood and equality, and that all efforts to bring in more Muslims into the society had failed. In reply to this letter, Iqbal wrote on 28 March 1909: "I, too, have been of the belief that distinction of religion should disappear from this country, and have till now practised it in private life. But now I think it is essential for both Hindus and Muslims to safeguard their national identity (*qawmi shakhsiiyyat*). Though the thought of creating a common nationhood (*mushtarik qawmiyyat*) in India is very beautiful, and has a poetic appeal, but in view of the present conditions and of the unconscious trends of the nations (*qawmon ki nadanista raftar*) appears to be impracticable."<sup>72</sup>

Much has been made of a contribution of Iqbal to the *Census Report of India* of 1911 entitled "Muslim Civilization". A short passage from it is to the effect: "To try to cover religion into [*sic*] a system of speculative knowledge is absolutely useless. The point that I have tried to bring out is that Islam has a far deeper

significance for us than merely religion. It has a national meaning for us. The idea of Islam is ultimately our Home or Country in which we live, move and have our being according to the tenets of Islam." After quoting this, one scholar comments that "these words are a proof of the fact that Allama Iqbal had presented a demand (*matalaba*) for a separate homeland for the Muslims of the sub-continent in as early as 1911". As "all the people agree that Iqbal had presented the demand for a separate homeland for the Muslims" in 1930 at Allahabad, "now I suggest to the intellectual circles that they should accept, as the source of the concept of the Pakistan of today, this article by Iqbal of 1911 in place of his 1930 Allahabad address".<sup>73</sup>

Iqbal's 1911 words are vague and do not lend themselves to such an interpretation. However, several persons came forward to accept the theory that the date of Iqbal's prophecy of a Pakistan should be pushed back to 1911. One of them claimed that this article was actually a lecture on the "Muslim Community" delivered by Iqbal at Aligarh in 1910. "I was a first year student there", he continued, "at that time we young students and other senior scholars and professors took it to mean that just as there could be no English nation without England so there could be no Muslim nation without a Muslim State. This was the general argument of the Muslim educated class at that time and Allama Iqbal had the courage to express it at the Aligarh meeting."<sup>74</sup> This may pass without comment.

In February 1912, Iqbal told a public meeting in Lahore that among the benefits accruing to India from the King Emperor's visit for the Delhi Durbar (at which the 1905 partition of Bengal was annulled, to much grief and anger of the Muslim community) would be that "the nations of India will merge together (*yahan ki qawmen baham mil jayengi*)".<sup>75</sup>

In March 1924, he wrote in a letter to Sayyid Sulaiman Nadawi, "The fact of the Muslims being sold to the Hindus is something intolerable. It is a pity that the Khilafatists have gone astray from their true path. They are leading us to a nationalism (*qawmiyyat*) which is not acceptable to any Musalman even for a single moment."<sup>76</sup>

However, in public he continued to express contrary views. In April 1926, he said that "I want it from my heart that Hindus and Muslims should remove their differences and live in the country like

brothers".<sup>77</sup> In January 1927, he told a public meeting in Lahore that "the concept of a united nationhood (*muthadda qawmiyyat*) is good for us. Though there will be difficulties in achieving this high goal, yet once we reach this high objective we will be very happy, and will not consider the effort as having been a waste. Therefore, O Hindus and Musalmans, you should cultivate each other in such a way that we can tolerate the existing differences".<sup>78</sup>

In May 1927, while speaking before a Punjab Provincial Muslim League meeting at Lahore, he declared: "I have the right to say that I was the first Indian to realize the importance and need of Hindu-Muslim unity, and it has ever been my wish (*arzu*) to see this unity take a permanent form."<sup>79</sup> In November, he entertained the hope that some practicable solution might be found if the spokesmen of the various Indian nations (*qawmen*, here a better translation would be "communities") could make another attempt to bring them together at one place (*markaz*).<sup>80</sup>

In January 1929, in Madras, he emphasized the "great need" for the unity of the "various communities", and felt that the Hindus and the Muslims ought to arrive at a compromise.<sup>81</sup> At the end of the year, in Lahore, he opined that "if provincial governments are autonomous (*amad*), that is, there is a federal government", there would be no risk to Muslim security even if only 25% seats were occupied by the Muslims.<sup>82</sup>

This survey of his pre-Allahabad opinions does not encourage us to believe that Iqbal upheld the two-nation theory, or wanted a separation between Muslims and Hindus, or looked forward to a dismembered India. On the other hand, he sounds anxious to bring the two communities together, to remove or weaken their differences, and to see a united India taking birth before his eyes.

There is one passage in Iqbal's "Reply to Questions raised by Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru" which throws some light on his concept of nation and its implications for the Indian communal problem. "It is obvious", he wrote, "that the Indian nationalist whose political idealism has practically killed his sense of fact, is intolerant of the birth or a desire for self-determination in the heart of the north-west Indian Islam. He thinks, wrongly in my opinion, that the only way to Indian nationalism lies in a total suppression of the cultural entities of the country through the interaction of which alone India can evolve a rich and enduring

culture. A nationalism achieved by such methods can mean nothing but mutual bitterness and even oppression."<sup>83</sup>

Two things about this statement are noticeable. It was written long after the Allahabad address. It does not say anything about separation or partition. On the contrary, it argues against a two-nation theory. The Hindu opposition to the birth of Muslim self-determination in north-west India is condemned, but at the same time the 1930 proposal, whatever Iqbal meant by it, is not recalled. Instead of separation, he is here concerned with the problem of producing a "rich and enduring" Indian culture out of the "interaction" of the several different cultures in existence in the country. This is quite in keeping with what he had said in 1930 about the harmonizing of the various communalisms of India into a national unity under which no single communalism would be the dominating factor. Instead of being an added proof of his separatist demand, this is a confirmation of his faith in one harmonious Indian whole embracing all local varieties and forces of communalism.

One minor piece of evidence has been produced which upholds the case of the Iqbal school, but unfortunately its original is said to have been lost, and more than one opinion is possible about its context. At some date in the last quarter of 1932, says Nazir Niazi, who was for several years quite close to Iqbal as one of his younger admirers, he (Niazi) wrote to Iqbal inquiring if a transfer of population would be required in case his ideal of a Muslim State were accepted. Only one line of Iqbal's reply is made available to us: "The suggestion for a transfer of population is not mine; it is Lala Lajpat Rai's."<sup>84</sup> Iqbal's reply may be construed to mean that he had advocated a separate state in 1930; though we must remember that the possibility of a transfer of population cannot be ruled out in relation to the creation of a large Muslim province in the north-west to which Muslims from other parts of India might wish to migrate. Iqbal's rejection of such a transfer does not sound consistent with his fundamental premiss that his aim was to save the Muslims from an un-Islamic environment so that they could realize in their society the ethical and social ideals of their religion. The Muslims of the north-west were only a minority of the total Indian Muslim population; and even if Iqbal had wanted a separate state, this could not have been of any help to a large majority of Indian Muslims. In fact, he made this left-out majority even greater

by recommending the exclusion of eastern Punjab from his north-western state.

We also learn from this letter that Iqbal was aware of Lala Lajpat Rai's suggestion for a clear partition, which had been made before his own Allahabad speech. Had he himself been urging a partition, is it not reasonable to expect that he would have referred to Lajpat Rai and other predecessors and drawn a distinction between his own proposal and theirs? By having failed to do so he encourages us to believe that he was not speaking about a partition at all.

There is only one definite statement of Iqbal which lends colour to the general theory about him. It has recently been discovered that in a speech delivered on 15 December 1932 in London, at a meeting called by the National League to enable foreign diplomats and members of the House of Lords and House of Commons to meet Iqbal, he said, "Four or five years ago as President of the All India Muslim League, I suggested as a possible solution the formation of a large West-Indian Muslim State. While this suggestion of mine was not embodied in the demands of the Muslims of India, my personal opinion still is that this is the only possible solution. I wait until experience reveals the wisdom or unwisdom of this suggestion."<sup>85</sup>

A careful perusal shows that this is not as clear as it seemed at first sight. Several points need clearing up. If Iqbal spoke these words in December 1932, and we are told he did, his conception of time must have been incredibly hazy. He said that he had spoken to the Muslim League session "four or five years ago", though this had happened exactly two years earlier. He was not delivering this speech 20 or 30 years after the Allahabad address. Long intervals weaken the memory, and one is apt to make a mistake of two or three years in recalling what happened so long ago. Iqbal was far from senile in 1932. And it was not something about whose date he could have been doubtful. His Allahabad address was among the greatest landmarks of his life, certainly the greatest in his political career; and yet we are invited to believe that the date of that year went clean out of his memory. With such a beginning one may be excused for looking at the rest with some scepticism.

Again, the "north-west", repeated a dozen times in the Allahabad address, has here become "West-Indian". This could have been careless phrasing, but it makes the connotation quite



different. In modern Indian history, politics, geography and administration, "West India" has a clearly-demarcated and universally-understood meaning; for example, Bombay is firmly included in this area, and West India logically excludes the north.

In considering the word "State" we come back to the foregoing discussion on the capital S and the small s. With so much confusion about and misquotation of an important written and printed address of which the original is available, it would be imprudent to rely on the spelling of the word in the report handed down to us in the above quotation, and to work out its implications on that assumption.

It is, however, significant that Iqbal did not use the word separate or independent in this speech, just as he had refrained from such expressions in 1930. At the same time he preferred "formation" to "creation". One forms a big area out of several small ones. One does not form an independent state; one creates it. The use of the adjective "large" is also noticeable. He wanted the formation of a large state, not of some small ones. When, later, Jinnah said he wanted Pakistan, he did not say he wanted a large Pakistan or a large Muslim state. The opposite of large is small, and Iqbal was stressing the point that he was in favour of amalgamating the several small Muslim provinces of the north-west into one large one—precisely what he had said at Allahabad.

For these reasons it seems unwise to accept the testimony of this speech as a proof of Iqbal's parentage of the idea of Pakistan. Editors of his writings and speeches have handled their material so carelessly that, apart from the internal contradictions of this speech to which I have pointed out above, we should wait for the discovery of the unimpeachable original text before accepting it as incontrovertible evidence. All canons of historical criticism cast doubt on the genuineness of the available text of this speech.

One habit characteristic of all students of Iqbal's politics is to make controversial assertions without supporting evidence and then to attack those who refuse to bow before their *obiter dicta*. Even the best scholars in this field are not above indulging in this practice. Here and there we come across a writer who cares to present a rational argument. Among this small circle is M.A. Khan whose replies to Iqbal's critics deserve attention. He picks out a few important "accusations" made against Iqbal's reasoning and phrasing and tries to answer them.

The first point to which he gives attention is the use of the word "autonomous" in the Allahabad address. Iqbal had said that he wanted an autonomous state, and his failure or refusal to employ terms like independent and sovereign conveys the impression that he was not arguing for a separate state but for a province in an Indian federation. To this Khan has two replies to make. One is that by "autonomous state" he meant dominion status, *i.e.*, autonomy within the British Commonwealth, not membership of the Indian federation. The argument has some plausibility. The concept of autonomy has been used in the constitutional law of the British Commonwealth in this sense, and for many years Canada and Australia were informally referred to as enjoying dominion autonomy or the status of autonomous members of the empire or commonwealth. To this extent the argument holds good. But two considerations dilute the strength of this interpretation. In the first place, in Indian political and constitutional vocabulary the use of the word "autonomy" or "autonomous" was confined to provincial autonomy or autonomous provinces. The terminology of the entire discussion on the making of the Indian federation bears this out. Some Muslim leaders, like Jinnah, had been asking for a federation since 1924 and urging fully autonomous provinces. Whenever the status of India *vis a vis* the British government was at issue the words used were independence, *swaraj*, freedom or dominion status. Hardly any Indian leader declared that he wanted an autonomous India or that he was fighting for Indian autonomy.

In the second place, if by "autonomous" Iqbal meant independent, what was there to stop him from spelling out the details of his demand? Independence was a radical idea in Indian politics, but then the Congress had owned it officially in January 1930 and Hasrat Mohani had been preaching it since 1921. Radicalism could have held no terror for Iqbal who gloried in breaking prescriptive idols. If, as his defenders claim, he was making a radical suggestion in his address, why did his courage to voice the unfashionable idea quail before clarifying the nature of his demand?

The second line of defence raised by Khan is that Iqbal was not interested in the constitutional niceties of a distinction between "complete independence" and "dominion status". "By using the phrase 'sovereign state' he could have gained the sympathy of the extremists in Indian politics but lost that of the moderates, and

further earned the wrath of the ruling class." This would not have been "a demonstration of political wisdom". He realized that his scheme was a novel one and would be unacceptable to Indian and British statesmen. This novelty, he feared, might lead to its rejection. Therefore he abstained from presenting it in words which would have led the Indian politicians and the Muslim leaders to ignore it and the British authorities to reject it out of hand.<sup>86</sup>

It is hardly a tribute to Iqbal to say that he was not interested in the constitutional distinction between independence and dominion status. It was not an academic nicety but a vital controversial issue, particularly since Hasrat Mohani's campaign for a demand for full independence, and more recently since the Congress's resolution on complete independence. Even apart from the passionate debate it aroused among politicians, the distinction had a meaning of its own. The argument of a choice between complete independence and membership of the Commonwealth (which was a British institution with the British Crown at its head, whatever the legal fiction) was a perfectly valid one. To dismiss it as a constitutional nicety is to run away from logic. Some may also find it a little strange that a poet who sang so lyrically of the primacy of the Ego and the vital, pulsating force of the faith of Islam was not averse to leading his people into a British Commonwealth, as if this were the noblest goal a Muslim society could pursue!

It is also no compliment to Iqbal to say that he did not express his real intentions for fear of alienating public opinion and offending the British overlords. Whatever he was in politics, he was not a coward. To make a suggestion in irritatingly vague words is not a mark of political wisdom. To fear the wrath of the imperial power so much as to conceal the true meaning of one's public pronouncement is to surrender self-respect to security. Khan's argument paints Iqbal as completely devoid of courage, and incapable of leading public opinion or countenancing imperial disfavour. Men before Iqbal—British, Hindu and Muslim—had demanded clearly a partition of India and a separate Muslim state. No public anger had descended upon them. No imperial frowns had darkened their fortunes. Why should Iqbal have been singled out for punishment or obloquy had he expressed his wishes without ambiguity? It is such defenders of Iqbal who, by their misplaced but well-intentioned enthusiasm, belittle him, and thus achieve the exact opposite of what they had set out to do.

Then Khan turns to Iqbal's support to AIMC's Delhi resolution, and the resulting incompatibility between this and his demand for a separate state. He solves the contradiction by answering like this. The Muslim Conference resolution had made a plea for a federation in which residuary powers would vest in the provinces. This was close to Iqbal's own conception, and his scheme was in fact only one step further from this resolution. It would not have been practical politics for him to reject a recommendation so near to his own ideal merely for the purpose of boosting his own leadership. Therefore he supported the Muslim Conference resolution as the leader of the Muslim League, and then offered his own scheme in his personal capacity.<sup>87</sup>

How can the concept of an Indian federation, irrespective of where the residuary powers lie, be so close to the scheme of a separate state that a believer in the latter could in conscience support the former in the same breath? There would have been nothing wrong in Iqbal's rejection of the Muslim Conference proposals if his thoughts had a different bent. Either he agreed with the Delhi resolution and therefore with the idea of an Indian federation, and so he would not have put forward his own scheme. Or, he had a solution of his own to give which was radically different from the Muslim Conference stand, and then he had no right to support the Conference's decision. It is meaningless to argue that rejecting the Delhi proposals would have amounted to "boosting his own leadership". If every politician lends his support to previous decisions of the community, without believing in them, in order to avoid the impression that he is self-seeking, the political world will disintegrate into chaos and people will lose all trust in the word of their leaders. To run with the hare and hunt with the hounds may bring a brief hour of pleasure, but soon nemesis catches up and the outcome is ignominy. Those who make the Iqbal of 1930 an originator of the idea of a separate state should remember this, and not burden him with an extra charge to be answered.

The next point dealt with by Khan relates to Iqbal's support of some of the recommendations of the Simon Commission. If he had finally rejected a federal solution for India and substituted it with a territorial and political partition, why did he welcome the Simon Commission's suggestions about a federal India? Khan's reply is this. Iqbal did this because the Commission had recommended

complete provincial autonomy and separate electorates, and these two items were very important in his eyes. Further, the Commission had recommended a re-distribution of provinces on religious, linguistic and cultural bases, and this was in consonance with Iqbal's own point of view. The Montagu-Chelmsford scheme had suggested a unitary India; the Nehru Report had also advocated a unitary system; only now the Simon Commission had proposed a federal plan. This was in Muslim interests, and therefore Iqbal called it "sound in principle".<sup>88</sup>

It is clear from this that Iqbal was not asking for separation. He wanted a federation to replace the unitary structure; the Simon Commission had proposed this; therefore, he supported the Commission's scheme. If a federal plan with full provincial autonomy, separate electorates and some re-arrangement of provincial boundaries was in Muslim interests and if Iqbal found it "sound in principle", what was the point in presenting his own scheme which made nonsense of a federal idea? The Commission's federal solution was either in Muslim interests or it was not. If it was, it should have been accepted by Iqbal. If it was not, he should have rejected it and suggested a new solution. But, according to Khan, he did both; something which even a man of Iqbal's great achievements was incapable of doing. Khan also forgets to mention two things. The re-distribution demanded by Iqbal was quite different from that recommended by the British inquiry report. Further, he rather exaggerates the fulness of the provincial autonomy envisaged by the Commission.

Finally, Khan takes up the interesting and important point of Iqbal's failure to present or rather repeat his 1930 scheme at the RTC. Here the defensive barrier is made of poor material: a hastily erected stockade rather than a solid rampart. We are told that "the occasion, the force of circumstances and the demands of discretion and statesmanship dictated that he should not have put this proposal at the Round Table Conference". His scheme could only be considered after the fundamental demands of the Muslims had been conceded. Otherwise it would have been putting the cart before the horse. His scheme was "the palace which was to be built on the foundations of the basic Muslim demands". "Without prior acceptance of these demands how could the building go up?" For Iqbal "to further his scheme at the Round Table Conference would certainly have amounted to an exhibition of egotism and

self-praise". By insisting on their demands Muslims had already alienated the Hindus. Now, at the Conference, they depended on the British for their fulfilment. They could not afford to alienate the British, and this is what Iqbal's campaign in favour of his scheme would have led to. The British would not have liked its Islamic tone and idealism, and might have looked at it as an attempt to revive the Mughal Empire.<sup>89</sup>

It needs no effort to pick holes in such a vulnerable argument. If it is statesmanship to present a scheme from a major platform and not to follow it up, then Khan is using a vocabulary different from ours. It is strange logic to argue that the scheme could only have been brought to the attention of the Conference after Muslim demands had been met. In other words, after a full and detailed federal plan had been decided, devised and drafted at the end of countless debates and much labour and time and after all the major Muslim demands had been met, Iqbal or some other Muslim spokesman should have stood up and addressed the Conference in some such words:

"Mr. Prime Minister, my right honourable friends and fellow delegates, I thank you, on behalf of my delegation, for the courtesy shown to us and the sympathy and readiness with which you have perceived the justice of our cause and the rightness of our demands. On behalf of the entire Muslim population of India, on behalf of all the 75 millions of us, I express my grateful thanks for the acceptance of all our major demands. You have given us full and complete provincial autonomy, thus making our provinces powerful entities. You have conceded us separate electorates, which will enable us to continue to send to the legislatures men and women of our own choice. You have separated Sind from the Bombay Presidency, thus saving the Sindhi's self-respect. You have raised the Frontier Province and Baluchistan to full provincial status, and in so doing removed a long-standing grievance of the proud and freedom-loving wardens of our marches. You have given us statutory majorities in the Punjab and Bengal which was our right by any democratic principle, but still we thank you for it. You have vouchsafed us one-third of all the seats in the federal assembly, and we hope this will add to the Muslim feeling of security. You have made provisions for adequate Muslim representation in all executive bodies at the centre and in the provinces with a view to giving us some voice in the running of the



country. You have also fixed a quota for us in the public services, and thus assured us that our backwardness in education, a very temporary disadvantage we hope, will not mean our exclusion from a share in the administration of the country. And you have, in your infinite wisdom, bestowed upon you by Divine grace, devised a federal system which we are sure will protect our interests, safeguard our future and enable us to make our contribution to the progress and advance of India. Now we see that all the hard labour, all the long hours and all the serious efforts which have gone into the making of this constitution were worth our while. We have produced a system which matches the eminence of this assembly in its quality and ingenuity. For all this we thank you."

"But the fact of the matter is that the Muslims do not want to live in India under any system. [*The members were stunned*]. We want a separate state for ourselves in the north-west where we can be our own masters. [*A hush overwhelmed the chamber*]. Gentlemen, you will, I am sure, recall that such a scheme was put forward some years ago from the platform of our great national organization, the All India Muslim League. We still stand by that scheme and, now, with your permission, Mr. Prime Minister, I am going to place it before this august assembly with the single statement, final and irrevocable, that this is our irreducible, minimum demand on which none among us here, and none in India, dare make compromises or listen to alternatives. [*Pandemonium in the conference hall*]."

Imagination boggles at the results of such a speech at the RTC. It would have made the Muslim delegates and all the parties they spoke for the laughing stock of the world. And yet this is what M.A. Khan thinks should have been done.

It also passes understanding how Iqbal's advocacy of his scheme at the Conference would have amounted to "an exhibition of egotism and self-praise". Was it egotism which impelled him to propound it in the first place at Allahabad? If it was, it did no harm to play the egotist once again in London. If it was not, it was his duty to carry his proposal to the Conference where the real decisions were being taken. And, if Iqbal was afraid of offending the British by repeating his suggestion in London, what had happened to this fear when he was presenting it in 1930? Was the fear now greater? Was it politically wise and morally correct to throw overboard his own scheme, to which he still pinned his faith,

simply because it was likely to estrange the British?

If this is the stuff of which the best arguments of Iqbal's myth-makers<sup>90</sup> are made, the others may be left to the reader's imagination or allowed to rest in oblivion. Their makers are truly fearless. No amount of contradictions weaken their resolve. They are not afraid of looking foolish. They acknowledge no principle of logic, no canon of reasoning. Iqbal supported the Muslim Conference resolution, and at the same time suggested something different. He praised the Simon Commission's recommendations, and in the same breath argued against the Commission's basic idea. He talked in detail of the kind of federalism suitable for India, and along with it demanded a division of the country. He made a revolutionary statement from a public platform without fear or favour, but was not prepared to repeat it lest the British be offended. He proposed a scheme from the Muslim League presidential chair and offered it to the nation as the only solution of the communal problem and went on believing in it, but he did not put it before the London gathering for fear of being seen as waving his own flag. These contradictions are no contradictions in the eyes of the believers. Faith, our elders used to say, dissolves all doubts. Apparently it still does that, for how else can we explain the force and longevity of a point of view which is alike impervious to facts, arguments and common sense. It hugs a certain image, a fancy, to its breast and will not allow its glory to be tarnished. Myth, they seem to say, is stronger than history. They may be right. Whether it may also be truer than history is a question they have never asked themselves.

Even the obvious is ignored by those bent upon presenting Iqbal as the harbinger of the later-day Pakistan. In spite of the fact that the "state" advocated by Iqbal was confined to the Muslim provinces of the north-west and he himself, in the address and in subsequent statements, always talked of the north-west or the west, some defenders of this myth insist that he had included Bengal in his calculations. Some years ago when this was denied by Z.A. Suleri, a Pakistani journalist, Dr. Khurshid sprang to his hero's defence with the astonishing claim that Bengal appears in Iqbal's plan as contained in the address, and the equally astonishing accusation that such baseless statements could only be due to a failure to read the text of the address. In his words, "The statement of Suleri sahib that Bengal did not figure in Allama

Iqbal's plan is incorrect. Though this is not really the fault of Suleri sahib. It is a pity that like Rousseau's famous work, *The Social Contract*, which every one mentions but none studies, people usually do not read the Allahabad address, and even if they do, they do not read it carefully". Interpreting the address as a demand 'for a "separate Islamic state", he made this clarification about Bengal: "Allama Iqbal's proposal covered the whole of India. He gave the designation of 'states' to the 'provinces' and made each state autonomous (*Khud-mukhtar*). As Muslims were already a majority in Bengal, it had to become a state."<sup>91</sup> It is enough to refer the reader to the relevant passage in the address and let him decide if Bengal can be included in the plan without doing gross violence to Iqbal's actual words.<sup>92</sup>

The same author has also solved the problem of Iqbal's failure to follow up his scheme in the years following the Allahabad address. "There is something called an objective or goal", he tells us, "and there is another thing which we call the means through which that objective is achieved. The means include political games (*dao paych*) which imply the making of compromises on the principle of give-and-take. Allama Iqbal's objective was the one he expressed in the Allahabad address, but when he realized that he did not have the sympathy and support of prominent Muslim leaders, he decided to co-operate with them on the minimum programme on which there was common agreement, and this was Mr. Jinnah's fourteen points. . . . These points were really of fundamental importance for the success of the Pakistan movement. Therefore, what was the harm in Hazrat Allama's acceptance of the establishment, on the basis of these points, of a weak central government, as a temporary political expedient?"<sup>93</sup>

We must admit that this explanation is consistent with Iqbal's attitude in the early and mid 'thirties and his pronouncements at the RTC. It is also plausible provided that the first premiss is granted, viz., that he was in fact demanding a separate state in 1930. He had announced his proposal from the highest platform available to him, but had discovered immediately that he had no support among his colleagues. A similar realization came to him when he found his *confreres* at the London conference indifferent or perhaps even hostile. Therefore he never repeated his Allahabad suggestion and went along with the general trend of Muslim political thinking; but in his heart he did not give up the old idea of

separation, which remained his ideal.

It may have been so, but the argument goes astray where it shows Iqbal accepting a "weak" central government for India. The 1935 constitution which emerged out of the long labours of the Simon Commission, the RTC and the Joint Select Committee, did not establish a weak centre. The federal system as finally devised was a "close" one, not a loose one, and no talk of provincial autonomy could disguise the fact that the federal centre had been armed with powerful opportunities of interfering in provincial affairs, determining the content of the concurrent list, controlling provincial finance, governing the conduct of senior civil servants posted in the provinces, intervening in provincial administration in the name of statutory safeguards, and in other ways making provincial independence a mere legal fiction. It was a stroke of good fortune for the Muslims that the federal part of the constitution did not come into operation, otherwise the story of the Congress-ruled provinces in 1937-39 would have reproduced itself all over India, and the Muslims of the Muslim-majority areas would not have escaped the Congress whip.

The conclusion to be drawn is that Iqbal's acquiescence in the new constitution cut at the root of all his major principles enunciated at Allahabad. If he was demanding a separate state, of course the new Act took no notice of it. If he was arguing for such a re-distribution of provinces as would secure Muslim interests and bring into existence a large north-western unit, his wishes were once again ignored. The separation of Sind from Bombay was the only concession to Iqbal made by the new arrangement; but this demand had been voiced by many Muslims, and some Hindus, for several years. It was a far cry from the territorial solution urged by Iqbal.

### The Upper India Muslim Conference Proposal

Some attention has been paid to Iqbal's plans to organize a separate political party for the north-west Muslims, and it has been suggested that his Allahabad address was in fact a child of these plans. It is therefore relevant, and may be profitable, to examine this project in some detail and to find out if the exercise throws any fresh light on Iqbal's mind and widens our understanding of the problem we are studying. The account which follows has much

interest for us, though it must be pointed out that the whole of it is based on information derived from one major source<sup>94</sup> and one editorial annotation.<sup>95</sup>

Towards the end of 1930 Iqbal saw the course of Muslim politics darkened with clouds of uncertainty. On the one hand, the Hindus were in no mood to concede any Muslim demand, however reasonable it was. On the other, the Government of India was expressing views which compromised all those major recommendations of the Simon Report which had held out some hope for the Muslims. On top of that, Muslim delegates to the first RTC "committed a political blunder in watering down the Muslim demands and even accepting [a] joint electorate that killed all chances of Muslims securing majorities in [the] Punjab and Bengal". In these circumstances Iqbal came to believe that the Muslims of the north-western areas should try to solve their problem by themselves without leaving their destiny in the hands of others. This belief was strengthened by a feeling that these areas posed certain problems which were peculiar to them, and which the Muslims of other parts of India could not understand. In fact, in his opinion the rest of Muslim India was not at all interested in these issues. In short, "Iqbal realized that the peculiar problems of the Muslims in the North-West could only be understood by the people belonging to this region and that in order to survive they would have to chalk out their own line of action."<sup>96</sup>

He opened the campaign in November 1930. In those days Lahore had three daily newspapers with "separatist ideas": *The Muslim Outlook* in English, and *Inqilab* and *Siyasat* in Urdu. The editors of all the three were intimately known to Iqbal. Long private conversations were held on the subject, and finally, under Iqbal's inspiration, *Inqilab* wrote a leader on 21 November underlining the necessity of convening a conference of the Muslims of northern India to discuss the problems and difficulties of the region. The last paragraph of the editorial ran: "The need for a Conference of the Muslims of Northern India was felt since long. However, recent events have made it absolutely necessary. As long as [the] Centre's hold on the provinces is not weakened, constitutional reforms are not introduced in Sind, the NWFP, and Baluchistan, and Muslim majority is not secured in the Punjab through [a] separate electorate, the political existence of the Muslims of Northern India will remain in jeopardy. No doubt, it is

the crying need of the hour that Muslims of this region rise to the occasion and decide what practical steps are necessary in order to safeguard their rights in the Punjab, Sind, the NWFP, and Baluchistan. If they remain inert at this critical moment, they will be sorry for ever."<sup>97</sup> Iqbal supported this proposal in an interview with *The Muslim Outlook*, which was published in translation in the *Inqilab* of 23 November.<sup>98</sup>

This new call to action was given a period of two days to sink into the Muslim mind. Then on 23 November Iqbal called a meeting of the leading Muslim citizens of Lahore in the Barkat Ali Islamia Hall. The assembly included Dr. Khalifa Shujaiddin, Sayyid Muhsin Shah, Sardar Habibullah, Sayyid Maratab Ali, Nawab Saadat Ali Khan, Ghulam Muhayyuddin Qasuri, Haji Mir Shamsuddin, Mian Ferozuddin Ahmad, Majid Malik (editor, *The Muslim Outlook*), Ghulam Rasul Mehr and Abdul Majid Salik (editors of *Inqilab*), Sayyid Habib Shah (editor of *Siyasat*), Muhammad Ali (leader of the Lahori branch of the Ahmadiyya community), Dr. Muhammad Sharif, Mian Haq Nawaz, Mawlavi Fazluddin, Malik Muhammad Din, Fazal Karim, Mahbub Elahi, and Khan Bahadur Mir Azizuddin.<sup>99</sup> As the idea was Iqbal's own he chose to preside over the gathering. In the inaugural address he outlined the aims and objects of the projected conference. The meeting decided unanimously to invite to the conference all Muslim members of the provincial legislative assemblies, municipal committees and district boards of the four Muslim provinces of the north-west, delegates from various Muslim organizations, and other leading men of the region. The meeting was then converted into a reception committee for the proposed conference. Majid Malik and Saadat Ali Khan were appointed its secretary and financial secretary, respectively.<sup>100</sup>

Two important questions were raised and quickly disposed of by the meeting. First, it was asked if the Muslims of northern India had no sympathy with their co-religionists in the rest of India. The *Inqilab*, acting as Iqbal's mouthpiece, answered this a few days later. Separate regional consultations were necessary because all opposition was directed at undermining Muslim rights in the Muslim majority provinces, while the weightage given to the Muslims in the minority provinces had hardly ever been challenged by the Hindus, the Government of India or the Simon Commission. The second question arose out of this line of thinking. If the



problems of the Muslims of Bengal were similar to those of the Muslims of the north-west, was it right to exclude Bengal from the proposed conference? The answer given was that the decision to exclude Bengal merely took notice of the long distance involved. But the Muslims of Bengal were assured of full help and support in case they chose to hold a similar conference of their own.<sup>101</sup>

Some more decisions were taken on 4 December when the reception committee met at Iqbal's residence. Sayyid Afzaal Ali Hasni, an influential citizen of Lahore, was allowed to join the committee. Sayyid Habib was appointed co-secretary to work with Majid Malik. A name was given to the proposed conference: the Upper India Muslim Conference. Organizational efforts were strengthened and speeded up by opening a proper office and appointing a small staff. Abdullah Haroon of Sind had joined the sponsors of the conference and was busy in mobilizing public opinion in Sind in favour of the proposed deliberations.<sup>102</sup> It was decided to postpone the plenary session of the conference from December 1930 to January 1931, as Iqbal was to go to Allahabad in December.<sup>103</sup>

The task of publicizing the aims and objects of the conference was then taken in hand. On 14 December the *Inqilab* appeared with a double-column box on the front page carrying an appeal to the Muslims for their full co-operation in holding the conference. The first two lines of the poster-box announced: PUNJAB, SIND, NWFP AND BALUCHISTAN ARE A MUSLIM COUNTRY.<sup>104</sup> KEEP THE BANNER OF ISLAM ALOFT IN THEM. The box appeared several times at short intervals during the following few months.<sup>105</sup> On 16 December, Iqbal and other members of the reception committee issued an appeal — some leading figures of these provinces, summarizing the objects for the achievement of which the conference was being convened.<sup>106</sup>

At the end of December Iqbal went away to Allahabad to speak of the ideal of a north-west Muslim India. On his return to Lahore he persisted in his idea of holding the conference. The reception committee continued to meet, more often at his home, till about the end of March 1931. Then all the plans disappeared and nothing more was heard of the conference.

This account differs materially from two other versions available to us. But before looking at them one small point may be mentioned. In the foregoing account Khurshid says that the idea of the

conference occurred to Iqbal towards the end of 1930. In another place, however, he tells us that "the idea of an Upper India Muslim Conference was revived" at this time.<sup>107</sup> But this is a small point and need not detain us.

What gives an entirely new complexion to the conference project is a statement made by Khurshid's father, Abdul Majid Salik, who was *Inqilab's* editor and one of the foremost sponsors of the plan. He recalls in his autobiography that the scheme for holding such a conference was inspired by "the thought of fortifying the stand of the Muslim delegates to the Round Table Conference".<sup>108</sup> This contradicts his son's contention, apparently based on the information published in the *Inqilab*, that the conference, far from providing support to the Muslim delegates, was in fact meant to make amends for their alleged mishandling of the Muslim issue in London.

Another contemporary report presents still another picture. According to Nazir Niazi, who at this time was either meeting Iqbal or receiving letters from him, it was after Iqbal's return from the Allahabad session that the scheme of holding this conference was prepared (he gives it the name of "Upper India Conference", dropping "Muslim" out of it; a significant alteration, unless his memory is at fault). Iqbal in fact began to write the inaugural address for it, but it was never held. However, he did not give up all hope because in October 1932 he told Niazi, "Wait and you will see what I want to say".<sup>109</sup> Nothing, however, was said by Iqbal or anyone else, and the idea of a northern regional conference disappeared from history.

It would be wrong not to realize the importance of this conference project in the evolution of Iqbal's thinking. It is a pity that we possess so scanty information on the subject. Obviously the idea could not have appeared out of nothingness in November 1930. Iqbal must have been thinking about the problem of the north-west at least for some time before this date. He might have mentioned it to his friends in conversation or written to them about it. But there is no record of this, and it becomes difficult to examine an idea whose origins and antecedents are so imperfectly known.

In whatever way the idea emerged in Iqbal's mind, its connection with his Allahabad proposal is clear. He had reduced the essence of the Indian Muslim problem to the future position of

the Muslims in the north-west, and had concentrated his attention on finding a solution to it. The rest of Muslim India could be left to fend for itself. Probably Iqbal realized that no territorial re-grouping, no transfer of population, no political expedient and no constitutional innovation could save the millions of Muslims scattered in uneven numbers throughout Hindu India. The search of a solution which would embrace all of them and save Indian Islam from being overwhelmed by Hinduism was a waste of time and effort. It was prudent and practical to cut the losses and save what could be saved. Therefore he narrowed down his interest to the north-west.

Here was a compact, contiguous and relatively homogeneous area where Muslims were in a comfortable majority. If some way could be discovered of ensuring a genuine autonomy for this region, a degree of Muslim self-rule could be won. As the area was split artificially into four administrative divisions, some of them being too small and weak for autonomy, he suggested their amalgamation into one large province, whose resources, size and population would be sufficient guarantee of its ability to exercise adequate powers. With such an extensive and strong Muslim province situated on the strategic periphery, a good part of the Muslims of India would be able to look the central government in the eye and to refuse to be cowed down by the perpetual Hindu majority in the federation as a whole.

This seems to have been the background to his Allahabad proposal. It was a commendable idea, though it was less far-reaching than some other proposals which cut off the north-west from the Indian body because they saw no hope in a co-operative federation. Iqbal was not prepared to go to that extent. He still believed that a united India was not only possible but also desirable. He wanted to keep India as a Hindu-Muslim entity with his principle of "internal harmony". Within the possibilities of such a solution his ideal of a Muslim north-western unit in the Indian federation salvaged at least a part of Islam. Short of separation, it was perhaps the best method of protecting Muslim interests within an Indian federation. In this respect and to this extent it may be said to foresee Pakistan; for if the experiment failed and even this large Muslim province could not in practice hold itself against the ambitions of the Hindu centre, then nothing remained except separation. Such a possibility, or rather eventuality, might have

occurred to Iqbal in the course of his cogitations, but for reasons unknown to us he did not express it.

Seen in this light the exclusion of Bengal from his calculations ceases to wear an odd look. At first sight it seems strange that Bengal, with its largest mass of Muslim population in the sub-continent, does not figure in his scheme. One who set out with the express purpose of creating a "Muslim India within India" could ignore Bengal only at the cost of making his ideal look silly. But to regard his plan in this way is to misunderstand him. We must remember his terms of reference and clearly see the limits within which his ingenuity was forced to seek a solution.

An all-India federation was coming and escape from it was impossible. The problem was to find a way of protecting Muslim interests within this federation. It was clear, painfully but absolutely, that no expedient, however inventive, could save the entire Muslim population. It had to be an attempt to save as much as was possible. Fortunately the north-west presented one sizeable unit with a Muslim majority whose autonomy could be demanded with justification and worked with success. Hence Iqbal's scheme for a north-western province embracing the Punjab, NWFP, Sind and Baluchistan. There was no need to make any specific reference to Bengal. Bengal was a Muslim majority province, and that it would remain when the federation came. In fact, if Iqbal's scheme was followed, the federation would contain two huge provinces at the two ends of India, both with Muslim majorities. In this way a sort of a balance of power would be created within the federation between Hindu and Muslim provinces.

It must be emphasized, however, that this interpretation of Iqbal's scheme fits in only if we take him as an advocate of an Indian federation with strong Muslim units as its component members. Those who believe that he was, on the other hand, demanding separation and urging the creation of an independent Muslim state in the north-west, have to think of an answer to the charge that, in that case, by excluding Bengal he was leaving a large majority of Indian Muslims to their own fate.

Coming back to the plans for an Upper India Muslim Conference, from the list of its sponsors it seems to have been a purely Punjabi idea. The reception committee was entirely Punjabi in composition, the newspapers which supported and propagated the project were also Punjabi, and we have no information about

the reaction of other provinces in the north-west. Who were the persons in the NWFP and Sind who were contacted, and what was their attitude? Were any such contacts made at all? Similarly, how did the Muslim League and the Muslim Conference view this proposal? One would also like to know the exact date of Iqbal's election as president of the Muslim League. Did it come before he began to speak of his own regional conference, or after? When the Muslim League chose him as its leader, did it know that he was campaigning for the establishment of another party which was bound to weaken and, in some ways, oppose the Muslim League itself? These are interesting questions which, if and when answered, would throw more light on several dark corners of the history of this period.

The mystery of this would-have-been conference is further deepened by the silence and suddenness with which it vanishes from history. The preparations for it were begun with much *eclat*. Important people got together to bless it. The finest Muslim newspapers of the north-west came out in support of it. A man of Iqbal's reputation and stature stood firmly behind it. And then, some time in March or April 1931, the whole idea was dropped. By whom? We don't know. Why? We don't know. Khurshid, who has read the relevant newspapers, is silent. His father, who was there in the thick of things, does not tell us. (In fact, he encourages all kinds of doubts about the conference by presenting a picture of it in which Iqbal has no place). Once again, as so often in this book, we are reduced to speculation.

As it was Iqbal's idea, we must turn to him in our search for the reasons. We know that the reception committee met several times in January, February and March 1931. It was about March, then, that the idea was dropped. What could have happened in this period to make Iqbal change his mind?

One reason may have been the lack of support from other north-western provinces. The Punjab alone could not have staged the conference, though it had the resources to do so. That would have been against the whole idea of gathering the four provinces under one umbrella. Apart from Abdullah Haroon of Sind we hear of none else coming forward to help Iqbal. This must have been a bitter disappointment to the sponsors; but they were all men of public affairs, and would have realized that it was better not to hold a conference at all than to hold a weak and ineffective one.

An even stronger reason must have been the indifference meted out to Iqbal's Allahabad proposal. His scheme as presented at the Muslim League session was a preview of what the projected conference was scheduled to preach. Quite naturally Iqbal saw the Allahabad session as a rehearsal of his own coming conference. And as a rehearsal it was an irredeemable failure. The stony silence which met his proposal, in the Muslim League, in Muslim press, among Muslim leadership and in Muslim public, must have convinced him that his programme, which was to be the *raison d'être* of the conference, had no chance of winning public approval. After this realization there was no point in holding the conference. This also explains why he never repeated his Allahabad scheme in later years.

It is clear that Iqbal's ideas about the future differed from those of other Muslim leaders, and specially from those of the Muslim delegates to the RTC. The opposition of Muslim leaders from the rest of India was to be expected, and Iqbal or anyone else could not do much about it. Yet, he might have persisted if he had the support of the Muslim leaders from the north-west. The foremost spokesman from the region was Sir Muhammad Shafi. Shafi was a powerful man with a long political experience, impressive connections and wide influence in the Punjab and outside. At the RTC he was playing a very important role, and was to do so again in the following sessions. If Iqbal wanted to hold his conference he had to range his forces against Shafi's. This, as everybody knew, was beyond his power. Shafi was too powerful to be beaten in a straight fight, too astute a politician to be won over by political bargaining, and too set in his opinions to be persuaded to change course. He also enjoyed much popular backing which was denied to Iqbal, particularly after the Allahabad session. Shafi was a recognized Muslim spokesman of all-India level, who had been negotiating with the Hindus and the British for several years and who had demonstrated both skill and courage in 1927 by splitting the Muslim League and holding his own session in Lahore in the teeth of Jinnah's opposition. Iqbal lacked this status. The holding of the conference would have meant an imminent clash with a set of established and recognized forces against which Iqbal could only muster his own reputation (as a poet and a philosopher, *not* as a politician) and the support of his own circle. Another powerful politician in the Punjab was Sir Fazli Husain—so powerful that Muslim delegates to the RTC were appointed after his consent had



been given—and his views too were opposed to Iqbal's. Thus, the outcome of a confrontation between Iqbal and other Muslim leaders would have brought no laurels to Iqbal and no unity to Indian Islam.

The holding of the abortive conference would have been only the first step in a fight for the recognition of a separate identity for the north-west. It would not have been enough to meet in a conference, pass a few resolutions and disperse. The conference would mean the establishment of a new party to uphold a new cause. In other words, Iqbal would have to establish, mould and strengthen a new Muslim political organization which would be nothing if not a rival of the Muslim League and the Muslim Conference. It is easy to see how impossibly difficult a task this was. The League was an established organization, the oldest in India, with a definite public image, and wide support throughout the country. Its organization needed much improvement, and in recent years it had fallen a prey to factionalism and internal indiscipline. Yet it was a recognized national party with its own history and prestige. The All India Muslim Conference was a young body, but it gained in unity and power what it lost in freshness. It had such a wide base of support that nearly every respectable Muslim group was represented in it. To oppose two such organizations needed resources of manpower, money and effort which Iqbal and his Punjabi group could not muster at this or any other time. Moreover, a party established for the express purpose of winning a special position for a certain area would never have the power, prestige and status of an all-India organization. No matter how Iqbal looked at the proposition, he must have been assailed by serious doubts and misgivings. In the end he gave up the entire plan as impracticable and futile.

It is reported that in 1936 Iqbal once again revived the idea of such a conference, and again nothing came out of it. This time it is easier to see the reasons for its failure. Jinnah was back in India and was busy in pulling the Muslim League out of the doldrums in which years of neglect and lack of good leadership had left it. He was building an all-India platform from where the Muslim could fight the Hindu on an equal footing. He had not yet begun to give any thought to separation and envisaged an all-India struggle within the new federation. In this he needed the support of every individual, every group and every province. How could he counte-

nance even the thought of a separate political party upholding a regional cause? He would not have found it difficult to convince Iqbal that his scheme for a north-west conference would be a disaster for the Indian Muslims in so far as it would weaken the only political party they had, the Muslim League, break the unity of the Indian Muslim nation, and leave the Bengali Muslim utterly exposed and unprotected. It is quite possible that it was from here that Iqbal went on to think afresh about the future and was led to write his 1937 letters to Jinnah. But of that more later.

## NOTES

1. I have found only two such references in this period, both of 1939. The Raja of Mahmudabad, a leading Muslim Leaguer, misquoted the relevant portion of Iqbal's address and then declared that "that is in a nutshell the 'Pakistan' Movement. . . the central idea is the formation of a single Muslim state or, if you prefer to use the constitutional phraseology, a separate federation of autonomous Muslim provinces" (Presidential Address, Provincial Muslim League Political Conference, Delhi, TSI, 5 May 1939). Sir Abdul Qadir, a former president of the AIML, thought the same (see his article in *Great Men of India*, ed by L.F. Rushbrook Williams, Bombay, 1939, pp. 563-571; repeated in his *Iqbal: The Great Poet of Islam*, Lahore, 1975 rep, p. 43).
2. I.H. Qureshi, "Pakistan: An Ideal or Practical Politics?", *TET*, 9 August 1940, reproduced in full in *India's Problem of Her Future Constitution*, Bombay, n.d., pp. 103-104.
3. A Punjabi, *Pakistan: The Critics' Case Examined*, Lahore, 1941, p. 7.
4. M.R.T., *Pakistan and Muslim India*, Bombay, 2nd ed 1946, p. 14.
5. Iftikhar-ul-Haq, *Pakistan and Constituent Assembly*, Lahore, 1946, p. 78.
6. S. Hyder, *Progress of Pakistan*, Lahore, June 1947, pp. 24, 35.
7. Shamloo, *Speeches and Statements of Iqbal*, Lahore, 1945, 2nd ed 1948, Introduction, p. vii.
8. M.A. Khan, *Iqbal ka Syasi Karnamah*, Karachi, 1952, pp. 125-126. Muhammad Ahmad Khan was a former chief justice of Bhopal, who migrated to Karachi in about 1950 and died there (Sahba Lakhnawi, *Iqbal awr Bhopal*, Karachi, 1973, p. 274).
9. *Ibid.*, p. 463.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 476.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 456. The address has absolutely nothing on this migration. The author infers this from two Urdu verses of Iqbal, which are not to be found in the address.
12. Abdullah Anwar Beg, *The Poet of the East*, Lahore, 2nd ed 1956, p. 262.

13. Syed Hassan Mahmud, *A Nation is Born*, n.p.p., 1958, pp. 413, 528, 532.
14. Rais Ahmad Jafri, *Iqbal awr Syasat-i-Milli*, Karachi, n.d., pp. 221, 234.
15. A.S.M. Abdur Rab, *A.K. Fazlul Huq*, Lahore, n.d., p. 100.
16. G. Allana, *Quaid-i-Azam Jinnah: The Story of a Nation*, Karachi, 1967, pp. 216, 299.
17. K. Abdur Rahim, in *Iqbal: The Poet of Tomorrow*, ed by himself, Lahore, n.d., p. iii.
18. S. Mahboob Murshid, "The Pebbled Shore", in *ibid.*, p. 142.
19. Javid Iqbal (ed), *Stray Reflections: A Note-Book of Allama Iqbal*, Lahore, 1961, Introduction, p. xxi.
20. Javid Iqbal, "Introduction to the Study of Iqbal", in K. Abdur Rahim, *op. cit.*, p. 16.
21. I.H. Qureshi, in editorial note on selections from Iqbal, in W. Theodore do Bary (ed), *Sources of Indian Tradition*, New York, 1958, 2-vol ed 1964, Vol II, p. 199. It is not quite clear from the editor's note on p. vii if Qureshi did write this editorial note; most probably he did.
22. *Ibid.*, Vol II, p. 275. Qureshi's editorial note.
23. I.H. Qureshi, *The Muslim Community*, The Hague, 1962, p. 297. In the "Select Chronology" at the end of the book he says, "Iqbal's address advocated a separate Muslim state", p. 306.
24. Aziz Ahmad, "Influence de la litterature francaise sur la litterature ourdoue", *Orient*, no. 11 (1959), p. 132.
25. Aziz Ahmad, "Sayyid Ahmad Khan, Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and Muslim India", *Studia Islamica*, 1960 vol, p. 77.
26. Aziz Ahmad, "Iqbal et la theorie du Pakistan", *Orient*, no. 17 (1961), p. 86.
27. Aziz Ahmad, *Islamic Modernism in India and Pakistan, 1857-1964*, London, 1967, pp. 160, 162.
28. Aziz Ahmad, "L'Islam et la democratie dans le sous-continent Indo-Pakistanaï", *Orient*, nos. 51-52 (1969), p. 11. The same claims are made by him in his "India", in Joseph Schacht and C.E. Bosworth (eds), *The Legacy of Islam*, Oxford, 1974, p. 140, and Aziz Ahmad and E. von Grunbaum (eds), *Muslim Self-Statement in India and Pakistan, 1857-1968*, Wiesbaden, 1970, pp. 15, 130.
29. S.A. Vahid, "Allama Iqbal", in *A History of Freedom*

- Movement*, Karachi, Vol. III, Part II, 1963, p. 506.
30. *Ibid.*, pp. 532–533.
  31. S.A. Vahid, *Studies in Iqbal*, Lahore, 1967, p. 281.
  32. *Ibid.*, p. 300.
  33. *Ibid.*, p. 301. See also, for similar views, his "Iqbal awr Bina-i-Pakistan", *Mah-i-Naw*, April 1954, p. 10, again printed in the issue of September 1977, pp. 334, 336–337; *Glimpses of Iqbal*, Karachi, n.d., pp. 138, 163; and other works.
  34. Abdul Hamid, *Muslim Separatism in India*, London, 1967, p. 205.
  35. G.W. Choudhury, *Pakistan's Relations with India, 1947-1966*, London, 1968, pp. 5, 18; see also his "The Quaid-i-Azam: Founder of Pakistan", *Pakistan News Digest*, 15 September 1970, p. 6.
  36. L.F. Rushbrook Williams, *The State of Pakistan*, London, 1962, p. 21.
  37. Prof. Williams was repeating a normal English error. *The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English* (4th ed and 5th ed) gives as one of the meanings of the word Pakistan "Moslem autonomy".
  38. Ian Stephens, *Pakistan*, London, 1963, p. 75.
  39. T.G.P. Spear, *A History of India: Volume Two*, Harmondsworth, 1965, p. 27.
  40. T.G.P. Spear, *The Oxford History of Modern India*, Oxford, 1965, p. 363.
  41. Robert D. Campbell, *Pakistan: Emerging Democracy*, Princeton, 1963, p. 13. Two further misstatements occur on the same page: that Iqbal taught at Cambridge, and that he was president of the Muslim League in 1926 and 1930.
  42. D.N. Wilber, *Pakistan: Yesterday and Today*, New York, 1964, p. 103.
  43. D.N. Wilber, *Pakistan: Its People, Its Society, Its Culture*, New York, 1964, p. 21.
  44. Pakistan History Board, *A Short History of Hind-Pakistan*, Karachi, 1955, p. 434. This is by no means the only weakness of this text book.
  45. Rafiq M. Khan and Herbert S. Stark, *Young Pakistan*, London, 1951, p. 225.
  46. Anwar Enayatullah, *Story of Jinnah*, Karachi, n.d., pp. 35-36.

47. *Ibid.*, pp. 38-39.
48. Zainab Ghulam Abbas, *Story of Pakistan*, Karachi, 1964, p. 22; also *Tahrik-i-Pakistan*, Islamabad, n.d. (? 1982), p. 15, and Ashfaq Ahmad, *Mera Watan, Mera Pakistan*, Islamabad, n.d. (? 1982), p. 39, both government publications.
49. Safdar Mahmood and Javaid Zafar, *Founders of Pakistan*, Lahore, 1968, pp. 172-173.
50. As a representative selection showing the quality and attitude of this work see the following unpublished M.A. dissertations submitted at the University of the Punjab (the country's oldest and most respected seat of higher learning): Fakhrunnissa, Contribution of Iqbal towards the Creation of Pakistan, 1958; Syed Abdul Majid, 1958; M. Qadeer Malik, 1958; and Ghulam Haider, 1959—all carry exactly the same title. The deadening uniformity of the titles is a fair indication of the scope of their imagination and the capacity of their interpreting power. None quotes the address from the original text.
51. A complete list of writings which follow the conformist opinion will make a slim volume. To show the variety of their origins and the tenacity of their purpose I give below a selection (exclusive of the items cited in my text) arranged in some order:  
Trained scholars of Pakistan: Muhammad Baqir, "The Pakistan Movement—In Retrospect", *TPT*, 23 March 1961; Sharif al Mujahid, *The Poet of the East: The Story of Muhammad Iqbal*, Lahore, 1961, p. 31; A.S. Khurshid, "Immediate Reactions to Iqbal's Allahabad Address", *TPT*, 21 April 1963; A.S. Khurshid, "Pakistan ka Bani Kawn?", *Mashriq*, 1 April 1964; A.S. Khurshid, "Iqbal: aik Mustaqbil Shanas Siyasatdan", *Naqush*, January 1966, p. 148, where he asserts that "it is a fact that Iqbal was the first person in India to present, from the platform of an all-India political party, the concept of a separate State constituted of the Muslim-majority areas of the sub-continent" (two serious errors in three lines); K. Ali, *A New History of Indo-Pakistan since the British Rule*, Dacca, rev enl ed 1968, p. 284 (a university text book); Muhammad Baqir, "Taqqir-i-Umam", in Aslam Malik (ed), *Mataleat-i-Iqbal*, Sialkot, 1969, p. 29; Saleem M.M. Qureshi, *Jinnah and the Making of a Nation*, Karachi,



1969, p. 60; Saleem M.M. Qureshi, "Pakistani Nationalism Reconsidered", *Pacific Affairs*, Winter 1972-73, p. 557; Shafique Ali Khan, *Two Nation Theory*, Hyderabad Sind, 1973, pp. 613, 623; Safdar Mahmood, *Matalea-i-Pakistan*, Lahore, 1973, pp. 67, 81; Khwaja A. Haye, *First Steps in Our History*, Lahore, 19th rep, 1973, p. 225 (a popular text book); Abdur Rauf, *Islamic Culture in India and Pakistan*, Lahore, 1975, p. 56; Muhammad Usman, *Hayat-i-Iqbal ka ek Jazbat-i-Dawr*, Lahore, 1975, p. 178; M. Moizuddin (Director, Iqbal Academy), "Iqbal and the Quaid-i-Azam: The Seer and the Realist", *Papers Presented at the International Congress on Quaid-Azam, 19-25 December 1976*, Islamabad, 1976 (mimeo), Vol II, pp. 112-113; Shaikh Imtiaz Ali (Vice-Chancellor, University of the Punjab), *Address of Welcome: Quaid-i-Azam Seminar*, Lahore, 23 March 1976, p. 4; A.S. Khurshid, *Quaid-i-Azam awr Pakistan*, Islamabad, 1976, pp. 4, 7; Hamid Ahmad Khan, *Father of Our Nation: Early Life History*, Islamabad, 1976, p. 7; Fateh Muhammad Malik, "Iqbal's Concept of Pakistan", *TPT*, 9 November 1977; Muhammad Sadruddin, "Allama Iqbal awr Tasawwar-i-Pakistan", *NW*, 7 November 1977; M. Moizuddin, "Allama Iqbal awr Tasawwar-i-Pakistan", *Jang*, 11 November 1977; Abdul Qayyum and S.R. Wasti, "Struggle for Independence", in Hamid Jalal (ed), *Pakistan*, London, 1977, p. 113.

Popular writers of Pakistan: Farid S. Jafri, "Muhammad Iqbal (1873-1938): The Man Who Conceived Pakistan", *Islamic Review*, April 1949, pp. 8-13; Farid S. Jafri, "The Man Who Conceived Pakistan: Muhammad Iqbal", *CMG*, 21 April 1951; Mumtaz Hasan, "Iqbal: Architect of Pakistan", *Evening Times*, 21 April 1952; K.A. Waheed, "Pakistan: The Realization of Iqbal's Dream", *Pakistan Calling*, Vol VI, no. 8 (1952), pp. 9-10; K.A. Waheed, "The Role of Iqbal in the Establishment of Pakistan", *Al-Islam*, 15 June 1953, p. 47; Abdul Majid Salik, *Zikr-i-Iqbal*, Lahore, n.d., pp. 150, 153; K.A. Waheed, "Iqbal: The Poet who Conceived Pakistan", *Al-Islam*, 15 April 1955, p. 60; Abdul Majid Salik, *Muslim Saqafat Hindustan Men*, Lahore, n.d., pp. 666-667; Anonymous, "Iqbal: The Architect of Pakistan", *CMG*, 21 April 1958; Muhammad Ahsan Faruqi, *Sangam*, Karachi, 1961, p. 309; R.M. Whyte, *The Great Leader: Quaid-i-Azam*, Lahore,

2nd rev ed 1962, p. 53; Nazar Zaidi, *Islam ka Namwar Farzand*, Lahore, 1964, p. 173; Faqir Syed Wahiduddin, *Rozgar-i-Faqir*, Lahore, 5th ed 1965, p. 133; Anwar Kidwai, "Iqbal awr Tasawwar-i-Pakistan", *NW*, 21 April 1965; K.A. Waheed, *A Bibliography of Iqbal*, Karachi, 1965, p. 21; Syed Wasimuddin Balkhi, "A Poet's Dream Translated into Living Reality", *Dawn*, 23 March 1965; B.A. Dar (a specialist on Iqbal), *Anwar-i-Iqbal*, Karachi, 1967, p. 95 fn, p. 96 fn; Najam Yusuf, "Hakim-ul-Ummat Allama Iqbal ne Musalmanon ke liye Alehda Watan ki Tajwiz Pesh Ki", *Kohistan*, 13 August 1968; Mazhar Ansari Dehlawi, *Sayyid Ameer Ali*, Lahore, 1968, pp. 79-80 (in Urdu); Nazir Ahmad Shaikh, *Quaid-i-Azam*, Lahore, 1968, p. 57 (a text book); Muhammad Husain Marharawi, in *Jang*, 5 May 1968; Abdul Hai, "The Message of Iqbal", *Pakistan Observer*, 21 April 1969; Muhammad Sharif Baqa, "Tasawwar-i-Pakistan awr Iqbal awr Jinnah", *NW*, 21 April 1969; Anonymous, "Nazrya-i-Pakistan ka Bani-Iqbal", *Hurriyat*, 24 March 1969; Mumtaz Hasan, "Iqbal and Jinnah", *Contemporary Affairs*, Spring 1969, p. 15; Sarfraz Husain Mirza, *Muslim Women's Role in the Pakistan Movement*, Lahore, 1969, p. 39; Arif Batalawi, *Tarikh-i-Muslim League*, Lahore, 1970, p. 313; Ziauddin Ahmad, *Quaid-i-Millat Liaquat Ali Khan*, Karachi, 1970, pp. 50, 55; Naz, *Iqbal*, Lahore, 1970, p. 45; S. Zakir Ejaz, *Sayyid Jamaluddin Afghani*, Lahore, 1970, p. 92; Hakim Muhammad Said (ed), *Main Currents of Contemporary Thought in Pakistan*, Vol II, Karachi, 1973, p. 30, his inaugural address at Dacca on 12 February 1970; Jamiluddin Ahmad, "Factors and Forces behind the Pakistan Movement", in *ibid.*, p. 188, a lecture delivered at Rawalpindi on 1 September 1970; Syed Asghar Ali Shah Jafri, *Tahrik-i-Pakistan awr uska Pas Manzar*, Lahore, 1970, p. 179; Mumtaz Hasan, Foreword to B.A. Dar, *A Study in Iqbal's Philosophy*, Lahore, 1971, p. x; Siddiq Ali Khan (a Muslim League politician), *Be Tegh Sipahi*, Karachi, 1971, p. 212; Khwaja Jamil Ahmad, *Hundred Great Muslims*, Lahore, 1971, p. 344; Malik Hasan Akhtar, *Atraf-i-Iqbal*, Lahore, 1972, pp. 256, 291; Ishrat Rahmani, *Hamari Azadi ki Kahani: Sir Sayyid se Quaid-i-Azam Tak*, Lahore, 1972, p. 41; Ahmad Khan, "Qyam-i-Pakistan ka Maqsad", *Jang*, 25 April 1973; Mushtaq

Ahmad Wajadi, *Hangamon men Zindagi*, Lahore, 1974, p. 136; Anonymous, "Iqbal and the Emergence of Pakistan", *Pakistan Pictorial*, November–December 1974, p. 15; Sardar Muhammad Khan Aziz, *Sarguzasht-i-Pakistan*, Lahore, 1974, p. 63; Chaudhri Nazir Ahmad Khan (a politician), *Kalam-i-Narm-o-Nazuk: Ap Biti: Dastan-i-Pakistan*, Lahore, 1975, pp. 56, 86; Syed Shamsul Hasan (a former official of the AIML) (ed), *Plain Mr. Jinnah*, Karachi, 1976, Introduction, p. 52; Ejaz Ahmad, *Hamare Quaid-i-Azam*, Lahore, 1976, pp. 104-105; Altaf Husain (a leading journalist and editor), "... And So to Pakistan", in I.H. Qureshi, Altaf Husain and Muhammad Musa (eds), *A Nation Born of Sacrifices*, Karachi, 1976, p. 25; Ajmal Siddiqui, "Iqbal ka Tasawwar-i-Pakistan", *NW*, 3 April 1977; Ihsanullah Sharif Alig, "Shair-i-Mashriq Allama Iqbal ki Hamagir Shakhshiyat", *Jang*, 21 August 1977; Rafiuddin Hashmi, "Allama Iqbal awr Qyam-i-Pakistan", *NW*, 24 November 1977; Muhammad Nazir Kakakhel, "Tahrik-i-Pakistan ke Mazhabi Awamil", *Fikr-o-Nazar*, February 1977, p. 413; Mir Abdul Baqi Baluch, "Allama Iqbal awr One Unit", *NW*, 29 November 1978; Razia Farhat Bano *Khutbat-i-Iqbal*, Karachi, 2nd. rep. 1960, p. 38; Yusuf Aziz, *Shua-i-Iqbal*, Faisalabad, 1977, p. 58; M.H. Siddiqui in his (comp.), *Iqbal: A Critical Study*, Lahore, 1977, p. 155; M. Yusuf Saraf, "Iqbal's Role in Kashmir's Struggle", *TPT*, 21 April 1952; Yusuf Khattak, "Iqbal's Journey to Pakistan", *Iqbal Reveiw*, April 1974, pp. 19-20; Ziauddin Ahmad, "Iqbal's Concept of Islamic Polity", *Pakistan Pictorial*, September 1977, p. 9; Saeed Ahmad, "Iqbal and the Pakistan Movement", *ibid.*, p. 29; Abdul Hamid, "The Legacy of Iqbal", *ibid.*, p. 65; Mumtaz Hasan, "Iqbal awr Pakistan", *Mah-i-Naw*, September 1977, p. 306; Nazar Hyderabad, *Iqbal awr Hyderabad*, Karachi, 1961, p. 187; S. Jamil Wasti, *My Reminiscences of Chaudhary Rahmat Ali*, Karachi, 1982, pp. 44-45 153.

Official views and reference works: Mian Asghar Ali (Deputy Commissioner, Sialkot), speech at Iqbal Day, April 1968, in Aslam Malik, *op. cit.*, pp. 12-13; *Pakistan Yearbook 1969*, Karachi, 1969, p. 65; *Struggle for Independence: Photographic Album, 1905-1947*, Lahore, n.d., p. 51; *Pakistan 1973: Year Book*, ed by Rafique Akhtar, Karachi, 1973, p. 33; *ibid.*, 1975, pp. 30, 72; Masudul Hasan, *Short Encyclo-*

*paedia of Pakistan*, Lahore, 1975, pp. 31, 53; *Pakistan Year Book 1975*, ed by Rafique Akhtar, Karachi, 1975, p. 31; messages to the nation issued every year on 21 April by the country's governor generals, prime ministers, presidents and chief matrilaw administrators; and, above all, *The Urdu Encyclopaedia of Islam*, Lahore, Vol. III, 1968, p. 11, article by Khalifa Abdul Hakim and Ghulam Rasul Mehr.

Indian scholars: *The Aligarh Magazine*, Special Pakistan Number 1944, Aligarh, 1944, editor's note on Iqbal's address, p. 23; S. Abid Husain, *The Destiny of Indian Muslims*, Bombay, 1965, pp. 66-67; M.U. Haq, *Muslim Politics in Modern India, 1857-1947*, Meerut, 1970, p. 147; M. Anwar-ul-Haq, *The Faith Movement of Mawlana Muhammad Ilyas*, London, 1972, p. 44; Abul Hasan Nadawi, *Naqush-i-Iqbal*, tr by Shams Tabrez Khan, Karachi, 3rd ed 1973, p. 47; S.A.A. Rizvi, "Muslim India", in Bernard Lewis (ed), *The World of Islam*, London, 1976, p. 312.

European and American scholars: Phillips Talbot, "The Rise of Pakistan", *The Middle East Journal*, October 1948, p. 385; H.A.R. Gibb, article on Iqbal, in L.G. Wickham Legg (ed), *The Dictionary of National Biography, 1931-1940*, London, 1949, pp. 641-642; V.G. Kiernan, *Poems from Iqbal*, London, 1955, Preface, p. xxii; Jean-Paul Roux, *L'Islam en Asie*, Paris, 1958, p. 137; Leonard Binder, "Pakistan and Modern Islamic Nationalist Theory, Part II", *The Middle East Journal*, Winter 1958, p. 50; Andre Guimbertiere, "Le reformisme musulman en Inde", *Orient*, no. 18 (1961), p. 48; F.R.J. Verhoeven, *Islam: Its Origin and Spread in Words, Maps and Pictures*, London, 1962, p. 79; Walter Leifer, *Himalaya: Mountains of Destiny*, tr from the German, London, 1962, p. 71; Fosco Maraini, *Where Four Worlds Meet: Hindu Kush 1959*, tr from the Italian, London, 1964, p. 8; Freeland Abbot, "Pakistan and the Secular State", in Donald E. Smith (ed), *South Asian Politics and Religion*, Princeton, 1966, p. 359 fn 23; John Marek, "Socialist Ideas in the Poetry of Muhammad Iqbal", *Studies in Islam*, April-July 1968 (Iqbal Number), p. 179; Sir Gilbert Laithwaite, "The Emergence of Pakistan: From Nationhood to Statehood", *Round Table*, November 1970, p. 596; John A. Teta, *Pakistan in Pictures*, New York, 2nd rev ed 1970, p. 25;

James B Prior, "Iqbal's View of Islamic Nationalism in Javid Namah", in M. Saeed Shaikh (ed), *Studies in Iqbal's Thought and Art*, Lahore, 1972, p. 383 (originally appeared in *Iqbal*, July 1971); Max Gallo, "Gandhi l'avait prédit", *L'Express*, 13-19 December 1971, p. 78; David Loshak, *Pakistan Crisis*, London, 1971, p. xv; Annemarie Schimmel, article on Iqbal, *Dictionary of Oriental Literatures*, general ed Jaroslav Prusek, Delhi, 1975, Vol II, p. 63; P.H.L. Eggermont, "The Pakistan Concept: Its Background", in *Papers Presented at the International Congress on Quaid-i-Azam, 19-25 December 1976*, Islamabad, 1976, Vol IV, p. 11 (mimeo).

In contrast, the only references which assert that Iqbal's 1930 demand was *not* for an independent or separate state are: "Sir Muhammad Iqbal", *CMG*, editorial, 22 April 1938; Jinnah's speech at an Iqbal Day meeting in Lahore in March 1940, in which he did not make any allusion whatsoever to his 1930 address or to his "Pakistan" idea, *ibid.*, 26 March 1940; Rashiduzzaman, "Demand for Pakistan", *Pakistan Observer*, 14 August 1968; Syed Nur Ahmad, "Allahabad Address in Historical Perspective", *TPT*, 21 April 1969; Parveen Feroze Hasan, *The Political Philosophy of Iqbal*, Lahore, n.d., pp. 330-333; Muhammad Rafi Anwar and Hasan Askar Rizwi, *Tahrik-i-Qyam-i-Pakistan*, Lahore, 3rd ed 1974, p. 158 fn; Mary Louise Beck, "Some Formative Influences on the Career of Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah", in *World Scholars on Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah*, ed by A.H. Dani, Islamabad, 1979, p. 87.

52. *All India Muslim League: Allahabad Session, December 1930, Presidential Address by Dr. Sir Muhammad Iqbal, Barrister-at-Law, Lahore*, Lahore, p. 7. My italics.
53. Shamloo, *op. cit.*, p. 12, and Latif Ahmad Sherwani (ed.), *Speeches, Writings and Statements of Iqbal*, Lahore, 1977, p. 10.
54. S.A. Vahid, *Thoughts and Reflections of Iqbal*, Lahore, 1964, p. 171.
55. *IAR 1930*, Vol II, pp. 334-345; this passage on p. 338.
56. *The Aligarh Magazine*, Special Pakistan Number, 1944, p. 29.
57. See Khalid B. Sayeed, *Pakistan: The Formative Phase, 1857-1948*, 2nd ed, London, 1968, pp. 103-104.
58. F.K. Khan Durrani, *The Meaning of Pakistan*, Lahore, 1946

rep, pp. 156-157.

59. *Struggle for Independence, 1857-1947*, Karachi, n.d., Appendix IV.
60. Aziz Ahmad, "Iqbal et la theorie du Pakistan", *Orient*, No. 17 (1961), p. 88; *Elat* at both places; he says he is quoting from *Struggle for Independence*, which he calls *Struggle for Freedom*. He and G.E. von Grunebaum reproduce this extract incorrectly in their *Muslim Self-Statement in India and Pakistan, 1857-1968*, Wiesbaden, 1970, pp. 148-151, and cite their source as the *Struggle for Independence*, Appendix IV. Copying from a secondary source in a collection of documents does not become such prominent scholars; copying incorrectly is unforgiveable.
61. For example, Andre Guimbretiere, "Le reformisme musulman en Inde", *Orient*, no. 18 (1961), p. 48; Annemarie Schimmel, *Gabriel's Wing* (her major work on Iqbal), Leiden, 1963, p. 34; Jamiluddin Ahmad, *The Final Phase of Struggle for Pakistan*, 2nd ed, Lahore, 1968, p. 151, and *Middle Phase of Muslim Political Movement*, Lahore, 1969, p. 124. Parveen Feroze Hasan, *The Political Philosophy of Iqbal*, Lahore, n.d., p. 332, cites Shamloo, and yet, what a surprise, the passage comes out correct; probably a rare case of a happy misprint!
62. For example, Hierndranath Mukerjee, *India's Struggle for Freedom*, Calcutta, 3rd rev ed 1962, p. 217; Raja Hasan Akhtar, "The 'Forgotten Hero'", *TPT*, 29 March 1964; K. Ali, *A New History of Indo-Pakistan since the British Rule*, Dacca, rev ed 1968, p. 284; Abdul Hai, "The Message of Iqbal", *Pakistan Observer*, 21 April 1969; G. Allana, *Our Freedom Fighters, 1526-1947*, Karachi, 1969, p. 192. At least two authors substitute "province" for "state": Syed Nur Ahmad, "Allahabad Address in Historical Perspective", *TPT*, 21 April 1969, and Walter Leifer, *Himalaya: Mountains of Destiny*, London, 1962, p. 73.
63. *Struggle for Independence, 1857-1947*, Karachi, n.d., pp. 13 and 61; see Abdul Hai, in M.H. Siddiqui (comp.), *Iqbal: A Critical Study*, Lahore, 1977, p. 14.
64. See Edward Thompson, letter, *The Times*, 3 October 1931, and Muhammad Iqbal, letter, *ibid.*, 12 October 1931.
65. S.A. Vahid, *Iqbal: His Art and Thought*, London, 1959, p. 20.



66. *Ibid.*, p. 21.
67. See Al-Beiruni (S.M. Ikram), *Makers of Pakistan and Modern Muslim India*, Lahore, 1950, throughout.
68. S.M. Ikram, *Modern Muslim India and the Birth of Pakistan*, Lahore, 1965, p. 181.
69. *Ibid.*, pp. 181-182.
70. *Ibid.*, p. 184.
71. Frank Moraes, *Witness to an Era*, London, 1973, p. 35.
72. Munshi Ghulam Qadir Farrukh, *Safina-i-Hayat*, pp. 22-23, quoted in Abdul Majid Salik, *Zikr-i-Iqbal*, Lahore, n.d., pp. 92-94; see also Javid Iqbal (ed), *Stray Reflections: A Note-Book of Allama Iqbal*, Lahore, 1961, Introduction, p. xxi.
73. Riaz Husain, "Hakim-ul-Ummat Allama Iqbal awr Do-Qawmi Nazriya", *NW*, 9 January 1975.
74. Aftab Ahnada Khan, letter, *TPT*, 15 January 1976.
75. Iqbal's speech in support of a "loyalist" resolution moved by Mawlana Ghulam Mohayyuddin at a meeting held outside Mochi Gate, Lahore, on 1 February 1912, *Zamindar*, 4 and 6 February 1912, reproduced in Rafique Afzal (ed), *Guftar-i-Iqbal*, Lahore, 1969, p. 2.
76. Iqbal to Sayyid Sulaiman Nadawi, 18 March 1924, quoted in Rais Ahmad Jafri, *Iqbal awr Siyasat-i-Milli*, Karachi, n.d., p. 120.
77. Statement to the press, 5 April 1926, *Zamindar*, 6 April 1926, cited in M.R. Afzal, *op. cit.*, p. 13.
78. Speech at a public meeting outside Mochi Gate, Lahore, 30 January 1927, *Zamindar*, 2 February 1927, *ibid.*, p. 22.
79. Speech at Barkat Ali Islamia Hall, Lahore, 1 May 1927, *ibid.*, p. 27.
80. Statement on the appointment of the Indian Statutory (Simon) Commission, 9 November 1927, *ibid.*, p. 51.
81. Speech at a reception given at Madras by the Anjuman-i-Hilal-i-Ahmar, 7 January 1929, *ibid.*, p. 74.
82. Speech at Barkat Ali Islamia Hall, Lahore, 19 December 1929, *ibid.*, p. 106. It is this use of the word *azad* which has abetted the misinterpreters to read in his pronouncements a suggestion for independence. The normal meaning of *azad* is "independent" or "free". A province or state in a federation is not independent, at the most it is autonomous. But there is no word for "autonomous" in Urdu, hence Iqbal's use of

*azad*. Students of his ideas ought to know this.

83. Muhammad Iqbal, "Reply to Questions raised by Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru", in S.A. Vahid (ed), *Thoughts and Reflections of Iqbal*, Lahore, 1964, p. 258. Also reproduced in Shamloo, *op. cit.*, pp. 111-144. Neither of the compilers gives a date to this statement. It was probably written in 1934.
84. S. Nazir Niazi (ed), *Maktubat-i-Iqbal*, Karachi, 1957, p. 85. Niazi says he has lost this letter. Is he, then, recalling the text from memory? Iqbal's exact words were: "*Abadion ke tabadlay ki tajwiz meri nahin, Lala Lajpat Rai ki hai*".
85. B.A. Dar (ed), *Letters and Writings of Iqbal*, Karachi, November 1967, p. 75.
86. M.A. Khan, *Iqbal ka Siyasi Karnamah*, Karachi, 1952, pp. 476-481.
87. *Ibid.*, p. 481.
88. *Ibid.*, pp. 482-488.
89. *Ibid.*, pp. 488-489.
90. M.A. Khan was a trained lawyer, and had retired from the chief justiceship of Bhopal State before writing this book.
91. A.S. Khurshid, "Pakistan Ka Bani Kawn?", *Mashriq*, 1 April 1964. There is something wrong with the last sentence. In the original Urdu it reads: "*Bengal men Musalman pahley hi aksariat men the, is liye Bengal state ko banana hi tha*", which is meaningless. I have translated it to the best of my ability so that it may make sense.
92. Khurshid, however, is not alone in extending Iqbal's north-west "independent state" to the whole sub-continent. He has numerous friends in this game, including some prominent scholars. I submit some examples. "The idea that the hundred millions of Musalmans of India are a nation and must have a separate homeland of their own in the sub-continent, was first struck [*sic.*] to him" in 1930 (editor's note on the text of the Allahabad address, *The Aligarh Magazine*, Special Pakistan Number, Aligarh, 1944, p. 23). "The Muslims had presented their goal of an independent Muslim State (*mamlakat*) at the Allahabad Muslim League Conference" (Abdul Majid Salik, *Zikr-i-Iqbal*, Lahore, n.d., p. 153). "Il emit pour la premiere fois l'idee de creer dans les Indes un Etat qui regrouperait tous les musulmans" (Jean-Paul Roux, *L'Islam*

en Asia, Paris, 1958, p. 137.) Iqbal suggested that "all the territories of India where Muslims predominated should be separated from India and made into an independent state" (Nazar Zaidi, *Islam ke Namwar Farzand*, Lahore, 1964, p. 173). Iqbal wanted a separate state "for the Muslims of the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent" (K.A. Waheed, *A Bibliography of Iqbal*, Karachi, 1965, annotation on the Allahabad address, p. 21). Iqbal "called for the creation of an independent territory for Indian Muslims" (Jan Marek, "Socialist Ideas in the Poetry of Muhammad Iqbal", *Studies in Islam*, April-July 1968, p. 179). He demanded that "the Muslims of India should be given a separate homeland, and the areas where they are numerically superior to Hindus should be joined under an independent and free Islamic government" (Mazhar Ansari Dehlavi, *Sayyid Ameer Ali*, Lahore, 1968, pp. 79-80, in Urdu). He "dreamt of a separate homeland for the Muslims of India" (K. Ali, *A New History of Indo-Pakistan since the British Rule*, Dacca, rev ed 1968, p. 284; a university text book). Iqbal "expressed in so many words what he visualized as the future destiny of the Muslims in the Sub-Continent" (Mumtaz Hasan, "Iqbal and Jinnah", *Contemporary Affairs*, Spring 1969, p. 15). He "set forth his plan for a separate homeland for the Muslims in the sub-continent" (Abdul Hai, "The Message of Iqbal", *Pakistan Observer*, 21 April 1969). In 1930 "Muslim India proclaimed that the future of Indian Muslims with their distinct culture and spiritual urges lay in a separate state" (G.W. Choudhury, "The Quaid-i-Azam: Founder of Pakistan", *Pakistan News Digest*, 15 September 1970, p. 6). Iqbal, in 1930, "put forward the concept of a separate Islamic state in the provinces of the sub-continent with Muslim majority" (Aziz Ahmad and G.E. von Grunebaum (eds), *Muslim Self-Statement in India and Pakistan, 1857-1968*, Wiesbaden, 1970, note on p. 130). He "thought of a separate homeland for the Muslims" (M.U. Haq, *Muslim Politics in Modern India, 1857-1947*, Meerut, 1970, p. 147). He "put forward his concept of a separate and independent homeland for Muslims, comprising the Muslim-majority areas of the sub-continent" (*Struggle for Independence: Photographic Album, 1905-1947*, Government of West Pakistan, Bureau of

National Reconstruction, Lahore, n.d., p. 51). He "gave expression to the idea that the people of India should be separated on racial and religious grounds" (Naz, *Iqbal*, Lahore, 1970, p. 45). He demanded that, in addition to the north-west, "the Muslim-majority districts of Bengal should similarly be given the status of a Muslim state and completely separated"; and he declared (here Iqbal is being quoted), "I have studied the circumstances with great care and have arrived at the definite conclusion that a new state is going to emerge in the northern and eastern parts of the Indian sub-continent; no power on earth can now stop its emergence; and this state, appearing in the two parts of the country, will be run under a common system of governance" (Syed Asghar Ali Shah Jafri, *Tahrik-i-Pakistan awr uska Pas Manzar*, Lahore, 1970, p. 185). Iqbal announced that "the political goal for the Indian Muslims... was a separate independent State in the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent" (Mumtaz Hasan, Foreword to B.A. Dar, *A Study in Iqbal's Philosophy*, Lahore, 1971, p. x). He "elaborated his scheme of an independent Muslim state in the sub-continent" (Khawaja Jamil Ahmad, *Hundred Great Muslims*, Lahore, 1971, p. 344). He advocated "a separate home for Muslims to be carved out of India after independence" (David Loshak, *Pakistan Crisis*, London, 1971, p. xv). He "for the first time very systematically demanded a separate homeland for the Muslims of India"; he "in a very clear, logical and reasonable way demanded a separate homeland for the Muslims of India" (Shafique Ali Khan, *Two Nation Theory*, Hyderabad Sind, 1973, pp. 613, 623). He "demanded political independence of the Muslims of the sub-continent" (*Pakistan 1973: Year Book*, ed by Rafique Akhtar, Karachi, 1973, p. 33; repeated in the 1975 ed, p. 30). He suggested that "all areas with a Muslim majority should be transformed into a separate Muslim state" (Sardar Muhammad Khan Aziz, *Sarguzashi-i-Pakistan*, Lahore, March 1974, p. 63). He "advocated the establishment of a separate homeland for the Muslims" (Masudul Hasan, *Short Encyclopaedia of Pakistan*, Lahore, 1975, p. 81). He "spelled out the idea of a separate Muslim homeland" (Shaikh Imtiaz Ali, Vice-Chancellor, University of the Punjab, *Address of Welcome: Quaid-i-Azam Semi-*

nar, Lahore, 23 March 1976, p. 4). He "demanded a Muslim State for the Muslims of India" (Hamid Ahmad Khan, *Father of Our Nation: Early Life Story*, Islamabad, 1976, p. 7). He "articulated the proposition that Muslim-majority areas of the sub-continent should constitute a separate Muslim State" (Abdul Qayyum (a journalist) and S.R. Wasti (a professor of Indian history), "Struggle for Independence", in Hamid Jalal (ed), *Pakistan*, London, 1977, p. 113). He announced for the first time that "a separate state should be created out of the Muslim-majority provinces in the north-west and east" (Ihsanullah Sharif Alig, "Shair-i-Mashriq Allama Iqbal ki Hamagir Shakhsiiyat", *Jang*, 21 August 1977).

It must be pointed out that all these writers are talking specifically about the Allahabad address, not about his later opinions. As I write this, I have before me 63 other references to the same effect; but the above selection is quite representative of different kinds and levels of authors and should suffice.

93. A.S. Khurshid, *op. cit.*, *Mashriq*, 1 April 1964.
94. A.S. Khurshid, "Trends that Led to Iqbal's Allahabad Address", *TPT*, 17 June 1962.
95. M. Rafique Afzal, *op. cit.*, pp. 110-114.
96. Khurshid, *op. cit.*
97. *Ibid.*
98. M.R. Afzal, *op. cit.*, pp. 110-111.
99. Khurshid, *op. cit.*, and Afzal, *op. cit.*, pp. 111-112.
100. Khurshid, *op. cit.*, and Afzal, *op. cit.*, p. 112.
101. Khurshid, *op. cit.*
102. *Ibid.*
103. Afzal, *op. cit.*, p. 112.
104. This is Khurshid's account. A significantly different version is given by his father, Abdul Majid Salik, who quotes the headline as "*Punjab, Sind, Sarhad awr Baluchistan Islami mamalik hain*" ("...are Muslim countries"); see his *Sarguzasht*, Lahore, 1955, p. 284. Is Khurshid forestalling the Allahabad suggestion of amalgamating these provinces, or was his father writing from a fading memory?
105. Khurshid, *op. cit.*
106. Afzal, *op. cit.*, pp. 113-114, who quotes the appeal; the original newspaper date is unclear. The signatories of the

appeal were Iqbal, Majid Malik, Sayyid Habib, Saadat Ali Khan, Sayyid Mehr Shah, Abdul Majid Salik, Mawlana Muhammad Ali, Hakim Muhammad Sharif, Ghulam Moha-yyuddin Qasuri, Khalifa Shujauddin, Mawlawi Wahabur Rahman, Mir Azizuddin and Abdullah; *ibid.*, p. 113.

107. A.S. Khurshid, "Immediate Reaction to Iqbal's Allahabad Address", *TPT*, 21 April 1963. My italics.
108. Abdul Majid Salik, *op. cit.*, p. 284.
109. Sayyid Nazir Niazi (ed), *Maktubat-i-Iqbal*, Karachi, 1957, pp. 63-64. Khurshid also says that in 1936 Iqbal had once again suggested the convening of such a conference; see his "Trends that Led to Iqbal's Allahabad Address", *TPT*, 17 June 1962.



# 6

## THE REAL IQBAL: 1930

### Iqbal's Views of 1930-1934

The plans for holding an Upper India Muslim Conference and the suggestion about a north-west Muslim India made at Allahabad had entered Iqbal's mind at the same time and seemed to have left it at the same time. A study of his speeches and statements made between 1930 and 1934 shows that both these ideas had ceased to interest him soon after the Allahabad session. What follows in this section should be enough to demonstrate the untruth of the claim that he "continued to develop this idea, whenever the occasion arose".<sup>1</sup> In his words we find no reference to his 1930 proposal; on the contrary, we see him grappling with problems alien to it.

In the summer of 1931 Iqbal wrote a letter to Sir Francis Younghusband, which soon afterwards found its way into the press. It reveals his studied attitude towards the Hindu-Muslim problem and should be quoted at some length. He began by saying: "While realizing the seriousness and importance of the Hindu-Muslim problem, with which this country is confronted today, and the practical difficulties involved in finding a satisfactory solution of it, I cannot allow myself to believe, as many people unfortunately do, both here and in England, that all human efforts directed to uniting the two communities are doomed to failure. I am not ashamed to say that in solving this problem we may need the assistance of Britain guided by the best of motives."

And a little later: "If you transfer political authority to the Hindu and keep him in power for any material benefit to Great Britain, you will drive the Indian Muslim to use the same weapon against the swaraj or Anglo-Swaraj Government as Gandhi did against the British Government. Moreover, it may result in the

whole of Muslim Asia being driven into the lap of Russian Communism which would serve as the *coup de grace* to British supremacy in the East. I do not myself believe that the Russians are by nature an irreligious people. . . . Since Bolshevism plus God is almost identical with Islam, I should not be surprised if in course of time either Islam would devour Russia or Russia Islam. The result will depend, I think, to a considerable extent on the position which is given to the Indian Muslims under the new constitution. . . . I shall have no objection to be ruled by the Hindu if he has the tact and ability to govern, but I cannot worship two gods. It must be either him or the British alone, but not the two together. . . . Somehow I feel hopeful that some solution of the Indian communal problem will be found at the next RTC which would satisfy all parties, including the British. . . . To the recognition of a common ideal and to the avoidance of friction in advancing along the path of self-rule, let us here and in the West address ourselves."<sup>2</sup>

In one respect this statement of his ideas and hopes conforms to the substance of his Allahabad address; in another, it contains some staggering opinions: depending on the point of view of the present-day reader. What stands out is the absence of any reference, direct or oblique, to his "Muslim India within India" and the separation of the north-west. Writing within a few months of his Allahabad address on the subject of the Hindu-Muslim problem and the shape of the future constitution, there must have been strong reasons for not referring at all to his own solution of a Muslim state in the north-west. Either he had changed his mind completely about separation, or he had never suggested it in the first place.

The rest of the letter tends to confirm the second possibility. He had not lost hope in the final communal agreement. And he makes it clear that his idea of an agreement was not one of separation but of "uniting the two communities". In this task of shaping a united India he seeks British help and guidance, but at the same time warns the British against two possibilities in case Muslim rights are disregarded. If all power is transferred to the Hindus, the majority, Muslims would treat the new Indian government in the same way as Gandhi had treated the British Indian Government—by which he probably meant civil disobedience. The second threat is more significant. If the British betray the Muslim faith in them, the

whole of Muslim Asia would be "driven into the lap of Russian Communism", thus putting an end to British supremacy in the East. Some students of Iqbal may here question his concern about the future of British supremacy; they may also look askance at his equation of Bolshevism plus God with Islam. But let that pass.

Iqbal has no objection to be ruled by the Hindus provided that they show tact and ability. He has also no objection to be governed by the British. What he does not want is that both the Hindus and the British should dominate the Indian Muslims: he does not mind the overlordship of any one of them. He does not indicate his preference, but the reference to "uniting the two communities" makes it clear that it was the British who had to leave the scene. So much for the supposed plans for the freedom of the Muslims. He ends the communication with the hope that a solution of the communal problem satisfactory to all parties would be found at the next RTC. The requirements were to recognize "a common ideal" and to avoid friction. This takes us back to the Allahabad search for a principle of internal harmony which would co-ordinate the different communalisms into a whole. In this sense, but not in the sense in which he is generally interpreted, he is reiterating his 1930 ideas.

Soon after writing the above letter to Younghusband, Iqbal left for England to participate in the deliberations of the second RTC, to which he had been appointed a delegate. On the eve of his departure for London he gave an interview to the *Bombay Chronicle*.<sup>3</sup> In this there is not a word about his scheme of a string of autonomous Muslim provinces on the north-west, or a large amalgamated Muslim state in an Indian federation, or a separate Muslim state in the north-west.

While in London Iqbal wrote a letter to *The Times* which contains his own interpretation of the Allahabad address and should settle the controversy once and for all. Edward Thompson, an English educational missionary with strong and un concealed sympathies for the Hindus, wrote a letter to *The Times* in early October in which, after characterizing Iqbal's Allahabad proposal as "Pan-Islamic plotting", he said, "And I am not arguing against the establishment of Muslim 'communal provinces' in North-West India. But what Sir Muhammad Iqbal demands is a confederation 'within or without' the Indian Federation. Look at the map and see what sort of defensible frontier would be left to the rest of India."<sup>4</sup>

Before we look at Iqbal's reply, it should be pointed out that Iqbal had not used the word "confederation". Whether it is possible to have a confederation within a federation is a question which Thompson alone could answer, and he is dead.

Iqbal replied in a letter published in the same journal on 12 October. He wrote: "May I tell Dr. Thompson that in this passage [here he quoted the two italicized sentences from his address beginning 'I would like to see the Punjab. . .'] I do not put forward a demand for a Muslim State, outside the British Empire, but only a guess at a possible outcome in the dim future of the mighty forces now shaping the destiny of the Indian sub-continent. No Indian Muslim with any pretence to sanity contemplates a Muslim State or series of States in North-West India outside the British Commonwealth of Nations as a plan of practical politics."

After thus interpreting this passage, he turned to an explanation of his territorial solution for which he had argued at Allahabad: "Although I would oppose the creation of another cockpit of communal strife in the Central Punjab, as suggested by some enthusiasts, I am all for a re-distribution of India into provinces with effective majorities of one community or another on lines advocated both by the Nehru and the Simon Reports. *Indeed, my suggestion regarding Muslim provinces merely carries forward this idea.* A series of contented and well-organized Muslim provinces on the North-West Frontier of India would be the bulwark of India and of the British Empire against the hungry generations of the Asiatic highlands."<sup>5</sup>

Thus he confessed that at Allahabad he had not demanded the creation of a Muslim State, which, he now made clear, was "only a guess at a possible outcome in the dim future". Those who allege that he made such a demand or suggestion should accept Iqbal's own words and refrain from claiming that they know better than Iqbal did. In this letter he uses the word "province" again, and again, and reaffirms that his territorial solution only meant the creation of provinces with effective majorities of any one community. Indeed, he removes the last vestige of doubt by saying that his suggestion was only a development of the idea contained in the Nehru and Simon Reports. He has also withdrawn the proposal for amalgamating the four northern Muslim provinces (which we can now presume to have been relegated to the dim future), for in the closing sentence he talks of a series of Muslim provinces on the

north-west. It may also be noticed in passing that two of his arguments given in support of such a configuration could not have won much appreciation from the Indian Muslims of his day: his anxiety to see a new Muslim north-west as a bulwark of the British Empire, and his uncomplimentary reference to the Central Asians which must have riled every frontiersman who called himself a Pathan or an Afghan.

At the RTC Iqbal did not put forward his Allahabad proposal, and the above letter explains why. The next major occasion when he could have reiterated his scheme, if he had wanted to, was the AIMC annual session at Lahore in March 1932, where he delivered the presidential address. Here again we find no mention of separation, or of a Muslim state. There is no reference even to a re-distribution of provinces. The emphasis is on the attainment of unity and harmony. Some passages of this speech need to be quoted and annotated in order to understand the development of his ideas and their connection with those of 1930.

Arguing for unity rather than division, he said: "In view of the visible and invisible points of contact between the various communities of India I do believe in the possibility of constructing a harmonious whole whose unity cannot be disturbed by the rich diversity which it must carry within its bosom. The problem of ancient Indian thought was how the one became many without sacrificing its oneness. Today this problem has come down from its ethical heights to the grosser plane of our political life, and we have to solve it in its reversed form, *i.e.*, how the many can become one without sacrificing its plural character. In so far then as the fundamentals of our policy are concerned, I have got nothing fresh to offer. Regarding these I have already expressed my views in my address to the All India Muslim League."<sup>6</sup>

He wants "unity", "a harmonious whole", the making of many into one—and calls it the "fundamentals of our policy" which he had already expressed at Allahabad. Certainly the creation of a separate state is not the same thing as the achievement of a unity in which differences are ironed out and a plural society is formed out of the "many".

Referring to Sir Geoffrey Corbett's scheme relating to the Punjab, which had been circulated at the RTC, Iqbal called it "very similar to the one I had suggested in my address to the All India Muslim League".<sup>7</sup> But he did not recall that for him it had formed

a part of a general scheme in which a truncated Punjab was joined with its northern and western provinces to produce a large unit.

He summed up the Muslim demands in the following paragraph: "The continuance of separate electorates and the status of the Frontier Province are no doubt assured, but complete provincial autonomy, transfer of power from Parliament to Indian provinces, equality of federal units, classification of subjects not into federal, central and provincial, but into federal and provincial only, majority rights in the Punjab and Bengal, unconditional separation of Sind, and one-third share in the Centre, constitute no less essential elements of our demand."<sup>8</sup>

By now he has identified himself completely with the point of view of other Muslim leaders. His demands are the same as theirs, and there is no mention of a territorial re-grouping. It would, however, be wrong to conclude from this that he had clipped his wings in order to win the presidency of the Muslim Conference. He had jettisoned his 1930 ideas long ago, and was now formally and morally a part of the Muslim delegation to the RTC (in spite of his dissociation from it on the preceding 15 November), against whose views, we are given to understand, he had once planned the campaign of an Upper India Muslim Conference.

Iqbal made one rather curious statement in this 1932 presidential speech. Deploring the declaration made by Muslim spokesmen in the Federal Structure Committee of the RTC on 26 November 1931, to the effect that they agreed to the simultaneous introduction of provincial autonomy and central responsibility, and giving his opinion that responsible government ought to be introduced immediately in British Indian provinces without waiting for the coming of a "federal superstructure", he said: "In my address to the All India Muslim League [in 1930] I raised my voice against the idea of an all-India federation!"<sup>9</sup>

As it stands here, without any qualifying clause, this can be very misleading. The operative word is "all-India". He had not opposed the concept of any federation for India, but the idea of a federation in which the native states would be brought in along with the provinces. Torn from its context and quoted by itself such a statement can give a completely wrong impression of his Allahabad address. It is important to remember this because some writers have taken this sentence out of the speech and presented it as an argument that in 1930 he had stood firmly against the federal



solution, with the implication that he had suggested a division of India and the creation of a separate Muslim state.

On 8 June 1932, Iqbal wrote a letter to Muhammad Irfan Khan which cliniches the argument against the myth-makers. It said: "Mawlana Shawkat Ali must be busy in preparing his legal case. Will you find out from him how things stand and write to me? Some days ago I had written to him that I had received a letter from a Hindu gentleman, Mr. Lalit, saying that Dr. Moonje accepts the scheme that I had put forward in my Muslim League presidential address and that he (Lalit) was going to consult Pandit Malaviya who, too, will accept it for the sake of Hindu-Muslim amity, and that at present it was not prudent to accept the scheme publicly. This letter was confidential. It also said that he (Lalit) had talked to Mawlana Shawkat Ali and found him willing to come to an agreement. You must have understood to which scheme I am referring—consolidation (*ek ho jana*) of the Muslim provinces of northern India."<sup>10</sup>

That should leave no doubt about what Iqbal thought he had proposed at Allahabad. Had he demanded a separate state, he should have said so in the letter. But he reminds Irfan that he is referring to his 1930 plan of amalgamating the four provinces.

Later statements by him can be considered more briefly. In July 1932, replying to the Sikh demands in relation to the future of the Punjab, he wrote: "The Muslims of India are as anxious to protect their communal interests as to secure the constitutional advance of the country. The safeguards which they demand are essential for their protection as an all-India minority. They accept the principle of majority rule in the Centre and in those provinces where they happen to be in a hopeless minority provided they are not deprived of the countervailing [*sic.*] and legitimate advantage of being in a majority in certain other provinces."<sup>11</sup>

Exactly one month later, while commenting on the Communal Award, he again stressed the importance of provincial autonomy and its role in bringing security to the various minorities. "I must add", he said, "that the mere allotment of seats to various communities is in itself of no great consequence. What is vital is the amount of power which may be transferred to the provinces of India. If real power comes to the provinces there is no doubt that the minorities of India, Muslims and non-Muslims, will have an opportunity of improving their political position in the country

and that in working out the coming constitution, Muslims in their majority provinces will, in view of their past history and traditions, prove themselves free from all pettiness of mind and narrowness of outlook."<sup>12</sup>

By 1933 the shape of the coming constitution was becoming clear, and in February Iqbal welcomed it in a statement which complimented its principle of protection of minorities and applauded the birth of a new Indian nation. On the first point he said: "The proposed constitution clearly recognizes the principle of protection of minorities. This is the only way of giving the minorities a national outlook. It is now for the minorities themselves, who were parties to the Minorities' Pact in London, to take full advantage of the opportunities given to them." On the second he declared: "Whatever else one may say about the results of the RTC, nobody can deny that they have given birth to a people who are at once new and ancient. I believe it to be one of the most remarkable facts of modern history. Not even a farsighted historian can realize the full consequences of the birth of this new-ancient people."<sup>13</sup>

The expression of these opinions marks a new and odd stage in the evolution of Iqbal's attitude to an Indian federation. He had started as a well-informed critic of the whole federal concept as it was visualized for India. At the RTC he had seen his doubts deepening and had therefore given priority to winning provincial autonomy even if that meant a postponement of central responsibility. Throughout 1932 he had been asserting this, and harping on the virtues and primacy of provincial autonomy and giving increasingly less attention to the federal centre. And now abruptly we find him singing the praises of the whole package deal prepared and offered by the RTC. Both the points he made in the above-quoted statement separate him from the stand taken by the generality of Muslim commentators and from his own earlier opinions. It is not easy to see what had convinced him of the efficacy of safeguards embodied in the Conference decisions. Several of the Muslim demands, like constitutional provisions for adequate share in provincial and federal executives, had not been met. The idea of composite cabinets, *i.e.*, representation of minorities in the ministries under a written rule rather than by an unspoken tradition, had found no favour in London. This point was to create immense trouble with the coming into operation

of the provincial part of the new constitution. The Muslim League movement for Pakistan began and immediately commanded so much support because the 1935 constitution failed to protect Muslim interests or allay Muslim fears.

Similarly, Iqbal's generous tribute to the Conference for having produced a new "people" in India is beyond comprehension. He called it a "remarkable" achievement and rejoiced in its birth. If he meant that federalism had cemented Indian unity and heralded the coming of an Indian nation, soon, very soon, history was to prove him wrong. If he meant that the federal machinery now devised was exactly suited to the plural character of the Indian society, again later developments would refuse to vindicate him. In fact, one major reason for the failure of the federal solution to keep India together and avoid partition was that the makers of the new constitution closed their eyes to Indian diversity and heterogeneity, and refused to match their handiwork with the plural nature of the population for which it was meant. Far from considering the Indian Muslims sufficiently different from other Indians to rightfully demand separation, Iqbal was in fact welcoming the prospects for a new unity to be created by fresh constitutional means. Far from preaching or believing in a two-nation theory, he was looking forward to a united India based on the recognition of interests common to all her communities.

This comes out very well in his statement issued in December 1933 in explanation of the attitude of Muslim delegates to the RTC. Echoing the words of the Aga Khan and other Muslim delegates spoken at the second RTC in the course of their unsuccessful negotiations with Gandhi, he said: "If under Pandit Nehru's leadership the Hindus and the Congress agree to the safeguards which Muslims believe to be necessary for their protection as an all-India minority, the Muslims are still ready to serve, in the Aga Khan's words, as camp-followers of the majority community in the country's political struggle." Having thus set the pace, he went on to hope for a united India. "It is obvious that there are interests common to the various communities of India. In so far as these interests are concerned an understanding among the communities is possible: according to my belief, it is bound to come. The present situation is only a necessary stage in the country's political evolution. A united India will have to be built on the foundations of concrete facts, *i.e.*, the distinct existence of more than one people

in the country." If this state of affairs did not materialize, Iqbal would go back to his territorial solution of 1930. "Either the Indian majority community will have to accept for itself the permanent position of an agent of British imperialism in the East or the country will have to be redistributed on a basis of religious, historical and cultural affinities so as to do away with the question of electorates and the communal problem in its present form."<sup>14</sup>

One thing conveyed by these words of Iqbal is that in his opinion no change had occurred in the Muslim attitude since 1931, when the Aga Khan had made an offer of co-operation to Gandhi. Another thing made clear is Iqbal's faith in the attainment of Indian unity, in the realization that there were common interests on the basis of which this unity would be built, in the opinion that the present impasse was but a transient stage in the political evolution of India, and in the conviction that an understanding was bound to come. Still another thing we learn here is that in case such an understanding failed to emerge, Iqbal would once again stand by his earlier solution of re-distributing the provinces.

Any attempt to reconcile this statement of Iqbal's opinions with his popular image as the dreamer of Pakistan immediately comes up against four difficulties, which even his most tenacious supporters will not find it easy to overcome. In the first place, his emphasis on the unity of India and his sanguine hopes of winning it, as also his mention of common interests, set him apart, on the one hand, from those of his contemporaries and predecessors who saw nothing in common either between the Hindus and the Muslims or between Hinduism and Islam except a struggle for power which could only lead to the domination of one by the other, and, on the other hand, from his successors, among whom Jinnah stands supreme, who had lost all hope of an understanding and believed that a parting of the ways had become inevitable. Iqbal still hitched his wagon to the rapidly setting Indian star. In the second place, even if no agreement was forthcoming and the Hindu majority was to be installed in absolute power, the only solution Iqbal could offer was that of re-distribution of provinces. His gaze was still struck at an all-India federation with a number of autonomous Muslim provinces. He did not see partition as an alternative. In the third place, he was still fighting the narrow, by this time obsolete, battle of electorates. His re-distribution was aimed at doing away "with the question of electorates" and solving the communal pro-

blem "in its present form"—not at the deliverance of Islam or the freedom of Muslims.

Finally, we must not forget that when Iqbal was making these suggestions and expressing these hopes the call for a clear-cut partition with a name to itself had already been made by Rahmat Ali, for whom even to think in Indian terms was to strengthen the bonds of slavery, and to acquiesce in remaining a part of India was to sell the Islamic heritage to Hinduism. Iqbal must have known about the proposal of Rahmat Ali, for the message of Pakistan had reached the Punjab and was already agitating the mind of its youth. It is a proof of Iqbal's rejection of a solution by partition that at this time he issued a statement of this nature. This disposes of the unfounded claims of those who insist that Iqbal met Rahmat Ali in London and inspired him to think and plan for a partition of India. It passes understanding how a man who was arguing for a united India at the end of 1933 could have persuaded Rahmat Ali in 1931 or 1932 to demand a divided India.

That Iqbal was quite consistent in his opinion is once again borne out by what he wrote in 1934 in reply to Jawaharlal Nehru's remarks on Islam and nationalism which were published in the *Modern Review* of Calcutta. Clarifying the attitude of Islam towards nationalist ideals, Iqbal wrote: "Nationalism in the sense of love of one's county and even readiness to die for its honour is a part of the Muslim faith; it comes into conflict with Islam only when it begins to play the role of a political concept and claims to be a principle of human sodiarity [*sic.*] demanding that Islam should recede to the background of a mere private opinion and cease to be a living factor in the national life. In Turkey, Iran, Egypt and other Muslim countries it will never become a problem. In these countries Muslims constitute an overwhelming majority. . . . It becomes a problem for Muslims only in countries where they happen to be in a minority, and nationalism demands their complete self-effacement. In majority countries Islam accommodates nationalism; for there Islam and nationalism are practically identical; in minority countries it is justified in seeking self-determination as a cultural unit. In either case, it is thoroughly consistent with itself."<sup>15</sup> Then in one single sentence he applies this principle to India: "In so far as India is concerned I can say with perfect confidence that the Muslims of India will not submit to any kind of political idealism which would seek to annihilate their cultural identity."<sup>16</sup>

Here again there is no reference to a Muslim nationalism in India, or to a feeling among Indian Muslims which could lead to a separate nationalism. What agitates his mind is the fear of a cultural disintegration of Islam, not its political servitude; and it can scarcely be argued that here, for him, the one included or implied the other. Nor does he enunciate the principle that nationalism for the Indian Muslim is primarily based on his culture, otherwise the fear of cultural decay might have produced a national feeling. The fact that Iqbal stopped after indicating his anxiety about the disappearance of Muslim culture is a measure of his refusal to acknowledge the birth or existence of a separate Muslim nationalism.

### Modern Historians and the Address

The interpretation put forward in these pages, *viz.*, that Iqbal's Allahabad address can, by no rational process, be made to yield a demand for Muslim separation or for the creation of a Muslim state independent of an Indian federation, should not be considered an innovation, though the so-called Iqbal school may find it alien to its orthodoxy. Several writers and historians have read Iqbal in this way, and an account of their findings may help to put the issue in its perspective.

When Iqbal's letter to Edward Thompson, to which reference was made above, appeared in *The Times* on 12 October 1931, and was in the following weeks reproduced by many Indian English-language newspapers, a Muslim commentator, who used to write a regular column in the *Civil and Military Gazette* of Lahore under the pen-name of But Shikan (idol-breaker), deplored the "mischievous" way in which the Hindus and the British were spreading the wrong impression that Iqbal was advocating a separate Muslim state in the north-west. "How much misrepresentation there has been of Muslim views", he wrote, "is evident from the fact that Sir Muhammad Iqbal recently found it necessary to write to the London *Times* to contradict the mischievous suggestion that he and his fellow Pan-Islamists contemplated the creation of a group of Indian Muslim States, outside the British Commonwealth of Nations. The chain of Muslim States contemplated by Sir Muhammad Iqbal. . . was of course to have been a part of British India, and certainly of the British Commonwealth of Nations."<sup>17</sup> As far as we know no communication contradicting this was



published in this newspaper, nor did any controversy or discussion erupt in the correspondence columns, which would suggest that at that time even in Lahore the above interpretation was acceptable, at least to the English-reading Muslim elite.

Sir Reginald Coupland, perhaps the most astute British observer of modern Indian politics, reaches the same conclusion. He admits that Iqbal's language was ambiguous, but "it is clear from the rest of Sir Muhammad's speech that he was not contemplating a separate sovereign Muslim State but only the consolidation of the Muslim North-West in one political unit of an all-India federation".<sup>18</sup>

It was possible for Muslims holding opposite political views to agree on this version of Iqbal. Shawkatullah Ansari, a stout Congressman and a consistent critic of Muslim League politics, denied in 1944 that Iqbal originated the Pakistan idea.<sup>19</sup> In the same year, Sardar Iqbal Ali Shah, a strong supporter of Muslim separatism and a prolific publicist of the Pakistan plan, remarked that in his 1930 address Iqbal "had not shed the idea of Pakistan as an integral part of India, for Pakistan to Iqbal was to be of federal association with the rest of India".<sup>20</sup>

Before 1947 the origin, nature and prospects of the idea of a partition of India on Hindu-Muslim lines were studied in much detail by two prominent non-Muslim politicians: Dr. Ambedkar, the untouchable leader, and Dr. Rajendra Prasad, a leading Congressman who later presided over his party. Of these two treatments Dr. Ambedkar's is less prejudiced and reflects an earnest effort to understand the Muslim separatist sentiment.<sup>21</sup> Dr. Rajendra Prasad's study, though much slanted and frankly expressive of the Hindus point of view, is important because it represents the Congress attitude and also because on certain points it goes into greater detail. By the time his book was published the myth of Iqbal had come into its own, for he says, "It is generally said that it was the late Sir Muhammad Iqbal who first put forward the demand for a separate and independent Muslim State in his Presidential address. . .".<sup>22</sup> But when he comes to examine the text of the speech he reaches the conclusion that "in the scheme adumbrated by Sir Muhammad Iqbal there is no independent Muslim State without a Central Indian authority of any kind contemplated. He evidently wants a Federation in which the Units will be autonomous and suggests a new demarcation of boundaries

of the Provinces in the North-West so as to create a unit in which the proportion of Muslims will be greater and the area more manageable".<sup>23</sup>

It may also be relevant to point out that Iqbal's Allahabad address, no matter how one interprets it, finds no mention in the works of the two most outstanding English scholars of Islam. Professor Sir Hamilton Gibb, in his popular and frequently reprinted *Mohammedanism*, does not even hint at Iqbal's foreshadowing of Pakistan.<sup>24</sup> Alfred Guillaume, in his extremely sympathetic and widely-read book on Islam, has nothing to say about Iqbal's politics or their influence on the creation of Pakistan.<sup>25</sup> It is fair to suggest that had either of these perceptive students of Islam found any ground for thinking that Iqbal had foreseen Pakistan, he would have included this in his account.

A Hindu historian of the Muslim League also concedes that "it is true that Muhammad Iqbal's suggestion of a compact Muslim state at this stage did not altogether contemplate the possibility of secession from Indian polity", though he goes on to say that "but for this reason the fact of preaching Muslim isolation could not be rendered less effective".<sup>26</sup>

In recent years some Pakistani scholars, after a careful study of the Allahabad address, have come to the conclusion that the origin of Pakistan has to be discovered elsewhere. One of them, comparing the Allahabad suggestion with the later Pakistan demand, points out three significant differences. First, Iqbal "was thinking only of North-West India and not of Bengal". Secondly, he wanted a division of the Punjab with a view to excluding the non-Muslim majority districts. "In a way he was clearer than the formulators of the Lahore Resolution of 1940. West Pakistan of the future was to cover roughly the territory outlined by Iqbal." Finally, "Iqbal was agreeable to the idea of the North-Western Muslim state forming a part of the Indian Federation, if 'residuary powers' were left entirely to self-governing states".<sup>27</sup>

Another historian (Hafeez Malik) realizes that "on the basis of his historic Allahabad address Iqbal is considered to be the architect of the state of Pakistan", but his own opinion is that "this interpretation is only partially correct". His comment on Iqbal's exclusion of Bengal is short and sharp. "First of all, he is silent about the fate of the Muslims of East Bengal, who were in fact more numerous than the north-western Muslims. Whether this was

an oversight or deliberate omission is not clear." On the proposed state he writes that the words of the address "indicate that the north-western Muslim state that he envisioned was to be part of an Indian Confederation [*sic.*]. He failed to answer the question how this plan could work without creating friction between Hindus and Muslims. Perhaps he intended to be vague so that Muslim politicians would have sufficient leeway to work out details for a Muslim homeland". Perhaps not really happy with having treated Iqbal in this way, he concludes with the statement that "nevertheless, 'the seeds of Pakistan' can be found in Iqbal's address".<sup>28</sup>

Hafeez Malik's reference to an "Indian Confederation" within which Iqbal allegedly wanted to put his north-western consolidated Muslim unit is misleading. Confederation is not mentioned anywhere in his address or in his later statements, nor was it ever considered at the RTC or, earlier, by the Nehru and the Simon reports. The controversy raged between the supporters of the close-type federation in which the centre would be immensely powerful (the Hindus) and the advocates of a loose-type federation in which the component units would be in control of their own affairs and the federal government would be vested only with the minimum powers essential to the efficient working of the entire machinery (the Muslims). This, incidentally, leads to the reflection why no Muslim politician suggested a confederal solution to the Indian problem. It is true that confederations are notoriously difficult to work and that history provides few instances of successful confederal arrangements, yet one would have thought that a proposal of this kind would occur to some one between the rejection of the federal solution and the suggestion for a partition.

To make the story complete and to maintain the chronological order, I may mention here that my interpretation of Iqbal was first put forth in my doctoral thesis at the University of Manchester in 1957-59, and appeared in published form in 1963. There I had written that "it is vital to remember that his scheme was for a Muslim India within a larger Indian federation, and in no sense can he be said to have envisaged a sovereign and independent Pakistan".<sup>29</sup>

The latest historian to publish his conclusion confirming the above line of thinking is Waheeduzzaman. In the course of his study of Indian Muslim politics during the years 1928-1940, he

writers, "... it is important to note that Iqbal was using the word *state*, not with the meaning of a sovereign independent state but as a component and constituent unit of India". He finds support for this in Iqbal's reference, contained in the sentence immediately following the italicized enunciation of his own proposal, to the rejection of his scheme by the Nehru Report, and adds, "The framers of the Nehru Report were obviously not entertaining any idea of separating certain areas from the rest of India".<sup>30</sup> To leave no doubt on this point in his own mind, and in ours, he continues in the same firm tone, "To start with, Iqbal nowhere in this lengthy speech mentioned the term 'Pakistan'. He did not advocate the division of India. He nowhere suggested the creation of a separate independent state. His main concern was with 'Muslim India within India'. It is quite possible that Iqbal himself had not yet found the correct clue to the Indian political riddle, or, which [*sic.*] is perhaps more probable, he did not consider at this time that the situation called for such a solution".<sup>31</sup> And again, "All that he wanted was a loose federation with maximum Provincial autonomy and an amalgamation of the Punjab, NWFP, Sind and Baluchistan into one Province. This Province was to be a part of the Indian Federation and there was no suggestion of its separation from the rest of the country".<sup>32</sup> And once again, "The idea of Pakistan did not originate with him".<sup>33</sup>

Nothing could be clearer than this. But in another paragraph he has, probably inadvertently, contradicted himself. Writing about Iqbal's inestimable service in awakening the Muslims of India to their real situation, he says, "His contribution, it must be emphasized, was not so much in making a demand for a separate homeland for the Indian Muslims, but in the fact that he inspired a whole generation of Muslims to think on those lines and ultimately to make that demand. He prepared the ground for Jinnah who finally led the Muslims to the goal of Pakistan".<sup>34</sup> Was Iqbal making a demand for a separate homeland for the Indian Muslims? Here the impression is given that he was, though elsewhere the opposite case is argued in terms which brook no compromise. It is possible that here the author has in mind the Iqbal-Jinnah correspondence, not the Allahabad address. If that be so, the context should have been specified.

Later, at another place, Waheeduzzaman has claimed that in

making his Allahabad proposal Iqbal "had gone farther than any other Muslim political leader".<sup>35</sup> This assertion fails to take notice of some of Iqbal's predecessors, and in particular of Zulfikar Ali Khan. If he means that no other "Muslim political leader" had recommended the amalgamation of the four north-western provinces into one large area which would be a unit of the Indian federation, he is still wrong, since the Aga Khan's 1918 suggestion for an "Indus Provinces" had forestalled Iqbal's plan.

We may also take notice of a contemporary opinion. Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan, a well-known Punjabi politician of that period, was also of the belief that Iqbal's proposal was "in connection with an all-India federation".<sup>36</sup> The passage where this sentence occurs shows that this view of the Allahabad address is being taken for granted and needs no arguing or clarifying.

In 1967, I repeated my earlier interpretation of Iqbal and wrote, "It is grossly misleading to call him the originator of the idea of Pakistan or the poet who dreamed of partition. He never talked of partition. . . . It is one of the myths of Pakistani nationalism to saddle Iqbal with the parentage of Pakistan".<sup>37</sup> (It needs to be recorded, in passing, that I was pulled up severely for betraying the "national ideology" by several Pakistani scholars and writers. I quote two of my critics. The Director of the Iqbal Academy fancied it a duty of his office to remark: "I we accept this interpretation of the worthy scholar, the very basic conception of the demand of Pakistan as a separate homeland is totally shattered."<sup>38</sup> A columnist of an influential Urdu daily newspaper wrote that "it is clear" that this statement of "the famous historian K.K. Aziz" is "a part of the conspiracy aimed at diminishing the role of Iqbal in the creation of Pakistan and in the evolution of the concept of Muslim nationalism in the sub-continent";<sup>39</sup> the Urdu text runs: ". . . is saizish ka ek hissa hay jo Pakistan ke qyam aur barr-i-saghir men Muslim qawmiyyat ke tasawwur ke irtiqa ke silsila men Iqbal ke kirdar ko ghataney ki khatir ki ja rahi hain". I prefer not to speak about the unspeakable.)

It will be noticed that in this list of authors there are only four Pakistani names, and a number of points are common among them. All write in English, not in any Pakistani language. All are scholars, not journalists or popular writers. All were trained in research in the West. And, barring Waheeduzzaman, all published their books outside Pakistan. As for the exception, it may be

pointed out that Waheeduzzaman's book was written as a doctoral thesis in Toronto, though it was published in Pakistan.

Such writings are read by the English-knowing elite, not by the traditionally-educated class which receives all its knowledge from Urdu publications or by the common man whose literary effort is limited to reading Urdu newspapers, magazines and popular books which are by and large unreliable. None of these four authors has been translated in any local tongue. The importance of these facts lies in the conclusion that opinions expressed in such books do not travel far and have absolutely no effect on the continuing dissemination of the Iqbal myth which goes on from strength to strength. The historical truth or otherwise of these opinions is an irrelevant issue. What matters is that the prevalent orthodoxy, fully supported by the establishment, looks upon them as heresy, wrinkles its nose and goes its way. The impact of fresh thinking is blunted when its conclusions meet such deadly indifference from the scholars and such peurile abuse from the journalists.

### The Alleged Recantation

One small, but not unimportant, point need to be settled before we turn to a summing up of Iqbal's Allahabad proposal and its true place in the history of the idea of Pakistan. This concerns two different allegations that he recanted what he had proposed in December 1930.

The first to make a statement to this effect was Malik Barkat Ali, a lawyer from Lahore who later became a staunch supporter of the Muslim League and was for some years after 1937 the only Muslim League member in the Punjab legislative assembly. In 1931 he was in the "nationalist" camp, and was elected chairman of the reception committee for that year's session of the Punjab Nationalist Muslim Conference. Speaking in this capacity on 24 October, he said, "The conception of a divided India, which Sir Muhammad Iqbal put forward recently in the course of his Presidential utterance from the platform of the League, at a time when that body had virtually become extinct and ceased to represent free Islam—I am glad to be able to say that Sir Muhammad Iqbal has since recanted it—must not therefore delude anybody into thinking that it is Islam's conception of the India to be".<sup>40</sup> Another version of the same speech is slightly different: "The conception of a divided



India. . . must not delude anybody to think that that is Islam's conception of the India to be. *Even if Sir Muhammad Iqbal had not recanted it as some thing which could not be put forward by any sane person, I should have emphatically and unhesitatingly repudiated it. . .*"<sup>41</sup>

Two things about this assertion are clear. First, Barkat Ali had taken the Allahabad scheme to mean a division of India. Whether this was his own independently-arrived conclusion, or an impression borrowed or derived from current Hindu opinion which the "nationalist" Muslims always followed, is not clear and has no importance. Secondly, the date of this speech puts it beyond any doubt that he was referring to Iqbal's letter in reply to Edward Thompson published in *The Times* of 12 October. That letter had been reproduced by several Lahore newspapers and must have come to Barkat Ali's notice. In this letter, as we have seen, Iqbal had repudiated the idea that at Allahabad he had demanded the creation of a separate state in the north-west and had affirmed that his only suggestion was for a re-distribution of provinces with a view to easing the communal problem. The reference in the second of the above quotations to "something which could not be put forward by any sane person" paraphrases the language of Iqbal's letter, and makes it obvious that Barkat Ali was taking it as his authority for the inference that Iqbal had uttered a recantation. Barkat Ali's failure either to refer directly to the letter or to quote from it created the impression that he was either referring to a private communication of which the public was not aware or inventing a story to blacken the Muslim League. Surprisingly several Hindu and "nationalist" Muslim writers have quoted Barkat Ali without mentioning Iqbal's letter, thus creating the wrong impression that Iqbal was guilty of recantation and that Barkat Ali was the first to bring this withdrawal to public notice.

This incident has no inherent significance, and has been mentioned here merely to show how Iqbal's interpretation of his own proposal was given the unsightly and politically loaded name of recantation, and how cleverly the "nationalist" Muslims exploited the slightest possibility of making their political enemies look silly.

The second story about recantation has even less ground to stand upon. Its author is Edward Thompson, who wrote in one of his books on India: "In the *Observer* I once said that he [Iqbal]

supported the Pakistan plan. Iqbal was a friend, and he set my misconception right. After speaking of his own despondency at the chaos he saw coming 'on my vast undisciplined and starving land'. . . he went on to say that he thought the Pakistan plan would be disastrous to the British Government, disastrous to the Hindu community, disastrous to the Muslim community. 'But I am the President of the Muslim League and therefore it is my duty to support it'."<sup>42</sup> As this statement has been quoted with approval, almost glee, by several Hindu authors, including such responsible persons as Rajendra Prasad and Jawaharlal Nehru, and as Thompson was a writer of some popularity in England where the Left accepted him as a figure of liberal nobility, it is necessary to settle this controversy once for all by looking at its author and its antecedents.

Who was Edward Thompson? It is not known when he was born, but he died in 1946. By vocation an educational missionary, he taught at Bankura College in Bengal from 1910 to 1922, and was later given a fellowship at Oriel College, Oxford. He was neither a trained scholar nor a professional historian, but he wrote much on India. His only valuable book on India is a study of the native states. What endeared him to many anti-British Indians was his volume on the Mutiny, in which he tried to present the theory that the British atrocities during and after the uprising matched Indian excesses. Due partly to his missionary background, partly to his long stay among the vocal Bengali Hindus, and partly to his "liberal" beliefs which saw much virtue in the rigidity of the principle of majority rule in all areas of the Empire, he was an unflinching supporter of the Congress movement for independence and the Hindu plans for ruling all India. An interest in the future of the Indian minorities was to him nothing more than an unsavoury imperial move to keep India under the British yoke. Muslim claims for safeguards, protection and autonomy were to him nothing less than expressions of reaction, primitiveness and treachery to the cause of "Indian" freedom. Sincere in his own opinions, he was incapable of seeing the same virtue in the opinions of others.

A glance at some of his ideas about India and Indian Muslims will reveal his outlook and show the influences working upon him.

During the first RTC he acted, behind the scenes, as a spokesman of the Hindus. Suggesting outside arbitration to solve the

communal problem, a course which had already been rejected by the Muslims, he stated it as a "fact" that the younger Muslims were not as "communal minded" as the old ones.<sup>43</sup> When Muslim leaders, in a letter to *The Times* on 22 June 1931, expressed their resentment at this suggestion and this remark, he answered that it was a suggestion he had been "asked to make".<sup>44</sup> He did not say who had asked him to do so, but we know that the idea of tackling the Muslim problem through arbitration had been propounded in January by three Hindu (Mahasabha) leaders, M.R. Jayakar, B.S. Moonje, and S.B. Tambe.<sup>45</sup>

Towards the end of 1939, when even some of the Congress leaders had begun to weaken in their claims to represent the Muslims, Thompson continued to doubt if the Muslim League spoke for even a quarter of the Indian Muslims, and to assert that the Congress had a larger Muslim membership than the League's.<sup>46</sup> The rising popularity of the League, the growing strength of Jinnah, the continuous defeats of the Congress in provincial and central by-elections in Muslim constituencies—nothing could alter his belief in the Congress as the only true spokesman of India. In early 1941 he again claimed that the League had still a long way to go before it could be accepted as representing Muslim India.<sup>47</sup>

Echoing the Congress, he deplored the alleged British policy of giving the Muslim League a permanent veto on Indian constitutional advance.<sup>48</sup> A few years later he repeated the Hindu Mahasabha claim that the British had won the sovereignty of India from the Marathas, not the Muslims, implying that therefore sovereignty should revert to the Hindus when British rule was withdrawn.<sup>49</sup> Next year, he argued that Pakistan should not be conceded to the Muslims even if Gandhi and Jinnah agreed to it, for they had no right to decide this question. Neither of them was a Punjabi or a Bengali; the Punjab was being governed by a Hindu-Muslim-Sikh coalition; in Bengal, though Muslims had a slight majority, the "wealth and tradition and culture of the Bengali nation was overwhelmingly Hindu". Recalling the 1905 partition of Bengal, he uttered an historical falsehood by saying that it had been opposed so much by "all Hindus and Muslims" that it had to be annulled.<sup>50</sup> Indulging in the general habit, practised by the British left, of likening Hindu-Muslim rivalry in India to Catholic-Protestant friction in Britain, he declared that if Britain had been

occupied by a conqueror who then offered self-government on the condition that first the Catholics and the Protestants should be in agreement, "we should never have won freedom".<sup>51</sup>

The important point here is not that such opinions were held and expressed by Edward Thompson, for this was the general attitude of British liberals and socialists;<sup>52</sup> what is relevant for us here is to take notice of the kind of man we are dealing with when we come to consider his story about Iqbal.

It is obviously useless to expect objectivity from a commentator of these antecedents. His sympathies for the Hindus were too deep-rooted to let him view the Muslim question dispassionately. The examples I have quoted above also indicate his inability to treat facts with respect. He was not beyond uttering actual falsehoods in the pursuit of his own argument. In such a case, therefore, the historian has no obligation to accept his word unless there is unimpeachable corroboratory evidence to support it. And of that there is not an iota. On the contrary, there is much to disprove his allegation, both in his own statement and in attendant circumstances.

First of all, the book containing the allegation was published two years after Iqbal's death, when all unsupported statements about him were beyond any risk of contradiction by Iqbal himself. When Thompson was writing this book in 1939, he knew that Iqbal was dead and no longer in a position to confirm or deny what he was going to say about him. This should have obliged Thompson to present his evidence in chapter and verse, so that no doubt could be entertained. Even if he did not care for historical discipline, he owed something to the memory of the dead. But unfortunately he preferred to make a wild allegation which had nothing in its favour except his own tainted word and a proven prejudice and much against it.

Then, in making such a charge, Thompson is curiously indifferent to dates, though time is the essence of this story. He says that "once" he wrote that Iqbal supported the Pakistan plan. He does not say when. Nor does he give the date or text of Iqbal's letter in which he is supposed to have denied this. Such a letter, if it was ever written at all, could only have been written between January 1933, when the word "Pakistan" was born, and April 1938 when Iqbal died. But Iqbal never supported the Pakistan of Rahmat Ali, and this name was not given to the Muslim League

partition scheme till two years after Iqbal's death. Was Thompson referring to the Allahabad address, which he interpreted as a demand for separation? If so, it was grossly wrong to call it by the name of Pakistan; and Iqbal had already, in his letter to *The Times* of 12 October 1931, put a different construction on his 1930 proposal. Or, was Thompson referring to the scheme propounded by Iqbal in his letters to Jinnah written during 1937-38? But that is impossible, for the existence of these letters was unknown to all except Jinnah till quite late.<sup>53</sup>

There is also the added mystery of Iqbal's "confession" that he had to support the Pakistan plan because he was president of the Muslim League. Iqbal held this office only once, and that was in 1930 when he spoke at Allahabad. At that date the word "Pakistan" was yet unknown to the world, not to speak of forming a part of the Muslim League policy. When the League came to adopt it as its goal, in March 1940, Iqbal had been dead for two years. Is Thompson then referring to the year 1930-31? In that case, how can one use the word "Pakistan", even if Iqbal was believed to have urged a division at Allahabad?

Anyway, what is this "Pakistan" Thompson is talking about? If he means the plan put forward by Rahmat Ali, Iqbal was never a supporter of that. If he means the scheme propounded by Iqbal in 1937-38 in his correspondence with Jinnah (assuming that by some magic he knew the contents of these letters), Iqbal never recanted it, for he continued to press it on Jinnah till the day of his death. The word "Pakistan" was not in existence before 1933, and it was not in the vocabulary of the Muslim League till long after Iqbal's death.

Thompson's claim that Iqbal was a friend of his is also open to serious doubt. We know the names of Iqbal's English friends, and his correspondence with some of them has been published in the various collections of his speeches, writings and letters, or is available in scattered references in the biographies, autobiographies and memoirs of important figures of that period. Thompson does not get a mention anywhere. Nor is his name to be found in any of Iqbal's biographies, or in any of the accounts of Iqbal written by people who worked with him or were in close association with him. The conclusion is inescapable that Thompson's claim to Iqbal's friendship was put into this statement with a view to either pretending that he was well known to the great poet or to

lending a semblance of truth to the allegation he was making.

To sum up, in view of Thompson's life-long anti-Muslim campaign and the contradictions inherent in the statement itself, his allegation is too big a draft on our credulity to be taken seriously. By normal standards of checking historical documents the statement has every appearance of being a fabrication, and that is how it should be treated.

### A Re-Assessment

From what has been said about Iqbal in these pages it is evident that a re-assessment of his role in Indian Muslim politics, and especially in the history of the idea of Pakistan, is called for. We have seen how widely, one-sidedly and passionately he is misinterpreted, and an imaginary meaning is given to his words. The Allahabad address is a very important document even without making it out to be the first, or the first Muslim League, call for the creation of a Muslim state. Iqbal's refreshing view of communalism and its place in a society which was not yet a nation broke new ground.<sup>54</sup> His warning to the Muslims to beware of the dangers of accepting the western concept of nationalism underlined the fact that for them nationalism, when and in whatever shape and whatever name it came, would be an empty shadow unless it was given substance by Islam. In their society and thought there was no place for a secular, state-inspired and purely earth-bound nationalism which divorced the essence of life from its material existence, which took the husk to be the substance and the body to be the soul, which separated the unseparables, the creed from the people, the faith from the believers, which made Islam but an oriental version of Christianity, and which corrupted the religion of Allah in the name of a spurious reformation.

To use a modern, though horrible, word, this was the ideology Iqbal gave to his people. It is his mark of distinction that none before him had done so. The upholders of orthodox Islam seemed to be sending out a similar message from their fastnesses in Deoband and Farangi Mahal, but only seemed. They were preaching the non-existence of territorial nationalism in Islam and stressing its universalism. The conclusion they drew was the exact opposite of Iqbal's. There could be no Muslim nationalism in India because Islam gave no sanction to territorial nationalism;



therefore, there was an Indian nationalism of which the Muslims formed a part; therefore, the Congress was right in its claim to speak for all India; therefore, separate Muslim politics and parties had the sanction neither of Islam nor of political utility. This line of argument demonstrated how the same premisses can lead to diametrically opposed conclusions. But it is obvious that the divines of Deoband were making a very selective use of Islamic teachings. They chose from Islamic law and traditions whatever suited their purpose, and ignored the rest. They believed in the doctrine that nationalism had no place in Islam, for it buttressed their argument. But they showed no inclination to accept the much more fundamental belief that in Islam the secular and the sacred could not be separated. To them politics were an activity independent of religion; how else could they have justified, nay decreed, acquiescence in Congress policies? This dogma sat ill on the lips of religious leaders who claimed the monopoly of interpreting Islam. But stranger things have happened in history, or it would not be the exciting, tingling, flaming study that it is.

Iqbal, who was neither a *mawlawi* nor a *mulla* nor an *'alim* in the conventional sense, had a higher vision of Islam and a nobler view of mankind. His spirit was liberal to the core and completely at one with his true faith. He refused to see Islam as a set of static, unmoving and unmovable principles to be interpreted by a narrow class of *mullas* and to be accepted by the commonality with a look of spiritual ecstasy. This is not the place to discuss Iqbal's philosophical ideas,<sup>55</sup> but one or two basic points may be mentioned since they colour the entire body of his thinking.

He maintained that the human ego possesses creative freedom, and he found its sanction in the Quran. For him the fall of man had a different, more meaningful, significance. Human development had brought the human mind to a level where a finite ego emerged with the power to choose. In claiming this revolutionary destiny for man he parted company with the traditionalists of the Islamic world. To the ordinary mortals this belief taught a great lesson: that man is the maker of his destiny. The doctrine of fatalism, so dear to the orthodox heart and so popular an image of the Muslim in the West, he regarded as immoral, irreligious and degrading. It was an invention, he said, of those who had no understanding of philosophical truth, no grasp of the intention of God in creating the universe and no interest in the inherent quality

of the human ego. Man is the "co-worker" of God, and how can he be that if he wears the shackles of predestination? No legal interpretation of Islam could claim finality, and reasoning and interpretation were the rights of every Muslim.

To elect such a man to be the president of the Muslim League was indeed a revolutionary step, though it is very doubtful if those who nominated him realized the nature of their action.<sup>56</sup> It is not surprising that the League ignored his political suggestions which were by no means revolutionary or even radical. But it is astonishing that his colleagues and followers took no notice of his attempts to re-cast Islamic thinking in a new mould. The wind of liberalism which blew from him did not reach his people, for between him and they stood the rock of inherited custom and long tradition.

To turn to his politics, I have shown that his scheme did not go beyond creating a large Muslim province in the north-west which could protect the interests of a portion of Indian Muslims and enable them to find a better place in the federal structure of India. It is impossible to find any evidence for the theory that he demanded a separate Muslim state, country or homeland. There is nothing to indicate this in his poetry written before or after 1930. For one who could find time and inclination to write on every facet of Islam and even on such topical and minor subjects as Nawab Zulfiqar Ali Khan's motor car and the corrupting influence of the *pirs* of the Punjab, it would not have been difficult to write verses on a concept of such vital importance. We also fail to discover any references to such a proposal in his letters, speeches, writings, interviews and political statements. He also did not use the RTC as a platform to propound or reiterate the doctrine of separation. It is reasonable to think that before making such a far-reaching suggestion he would have consulted some of his close friends, his political supporters and one or two among Muslim leaders. Did he do this? We have no knowledge. If he did so, how did they react to his proposal? Again, we have no information. If he failed to consult them, there ought to have been strong reasons for it; but they have not been communicated to us.

The Muslim League took no notice of his proposal, and this opens another chapter of mysteries. Had Iqbal been really asking the League to endorse a partition scheme, one can understand the reluctance of the party to commit itself to such a course of action

without notice, and without the benefit of the advice of almost the entire leadership which was then away in London; though it should be recalled that in 1930 partition was no longer a revolutionary proposition, for several prophetic voices had already given tongue to it and the 1929 Khilafat Conference had heard of it officially from its formal platform.

But Iqbal was not offering a partition to the Muslim League. He gave a much narrower and less radical suggestion for the amalgamation of certain provinces in one region with a view to strengthening the Muslim position in the coming federation. Even this was implicitly but unmistakably rejected by the party. Why? Was it so enamoured of the federal solution that it was not prepared to accept any major change in its structure? Were the delegates so provincial-minded that they were not ready to merge the separate identities of their provinces even in the hope of better things to come? Or, was it that those from the rest of India were repelled by the parochial nature of the suggestion which, as they saw it, would leave a very large part of their co-religionists under Hindu control? Or, did the League fail to attach any importance to the words of a poet, because he had been invited to preside over its deliberations not as a statesman whose reflections were to be heeded but as a renowned poet who deserved to be honoured by election to high public office?

If the League ignored his proposal because the leaders were not available for consultation, it should have taken it up for consideration in its next session; but it did not. Was it because it failed to win approval of other leaders who had now returned to India? With the League in such an impossibly un-co-operative mood Iqbal should have carried his scheme to some other party or group. His plans for a special conference to promote his ideas fell through. But he was given a valuable opportunity to give his theory a second try when the Muslim Conference chose him its president in 1932. However, he did not care to reiterate his plan before a gathering which was more representative than his 1930 audience. Is it that the indifference of the League had broken his heart, and he did not find in himself enough patience or strength to repeat something to which another assembly had given so scant an attention?

Perhaps, the explanation lies not in the refusal of the League but in the will of public opinion which seemed to confirm the

League's inaction. The eloquent silence with which his scheme was greeted by the public and the press must have gladdened the hearts of the League delegates. How right they had been in rejecting a suggestion which public opinion had refused to take up! Some of them may even have congratulated themselves on their prescience. Did it not show that they had their finger on the pulse of the nation, and were therefore perfectly qualified to guide its destinies? Iqbal saw the direction of the wind and felt, how strongly we don't know, that it was not blowing his way.

Politicians are a stubborn tribe and must have a hard skin (their friends call it resilience) in order to practise their profession. Had Iqbal belonged to this order he might have persisted in his ideas, offered them again and again to the people, fought for them, and then left the decision to the goddess of luck who, in spite of her reputed fickleness, seems to smile on so many politicians. But he was a poet, and poets are a sensitive race. He was given to making exquisite verses which people read and heard and memorized and sang. He did not have to push them down their throats. That was the work of demagogues, not of poets. He was also a seer who pointed the way with his finger and passed on. Not for him to argue and cajole and protest, to plead and flatter and browbeat. He showed the rising star and blessed the flock. If others saw only the setting sun and needed no benediction, so much the worse for them. One attempt was enough. He would not give his people the benefit of the doubt. Had they heard him the first time he had spoken, he might have spelt out the idea. But if they were not interested, nor was he; and he passed on to other things. The idea died, as all ideas do when their creators turn their backs on them. With a scowl of disapproval upon his brow Iqbal let the idea perish. If asked, probably he would have answered that it deserved this end.

This general indifference to his proposal also gives a clue to the slight influence he exercised on his contemporaries, on schemes of partition or near-partition propounded by others in the early 'thirties, and on the general course of Muslim politics. The one outstanding plan for a clear-cut division put forward after the Allahabad address was that of Rahmat Ali. As we will see in the following chapter, Iqbal's admirers have made extravagant claims about his influence on Rahmat Ali, even going to the length of saying that Iqbal coined the name "Pakistan" for Rahmat Ali's

Muslim state, though there is absolutely no first-hand or reliable evidence to support this. When Iqbal himself had made a firm declaration that his suggestion was not for a partition but for a re-distribution of provincial boundaries, how could he have inspired Rahmat Ali who did not believe in an India and who argued from quite a different set of arguments to reach a very different conclusion?

As far as Jinnah is concerned there is again no evidence, direct or indirect, that the two men knew each other well during this period, or that Iqbal had any place in Jinnah's thinking until several years later when he began to write to Jinnah. The year 1935 is a marked watershed in Muslim politics in India, not so much because of the passing of the new constitutional act, but because of the new direction taken by Muslim political thinking with the reappearance of Jinnah on the Indian scene. A new age began, which we can rightly call the Jinnah age, in which a new leadership created a new organization to pursue a new policy. What had gone before seemed so far away, not in terms of years and months but in terms of policies, men, aims and circumstances.

Part of the responsibility for the controversy about Iqbal and the precise meaning of his scheme must be borne by him. Clarity was not a virtue which he practised when writing in English. Several of his statements were vague and lent themselves to more than one interpretation. Sometimes he seemed to rejoice in ambiguity, hardly realizing that in political thinking it created the same confusion of which he himself had once accused other Muslim politicians.<sup>57</sup> Of course, imprecision in expression is sometimes useful to a politician when he does not want to make himself clear in order not to make a commitment. Similarly, ambiguity has the advantage of providing convenient loopholes of escape when some imprudent public utterance comes home to roost.

But Iqbal was not speaking during a campaign on the hustings where he might have wanted to cover his words with a cloth of many colours. Nor was he attacking a particular official policy or decision, where circumspection and caution dictated roundabout phrases which could contain everything from something to nothing. Nor was he writing a political manifesto in which there is a famine of commitment in a flood of promise. Nor was he speaking extempore, or from memory, or from brief, hastily-scribbled notes. A written, printed text lay before him which he

read out in his clear, firm voice. He was addressing a respectable assembly from a responsible rostrum on an important occasion. He had brought a new message for his people, a fresh idea, a novel concept, a new ideal, and he had brought it in italics. It was incumbent upon him to spell it out clearly, in crystalline brilliance, in shining clarity, in terms which commanded a single meaning, in accents of ringing transparence into which doubt dared not enter. Instead, he made an announcement which opened the door wide to controversy. He talked of many things in the same breath: the overpowering role of Islam, the impossibility of a territorial Muslim nationalism, the undesirability of a divorce between the spiritual and the temporal, safeguards, separate electorates, a loose federation, autonomous provinces, consolidation of the north-west, a future inside or outside the British Commonwealth, the Delhi Resolution, the threat of a vague, unnamed direct action in the future, and so on. There was something for everyone in this package deal. What he really wanted to put across was driven out of sight by a plethora of qualifications. His scheme seemed to say one thing, his context quite another.

This confusion comes out well if we compare the Allahabad speech with other Muslim League presidential addresses. A perusal of Jinnah's addresses from 1937 onwards tells the difference. They are by no means pieces of well-written, even passable, prose, but they invite us to enter a world of certitude, a universe of imperatives. He knows what he wants to say, and says it without leaving his meaning unclear. His mind cannot be misunderstood. His ideas are definite, almost tangible. He wants either this or that, he rejects such and such a policy, he follows one guiding star and points it out to the public with a finger as steady as a rock. He deals in certainties which turn doubts to gossamer.

It is inconceivable that the Allahabad speech would have been made by a Jinnah or a Shafi, a Hasrat Mohani or a Muhammad Ali. Is it simply because Iqbal was a poet and given to play with words? This is not enough of an answer, because he spoke in English while he sang in other languages, and above all because he was also a lawyer. If his imagination led him into a riot of ideas, his legal training should have pulled him back. If his eye had seen a vision which he wanted his people to share with him, the lawyer's exactitude should have lent it precision. He did not do this, either at Allahabad or on later occasions. At different times he gave



different interpretations of his original plan. He had many opportunities to remove doubt, and either to repeat his suggestion in unmistakable language or to announce that it meant nothing more than a provincial re-arrangement. He did not use them, and left us with a controversy which still flourishes.

If we accept his proposal as a definite offer on behalf of the Muslim League, it is still doubtful if it would have won the support of Muslim India. He ignored Bengal to the chagrin of the Bengali Muslim. Though it may be argued that since under the majority principle Bengal would be one large Muslim province in the federation it needed no special mention, yet he was suggesting an all-India solution from a national platform, and indifference to Bengal, however unintentional, was bound to create misgivings among the sensitive Bengalis. If his interest was limited to the north-west, and the plans for an Upper India Muslim Conference show that it was, he was exposing himself to the charge of parochialism. He was entitled to his opinion, but he should not have made the Muslim League a vehicle for his purely regional ambitions.

By putting the Muslims of the minority provinces out of his calculations he gave a lie to his claim that the future of Indian Islam agitated his heart. It is quite true that as things stood nobody could have done anything for those Muslims. None of the proposals aimed at re-arranging, re-grouping, re-distributing or dividing India could rescue the badly scattered faithful (except Rahmat Ali's, which was impracticable in this aspect). When later Pakistan became a reality these people still stayed outside its scope. But the point is that by banishing them from his consciousness and from his consideration, Iqbal made his scheme even less palatable to Muslim India as a whole. It will be remembered that as late as 1939 the Raja of Mahmudabad was constrained to refer to Iqbal's proposal as unacceptable to Indian Muslims because of its "fundamental weakness" that "it left out of account the fate of Muslims scattered in the provinces where the Hindus happened to be in the majority", and also because it took no notice of Bengal, and gave no attention to the future of Hyderabad, Bhopal and other Muslim native states.<sup>58</sup>

It may be said in reply that Jinnah too was guilty of leaving the Muslims of the minority provinces to their fate. But there were two important differences between Iqbal and Jinnah. Iqbal's gaze

was limited to a part of India, Jinnah's covered the whole of it. Iqbal wanted a regional solution, Jinnah a national one. Iqbal was fighting for a portion of Indian Islam, Jinnah for the entirety. Iqbal would have broken the national strength of the Muslim League, Jinnah aimed at making it the equal of the Congress. Iqbal was content with a Muslim India within India, Jinnah wanted a sovereign existence. Iqbal wished to build up a united India on the basis of an internal harmony, Jinnah aspired to make the Muslim areas independent and free of all dangers of Hindu rule. Iqbal was arguing the case of a region, Jinnah the case of a nation.

In the second place, Jinnah was a more skilful politician. He could persuade the Muslims of Hindu India that a Pakistan without them would still be a deliverance of Indian Islam and would still save the maximum possible number of Muslims. Would not a minority of the nation, he asked, make sacrifices so that the majority of the nation became free? Because he put it like this the people followed him—even those people who had nothing to gain from supporting him and everything to lose. Iqbal's attitude was different. He turned his back on these people and talked only of the north-west. He did not appeal for their help. He did not count them among his people, as he did not believe in the two-nation theory. He did not ask for their support and sympathy; perhaps he thought he did not need them in the campaign he was going to mount. He surrendered his national leadership of his own accord by narrowing down his territorial solution to a certain part of India, and by making himself its major exponent. Even if the final result was the same as that of the Muslim League's Pakistan, his attitude was revealed to be vastly different. And in political and national movements attitudes of leaders are of the utmost importance.

Yet the myth that Iqbal dreamt of Pakistan in 1930 was created. A variety of factors and sentiments helped to sustain it. One was sheer momentum. Once the myth got going there was nothing to oppose it. Extraneous sentiments pushed it forward. As the poetic genius of Iqbal entered the national consciousness more and more, the line between the poet and the politician grew dim and gradually disappeared. As his fame as a thinker and philosopher grew the origin of many things was attributed to him, until an indomitable folklore gathered around him which reverence made stronger and tradition more sacred. Another factor was the absence

of an alternative myth. The belief that he had originated the idea of Pakistan was allowed to develop because the names of those who had really done so were allowed to remain in oblivion. Still another factor was the lack of objectivity. No serious effort was made to discover the origin of Pakistan, to identify the person or persons who might have spoken of it, and to find out the truth behind the myth. Comfortable conclusions took the place of history. Wishful thinking overpowered facts. Sentiment vanquished reason. The myth-makers got a myth by wanting one. A final factor was the need of owning a great intellectual as the father of the idea. In every nationalist movement there are men of letters who illumine the idea of freedom by their literary efforts. They become a part of the national tradition. They are poets, novelists, dramatists, philosophers, essayists and historians, but they are also intellectual fighters in the struggle for national existence. The Muslims, too, wanted a great literary figure who could be said to have inspired the national struggle or at least to have given the nation a noble goal. Iqbal, in their eyes, fulfilled these qualifications, and at once a shrine was raised to him.<sup>59</sup>

What the myth-makers forgot was that the Muslim League itself, which fought for and won Pakistan, did not share their belief in the myth. It ignored Iqbal in 1930, when he was its elected president, by choosing to take no notice whatsoever of his proposal. But, of course, at that time the myth did not exist. When Iqbal died in 1938, the League once again gave him no special plaudits. It was customary at the annual session and in the Council meeting immediately preceding the session to adopt resolutions condoling the passing away of all prominent Muslims who had died since the previous session. In the resolution on Iqbal's death passed by the Muslim League Council in its meeting at Delhi on 4 December 1938 there is no mention of his Allahabad proposal, even of his letters to Jinnah of a much later date, or of any special contribution made by him to the national movement. He is praised as a great poet and as a philosopher of Islam.<sup>60</sup> That is all. The annual session at Patna in December repeated this resolution without any change, except the substitution of "the Council of the All India Muslim League" with "this session of the All India Muslim League".<sup>61</sup> The party did not even refer to the fact that he was once its president.

So much for the occasion of his death—a time when usually

mourners closely examine the career of the departed soul for anything worthwhile to be recorded in the formal condolences. Apparently the myth had still not arrived. The next occasion, the greatest by its nature and timing, came in March 1940 when the Muslim League met in Lahore to demand Pakistan. The venue of the session was the vast ground next to the great mosque of Awrangzeb in the compound of which Iqbal lay buried. Throughout the long session, its presidential address delivered by Jinnah with fervour but without notes, the momentous Lahore Resolution which tolled the bell for Indian unity and rang in the new Muslim nationalism, the fighting and eloquent speeches made in support of partition, the resolutions passed on various topics ranging from Palestine to the Khaksars and from the powers of the Working Committee to the election of the honorary secretary and honorary treasurer—throughout all this nobody mentioned Iqbal's name, nobody referred to him as the father of the idea which was now being enshrined in the national demand. The myth, it seems, had yet to come.

Immediately after the session, Iqbal's admirers from all communities and circles held a meeting in the University Hall to observe the "Iqbal Day" and to pay tributes to the poet-philosopher. A.K. Fazlul Haq, the Bengali Muslim League leader who had moved the Lahore Resolution, presided over the first session; Jinnah chaired the second session. In his speech, Jinnah paid a glorious tribute to Iqbal when he said, "If I live to see the ideal of a Muslim State being achieved in India, and I was then offered to make a choice between the works of Iqbal and the rulership of the Muslim State, I would prefer the former." Iqbal was a dynamic personality, he added, and had made the greatest contribution towards rousing and developing Muslim national consciousness. Sir Abdul Qadir, a former president of the Muslim League and a man of letters, also addressed the meeting. Among others who spoke were Hafeez Jullundhuri, Khawaja Ghulam-us-Sayyidain, S.A. Rahman, Ghulam Ahmad Parvaiz and Nawab Bahadur Yar Jung.<sup>62</sup> Still there was no mention of his Allahabad speech or even of his Muslim League presidentship.

The Iqbal myth was not the handiwork of the Muslim League or of Muslim politicians. It was a group of popular writers, journalists and other propagandists of the Pakistan campaign which gradually brought in his name, as if it were an argument, to prove

the righteousness of the demand. It is not a sudden sentiment, they seemed to say, not an upstart idea; look at Iqbal who showed the way in as far back as 1930. A great poet had seen the vision, and he could not have been wrong. The Muslim League had been told of it ten years ago, and the demand immediately became respectable in their eyes by thus gaining relative antiquity. From that onwards the myth rolled on, becoming stronger with every mention of his name, gaining in credibility with every new book and pamphlet, and, with the coming of independence, becoming a part of the official national tradition. Extravagant claims were made for an imaginary proposition and went unchallenged. Truth was suppressed in the interest of a doubtful cause, and no protests were heard.

For those who want to see history as it happened, free of all assumptions however serviceable, pure of all dross however attractive, clear of all prejudices however convenient, the saddest thing about the myth is that, in an attempt to credit Iqbal with something he did not do, it succeeded in ignoring the vital role he actually played in the life of the Indian Muslims. He created an awakening of which there is no parallel in their history.

In the reconstruction of Islamic thought, Iqbal's major contribution was the introduction of a liberal tendency which was capable of leading to radical social and legal reforms. Some of his ideas were genuinely fresh and amounted to a revolution in religion and theological thinking. In interpreting the Quran and assessing the role of man in divine creation he broke with a thousand year-old tradition which had become an unquestioned and unquestionable dogma in Islamic thought. It is true that at times Iqbal could not go all the way in accepting the conclusions of his own premisses, and ended with indefinite references to the cake of custom and the difficulty of breaking ancient tradition. By and large, however, his thinking was consistent and courageous, and could have resulted in widespread and far-reaching changes had his ideas been accepted by the Muslim society.

They were not accepted for several reasons. One was his radicalism which repelled the majority of the traditionalists, who were accustomed to the well-known path of obedience to the old masters and could not distinguish between reform, innovation, impudence and heresy. Dogma as enunciated of old was for them the essence of their faith, and against that they were not prepared

to hear a word of criticism. The general conservative character of the society was another factor working against the acceptance of Iqbal's reformist ideals. Led by the fundamentalists, demoralized by the humiliation of living under a foreign rule, turned reactionary by lack of education, and corrupted by the enveloping influence of folk religion, the Indian Muslim society had learnt to look backwards and inwards; and so impervious was this crust of tradition that neither Shaikh Ahmad of Sirhind nor Shah Waliullah of Delhi, neither Sayyid Ahmad Khan nor Sayyid Ameer Ali, had succeeded in showing it the wrongness of its ways and the perils of its attitude.

Another thing which stood in the way of Iqbal was the general tendency of the Muslims to shun fresh thinking and hug the conventions—a not uncommon phenomenon in history when a civilization is passing through its years of decline. Innovation is a taboo when traditions govern the mind to the exclusion of independent thinking. It is so easy to bandy about charges of *kuf*r when new ideas are working to dethrone long-cherished theories. Finally, Iqbal's English prose did not encourage wide reading. His lectures on Islamic thought, which gave a new turn to Islamic philosophy and theology and should have been compulsory reading for all educated Muslims, are written in a heavy, unattractive style, which suffers from lengthy sentences, involved expressions and turgid constructions. Moreover, he wrote in a language which was unknown or unpalatable to a large number of traditional-minded Muslims, whose oriental learning and knowledge of the faith were deep, but who knew little of western learning and even less of modern methods of rational thinking. The Urdu translation of the lectures that I have seen seems to have been made with the express purpose of repelling the reader.

In poetry, Iqbal's most mature and deepest thought is to be found in his Persian verses. He had taken up Persian as the vehicle of his ideas in order to be understood beyond the confines of India. When he wrote this poetry almost every educated Indian Muslim had a fair knowledge of the language and could follow his message. It is a tragic coincidence that with the coming of independence Persian gradually lost its pre-eminent place in the culture and study of Pakistanis, and today only a few among the educated can read and understand Iqbal's finest work.

In consequence of all this, Iqbal's ideas about Islam were



circulated within a small circle. The modern-educated elite read him. Students of philosophy at the universities studied his lectures as a part of their syllabus. Beyond this narrow group it is doubtful if his lectures and Persian works were read by more than a few persons. The impact of his liberal thinking was therefore severely restricted. His revolutionary ideas failed to inspire any general movement of social purification, economic uplift and religious transformation, which should, in all logic, have appeared and could, in all probability, have changed the face of Muslim society in India and also elsewhere.

Fortunately, what Iqbal lost in the failing influence of his philosophy he gained in the rising popularity of his (Urdu) poetry. As a poet he added lustre to the annals of Urdu literature which were already distinguished in the volume and quality of their poetry. By common consent he is the greatest poet in any language that Muslim India produced in its history of a thousand years. In the art of *ghazal* Mir and Ghalib were more polished in the traditional style. In philosophical interest Ghalib approaches him but only when he touches the heights of his art. In wit and sweet mischief Dagh stands unique, but in some of his verses Iqbal bears favourable comparison.

The greatness of Iqbal lies in the wide, almost limitless, range of his power. He can write simple, unadorned lines which school children can understand and have understood for decades: some of them were sung as the morning prayer by the school assembly even before independence. He is capable of producing natural, unaffected poems transmitting elementary moral lessons in a most moving way: "man ka khwab" is a good example of this. He can write verses of light wit, unwounding humour and cutting satire if the spirit moves him. But his highest art is revealed in the serious Urdu and Persian poems, where his theme is God, Satan, man and the universe. Like the Greek poets of old, like Kalidasa and Dante and Milton and Goethe, like the classical giants of Persia, he is at his best when he sings of the creation of the living universe; the divine effulgence of God whose power is as unique as His compassion is universal; the pride of Satan which over-reaches him and the inevitable command of exile goes forth, and his fall which, however unangelic, has an exciting grandeur in the event and has coloured the life of man through the ages; the coming of man to earth when an angelic horde welcomes his earthly spirit and pro-

phesies the unlimited possibilities of good and evil embedded in his nature; the fundamental, universal conflict of good and evil and the story of man wrestling with the devil within him; the love of the youth for the maiden, of the mother for the child, of man for man, and, above all, of man for God and of God for man; the over-powering, dazzling spark of sacred love which knows no limits, fears no obstacles, acknowledges no weaknesses, makes no compromises, shuns no sacrifices, and ends in the ultimate fusion of the sacred and the profane, the worldly and the ethereal, the material and the spiritual, the final mystic vision of the creator of all things, where the longing, burning human heart finds what it seeks and rejoices in the fulfilment.

As in substance so in form, Iqbal's range of thought and subject matches his ability to shape the suitable mould. Art and form go hand in hand. Thought and its vehicle are beautifully yoked together. There is no *genre* of oriental prosody, classical or modern, which lies beyond his inventive power. Every form he touches comes out in perfect shape. The means of conveying the idea are selected to conform to the nature of the idea. Variety is thus achieved, and beauty of expression enhanced. There is no thought that misses the exact form which will clothe it in raiment of glory. There is no form that does not carry in its bosom a noble heart-beat.

How could such a poet fail to move the heart and soul of the nation? Nothing like this had been seen before. Sublimity of thought kept pace with an unearthly loveliness of words. Be it in Urdu or in Persian, the music bursts forth, now in a crash of symbols reverberating to the end of time, now in soothing, soft tones, not exactly a pleasure in itself but a statement of intent to please, at one moment pounding out the beats of a glad heart in repetitive ease, at another measuring out joys and sorrows of man in long syllables. The lyric quality is supreme. Every note is chosen for its effectiveness and suitability. Voices rise and fall with the unfolding of the story. Short, choppy lines speak in anger, complaint or arrogance. Long, vibrant phrases express sorrow, anguish and yearning. Philosophy speaks in its own upright syllables which keep faith with the purity of the theme. Love uses its own swinging, teasing, tingling phrases which seem to come from another world.

The impact of this poetry had a shattering effect on the com-

placency of the Muslim mind. Poetry has always enjoyed greater force to move the heart than words arranged in prose order. Love of words strung in music is man's most ancient heritage and his earliest love. In all Muslim societies poetry has had a special place. When the songs of Iqbal were read or heard, every one woke up and found his blood set astir. Here was someone revealing the unseen, uncovering the mystery of life veil by veil, speaking of things ever felt by the heart but never given a voice. Above all, he spoke of Islam, of its rise to greatness from humble Arab origins, of its glories sung by friends and envied by enemies, of its decline and fall which was a tragedy for mankind and a blight to world civilization, and of another rise, another great future, another age of achievement, which will come if the faithful renew their oath of fealty to God, their vow of faith in the Quran, their promise of loyalty to the Prophet, and their pledge to the service of mankind. He pointed to the West, to its glittering prizes of doubtful merit, to its corrupting materialism which weighed everything in the scales of gold, to its inverted values which assuaged the misery of the poor at the cost of faith in God, to its technological progress which silenced the voice of the heart in the clang and clatter of the machine, to the anarchy creeping nigher and making nought of the spiritual quest of man. He warned that the path of salvation lay not through the heresy, the confusion and the chaos of the modern world cast in the image of the heretical West, but through the pure, natural stirrings of the heart which spoke, not always in vain, of the need for love, of a search for the higher good, and of the craving for the brotherhood of man. Islam was the highest stage of this surrender to the good in man, and only by following its dictates was he to become great once more. The path to achievement led to infinite summits, and nothing lay beyond his capacity. The only barrier was man's own defeatist mentality bred by bending the knee before false deities. Shed the worship of these tin gods, cleanse the heart of all dross, he called, and you can achieve the impossible. Man is the maker of his destiny; to deny this is to deny God. Once he develops his will his grasp will over-reach the stars.

The ordinary reader of Iqbal did not understand his allegories, his philosophical touches, or even all his allusions to Islamic history. But he did not have to understand them to be moved by his poetry. The message came through, vivid and clear. It was a call

to action. It was an appeal to become self-reliant, self-respecting, honourable. It was a command to come back to Islam, the pristine fount of truth, not the lifeless dogma preached by the *mulla*. Some understood Iqbal, many more heard of his words, nearly all were influenced by him. Those who could not read had his poems recited to them. Whole poems were learnt by heart and recited to one another. Verses were quoted to suit the occasion: an old, pleasing habit of Muslims all over the world. Even those who knew no Urdu or Persian were conscious of his influence; some of them made his acquaintance through translations or Urdu- and Persian-knowing friends. In literature as well as in popular thinking this was the age of Iqbal: His presence was felt throughout the land and moulded the consciousness of men.

The upshot was that to everyone—from the illiterate who had his Iqbal on hearsay through the half-educated who knew him on the second or third remove up to the elite who read and appreciated him—Iqbal brought one message: "You are a Muslim". For the first time Indian Muslims became intensely conscious that they were Muslims. The first quickening had come with the Khilafat movement, when politics had become almost solely a religious affair with the future of the *khalifa* in jeopardy and the integrity of the Ottoman Empire in grave peril. But soon, rather too soon, the years had rolled away, the Khilafat had gone the way of all traditional institutions which have outworn their original purpose, and the one great Islamic empire of the descendants of Osman had shrunk to a small, secular republic. The Indian Muslims were frustrated, a little angry and wholly dispirited. They sank into inaction, and would have stayed in that twilight of lethargy had Iqbal not come to revive them. Their national problems were being tackled by the politicians, but this was not the age of democracy, nor was the Muslim League yet a mass organization. Some one was needed who could reach the common man, capture his attention and shake him out of his deadly ignorance. Iqbal did this, and it was his greatest achievement. He made a nation out of his people. He made them painfully aware of their inability to go forward without faith in themselves. He prepared them for great things: for the days that were coming when every shoulder would be needed at the wheel, for the sacrifices which would be required of them before the sun of freedom rose and made them fully human.

This is what Iqbal did, and by this he should be judged in history. By no means was this an ordinary achievement. To awaken a fallen people to the sense of their fall, to move them to action, to revive their faith in themselves, to make them feel the impact of and the need for Islam, to force them to grow up into thinking adults, to rekindle the torch of self-respect which burned so low in their breast, to create a thinking community out of a sapless, sluggish mass of half-living creatures—few in human history are given to achieve this, and fewer achieve it so well as he did. For any man, whatever his role in human affairs, this should be enough to immortalize his memory. It is an impertinence to try to add to his achievements by fabricating events and putting false gloss on history. He licked his people into shape and prepared them for the acceptance of the idea of Pakistan. The idea was not his, but the force behind its coming belonged to no one else. In this sense he occupies the highest place in the development of the idea of Pakistan, and history shall always honour his memory.

## NOTES

1. G. Allana, *Quaid-i-Azam Jinnah: The Story of a Nation*, Karachi, 1967, p. 299.
2. Muhammad Iqbal to Sir Francis Younghusband, *CMG*, 30 July 1931. The letter is also reproduced in Shamloo, *Speeches and Statements of Iqbal*, Lahore, 2nd ed 1948, pp. 164-169.
3. See this statement in B.A. Dar (ed), *Letters and Writings of Iqbal*, Karachi, 1967, pp. 54-62. The editor gives no date to this interview, but it must have been in August 1931 as the Conference opened in London on 17 September.
4. Edward Thompson, letter, *The Times*, 3 October 1931.
5. Muhammad Iqbal, letter, *ibid.*, 12 October 1931.
6. Muhammad Iqbal, Presidential Address, AIMC, Lahore Session, 21 March 1932, Shamloo, *op. cit.*, pp. 38-39. A summary of the address is available in *IAR 1932*, Vol I, pp. 301-306, and in *CMG*, 23 March 1932.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 40.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 44.
9. *Ibid.*, pp. 41-42.
10. Letter reproduced, in part, in B.A. Dar (ed), *Anwar-i-Iqbal*, Karachi, 1967, p. 209, and Taswir Hamidi, "Pakistan ka Tasawwar", *Jang*, 23 March 1978. Dar gives the date as 8 June, Hamidi as 5 July; probably Dar's is correct.
11. Muhammad Iqbal, Statement on the Sikh Demands, 25 July 1932, Shamloo, *op. cit.*, pp. 177-178.
12. Muhammad Iqbal, Statement on the Communal Award, 24 August 1932, *ibid.*, p. 185.
13. Muhammad Iqbal, Statement on the Constitution emerging from the RTC, 26 February 1933, *ibid.*, p. 189. The subject of the comment was Great Britain, *Proposals for Indian Constitutional Reform*, London, 1933, Cmd. 4268.
14. Muhammad Iqbal, Statement explaining the Attitude of Muslim Delegates to the RTC, 6 December 1933, Shamloo, *op. cit.*, pp. 208-212, the three passages quoted by me occur on pp. 210, 211, 212; in S.A. Vahid (ed), *Thoughts and Reflections of Iqbal*, Lahore, 1964, pp. 365, 366, 367.
15. Muhammad Iqbal, Reply to Questions Raised by Pandit J.L. Nehru, Shamloo, *op. cit.*, pp. 141-142.



16. *Ibid.*, p. 143.
17. But Shikan, "The Muslim World", *CMG*, 19 October 1931.
18. Reginald Coupland, *Indian Politics, 1936-1942: The Second Part of a Report on the Constitutional Problem in India*, London, 1943, p. 198.
19. Shaukatullah Ansari, *Pakistan: The Problem of India*, Lahore, 1944, p. 4.
20. Sardar Iqbal Ali Shah, *Pakistan: A Plan for India*, London, 1944, p. 14. See also his "The Political Aims of Muslim India", *Asiatic Review*, April 1942, pp. 151-158.
21. B.R. Ambedkar, *Pakistan or the Partition of India*, Bombay, December 1940, 2nd ed 1945.
22. Rajendra Prasad, *India Divided*, Bombay, 3rd ed June 1947, p. 204.
23. *Ibid.*, p. 206.
24. See H.A.R. Gibb, *Mohammedanism*, London, 1950 rep, p. 185.
25. Alfred Guillaume, *Islam*, Harmondsworth, 1954, new ed 1956, pp. 160-163.
26. Lal Bahadur, *The Muslim League: Its History, Activities and Achievements*, Agra, 1954. Originally a doctoral thesis submitted at the University of Agra.
27. Khalid B. Sayeed, *Pakistan: The Formative Phase*, Karachi, 1960, p. 112.
28. Hafeez Malik, *Moslem Nationalism in India and Pakistan*, Washington, D.C., 1963, pp. 239-241.
29. K.K. Aziz, *Britain and Muslim India*, London, 1963, p. 143.
30. Waheeduzzaman, *Towards Pakistan*, Lahore, 1964, p. 132. The word "state" is in italics in the quotation.
31. *Ibid.*, p. 134.
32. *Ibid.*, p. 137.
33. *Ibid.*, p. 147.
34. *Ibid.*, p. 142. My italics.
35. Waheeduzzaman, in I.H. Qureshi (ed), *A Short History of Pakistan*, Karachi, 1967, Book Four, p. 205. Perhaps it is not fair to hold the author responsible for the view expressed here in view of the editor's declaration that at places (which he does not indicate) he has wielded the editorial pen without let or hindrance. The reader should also know that this 4-volume text book was prepared under official instructions

- and guidance of the federal ministry of education, which might have restricted the freedom of the contributors to wander away from the establishment view.
36. Syed Nur Ahmad, *Martial Law se Martial Law Tak*, Lahore, 1965, p. 126.
37. K.K. Aziz, *The Making of Pakistan: A Study in Nationalism*, London, 1967, p. 54.
38. M. Moizuddin, "Iqbal and the Quaid-i-Azam: The Seer and the Realist", in *Papers Presented at the International Congress on Quaid-i-Azam, 19-25 December 1976*, Islamabad, 1976, Vol II, pp. 112-113 (mimeo).
39. Ajmal Siddiqui, "Iqbal ka Tasawwar-i-Pakistan", *NW*, 3 April 1977.
40. Malik Barkat Ali, Address as Chairman, Reception Committee, Punjab Nationalist Muslim Conference, Lahore, 24 October 1931, *IAR 1931*, Vol II, p. 235; also quoted in Shaukatullah Ansari, *op. cit.*, pp. 3-4. My italics.
41. This was pub by *The Tribune*, a Hindu daily of Lahore, on 9 July 1941, and reproduced from there in Rezaul Karim, *Pakistan Examined*, Calcutta, 1941, p. 159. My italics.
42. Edward Thompson, *Enlist India for Freedom*, London, 1940, p. 58.
43. See Edward Thompson, letter, *The Times*, 17 June 1931.
44. Edward Thompson, letter, *ibid.*, 26 June 1931.
45. See their joint letter, *ibid.*, 14 January 1931.
46. Edward Thompson, "Greatest Freedom for India", *MG*, 29 November 1939.
47. Edward Thompson, letter, *The Times*, 6 January 1941.
48. See his letter, *ibid.*, 12 November 1940. In this letter he gave incorrect figures of Muslim wins in the preceding general elections.
49. See his letter, *ibid.*, 8 March 1943.
50. His letter, *Spectator*, 1 September 1944.
51. His letter, *The Times*, 20 March 1945.
52. For a full discussion of the attitude of the British left see my *Britain and Muslim India*, London, 1963, which gives a large number of illustrations and tries to discover reasons for this partisanship.
53. According to one report, the year of Iqbal's alleged denial was 1935. ". . . as late as the year 1935, Dr. Iqbal was

opposed to the idea of Pakistan. In a letter addressed to Dr. Edward Thompson. . .", Muhammad Anwar, "The Forgotten Hero—I", *TPT*, 23 March 1964. We don't know how and on what evidence Anwar fixes this date. There is nothing in Iqbal's records to show that he supported the Pakistan plan before (or, as a matter of fact, after) this year. Anwar seems to have accepted Thompson's allegation without demur.

54. It appears that Iqbal was much influenced by Durrani in this field. There are phrases and passages in the Allahabad address which bear a close affinity to what Durrani had written nearly two years earlier. To give one example: "Communism and Nationalism are antagonistic forces; but they are also necessary accompaniments of each other because of the peculiar constitution of the two communities concerned" (F.K. Khan Durrani, *The Future of Islam in India*, Lahore, 1929, p. 20).
55. The original source is, of course, his own *Six Lectures on the Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, first pub in 1928, and his poetical works. Competent expositions have been attempted by H.A.R. Gibb, *Modern Trends in Islam*, Chicago, 1947, Aziz Ahmad, *Islamic Modernism in India and Pakistan*, London, 1967, and others. But it is a pity that his message still awaits a commentator worthy of the task.
56. For a very brief account of how Iqbal was elected to the presidentship of the Muslim League see Syed Shamsul Hasan (ed), *Plain Mr. Jinnah*, Karachi, 1976, Introduction, pp. 50-52.
57. "First, we must frankly admit that there is yet a sort of chaos in the political thought of those who are supposed to guide the activities of the Indian Muslims in the present-day political struggle", Presidential Address, AIMC, Lahore, 21 March 1932, Shamloo, *op. cit.*, p. 56.
58. Raja of Mahmudabad, Presidential Address, Delhi Provincial Muslim League Conference, Delhi, 8 April 1939, *IAR 1939*, Vol I, p. 376.
59. It may be of some interest to catalogue the motives attributed to Iqbal for demanding a partition by those who insist that he wanted a separate Muslim state. According to one student of his poetry, it was the pessimism born of looking at the Hindu-Muslim conflict and finding that no alternative

was possible (Abdul Malik Arwi, *Iqbal ki Shairi*, Badayun, 1950, p. 320). In the opinion of a Muslim "nationalist" writer, it arose out of Iqbal's efforts to find compensation for the loss of the Muslim majority in the Punjab Legislative Assembly under the provisions of the Lucknow Pact (Tufail Ahmad Mangalori, *Musalmanon ka Rawshan Mustaqbil*, Delhi, 1945, p. 630). Another scholar of Iqbal gives the following list: love of Islam, sorry state of the Islamic world, abolition of the Khilafat, memory of Jamaluddin Afghani's movement for pan-Islamism, anxiety to conserve the culture of the Muslims, and, as he said in the Allahabad address, the conviction that India was the greatest Muslim country in the world (M.A. Khan, *Iqbal ka Siyasi Karnamah*, Karachi, 1952, p. 512).

60. The resolution read: "Resolved that the Council of the All India Muslim League places on record its appreciation of late Sir Muhammad Iqbal as a sage philosopher of Islam and a great national poet. He urged the Muslims to build their future in consonance with their great past. Though he is not among us, he lives for ever in his imperishable verses which would continue to inspire the life and actions of the Muslims all over the world. This meeting of the Council deeply mourns for him and offers fervent prayers to the Almighty that soul of the deceased may rest in peace" (*Resolutions of the All India Muslim League from October 1937 to December 1938*, Delhi, n.d., Resolution no. 3, p. 42).
61. *Ibid.*, Resolution no. 3, p. 56.
62. *CMG*, 26 March 1940.

## A VISION SEEN IN CAMBRIDGE: 1931-1940

### The Climate of Opinion (1931 - 1932)

Between Iqbal's Allahabad address and Rahmat Ali's call for a Pakistan Muslim political thinking presents a strangely unreal panorama. Most of the parties and persons continue to discuss federation as a solution of the communal problem, at the same time calling increasingly for the recognition of the Muslims as a separate nation and expressing the fear that even a federal arrangement would not be enough protection against a Hindu rule. Hindu leaders and parties still find it difficult to reconcile themselves to Muslim claims and wishes. It may involve some repetition, but we will get a better view of the political scene if we begin this summary of contemporary thinking from mid-1930.

In July the Executive Board of AIMC made a significant demand relating to the communal composition of the Indian army. It asked for a legal guarantee for "an adequate and effective representation of Muslims in all grades of military service and other fighting forces, such as navy and air force".<sup>1</sup> In December the general Muslim position won unequivocal support from a Parsi leader during the RTC deliberations in London. "The Musalmans feel—and in my opinion rightly feel—that while the Hindus enjoy power and influence in 8 or 9 provinces, that at least in 2 or 4 provinces, they should have a similar right and a similar power."<sup>2</sup>

The leader of the Ahmadiyya community criticized the Nehru Committee for rejecting the federal solution; this was such a serious matter as to amount to the denial of all Muslim demands.<sup>3</sup> He explained that the Muslims wanted a federal system because this alone could give each community "full scope for progress"; in its absence the Muslim provinces might lose their rights, privileges and majority rule at any time at the discretion of the Hindu-

controlled central government.<sup>4</sup> The Aga Khan summarized this point of dispute during 1930 as follows: "For while the whole drive of the Hindu movement to self-government was concentrated on the idea of a strong central government and the establishment of an immediate democracy, conceived solely in terms of numbers, in which religious differences counted as such and as nothing more, Muslim opinion had crystallized steadily in favour of a distribution of powers from the centre to virtually self-governing and autonomous provincial governments"<sup>5</sup>

Non-Muslim neutral opinion tended to confirm Muslim apprehensions throughout the year. A British observer of Indian religious life noticed that Muslims "dread a Hindu supremacy" and were fearful "lest their charitable institutions, schools, marriage and testamentary laws, should be interfered with".<sup>6</sup> In the words of a French professor of law, the Muslims "n'envisagent pas sans une certaine crainte la naissance d'une Inde autonome ou ils risqueraient de se trouver opprimés par une majorité hindoue. Cette crainte a été accrue dans ces dernières années par l'agressivité des Hindous. . .".<sup>7</sup> An Englishman, who was studying Indian politics from close quarters, asserted that the Muslims, though in a minority, had "no intention whatsoever of submitting to Hindu domination"; in fact, some of them were looking forward to ruling India again should the British withdraw; if the Hindus got their "complete independence" and the British troops withdrew, Muslims "would at once attempt the reconquest of India, and they would succeed".<sup>8</sup> One of Gandhi's admirers had told him that the real object of *swaraj* was "the revival of Hinduism in all such forms as existed before the British intervened".<sup>9</sup>

All information about Muslim thinking in 1931 indicates that the community was determined not to let itself pass under the sway of a Hindu government. But its hope still lay in a federal balance of forces.

Speaking in the Minorities' Sub-Committee of the RTC on 1 January 1931, Sir Muhammad Shafi expounded this idea. "To my mind the Federal India of the future with the Central Government in the hands of the majority community, and the Provincial Governments in 6 of the 8 Governors' Provinces in the hands of the same community, the 4 Provinces in which the majority community will be in a minority and the minority community will be in a majority, will in itself constitute a guarantee of good treat-



ment by both the communities. . . . In the majority of the Provinces, our Hindu brethren have the position of advantage. . . . In only a minority of the Provinces—four—have the Musalmans a similar position of advantage, with the result that there will be an automatic guarantee of good treatment to both the communities. That will be the permanent solution of the Hindu-Muhammadan problem in India."<sup>10</sup>

On the same day Muhammad Ali, forty-eight hours before his death, composed a letter to the British prime minister in which he took the argument one vital step further and questioned the appellation of "minority" to the Muslim community. "A Community that in India alone must now be numbering more than 70 millions cannot easily be called a minority in the sense of Geneva minorities, and when it is remembered that this community numbers nearly 400 million of people throughout the world, whose ambition is to convert the rest of mankind to their way of thought and their outlook on life, and who claim and feel a unique brotherhood, to talk of it as a minority is a mere absurdity."<sup>11</sup>

On 7 February 1931 Hasrat Mohani introduced a resolution in AIMC working committee which underlined the depth of Muslim fears. It read: "Whereas the Muslim community is now convinced that the Hindus are bent upon establishing a Hindu Raj in India and whereas the Hindus and the British Cabinet have joined hands to ignore most of the important Muslim demands contained in the Delhi resolution of this Conference, this Committee believes that the establishment of Dominion Status in India and the vesting of responsibility in the legislatures is detrimental to Muslim interests and will, therefore, not be acceptable to them." After a 6-hour discussion the working committee decided to postpone final decision on this resolution till the ensuing special session of AIMC.<sup>12</sup>

Almost simultaneously a call for a clear partition of India came from an anonymous correspondent, presumably a domiciled European or an Anglo-Indian, who argued his case in a letter to the *Civil and Military Gazette* of Lahore. The "most reasonable solution" of the communal problem was to divide India into three States: one for the Hindus, one for the Muslims, and one for the Europeans and Anglo-Indians. In case the Sikhs were not prepared to lose their identity in the Hindu state, a portion of the third state would be reserved for them. All the portions of the sub-

continent north of a line joining Bombay to some point below Bihar and Orissa should be made over to the Hindus, and the remainder to the Muslims, except for a small portion of the coastal country from Bombay towards Bangalore which the domiciled Europeans and Anglo-Indians should be given.<sup>13</sup>

In April AIMC again turned to the future of the Muslims. In his presidential address Shawkat Ali warned that "no one should forget that we ruled in India for over 850 years, and, on the whole, I think we ruled well. . . . We have got to rouse ourselves to realize that our future must be worthy of our past".<sup>14</sup> This special session of the Conference resolved that "all transfer of power shall be from Parliament to the provinces" and "no subject shall be made federal without the previous and mutual consent of the autonomous units".<sup>15</sup> Muslim opinion was coming round to demanding a very loose federation, so loose that it could serve as a stepping-stone to separation.

In mid-year Sir Theodore Morison published in England a comprehensive article on the Muslim problem which read the Muslim mind faithfully. To describe the Hindus and Muslims of India as communities, he said, was to misrepresent facts and under-estimate their seriousness. There were, in fact, two nationalities in conflict, and the passions that were driving them into collision were of the same magnitude and gravity as those which in Europe had produced the catastrophe of 1914. In India all the persons who followed the same religion, shared the same culture and had a community of historical antecedents, belonged to one nationality regardless of whether they inhabited the same region or were separated from one another by considerable distances. Then he quoted Sir Abdur Rahim as follows: "Any of us Indian Muslims, travelling, for instance, in Afghanistan, Persia, Central Asia, among Chinese Muslims, Arabs, Turks, would be at once made at home and would not find anything to which we are not accustomed. On the contrary in India we find ourselves in all social matters total aliens when we cross the street and enter that part of the town where our fellow Hindu townsmen live." Each of these nationalities is moved by its own separate ideals, its memories of past glories or past sufferings, its noble patriotism or, at times, its ignoble chauvinism.

As the Congress was in the main a Hindu body, its leaders were asking for the establishment of what in fact would be a Hindu

national State. But a national state in India was only possible if the several nationalities were first segregated into homogeneous blocks. "I can imagine a Muslim national state in the north of India buttressed against Central Asia, a promontory of Islam jutting into the waters of Hinduism. Such a state would hold a very strong strategic position and could defy all attacks from the south. . . . Can a modern state which derives its authority from the consent of the governed be founded on the basis of two or more nationalities? A survey of the world today does not justify a positive answer to this question."<sup>16</sup>

In the same month, June, the India correspondent of the *Manchester Guardian* sent home a report which gives a clear idea of Muslim search for a permanent and workable solution of the problem posed by their existence in India. They now realized, said the dispatch, "that the new Federal Government, if and when it comes into existence, will have a large Hindu majority. The entrance of the States has increased the majority, for the States are chiefly Hindu. There is a strong tendency to counteract the permanent majority by trying to form a large northern block of provinces which will be Muslim, and in which the Hindus will be, as it were, hostages of the good behaviour of their co-religionists in the centre and the South. . . . Many Muslims do not believe in the permanence of a Federal India, and they foresee a Muslim state in the North stretching from Karachi to North Bengal".<sup>17</sup>

It will be recalled that an almost identical finding was recorded by the correspondent of *The Times* in March 1928, which proves that the current of Muslim thinking had continued determinedly to flow in the same direction. Yet the date of this dispatch is significant. In 1928 the federation was a vague idea, rather an ideal, floating only in Muslim consciousness, far from being a possible or realizable objective. By the middle of 1931 it had become a solid reality, an arrangement whose broad contours had been accepted and drawn, and only the refined details left to political bargaining and constitutional expediency. But it seemed as if the Muslim question was still as far from being resolved as it had ever been. As the report pointed out, the entry of the native states might have brought the ideal of an all-India federation nearer, but it had complicated the Hindu-Muslim problem by making the federal centre the axis of a permanent and unchangeable Hindu majority. The Muslims were trying to find an escape

from this dilemma by creating a northern block of provinces which would bring them some relief and consolidate their strength. Such an arrangement was being proposed by several persons, Iqbal being the latest and the best-known exponent.

The last sentence of the dispatch indicates two new points of departure. Muslims were losing faith in the permanence of the federal arrangement even before it had been finalized. This betrays the depth of their anxiety and explains their persistence in seeking a different solution even while they were discussing the making of a federation. Secondly, the contemplated north-west state has now been developed into a northern state whose boundaries will touch North Bengal. None of the recent proposals for Muslim consolidation had stretched its scope to include the Muslims of the eastern wing of India. We don't know whether the *Manchester Guardian* correspondent had some actual scheme in view when he wrote this or, by a natural extension of thought, he had interpreted Muslim wishes to their logical conclusion of including all Muslim-majority provinces within the hoped for state.

On 21 July, Zafrulla Khan declared from Delhi that the Muslims felt that the Congress had also abandoned them and identified itself with the interests of the majority community, and this made them fear that "any constitutional advance that might result from the deliberations of the RTC is likely to expose them to the domination of a stronger and more powerful community".<sup>18</sup>

In the following month, Hasrat Mohani, in his presidential address to the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Hind at Allahabad, asked what would be the form of government after the British connection had disappeared. He answered the question himself: it would be nothing else than a Hindu raj which Muslims would under no circumstances tolerate or accept. Therefore, at present they should think only of complete provincial autonomy and safeguards for their rights, and wait for a chance to attain "autonomy in the centre".<sup>19</sup> The "autonomy in the centre" could only have meant a separate state. At the same time, the *Manchester Guardian* realized that Muslim demands at the RTC foreshadowed a Muslim plan for domination in north-west India.<sup>20</sup>

A British Cabinet paper of September, studying the Hindu-Muslim aspect of the problem of central authority in India, concluded that it was a "question whether the Muslim provinces, or the provinces in which the Muslims hope to consolidate their

power, should be under any degree of control from a centre which will be predominantly Hindu". It said that the Muslims' "primary object" was the creation of a "Muslim India"; the secondary object was to secure Muslim interests elsewhere by the operation of the hostage theory.<sup>21</sup>

Far from paying serious attention to Muslim fears of Hindu rule or from considering any alternative political or constitutional suggestion to ease the communal problem, the Hindus showed no inclination even to talk about the least controversial Muslim demands. The characteristic Congress response was contained in Jawaharlal Nehru's remarks in his letter to Gandhi of 27 September. "... if I had to listen to my dear friend Mohammad Ali Jinnah talking the most unmitigated nonsense about his 14 points for any length of time, I would have to consider the desirability of retiring to the South Sea islands, where there would be some hope of meeting with some people who were intelligent or ignorant enough not to talk of the 14 points. . . . I marvel at your patience."<sup>22</sup> When a man of Nehru's sophistication and intellect behaved in this manner, the attitude of the rest of Congress leadership can well be imagined.

In October, the Sikhs presented their own plan of dividing the Punjab, or rather of expropriating most of it, at the expense of the Muslims and the Hindus. Sardar Ujjal Singh submitted a memorandum to the RTC on 8 October, in which he suggested that the two western Divisions of Rawalpindi and Multan (minus the Lyallpur and Montgomery districts) should be detached from the Punjab and amalgamated with the NWFP. This would achieve two purposes. It would give the Sikhs such a strong majority in the Punjab that they would be freed of the necessity of demanding any special rights or protection. It would also enlarge the NWFP to a level where it would merit the status of a governor's province.<sup>23</sup>

On 12 October, Sir Geoffrey Corbett, a Punjab civilian, tabled a memorandum at the RTC on the same subject. (It was circulated on Gandhi's request. Why? We don't know). He argued that the Ambala Division (minus the Simla district and the north-west corner of the Ambala district) should be separated from the Punjab; at the same time the unwieldy United Provinces should be divided into a Western Province of Agra, which would include the Ambala Division, and an Eastern Province of Oudh. In the new

Punjab religious percentages would be as follows (existing percentages in parentheses): Muslims, 61.8 (55.3); Hindus, 23.6 (31.8); Sikhs, 12.6 (11.1); others, 2.0 (1.8).<sup>24</sup>

The Punjab Hindus rejected both the Ujjal Singh proposal and the Corbett scheme.<sup>25</sup> On 16 October, the Hindus of Delhi "wholeheartedly endorsed" the Corbett scheme and urged the constitution of a province comprising Ambala, Meerut, Agra and Rohilkhand Divisions and Delhi.<sup>26</sup> This suggestion actually went beyond what Corbett had prescribed, and would have resulted in the creation of a predominantly Hindu province. The Delhi Muslim Association at once rejected the scheme. The *Civil and Military Gazette* commented, "The communal problem is an all-India one and such devices as the transfer of districts from one administration to another in the north-west will do nothing to heal communal differences in other parts of India."<sup>27</sup>

Redistribution of provinces now became a popular topic, and towards the end of the month Sir Muhammad Yaqub expressed the opinion that the real solution of the communal problem lay in the rearrangement of provinces "into small and less expensive autonomous States, inhabited, as much as possible, by people of common descent, having common family traditions and using common language, provided the Muslim majority in the existing provinces is not affected". India should not be treated as one country, but as a sub-continent inhabited by different nationalities. If "India is formed into small homogeneous units, having full autonomous powers, leaving only a defined and limited authority in the centre, I am sanguine that the problem of our country would be automatically solved to a very great extent, and a happy and contented Federal India would form the brightest and the most precious gem in the Crown of the British Empire".<sup>28</sup>

Muslim intentions and plans were now being increasingly grasped by the British press. As Yaqub was issuing his statement, the *Economist* was writing: "Evidently the Muslims are manoeuvring already for an effective control of the entire Indus Basin from Kashmir to the NWFP through the Punjab to Sind inclusive. They may also reasonably look forward to making themselves masters of Eastern Bengal, where they have an overwhelming majority. In addition, they have a fair chance of dominating a corridor between Eastern Bengal and the Punjab—a corridor which contains all the historic centres of the Muslim Raj in India, though



numerically the Muslim element here is in a minority. With these great territories in their hands, the Muslims would hold a large Hindu population in pawn, as pledges for the safety of the scattered Muslim minority in other parts of India. In the worst event, they could retreat into their north-western and north-eastern citadels, pending reinforcements from the solid core of the Islamic world, which lies just on the other side of the Sulayman Mountains. That is how the Indian Muslims see the future, supposing that the British Empire in India were to go the way of the Manchu Empire in China. They do not seem to be afraid of the future. At any rate, they are not clinging at all apprehensively to the skirts of the British Raj. They welcome the transference of power from British to Indian hands by the constitutional process, on the condition that they are assured, at this stage, of these minority guarantees which they have now demanded, jointly with the other minorities, from the Prime Minister. Supposing that the constitutional process of transference breaks down and there is a scramble for the British legacy, in that event also the Indian Muslims seem to be confident of holding their own against the Hindus in spite of the disparity of numbers."<sup>29</sup> In spite of its rather over-optimistic tone this would have gladdened the hearts of the Muslims who were then groping their way to some such future.

In December the Muslim League held its annual session in Delhi under the chairmanship of Zafrulla Khan. In his presidential address Zafrulla described the Muslim situation in India as "peculiar and unique". "It would be difficult to point out a parallel in the contemporary or past history of any other country or community. Our numbers exceed the numbers of many communities which are today enjoying and have in the past enjoyed the position and privileges of a nation. Our religious, cultural, social, and I may even add, linguistic unity, supplies us with all the essentials that go to form a nation. Our common civilization, traditions, and history furnish additional factors that bind us together. We are anxious to preserve intact all these factors, and past experience has taught us that special provisions and safeguards are necessary for such protection, although we feel that even with those provisions and safeguards in the constitution, the protection afforded will not be complete or even adequate. This, however, is a disability to which all political minorities are subject and it is not capable of being remedied by constitutional safeguards." With

a view to affording greater protection and autonomy to Muslim provinces, he suggested the provincialization of all services the officers of which would normally serve in provincial governments and administrations.<sup>30</sup>

The Muslims are now called a nation; the first such declaration from the Muslim League platform. The last sentence of the above quotation implies that if safeguards proved useless some non-constitutional solution (e.g., partition) might be the only way out.

Similar trends of thought continued into 1932. Some talked of unity and federation, others of alienation and separation.

Shafaat Ahmad Khan made it clear in January that the Muslims had "no desire to create an *imperium in imperio*" and no wish "to form a separate independent State of their own"; they did not want to create barriers which "will prove insuperable obstacles to the unification of India".<sup>31</sup> In February, a British writer on Indian affairs prophesied that a federal India would be a Hindu India under the rule of the Congress to which Muslims would never submit.<sup>32</sup>

On 22 March AIMC demanded in its Lahore annual session "the immediate introduction of provincial autonomy in all provinces" while the details of the federal structure were yet being negotiated.<sup>33</sup> On 26 March the *Economist* realized that Muslim policy was to keep the federal government as weak as possible, since they could not hope to have more than a third of the power there, and to secure as much local power for the provinces as possible, in order that "the provinces in which the Muslim community is in a majority may serve as Muslim citadels".<sup>34</sup>

On 16 April, Lord Irwin, the Viceroy, wrote to Hailey: "I must confess, though I should not dare say so publicly, that to me the prospects of an All-India federation seem to recede in favour of some division of India that would hold better hope of containing means of settling the communal difficulty."<sup>35</sup> On 19 May, H.T. Lambick, an ICS officer posted in Sind, wrote home: "We may well have an India split into Muslim provinces and Hindu provinces; the dividing line being softened and a certain unity maintained by the presence of enormous communities as hostages on each of the 'wrong' sides of the line. . . it seems cynical, but it is a solution thoroughly in keeping with the genius of the country. . . . Of course, the pan-Muslim belt from Kashmir through half the Punjab, NWFP, Baluchistan and Sind looks rather like a pistol aimed at the

heart of India, with behind it the Khilafat and the Jihad. It is Shaikat Ali's dream. . . ."<sup>36</sup>

In June, AIMC working committee again called for the provinces to be invested with "complete financial autonomy."<sup>37</sup> In the same month, a detailed and comprehensive statement of their position was sent to the Aga Khan by Indian Muslims with a request to make it public in Britain if it met with his approval. He associated himself with it unreservedly, and the full text was published by *The Times* on 11 June. Portions of this testament are relevant. "... we can do no other than offer the strongest opposition to Hindus having political supremacy even where they are in a minority. . . . We are confident that if the alternative to British rule were the ubiquitous supremacy of Hindu rule, the mass of our Muslim brethren would prefer the former, not only because of the safeguard offered by its impartiality, but also because under the alternative system there would be hideous strife between the virile and martial Muslim races and those many Hindus in whom the Congress's Left Wing has sown the seed of lawlessness, insidious conspiracy, and rebellion."<sup>38</sup>

On 2 July, Srinivasa Sastri conjured up the horrifying spectre of the future in a letter to a friend: "Imagine what will happen if provincial autonomy is granted and four provinces under Muslim rule oppose central responsibility (or stipulate impossible conditions) while seven Hindu provinces wish to go ahead."<sup>39</sup> In August, Lord Lloyd, a former governor of Bombay, foresaw a great obstacle to the proposed federation in the shape of Muslim determination not to submit to Hindu rule.<sup>40</sup> On 27 September, in his presidential address to AIKC at Ajmer, Shaikh Abdul Majid declared that "the Hindu is bent upon having domination in India with the aid of British bayonets and the real problem before the Musalman is how to save himself from the combined domination of the Britisher and the Hindu."<sup>41</sup>

Lord Eustace Percy recalled that "I saw enough of Indian opinion in 1932 to be aware of the attraction exerted upon some Moslem minds by the memory of Sir Edward Carson and by the analogy of Ulster."<sup>42</sup> Sir Theodore Morison again underlined the basic Muslim unity in India. "It is the sympathy which springs from a common manner of life, common usages, and common ideals. . . . The characteristics of an Islamic civilization can hardly survive under an alien government, especially if that government

be a democracy, which inevitably tends towards the standardization of its citizens." There was no point in enumerating the differences between Muslims and Hindus. "The only thing that matters is that they do in fact feel and think of themselves as separate peoples. In all disquisitions on nationality this is the only test which is found to cover all cases. If a certain body of persons think of themselves as one nation and are willing to endure tribulation and material losses in order to remain together, then they are one people; if they cannot pass this acid test, they are not. Judged by this standard the Muslims of India are a nation."<sup>43</sup> No Muslim leader or ideologue had so far presented a better or more lucid argument in favour of the two-nation theory.

Another Englishman summarized the Muslim inclination towards separation and possible division in equally sympathetic words. John Coatman wrote that the Muslims had realized that the institution of democratic government, with its central doctrine of majority rule, would put them permanently in a minority in the central government of India and in the governments of most of the provinces. Therefore, they feared that their future would be controlled by the Hindus, who would, inevitably, foster Hindu interests and extend Hindu ideas and culture, to the detriment of non-Hindu communities. Muslim policy now was, therefore, aimed at "the transformation of the Indian Provinces, now existing or to be created, into political units as autonomous as the American or Australian States". The Muslim proposals would give them "complete and possibly permanent control over the government of the North and North-West of India, whilst leaving the Hindus in control of the rest of the country."<sup>44</sup> The creation of a strong, united India was daily becoming impossible, and "in its place it seems that there may be brought into being a powerful Muhammadan state in the north and west, with its eyes definitely turned away from India, towards the rest of the Muslim world of which it forms the fringe. . . ."<sup>45</sup>

With such ideas inhabiting the minds of many in Muslim India the time was ripe for a clear-cut partition scheme to appear which could not be misunderstood and had, in addition, a name to itself. The time put forth the man, and Rahmat Ali published such a plan from Cambridge, complete with all argument and logic and, above all, with a name for the country to be carved out of India.

### Rahmat Ali (1933)

To come to Rahmat Ali after a study of Iqbal is to step into a world where every particle shines in clear light. No longer are we obliged to seek interpretations or read between the lines for meanings, or collate words and phrases in pursuit of clues. He is free of all controversies of text, all uncertainties of motives, and all difficulties of ambiguity. Assumptions are not required to read Rahmat Ali's mind. He says what he wants to say in unmistakable phrases. One may disagree with him but dare not misunderstand him.

Beyond their love of Islam, their corroding anxiety to save Indian Islam from disintegration, and an affiliation with the University of Cambridge, there is little in common between Iqbal and Rahmat Ali. One was a poet of world fame and a thinker of immense power; the other an unknown student in a foreign land. One was the president of two national organizations and a delegate of his country to a high decision-making forum; the other a mere political worker thrown on his own initiative, without any office, without a party, without any recognition. Both were engaged in solving a problem which they knew had to be tackled; but one saw several possibilities and hesitated to make the final choice; the other took to one path as if none other was open to his steps. One argued in many directions and left behind him a legacy of controversy; the other took hold of one idea and voiced it with ferocious intensity. One still pined to make one India out of the many by using the principle of internal harmony; the eye of the other saw no ground where the forces of faith and heathenism could meet. One was afraid of the dangers lurking in the spirit of a nationalism imported from the Christian west; the other sought to vanquish such fears by calling for a nationalism which was at the same time territorial in arrangement and spiritual in content. One still thought in terms of India; to the other Indianism was a foul anathema and a perilous snare. One hoped for British co-operation in solving the Hindu-Muslim problem; the other warned against a Hindu-British alliance bent upon administering a *coup de grace* to Indian Islam. One stood for some sort of rapprochement with the Hindus within the wider Indian context; the other saw salvation in nothing less than a clear partition resulting in Muslim sovereignty. One became a hero and a prophet to whom nothing

could be denied; the other remained an unhonoured name to whom the country he had envisioned and christened could offer nothing but bitter humiliation and a lonely exile.

Rahmat Ali is a sad figure in the history of the idea of Pakistan, for in many respects his contribution to it is outstanding, and yet he has been treated with an indifference which even ignorance and prejudice cannot explain. We will return to this point later when we have studied the man and his ideas.

Rahmat Ali belonged to a small village in the district of Hoshiarpur (now in the Indian Punjab), where he was born on 16 November 1897. His father, Haji Choudhary Shah Muhammad, possessed some land whose income assured the family the comforts of a middle-class life. Rahmat Ali received his early education in two small rural towns, and then matriculated in 1912 from a Hindu school in Jullundher city. After graduating from Islamia College, Lahore, in 1918, he served as a tutor at the Aitchison Chiefs' College, Lahore, till 1923. During 1923-25 (here dates are unreliable) he attended the Punjab University Law College, Lahore, but left without taking a degree. In the Aitchison College he came in contact with the children of the Mazari family and, through them, with the head of the Mazari tribe. At this time the Mazari estate became the subject of litigation, and Rahmat Ali helped the Mazari chief with legal advice and acted as his private secretary. When the case was decided in favour of his patron, he was given a handsome amount for services rendered. Immediately he decided to invest this money in giving himself higher education in Britain. Arriving in England towards the end of 1930, he entered Emmanuel College, Cambridge, in January 1931, where he passed the Law Tripos, Part II, Examination in June 1932 and took the degree in 1933. Later he was called to the bar in 1943 at the Inner Temple Inn. He lived in Cambridge after finishing his education, came to live in Pakistan in 1948 but was ordered out by the government, returned to Cambridge, and died there in February 1951. He is buried in Cambridge.

As we have noticed earlier, Rahmat Ali first talked about a Muslim state in India in 1915 when he was still an undergraduate in Lahore, but of this we have no direct evidence except his own word. He himself did not return to the subject till his student days in Cambridge. These days coincided with the sessions of the RTC, and he revived his old plan and tried to persuade the Muslim dele-



gates to the RTC that a federation, for which they were working, would bring an end to Islam in India, and that, instead, they should demand the creation of a Muslim state which would be separate and sovereign. When he was not heard, he decided to publish his own scheme.<sup>46</sup>

On 28 January 1933 he issued a declaration entitled *Now or Never: Are We to Live or Perish for Ever?* addressed to the world on behalf of the 30 million Muslims of north-west India. It appealed for "sympathy and support in our grim and fateful struggle against political crucifixion and complete annihilation". The homeland of these Muslims was defined in the first sentence as PAKSTAN, "by which we mean the five Northern units of India, viz., Punjab, North-West Frontier Province (Afghan Province), Kashmir, Sind and Baluchistan". Then came a stinging attack on the Muslim delegates attending the RTC. These so-called leaders were sacrificing the nation "with reckless disregard to our future and in utter contempt of the teachings of history". They "have submitted, in the name of Hindu nationalism, to the perpetual subjection of the ill-starred Muslim nation". By agreeing to a federal constitution they had signed the death-warrant of Islam and its future in India.<sup>47</sup>

India was neither a country nor a nation. Its heterogeneity was a proven fact. The Muslims were a separate and distinct nation. "Our religion, culture, history, tradition, economic system, laws of inheritance, succession and marriage are basically and fundamentally different from those of the people living in the rest of India." The ideals which moved the Muslims were different from those which inspired the Hindus. These differences extended to the minutest details of their lives. "We do not inter-dine; we do not inter-marry. Our national customs and calendars, even our diet and dress are different." To force these Muslims into an Indian federation would sound "the death-knell of the Muslim nation in India for ever". What would this mean to Islam and the world? He reminded his readers that these 30 million Muslims of "Pakistan" counted for about one-tenth of the entire Muslim world. Their homeland constituted an area four times that of Italy, three times that of Germany and twice that of France. In population, they were seven times as large as Australia, four times as Canada, twice as Spain, and as large as France or Italy. Therefore, they "deserve and must demand the recognition of a separate national status by

the grant of a separate Federal Constitution from the rest of India".<sup>48</sup>

To enable the two nations of India to develop themselves "without one being subject to another", a separate federation of the five predominantly Muslim units in the north should be created. This would bring several advantages. It would act as a buffer state against any invasion, either of ideas or of arms, from outside. It would not materially disturb the ratio of the Muslim and Hindu population in the rest of India. It was in the interest of British and Hindu statesmanship to have as an ally a free, powerful and contented Muslim nation. He pointed out that his demand was "basically different" from Iqbal's. Iqbal wanted an amalgamation of these provinces into a single province forming a unit of the Indian federation; his own plan was for these provinces to have a separate federation of their own.<sup>49</sup>

An Indian federation was rejected because it would be based on the uncertain principle of safeguards, which was no substitute for the loss of nationality and independence. No safeguard could turn the Muslim minority of one in four into something different. No safeguard could compensate the Muslim loss of their social and religious ideals. No safeguards could give them the status of a nationality. "However effective and extensive the safeguards may be, the vital organs and proud symbols of our national life, such as army and navy, foreign relations, trade and commerce, communications, posts and telegraphs, taxation and customs, will not be under our control, but will be in the hands of a Federal Government, which is bound to be overwhelmingly Hindu."<sup>50</sup>

Rahmat Ali could not understand why, in the face of such facts, Muslim leaders were still prepared to go into an Indian federation. Was the nation to be crucified to save the faces of these leaders? The people of these provinces were not in favour of strangulating themselves to please these politicians. "We will not crucify ourselves upon the cross of Hindu nationalism in order to make a Hindu holiday."

The declaration concluded with a ringing appeal to the forces and future of Islam. "We are face to face with a first-rate tragedy, the like of which has not been seen even in the long and eventful history of Islam. It is not the question of a sect or of a community going down; but it is the supreme problem which affects the destiny of the whole of Islam and the millions of human beings

who, till quite recently, were the custodians of the glory of Islam in India and the defenders of its frontiers. We have a still greater future before us, if only our soul can be saved from the perpetual bondage of slavery forged in an All-India Federation. Let us make no mistake about it. The issue is now or never. Either we live or perish for ever. The future is ours only if we live up to our faith. It does not lie in the lap of the gods, but it rests in our own hands. We can make or mar it. The history of the last century is full of open warnings, and they are as plain as were ever given to any nation. Shall it be said of us that we ignored all these warnings and allowed our ancient heritage to perish in our own hands?"<sup>51</sup>

Rahmat Ali alone drafted this declaration, but in order to make it "representative" he began to look around for people who would sign it along with him. It took him more than a month to find three young men in London who were prepared to support and sign it. Aslam Khan Khattak was at Oxford; Sahibzada Shaikh Muhammad Sadiq was reading for the bar at one of the Inns of Court in London; and Khan Inayat Ullah Khan was studying engineering in London.<sup>52</sup> Khattak signed himself as president of the Khyber Union, and Inayat Ullah as the secretary of the same body. Soon Khattak backed out and withdrew his support.

A few points in the declaration are noticeable. One is its narrow scope. Like Iqbal and a majority of other Muslim planners, Rahmat Ali ignored Bengal. He stated clearly that there were 80 million Muslims in India and his "Pakstan" would contain 30 million of them. But the significance of these figures seems to have been lost upon him. His scheme, propounded expressly in the name of Islam and with a view to saving the Muslims of India from Hindu rule, would still leave a clear majority of Indian Muslims in Hindu hands. It was much later that he rectified this omission by suggesting another separate state for Bengal and Assam.

An interesting feature of the declaration is the clear and firm tone in which he proclaimed the Muslims to be a separate nation. None before him had pronounced this so insistently and so rationally. When, later, the Muslim League came to advocate its own Pakistan plan, it could not think of any new arguments and repeated and elaborated his points. Jinnah's presidential address at the 1940 Muslim League session at Lahore, where partition was first demanded by the party, contains several sentences which repeat the very words used by Rahmat Ali in this declaration.

That is a measure of Rahmat Ali's understanding, percipience and foresight. But he ignored logic in claiming a separate nationhood for the north-western Muslims on the basis of Islam, and forgetting the Muslims of Bengal who were also among the faithful. Iqbal had also dismissed the Bengali Muslim from the horizon of his thought, but two points can be entered in his defence. He did not believe in the two-nation theory; on the contrary, he had set out to create an Indian nation and an Indian unity with his principle of internal harmony. He was also making a case for an Indian federation in which, anyway, Bengal would have figured as a Muslim-majority unit. Therefore he was not obliged to fight the battle of the Bengali Muslim. Rahmat Ali could not use this defence. He stood for a partition of India on the basis of a separate Muslim nationhood, and yet he excluded a majority of this nation from his view. No justification can be found for this.

The most remarkable thing in this declaration is the first appearance of the word "Pakstan". He gave this name to the sovereign Muslim state demanded on behalf of the Muslims of the five north-western areas. It must be noticed that here he spelt the word without an "i", in the Persian fashion, as it is still written in Urdu, though the pronunciation follows the English spelling. In meaning, origin and terminology the two versions are the same, but it is of some historical importance to notice that when the word was used, printed and proclaimed for the first time it was spelt as "Pakstan", not as "Pakistan".

Rahmat Ali was conscious of the great significance of the declaration. He wrote later: "This Declaration and this date will be memorable in history. . . the date marked the birth-day of Pakistan, the death-day of India, and the dissolution-day of British Imperialism in India. Not only that. This Declaration on that date started an ideological revolution in the life of one-fifth of mankind living in India, a revolution the repercussions of which will be felt throughout Asia and the world."<sup>53</sup>

It is not necessary to share Rahmat Ali's self-congratulatory enthusiasm to realize the inherent importance of the declaration. It proclaimed the Muslims of north-west India as a separate nation. It declared a war against the concept of an Indian federation. It staked a claim to a sovereign and independent Muslim state in the north-west. It gave this state a name. On all these points Rahmat Ali was far in advance of his time. These aspirations and sentiments

had been in the air for some years, and had propelled the Muslim mind in a certain direction. But they had remained half-felt, half-uttered wishes. It was his achievement to draw all the threads together, to make a coherent philosophy of them, to expound the final idea in words which were at once rational and passionate, and to present the world with a new name for the state of freedom which his people would one day attain.

Once Rahmat Ali had declared the truth as he saw it, he felt the need of putting up a co-operative effort to publicize and promote the ideal. Not being a politician, he could not take his message to the masses. Living in a foreign country, he could not establish a new political party to espouse his cause. He was a thinker, not an organizer. Therefore, he decided to establish a movement rather than a proper organization. In fact, even this movement did not amount to more than he himself and a few Indian Muslim friends who were studying in Cambridge or London. Mostly he did the entire work, wrote all the pamphlets, contacted influential people, corresponded with his friends and acquaintances in India, toured Europe to speak about his ideas, and spent his own money on the project. Later he founded a few more movements, but really he was the inspiring spirit and throughout his life the headquarters of these movements were situated at 16 Montague Road, Cambridge, where he had lived for some years.

Anyhow, he needed, in his own words, "a centre of members to work for Pakistan, for the Pak Plan, and for the Pak Ideology".<sup>54</sup> And in 1933 he founded the Pakistan National Movement, and directly published an 8-page pamphlet, *What Does the Pakistan National Movement Stand For?*, stating "the fundamentals of the political ideology" of the movement.

He began by defining "Indianism" as the force which had dominated all the countries of south Asia and defeated the efforts of their peoples to improve their lot. This was a destructive power, victimizing men and nations, crippling religions and states, and enslaving at least half of the continent of Asia. With the coming of the British it had manifested itself in the establishment of the Indian National Congress. In this clever way it had designated all British possessions in south Asia as India, denied to the non-Indian nations the right to their own nationhood, and stamped Indian nationality on the peoples of this area. So insidious was this influence that when the various nations, communities, sects

and groups came to set up their organizations and parties, they used the prefix "Indian" or "All India". They did not realize that by so doing they were acquiescing in calling themselves Indians, and their leaders had fastened fetters of "Indianism" on them. The latest move in this campaign of perpetuating "Indianism" was the plan for establishing an all-India federation. The federal device was chosen because, of all constitutional arrangements known to law, it could alone enslave for ever the non-Indian peoples, extract from them a permanent renunciation of their claim to nationhood, and demand from them a formal acceptance of a single Indian nationality. This was the central idea underlying the proposal for an all-India federal constitution.<sup>55</sup>

The Pakistan National Movement was formed to fight against this federation. This it was to do by adhering to seven principles, which might be called its aims and objects.

First, the movement stood for the *spiritual liberation* of the nations of south Asia from the *secular thralldom* of "Indianism". During the previous 3,500 years Indianism had opposed all religions and worked for their disintegration: banishing Buddhism, absorbing Jainism, menacing Islam and stifling Sikhism. This anti-religious process had "grievously retarded the spiritual emancipation of mankind and dwarfed the moral development of half the population of the continent of Asia".<sup>56</sup>

Secondly, the movement stood for the *cultural liberation* of the nations of south Asia from the *barbarian influence* of Indianism. Indianism had corrupted the cultures of the non-Indian nations without contributing anything to their intellectual, artistic and moral fabric. Self-defence against such a record was essential, so that these nations could revert to "their original conception of life and regenerate their respective cultures in their national strongholds". Indianism must, therefore, be confined to its historical and national sphere—India (Hindustan)—so that other nations got an opportunity to liberate themselves culturally from its barbarian environment.<sup>57</sup>

Thirdly, the movement stood for the *social liberation* of the nations of south Asia from the *caste tyranny* of Indianism. Of all creeds and philosophies in the world, Indianism stood alone against the universal belief and practice of the brotherhood and equality of man. Thus it created perpetual divisions among the people and stopped their integration into one nation. This was a curse which



must be removed. All disabilities imposed and sanctioned by Indianism would be swept away so that people regain their social status and become full human beings.<sup>58</sup>

Fourthly, the movement stood for the *economic liberation* of the nations of south Asia from the *impoverishing capitalism* of Indianism. For centuries Indianism had exploited men, women and children for its material gain, surpassing even the plunder of despotic kings, corrupt dynasties and foreign rulers. The poor and the landless had been pitilessly treated by the money-lender and the *bania*. These groaning masses must be saved from the Indian greed of gold.<sup>59</sup>

Fifthly, the movement stood for the *national liberation* of the nations of south Asia from the *destructive domination* of Indianism. Indianism had physically exterminated the ancient race of the Dravidians, destroyed the depressed classes, politically ruined the Muslims, the Rajputs, the Sikhs and the Marathas, and finally "dragooned them all into subjection to British imperialism". To remedy this, the movement admitted "the birth-right of each and every nation which is under Indian domination to a nationhood of its own in the territory wherein it may form a majority of the population", and promised "to support by all legitimate means the actual realization of this right by all such nations". The movement, thus, stood "for the birth-right of all nations to their national existence, even if that birth-right may have to be satisfied, as in the case of the Sikhs, at the expense of Pakistan itself".<sup>60</sup>

Sixthly, the movement stood for the *inter-national consolidation* of the nations of south Asia against the *de-nationalizing dangers* of Indianism. Not only was the demon of Indianism to be exorcized, but the freed nations were to be "Asianized" by the creation of a spirit of international solidarity among them. This was to be achieved by each one of them recognizing and guaranteeing the integrity of one another in such a manner that, without let or hindrance, they could all develop along their own lines and attain their national ideals in their own ways. Then, in a voluntary and mutual co-operation, they "must consolidate themselves inter-nationally by entering into alliances with their neighbours so that they can for ever offer a united front against the de-nationalizing dangers of 'Indianism' ". This would open a new chapter in the history of south Asia.<sup>61</sup>

Finally, the movement stood for the creation of a new order

of *Asianism* to take the place of the *order of Indianism* in south Asia. History would not be allowed to repeat itself, nor Indianism permitted to reappear in a different shape or form. The movement appealed to all nations to evolve a new order so that their national life and liberty be protected and the moral entity and political integrity of south Asia live for every.<sup>62</sup>

Rahmat Ali always used strong words and wrote with clarity. He also tried to be comprehensive in scope and frank in his prejudices. Here, no aspect of a nation's life was ignored. Cultural and economic autonomy was recognized as a vital characteristic of modern nationalism. The spiritual base of a people's life was to be strengthened. The ultimate aim was to destroy caste Hinduism, and eliminate all prospects for its imperial resurgence. His outlook, however, was not limited to the narrow horizon of nationalism. He looked forward to the day when a supra-national spirit would take these nations into the broader field of an Asian comity inspired and enlivened by mutual co-operation.

He did not mince words in talking about Hinduism (his "Indianism"). All his efforts were directed to breaking its power, and he was anxious to enlist the help and support of all Indian minorities, including even some Hindu groups, in this crusade. This led him to the idea of self-determination which he believed to be the right of all oppressed and disinherited peoples of India. The sincerity of his promises is not questionable, for he was prepared to see the Sikhs win their freedom, though this would be at the cost of Pakistan as they were to be found in the Punjab.

Rahmat Ali's repeated references to India as South Asia have a prophetic quality. After 1947 this name for the sub-continent (plus Ceylon and Nepal) has been adopted by everyone writing on or speaking of the area. Probably no contemporary political scientist, historian or economist is aware that Rahmat Ali had used it first in 1933.

### The Climate of Opinion (1933 - 1935)

Between the appearance of Rahmat Ali's declaration and his next attempt to argue in favour of a Pakistan, Hindu and Muslim views in India continued their march down the traditional path of mutual incomprehension, dislike and incompatibility. A few examples will illustrate this.

In February 1933, A Bengali Muslim legislator complained that 45 years' experience of public life had taught him that "as a community the Hindus are incapable of taking a broad view of public affairs. In their vocabulary, nationalism and Hinduism are synonymous terms. To them Nationalism means subservience of all sections to their views and interests".<sup>63</sup>

In June Haji Rahim Bakhsh of the Punjab, writing in the *Civil and Military Gazette*, made a case for the Muslims being a separate nation; and his line of argument betrayed Rahmat Ali's influence, though he mentioned neither him nor the word Pakistan. Hindus and Sikhs on the one hand and Muslims on the other "form two distinct nations in the truest sense of the term". "The two live side by side but they do not inter-dine or inter-marry, and practically lead two mutually exclusive social lives. In other words, the corporate lives of the two nations run as two distinct and parallel currents. In short, those powerful historical and social forces which unite individuals into nations have divided Indians into two distinct nations which may be broadly called the Muslim nation and the Hindu nation. . . . A constitution which secures political power to Islam in certain provinces and to Hinduism in certain others, creating a happy balance of power in a federation through which Muslim India and Hindu India would work for certain common purposes can alone satisfactorily solve the problem of Swaraj for the two *Swa* (selves) in India. A certain portion of the Indian Muslim nation would be living as a minority in Hindu India and similarly a certain portion of the Hindu nation would be living as a minority in Muslim India—for them due safeguards as minorities are a necessity. But the Hindu nation or the Muslim nation as a whole should seek its self-expression through what would be Hindu India or Muslim India respectively. In short, the choice before India is between continuing to fight against itself and accepting the idea of giving the Hindu and Muslim nations opportunities of self-expression and self-development."<sup>64</sup> This came very near to demanding a partition, for a nation can find its self-expression only in an independent state; but the author did not spell out the logical conclusion of his argument.

In September an Englishman (F.F. Holsinger) put forward a definite and clear scheme of splitting India into Hindu and Muslim dominions. Despaired of any solution of the Muslim problem which could retain the unity of India, he arranged the sub-

continent into a number of independent entities which by their size and resources could stand as separate dominions within the British Commonwealth. According to him, Muslim districts of the United Provinces would form one dominion with Lucknow as its capital, the NWFP and Muslim districts of the Punjab would make up another dominion, Bengal would be divided into a Hindu and a Muslim dominion, and so on, until 13 dominions covered the area of British India. Twelve of the bigger states could be turned into kingdoms.<sup>65</sup>

The attraction of this solution lay in its freshness. From the idea of dividing India into two parts, which had so far been the limit of new proposals, he developed the pattern of a mosaic of dominions spread over the whole country, and still giving it some sort of a supra-national unity. This was decidedly a step beyond federation, even beyond confederation, and might have appealed to the British imperial instinct with its possibility of retaining India within the Commonwealth.

The idea of making practically every province into a dominion looks less impracticable if we remember that the Commonwealth of that day had such tiny dominions as New Zealand and was later to have a number of small members like the West Indies, Zambia, Uganda, Kenya and Ceylon, few of whom were larger than an average Indian province or even a quarter of a province like Bengal or the United Provinces. The weakness lay not in the nature or the underlying principle but in the difficulties inherent in its application. Several of the dominions, in northern and central India, would have been landlocked territories with no outlet to the sea or to foreign lands except through neighbouring dominions. The will to co-exist peacefully and co-operate readily which such a configuration took for granted was something that the future could not have produced out of the bitter and irreconcilable present. Communal rivalry would have been transferred to the national level, thus made more respectable but also more intractable. It would also have failed to solve the problem of Hindu-Muslim friction within each dominion. (These two objections could also be raised against the later Muslim League Pakistan scheme. The first was proved true and has soured Indo-Pakistan relations since 1947. The second was removed—but only in West Pakistan—by a huge transfer of population which could not have been foreseen in 1933 and was not contemplated even until the middle of 1947). What-

ever its weaknesses, and it was a mere suggestion not a full-fledged detailed plan, it showed a deep concern with the magnitude and gravity of the Muslim problem. It might also have influenced Rahmat Ali to demand, in 1935, a number of Muslim states and enclaves within India.

We don't know if any of these post-1930 suggestions owed something to Iqbal. He is not mentioned in any of them, but then nor are others who had specifically demanded a partition. This does not mean that Iqbal's Allahabad address had no effect at all, but it does mean that it was not considered an outstanding event meriting special mention. He was one of several voices speaking of a future which the present was not contemplating but whose seeds lay far back in the past. He added to the chorus and perhaps helped to make it a little louder, but he could neither change its words nor alter its music.

In October, Sir Muhammad Yaqub repeated that India "is not a country but a sub-continent". Its different parts were as far apart from one another as were the various countries of Europe. "Would it ever be in the range of practical politics to frame one single Constitution for the whole of Europe? How could it therefore be possible, or even prudent, to frame one single Constitution for the whole of India? Different provinces must therefore have different qualifications for franchise and different systems of election."<sup>66</sup> Once again the major premisses of the argument for a partition are presented and supported, but partition is not demanded. This was a habit to which nearly all Muslim leaders were addicted.

The Hindu answer to all such sentiments was the same as it had been since late nineteenth century. India was the land of the Hindus alone; other peoples were there on Hindu sufferance.<sup>67</sup> Urdu was a foreign language which "is a living monument to our slavery". It "must be eradicated from the page of existence".<sup>68</sup>

Towards the end of 1933 the *Star of India* discussed a territorial distribution of provinces attributed to Sir Henry Lawrence, a former Commissioner of Sind. It had originally been entitled "The Balkanization of India". It was pointed out that the existing territorial division had been formed in a haphazard way through accidents of war during a protracted period. This was an irrational scheme of things. The remedy was to limit the number of provinces and give this status to large areas which could enjoy administrative and financial autonomy. Provinces like the Central Provinces,

Assam, Sind, Orissa and NWFP would have to be amalgamated with other provinces. It was suggested that such a re-distribution should not cause any concern to statesmen who had seen the re-distribution of states in Europe after the world war.<sup>69</sup>

Encouraged by the Muslims, and more specifically by Rahmat Ali's appeal to the Indian minority groups, Sir Henry Gidney now asked for a separate state for the Anglo-Indians, pressing his demand for an area of two hundred thousand acres.<sup>70</sup>

An Indian Christian commentator (Albion R. Banerji), who wrote several books in this period to show that he was enamoured neither of Congress policies nor of Muslim separatism, feared, above all, that Muslim nationalism, if encouraged or allowed to develop unchecked, would one day result in a sentiment of pan-Islamism and an "Islamic Empire".<sup>71</sup> He did not identify the sources of his fear: it may have been the general trend of Muslim thinking, or Iqbal's emphasis on Islam as the prime mover of Muslim politics, or more specifically the plan recently propounded by Rahmat Ali in England where Sir Albion was then living.

In the summer of 1934, Abul Kasem repeated his words of February 1933: that the Congress was an organization of the caste Hindus and in its vocabulary "nationalism" meant "Hinduism".<sup>72</sup>

At the same time Sardar Iqbal Ali Shah reported that the idea of creating a "great Central Asian Confederacy" had taken a "definite shape" in Central Asia. Recent events in Chinese Turkistan were of "poignant interest" to the Muslims of India, Turkey, Afghanistan and Tatar republics of the Soviet Union. "Many will see in these struggles the dawn of a new Muslim era, and the institution of another Islamic buffer state on the borders of India. They point to the close historical and cultural affinities of the British Muslims with their co-religionists in the disturbed Turkistan, and emphasize the fact that the area that stretches from Kashgar is situated on the very threshold of Kashmir, and is closely linked up by trade relations with the Punjab and the Afghan Frontier Province. Thus, it is believed, that the time is ripe for detaching Eastern Turkistan from its loose connection with China, and creating there an independent Muslim State." How this movement for a Central Asian Confederacy could be spread far and wide "can be seen by noting the geographical cutlets [*sic.*]. Indiawards, it can pass by two roads. One is from Khotan via



Gilgit and Chitral through Kashmir; the other lies by way of Kashgar, the Pamir Passes, Afghanistan and the Khyber Pass, into India."<sup>73</sup> Shades of the supposed Jamaluddin message!

In July, an anonymous writer in the *Star of India* blamed the Hindus for alienating Muslim support and sympathy from the mainstream of Indian nationalism, and warned that "unless the Hindu Press reforms its tone and starts respecting the sentiments of Muslims there can be no hope of unity or concerted action on the part of Muslims".<sup>74</sup> In the following month, the president of the Congress Nationalist Party raised the old and by this time obsolete question of communal electorates. He believed that with this system in force the country would never get a government by the people, for the people and of the people, but a government of one community over another. This would not be democracy, but a special kind of despotic government.<sup>75</sup> But he did not recommend any solution of the problem. A Punjabi Hindu commentator saw dire consequences of the creation of a Pakistan. "If a Muslim Federation for the five North-Western provinces is established as is demanded by some Muslims, the federal Government for the rest of India would not be worth the paper on which its constitution may be drawn."<sup>76</sup> He did not explain, however, how the creation of this Muslim federation would affect the rest of the sub-continent so deeply. In contrast, Muslims continued to complain that the Hindus were out to establish their own raj under the beguiling name of swaraja, and to express their preference for British rule which, with all its shortcomings, had admirably preserved the political life of the Indian minorities.<sup>77</sup>

The report of the Joint Select Committee on Indian Constitutional Reform was published in 1934, and its findings reflected the considered views of a large band of distinguished British and Indian statesmen who had manfully wrestled with the Indian problem for five years. It is interesting to see what the report had to say about majority rule and provincial autonomy and the apprehensions of the Muslims. The members were sufficiently impressed by the gravity of the communal situation to remark that "it must be recognized that if free play were given to the powerful forces which would be set in motion by an unqualified system of parliamentary government, the consequences would be disastrous to India, and perhaps irreparable".<sup>78</sup> (In the event they did prove irreparable, as the institution of parliamentary governments in the

provinces and the treatment meted out to the Muslims in the Hindu provinces accelerated the movement towards the demand for a Pakistan). The unity of India was perhaps the greatest gift which British rule had conferred on India. But, in transferring so many powers to the provinces, and in encouraging them to develop a vigorous and independent political life of their own, the new system would "be running the inevitable risk of weakening or even destroying that unity".<sup>79</sup> The risk did, in fact, materialize and destroyed the unity.

Some time in 1934-35, Sir Fazli Husain is reported to have talked in the Viceroy's Executive Council of "creating Muslim-majority zones as a counterpoise to Hindu-majority areas".<sup>80</sup> This was told to Durga Das, a journalist, by Sir Brojendra Mitter, the law member of the Council. We have not been given any further details, but the report, if true, is significant because Fazli Husain was opposed to the Muslim League policy.

In January 1935, Gulshan Rai, a Punjabi Hindu, probably realizing the inevitability of some kind of Pakistan, recommended a partition of the Punjab on communal lines.<sup>81</sup> Simultaneously, a Muslim writer (Waris Ameer Ali) asked, "How will supposedly Muslim 'autonomous' provinces, even if the Muslim majority functions in them, work harmoniously within a Hinduized centre at distant Delhi? Some Muslim leaders have a pathetic faith in the idea that they can secure fair treatment for their brethren in Hindu provinces by a threat of reprisals upon Hindus under their sway. What an augury for the harmonious working of the new Constitution, and how will this archaic method succeed with a centre increasingly under Brahminical influence? Even the foreshadowing of such events causes the birth of disturbing ideas, such as the plan formulated by some Muslim intellectuals for the setting up of a separate Federation of provinces in the North-West, completed by the expropriation of the Kashmir State. This proposed Federation is to be styled 'Pakistan'. But whether Pakistan materializes or not, Imperial interference to uphold the authority of a Brahminical Federal government is likely to coincide with grave repercussions beyond the frontiers, where Muslims have never remained quiet when their co-religionists in India were in trouble with Hindu powers."<sup>82</sup>

Still another warning from Sir Muhammad Yaqub came in March: "Until the Hindus create a feeling of trust and security in

the minds of the Muslims, the dream of Swaraj can never be fulfilled. Eight crores of dissatisfied Muslims would make it impossible for any constitution to work."<sup>83</sup> This was reinforced in April by an anonymous British writer.<sup>84</sup> In July, a Muslim, writing in a Calcutta paper, argued for a separate nationhood for Muslims in terms which brooked no compromise or weakening. Referring to the Congress-cum-Hindu ideology he said, "Never can we enter that contaminated and poisoned atmosphere which reeks with the foul breath of such putrid nationalism. There shall be no nation out of a merging of us into them or with them. If such was your hope, forsake it! If such was your pledge, forswear it! If India bleeds, let her lie bleeding. From now onwards, build a dream anew; with the iron yet hot and blazing in your soul, make another determination. THERE SHALL BE A TRUE NATION OF GENUINE PATRIOTS IN INDIA, A NATION OF EIGHTY MILLION MUSLIMS. . ."<sup>85</sup>

#### Rahmat Ali (1935)

So far Rahmat Ali's efforts to persuade the people engaged in making the new constitution for India had been fruitless. The RTC had met thrice to determine the basic principles of Indian federalism, a white paper had come out containing a summary of recommendations, a Joint Select Committee of the two houses of Parliament had worked long hours and made its report, a bill for the government of India had been drafted and was now, in 1935, before the Parliament for final disposal. All this time Rahmat Ali must have been meeting the men in authority, and especially Muslim members and witnesses of the Joint Select Committee, and warning them that the coming of a federation would be disastrous to Muslims. His expostulations came to nought; the unanimity with which Muslim leaders told the Committee that the "Pakistan" plan was a fantasy cherished by a student and was not worth talking about, was a humiliation to Rahmat Ali, and must have galled him. He decided, in the summer of 1935, to make one more effort.

On 8 July, he addressed a letter running to four out-size pages to the members of the House of Lords who were then considering the Government of India Bill. He may have sent a similar communication to the members of the House of Commons when the bill

was before them, but of this we have no record. In his letter to the peers of the realm, he appealed "on behalf of the people of Pakistan" for sympathy and support in their struggle against "the ruthless coercion of Pakistan into the proposed Indian Federation". The demand of Pakistan was for the recognition of its right to a separate national existence, distinct from Hindustan, based on social, cultural, religious and historical grounds. "Pakistan is not Hindoo in soul nor are its people Hindoostani citizens. It has always possessed a historical, spiritual, territorial and national individuality of its own. . . . While Hindoostanis claim Hindoostan as their mother country by birth, we claim Pakistan as our fatherland by the same right. If Hindoostan is theirs because they form three-fourths of its inhabitants, Pakistan is ours because we constitute four-fifths of its total population."

The two peoples were so different in everything as to be two nations. "We have, as a nation, nothing in common with them, nor they with us. In individual habits, as in national life, we differ from them as fundamentally as from any other civilized nation in the world. The very basis and content of our national life is founded on fundamentals essentially different from those on which Hindooism lives and prospers. Our agelong social systems and our ancient national tradition has [*sic.*] given us a civilization with a philosophy, a culture, a language, a literature and an art basically and fundamentally different from that of Hindoostan." These were hard facts which none could controvert. "They remain today, as they have ever been, unchangeable realities. This supreme distinction between Pakistan and Hindoostan is ineffacable, as it is based on eternal truths. Our constitution-makers must reckon with Nature's decrees."

Nature had made Pakistan a geographical identity. The Jumna flowed as a boundary between Pakistan and Hindustan. History had confirmed the work of nature. "This great cleavage. . . has existed from time immemorial, and must exist for ever. It represents our body and soul, as it stamps our separate national entity, and gives us an unchallengeable right to demand its recognition. It constitutes our ancient national heritage—of Faith and Fatherland—and we are firmly resolved to preserve it."

Repudiating the officially-nominated Muslim delegates who had come to London to make the "shameful surrender" of the right of their nation, Rahmat Ali demanded the creation of two federa-

tions in India, a Pakistan Federation and a Hindoostan Federation, with equal status and identical legal position. This demand, he said, was not actuated by any hostility towards the British or the "Hindoostanis". It sprang from "the motives of self-defence and self-preservation alone". The people of Pakistan were neither anti-British nor anti-Hindustani, they were simply pro-Pakistani. They realized that their acceptance of Hindustani nationality and their amalgamation with Hindustan were not only impossible, not only unthinkable, but also inhuman. They had, therefore, a moral and legal duty to oppose, by all constitutional means open to them, the proposed federation. It was a pity that the British plan for one Indian federation did not take notice of these "eternal differences" between the Hindustani and Pakistani nations with which the makers of the plan were quite familiar. "The Indo-Pakistani problem is not an inter-communal issue and will never be solved on inter-communal lines. It is an international problem and, therefore, will submit itself to a permanent solution on that basis alone. Any constitution—Federal or Unitary—which disregards this vital fact, while destructive for the Pakistanians, cannot but be disadvantageous to the British and Hindoostanis as well." If Burma was being separated from Hindustan and accorded a distinct national status, it was a mystery why Pakistan was being forced into an Indian federation against its will and in complete disregard of its interests and rights.

A federation for all India could be conjured up by the fiat of law, but could not be worked without the willing co-operation of the Pakistanians. The British Parliament could not impose a constitution unless it also imposed justice. The proposed federation denied "sacred justice" to Pakistan and would, therefore, "never satisfy the soul of the nation". The Pakistan National Movement would never accept the official dispensation as a permanent solution of the Indo-Pakistani problem. "Nothing on earth will ever induce us to play this suicidal part allotted to us under the Indian Federal Scheme. We cannot give up what we have inherited from our forefathers, nor can we surrender what has been bequeathed to us by our heroes and martyrs. We can sacrifice all but we cannot commit an act of self-strangulation by joining the Indian Federation to please the British, or to satisfy the Hindoos. . . . The struggle may be long and trying: it may entail suffering and sacrifice: but no trial can be too severe and no sacrifice too great

in this noble cause. We have the fullest faith in the justice of our national demand, and an unshakable belief in the destiny of our Fatherland." The letter concluded with a prayer that the help of God bless these efforts and the inspiring example of national heroes sustain them.<sup>86</sup>

### Muslim Thinking (1935)

On 13 August, the Aga Khan wrote to Sir Fazli Husain: "What should be the future policy of the Muslims of India? . . . To this there is only one answer: that we should take advantage of our position in the North, and in Bengal, and get all the natural advantages we can out of it. First, in all-India affairs we should be out and out Federalists using all our influence so that our provinces get at least such autonomy as the great Indian Princes will enjoy under the Federation. Secondly, by gradually changing the character of the Army from a professional force to a territorial one and having for each province the kind of advantage that Bavaria had in the old German Empire (which great Princes will have in the new Indian Federation), by using all our strength for this legitimate end, make India what she really is, i.e., a United States of Southern Asia rather than something on the model of present day Italy or Germany. Thirdly, internally we must strengthen our numbers by child welfare, by hygienic home life . . . . Here is the crux of our policy. How are these things to be carried out? In self-interest, if for no other reason, our attitude should be hardest possible political work on the lines of moderate State socialism, a policy that will get for us the sympathy of many depressed and poor Hindus as well as being in touch with the world movement—even in such reactionary countries as Germany and Italy. Our members in all the provinces (and especially in Bengal) should always be on the side of putting as many taxation burdens as possible on the upper and middle classes and reducing as much as they can indirect taxes, which fall generally on the poor. This being the case we have to start a real Economic Party with a semi-Socialist programme throughout each province and a purely Federalist programme at the Centre."<sup>87</sup>

This is a significant communication, both for its authorship and its contents. The Aga Khan had had immense influence on Muslim India, and though this was now waning and he played no



important part in the making of Pakistan, yet his insight into Indian politics was unparalleled. His advice to concentrate on the Muslim provinces (even to the extent of initiating the creation of provincial armies) and to win as much autonomy as possible was an indication that Muslim interest was now transferring itself from the Indian plane to that of Muslim provinces. One could interpret it as the foreshadowing of a possible partition.

An even more striking feature of this letter is the Aga Khan's socialist leanings. Coming from a man of his wealth and origin, the suggestion to follow a socialist policy shows how well he understood the needs of his community. Muslims were poor and in great economic distress, not only because the Hindus were exploiting them but also because the rich of their own community were indifferent to their welfare. A socialist programme would have two other advantages. It would help the Muslims to unite behind any party that promised to improve their material condition. It might also attract the sympathies of certain down-trodden and discontented groups among the Hindus. The advice was shrewd but unfortunately ignored by the Muslim leadership of that time, by the persons who led the later Pakistan movement and by their successors who came to rule the new country. As we will see shortly, similar recommendations were made by Rahmat Ali and Iqbal.

In October, the *Star of India* assured the Hindus that the Muslims did not want to dispossess them of anything that they had; they only demanded a proper share for themselves in the future India. And, this "the Hindus will never concede"; they wanted the Muslims to remain "perpetual economic and political serfs to them while they alone rule the roost".<sup>88</sup>

In December came the golden jubilee of the Indian National Congress, and the pro-Congress Muslims asked the mass of the community to celebrate the occasion. Most Muslim public men and newspapers rejected the idea and used the opportunity to enlarge upon the anti-Muslim past and policies of the Congress. One example typifies the line of argument.

One Ahmed Idrisi commented: "It is a historical truth that from its very foundation the Congress has been a Hindu body working for Swaraj, which in effect will be Hindu Raj . . . . To ask the Muslims to join the Congress Jubilee felicitations is to ask the injured victim to kiss his oppressor. . . . The Hindu policy in a

nutshell is that they want to utilize the presence of British troops in India during the period of the preparation for Hindu Raj, which is their distant goal. Moreover, the interests of the Muslim Kingdoms [did he mean Muslim native states, or Afghanistan, Iran and Turkey?] and the British Empire are identical. The strength of the British Government in India is not only of the greatest help to Indian Muslims for preserving their existence and individuality and for future progress, but is, at the same time, a sure guarantee for the safety and continued existence of the Muslim Kingdoms, which the British Government is bound, in its own interest, to protect from the common danger."<sup>89</sup> The message was loud and clear. If there were a choice, the Muslims would prefer the British to the Hindus.

The answer of the extreme-wing Hindus was equally blunt and unmistakable. "India is for the Hindus", said Dr. Kirtkoti at the Shuddhi Conference at Poona, "and other communities are merely guests of the country, of which fact they should be informed. They should also be warned to behave themselves as guests."<sup>90</sup> The gulf was as great as it could be.

Some British commentators of long Indian administrative experience confirmed Muslim fears and fortified their convictions. One of them wrote in this year: ". . . the Indian Legislative Assembly is dominated by Congress, and that all but one or two Provincial Assemblies are in Congress hands, one can see that if Responsible Government is given now, it must mean Congress Rule. Once Congress got the power, nothing but military force or a successful rebellion can make them quit it." Then followed some sharp comments on Hindu mentality. "The Hindu elements, whose vocal organ the Congress is, though experts in legal chicanery and political gerrymandering, are incapable of ruling India. Were they left to themselves they would not last an hour. The martial races of the north would soon take control, perhaps in the wake of an Afghan invasion."<sup>91</sup>

### Rahmat Ali (1935-1940)

As far as we know, Rahmat Ali did not publish anything between 1935 and 1940 except a letter in *The Times*, and it is difficult to know how his ideas were developing in these crucial years. This was the period when Muslim India turned, slowly

but firmly, towards partition, thus finally vindicating him. This was also the period when several students of public affairs suggested alternatives to an Indian federation which, they claimed, could secure Muslim rights without splitting the sub-continent. To make our study of Rahmat Ali complete (till 1940, the terminal year of this work) we will break our chronological order and get along with him, postponing a consideration of other schemes to later chapters.

Rahmat Ali published nothing, but one chance window is opened into his mind by a comprehensive "interview" he gave to the Turkish woman of letters and traveller, Halide Edib. She visited India in the mid-thirties and has left us an account of the visit. In her book, which was published in London in 1937, she reproduced a 10-page "interview" with Rahmat Ali, which in fact he had written himself and persuaded her to incorporate in the book in the shape of a conversation between him and her.

Emphasizing the separate identity of the Muslims of "Pakistan", Rahmat Ali said that their racial origins were from Central Asia, and socially their type of civilization was totally different from that of Hindustan. "Islam, as a social, moral, and political system, is the key to, and the outstanding feature of, the Pakistani nation." Then he made a startling point. The Muslims of Pakistan were separate even from the rest of the Muslims in the sub-continent. "The Muslims in Pakistan are in their national home. The Muslims in Hindustan (i.e., India proper) went there as conquerors. Therefore Hindustan was the Muslim Empire, where for over nine hundred years, they ruled over a vast native majority. But when they lost this Colonial Empire, as distinct from Pakistan, the Muslims who settled in these Muslim Imperial Dominions of Hindustan became a minority community in Hindustan . . . . At the time of the fall of their empire, had the Muslims possessed leaders with vision and courage, they could have preserved the national as well as territorial integrity of their homelands in Pakistan."

Barring a few honourable persons, Muslim politicians were "a mere crowd of careerists" who divided themselves into two classes: the communalists, who were pro-British but anti-Hindu, and who followed a policy of subservience to the British; and the nationalists, who were pro-Hindu but anti-British, and who advanced the cause of Hindu capitalism and Hindu nationalism. Both had no policy of their own and had never considered that there was, or shall ever be, "a distinct Muslim homeland in Pakistan". This

rudderless leadership had pushed the Muslims into an Indian federation where they would be a mere minority community belonging to the Hindu nation. The Pakistan National Movement had been created to fight this grave menace and to struggle for the establishment of "an independent and separate Pakistan", and it believed that this solution alone could ensure an honourable existence for both nations and also put an end to the exploitation of both by British imperialism.<sup>92</sup>

The British had declined to consider the demand for Pakistan. They suspected that the Muslims were aiming at the revival of the old Muslim empire, a sort of pan-Islamism. But this was a mistake and a misrepresentation of the movement. It was neither anti-Hindu, nor anti-British, nor pan-Islamist. It was simply a realization of the truth that "*within Hindustan we will be a minority community, but, outside it, a virile nation of forty-two millions*". Pakistan would be the fourth largest state in the world among the 54 countries in the League of Nations. It was the destiny of the Muslims, and sooner or later bound to come true. "It may or may not be realized in my lifetime; but, with time, it is sure to command recognition and become for the people of Pakistan an ideal worthy of the highest dedication."<sup>93</sup>

About the economic prospects of Pakistan Rahmat Ali showed the same confidence that Jinnah expressed later during the Pakistan movement and stressed the same point, namely, that an honourable existence was more important than an easy life of slavery. Pakistan had vast moral and material resources and with the removal of Hindu capitalism and British exploitation it should pay its way. The expensive, top-heavy administration would disappear, and public services would be "made to work for the nation, not the nation for the services". There would be no place for an unfeeling and highly-paid bureaucracy presiding over the misery and poverty of the common man. Karachi was a first-class port. The soil was the most productive in the sub-continent. With all the sources of revenue then going to the Government of India in the hands of the nation, there was no cause for worry about the future.<sup>94</sup>

Like Jinnah in later years, Rahmat Ali refused to be drawn into a discussion of details. Asked about the form of government in his Pakistan, he said that the first objective was to achieve independence. But one thing was certain. Pakistan would be "fundamen-

tally both democratic and socialistic". Whether it would be federal or unitary would be determined by the people when they were free to make a choice.<sup>95</sup>

He was optimistic that, once the two nations had achieved independence in their respective national states, "the national pride of each will be satisfied, and the historic clash replaced by neighbourly goodwill and friendly co-operation". The root of the problem lay in Hindu refusal to recognize Pakistan. Both logic and history rejected such an attitude. The Hindus denied to Pakistan the right of self-determination which they claimed for themselves in India. Their claim to Pakistan on the ground that it was once upon a time a part of the Indian empire was absurd. There had been Hindu empires and Muslim empires, and once they went, their boundaries too disappeared with them. Imperial frontiers of the bygone ages must be forgotten if a new future was to be shaped.<sup>96</sup>

To the important inquiry about the future of the 45 million Muslims to be left behind in India Rahmat Ali gave an honest answer. "The truth is that in this struggle their thought has been more than a wrench to me. They are the flesh of our flesh and the soul of our soul. We can never forget them; nor they, us. Their present position and future security is, and shall ever be, a matter of great importance to us. As things are at present, Pakistan will not adversely affect their position in Hindustan. On the basis of population (one Muslim to four Hindus), they will still be entitled to the same representation in legislative as well as representative fields which they possess now. As to the future, the only effective guarantee we can offer is that of reciprocity, and, therefore, we solemnly undertake to give all those safeguards to non-Muslim minorities which will be conceded to our Muslim minority in Hindustan . . . . But what sustains us most is the fact that they know we are protecting Pakistan in the highest interest of 'the Millet'. It is as much theirs as it is ours. While for us it is a national citadel, for them it will ever be a moral anchor. So long as the anchor holds, everything is or can be made safe. But once it gives way, all will be lost."

He continued: "Times come when even brothers have to part. Cruel as such times naturally are, the highest good of the Millet must come before everything else . . . . The nobler spirits among them appreciate this truth and are, therefore, actively supporting

the Movement. They are fully conscious of the fact that Pakistan's struggle is as vital to them as it is to us. We all know that the idea of earth-rootedness is repugnant to Islam. The world is remoulding itself, and political boundaries are disappearing before the tide of moral and spiritual allegiances. Sooner or later, but sooner rather than later if we can make it, Nature's decrees are bound to be obeyed. Therefore, if all of us hold fast and remain true to our teachings, we have every hope that the future will see us even closer to one another than we are at present."<sup>97</sup>

The last question Halide Edib asked him was, "isn't there an alternative in 'one Indian nationhood' for you all?" To which Rahmat Ali's immediate answer was, "No, Madam, certainly not! We are not Indians: we are Pakistanis." It would be "our national death" to embrace Indian nationalism. "Has any nation in the world ever committed national suicide in the interest of its neighbours' unity? I believe not. Defeat is a curse, but surrender, a sin." To unite these two nations politically and physically would be a grievous disaster. "Therefore for us to seal our national doom in the interest of 'One Indian Nationhood' would be a treachery against our posterity, a betrayal of our history, and a crime against humanity for which there could be no salvation."<sup>98</sup>

This "spoken" testament is important for some new ideas not to be found in his earlier writings and hardly referred to in later statements. For example, his straight answer that the government of Pakistan would be based on the principles of democracy and socialism is of much significance. He wanted a socialist state at a time when even the Congress had not committed itself to socialism, when no Muslim leader was giving thought to the economic issues of the future, and when even in Europe socialist states were scarce on the ground. Again, his emphasis on the weaknesses and dangers of a bureaucracy bred in the imperial stable put the finger on one of the important problems of the future. But what is more striking is what he did not say. There is no mention of an Islamic state in his programme. In spite of his intense devotion to Islam, the Islamic basis of his two-nation theory, and his anxiety to save Islam from Hindu domination, he stood for a state which would be Muslim without being Islamic.

Another interesting feature of this "interview" is his remarks on the future of the Muslims living outside Pakistan. In his theory of hostages, though he did not use these words, he foresaw what



was to be repeated by many in later years. His explanation that Muslims to be left behind in India would also gain by the creation of Pakistan, in so far as they would be participating in a cause which was in the interest of the entire *millat* and would be able to look to Pakistan as their moral anchor, is the only rational and realistic argument which could justify the two-nation theory and still find it practical to surrender a part of the nation.

In its issue of 5 December 1938, *The Times* had carried a special article entitled "Federation in India", in which Muslims were said to be "again toying" with the idea of the creation of a "Pakistan" in the Muslim-majority provinces of India. Rahmat Ali wrote a letter to the journal on the same day, alleging that the words used in the article were "somewhat misleading" in the sense that they gave "the impression to the reader that 'the idea' of creating a Pakistan has been intermittent and spasmodic". After pointing out that the idea had first been put forth in 1933 and since then consistently upheld by the Pakistan National Movement, he affirmed that "no Constitution, whether federal or unitary, can succeed which condemns our 80,000,000 Muslims to the status of a minority community, especially in the territories where, for centuries, we have been, and still are, the overwhelming majority of the population". He concluded by declaring that the Muslims living in the north-western India "have never been 'Indian' in the true sense of the word; nor do we aspire to that title in the future".<sup>99</sup>

In November or December 1938 Choudhry Khaliqzaman was in England, and one evening Rahmat Ali invited him to tea, and the two men had a long talk on Pakistan and the Muslim problem. Khaliqzaman tells the story like this: "This was my first meeting with him and I took a sincere liking for this tall, graceful and well-cut figure. When we started talking about the scheme of Pakistan I found that not only had he thought deeply over the question but was earnest about its realization . . . . After meeting him I felt sad that a man of his calibre and attainment was being reviled by his own people in India, without any justification, as a British stooge. After some discussion I informed him that I was already a convert to the idea [of Pakistan] but I told him that I was not ready to use the word 'Pakistan' for partition of the country because that would make the British suspicious on the one hand and antagonize the Hindus on the other. Why should we

not claim the right of self-determination for our areas instead of bringing in the name 'Pakistan'? But this did not appeal to him. We had many other talks on the subject later on . . . . In this scheme Bengal was excluded while the whole of the Punjab including Delhi found mention. Among others this was also one of the reasons why I was unwilling to give the scheme of partition the name of Pakistan. I preferred the idea of having two Muslim Federations."<sup>100</sup>

Several things are revealing in this narrative. Khaliqzaman says that he had been converted to the idea of Pakistan before he met Rahmat Ali; which shows how close Muslim India had come to the idea of a partition by the end of 1938, and Rahmat Ali's plans must have played a considerable part in effecting this change in Muslim attitude. But Khaliqzaman's refusal to accept the name "Pakistan" is not easy to understand. The reasons he pleads make it even more difficult. Why would the British be suspicious of the name, and, anyway, why should this consideration have deterred the Muslims from owning it? As for antagonizing the Hindus, any demand for Muslim separation was an intolerable anathema to them, no matter by what name one called it. These were no grounds for rejecting Rahmat Ali's name for the Muslim state. A more reasonable objection was that since Bengal was excluded from the Pakistan scheme, its adoption would not reflect the real wishes of the Indian Muslims who wanted a partition embracing the eastern wing. (In fact, the Lahore Resolution later asked for two or more states, and the north-western state could have been given the name of Pakistan). At the same time, it is interesting to note that Khaliqzaman himself, and probably some others too who shared his views, were in favour of two Muslim federations in India; in other words, two separate Muslim states, one in the west and one in the east. This continued to be the Muslim ideal, and the Lahore Resolution staked a claim for "States", not a State. Khaliqzaman's further objection that Rahmat Ali's Pakistan included the whole of the Punjab is meaningless, for later the Muslim League leaders also included the whole of the Punjab in their demand, though the Lahore Resolution did not mention provinces but Muslim-majority areas.

It is very interesting to find Khaliqzaman making no reference to Rahmat Ali's plans for the future of the Muslims living outside the five northern provinces. He himself came from a Muslim-

minority area, the United Provinces, and might have given some thought to the fate of the Muslims of his province in any plan of partition. The fact that he did not do so, in company with all others from these areas, shows the strength of Rahmat Ali's arguments as presented to Halide Edib.

It seems, however, that during their conversation Khaliqzaman had drawn Rahmat Ali's attention to the future of the Muslims of the Hindu provinces, and perhaps inquired how and why they were to be expected to support a scheme which left them where they were, or rather weakened their total strength in a free India. Rahmat Ali replied to this in writing, and Khaliqzaman has reproduced this letter: "At the moment, the millat in the whole of the bi-national sub-continent counts 77,677,545, which is 22% of the total population. Whatever our present representation in the Central Legislature, ultimately it will depend on our population. Now, if the whole millat supports the creation of Pakistan as separate from India it will, by doing so, be reducing its representation in the Central Legislature from 22% to 16% at the lowest. Whether we should suffer this reduction of 6 seats in order to lay the foundations of a Muslim nation in Pakistan is a question that I leave to the judgment of all those who, like yourself, have always tried to safeguard the future of the millat both within India and without it."<sup>101</sup> The argument could not have been put better.

On 22 March 1940, one day before the Lahore Resolution was moved at the Muslim League Lahore session, the Supreme Council of the Pakistan National Movement assembled in Karachi, perhaps its first meeting outside England. Rahmat Ali was present, and his address to the Council was later published as a pamphlet by the Movement with the title of *The Millat of Islam and the Menace of "Indianism"*.

Rahmat Ali began his speech by declaring that now after seven years, "according to all signs and indications, the millat understands the mission of the Movement, appreciates its work, and looks to it for guidance". The first part of the programme had been completed by creating successfully a national consciousness and by demonstrating the inevitability of the establishment of Pakistan. Struggle on this front would of course continue. In the meantime, the moment for initiating the second part of the programme had arrived. This related to Bengal and Hyderabad-Deccan.

He again attacked "Indianism" in strong words. To accept the territorial unity of India in any shape was to acknowledge the paramountcy of Indianism.<sup>102</sup>

He was glad that at long last AIML had come to claim for the Muslims a nationality different from the Indians. But it puzzled him to see it still clinging to India and calling it their "Common Motherland". There was no logic in it. How could one be half Indian and half-non-Indian; territorially Indian, but nationally non-Indian; internationally Indian, but internally non-Indian. India never was and would never be the Muslim motherland.<sup>103</sup>

Defining the fundamental creed of the movement, he declared "It is that we are Muslim, not Hindoo; Pakistani, not Hindoostani and Asian, not 'Indian'; that, in retrospect, the 'India of today is the 'South Asia of yesterday', but, in prospect, the sphere of the individual solidarity of several nations of tomorrow; that, at present, 'India' is the arbitrary name of the British Empire in South Asia, but, in future, it will be the natural designation of 'Indianism', confined to its national home in India proper (Hindoostan); that as this Empire is composed of several countries of South Asia, of which India (Hindoostan) is only a minor unit, no system of government, whether inspired by the Gladstonian soul of British Imperialism or by the Gandhian spirit of Indian nationalism, or by the grasping capitalism of both, can ever succeed unless it recognizes, and guarantees, the distinct nationhood of the nations living therein; and, finally, that, in so far as we are concerned, we will accept only that political situation which is based upon the aforesaid eternal verities—verities which inspire the 'Creed of the Movement' and ensure the sovereign status of Pakistan, of Bengal, and of Usmanistan." The Muslims must "first realize its inner truth before they expect others to recognize it".<sup>104</sup>

What, then, was the next step? Pakistan, Bengal and Usmanistan were the "political foundations of our heritage", which must be saved to ensure the ultimate safety of the millat. The Pakistani demand, which was put forward in 1933, was merely the first part of the movement whose final objective was, and remained, the "permanent defence of our entire millat against the persistent dangers of 'Indianism' ". The second part, now to be taken in hand, was to save Bengal and strengthen Usmanistan.

Bengal, with its hinterland of Assam, was to the Muslims the "Bang-i-Islam". Like Pakistan, it too had a Muslim majority, an

was therefore entitled to the exercise of the right of self-determination. For this purpose a national movement would have to be started and built up on the soil of Bengal. It was the duty and the responsibility of Muslim leaders of Bengal to create such a movement, remembering that on their sincerity, labour and devotion depended not only the immediate future of the 30 million Bengali Muslims but also the ultimate fortunes of Islam in South Asia.<sup>105</sup>

Usmanistan (Hyderabad-Deccan) was a princely state, not a part of British India. Yet it was "a part of our patrimony", and its future was inseparably bound up with that of the *millat*. The Muslims derived their right to Usmanistan "from those canons of International law from which other nations deduce their claims to their domains". The *de jure* sovereignty of Usmanistan was a fact, acknowledged in the treaties originally made by the British and the Nizam. No other state in India enjoyed the special status and privileges of Usmanistan. "These facts and factors constitute our title-deeds to Usmanistan." The people of the state should now embark upon a "sustained constitutional struggle" for the *de facto* recognition of her *de jure* sovereignty. It was imperative for them to establish an organization to work to this end.<sup>106</sup>

The moral foundations of the demand for a Muslim Bengal and a sovereign Hyderabad were secure. Both "countries" were clear-cut territorial units, treated as such for hundreds of years. They were different from Hindustan "in character, culture and in composition as well as in geography, in history, and in ideology". To push them into India would be an act of injustice. The restoration of these lands, as of Pakistan, to their rightful positions on the map "involves no revision of the boundaries of India proper, no redistribution of her territories, no fresh demarcation of her provinces, and no exchange of her populations". They would form three independent Muslim nations in South Asia.<sup>107</sup>

But the struggle for the achievement of their independence could not be left in separate, divided hands without weakening it. The national effort must be co-ordinated by creating an "international" organization. The only existing central organization, the Muslim League, had become "an anachronism and a fatal one at that", because the *millat* had decided to sever its ties with India and seek its future in Asia. So it must go and be replaced with "an alliance of the nations of Pakistan, Bengal, and Usmanisation".<sup>108</sup>

Some features of this address will strike the reader at once.

Perhaps because it was the spoken word, it lacked the close reasoning and crystal clarity characteristic of most of what Rahmat Ali wrote. There is too much of rhetoric here, as if he was carried away by his own eloquence. Words supplant arguments; metaphors are mixed; fondness for alliteration spoils the general effect.

The importance of the statement lies in its claims on behalf of Bengal and Hyderabad. Though Rahmat Ali said that they constituted the second step or stage of his programme and stemmed out of his original conception, there is no mention, direct or indirect, of Bengal or Hyderabad in his earlier declarations. We can safely take these new claims as after-thoughts, but after-thoughts which were by no means original. Between 1935 and 1940 Bengal had featured in various ways in several proposals suggested to solve the Muslim problem. Even Iqbal, who like Rahmat Ali had originally dismissed Bengal from his consideration, had later come to reckon in the eastern Muslims. The Hyderabad case was tricky, for it was neither a part of British India nor a Muslim-majority area. Yet it had been agitating the Muslim mind, partly because of its historical interest and partly because of a sustained Hindu campaign to harass the Nizam and demand majority rule. The new Congress policy of interfering with the internal affairs of the native states, particularly where this suited the Hindus (there was no Congress movement for democracy in Kashmir, which had a huge Muslim majority living under a Hindu ruler), was also intensifying Muslim fears. Mawdudi had already claimed Hyderabad to be a *dar-ul-Islam*, and Sayyid Abdul Latif, himself a Hyderabad, was trying to save at least the culture of his home by making the state a separate zone under his scheme. Finally, Rahmat Ali's interest in Bengal coincided with the Muslim League's new policy of claiming it for its own Pakistan. On two important points there was agreement between him and the League. Both demanded Assam in spite of its over-all Hindu majority, and both declared that Bengal-Assam would be a separate state.

In this speech Rahmat Ali mentions, in passing, that he had given the name of Bang-i-Islam to Bengal and Assam in 1937.<sup>109</sup> In a later pamphlet of October 1942, he again claimed that he had announced this for the first time in 1937.<sup>110</sup> It is possible that he had done so, but no pamphlet or other writing has come to my notice in which such a claim was made. His *Pakistan*, which con-



tains all his important pamphlets and other writings, does not reproduce any declaration of 1937, nor does it print any pre-1940 map embodying Bang-i-Assam.

It is obvious that Rahmat Ali was well aware of the different schemes which had been prepared by others during the three previous years. He did not make a detailed criticism of them, but his single uncomplimentary reference to them suggests that he was not interested in wasting his time on any plan which retained the identity of India and kept the Muslims within it.

### Rahmat Ali's Influence

Rahmat Ali influenced the development of the idea of Pakistan much more deeply than has been acknowledged by historians. He not only invented a beautiful name for the country but also converted a large group of people to the concept of separation. He was also the first Muslim to present a detailed case for Indian Muslim nationhood.

The main channel of his influence was the young student class, both in England and India. It felt the impact of his ideas and let him inspire its imagination. The founders and leaders of the Punjab Muslim Students Federation were all his followers. Some of them wrote a large number of articles in the Urdu papers of Lahore in favour of Rahmat Ali's Pakistan in 1937 and 1938, when the Muslim League had not yet made up its mind whether to ask for any kind of division or not. The word Pakistan was at this time in use in the Punjab, where both Hindus and Muslims employed it, but in different and opposite contexts. The Hindus used it as a synonym for communalism; Gulshan Rai's articles in the *Civil and Military Gazette*, when referring to Muslim communal feeling or reactionaryism, employed the term "Pakistani mentality". The Muslims, on the other hand, used it as a slogan that stood for freedom, separation, and the right of self-determination.

An even greater impetus was given to the movement for Pakistan through Muslim students who went to England for higher studies or professional training. Here was the cream of the nation, ready to be converted to any reasonable plan which safeguarded the rights and future of Muslim India. This group was well informed, educated, politically conscious, and mostly mature in years. Some of them had already heard of Pakistan, and were anxious

to meet Rahmat Ali. When they met him, his sincerity of purpose and persuasive power eliminated the few doubts they might have had, and the great majority of them became his followers, friends, co-workers and publicists.

These young men who fell under Rahmat Ali's spell came from all walks of life, and on their return to India joined different professions and services. In the main they belonged to three classes: lawyers, who later became successful advocates, judges and politicians; senior research students, who were either already lecturing at a college or a university and went back to it or made fresh entrance to the academic world on their return; and probationary members of the Indian Civil Service, who had been sent by the Government of India to Oxford or Cambridge to study some useful subjects and imbibe British culture. This was undoubtedly the elite of Muslim India, and Rahmat Ali gained an inestimable advantage in being able to interest it in his ideas and, in most cases, to convert it to his point of view.

When these men returned to India, full of zeal for Pakistan, they acted as valuable channels for the spread of the idea. Without actually entering politics or making public speeches, they were able to introduce the concept of a separate state into the Muslim mind. Each of these categories was ideally suited to take the message to the people without going through political or party channels. The lawyers met a large section of humanity in the course of their professional work, wrote articles for the press, and let their opinions be known in general during the interminable discussions and conversations in the thousands of bar rooms scattered all over India. The teachers were in an even better position to propagate Rahmat Ali's ideas. In Muslim universities and colleges they could of course talk about Pakistan to their hearts' content. In other places there was nothing to stop them from injecting the idea into the minds of their Muslim students, in private conversation or in small circles, and from distributing or lending Rahmat Ali's pamphlets to their students and colleagues. The ICS officers were not public men, but their exceptional position in the Indian society of those days made them powerful instruments in the service of the idea. Here was a "sahib", a part of the olympian bureaucracy, a very big man in common estimation, and whatever he said in private talk, in the club, in the family circle, or among friends, was taken note of, remembered and

repeated hundreds of times. If a servant of a foreign government, a dispenser of favours and privileges, said that Pakistan was a desirable goal, for thousands the idea immediately became unquestionable.

We should also remember that even in the 'thirties the "England-returned" had a special prestige in Indian eyes. Irrespective of his profession, status in life, income or ability, he enjoyed a unique distinction in society. (Even those who came back without a degree had an aura of respect around them, not available to the most highly educated in local universities). By virtue of his stay in England he became, in some mysterious way, a part of the common image of British authority and infallibility. His opinions commanded respect. His person demanded esteem. To question his ideals required extraordinary courage.

Thus we see how wrong it would be to measure Rahmat Ali's influence by the number of people who joined the ranks of his following in the technical sense of becoming members of his Pakistan National Movement. He was neither a politician seeking popular support, nor an election candidate begging for votes. Even more than being an arm-chair politician, he was a philosopher of political ideas, a creator of concepts, a maker of plans. For such people mass contact is not the aim, and hardly of much use. Communication of ideas takes place on a higher plane than the spread of political opinions. The channels used are also of a different variety. Men of influence are needed to carry the philosophy abroad, to talk to and convince other men of influence, to mould the mind of the elite in a certain direction. When this has been done, the philosopher of ideas has achieved what he had set out to do. The rest lies in the hands of the politicians and in the way they manipulate the political machine. But if the idea has sunk deeply into the consciousness of those who make, rather than follow, public opinion, the task of the politicians becomes lighter. In this sense, Rahmat Ali's contribution to the history of the idea of Pakistan is unique, and all those who helped to make his ideas known to their own circles in India must justly share the credit.

In spite of Jinnah's failure to acknowledge his debt to Rahmat Ali's ideas (and the Muslim League and most Pakistanis followed him in this regard), any one who has put Jinnah's pronouncements and Rahmat Ali's declarations side by side and read them together

will be immediately struck by the common thread of argument running through both. Each makes out a clear and rationally thought out case for the two-nation theory and for separation. But Rahmat Ali came first, and Jinnah could not have influenced him.

Rahmat Ali was the first to develop the consciousness of Hindu-Muslim differences into a finely constructed theory of two nations. Jinnah was the first Muslim leader to make the theory the basic plank of his policy and programme. When we read Jinnah's major speeches on the two-nation theory and then go back to what Rahmat Ali had written several years earlier, we find too many resemblances in argument and phraseology to be explained away by the long arm of coincidence. To take a specific instance, some passages in Jinnah's presidential address to the Muslim League session at Lahore in March 1940, delivered extempore on the most momentous occasion in the history of the League, echo not only Rahmat Ali's ideas but also his language and style. Jinnah summarized the theory of two nations in these words: "The Hindus and Muslims belong to two different religions, philosophies, social customs, literatures. They neither inter-marry nor inter-dine together and, indeed, they belong to two different civilizations which are based mainly on conflicting ideas and conceptions. Their aspects on life and of life are different. It is quite clear that Hindus and Musalmans derive their inspiration from different sources of history. They have different epics, different heroes, and different episodes. Very often the hero of one is a foe of the other and, likewise, their victories and defeats overlap . . . Musalmans are a nation, and they must have their homelands, their territory and their State."<sup>11</sup>

What Rahmat Ali had written in 1933 was this: "Our religion, culture, history, tradition, economic system, laws of inheritance, succession and marriage are basically and fundamentally different from those of the people living in the rest of India . . . These differences are not confined to the broad basic principles — far from it. They extend to the minutest details of our lives. We do not inter-dine; we do not inter-marry. Our national customs and calendars, even our diet and dress are different . . . The Hindus and Muslims are the followers of two essentially and fundamentally different religious systems."<sup>12</sup>

Again, in the same address Jinnah said: "The problem in India is not of an inter-communal but manifestly of an international

character and it must be treated as such. So long as this basic and fundamental truth is not realized, any constitution that may be built will result in disaster and will prove destructive and harmful not only to the Musalmans, but also to the British and Hindus."<sup>113</sup> Rahmat Ali had written in 1935: "The Indian-Pakistanian problem is not an inter-communal issue and will never be solved on inter-communal lines. It is an inter-national problem and, therefore, will submit itself to a permanent solution on that basis alone. Any constitution—Federal or Unitary—which disregards this vital fact, while destructive for the Pakistanians, cannot but be disadvantageous to the British and Hindoostanis as well."<sup>114</sup>

Obviously Jinnah had made himself thoroughly familiar with Rahmat Ali's ideas, and had probably re-read his writings before coming to Lahore for the session. Some of his later statements and speeches also reproduced the Cambridge views, at times word by word.

The similarities in the thinking of the two men do not stop here. The arguments they gave for the creation of one or more separate Muslim states bear the same points: fear of Hindu rule, contempt for some Hindu practices, protection of Muslim culture, futility of safeguards or promises of good treatment, failure of the federation to solve the communal problem, irreconcilable differences between the interests of the two nations, proud memories of Muslim rule in India, freedom to follow Islamic ideals in an Islamic environment, confidence that non-Muslim minorities in Pakistan would be well looked after, and a hope that Muslim minority in Hindustan would receive similar treatment. Another point common to Jinnah and Rahmat Ali is their faith in a constitutional approach to the settlement of all issues. Each undertakes to use all legal and peaceful means in the achievement of his ends. Each is opposed to the use of violence or to extremist action of any kind.

Any reader who cares to make a comparative study of the writings and speeches of the two men will discover that there is a great deal of material to draw a parallel between them. Enough has been said above to indicate that they had much more in common than is generally realized. But in spite of this close affinity Jinnah never mentioned Rahmat Ali in public or in private, and he opposed the adoption of the name of Pakistan till at last

strong public sentiment overcame his objection. Reasons for these actions are unknown to us.

To recapitulate, there are five points on which the Muslim League policy was inspired or influenced by Rahmat Ali's ideas. First, for reasons which we will examine later, the League leaders did not use the word Pakistan in the Lahore Resolution or in their speeches at Lahore and for some time afterwards; yet, everyone, including these leaders, knew that it was Pakistan that was being demanded. Secondly, the two-nation theory on which the demand for separation was based was for the first time argued in detail by Rahmat Ali. Thirdly, until April 1946 the League's official position was that separate states should be created in north-west and north-east India; and this followed Rahmat Ali's scheme in which Pakistan and Bangistan were to be separate countries and states. Fourthly, the League's insistence on including Assam (not a Muslim-majority province) in the north-eastern state can also be traced to Rahmat Ali, whose Bang-i-Islam or Bangistan was to embrace Bengal and Assam. Finally, almost every argument brought forth by the Muslim League in support of the desirability and inevitability of Pakistan had already been used by Rahmat Ali.

To dismiss all this as coincidence is to reject history in favour of prejudice. The Muslim League leaders might have had their reasons for not mentioning Rahmat Ali in their campaign for Pakistan, and later historians of the League might or might not be able to acknowledge his influence, but if facts are anything to go by there is little doubt that the Muslim League's ideal of and struggle for Pakistan owe a great deal to the Pakistan National Movement of Cambridge and to the ideas and opinions of Rahmat Ali.

I have found no satisfactory explanation of the Muslim League's failure or refusal to mention the word Pakistan in the Lahore Resolution. (As will be mentioned later, in 1939 Jinnah had asked "A Punjabee" to drop the original title of his book, which was *Pakistan*, which had created some embarrassment for the author as the book argued for a total separation). The term had been current since 1933, and since 1937 or 1938 it had actually been used in India by Muslims to define and describe their aspirations. In the Punjab there were identifiable groups and individuals who were demanding a Pakistan long before the League made its own



claim in March 1940. The silence of the Lahore Resolution is open to several interpretations.

It might have been an effort to snub or disown Rahmat Ali; an open declaration that the League wanted a Pakistan, but not of Rahmat Ali's variety. Or, it might have been aimed at demonstrating that the League did not owe anything to an outsider. Rahmat Ali was not a member of the Muslim League (in fact, he was a strong critic of its policies and title), yet the League had taken up his ideal and pronounced it as his own. This naturally put it in an embarrassing position. To announce that it had borrowed the idea from Rahmat Ali would have been an admission of lack of originality. Therefore, the party decided not to use the word Pakistan, but at the same time to retain the idea behind it. The League leadership might have thought that in this way they could use the plan without the obligation of acknowledging their debt to its author. Another possibility is that the League did not employ the word lest it scared the Hindus. The Hindus had picked up the name from Rahmat Ali, and were using it in a pejorative sense to emphasize the "communalism" of the Muslims. They were also making it out as the first stage of a pan-Islamic conspiracy against themselves, thus frightening the common Hindu into making a determined stand against any such demand. Jinnah and his colleagues might have thought it wiser not to give heart to this Hindu fright by persisting in calling their demand by the name of Pakistan.

Still another possibility is that the name was deliberately dropped as its official use would have conveyed to the Hindus and the British that the state(s) demanded by the League would embody a pure Muslim *rāj*. As the areas claimed in the Lahore Resolution contained a fairly large percentage of non-Muslim minorities who were then expected by everyone to stay there (Jinnah was opposed to a transfer of population, and no one could then have foreseen the wholesale migration forced upon the people by the unsettled conditions attending the actual process of partition), anything that encouraged a feeling of insecurity among the prospective minority groups was to be avoided. Already many a Hindu commentator had made much play of the meaning of the word Pakistan, and let his imagination loose on the intentions and secret motives of those who wanted to create a "land of the pure".

Finally, another explanation occurs to mind. The League's

policy of aloofness in relation to native states did not allow it to use a word whose very composition announced the inclusion of Kashmir in the country demanded by the party. Once having accepted the name formally, the party could not in justice claim that this meant no change in its policy on the native states. Nor could it eliminate the letter "k" from it, for that turned a beautiful name into an absurd and meaningless monstrosity.

For these reasons, I think, the Muslim League decided to avoid the dilemma by leaving the state(s) of its demand unchristened. Everyone, including the leaders, knew that Pakistan was being demanded and that with time the name would inevitably gain currency, and its silent implication would be transformed into common use without a formal announcement with its attendant political complications. After saying all this—and this is nothing but speculation, as there is no information available on this point in the published and unpublished material made public so far—I still find it rather curious that a party should have demanded the creation of separate and sovereign Muslim states without giving them a name; though it must be admitted that this had been done by so many persons (but not by parties in an official claim) before Rahmat Ali who had suggested a division of India on religious basis. The argument that the use of the word Pakistan would have scared the Hindus loses weight when we recall that in all his speeches Jinnah identified Islam with his demand and pointed out that the Muslims wanted a country where Islamic culture and values could flourish unhindered. Then how could the adoption of the name Pakistan have damaged the prospects of League's success in achieving it?

The mystery deepens with the Muslim League's ultimate adoption of the name. In practical terms, of course, this was a natural and obvious development. The Muslim demand was so universally known as Pakistan that it would have looked silly to continue to ignore the word. How could the leaders overlook it when in every meeting and procession their followers shouted themselves hoarse with the cry of "Pakistan zindabad" (long live Pakistan), and when every article, letter and editorial in the Muslim press asked its readers not to accept anything other or less than Pakistan? But when the League finally decided to own the name, was this not the right occasion to mention the origin of the word and the person who had coined it? Instead, Jinnah said that it was

the Hindus who had thrust the name on the Muslim demand, and his party was glad to accept it. This was hardly an explanation of the change of mind; in any case, it did not free the League from expressing its obligation to the man who had invented the word. All this wears the look of a deliberate decision to ignore Rahmat Ali.<sup>115</sup>

In one particular respect Rahmat Ali's name is unique in the history of the world. He is the only man to have given a name to a country many years before that country came into existence. There are examples, though not many, of countries being called after a great man, but Pakistan stands alone as a country which owes its name to the imagination of one man.

## NOTES

1. AIMC Executive Board Resolution, Simla, 4-6 July 1930, *IAR 1930*, Vol II, p. 328. For the All India Muslim Conference in general see K.K. Aziz (ed), *The All India Muslim Conference, 1928-1935: A Documentary Record*, Karachi, 1972; for this resolution, pp. 61-63. It was moved by Dr. Shafaat Ahmad Khan and seconded by Sayyid Habib Shah of Lahore.
2. Sir A.P. Patro, speaking in the Minorities Sub-Committee, 23 December 1930, *Indian Round Table Conference, 12 November 1930-19 January 1931, Proceedings of Sub-Committees (Part II), Sub-Committees II-IX*, London, 1931, p. 83.
3. Mirza Bashiruddin Mahmud Ahmad, *The Nehru Report and Muslim Rights*, Qadian, 1930, pp. 85-86.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 14.
5. *The Memoirs of Aga Khan: World Enough and Time*, London, 1954, p. 216.
6. A.C. Underwood, *Contemporary Thought of India*, London, 1930, p. 81.
7. Andre Philip, *L'Inde moderne: le probleme social et politique*, Paris, 1930, p. 245. He was a professor of law at Lyons.
8. J.E. Ellam, *Swaraj: The Problem of India*, London, 1930, pp. 168-169.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 251.
10. Sir Muhammad Shafi, speaking in the Minorities Sub-Committee, 1 January 1931, *Indian Round Table Conference, op. cit.*, p. 99.
11. Muhammad Ali's letter to the British Prime Minister, 1 January 1931, pub in *ibid.*, p. 142.
12. *IAR 1931*, Vol I, p. 284.
13. Much Concerned, letter, *CMG*, 12 February 1931. On the European community see R. Pearson, *A Social History of the European Community in Calcutta*, London, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, 1954. Next month, the *Round Table* thought it "certainly possible" that India might break up, first into a Muslim and a Hindu India, and later into a number of national states, as Europe did after the Renaissance and the

14. Reformation, *Round Table*, March 1931, p. 346.
15. Mawlana Shawkat Ali, Presidential Address, AIMC, Special Session, New Delhi, 5 April 1931, *CMG*, 8 April 1931.
16. AIMC Resolution, New Delhi, 5 April 1931, *IAR* 1931, Vol I, p. 288.
17. Sir Theodore Morison, "The Hindu-Muslim Problem of India", *Contemporary Review*, June 1931, pp. 710-717.
18. *MG*, June 1931, quoted in R.J. Moore, "The Making of India's Paper Federation, 1927-1935", a paper read at the Study Conference on the Partition of India, 1947, held at the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, 17-22 July 1967 (mimeo).
19. Zafrulla Khan, statement to the press, Delhi, 21 July 1931, *CMG*, 23 July 1931. In the same month, the Marquess of Zetland appreciated that a chain of predominantly Muslim provinces stretching across the north-west of India would be "a basis of great strength and influence" to the Muslims generally; see *Asiatic Review*, July 1931, p. 428.
20. *CMG*, 12 August 1931; also in *IQR* 1931, Vol II, pp. 238-239.
21. "Round Table Problems", *MG*, 8 September 1931.
22. India Office Departmental Note on Communal and Minority Problems, 25 September 1931, *Templewood Collection*, cited by R.J. Moore, in C.H. Philips (ed), *The Partition of India*, London, 1970, pp. 65-66, also in R.J. Moore, *The Crisis of Indian Unity, 1917-1940*, Oxford, 1974, p. 219.
23. Jawaharlal Nehru to Gandhi, 27 September 1931, *Gandhi Collection*, quoted in R.J. Moore, *The Crisis of Indian Unity*, pp. 241-242.
24. Memorandum by Sardar Ujjal Singh, "A Scheme of Redistribution of the Punjab", 8 October 1931, *Indian Round Table Conference (Second Session), 7 September 1931-1 December 1931, Proceedings of Federal Structure Committee and Minority Committee*, London, 1932, Appendix XVII, p. 582.
25. Memorandum by Sir Geoffrey Crobett, "The Communal Problem in the Punjab", 12 October 1931, *ibid.*, Appendix XVI, pp. 579-580. It was circulated on Gandhi's request.
26. Raja Narendra Nath, "Note on the Redistribution of the Punjab", *ibid.*, Appendix XVI A, p. 581.

27. *CMG*, 18 October 1931.
28. *Ibid.*, editorial, 19 October 1931.
29. *Ibid.*, 1 November 1931.
30. *Economist*, 7 November 1931, p. 844. A month later, Sir Alfred Knox, speaking in the House of Commons, saw no hope of the Hindus and Muslims coming into one organic whole (*H.C.* 260, 5S, 3 December 1931, cols. 1370-1371).
31. Zafrulla Khan, Presidential Address, AIML, New Delhi, December 1931, *IAR* 1931, Vol II, pp. 214-219.
32. Shafaat Ahmad Khan, "Muslims in the New India", *Asiatic Review*, January 1932, pp. 1-14.
33. Ian D. Colvin, "Trial and Error in India", *National Review*, February 1932, pp. 207-214.
34. AIMC Resolution no. 2, Lahore, 22 March 1932, *IAR* 1932, Vol. I.
35. *Economist*, 26 March 1932, p. 672.
36. Irwin to Hailey, 16 April 1932, *Hailey Papers*, HYC/24, quoted in Waheed Ahmad, *The Formation of the Government of India Act, 1935*, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Cambridge, 1969, p. 238. Two weeks later, Sir Walter Lawrence acknowledged the existence of many great and well-defined nationalities in India and saw the only hope of natural and healthy growth in their recognition; speech at the opening of the Indian Durbar Hall at Hastings on 29 April, *The Times*, 30 April 1932.
37. H.T. Lambrick, "Prospects for a United India after the Cessation of British Rule, as These Appeared in Sind, 1930-1946", a paper read at the Study Conference on the Partition of India, 1947, held at the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, 17-22 July 1967 (mimeo).
38. AIMC Working Committee Resolution, Simla, 7 June 1932, *Pioneer*, 11 June 1932.
39. *The Times*, 11 June 1932.
40. S. Sastri to P. Kodana Rao, 2 July 1932, T.N. Jagadisan (ed), *Letters of the Right Hon'ble V.S. Srinivasa Sastri*, London, 2nd ed 1963, pp. 231-232.
41. Lord Lloyd, "India: Facts or Fiction", *National Review*, August 1932, pp. 182-187. In the same month, even the *MG*, always a friend of the Congress, realized how utterly



opposed to each other were Hindu and Muslim attitudes to life, and how useless were such remedies as Pax Britannica, education and self-government (editorial, 8 August 1932).

41. Shaikh Abdul Majid, Presidential Address, AIKC, Ajmere, 27 September 1932, *IAR* 1932, Vol II, pp. 334-336. See also K.K. Aziz, *The Indian Khilafat Movement, 1915-1933: A Documentary Record*, Karachi, 1972, pp. 331-334.
42. Eustace Percy, *Some Memories*, London, 1958, p. 157.
43. Sir Theodore Morison, "Muhammadan Movements", in J. Cumming (ed), *Political India, 1832-1932: A Co-operative Survey of a Century*, London, 1932, pp. 95-96, 99, 104-105. At the same time, Sir Reginald Craddock asked that if Norway and Sweden could not keep together, if Ulster and the Irish Free State could not be got to unite, "how can it be expected that the infinitely greater diversities and divergent racial elements to be found in India could be welded into one self-governing and democratic whole?" (*The Dilemma in India*, London, 1932, pp. 7-8).
44. John Coatman, *The Indian Riddle: A Solution Suggested*, London, 1932, pp. 28-31.
45. John Coatman, quoted from Shaukatullah Ansari, *Pakistan: The Problem of India*, by Rajendra Prasad, *India Divided*, Bombay, 2nd ed June 1947, p. 206. Neither gives the source. What we definitely know is that he said: "... it may be that Muslim India in the north and north-west is destined to become a separate Muslim State or part of a Muslim Empire" (*Years of Destiny: India, 1926-1932*, London, 1932, p. 376).
46. Choudhary Rahmat Ali, *Pakistan: The Fatherland of the Pak Nation*, Cambridge, 3rd ed 1947, pp. 222-224. Hitherto cited as *Pakistan*.
47. Choudhary Rahmat Ali, *et. al.*, *Now or Never*, Cambridge, 28 January 1933, p. 1. This is a 4-page leaflet printed on large-size paper. It is a rare document. The reader interested in consulting the original will find it, along with everything that Rahmat Ali published, in K.K. Aziz, *Complete Works of Rahmat Ali*, Islamabad, 1978-80, 2 vols (Vol. II confiscated by the publisher).
48. *Now or Never*, p. 2.

49. *Ibid.*, pp. 2-3.
50. *Ibid.*, p. 3.
51. *Ibid.*, p. 4.
52. Rahmat Ali's memory is at fault when he says that Inayat Ullah Khan was studying veterinary science (*Pakistan*, p. 227). I have met Inayat Ullah Khan, and he has confirmed this.
53. *Pakistan*, p. 227.
54. *Ibid.*, p. 227.
55. C. Rahmat Ali, *What does the Pakistan National Movement Stand For?*, Cambridge, 1933, pp. 3-4. The pamphlet was reprinted in 1937 and 1942. I use the first ed.
56. *Ibid.*, pp. 4-5. All italics in this section are in the original.
57. *Ibid.*, p. 5.
58. *Ibid.*, pp. 5-6.
59. *Ibid.*, p. 6.
60. *Ibid.*, pp. 6-7.
61. *Ibid.*, pp. 7-8.
62. *Ibid.*, p. 8.
63. Abul Kasem, "A Plain Talk to Muslims", *TSI*, 1 February 1933. In the same month, a retired British ICS officer foresaw that within a short period the projected federal government would be faced with a "strong separatist movement" (G.T. Garratt, "The Third Round Table Conference", *Nineteenth Century*, February 1933, p. 137).
64. Haji Rahim Bakhsh, "The Two Distinct 'Nations' of India", *CMG*, 15 June 1933. A month earlier, Sir Elliott Colvin, a retired civilian, had given his opinion that the creation of a national union between Hindus and Muslims was likely to be a "matter of a century's duration" (E.G. Colvin, "India: The Longer View", *Nineteenth Century*, May 1933, pp. 545-546).
65. Frederic F. Holsinger, "Not One Dominion But Many", *Indian Affairs*, September 1933, pp. 176-179.
66. M. Yakub, "Indian Muslims and the Reforms", *Asiatic Review*, October 1933, pp. 638-643.
67. Bhai Parmanand, Presidential Address, All India Hindu Mahasabha, Ajmere, 1933, quoted in Nandalal Gupta (ed), *Nehru on Communalism*, New Delhi, 1965, p. 2.
68. Bhai Parmanand, Hindu Mahasabha Address, quoted in A.B.

- Rajput, *The Muslim League Yesterday and Today*, Lahore, 1948, pp. 54-55.
69. *TSI*, 4 December 1933.
  70. V.R. Gaikwad, *The Anglo-Indians*, Bombay, 1967, p. 30. See also K.E. Wallace, *Life of Sir Henry Gidney*, Bombay, 1945, pp. 188-196. On the community see Dorris W. Goodrich, *The Making of an Ethnic Group: The Eurasian Community in India*, California, 1952, Sharad J. Malelu, *The Anglo-Indians: A Problem in Marginality*, Ohio State, 1965, and Roy Dean Wright, *Marginal Man in Transition: A Study of the Anglo-Indian Community of India*, Missouri, 1970; all unpublished Ph.D. theses.
  71. Sir Albion Rajkumar Banerji, *The Indian Triangle*, London, n.d., pp. 234-244.
  72. Abul Kasem, "Beware of the Traps", *TSI*, 29 June 1934.
  73. Sardar Iqbal Ali Shah, "The North-Eastern Frontier: A Central Asian Confederacy", *ibid.*, 2 July 1934.
  74. Ainul Islam (pseud.), "On Men and Matters", *ibid.*, 5 July 1934.
  75. M.M. Malaviya, Presidential Address, Congress Nationalist Party Conference, Calcutta, August 1934, quoted in Asoka Mehta and A. Patwardhan, *The Communal Triangle in India*, Allahabad, 1942, pp. 157-158.
  76. Gulshan Rai, in *CMG*, 19 August 1934.
  77. Report from Madras, *TSI*, 28 August 1934.
  78. *Joint Committee on Indian Constitutional Reform (Session 1933-1934), Volume I (Part I), Report*, London, 1934, para. 20.
  79. *Ibid.*, para 26.
  80. Durga Das, *India from Curzon to Nehru and After*, London, 1969, p. 166.
  81. Gulshan Rai, "The National Liberal Standpoint", *CMG*, 29 January 1935.
  82. Waris Ameer Ali, "Moslems and the Proposed All India Federation", *National Review*, February 1935, p. 192.
  83. Sir Muhammad Yakub, "Shock to Peace-Loving Muslims", *TSI*, 5 March 1935.
  84. Recorder, "Indian Communalism Now and Hereafter", *Indian Empire Review*, April 1935, pp. 153-159.
  85. Archer (pseud.), "Slings and Arrows", *The Musalman*, 19 July 1935, quoted in full in M.A.H. Ispahani, *Quaid-e-Azam Jinnah As I Knew Him*, Karachi, 2nd ed 1967, p. 7. "Archer" was Altaf Husain (later editor of *Dawn*), and *The Musalman* of Calcutta was the spokesman of the Muslim Majlis Party of Bengal, *ibid.*, p. 4.
  86. Choudhary Rahmat Ali, letter of 8 July 1935, addressed to "My Lords". It is a printed document, by some freak chance not available in the library of the House of Lords. I have a copy in my private collection. Page references are not given as the letter is unpaginated.
  87. The Aga Khan to Sir Fazli Husain, 13 August 1935, Azim Husain, *Fazli Husain: A Political Biography*, Bombay, 1946, pp. 300-302.
  88. *TSI*, editorial, 29 October 1935.
  89. A. Ahmad Idrisi, "Muslims and Congress Jubilee", *CMG*, 28 December 1935.
  90. Dr. Kurtkoti, Presidential Address, Shuddhi Conference, Poona, Christmas Week, 1935, quoted by Gulshan Rai, "Is India for the Hindus Only?", *ibid.*, 18 January 1936. His Holiness Dr. Shankaracharya Kurtkoti (b. 1879): hereditary Brahman landlord of Kurtoki, district Dharwar. One of the founders of the Bhandarkar Research Institute, Poona. Occupied the Holy Seat of Jagadgurn of Karveer since 1917. President, All India Hindu Conference, Allahabad, 1918. Founder, Maharashtra Hindu Dharma Parishad, 1920. First Vice-Chancellor, Tilak Maharashtra University. Founder-President, All Faiths Conference, Nasik, 1933. President, All India Hindu Mahasabha, Lahore, October 1936. Won his Ph.D. from an American University on a thesis on Bhagvad Gita.
  91. H.K. Trevaskis, *Indian Babel*, London, 1935, pp. 189, 190.
  92. Halide Edib, *Inside India*, London, 1937, pp. 352-356. The quaint spellings of "Muslims" are in the original.
  93. *Ibid.*, pp. 356-357. Italics in the original.
  94. *Ibid.*, p. 357.
  95. *Ibid.*, pp. 357-358.
  96. *Ibid.*, pp. 358-359.
  97. *Ibid.*, pp. 359-360.
  98. *Ibid.*, pp. 361-362.
  99. C. Rahmat Ali, letter, *The Times*, 7 December 1938.

100. Choudhry Khaliqzaman, *Pathway to Pakistan*, Lahore, 1961, p. 200.
101. *Ibid.*, pp. 200-201. The letter was written on 12 December 1938.
102. C. Rahmat Ali, *The Millat of Islam and the Menace of "Indianism"*, Cambridge, n.d., pp. 1-5.
103. *Ibid.*, pp. 6-7.
104. *Ibid.*, pp. 7-8.
105. *Ibid.*, pp. 8-11.
106. *Ibid.*, pp. 11-13.
107. *Ibid.*, pp. 13-14.
108. *Ibid.*, pp. 14-16.
109. *Ibid.*, p. 16.
110. C. Rahmat Ali, *The Millat and the Mission*, Cambridge, October 1942, p. 2 fn.
111. Jamiluddin Ahmad (ed), *Some Recent Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah*, Lahore, 1952 ed, Vol I, pp. 178-180.
112. Choudhary Rahmat Ali, *Now or Never*, Cambridge, 1933, p. 2.
113. Jamiluddin Ahmad, *op. cit.*, p. 177.
114. Choudhary Rahmat Ali, *Letter to the Members of the House of Lords*, Cambridge, 8 July 1935, p. 3.
115. This and several other points are examined in detail in my forthcoming *Rahmat Ali: A Biography*, Wiesbaden, 1986. The biggest Pakistani work of reference is scandalously ignorant about him: according to it, Rahmat Ali founded a "political party" in "London" in "1932" and held "public meetings" in England to propagate for the creation of an "Islamic" state in India (the words in quotation marks indicate errors of fact); Sind was not included in his Pakistan; see *The Urdu Encyclopaedia of Islam*, Lahore, Vol. V, 1971, p. 420 (article prepared by the editorial board).

# 8

## IN A FAIR WAY: 1936-1938

### Muslim Thinking (1936-1937)

Muslim thinking in the years 1936 and 1937 was the same old, curious medley of mixed sentiments. Some talked of being Indians, some being outside of them. Some wanted safeguards, others desired to effect changes in the 1935 federal act. Almost everyone was dissatisfied with the prevailing conditions, but a very few considered partition as a solution of their problem. Continuing the practice of previous chapters, I will first indicate the "feel" of the period by citing important or typical contemporary opinions, and then examine the concrete proposals offered in these two years.

Delivering his presidential address at the Khilafat Conference at Calcutta on 4 January 1936, the Nawab of Dacca (Khawaja Habibullah) confessed that "we are 'Indian Muslims'". We refuse to believe that our being true and loyal 'nationals' of an Indian 'nation-state' should be a bar to our being faithful members of the 'Commonwealth of Islam' which is the mightiest single power for world peace, social democracy and international brotherhood in the world. We accept India to be our only 'Fatherland'. We look to no other country as our homeland. We have been born and bred up in India and we will live and die as Indian Muslims. In the past and present we have contributed our best 'National-Self' to the making of Indian life and culture and in the future we want to be a free and progressive people in order to contribute our best to the building of a free self-governing and progressive India. The fundamental political objective of the Indian Musalmans is a self-governing India in the Political Polity of which Islam must have a place as a free community of culture. We have no use for a system of 'Imperium-in-Imperio'. But equally we cannot allow the freedom



and unity of India to mean in practice the political subjection, economic exploitation and cultural submission of the 80 million Indian Muslims who constitute what Sir Bijoy Chand Mahtab aptly terms 'a community and race within a race, a sub-nation within a sub-continent'. The political individuality of the Indian Muslims must be recognized in many [sic.] schemes of national self-government of Swaraj. That is our political ideal. There is no earthly reason why such an idea should be regarded as incompatible with that of a real creative and catholic Indian Nationalism. If Indian Muslims are guaranteed that position we are ready to become the corner-stone of a free 'Indian Nationality' and the frontier guards of a free 'Indian Nation-State' ".<sup>1</sup> There is no mention of separation, not even of Muslim nationalism.

The *Star of India* believed that the Hindus wanted to make India free so that they alone might reap the fruits of that freedom. They forgot that unless "the position and power due to the Muslims as equal partners in this freedom is assured", the Hindus alone would not be able to win freedom.<sup>2</sup> Professor Gulshan Rai of Lahore answered these claims with his own suggestion. "As soon as the Muslims dissolve their Muslim Leagues, Muslim Conferences and the Khilafat Committees, the Hindus also will have no necessity for Hindu Sabhas and Hindu-Buddhist alliances. When that stage arrives, then no one among the Hindus will have any occasion to call the Muslims guests of India."<sup>3</sup> There is no mention of the Congress dissolving itself to please the Muslims or to help the communal problem solve itself.

In April the *Star of India* returned to the reality of Muslim fears. "A great menace faces the Muslims and threatens to wipe out their culture. Are they ready—are they preparing to face it?"<sup>4</sup> "As long as the present policy of the Congress lasts, as long as the present mentality the Hindus persists, as long as hypocrisy and deceit continue to play so large a part in Hindu politics, the Muslims would much rather die under the Crescent fighting the Tricolour than surrender their birthright, their cultural and national integrity."<sup>5</sup> Strong words! But still no indication of where the solution lies. A front-ranking Congress leader replied by appealing to all groups and parties, Muslim and others, to join the Congress, because "sooner or later Hindus and Muslims will join together", and there was no room for more than two parties in India, those working for India's freedom and those opposed to it.<sup>6</sup>

In July, or a little before that, a British ICS officer belonging to the Punjab commission, in a new edition of his book *The Wealth and Welfare of the Punjab*, offered the suggestion of creating a new federation consisting of the Punjab, Jammu and Kashmir State, NWFP, Baluchistan and Sind. Calvert made this proposal because he believed that in the Indian federation the commercial and industrial interests of Bombay would be so strong that the central government would be forced to adopt a still more protectionist policy, and that would cause the imposition of a greater burden of indirect taxation on the agricultural consumers of the Punjab. Already the Bombay mill and factory owners had brought about a fall in the prices of the Punjab agricultural produce.<sup>7</sup> Though the case is built on purely economic grounds, the proposed federation is identical with Rahmat Ali's scheme.

In an article on the Congress behaviour in the Indian Legislative Assembly, Sir Muhammad Yaqub concluded his treatment with these two sentences: "This is the state of affairs when the majority is still almost impotent and without possessing any real power. What will be their behaviour towards the minorities and how they will crush them when real power comes to their hands can easily be imagined."<sup>8</sup> A week later, an important Hindu leader added to Muslim fears by saying from a public platform that the "Hindus must recapture for themselves the fundamental historical and political truth that India must be considered theoretically and legally as a Hindu State".<sup>9</sup> Shawkat Ali reminded the Hindus that a self-governing India was impossible if the majority had not the goodwill and co-operation of the minorities 'and if the Hindus were not prepared to concede Muslim demands'.<sup>10</sup> The Democratic Swaraj Party deflected this reminder by confirming that "Hindustan is for Hindus and Muslims cannot dictate to us".<sup>11</sup> On 6 December, Edward Thompson wrote to Jawaharlal Nehru from Oxford: "You have the Princes and Moslems against you. . . [if you take office] you will make the National Movement not an almost solely Hindu Movement as (I am sorry, but) it now is, but an Indian movement."<sup>12</sup>

Among all the Muslim public men and editors quoted above none yet talked of a partition of India as a solution, or even as a threat to extract more concessions. The underlying Muslim feeling of insecurity and the rarely-expressed but real sentiment for separation were underscored by Hindu and British observers.

The introduction to a Hindu compilation noted that "this spirit of separatism flourishes under various disguises, and expresses itself in political discussions sometimes as possessing a special importance for the gate-keepers of India; sometimes as still capable of carrying on the traditions of imperial rule, sometimes calling in the aid of pan-Islamism to restore the balance disturbed by Muslim weakness in India . . . . The mentality that diverts and deflects national energies from the main current of building up a composite national life in India had its birth a century back".<sup>13</sup>

In the same year was published John Coatman's *Magna Britannia* which devoted a few pages to the Islamic renaissance of the twentieth century. The remarkable prescience and intelligent speculation of this account makes it worth our while to study some passages in their original wording. "One of the most notable, and yet least remarked, of all the developments in world politics, within the last two or three decades, is the political renaissance of Islam. Twenty-five years ago it seemed as though the last traces of political independence were about to disappear from the Muhammadan world . . . . But now a marvellous transformation has taken place. From East to West—from India to Northern Africa—we see new or renascent Muhammadan States, all of them the centre of political ideals and ambitions and some of them the seats of reviving Islamic culture. In a word, Islam is on the march again, and it can hardly be doubted that Islamic countries will play an increasingly important part in world affairs. No serious attention need be paid to any talk of Pan-Islamism, the bogey which at one time shared the stage with the Yellow Peril. A federation—even an alliance—of all or of any important number of Islamic countries is completely out of the question. Yet there are strong invisible bonds of sympathy which link all Muhammadan communities throughout the world . . . . The Islamic renaissance now in progress across the whole middle east and north of Africa can be a powerfully disruptive factor in international relations and the world order of the future. Although, as we have seen, there is no substance in the talk of Pan-Islamism, there is very material substance in some of the plans, or at any rate possibilities, of the growth of greater Muhammadan States by the union of neighbouring Muhammadan peoples; and further, there is the certainty that such growth will be partly at the expense of non-Muhammadan peoples. One example of the international disorganization which would be

produced by any such development as this would be provided by the amalgamation of Afghanistan and the Muhammadans of North-Western India into one State. Such a project as this may be a chimera, but it is discussed seriously enough by some Muhammadans of standing in both the countries concerned. There are enthusiasts who foresee the rise of a great Muhammadan kingdom, stretching from the eastern borders of Persia to Calcutta, and including Kashmir and some of the khanates, or little kingdoms, of Turkestan and Central Asia. It is easy enough to point out the tremendous dislocation which would ensue from the realization of such dreams as this and the permanent insecurity and the certainty of ultimate disaster from the inclusion in such a new State of millions of Hindus, who would form the Hindustan irredenta."<sup>14</sup>

Political statements and announcements of 1937 reflect the same confusion and increasing disillusionment. An anti-Muslim League Muslim paper of Delhi could say in January that "when an old Congressman and seasoned nationalist like Mr. Jinnah cannot tolerate the dictatorship of the Congress, the generality of Muslims would not be ready to be Congress camp-followers in hundreds of years". Jinnah's idea of "equal partnership" was "the common idea of the whole Muslim community". The policy of the Congress had been to establish the "despotism and dictatorship of the Congress leaders so that they and they alone may be enthroned as the absolute masters of the country".<sup>15</sup> *Sarfraz*, the Lucknow organ of the All India Shia Conference (which was opposed to the Muslim League), admitted that the Congress had become the political platform of the majority community. "Muslims, distrusting and despairing of the Hindus, have gone far away from the Congress, and the Hindus, far from trying to collect them together within the Congress fold, have driven the Muslims still farther away from the Congress by their selfish activities. It is an undeniable fact that Muslims, as a community and as an organized corporate body, are not at all with the Congress."<sup>16</sup> Even more revealing were the views of *Ansari*, a Congress Muslim newspaper of Delhi, which wrote: "We have stated it times without number and are still bold to assert that the Congress by overlooking the problem of Hindu-Muslim agreement and understanding is committing the greatest blunder which has made the position of all those Congressite Muslims extremely critical who in view of the great

objective of India's freedom incite Muslims in general to join the Congress . . . . It is a matter of thousand pittles that the more these mighty Muslim leaders of Indian nationalism stressed this point the more the Congress diverted away from the objective of a mutual understanding."<sup>17</sup> Significantly, this was written before the 1937 general election and before the ascension to power of the Congress in the Hindu-majority provinces under the 1935 federation.

No wonder that on the eve of the election the *Star of India* administered a serious warning to the Bengali Muslim electorate. "Another week, and the Muslims of Bengal will be proving by their own action whether they wish to live with honour in a land that is theirs by birthright—or to languish in eternal servitude. . . . The time has come for every true son of Islam to look deep into his being, to examine the stuff he is made of, and to ask himself whether he will be a saviour or a slaughterer of the great community to which he belongs."<sup>18</sup>

Why was the Congress behaving so arrogantly and refusing to acknowledge any other party as speaking for the Indians? Part of the answer is found in what Edward Thompson, who was in close touch with Congress leaders and especially Nehru and apparently knew their mind, told Sir Thomas Jones. Thompson's estimate of the situation, as communicated to Lady Grigg by Jones on 19 March, was that the Congress believed that Germany would declare war in the summer of 1938, that the British would be forced to withdraw their troops from India, that the native troops would not be reliable without the British stiffening, and that then the Congress would take charge and step into British shoes as the master and ruler of the sub-continent.<sup>19</sup>

If that was so, Muslim reading of the Congress intentions was not far wrong. Congress nationalism was "nothing more or less than Hinduism"; the party "stands unashamed in the fact that it is an organization working for a Hindu *Raj*."<sup>20</sup> The constitution of India could not be based on principles of unqualified nationalism. It must make room for diversity and "give scope for collective sentiments."<sup>21</sup> Sayyid Zakir Ali, Joint Secretary of the U.P. Muslim League Parliamentary Board, and Mulla Abdus Samad Mukhtadari, Working Secretary of the U.P. Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Hind (so far a pro-Congress body), declared in April that it was against the best interests of the Muslims to join hands with the Congress.<sup>22</sup> Sir Muhammad Yaqub called the Congress a "purely communal

organization" which was aiming at the "destruction of Islamic culture, Islamic civilization and the separate entity of Muslims in India". Still the Muslims were prepared "to co-operate and collaborate on terms of equality with any political organization in the country which aims at the elevation of our status to that of equal partners in the British Commonwealth of Nations by constitutional means".<sup>23</sup>

The chronicler of these years is bored stiff with reading such statements hour after hour. They show discontentment, disillusionment, displeasure, even despair; but they repeat each other *ad nauseam*, without hinting at any possible solution, without even referring to the solutions already proposed. Here and there, a bold person crosses the line of convention and asserts something new—and yet with caution and circumspection, as if he was not sure how the community would receive his *obiter dicta*. One such figure was Said Akbar Kiani, an obscure lawyer from Gujjar Khan in Rawalpindi district, who declared that "we are not merely a community but a nation—an integral part of the great Islamic fraternity of the world. We want to live in this country not only as Indians, but as good Muslims . . . . The Hindu, whether Congressite or otherwise, cannot brook the idea of our loyalty to Islam. Hence only the Muslim who curses his religion in public can remain a true nationalist".<sup>24</sup>

The Muslim press warned Nehru that he was "deliberately hatching plans not for the good of the Muslim masses but for the complete political domination of the Muslims of India"; he was in close alliance with persons who were "actively and even openly working for the extermination of Islam and Muslims from India".<sup>25</sup> Partnership between the Congress and the Muslims was an impossible dream. Partners must have common aims and ideals; the Congress and Muslims had nothing in common.<sup>26</sup>

In an article published in May, F.K. Khan Durrani, whom we have met before, argued the case for Muslim nationhood. The Muslims, he said, had become very fearful of their future. Partly by virtue of their faith and religious discipline and partly owing to recent political developments, they had become conscious of their "national oneness". Now they possessed a "national individuality" of their own. But they stood bewildered and were in a state of utter disorganization. The Muslim League was there and was trying to do its best, but "after a long study of the Musalman



psychology we have come to realize that their malady lies deeper than can be cured by mere political leaders". A political leader was, by the nature of his profession, an opportunist; and could not give true and basic guidance to the community. A body was needed that should aim at working a revolution in the hearts of men and prepare them by a spiritual discipline for the attainment of their real ends. The absence of coherence and sense of direction in their activities were due in a very large measure, if not entirely, to their ignorance of the true purposes of Islam. To carry this knowledge to the masses a new organization, the Muslim India Society, was being formed under Iqbal's presidentship. The idea of subjection to non-Muslim rule was foreign to the ideology of Islam. The Quran "conceives of Muslims only as free and independent and never as a subject people". The great need of the hour was to create an awakening about the true teachings and purposes of Islam. Any political work that did not touch the spiritual faith of the Muslim was bound to remain "ineffective and superficial".<sup>27</sup>

In August, Mian Ahmad Yar Khan Daultana, the Punjab Unionist Party leader, warned the Congress that its policy in the Hindu-majority provinces would compel Muslims to organize an all-India protest against it, and, in the end, "may very well drive India towards that fatal idea with which certain ultra-communalists on both sides have already made the country familiar—I mean the idea of dividing India into a Muslim India and a Hindu India, a Pakistan in which the Hindus are a subject people and a Hindustan in which Muslims occupy a similar position".<sup>28</sup>

Next month, Zafar Ali Khan declared the Muslims a separate nation from the platform of the Calcutta Muslim League. "The Muslims were a distinct, self-contained and self-sufficient people with their own glorious traditions and distinct civilization and culture, and they wanted to retain all these attributes of a great Muslim nation intact." Britain had betrayed them and thrust a constitution upon them which had done more harm to the cause of Islam and the Muslims of India than to the cause of the Hindus. "They had been handed over to the tender mercies of the majority community where the rule was that of the vote."<sup>29</sup>

*The Times of India*, a British Indian newspaper, affirmed that Muslim fears of Hindu rule "spring from deep feelings, the product of race, tradition and culture"; they could not "be dissolved by explanation alone"; and they must be accepted by the

"realistic politician".<sup>30</sup>

At the Lucknow Muslim League session of October, Hasrat Mohani, while moving his resolution on independence, characterized the cry of freedom from the Congress platform as "fraudulent and dishonest". However much the Congress leaders might talk of breaking the federal plan, he was convinced that Gandhi, Nehru and Malaviyya "would very soon accept it with thanks for they believed that although it might not bring real independence and freedom for India, it would inaugurate Hindu raj at the centre as in the Provinces and that the entry of the Hindu Princes in the Government of India would strengthen the power and position of Hindus as a whole".<sup>31</sup> On 4 November, Khawaja Hasan Nizami, a spiritual leader of great influence in northern India and a man of letters, wrote to Jinnah: "As the Congress has begun an All India Campaign against the Muslim Nationality and the Muslim League, it is now indispensable to start daily papers in English, Urdu and Hindi."<sup>32</sup> As the original letter was in Urdu and only an English translation has been published, we don't know which word he used to describe the Muslims as a "Nationality".

Congress reaction to these thoughts and activities was one of unchanging incomprehension. For Nehru, to attack the Congress and to weaken it was "to attack the conception of Indian unity itself and of nationalism and freedom". He asked: "What will take its place? And what of all of us if there is no such organization?"<sup>33</sup> Strangely enough, it was the right-wing, extremist Hindu Mahasabha which now grasped the emerging reality. Its president, V.D. Savarkar, told the party's annual session that "Let us bravely face unpleasant facts as they are. India cannot be assumed today to be a unitarian and homogeneous nation, but on the contrary there are two nations in the main, the Hindus and the Muslims".<sup>34</sup>

The British establishment, too, was leaning to the view that the federal scheme would be unworkable in the face of united Muslim opposition. On 13 December, the Secretary of State for India wrote to the Viceroy: "... if one thing is certain it is that the Muslims are united in their determination not to be dominated by the Hindus in any form of Central Government which may come into being."<sup>35</sup> A week earlier, he had already told Linlithgow that "the strongest opposition" to the federal scheme would come from the Muslims.<sup>36</sup>

### Iqbal's Letters to Jinnah (1937)

The first Muslim suggestion to be made in this period came from Iqbal in a series of letters he wrote to Jinnah from Lahore between March and August 1937. It is important to remember, however, that these letters were not published till many years later, and that therefore their contents were known to Jinnah alone and perhaps to some of his closest colleagues. The other proposals which we will examine could not, therefore, have owed anything to Iqbal's suggestions to Jinnah.

It was in his letter of 20 March that Iqbal first referred to the future of the Indian Muslims as a "distinct political unit in the country". But the idea of partition or separation still eluded him. Talking of the new federal constitution which was to come into operation (on the provincial level only) on 1 April, he wrote: "I believe you are also aware that the new constitution has at least brought a unique opportunity to Indian Muslims for self-organization in view of the future political developments both in India and Muslim Asia." But he did not explain how a federal India would help the Muslims to better organize themselves, or what future political developments in India and Muslim Asia he was foreseeing. Then turning to Indian politics he favoured Muslim co-operation with "progressive" forces. "While we are ready to co-operate with other Progressive Parties in the country, we must not ignore the fact that the whole future of Islam as a moral and political force in Asia rests very largely on a complete organization of Indian Muslims." Next, he turned to the All India National Convention which had recently met at Delhi at the command of the Congress after its successful performance in the provincial elections, and at which Nehru had made a provocative speech. He advised Jinnah: "I therefore suggest that an effective reply should be given to the All-India National Convention. You should immediately hold an All-India Muslim Convention in Delhi to which you should invite members of the new Provincial Assemblies as well as other prominent Muslim leaders. To this Convention you must re-state as clearly and strongly as possible the political objective of the Indian Muslims as a distinct political unit in the country." In answer to Nehru's argument that the Hindu-Muslim problem was nothing but a rivalry for jobs, and that the real issue in India was economic, not communal, Iqbal asked Jinnah to

emphasize the cultural problem. "It is absolutely necessary to tell the world both inside and outside India that the economic problem is not the only problem in the country. From the Muslim point of view the cultural problem is of much greater consequence to most Indian Muslims. At any rate it is not less important than the economic problem." The holding of the proposed convention "would further make it clear to the Hindus that no political device, however subtle, can make the Indian Muslim lose sight of his cultural entity"<sup>37</sup>

It was on 28 May that he made his first reference to the creation of a Muslim state or states in India, and it is interesting to notice that he came to this decision through his anxiety to improve the economic condition of the Muslim masses. We need to quote this letter at length.

He began by underlining the seriousness of the situation. "I have no doubt that you fully realize the gravity of the situation as far as Muslim India is concerned. The League will have to finally decide whether it will remain a body representing the upper classes of Indian Muslims or Muslim masses who have so far, with good reason, taken no interest in it. Personally I believe that a political organization which gives no promise of improving the lot of the average Muslim cannot attract our masses." Regretting that "our political institutions have never thought of improving the lot of Muslims generally", he went on, "The problem of bread is becoming more and more acute. The Muslim has begun to feel that he has been going down and down during the last 200 years. Ordinarily he believes that his poverty is due to Hindu money-lending or capitalism. The perception that it is equally due to foreign rule has not yet fully come to him. But it is bound to come. The atheistic socialism of Jawaharlal is not likely to receive much response from the Muslims. The question therefore is: how is it possible to solve the problem of Muslim poverty? And the whole future of the League depends on the League's activity to solve this question. If the League can give no such promises I am sure the Muslim masses will remain indifferent to it as before."

After thus sketching the nature and proportions of the problem, he prescribed his own solution. "Happily there is a solution in the enforcement of the Law of Islam and its further development in the light of modern ideas. After a long and careful study of Islamic Law I have come to the conclusion that if this system of Law is

properly understood and applied, at last [*sic.*] the right to subsistence is secured to everybody. But the enforcement and development of the Shariat of Islam is impossible in this country without a free Muslim state or states. This has been my honest conviction for many years and I still believe this to be the only way to solve the problem of bread for Muslims as well as to secure a peaceful India. If such a thing is impossible in India the only other alternative is a civil war which as a matter of fact has been going on for some time in the shape of Hindu-Muslim riots. I fear that in certain parts of the country, e.g., N.W. India, Palestine may be repeated." He said it again towards the end of the letter. "But as I have said above in order to make it possible for Muslim India to solve these problems it is necessary to redistribute the country and to provide one or more Muslim states with absolute majorities. Don't you think that the time for such a demand has already arrived . . . . Muslim India hopes that at this serious juncture your genius will discover some way out of our present difficulties."<sup>38</sup>

The next letter, written on 21 June, contains the longest elaboration of his suggestion that we have in this one-sided correspondence. He began by painting a dark picture of Hindu-Muslim riots which were then occurring, and of the "storm which is coming to North-West India, and perhaps to the whole of India". Once again it is necessary to quote his words so that the reader knows exactly what he was saying. "I tell you that we are actually living in a state of civil war which, but for the police and military, would become universal in no time." Then after giving some instances of communal disturbances, he wrote: "I have carefully studied the whole situation and believe that the real cause of these events is neither religious nor economic. It is purely political, i.e., the desire of the Sikhs and Hindus to intimidate Muslims even in the majority provinces. And the new constitution is such that even in the Muslim majority provinces, the Muslims are made entirely dependent on non-Muslims. The result is that the Muslim Ministry can take no proper action and are even driven to do injustice to Muslims partly to please those on whom they depend, and partly to show that they are absolutely impartial. Thus it is clear that we have our specific reasons to reject this constitution. It seems to me that the new constitution is devised only to placate the Hindus . . . . I have no doubt in my mind that this constitution is calculated to do infinite harm to the Indian Muslims. Apart from this it is no

solution of the economic problem which is so acute among Muslims."

He had also changed his earlier opinion on the Communal Award, which till recently he had accepted though without much enthusiasm. "The only thing that the communal award grants to Muslims is the recognition of their political existence in India. But such a recognition granted to a people whom this constitution does not and cannot help in solving their problem of poverty can be of no value to them. The Congress President has denied the political existence of Muslims in no unmistakable terms. The other Hindu political body, i.e., the Mahasabha, whom I regard as the real representative of the masses of the Hindus, has declared more than once that a united Hindu-Muslim nation is impossible in India. In these circumstances it is obvious that the only way to a peaceful India is a redistribution of the country on the lines of racial, religious and linguistic affinities. Many British statesmen also realize this, and the Hindu-Muslim riots which are rapidly coming in the wake of this constitution are sure further to open their eyes to the real situation in the country . . . . Some Muslims in the Punjab are already suggesting the holding of a North-West Indian Muslim Conference, and the idea is rapidly spreading."

Presumably, Jinnah had, in a previous letter, disapproved of the idea of such a conference, for Iqbal continued, "I agree with you, however, that our community is not yet sufficiently organized and disciplined and perhaps the time for holding such a conference is not yet ripe. But I feel that it would be highly advisable for you to indicate in your address at least the line of action that the Muslims of North-West India would be finally driven to take."

Then he repeated his own solution in some detail, the most significant feature of which is his emphasis on the north-west India, with only a casual reference to Bengal, as if it were an after-thought. "To my mind the new constitution with its idea of a single Indian federation is completely hopeless. A separate federation of Muslim provinces, reformed on the lines I have suggested above, is the only course by which we can secure a peaceful India and save Muslims from the domination of non-Muslims. Why should not the Muslims of North-West India and Bengal be considered as nations entitled to self-determination just as other nations in India and outside India are?"

He was not interested in the Muslims of the rest of India, for he



made it clear: "Personally I think that the Muslims of North-West and Bengal ought at present to ignore Muslim minority provinces. This is the best course to adopt in the interests of both Muslim majority and minority provinces. It will therefore be better to hold the coming session of the League in the Punjab, and not in a Muslim minority province."<sup>39</sup>

He repeated this last point in his next letter, sent on 11 August. "Events have made it abundantly clear that the League ought to concentrate all its activities on the North-West Indian Muslims."<sup>40</sup>

There is much in these three letters that reveals the working of Iqbal's mind. First of all, he does not seem to be able to make up his mind about the grounds on which separation was to be demanded—if separation it was that he really wanted. In the first letter he rejects the Congress view that the problem of India was fundamentally economic, and wants Jinnah to bring out the significance and relevance of the cultural problem for the Muslims. In the second letter, however, it is the poverty of the Muslim masses which agitates his mind to the exclusion of every other factor. In fact, he is so much impressed with this problem that he makes it the starting point of demanding a "free" Muslim state, where the observance and enforcement of the law of Islam would guarantee economic justice. In the third letter he again changes ground and expresses his conviction that the real problem is neither religious nor economic, but political, by which he means the Muslim fear of Hindu rule and the Hindu determination to dominate the Muslims. Nowhere does he argue, as Rahmat Ali had done earlier and Jinnah was to do later, that the Muslims were a nation by themselves.

Secondly, his criticism and unqualified rejection of the federal constitution is a completely fresh development in his political thinking. He had approved a federal plan for India in his Allahabad address; he had participated in the process of making the new constitution at the RTC; and he had been issuing statements in appreciation and acceptance of the federal dispensation, including the communal award.<sup>41</sup> We have no record of his views, favourable or otherwise, on the federation from the middle of 1934 up to the time of writing these letters. It is clear that his attitude towards the 1935 constitution underwent a radical change during these three years. We have no means of knowing the cause of it; but it

might not be unreasonable to attribute it, at least in part, to the influence of Rahmat Ali. This brings me to my third point.

It is a little strange that Iqbal does not mention Rahmat Ali or his demand for Pakistan in these letters, though some important points in Iqbal's arguments betray the influence of the Pakistan National Movement. Iqbal's rejection of the federation is now as uncompromising as Rahmat Ali's, and is based on several grounds which Rahmat Ali had already covered. Further, the very words used by Iqbal to describe his solution—"a federation of Muslim provinces"—came from Rahmat Ali. Moreover, Iqbal calls the Muslims of the north-west and of Bengal "nations", not one nation. This too reminds us of Rahmat Ali, who had first declared the north-west Muslims a nation, and only later showed interest in the Bengali Muslims. Finally, Iqbal's reference to "other nations" in India clearly indicates Rahmat Ali's prompting, for none before him had called the various Indian communities by that name.

In spite of his *volte face* on the issue of federation, Iqbal remained thoroughly consistent in his attachment to and interest in the future of the north-west. Like his Allahabad address, these letters also testify to his anxiety to secure the future of the Muslims of north-west India. His reference to Bengal is obviously a fugitive thought, for in the last letter quoted above he drops it. Nor did the fate of the Muslims living in Hindu provinces move his heart or imagination. Rahmat Ali, too, had set out with the same idea, but he had grown out of it and proceeded to demand Bangistan and Usmanistan in addition to the north-west Pakistan. Iqbal died before he could expand his vision to embrace the independence of other Indian Muslims. Whether such a stage would ever have come in his thinking had he lived longer is an open question. What is certain is that in the eight years granted him to evolve his scheme he preferred to confine his gaze to the north-west. (In a peculiar and tragic way history was to vindicate him in 1971, when the Bengali Muslims broke away from Pakistan, and what remained of Jinnah's efforts and Muslim League's campaign was the north-west Muslim India of Iqbal and Rahmat Ali).

It is of considerable significance that the word used by Iqbal throughout his political life for what he wanted to be done to India was "redistribution". It appears in the Allahabad address and in these letters. It is a word of vague connotation, and lies at the bottom of much controversy about his real aims. In the letter of 28

May he wants "to redistribute the country and to provide one or more Muslim states with absolute majorities". In that of 21 June he argues for "a redistribution of the country on the lines of racial, religious and linguistic affinities" and "a separate federation of Muslim provinces, reformed on the lines I have suggested above". If by this he meant a partition—it is not absolutely sure that he did—then the basis for this was not going to be religion alone. In other words, the country was not to be divided on Hindu-Muslim lines. Other "affinities", like those of race and language, were to receive equal consideration. To where would that have led? To a partition of every province of the north-west? Because the Sikhs spoke the same language as the Muslims of the Punjab but were different in religion; the Pathans shared the religion of the Muslims but were of a different race and used another tongue; the Sindhi Hindus were different in religion from the Sindhi Muslims but the two spoke the same language and were probably of the same race. This is confusion run riot. The creation of a separate Muslim federation in the north-west would not have solved anything unless lots of people changed places. But Iqbal does not mention any plan for a transfer of population. Yet he wants his state or states to have "absolute majorities". One does not really know what to make of all this, except that he studiously avoids the use of any term—partition, division, separation, splitting up, etc.—which would put it beyond doubt that he wanted the same thing as Rahmat Ali's or (later) Jinnah's Pakistan.

One thing which comes out strongly in these letters is Iqbal's unbounded faith in Jinnah's leadership and capacity to save the Indian Muslims. He impresses this on his correspondent again and again. "Muslim India hopes that at this serious juncture your genius will discover some way out of our present difficulties" (28 May). "... you are the only Muslim Indian today to whom the community has a right to look up for safe guidance through the storm which is coming" (21 June). There is no reason to doubt the sincerity with which Iqbal held this conviction. Time was to bring full vindication of this belief. It is a proof of his perceptive intellect that he saw this truth at a time when Jinnah's hold over Muslim India was extremely shaky, when Muslim politicians well entrenched in their provincial realms were unwilling to help him, and when his party had just emerged from a severe beating at the hands of the electorate.<sup>42</sup>

It is equally clear that Jinnah did not return the confidence so generously reposed in him by Iqbal—and for politically understandable reasons. In these letters Iqbal made six separate suggestions to Jinnah; none of them was acceptable to the latter. The suggestions were: hold an all India Muslim convention of members of new provincial legislatures and other prominent politicians, hold a north-western Indian Muslim conference, hold the next annual session of the Muslim League in the Punjab, concentrate the activities of the League in the north-west, ignore the Muslims of the minority provinces, and demand a separate Muslim state or states.

The Muslim convention was not called, for the simple reason that at that time the total number of provincial legislators elected on the Muslim League ticket was too small to be convened into a national gathering. Such a plan would also have raised unnecessary difficulties of organization, invitation and discipline, e.g., to allow or not to allow the Punjab Unionists to attend the convention, for they were on the point of entering into a pact with the Muslim League; to invite or not to invite other parties which had won some seats in opposition to the League but were in reality only offshoots of and seceders from the party. As Jinnah fully realized the extent and tradition of disorganization among Muslims he could see that the holding of a convention at that time would probably achieve nothing beyond demonstrating their disunity.

The idea of calling a separate conference of the Muslims of north-west India, for which Iqbal had been campaigning since 1930, was clearly opposed to Muslim League policy and interest. The next three suggestions went along with this. The Muslim League was a national organization, the only party which could make some claim to speak for all Indian Muslims. It was weak and poor and in a bad state of organization. Its leadership was neither firm nor of the first quality. But all these were things which Jinnah was then trying to repair. To accept Iqbal's advice was to cut up the League into so many small groups: one for the north-west, one for Bengal, and one or more for the rest of India. Instead of bringing all Muslims to one platform, so that they could bargain with the Hindus and the British as an equal party, Iqbal wanted to weaken the organization by surrendering its national outlook, alienating its national following, and giving up its traditional place in Indian politics. The reduction of the League to the status of a provincial or regional party was the exact opposite of Jinnah's

aims. Did Iqbal seriously hope that the Muslim League, which had never in its history been very strong in the north-west, would agree to make its home in that hostile environment and leave in the lurch the minority provinces which, on the whole, had been more loyal to it? Iqbal was inviting the League to a region where, in spite of a Muslim majority, not a single province had a League following of a respectable size, not to speak of a majority in the legislature. Nor could Jinnah see any profit in ignoring the Muslims of the minority provinces, who in fact were in greater need of protection and moral support, and whose past record of loyalty to the party was better than that of the Muslims of the Punjab and NWFP. Similar arguments ruled out the possibility of the League's jettisoning the Bengali Muslims who, if one went by Iqbal's own arguments, had a better title to the Muslim League on ground of their numerical strength. It would not have taken Jinnah more than a few minutes of reflection to reject all these suggestions, including the apparently harmless one of holding the next party session in Lahore. The small following of the League in the Punjab combined with the strong hold of the Unionists over the province would not have permitted the League to hold a successful meeting.

That leaves the last suggestion which asked Jinnah to demand one or more Muslim states. Jinnah did not do so for almost another three years. Reasons for this are not confined to the timing or nature of Iqbal's advice, but spread themselves over so many different fields and considerations that we cannot examine them until we have gone a little further in our study and looked closely at the development of Muslim League thinking on the issue of partition.

The reader ought to be told here how this correspondence between Iqbal and Jinnah has come to us in an incomplete and one-sided shape. Jinnah had saved these letters from Iqbal but had kept no copies of his own replies. In early 1943 he thought of publishing the correspondence, and with this in mind on 28 January wrote to Mian Bashir Ahmad of Lahore that "as these letters have become of great historical importance . . . could you kindly arrange at Lahore to secure my replies to Iqbal?" On 15 February he again impressed upon Bashir Ahmad that "the publication of this whole correspondence may render great service to our people and the cause for which we stand". But Jinnah's replies could not be found among Iqbal's papers (he had died in

April 1938), and after making some unfruitful efforts and inquiries, he reported to Jinnah: "On this I replied to him on 24 February 1943 that Choudhry Muhammad Husain, a trustee of Allama's property and assets, could not trace the letters wanted by the Quaid and that, therefore, I would suggest that he should publish Iqbal's letters to him with or without his comments as desired."<sup>43</sup>

In the meantime, Bashir had shown Jinnah's letters to Muhammad Shafi, a journalist of Lahore who had been in close attendance on Iqbal during the latter's last years and had actually written several letters on the poet's instructions and dictation, in the hope that perhaps Shafi had in his possession or knew something about Jinnah's replies to Iqbal. Shafi himself wrote to Jinnah on 2 February, reporting failure in tracing the letters, and holding out no hope that they would ever be available. "The idea has thrilled me", he said, "But I am afraid you will be disappointed in so far as it would of necessity be one-sided correspondence. I was his scribe during the last two or three years of his life and I remember that there existed no arrangement for preserving his correspondence, and their replies. . . ."<sup>44</sup>

In 1937 Jinnah was heavily engaged in re-organizing the Muslim League and negotiating with the Hindus and the British. He had insufficient secretarial help and therefore failed to retain copies of his replies to Iqbal. At the other end, as Shafi tells us, there were no proper arrangements to preserve letters received by Iqbal. The poet was at this time in ill health, his life was disorganized, and his associates and aides were careless. His son was too young to realize the value of his father's papers. When Iqbal died, the people entrusted with his papers do not seem to have taken their responsibilities too seriously. It is a great pity that probably a few thousand letters written to and by Iqbal—for he was at one time or another in correspondence with practically every Hindu and Muslim political, intellectual and literary figure—were thus lost to posterity.

From the point of view of our present inquiry it is a still greater tragedy that we do not possess Jinnah's replies. As we have seen above, it can be deduced from the text of Iqbal's letters and from Jinnah's opinions as expressed in his statements during this period that Iqbal's suggestions were utterly unacceptable to him. If we had Jinnah's replies before us it would have made it much easier



to settle the controversy about Iqbal's exact role in the history of the idea of Pakistan.<sup>45</sup>

Later commentators have obviously read too much in Iqbal's Allahabad address and his letters to Jinnah. For example, there is scarcely any solid evidence to sustain Dr. Ambedkar's assertions that "there can be no doubt that the [Lahore] Resolution merely resuscitates a scheme which was put forth by Sir Muhammad Iqbal in his Presidential address to the Muslim League at its annual session at Lucknow[sic.] in December 1930", and that "the League has only enlarged the original scheme of Pakistan. It has sought to create one more Muslim State in the East to include the Muslims in Bengal and Assam. Barring this it expresses in its essence and general outline the scheme put forth by Sir Muhammad Iqbal and propagated by Mr. Rahmat Ali".<sup>46</sup> This is an over-simplification, and does not take notice of the various proposals made during the one or two years preceding the adoption of the Lahore Resolution, and of the political developments of 1937-39 which influenced and moulded Jinnah's mind, Muslim League policy, and the attitude of the Muslim masses.

Similarly the observations made *ex cathedra* by a former chief justice of Pakistan, that Iqbal "was also the inspirer of the idea of Pakistan"<sup>47</sup>, represents more a popular impression than an historical truth. The poet's son shows more prudence in phrasing the claim for his father and clothes it in words of commendable caution: the establishment of Pakistan is "the realization in a concrete form of his abstract and nebulous political ideal".<sup>48</sup>

It has been reported by Matlubul Hasan Saiyid, a former private secretary to Jinnah, that once, soon after the 1940 Muslim League session at Lahore and probably in reference to the Lahore Resolution, Jinnah said to him, "Iqbal is no more amongst us, but had he been alive he would have been happy to know that we did exactly what he wanted us to do".<sup>49</sup>

All this is hearsay, popular impression or private opinion. The right place to find the truth is Jinnah's own words. Iqbal's letters were addressed to him, and it was he who finally, after a long interval, decided to make a demand for Pakistan. As far as first-hand evidence is concerned we can do no better than to hear Jinnah's opinion about Iqbal's position in the evolution of the idea of Pakistan. We don't have his replies to Iqbal's letters, though we know that he turned a deaf ear to Iqbal's advice on practically

every point, including the demanding of a separate Muslim state. What we do have is the foreword Jinnah wrote to the letters when they were published in 1943 or 1944 (the publication is undated).

In the foreword Jinnah admits that his success in organizing the Muslim League owed much to "the invaluable support that I obtained through the sincere efforts and patriotic and selfless activities of many friends like Sir Muhammad Iqbal, amongst others". In a later passage he repeats this: "It was a great achievement for Muslim League that its lead came to be acknowledged by both the majority and minority Provinces. Sir Muhammad Iqbal played a very conspicuous part, though at the time not revealed to public, in bringing about this consummation." And finally comes this very significant comment on Iqbal's plans for the future and their influence on Jinnah. "I think these letters are of very great historical importance, particularly those which explain his views in clear and unambiguous terms on the political future of Muslim India. *His views were substantially in consonance with my own and had finally led me to the same conclusion* as a result of careful examination and study of the constitutional problems facing India, and found expression in due course in . . . the Lahore resolution."<sup>50</sup>

This is the farthest that Jinnah could go in acknowledging Iqbal's influence on his own thinking on Pakistan. It is clear that Jinnah's mind was working on the same lines, and Iqbal's suggestion did no more than demonstrate a coincidence. It can hardly mean that Iqbal inspired Jinnah to demand Pakistan, or presented him with a brand new idea which had never before entered Jinnah's mind.

The final conclusion about Iqbal's contribution to the making of this idea is that he was one among those who thought of Pakistan. His own words and all historical evidence bear this out. To go beyond this and to call him the original author of the idea or the sole "dreamer" of the future state is to put a false construction on history in the service of a myth.

### Gazdar's Proposal (1937)

On 10 July 1937, M.H. Gazdar of Sind wrote to Jinnah, asking him to consider the proposition for an independent Muslim state comprising the four Muslim provinces of north-west India. His

argument was that the Muslims of these areas would not be secure until they could no longer be manipulated by the Hindus. "I would go so far", he said, "as to suggest a separate federation of the North West India, viz., Sind, Baluchistan, the Punjab, and the North Western Frontier Province. Without this I have despaired of any economic, political and educational improvement of Muslim masses of these provinces."<sup>51</sup>

### Sayyid Ali Jawwad (1937)

In October 1937, one Sayyid Ali Jawwad proposed a partition of India as a solution to the Congress-League struggle for power, at the same time hoping that things would not reach a pass where this would be unavoidable. "An alternative to a friendly settlement of our dispute is the partitioning of India into two parts, namely, Muslim India and Hindu India . . . Let us hope and pray that such a drastic cure of our ills will not have to be resorted to."<sup>52</sup>

### F.K. Khan Durrani (1937)

In the summer or autumn of 1937, F.K. Khan Durrani issued a 16-page pamphlet from Lahore entitled *The Muslim National Ideal* in which he explored the avenues open to the Muslims. He took it as said that Indian Muslims were a nation apart.

First he considered the position of the pro-Congress Jamiat-ul-Ulema, the right-wing party of the divines which stood for complete co-operation with the Congress "to join the battle of India's freedom". These men, he said, were honest in their views, but honesty was no guarantee of sanity, and these *ulema* "live so utterly divorced from the facts of life that their lead in worldly matters is anything but safe". They were ignoring certain obvious factors of political life. One of these was that when a community merged into another and larger community, it ceased to count as a political force in the country, because it was no longer a community. "A community is a community only so long as it has a political creed of its own, a goal of its own, a definite purpose of its own, in short, a soul of its own." When a community lost its soul and abandoned the principle that gave it unity and internal strength, it was dissolved as a body politic and its members became

naked and defenceless.

Muslims were interested in the fate of India because they were a part and parcel of the country. If they ceased to have any stake or share in the country, their interest also evaporated. "It means, India is we and we are India, and there is no India beyond ourselves. Our fight for India's freedom can only mean a fight for our own freedom." But if the end-result of this fight was going to be a freedom for the other communities, not for the Muslims, they could not participate in the struggle. "A political community can fight legitimately for its own political progress. If it ignores its own self and fights, Quixote-like, on behalf of others, it is only committing suicide. Are the Musalmans of India prepared to commit suicide?"

Identifying Congress with Hinduism, he castigated the Indian creed in words redolant of Rahmat Ali's style. "Hinduism means caste. Hinduism means untouchability. Hinduism means racial exclusiveness. The race has been under the most rigid discipline imaginable for three thousand years of these anti-national and anti-human institutions, and the Hindu is not yet born who could purge his soul of this ancient virus and think nationally." In truth, the greatest obstacle in the way of the Muslims' joining the Congress was "the communalism, sly and secret in some, open and blatant in others, of Hindu leaders in and outside the Congress".

Thus the Muslims could not give their loyalty to the Congress or other Hindu organizations or the pro-Congress Muslim groups. These were the negations of his thesis. What was the positive way open to them? No nation or community could be built on mere negations; defence was the weakest of all strategies. If the Muslims desired to maintain their separate identity, they "must justify it by a high principle". The questions to be asked were: "Are the Musalmans a unity by virtue of their internal structure? Does Islam want them to be a separate and self-contained political and social unit as distinguished from the rest of the world? If so, why?"

His answer to these inquiries, partly inspired by Iqbal's philosophy, may be summarized as follows: A nation perishes when it becomes unconscious of its Self, that is, its separate individuality or identity, and loses sight of the part the World-Spirit has called it into being to play. The Muslims cannot be an exception to this law of nature. They can live and prosper so long as they remain

true to this ideal; their present misfortunes are due wholly and solely to the fact that in recent centuries they have not been true to their divinely appointed ideal, and they can regain their national vigour only if they take hold of that ideal again and live in its light.<sup>53</sup>

He concluded the survey, not by asking for separation, but by ruling out Muslim-Congress co-operation. "Let it be understood that I am not 'against' the Congress. I am against it only in so far as it is against the interests of Islam. India must be freed from foreign domination; the hunger and poverty of the masses must be removed; the country must be put on the way to power and prosperity. To this end co-operation between the Congress and the Muslims is essential. But it must be co-operation and not surrender of one to the other. Trouble arises when the Congress demands surrender . . . . It is a demand which the Musalmans are bound to resist, which every Muslim who has any faith in him shall continue to resist to the last. We are not prepared to let others walk over our bodies. But co-operation is neither practicable nor even possible, and nothing can save the Musalmans from being submerged under the Congress avalanche, until and unless they get organized among themselves. Political forces are gathering awful momentum. The mental twilight in which the average Musalman passes his days may hide these forces from his eyes, but cannot save him from the calamity that is approaching fast. The time is not far when it will be too late. We shall fall singly wherever we stand, and Islam will be wiped out of this country as it was wiped out of Spain. What are you waiting for? Would you wake when the calamity is already upon you?"<sup>54</sup>

It is difficult to see why a man of Durrani's strong views and Islamic zeal should have stopped at making this call to recognize the dangers of current developments without going further and suggesting the creation of one or more Muslim states. He was deeply influenced by Iqbal's ideas and was writing *A Study of Iqbal* when this pamphlet was published. Internal evidence shows that he had read Rahmat Ali. His total rejection of any kind of co-operation with the Congress and its satellite parties implied that the Muslims must carve their own separate path to the summit of freedom. But he did not propose, or even refer to, any solution by division. Possibly, he confined himself in this pamphlet to making an appeal for unity and issuing a warning that events were over-

taking current Muslim policy. Probably he planned to follow up the warning with a concrete scheme but circumstances, unknown to us, intervened and he was unable to pursue the matter.

### Muslim Thinking (1938)

Muslim public opinion in 1938 did not show any startling change from its confused and confusing flow of the previous two years. Political statements and press announcements are full of apprehensions of Hindu rule and oft-repeated determination that Muslims would not submit to this fate. Congress and other non-Muslim parties still continue to talk of Indian nationalism and Indian unity, under-estimating Muslim discontent. Except for the resolution of the Sind Muslim League Conference of October (to be studied in chapter 13 in the context of the evaluation of the Muslim League point of view), the general talk is one of inadequate safeguards, unsatisfactory concessions and betrayed promises. Hardly any one gives serious consideration to partition. These currents of thought are summarized in this section, as far as possible in the words of the speakers and the writers.

In a political novel on India published in 1938, Edward Thompson remarked, "And it was more certain than ever that in the womb of old India, struggling to be born, were two nations tugging and fighting for mastery even before birth."<sup>55</sup> The significance of this comment lies more in the reporter than the report, for Thompson was a person of strong and unconcealed pro-Congress sympathies.

Muslim circles talked of discontent and threats, not yet of action. On 29 January, the *Star of India* wrote: "If Muslims wish to live in India as free men, if there is to be a free Islam in a free India, we exhort the leaders of the community to prepare for a fight and to launch such an agitation throughout the country as may rouse these Governors to a sense of their duty towards the helpless and betrayed minorities."<sup>56</sup> The reference was to the persecution of Muslims by the Congress administrations in Hindu provinces and the failure of the governors to intervene and exercise their duty under the constitution. On 3 February, the paper declared that this "communal tyranny" was "filling Muslims throughout India with a terrible dread."<sup>57</sup> On 21 February, it asked how long Muslims could tolerate "these outrages upon their



most cherished sentiments, these denials of their fundamental rights, these acts of organized goondaism, arson and loot". The hope that safeguards could protect them had vanished; the dream that the governors would step in to save them had been shattered. "It is the strength of the Muslim faith, Muslim arms and Muslim determination alone—it is the uniting of the eighty million sons and daughters of Islam in one solid phalanx of a defensive Islamic army that can save Islam from the menace of its foe".<sup>58</sup> A call to battle! Yet, there is no mention of partition.

On 2 March, Khawaja Hasan Nizami stated from Delhi that the Muslims did not need any help from the Congress or any protection by the British. They had "awakened from their slumber", recognized their strength, and were now fully self-conscious and self-confident.<sup>59</sup> The decision to separate was still not a part of this self-consciousness. But the Hindus feared what the Muslims were not yet prepared to utter. In his presidential address at the annual session of the Hindu Religion Protection Society at Indore on 9 March, B.S. Moonje appealed to the Hindus to enter the federation and frustrate the "mischievous efforts" of those who wanted to divide the country as Hindu India and Muslim India. He warned that if they in haste rejected the federal solution, the British government might give them a new communal award involving the native states also. By accepting the federation the unity of India would be assured and the resulting unity would not be broken without a civil war.<sup>60</sup>

A Hindu of Bihar admitted that "the average Muslim today honestly fears that his contact with Hindus will ultimately result in the complete disappearance of his ancient religion, his language, culture, means of earning a decent and honest livelihood and in fact his individuality as a group. He honestly believes that the Congress is a Hindu body and that the Hindus really want to substitute Hindu for British rule".<sup>61</sup> As if to confirm this, on 10 June S.C. Bose, in a speech at Chittagong, declared that "the only alternative to British rule was Congress rule".<sup>62</sup> Another Hindu reported from Patna in October that "the Congress plan of the cultural extinction of the Muslims as a people is now no secret", and that "the Congress excesses and intrigues are now fast driving the North Western Indian Muslims to the Pakistan ideal as they have lost all hopes of a fair deal from the Congress".<sup>63</sup> In December, Gandhi echoed Bose when he warned the native states to

"cultivate friendly relations with an organization [he meant the Congress] which bids fair in the future, not very distant, to replace the Paramount Power—let me hope, by friendly arrangement".<sup>64</sup>

Impatient as the youth is, some young men of the Punjab established in Lahore a society under the name of Majlis-i-Pakistan in June or July 1938, and its central body, Majlis-i-Kabir-i-Pakistan in January 1939. Some branches were opened in other towns. It propagated the Pakistan idea, held meetings, wrote articles for the Urdu newspapers, and functioned as the distributing agency of some published material.<sup>65</sup> Its membership form carried on its forehead a map of Pakistan copied from Rahmat Ali's pamphlet. Its text was a promise made by the member and read: "I sympathize with the Pakistan Movement which aims at separating the provinces of the Punjab, NWFP, Sind, Kashmir and Baluchistan from India proper and uniting them under a free and independent government. I promise to make all efforts to make the Pakistan Movement a success. I am enclosing my annual membership fee of 4 annas for the year 19—. Please elect me a member of the Majlis. I shall abide by every decision of the Central Majlis."<sup>66</sup>

Towards the end of 1938 British newspapers were talking of the coming of Pakistan. Two dispatches from India which appeared in *The Times* will bear quotation. The first said that "so serious have these ideological tendencies become in India that many Moslems in the North are again toying with the idea of creating a 'Pakistan' of those Provinces in which the Moslems are in a majority".<sup>67</sup> The second analysed the Muslim attitude in some detail. The Muslim League opposed the federation almost entirely on the ground that it implied Hindu domination at the centre. "This is a much more serious objection than anything the Congress Party brings against Federation, for it means an intensification of that communal bitterness which it was hoped the scheme for unifying India would tend to lessen. Many Moslems, with a view to maintaining the internal sovereignty of the Moslem Provinces, urge a confederation of these Provinces as a preliminary step to association with the greater Federation of the Act. This theory has given renewed interest to the old proposal of creating a 'Pakistan' of the Moslem Provinces, a proposal that does not ignore the possibilities of linking the Moslem Provinces of Northern India with those Islamic areas which form a belt of peoples of one faith stretching from Saharanpur to Istanbul. The seriousness

with which Moslems are now seeking unification against the Hindus may prove to be as great a stumbling-block to the inauguration of Federation as will the political objections of the Hindus."<sup>68</sup>

On the last day of this year Gandhi issued a statement which intensified Muslim fears. "The Congress does claim to be the one and the only party that can deliver the goods. It is a perfectly valid claim to make . . . . It would love to be absorbed in or to absorb the Muslim League so far as the political programme is concerned. For religious and social activities, of course, every community can have its separate organization . . . . You may try to damn it by calling it Totalitarianism. Absorption is inevitable when a country is engaged in a struggle to wrest power from foreign hands; it cannot afford to have a separate rival political organization . . . . I claim to be able to look at the whole position with a detached mind. There is no substance in our quarrels. The points of difference are superficial, those of contact are deep and permanent."<sup>69</sup> How wrong and short-sighted even a "great soul" could be!

The Hindu Mahasabha said the same thing in slightly higher notes. Its president, V.D. Savarkar, declared at Nagpur: "When we will be in a position to retaliate and do retaliate the Muslims will come to their senses in a day. We shall not only save Hindu rights and honour in Hindu provinces but in provinces where the Hinds are in a minority. Knowing that every attempt to tyrannize the Hindus is sure to recoil on themselves and react for the worse on Muslim interests in all India—the Muslims will learn to behave as good boys."<sup>70</sup>

Sir Harry Hodgson found no "accredited Muslim leader" supporting the idea of Pakistan.<sup>71</sup> Both Jinnah and Sir Sikandar Hayat Khan told him that Muslims would fight rather than accept a Hindu raj. "It is, however, difficult to see on what front and with what weapons they would fight, except it be by mutiny in the Army. That does not seem very probable. On the whole one is bound to conclude that the Muslims' bark is likely to prove worse than their bite." He continued: "Nevertheless while the communal problem remains as bitter as it is now, we must take into account that the establishment of what the Muslims would regard as a Hindu Raj would be fraught with danger. We must also reckon with the possibility that in the long run the unity of

India may prove impossible under domestic conditions and that a Muslim north-west may split off and seek its destiny in association with other Muslim countries rather than with South and Central India."<sup>72</sup>

### A Turkish Proposal (1938)

The year 1938 opened with a Turkish proposal for the creation of three independent Muslim states in India. According to Mian Kafayet Ali, who later presented his own scheme under the title of *Confederacy of India* writing as "A Punjabi", a movement for the unification of the nations of Islam, called the Silsila-i-Jamiat-i-Vahdat Umam Islam,<sup>73</sup> was started in Turkey under the patronage of Sayyid Jalil Ahmad Sinyusi and at the instance of Mustafa Kamal Ataturk. "One of its aims was to create more Muslim republics in all those parts of the world which are predominantly Muslim, in addition to the Muslim States already functioning." Among the ten republics proposed by the Silsila three were to be established in India: Haidrya Republic in the Hyderabad state, Muhammadiyya Republic in Muslim Bengal, and Islamistan in Muslim north-west.<sup>74</sup> The other republics were to be: Surya Republic (Syria, Palestine, Trans-Jordan), Sinuysia Republic (Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, Libya), Azarya Republic (Azarbaijan, Daghistan, Crimea, all in Central Asia), Turanian Republic (eastern and western Turkistan), Aqsa Republic (Muslim provinces of China), Barghashia Republic (Muslim tracts of East Africa), and Java Republic (Isles of Java, Sumatra and Borneo).

Two features of this scheme should be noticed. It was a part of a large pan-Islamic plan aimed at liberating a vast portion of Muslims from foreign rule, establishing many new Muslim states, and creating unity among the Islamic world. The suggestion for the three republics in India seems to have been borrowed from Rahmat Ali. It is significant that the Turkish scheme concerns itself with Bengal at a time when a majority of Indian Muslim planners were giving little or half-hearted attention to the Muslim majority of the north-east.

It is almost impossible to accept the reported association of Ataturk with this scheme. His views on Islam and the impetus of his entire revolution in Turkey<sup>75</sup> rule out all possibility of his initiation or support of such a plan; he would not even have

tolerated it. Unfortunately, Mian Kafayet Ali provides no further information about the movement or its proposal.

### Jamiluddin Ahmad (1938)

Towards the end of 1938, Jamiluddin Ahmad, a lecturer in English at the Aligarh University, wrote a pamphlet called *Is India One Nation?* in which he favoured a division of India on religious lines. "The only way out of the impasse therefore seems to be to divide India into two federations—federation of Muslim majority provinces and states and another of Hindu majority provinces and states. The relations between the two federations should be regulated by a voluntary treaty of alliance as between two sovereign states. There should also be provision for mutual exchange of population and reciprocal safeguards for the minorities living in each federation. The creation of two such federations is quite feasible and would be in the best interests of both Muslims and Hindus."<sup>76</sup>

He goes beyond the Muslim League official policy of not concerning itself with the native states, and he adds them to the Muslim provinces in his proposed federation. He suggests one federation of Muslim areas; it is not clear whether he was ignoring Bengal and concentrating on the north-west or thinking that somehow the north-east could be tagged on to the north-west (as actually happened in 1947). The idea of an exchange of population is also striking, coming from a Muslim Leaguer in a tract published by the party. There is no mention of Rahmat Ali or any other source that inspired him.

I asked Jamiluddin about the exact date of the writing of this pamphlet and the influence or influences which had worked upon his mind to produce this solution. About the date, he confirmed that, as far as he could recall, he wrote it "towards the end of 1938". About the influences, he wrote: "I merely echoed the prevailing feeling of the Muslim intelligentsia at that time . . . . Hindu-Muslim riots had become a common occurrence ever since the British started patronizing the Hindu majority as against the Muslims and they were not a new phenomenon during the period of Congress rule in the provinces. I had been watching the attitude and the designs of the Hindu majority since 1925 and I like many other young men of the time made a deep study of the Hindu-

Muslim problem as it developed ever since the decline of the Muslim power in the sub-continent. To put it briefly, these observations and studies led me, as they led so many others, to the conclusion that for Muslims there was no other way out but the establishment of a separate Muslim State."<sup>77</sup>

### Abdus Samad Khan Rajisthani (1938)

On 4 November the *Star of India* carried a letter from Jaipur by Abdus Samad Khan Rajisthani, the propaganda secretary of the All India States Muslim League. He asserted that instead of "Pakistan" the Muslims must "demand and fight" for two federations: Northern Indian Federation and Southern Indian Federation. The first would be made up of NWFP, Sind, Punjab, United Provinces, Bihar, Bengal and Assam. It would "secure supremacy for the Muslims and solve the complicated questions of political, social, linguistic and cultural nature and importance". The second will be for the Hindus, and will comprise Bombay, Central Provinces, Madras and Orissa and Bihar. For a country the size of India this division was "the only right, rational and acceptable solution for all classes and communities and the different schools of thought". The British would provide the policy and the machinery to maintain harmonious relations of political, administrative and territorial nature between the two federations; they would also deal with any questions of dissension and discord that might arise in the future. "This Federal Division of India will be the most balanced one in the British Empire finding its equilibrium in size and area in the American Federation."<sup>78</sup>

The suggestion calls for no comment. It would not have solved the communal problem. It was no remedy for Muslim insecurity. The Hindu provinces of United Provinces, Bihar and Assam would never have accepted it. A confederation under the control of the British, regulating these two federations, would have been unworkable; it also implied a permanent imperial connection.

### Abul Ala Mawdudi (1938)

The next person to suggest a re-arrangement of India on an "international" basis was Abul Ala Mawdudi. In the October,



November and December issues of his journal *Tarjaman-ul-Quran* (which he issued in Urdu from Hyderabad Deccan), he wrote a series of articles on the Hindu-Muslim problem. Rejecting the Congress claim of secularism as a mere pretence and its slogan of democracy as another name for Hindu rule and a system which would for ever give three votes to the Hindus and only one to the Muslims, he showed how unsuitable for India was the western dogma of majority rule. After a detailed examination of the political and constitutional circumstances obtaining in India he concluded that the Muslim problem would find no solution in expedient devices like separate electorates, weightage in legislatures, reservation of seats in public services, minority safeguards and composite executives. All this had been tried and found wanting.<sup>79</sup>

His own proposal took the shape of three alternatives, any of which, he claimed, would be better than what was then being suggested or considered by various parties and individuals. The three alternative schemes were: (1) An "international federation", which should be a State of Federated Nations, in which each nation would be "sovereign" and would enjoy cultural autonomy; (2) The scheme envisaged in the *Cultural Future of India* prepared by Dr. S. A. Latif (it is considered in the following chapter) should be implemented, and separate regions should be demarcated for the establishment of "autonomous" States of respective nationalities. The centre should retain the minimum possible subjects. A period of 25 years should be provided for exchange of population between them. East Bengal, Hyderabad, Bhopal, Junagadh, Chandra, Tonk, Ajmer, Delhi, Oudh, North-West Punjab, Sind and Baluchistan should be assigned to the Muslims. Separate regions should be allocated to the Sikhs and the Depressed Classes, if they so desired; (3) If these two alternatives are not acceptable then there should be separate National Federal States, one of the Hindus and one of the Muslims, with a "confederacy" (*tahalaq*) between the two. There should be a pact or treaty between the federations regarding defence, communications and trade and commerce.<sup>80</sup>

First some minor points of clarification should be noted. In alternative number one, the term "international federation" (*bain-ul-aqwami wafaq*) is meaningless. Mawdudi used it either as an equivalent or variant of a "confederation", or as a new construction meaning a federation made up of several nations

Similarly, it is difficult to see how "each nation" of this federation could be "sovereign". In the alternative number two, it must be carefully noted that the "autonomous States" to be established under the Latif scheme were not to be independent states (in spite of the capital S) but mere provinces or units of a federation. This is made clear by the stipulation that the centre was to retain the minimum possible number of subjects. Mawdudi's demand that Muslim native states (Muslim by the religion of the ruler, not by the majority of the population), like Hyderabad, Bhopal, Junagadh and Tonk, should be included in the Muslim zone shows his anxiety to bring as much of India as possible under Muslim control; his reference to Hyderabad might have been influenced by Rahmat Ali's suggestion or by the fact that he himself was living there and depended on the state court for his living.

The significance of these proposals is two-fold. In the first place, they come from the pen of a person who was in no way allied with the Muslim League or even in sympathy with its outlook. From the first day of his political emergence till the creation of Pakistan (and even afterwards) Mawdudi was a vitriolic critic of Muslim League policy, of Muslim nationalism, of the Pakistan demand, and of the persons of Jinnah and his associates. His objection was based on the incompatibility of nationalism and Islam. In Islamic orthodox theory nationalism has no existence. To divide the Muslim community among national groups and areas is to split the faithful and to go against the will and pleasure of God. Mawdudi mocked the Muslim Leaguers with the taunt that unless they guaranteed an Islamic state in Pakistan (presumably of his own definition), their Pakistan would not be a land of the pure but a land of the filthy and the ritually unclean (*na-pak*). He also made bitter personal attacks on Jinnah and other League leaders, accusing them of a complete ignorance of Islamic teachings, charging them with leading un-Islamic lives, and warning the Muslims of dire consequences to their faith and future if they followed such irreligious leaders.<sup>81</sup> To hear of proposals envisaging Muslim separation from such a person is irrefutable testimony of general Muslim anxiety about the prospects of living in a united India. It shows that even the non-Muslim League opinion had come very close to demanding a Pakistan more than a year before the passing of the Lahore Resolution.

In the second place, the reader will notice the essential simila-

city between the third alternative of Mawdudi's and the Lahore Resolution. Mawdudi provided for a "pact or treaty" between Hindustan and Pakistan "regarding defence, communications, trade and commerce", and stipulated the establishment of a "confederacy between the two". The Lahore Resolution did not want a confederacy or confederation, but its last paragraph carried an implication (admittedly ambiguous; but then the entire resolution, as we will see, was an exercise in ambiguity) of some kind of connection, however temporary and transitional, between the two countries or states: "This session further authorizes the Working Committee to frame a scheme of constitution . . . providing for the assumption finally by the respective regions of all powers such as defence, external affairs, communications, customs and such other matters as may be necessary." But as Mawdudi does not go into the details of his proposals it is difficult to say why he preferred a confederal relationship between Hindu India and Muslim India to complete separation. Besides, he wrote in Urdu, a language in which technical political terminology is still in the formative stage. When he used certain terms, like autonomy, international federation, confederacy, a federation of nations, etc., we are not sure about what he wanted to convey.

I wrote to Mawdudi on 14 October 1969, requesting him to clarify certain points in his three alternatives, to define the terms he was employing, and also to explain the contradiction in his theory of non-nationalism. I wrote: "In the late 'thirties you were very critical of the Muslim League policies and afterwards when the League demanded a Pakistan you were opposed to it; and yet in 1938-39 you yourself proposed a partition of India on 'national' lines. Your critics will say that there is a contradiction here, not only between your scheme and your opposition to the Pakistan plan, but also between your general theory that there is no nationalism in Islam and your proposal for a division of India on national lines. Could you explain this for me please?"

Mawdudi's special assistant, Ghulam Ali, answered my letter on 23 October, saying that Mawdudi was away in Mecca and would write to me on his return, and asking me to read Mawdudi's several writings in order to understand his ideas.<sup>82</sup> On 6 November, Mawdudi wrote to me. He said that "my real proposals cannot be properly understood until you are aware of the entire discussion on which they were based. It would be better if you read my book

*Tahrik-i-Azadi-i-Hind awr Musalman*, which contains this discussion". In reply to my inquiry about his contradictory stand on nationalism, he asked me to read the third volume of his *Musalman awr Mawjuda Siyasi Kashmakash*, adding that he wanted an Islamic state and the Muslim League wanted a national state, and hence their clash.<sup>83</sup> He did not care to explain the terms he had used in presenting his proposals.

### The Islamabad Tahrik (1938)

Sometime in 1938 one Muhammad Yousuf Yaqub published a 4-page leaflet in Urdu from Chakiwara in Karachi. On the top of the first page was printed an outline map of the sub-continent, showing the north-west as a separate area with the name of "Islamabad". Entitled *Islamabad Tahrik Kya Hay?*, it contained a rhetorical and passionately-written introduction of a page and a half, and then a catalogue of twenty aims and objects of the movement. Nineteen of these asked the people to be good Muslims, spiritually, doctrinally, socially and personally; no. 8 said: "The purpose and goal of our life is to create national self-respect and Islam's collective domination (*Islam ka ijtamai ghalba*) in our fatherland (*pidr-i-watan*), Sind, Punjab, Baluchistan, NWFP and Kashmir."<sup>84</sup>

I have not been able to discover anything about the author of this leaflet. The area of his demand and the map on the first page show Rahmat Ali's influence; he also sent a copy to Rahmat Ali. He must have written something before this, explaining his scheme, giving reasons for his initiation of the proposal, and saying why he chose the name "Islamabad" for an area which had already been christened "Pakistan" by Rahmat Ali and accepted as such by a large number of people in north India. But of this there is no available record; nor does any of my informants know anything about the man. Anyway, he was a straw in the wind that was then blowing towards Pakistan, and his name should be entered in the list of those who thought about partition and even gave a name to the state of their dreams.

## NOTES

1. Nawab of Dacca (Khwaja Habibullah), Presidential Address, AIKC, Calcutta, 4 January 1936, *IAR 1936*, Vol I, p. 306; also in *TSI*, 7 January 1936.
2. *TSI*, editorial, 6 January 1936.
3. Gulshan Rai, "Is India for the Hindus Only?", *CMG*, 18 January 1936.
4. *TSI*, editorial, 9 April 1936.
5. *Ibid.*, editorial, 16 April 1936.
6. S. Satyamurti, President, Tamil Nad Congress Committee, addressing a public meeting at the Congress House, Madras, 29 April 1936, *IAR 1936*, Vol. I, pp. 291-292.
7. Gulshan Rai, "The Punjab under Federal Government", *CMG*, 11 July 1936.
8. Sir Muhammad Yakub, "The Domination of the Majority: Congress Behaviour in the Assembly", *ibid.*, 13 October 1936.
9. Dr. Radha Kumad Mukerji, Presidential Address, All India Youth Conference, Lahore, *ibid.*, 20 October 1936.
10. Shawkat Ali, Presidential Address, Central Provinces Muslim Political Conference, Nagpur, 24 October 1936, *IAR 1936*, Vol II, p. 273.
11. A leader of the Democratic Swaraj Party, speaking at the party's conference, Nasik, 1 November 1936, *ibid.*, p. 10.
12. Edward Thompson to Jawaharlal Nehru, Oxford, 6 December 1936, Jawaharlal Nehru, *A Bunch of Old Letters*, Bombay, 1960, p. 216.
13. Suresh Chandra Dey, "India in Home Polity", *IAR 1936*, Vol. I, p. 62.
14. John Coatman, *Magna Britannia*, London, 1936, pp. 318-322.
15. *Al-Aman* of Delhi, quoted in *TSI*, 18 January 1937.
16. Sarfraz of Lucknow, quoted in *ibid.*, 18 January 1937.
17. Ansari of Delhi, quoted in *ibid.*, 18 January 1937.
18. *TSI*, editorial, 11 March 1937.
19. Letter to Lady Grigg, 19 March 1937, Thomas Jones, *A Diary with Letters, 1931-1950*, Oxford, 1954, pp. 325-326.
20. *TSI*, editorial, 20 March 1937.
21. Sir Muhammad Yakub, article in *TTI*, special supplement

- on the new constitution, 1 April 1937.
22. Quoted in *CMG*, editorial, 29 April 1937.
23. Sir Muhammad Yakub, statement to the press, Bombay, 29 April 1937, *ibid.*, 30 April 1937.
24. Said Akbar Kiani, letter, *ibid.*, 30 April 1937.
25. *TSI*, editorial, 10 May 1937.
26. *Ibid.*, editorial, 1 June 1937.
27. F.K. Khan Durrani, "Muslim India Society", *ibid.*, 22 May 1937.
28. Ahmad Yar Khan Daultana, "Congress Policy and Muslims", *CMG*, 7 August 1937; rep by *TSI*, 16 September 1937, under the title "Congress Communalism and Muslim Minorities".
29. Zafar Ali Khan, Presidential Address, Calcutta Muslim League Conference, Calcutta, 26 September 1937, *TSI*, 27 September 1937.
30. *TTI*, quoted in *ibid.*, 23 October 1937.
31. Quoted in M. Noman, *Muslim India*, Allahabad, 1942, p. 353.
32. Khwaja Hasan Nizami to Jinnah, 4 November 1937, Mukhtar Masud (ed), *Eye-Witnesses of History: A Collection of Letters addressed to Quaid-i-Azam*, Karachi, 1968, p. 53.
33. Jawaharlal Nehru to Nawab Ismail Khan, Allahabad, 26 December 1937, *CMG*, 3 July 1938.
34. V.D. Savarkar, Presidential Address, All India Hindu Mahasabha, 1937, quoted in Ram Gopal, *Indian Muslims*, Bombay, 1959, p. 264.
35. Zetland to Linlithgow, 13 December 1937, quoted in R.J. Moore, "British Policy and the Indian Problem, 1936-1940", in C.H. Philips (ed), *The Partition of India*, London, 1970, p. 84.
36. Zetland to Linlithgow, 6 December 1937, quoted in *ibid.*, p. 83.
37. *Letters of Iqbal to Jinnah: A Collection of Iqbal's Letters to the Quaid-i-Azam conveying his Views on the Political Future of Muslim India* (with a foreword by M.A. Jinnah), Lahore, n.d., letter of 20 March 1937, pp. 11-13. Actually these letters begin on 23 May 1936 and end on 10 November 1937, but here I deal only with those which contain references to the future of Indian Muslims and the Muslim League policy on it. It is reported that an Urdu tr of these



letters was pub; but the only reference to it that I have come across has fallen victim to a vital misprint, "Sa'id, Abdurrahman, 'Iqbal ke Khatut Jinnah ke Nam', Haiderabad Deccan, 1914 [sic.], pp. 32" (K.A. Waheed, *A Bibliography of Iqbal*, Karachi, 1965, p. 20).

38. *Ibid.*, letter of 28 May 1937, pp. 14-18.
39. *Ibid.*, letter of 21 June 1937, pp. 18-23.
40. *Ibid.*, letter of 11 August 1937, pp. 23-24.
41. His latest statement, asking the Muslims "to stand boldly by the Communal Award even though it does not concede all their demands", was issued on 19 June 1934; see Shamloo, *Speeches and Statements of Iqbal*, Lahore, 1948, pp. 212-213.
42. It may be mentioned in passing that there is not a shred of evidence to prove the claim, made by several persons, that it was Iqbal who had persuaded Jinnah in 1934 to return to India and to politics. For such assertions see, among others, *Struggle for Independence, 1857-1947*, Government of Pakistan, Karachi, n.d., p. 61; and Allah Bakhsh Yusufi, *Sarhad awr Jidd-o-Jehadd-i-Azadi*, Lahore, 1968, p. 582.
43. Mian Bashir Ahmad, "Quaid-i-Azam: Some Glimpses of His Greatness", in Jamiluddin Ahmad (ed), *Quaid-i-Azam as Seen by His Contemporaries*, Lahore, 1966, p. 17.
44. Muhammad Shafi to Jinnah, 2 February 1943, Mukhtar Masud, *op. cit.*, p. 106. Mian Bashir Ahmad's letter to Jinnah of 24 February is also reproduced here, p. 108.
45. It should be recorded here that during the period in which Iqbal was writing to Jinnah, and later till his death on 21 April 1938, he was expressing views which did not confirm his suggestion of demanding a separate state or states. On 29 July 1937, he wrote to Hakim Raghbir Muradabadi that "in brief my advice is that if Muslims join the Congress *unconditionally*, it will bring harm to Islam and them" (my italics) (original Urdu letter reproduced in B.A. Dar (ed), *Anwar-i-Iqbal*, Karachi, 1967, p. 223). On 10 January 1938, he told Nazir Niazi that an Islamic state would be established "provided that we maintain our unity and do not give up the claim that India is inhabited by several nations, not one" (Syed Nazir Niazi, *Iqbal ke Huzur*, Lahore, 1971, p. 46). On 2 February 1938, he told a visitor that "we should make

a definite demand for joining Sind with the Punjab" (*ibid.*, p. 136). On 11 February, he told Ghulam Rasul Khan of the Punjab Provincial Muslim League that the plan for the creation of a new province comprising the Ambala division of the Punjab, Delhi, Ajmere and Marwar was a "*mubarak*" (auspicious) one and that Muslims should "immediately welcome it" (*ibid.*, p. 182).

46. B.R. Ambedkar, *Pakistan or Partition of India*, Bombay, 2nd ed 1945, p. 5.
47. S.A. Rahman, "Iqbal: The Apostle of Muslim Renaissance", in K.A. Rahim (ed), *Iqbal: The Poet of Tomorrow*, Lahore, n.d. For another similar opinion, see Aziz Ahmad, "Remarques sur les origines du Pakistan", *Orient*, no. 26 (1963), p. 23, who says that the demand for the creation of Pakistan was due to "la conversion finale de Jinnah a ces theses au cours de sa correspondance avec Iqbal".
48. Javid Iqbal (ed), *Stray Reflections: A Note-Book of Allama Iqbal*, Lahore, 1961, Introduction, p. xxi.
49. M.H. Saiyid, *Muhammad Ali Jinnah*, Lahore, 2nd ed 1953, p. 439. Saiyid is quoted by Hector Bolitho (*Jinnah: Creator of Pakistan*, London, 1954, p. 129), and Bolitho by S.A. Vahid (*Studies in Iqbal*, Lahore, 1967, p. 304). Thus unsupported statements become by repetition a part of history.
50. *Letters of Iqbal to Jinnah*, Jinnah's foreword, pp. 2, 3, 4-5. My italics.
51. M.H. Gazdar to M.A. Jinnah, 10 July 1937, quoted in Lawrence Ziring, "Jinnah: The Burden of Leadership", in *World Scholars on Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah*, ed by A.H. Dani, Islamabad, 1979, p. 406.
52. *The Pioneer*, 16 October 1937, cited by S.S. Pirzada, *The Foundations of Pakistan*, Karachi, 1970, Vol. II, p. xviii.
53. F.K. Khan Durrani, *The Muslim National Ideal*, Lahore, n.d., pp. 1-14.
54. *Ibid.*, pp. 15-16.
55. Edward Thompson, *An End of the Hours*, London, 1938, p. 175.
56. *TSI*, editorial, 29 January 1938.
57. *Ibid.*, editorial, 3 February 1938.
58. *Ibid.*, editorial, 21 February 1938.
59. Khwaja Hasan Nizami, statement from Delhi, 2 March

- 1938, *ibid.*, 7 March 1938.
60. *CMG*, 10 March 1938.
  61. Ram Nath Dar, in an article in a Patna daily, reproduced in *TSI*, 16 May 1938.
  62. S.C. Bose, speech at Chittagong, 10 June 1938, *CMG*, 12 June 1938.
  63. Ram Nandan Chaudhry, statement from Patna, *TSI*, 18 October 1938.
  64. *Harijan*, 3 December 1938.
  65. Mian Kafayet Ali's letter to me, dated 26 May 1976; Mr. Khurshid Alam's letters to me, dated 14 November and 28 December 1969; Jamiluddin Ahmad's letter to me, dated 24 October 1969.
  66. An original blank form was kindly sent to me by Mr. Khurshid Alam with his letter of 14 November 1969.
  67. India Correspondent, "Federation in India: The Princes and the Provinces: An Old Conflict in a New Guise", *The Times*, 5 December 1938.
  68. India Correspondent, "New Factors in India: The Attitude to Federation: Parties and Princes", *ibid.*, 21 December 1938.
  69. *CMG*, 2 January 1939. For Jinnah's reply of 3 January see *ibid.*, 4 January.
  70. V.D. Savarkar, Presidential Address, All India Hindu Mahasabha, Nagpur, December 1938, quoted in Asoka Mehta and A. Patwardhan, *op. cit.*, p. 158.
  71. Sir Harry Hodgson's report, quoted in Kanji Dwarkadas, *Ten Years to Freedom, 1938-1947*, Bombay, 1968, p. 32.
  72. *Ibid.*, pp. 36-37.
  73. Mian Kafayet Ali's tr of the name of the movement is "a movement for the unification of the Muslim World"; considering the word "*umam*" used by the Silsila, I should rather tr it as "the nations of Islam" rather than "the Muslim World".
  74. A Punjabi, *Separation—A Reply to Its Critics*, Lahore, 1942, pp. 14-16.
  75. For a general description of Ataturk's revolution and an account of his ideas on Islam and secularism see Daniel Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East*, New York, 1958; T. Cuyler Young (ed), *Near Eastern Culture and Society*, Princeton, 1951; Dank-

- wart A. Rustow, *Politics and Westernization in the Near East*, Princeton, 1956; Serif Mardin, *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought*, Princeton, 1962; Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, London, 1961; E.I.J. Rosenthal, *Islam in the Modern National State*, Cambridge, 1965; C.H. Dodd, *Politics and Government in Turkey*, Manchester, 1969; Firouz Bahrapour, *Turkey: Political and Social Transformation*, Brooklyn, N.Y., 1967; Niyazi Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*, Montreal, 1964; Kemal H. Karpat (ed), *Social Change and Politics in Turkey*, Leiden, 1973; Robert E. Ward and Dankwart A. Rustow (eds), *Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey*, Princeton, 1964; Geoffrey Lewis, *Modern Turkey*, London, 1974; and articles in the relevant journals.
76. Jamiluddin Ahmad, *Is India One Nation?*, Muslim University Muslim League Publications no. 6, Aligarh, 1939, reproduced in *India's problem of Her Future Constitution*, Bombay, n.d., p. 139. Jamiluddin Ahmad told me that he had written this 17-page pamphlet in 1938; later he confirmed this in his "Evolution of the Concept of Pakistan", *Contemporary Affairs*, Autumn 1969, pp. 154-155.
  77. Jamiluddin Ahmad's letter to me, dated 9 December 1969.
  78. Abdus Samad Khan Rajisthani, letter, *TSI*, 4 November 1938.
  79. For a detailed description of Mawdudi's opinions on these points see his *Musalman awr Mawjuda Siyasi Kashmakash*, Lahore, n.d., 3 vols.
  80. *Tarjuman-ul-Quran*, October, November and December 1938.
  81. For examples of his unrestrained and vituperative language see his *Musalman awr Mawjuda Siyasi Kashmakash*, Lahore, n.d.; *Nationalism and India*, Pathankot, 1947; *The Process of Islamic Revolution*, Pathankot, 1947; *The Message of Jamaat-i-Islami*, Lahore, 1955; and the file of *Tarjuman-ul-Quran*. On him see M. Sarwar, *Mawlana Mawdudi ki Tahrik-i-Islami*, Lahore, 1956; Leonard Binder, *Religion and Politics in Pakistan*, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1961; Government of the Punjab, *Report of the Court of Inquiry constituted under Punjab Act II of 1954 to inquire into the Punjab Disturbances of 1953*, Lahore, 1954 (Munir Report); K.K. Aziz, *Party Politics in Pakistan, 1947-1958*, Islamabad,

1976, pp. 139-159; and Kalim Bahadur, *The Jamaat-i-Islami of Pakistan*, New Delhi, 1977, pp. 9-32.

82. Ghulam Ali's letter to me, dated 23 October 1969.
83. Abul Ala Mawdudi's letter to me, dated 6 November 1969.
84. Muhammad Yusuf Yaqub, *Islamabad Tahrir Kya Hay?*, Karachi, n.d. A copy of it was sent to Rahmat Ali in 1938, from which I presume that it was published in that year. He might have published more pamphlets on the subject before or after this one, but I am not aware of them.

## 9

### CULTURE TRIUMPHANT: 1938-1940

#### The First Latif Scheme (1938)

Perhaps the best known and certainly the most controversial set of proposals came from Dr. Sayyid Abdul Latif between 1938 and 1943. First, a few words about the man himself. He lectured on English literature at the Osmania University of Hyderabad Deccan, and little is known about him before the mid-'thirties. In 1936, however, he began to take an increasing interest in the political future of the Indian Muslims. He was particularly struck by the Hindu argument, offered among others by Jawaharlal Nehru in his *Autobiography*,<sup>1</sup> that there was no such thing as a Muslim culture in India, that what the Muslims called their distinct culture was not materially different from the culture of the Hindus, and that therefore the Muslim talk of cultural safeguards was meaningless. In 1936-37 Latif set out on an all-India tour to find out if Muslim intellectual and cultural leaders agreed with the Hindu thesis. He visited Aligarh and the Jamia Millia of Delhi (which, incidentally, was a centre of "nationalist" Muslims who were loyal to the Congress), and impressed upon their leading dons the need for counteracting Hindu propaganda.

In Delhi he met Iqbal who invited him to come to Lahore and spend a few days with him. During this stay in Lahore, Latif told Iqbal that his Allahabad scheme, which aimed at bringing north-western India "into a single administration"; was not a complete solution of the cultural problem of the Muslims of the whole of India, and that "a scheme should be devised such as might comprehend the needs of the Muslims not merely of the North-West but of the Muslims of Bengal and Assam where also they were in the majority; and comprehend above all the needs of the Muslim minorities so thinly distributed from Delhi,



Lucknow, Patna downwards to Cape Comorin; as also of the Indian Muslim States".

On his return from this tour, and as a result of what he had discovered during it, Latif founded the Muslim Cultural Society whose membership came mainly from "the higher Muslim intellectual talent available in Hyderabad". In August 1937 he delivered his inaugural address to the Society on "The Muslim Culture in India", which was a direct answer to Nehru's allegation that there was no Muslim culture in the country. Among the audience were Shawkat Ali and Mrs. Sarojini Naidu. "The address made it clear that the culture of Islam was not a culture which attached importance to the mere externalia of life. It was, on the other hand, an expression of the inner forces of Muslim life, and embodied two fundamental laws of human existence—the law of movement, and the law of unity, stimulating and welcoming on the one hand every urge for progress and on the other striving to let that urge subserve or advance the cause of unity in life. The abiding or permanent from in which it manifested itself was the law of Islam called the *Shariyyat* which moulded its followers into a distinct social order with its own problems to solve on its own lines—problems, educational, social, economic, and political, national and international. Indeed, it was a culture to be preserved as a force for national emancipation, if its intrinsic value could only be properly appreciated by the non-Muslims".

On these arguments Latif built up the Muslim demand for cultural safeguards. In the Haripura session of February 1938 the Congress, going back on its earlier claims that no separate Muslim culture was in existence, admitted the principle of cultural safeguards and asked the Muslim League to submit its list of safeguards. Jinnah refused to acknowledge that arrogant attitude of the Congress which pretended to occupy the place of supreme authority from where to direct other parties to make submissions. Latif interpreted this in a different way. Construing it as Muslim League failure to know what Muslim cultural safeguards were, and calling it "a humiliating situation", he felt "that the absence of any specific plan of cultural and other safeguards was due primarily to the absence of any specific goal for the Muslims to aim at".<sup>2</sup>

This goal he put before Muslim India in his pamphlet *The Cultural Future of India*, published from Bombay in 1938. Its contents must be looked into carefully.

He began by asserting and arguing that the main factors of unity were absent in India. In whatever way we approached the idea of nationhood its basic principle was the presence of a "common moral consciousness", which permeated the entire body of the people who would like to live together as a nation. Ethnologically and culturally India was not a unit. Two great cultures, not to speak of others, subsisted here side by side, inspired by two separate religions affecting every detail of one's life. "Islam and Hinduism stand poles asunder. The two have evolved two entirely different social orders, the one a monotheistic democracy which for the sake of uniting humanity brushes aside all barriers of colour and race and language, and takes little account of geographical limitations; the other, a graded and diversified caste system deeply rooted in symbolism. If I may so express it, it is a federation of religions and cultures, a social imperialism holding under its powerful grip through its Brahminic ritual people standing at every stage of intellectual development, a social system where spirituality or philosophy or even philanthropy comes in as a matter of only individual religious experience, hardly calculated to react on the general spiritual or moral uplift of the entire society . . . . What factor of unity can we then invoke to help the formation of a single nationality for the whole of India covering every section of its people, the Hindu, the Muslim, the Christian, the Buddhist and others?" A common language might have served as a binding force, but that was yet to be. "India is not a country; it is a continent as wide as Europe minus Russia. Even the unity, political or economic, that exists at the present moment here, is after all the result of British rule which so many are out to destroy."

The advocates of a single nationality talked of the possibility of creating a country-wide consciousness through a programme of hate against foreign domination. But every consciousness born of hate was "at best an urge for wilful negation". It would not generate positive virtues. Thus, the question of India's freedom should stand on its own ground. To mix it up with a proposition of a single nationality was to create fresh obstacles in its way.

The cultural peculiarities of the Hindus and the Muslims remaining what they were, the idea of a single composite nationality for them was an impossible proposition unless the Muslims gave up their culture and identity and tagged themselves on as an

additional sub-caste to the Hindu hierarchy. Any programme on the basis of a single nationality would amount to a wilful attempt to strengthen the Hindu nationality only. That probably explained why the Muslims were not enamoured of the policy of the Congress. Its politics was inseparable from Hinduism. "If the Congress electoral arrangement is to consolidate Hinduism or further the cause of a Hindu nationality, even as a separate electorate for the Muslims is considered necessary to prevent the disintegration of Islam in India, and to preserve the Muslim national individuality, the sanest procedure for both is to come to terms with each other on a footing of equality as between two nationalities following two different cultural ideals but obliged by circumstances to live together in a common geographical area, and to effect a pact allowing none to have an upper hand over the other but affording both every urge to work peacefully together for the country's good." If the Congress aimed at imposing the Hindu majority nationalism, particularly on the Muslims, through the machinery of the state, it was courting a civil war. "It will be a war India has never experienced in its long history."

The problem of Indian unity was really a cultural one. Therefore, any solution that might be suggested should provide for two things: cultural autonomy to each Indian nationality and political unity for India. The tendency in the modern international world was to allow every cultural unit a geographical home which one might call his own and on which one might raise the edifice of a prosperous nationality. Instead of seeking a unity for India through a federation of Indian states and provinces, each one of which had its own Hindu-Muslim problem, we should work for a confederacy or federation of free states, culturally autonomous, formed through a feasible exchange of population conveniently extending over a number of years.

India should be divided into four cultural zones for the Muslims and at least eleven zones for the Hindus. The native states might be distributed among the different zones in accordance with their "natural affinities". Each zone would form a free autonomous state with a federal form of arrangement within it, but fitting along with other zones into an all-India confederacy.

The four Muslim cultural zones were to be: (I) North-West Block, consisting of Sind, Baluchistan, the Punjab, NWFP, and the states of Khairpur and Bahawalpur. These six units would form

a federation and become a "single autonomous State", thus allowing over 25 million Muslims "a free home of their own". (2) North-East Block, consisting of Eastern Bengal and Assam, which would give 30 million Muslims "a free political existence". (3) Delhi-Lucknow Block, which would extend "in a line from the Eastern border of Patiala to Lucknow and rounding up Rampur on the way", would accommodate 12 million Muslims of the United Provinces and Bihar. (4) Deccan Block, which would contain the 12 million Muslims at present scattered below the Vindhya and Satpuras, would be carved out of the Hyderabad state with a strip of territory restored to it in the south running down to the city of Madras.

Muslims living in Rajputana, Gujrat, Malwa and Western Indian states would need to be concentrated in the territories of the Muslim states of Bhopal, Tonk, Junagadh, Jaora and others, and a newly-constituted Free City of Ajmer.

The rest of India would organize itself into eleven cultural zones "guaranteeing permanence to every Hindu cultural interest in the country". These zones would be Bengal and Bihar, Orissa, Hindustan proper, Rajput states of Rajputana, Gujrat, Mahratta territories, Canarese areas, Andhra, Tamil territories, Malayalam, and a Hindu-Sikh zone in the north-west. A Royal Commission might be appointed to demarcate the boundaries of the suggested zones.

With economic security assured in his new home to every individual through a system of reciprocity, a higher and nobler sentiment would vanquish the earth-rootedness of the people affected, and an exchange of population would be practicable on a basis of goodwill. This movement might be spread over a period of 15-20 years to minimize its inconvenience. The Muslims, particularly those of the south and the proposed Delhi-Lucknow block, would suffer more than others in this migration. "But it is better that the present generation of them face the ordeal manfully rather than leave the task to their children who may not probably have the chance of a peaceful exchange which at this time may be possible for us to effect."

This large-scale migration might still leave some minorities in most zones. These would be afforded security of person and cultural interests under a "Public Law of Indian Nations" adopted by the central government. In addition, all religious shrines,

monuments and graveyards belonging to any one of the two nationalities left behind by either would be preserved and looked after by each Free State under the supervision of the central government.

The Depressed Classes counted by millions and were dispersed all over the country. They did not possess any common culture among them. They would have to be given the fullest freedom to select their own place in either the Hindu nationality or the Muslim or the Christian; for, left alone, they would probably take ages to develop a culture of their own.<sup>3</sup>

### The Second Latif Scheme (1939)

In the meantime, the Muslim League had appointed a "Foreign Committee" to consider constitutional arrangements alternative to the 1935 Act and providing the Muslims greater security. Sir Abdullah Haroon of Sind, a member of the Muslim League Working Committee and chairman of the Foreign Committee, was so much impressed with Latif's proposals contained in the *Cultural Future of India* that he invited him to Lahore "in order that he might discuss his views with the members of the Foreign Committee of the Muslim League which was to meet there on the 29th January 1939". Latif duly came to Lahore and had conversations with the Committee. After hearing him, the Committee requested him "to prepare a scheme under which the goal suggested might be reached by successive stages".<sup>4</sup> The revised scheme was prepared and sent to the Muslim League in March 1939, and simultaneously released to the press.<sup>5</sup> As soon as he had dispatched it to Haroon, Latif began to elaborate the bare details he had been able to embody in his memorandum, and in July published from Karachi the enlarged version under the title of *The Muslim Problem in India together with an Alternative Constitution for India*, which carried a foreword by Haroon. A summary of the recommendations made in this pamphlet was later reproduced in *The Pakistan Issue* (pp. 2-12).

The following account of the 1939 scheme (the year is important because Latif was to present other schemes in later years) follows the text of *The Muslim Problem in India*.

He opened the book with the question: "Why are the Muslims of India at this moment in a state of serious anxiety over their

future?" The answer, he said, lay "in the fact that the Muslims have lost faith in the Hindus and apprehend that the Act of 1935 and anything that may follow on its lines will sooner or later destroy their individuality and reduce them to the position of a helpless minority". Muslims were also convinced that the British Parliament had "set aside every moral obligation towards them in an anxious desire to placate the Hindu majority". The British had made a great mistake in devising for India a constitution which was "out of tune with the genius of its people, their history, tradition and social organization". It was framed on the assumption that India was a composite nation, "which it is not and does not promise to be". The Hindus and the Muslims, "the two leading and major nationalities of India", were divided "into two different social orders drawing direct inspiration in every detail of life from two fundamentally different religions and cultures". The new constitution was bound to establish governments, both in the provinces and at the centre, of "a single majority nationality".<sup>6</sup>

Further, the kind of democracy brought to India by Britain was "a direct challenge to the basic principles of the Hindu social structure", because caste was "a comprehensive system of life dealing with food, marriage, education, association and worship". Democracy was not merely a form of government but a "state of society", a "system of social relationships". That was why human equality became the basis of democracy, and that was where Hinduism, with its inequality written into the creed and enforced by the fear of the Brahman, clashed with the essence of the democratic principle. "Indeed the fascist tendency so clearly noticeable in the high-command of the Congress at the present moment is but a phase, a development of the self-same high caste Imperialism which from time immemorial has denied to the Hindu masses their birth right of freedom". Caste and democracy were "fundamentally opposed in ideals, contrary in methods, and different in results". How could one have a political system based on equality where the social system was based on inequality?<sup>7</sup>

This weakness of the Indian social organization perhaps might not have been fatal to the evolution of democracy had the people of the country been of one nation. But India "is a congeries of races and cross-breeds". Still it might have been a nation if it were culturally unified. Even within the fold of Hinduism "a single stable nationality for all the Hindus" was impossible. The



political and economic unity which India showed was "after all the result of British rule which so many are out to destroy". There was no common moral consciousness permeating the entire body of the people. A unity born of an anti-British feeling would be a child of hate, and no nationhood could be based on this negation. Hindus and Muslims would never unite culturally, and therefore the birth of a composite nation in India was a remote possibility.<sup>8</sup>

After reading *The Cultural Future of India*, Gandhi had written to Latif: "I see we look at things from different angles of vision. I believe in the possibility of the two cultures blending. The difficulties which you picture don't baffle me." Now Latif asked himself the question if the two cultures could "so blend into each other as to create a composite nationality for India".

The only result of centuries of intercourse that he could see was "a process of interaction in ways of living materially assisted by a common climate". Even this, however, was primarily in the externals of life, leaving the inner soul of each unaffected. Their life-currents did not meet. Their spirits did not blend. They still had no common ways of thought and living, no common personal laws, no common ideals. Occasional manifestations of toleration and courtesy could not amount to the adoption of a common culture. The "true seat of culture is the mind of man", and here the distinction between Hindus and Muslims was clear and stark. "The blending of two such cultures calls for the blending of the religions themselves which have inspired them." Culture could not be divorced from religion. It was synonymous with life, and life was the expression of man's deepest convictions. Religion alone embodied these convictions and offered ideals to uplift the human spirit. Culture was the cultivation of the mind as it had been moulded by religion.

If religion was the basis of culture, how could Muslim and Hindu cultures blend unless Hinduism and Islam blended? And, was that possible? For the Muslim to give up his spiritual ideals and his way of life was to go down the scale. He would never do it. Would the Hindu try to build a half-way house by discarding his ritualism and his caste beliefs and practice and by cultivating a genuine fraternal feeling towards the Muslim?

Gandhi might talk glibly of an Indian culture, but "neither he nor any of his followers can deny that his one aim in life has

been to consolidate Hinduism, and that to him his Hinduism has been synonymous with Indian nationalism. The Muslim culture would come in for his recognition if and only if it could fit into his own brand of Hinduism. His *Hindi-Athwa-Hindustani* movement, his Wardha and Vidya Mandir schemes of education, and his attitude towards that provocative polytheistic song, *Vande Mataram*—all, show the type of blending he likes. Under his influence, the intellectuals among the Hindus have gradually and at times with determined effort discarded one after another the things which were a common heritage from the country's past, the heritage left by the traditions of the Moguls." At Yaravada in 1932 Gandhi had staked his life to prevent the granting of separate electorates to the untouchables, "not in the name of India's freedom, not in the name of an Indian nationality, but merely to 'consolidate Hinduism' as he put it". So, on the record of the man who had for so long guided the destiny of the Congress, for the Hindus politics was inseparable from religion.<sup>9</sup>

Thus it was clear that the Act of 1935 embodied principles inapplicable to India. It transferred power to one single majority community which would hold office in perpetuity. The Muslim minority would never be able to become a majority and would therefore live entirely on the sufferance of the Hindu majority. The result would not be a responsible government, but one-party tyrannies the like of which had already been established in all Congress provinces. It was an added misfortune that the new rulers were strangers to the art of government. Never before in their history were Hindus called upon to rule over such a large number of Muslims. It was therefore not surprising that they succumbed to the lure of power and to the urge to put down their former masters and to force their own culture upon them. Jinnah had warned against this tendency, but the Congress leaders, flushed with their own power, were not in a mood to hear of equality or fair treatment. Jinnah's "one desire is to have for the country a constitution under which no single community, Muslim or Hindu, should gain an upper hand over the other. The Congress refusal to see this had created a strong reaction among the Muslims. They had taken the decision to resist this constitution with all the strength that they still possess and fight it to the bitter end." This resolve was so strong that the Congress would be courting the calamity of a civil war if they persisted in their effort to

impose their Hindu nationalism on the Muslims through the machinery of provincial governments. It would be foolish for the Congress to count upon its "nationalist" Muslims: they would be swept off the board when the crisis came. Unless the Congress and the British government did something to improve the situation, the country would be in the grip of a civil war "such as India never knew before in its long history".<sup>10</sup>

Using the term "culture" in its widest sense, the Hindu-Muslim problem was really cultural rather than purely political. Its solution must provide for two things: "cultural autonomy to each Indian nationality or community, and political unity for India". This could be attained in either of two ways. "One is to allow each community or nationality to fit into the existing conditions and adjust their relationship in a manner that may allow none to have any commanding influence over the other; the other is to alter the existing conditions and create separate homelands or cultural zones for the different Indian nationalities all bound together by a common political nexus, and thus eliminate for ever the never-ending clashes arising everywhere out of the fundamental cleavage existing between their cultural ideals and social orders." The first alternative more or less represented the kind of approach Jinnah had all along taken to bring about a settlement, but the Congress had refused to negotiate with the Muslims on terms of equality. "Personally I believe in the possibility of a reconciliation—a reconciliation which at least in our time might suspend mutual acerbities", provided that Hindu leaders of every complexion "sincerely feel contrition over the wilful designs they have had on the Muslims", and agreed to a constitution under which none gained an upper hand over the other.

If this solution was unacceptable to the Hindus, a partition of the country remained the only alternative. For several years the Muslim mind, particularly in the north-west, had been thinking on the lines of a Pakistan scheme which was based on the principle that "the Muslims should be rulers somewhere instead of being subjects everywhere". The one great advantage of this plan was that it did not involve any exchange of population. "But in other respects, it was at best a patch-work, and no permanent solution to the Hindu-Muslim problem." It ignored the Muslims living in Hindu provinces. By leaving Hindu and Sikh minorities in Pakistan it would still have on its hands the problem of minority-

majority adjustments and safeguards. Thus all plans involving separation led to endless complications.

Therefore one returned to the solution by reconciliation. The scheme urged as a last resort by *The Cultural Future of India* had been "fundamentally different" from these separatist proposals. "It was a scheme for the unification of India on natural lines, and was therefore entirely Indian in outlook."<sup>11</sup>

The cultural distribution of India would work as follows. It would create four cultural zones for the Muslims and at least eleven for the Hindus. The native states would be distributed among the different zones in accordance with their natural affinities. "Each such zone will form a homogeneous State with a highly decentralized form of government within, wherever more than a unit should compose the zone, but fitting along with similar States in an All-India federation."

The North-West block would save 25 million Muslims, and the North-East block 30 million. The Delhi-Lucknow and Deccan blocks would each have 12 million Muslims. The creation of the Deccan block would restore to the Muslims of the south "the historic consciousness that they are the common inheritors of the Muslim culture that developed and flourished here for centuries consummating in the time of the Moguls when the whole of this area formed part of a single *Suba*." The rest of India would be arranged into eleven zones. Ten of these were the same as had been indicated in the earlier scheme. The eleventh would be demarcated for the Hindus and Sikhs of the north-western Muslim block. It would contain all the non-Muslim states of the Punjab States Agency and part of Kashmir. Districts of Kashmir occupied by Muslims would be transferred to the Punjab, and in exchange the Maharaja would receive a portion of the north-east of the Punjab comprising the Kangra Valley.

The scheme would involve a large-scale exchange of population which might not be to the liking of many persons who would be asked to move. But the advantages of the transfer would "far outweigh" the disadvantages and inconveniences. Once the individual was assured that the move would not bring any economic handicaps, "a new sentiment immeasurably higher and nobler than that of earth-rootedness will be his inevitable reward". As the object of the exercise was to guarantee to the Hindus and the Muslims perfect freedom to follow their own culture in their own

homelands, everyone would bear the inconvenience with good cheer. The suffering would be greater in the case of the Muslims of the United Provinces and those of Hyderabad and the south because they were scattered over a large area, but it was better that the present generation faced the ordeal manfully than that they left the task to their children who might not be able to effect the move peacefully. Anyway, such migrations were not unknown to the Muslim race. In the case of the Hindus, the shift would be less inconvenient because it would cover a shorter distance and would not take them to very different climatic conditions.

The resulting problem of compensation for the property left behind by the migrants would not be difficult to settle between the governments of the federal units concerned. The parties involved would discharge their financial obligations in a spirit of reciprocity under a "Public Law of Indian Nations" covering these obligations and embodied in the new constitution.

The smaller nationalities, such as the Christians, Parsis, Buddhists and Anglo-Indians, would be given by each state, Hindu or Muslim, all necessary religious and cultural safeguards. If they so desired, they could also ask for a cantonal life for themselves. The Harijans or the Untouchables, who did not belong to any one culture, were dispersed all over the country and had, in most cases, no landed property, would be given a choice to make their permanent homelands in any Hindu or Muslim zone.

This, said Latif in conclusion, "is the federal order which the Muslim is anxious to see ultimately established in the country". The Congress could have no objection to it because its own creed looked forward to re-fashioning India on a cultural basis. In the Congress programme cultural distribution was to follow linguistic lines. In this scheme "the cultural lines are fuller, comprehending the linguistic as well". While the Congress proposal provided no cultural autonomy to the Muslims, this scheme guaranteed cultural freedom to every cultural unit in its own homeland. It also gave a promise of greater freedom to the smaller minorities. Moreover, it left the native states intact, at the same time enabling them to share a common regional and cultural life with contiguous territory possessing common affinities. Finally, it did not disturb India's connection with Britain. In the closing sentence, Latif emphasized that "the scheme is a scheme for unity and not for disruption".<sup>12</sup>

In the last chapter Latif outlined an alternative constitution

"which may mark the first step towards the realization of the zonal ideal". The most important issue was that of provincial autonomy. India was too vast and varied to be encompassed into a close federation with a strong centre. Its divergent units could not be yoked together except in matters which were absolutely common to all, namely, defence, foreign affairs, commerce, communications, and the like. Three further considerations dictated the establishment of a weak federal centre. The cultural diversity of the country did not lend itself to regulation by a distant, central legislature: federal interference would result in social disturbances and unpleasant feelings. The native states, already reluctant to enter an all-India federation, could be brought into a federal arrangement only if their security and autonomy were fully assured. For the Muslim minority the only real safeguard in the future constitution would be the reality of self-rule in their own provinces and zones. If all power was to be vested in the centre with its inevitable Hindu majority, Muslims would not have anything to do with it. In a country where there was no single homogeneous nation, the prospect of the majority community seizing power at the centre in the name of a non-existent nationalism would never be acceptable to the Muslims.

The centre would therefore have very limited powers enumerated in one list. The residue would be vested in the units. There would be no concurrent list. In order to co-ordinate the activities of the contiguous units in such cultural and economic matters as were common to them, zonal boards would be established to evolve common policies on common problems. Legislation on the basis of policies thus evolved would be left to the individual federal units. The formation of such zonal boards would remove the need of making sub-federations out of provinces.

A parliamentary executive, which in India would be bound to degenerate into a perpetual tyranny of one majority party, would be substituted by a composite one. This would not be a coalition government of two or more parties or communities, but a composite government "such as exists in America and follows an agreed policy". In concrete terms, the prime minister in each province would be elected by the entire legislature to function during the complete term of the legislature. He would make up his cabinet "in terms of the ratio fixed on an all-India basis by agreement between the communities concerned". An adverse vote by the



assembly would not dislodge the government which would "devote itself exclusively to the welfare of the people by following a policy agreed by the members composing the government".

Special safeguards for Muslims were prescribed, arranged in seven categories. In representation on legislatures, separate electorates were to be maintained along with the existing system of weightage. The native states would be allowed entry into the federation on the condition that they returned to the federal parliament as many Muslims as would be sufficient to ensure that the total Muslim strength was not less than one-third in the whole house. In the zonal boards Muslims would have adequate and effective representation commensurate with their total strength in the legislatures of the several units composing each zone. In the legislature, personal law and culture would be the exclusive concern of Muslim members, who would for this purpose constitute themselves into a special committee. This committee was to be augmented by a third through co-opting representative Muslims learned in law and religion. Its decisions would be accepted by the whole legislature.

In the "composite governments" already suggested, in the portfolios of law and order and education there would be a minister and an assistant minister, and one of these posts would always go to a Muslim. In all provinces where Muslims were in a minority and at the centre, at least one member of the public service commission would be Muslim, and one of his duties would be to see that the government maintained the ratio fixed for Muslims in public services. In the judicial field the personal law of the Muslims was to be administered by Muslim judges. Each province would have a Muslim board vested with the authority to control and supervise the cultural side of the education of Muslims and their technical and industrial training, and to devise measures for their economic and social uplift. Whenever the Muslims wished to tax themselves for any special purpose, the necessary legislation would be passed without opposition.

Finally, the transitional constitution would make arrangements for the transfer of population. In the transitional period migration would be on a voluntary basis. A Royal Commission would be appointed to lay down a suitable programme of gradual exchange of population. Periodical reviews of results of voluntary migration should be made, and if it were found that it had "eliminated the

cultural clashes between the Muslims and the Hindus to an appreciable extent and given them a sense of security wherever they need it, or has brought about a change of heart in either camp", the operation of compulsory migration might be postponed indefinitely and the use of voluntary method continued.<sup>13</sup>

Some points of this plan were elaborated by Latif in his correspondence with Dr. Rajendra Prasad in January 1940. It would be better to look at these clarifications before attempting an appraisal of the scheme.

On the projected division of Kashmir, he added that the Maharaja would be compensated for the exclusion of his Muslim-majority areas in the west by the transfer to him of a portion of the Kangra valley "on the basis of respective land values". "The balance, if any, may be adjusted by payment in cash by the government concerned." The Hindus of Sind would be accommodated in Gujrat and Rajasthan when the Muslim population shifted from these areas. He reiterated that the creation of the Delhi-Lucknow Muslim block was so important that preparatory to the exchange of population that part of the block which lay in the British Indian territory should have to be demarcated into a province and given a Muslim prime minister. He justified the establishment of the Hyderabad block and the inclusion of Madras as its outlet to the sea on three grounds: it alone could effect the concentration of the Muslim population of the south into one territory; it alone allowed the Mahrattas, the Andhras, the Kanaras, the Malayalis and the Tamilians homogeneous states with exclusive boundaries of their own; the allotment of Madras to the Muslim zone would preserve the homogeneity of the Hindu zones mentioned above. The territory of the Hyderabad block was calculated on the assumption that the Harijans of this block would not migrate to a Hindu zone.

On the cost of transfer of population, he made it clear that compensation would be permissible only in respect of the immovables, such as land and houses. It was expected that the migrant would be able to dispose of his heavy movables like furniture and cattle before he left his town or village.

Any Indian citizen, or even a foreigner, would have the right to take up residence in any block and carry on his business there. But he would be considered as a national of the block he came from.

Full freedom of conscience would be allowed, but propaganda

for conversion would be restricted. If an individual changed his religion, he would be allowed to migrate to a block where his new co-religionists were in a majority; or, if he chose to stay back, he would be counted among the minority community of the block, and so automatically governed and protected by the "Public Law of Indian Nations". As regards the Untouchables, Latif said that "my impression is that those living in areas to be reserved for Muslims may not find it profitable to shift along with the Caste Hindus". If they wanted to leave the Muslim blocks no obstacles would be put in their way. If they desired to live among the Muslims, they would not only be welcome but "I would give them a permanent interest in the land under some equitable distribution of the landed wealth of the block concerned". To Rajendra Prasad's inquiry if Latif treated the Untouchables as non-Hindus, he replied, "I have no right to call them either Hindus or non-Hindus. They will have to determine which they are."<sup>14</sup>

It is reported that Haroon widely circulated *The Muslim Problem in India* both in India and in Britain, and was pleased at its favourable reception in many circles. In a letter to Latif written on 5 January 1940, he expressed his great pleasure at finding that the book "has received great popularity in England and many people view it as being an excellent representation of Muslim opinion". He had also received some other letters "which undoubtedly show that the book has been appreciated by a large section of public-minded people". He concluded with a significant sentence: "Under the circumstances I must express my utmost thanks for the labour you undertook for the supreme cause of Musalmans by evolving such a scheme which if materialized embodies in itself the separate and free Homelands for Muslims in India."<sup>15</sup>

There is some indication that Latif's book was well reviewed in certain British circles. Writing in the *Great Britain and the East* of 14 December 1939, Professor Rushbrook Williams commented: "This little book is important because it is not written from the British point of view, nor from the Pan-Islamic point of view, but the Indian point of view. The author counts himself as good a nationalist as anyone else; but he is determined to oppose the kind of nationalism which would eliminate Islam as a political force in India. We commend it to those well-intentioned critics who believe that the minority problem is a nettle which needs

only to be grasped firmly and with courage in order to render the spines impotent. The particular spine is far more likely to pierce the hand which fails to show it proper respect."<sup>16</sup>

Another British reviewer saw in the scheme a pointer to the serious threat posed by the Muslim problem to the progress of India towards self-government. "Even if the proposal be ignored", wrote H.J. Fells, "its appearance is a clear indication of the fact that if nothing remedial be done India's attainment of the stature of a self-governing unit in the Empire is permanently barred and the canker of communalism will eat still further into the heart of India."<sup>17</sup>

### The Scheme Analyzed

The first thing that strikes us in Latif's argument is its extraordinary similarity with the Muslim League point of view and the general Muslim opinion of the time. All the points which the Muslims were then beginning to make against the conception and possibility of a united India are to be found in Latif: Muslim loss of faith in Hindu sincerity and promises, Muslim fear of Hindu rule, the inapplicability of democracy to India, the creation of a perpetual Hindu majority by the operation of the 1935 constitution and Muslim resolve to fight this to the bitter end, the danger of a civil war if no ameliorative steps were taken, the rejection of India as one national entity and refusal to see any possibility of it in the future, a firm belief in the presence of two nations in India based on the two major religions, a conviction that Congress politics were rooted in Hinduism, and a settled opinion that Congress ministries in the provinces were oppressing the Muslims and forcing Hindu culture upon them. All these were ingredients of the Muslim campaign against the Congress objective of establishing the principle of majority rule in the name of freedom, and in favour of an alternative which would alleviate Muslim apprehensions and grant them adequate protection and effective autonomy. Latif was the first to make use of all these arguments and, by putting them in some kind of order, to build a coherent case against the assumptions underlying the 1935 constitution and the future arrangements prescribed by the Congress. It stands to his credit that he saw the problem in a clear perspective and stated it in terms which could not be misunderstood.

It is, therefore, a matter of much significance and considerable surprise that Latif did not agree with the advocates of partition. After fully supporting the Muslim League policy of opposition to the Congress, after praising Jinnah for his patriotism, moderation, leadership and foresight, after bitterly condemning the Congress for its narrow mentality and its exclusively Hindu thinking, after reprimanding the Hindu leadership for their treatment of the Muslim minority in their provinces, after firmly rejecting the theory of a single Indian nationalism, after repudiating the possibility of the blending of the two cultures—after all this—he still believed in reconciliation and a kind of co-existence. The contrast between his premisses and his conclusion amounts to a contradiction. If what he says about the Congress attitude and the Muslim reaction to it is true, then facts should have ruled out reconciliation. If he is right in claiming that reconciliation could work, then the premisses from which he argued could not have been correct.

This apparent contradiction can be partially, but only partially, explained by his determination to provide for the protection of Muslims living in the minority provinces and areas. This comes out in his criticism of the Pakistan proposal. He raises three main objections against it: it neglects the Muslims living in Hindu provinces, it ignores Hyderabad, and it will not solve the cultural problem. It is not clear which "Pakistan" he was criticizing in these arguments. Strictly speaking, the only Pakistan scheme before the public at that time was the one prepared by Rahmat Ali; and that should have satisfied Latif because it created several national homelands for the Muslims of Hindu provinces and turned Hyderabad into a sovereign Muslim state. But obviously he had some other general proposals in mind; for by 1939 the term "Pakistan" had come to be applied, both by Muslims and Hindus, to any scheme which suggested a partition of India. Thus we can safely assume that Latif was rejecting some imprecise and undetermined scheme which, like the later Muslim League demand of Pakistan, did not concern itself with Muslims living outside the north-west and Bengal-Assam.

As he himself belonged to Hyderabad, his critics might well detect a parochial tendency in his anxiety to save the Muslims of Hindu India even if this led him to self-contradictions and indefensible conclusions. His scheme of making Hyderabad into a

Muslim zone is based on no democratic or national principle. Like Rahmat Ali he trots out three sets of arguments in justification of this proposal: culturally Hyderabad was an "Urdu area" and needed to be kept as such, historically it had been a Muslim-ruled state since the Mughal times and ought to be retained as such, nationally it would be able to offer protection to a few million Muslims scattered all over south India. These arguments do not convince. In fact, Latif went beyond Rahmat Ali in refuting his own logic. He divided Bengal on a religious basis, giving the eastern half to the Muslims and the western to the Hindus; he also divided Kashmir on religious lines, allotting the western districts to the Punjab and the eastern to the Maharaja. Both Bengal and Kashmir were Muslim-majority entities, and yet he wanted them to be broken up so that Hindus were not forced into living under Muslim rule. But he was anxious to keep the whole of Hyderabad, enlarged by the addition of some more territory, as a Muslim region, unmindful of its overwhelming Hindu majority.

And that was not all. He went further and created pockets for Muslims in the heart of Hindu India. By suggesting that the Muslim native states of Bhopal, Tonk and Junagadh should be Muslim areas and that Ajmer should be a free city, he offered a proposition far worse than Rahmat Ali's. Far worse, because these areas were of tiny proportions in comparison with Rahmat Ali's national homes. Similarly, his Delhi-Lucknow zone was to be a landlocked region containing a thinly-spread Muslim population. He was so keen on this zone that, in Section II of his alternative constitution, he conceded that new provinces might be created piecemeal, but insisted that the one to be carved out of the United Provinces ought to be demarcated at once and put under a Muslim prime minister.

His determination to protect the Muslims of minority areas did not brook any obstacle. He made light work of the necessity of a migration on a huge scale without which his plans could not be realized. For him there were no great difficulties in effecting a transfer of population involving a few hundred millions. Such movements, he proclaimed almost like a medieval historian, were not unknown to the Muslim race.

Other weaknesses of his over-all scheme may be noticed more briefly, but without implying that they are unimportant. Probably because he was a Hyderabadí, he retained intact the princely



states in his structure of the future. He did not even mention the incongruity of making up a federation of such diverse units as provinces and native states. He also failed to make any reference to the undemocratic nature of the administration of these states. Perhaps he did not realize that he was perpetuating an oppressive and unprogressive system of government, and consequently siding with the cause and spirit of reaction.

Throughout the scheme there is not a word about the independence of India. The indefinite continuation of British rule is taken for granted. There is no criticism of foreign domination, no timetable for its withdrawal, and no provisions for readjustments if and when the imperial connection would be severed.

When we come to the concrete proposals embodied in his alternative constitution we notice some peculiar suggestions. He starts with a most impracticable proposition in rearing the whole constitutional fabric on the basis of a weak federal centre. The British-made 1935 constitution had decreed a close-type federation with immense powers in the hands of the centre; the provinces enjoyed a spurious autonomy. British anxiety to see a united India taking firm roots ruled out any possibility of British acquiescence in the creation of a loose federation. The Congress leaders were even more devoted to a strong centre, and no amount of Muslim opposition seemed to shake them out of this belief. It is true that their fanatical efforts to establish a strong federation were a testimony to their knowledge that the fissiparous tendencies prevalent in India would destroy the facade of its precarious unity unless a permanent Hindu majority controlled a powerful federal government. In view of Congress insistence on a strong centre all suggestions for the making of a weak federation were unrealistic.

The setting up of zonal or regional boards would have made the constitution too complicated to work smoothly. In spite of Latif's denial that he was erecting sub-federations, the fact is that he was offering a three-tier federal structure, something similar to the later Cabinet Mission plan of 1946. Though he made the establishment of these boards optional, yet their absence would have rendered the whole zonal system pointless.

The "compositive executive" suggested in the constitution ran counter to all principles of political science, and would have been unworkable in practice. It was worse than a coalition government, for it would have had no unified policy to carry out and at the

same time no option to resign and let another cabinet take charge. Being irremovable through an adverse vote, it could easily develop into a corrupt tyranny. Legislative accountability disappears when the will of the house cannot change a government. Latif was also wrong in claiming that this system was modelled on the government of the USA. A president elected by the whole country by (virtually) a direct vote is quite different in stature, authority and popularity from a prime minister chosen by an assembly. Nor does the president of the United States form a cabinet from among the legislature. Nor is his government "composite", for it is a party government in every sense.

In his clarification of a point raised by Rajendra Prasad, Latif postulated a strange feature in his federation. There would be no Indian citizenship, i.e., no federal citizenship, but separate citizenships for each block or zone. This is unknown to the federal principle. The whole idea behind federalism is to create a new state embracing several units or areas. This new state would be incomplete, in fact not a state at all, if all its inhabitants did not have a common citizenship. Separate citizenships are possible in a confederation, but evidently Latif was not suggesting a confederal arrangement.

In conclusion, we must notice that, in spite of Latif's failure to mention Rahmat Ali or to acknowledge any influence of the Cambridge movement upon his own ideas, his scheme has much in common with that of Rahmat Ali's Pakistan. Both refuse to see any unity in India, underline the fundamental clash between Hindu and Muslim cultures and ideals, and expound a two-nation theory according to which Muslims constitute a separate nation or nationality. When Latif spoke of the impossibility of the two cultures blending with each other, his very phraseology seems to have been borrowed from Rahmat Ali. Both reject the 1935 constitution on identical grounds, and emphasize Muslim determination to oppose its implementation and operation regardless of consequences. Both are anxious to retain the Nizam's dominions as a Muslim region: Rahmat Ali wants it to be a sovereign state, Latif makes a separate zone of it. Both provide for the creation of a small "home" for the Hindu and Sikh minorities of the north-west. Both establish several small Muslim strongholds in the heart of Hindu India. Both include Assam, a Hindu-majority province, in the Muslim north-eastern zone or state. Both are deeply concerned

with the future of the untouchables, whom they want to see separated from the Caste Hindus and, if possible, allied with the Muslims. Such sharp resemblances could hardly have been a matter of coincidence. In fact, the only major point distinguishing them is that while Rahmat Ali stood for a complete separation of the Muslims from the rest of India, Latif did not want to break up the unity of the country and believed that, in spite of the Muslim loss of faith in the Hindu, a reconciliation was possible and a common federation workable.

### The Third Latif Scheme (1940)

In the following year (1940), Latif offered still another scheme which was an amended version of the one we have been examining above. The background against which this was done was his opposition to the Lahore Resolution. Some time after the adoption of the Resolution by the Lahore session of AIML (March 1940), he realized that the Resolution did not conform to the consensus of opinion held by the Constitution Committee, which had been appointed in February 1940 to examine each plan submitted to the Muslim League executive body and to see if a consolidated scheme could finally be framed. Apart from protesting against this to the Foreign Committee, on whose request Latif had prepared his scheme and under whose auspices the Constitution Committee was supposed to be working, he sent it a "preliminary note" analysing the Lahore Resolution.

To begin with, he asked four questions about the meaning of certain provisions of the Resolution. "Are the several regional states to combine for any specific purpose or purposes under a single constitution for the whole of India, or is each state to live a separate existence of its own? The Resolution would provide 'mandatory safeguards for minorities in the constitution'. But under whose mandate? and in which constitution,—constitution of the region or of the constituent 'sovereign units' thereof, or of India as a whole? . . . If each state should be independent, who is to guarantee that the mandatory safeguards sought for the Muslim minorities in regional states, where Hindus predominate or for the non-Muslim minorities where the Muslims predominate, will be properly respected by the governments of the states concerned? In other words what are the 'sanctions', and who is to apply

them? . . . The Resolution implies that at any rate for some time, the powers of defence, etc., will have to be exercised by some authority other than these states. This argues a transitional constitution for the whole of India, at least for this purpose. What is that arrangement to be like?"

To him the meaning of all this was that the plan envisaged by the Resolution could not be implemented except by fitting it into an all-India constitutional scheme. He asked the League to decide at once about the shape of this all-India constitutional structure. "A tentative outline of it, as submitted by me, has been under the consideration of the Working Committee for over a year. Some of its features, including the provision of regional sovereign states have, no doubt, been incorporated in the Lahore Resolution. But the background for the framework of an All-India Constitution has not been reproduced." He particularly wanted the League to give close attention to the question of mandatory safeguards, which was "of supreme importance to the Muslims of all those provinces where they are in the minority. They are alarmed at the plan envisaged in the Resolution, and are therefore to be assured that their position is safe under it, and also shown how it is so."<sup>18</sup>

The scheme which he now offered, and called "a broad outline of the Union or Commonwealth of India", was a new version of his 1939 constitution revised in the light of the Lahore Resolution. Whether India achieved the status of a dominion or became completely independent, it would be in her best interests "to resolve herself into a Union with a federal form of constitution peculiar to Indian conditions". This Union was to be composed of "sovereign states" of two categories: those carved out of the territory known as British India, and the native states. Each of the states in the first category should be "so constituted through a readjustment of existing provincial boundaries as to form a compact block affording absolute cultural homogeneity to the majority community inhabiting the areas and cultural autonomy to the minority communities wherever necessary". It might consist of several units, each administratively autonomous, which together would form a zonal federation fitting into an all-India union along with other similar zonal federations. To take one example, the linguistic areas known as Tamil Nad, Andhra, Malabar and Canara might choose either to remain as "separate sovereign

federated states", or combine to form a zonal federation of Dravidian races or cultures which would then be linked with the Indian Union.

Two such "sovereign states" to be created in the north-west and the north-east to satisfy the political aspirations of the Muslims of these areas would be (1) a zonal federation composed of Sind, British Baluchistan, the NWFP and the Punjab, and (2) a zonal federation composed of Bengal and Assam. Each unit within these two federations would be autonomous.

The larger native states would remain "sovereign states and join the Union in their individual rights". The smaller ones would either merge with contiguous states in British India or group themselves together "for purposes of representation at the Centre though individually enjoying autonomy in internal affairs".

The distribution of powers between the centre and the units making up the Union would be based on the principle of one list enumerating the powers of the centre and limiting them to the barest minimum. Broadly speaking the four subjects allotted to the Union would be external relations, defence, major communications, and customs. In the field of defence, the navy would be entirely under the control of the centre "subject to such concessions as the coastal states might need". But each state would have its own army, whose strength and size would depend on the importance and strategic position of the state and would be specified in the constitution. Part of the army would be classified as "federal", and the centre would share the military expenditure of each state in proportion to the strength of the army maintained by it. In normal times the military forces of each state would be controlled by its own government under the supervision of the centre. In time of war, however, the centre would assume full control of all armed forces. The "federated states or units" would be fully autonomous with all residuary powers vested in them. These were to include the right of entering into commercial treaties with foreign countries and of seceding from the Union.

On the levels of units and zonal federations the minorities, whether Hindu or Muslim, were given two safeguards relating to their representation in legislatures. They would have the option of returning their representatives to the assemblies through their own electorates. A minority with a strength of less than one-third in the population of a unit or a zonal federation would be given

one-third of the total seats in the legislature; but this concession was limited to the two major communities, the Hindus and the Muslims, wherever they were in a small minority. In the parliament of the Union, Muslims would be entitled to "at least two-fifths of the seats reserved for them". These Muslim seats were to be filled through election by Muslim members of the legislatures of the federated states. This concession was based on two considerations: the size of Muslim share in the defence responsibilities of India (the Simla Deputation of 1906 had used the same argument), and Muslim fear of Hindu domination at the centre.

The executive at the centre and in each federated state and its unit would be of the composite variety and would "follow an agreed policy". In each case the head of the cabinet would be free to choose some of his ministers from outside the legislature, and these would automatically become members of the legislature on their appointment. The cabinet would be selected from a panel suggested by the leaders of the different communities in the assembly. The office of the head of the cabinet would rotate between Hindus and Muslims. No decision of the cabinet would be effective if it were opposed by its Muslim members. Like representation in the legislatures, Muslims were to have one-third quota on the executives of all federated states and units where they were in a minority (with a corresponding concession to the Hindus where they were in a minority), and two-fifths quota in the executive of the Union.

In all legislatures no law could be enacted if it was opposed by four-fifths of the Muslim or Hindu members on the ground that it prejudiced their interests.

There was only a brief reference to transfer of population in this constitutional draft. Obligatory migration was not mentioned this time. One of the objects of the constitution, it was declared, would be "to facilitate inter-migration of Muslims and Hindus wherever sought or wherever necessary, between states or between parts of the same state so as to promote a sense of security among them". Each state would pass the legislation required for this and set up a competent machinery to organize and regulate the migration and assign compensation for property left behind by the migrants.<sup>19</sup>

We may briefly notice the points in which this scheme differs from the earlier one. Most of the amendments and changes are obviously aimed at bringing his plan nearer to the Lahore Resolu-



tion. The constitutional structure is now made even more loose by designating it as a Union or a Commonwealth instead of a federation, by setting up a very weak centre, by providing for state armies, and by granting the units the right of secession. The former zones, blocks and regions have been replaced by zonal federations, and the two such federations in the north-west and the north-east follow the demand of the Lahore Resolution. The suggestion for dividing Bengal between Hindus and Muslims has also disappeared. He has also given up the previous scheme for creating small Muslim centres (based on Muslim native states like Bhopal, Tonk, etc.) in the midst of Hindu regions. But he still insists on retaining the identity and independence of the princely states, and has an obvious eye on Hyderabad when he makes the larger states "sovereign" in the Union.

These changes have, however, failed to remove the major weaknesses of his proposals. All the defects of the earlier plan are still there: a three-tier federal arrangement, a mixture of provinces and princely dominions in the Union, a weak centre, composite executives, irremovable cabinets, and transfer of population. Some new disadvantages have been added, the most serious of them being the creation of state armies and the right of secession. These things make the plan even more impracticable than the previous attempt. Latif must have been completely out of touch with realities and blindly ignorant of Congress opinion to hope that a union with such a weak centre, with independent state armies, and with states' right of secession, would receive the slightest consideration from the Hindus. To make matters worse, he has the irritating habit of calling the federated states "sovereign". But of this more at the end.

If this was an attempt to produce a scheme which would be more acceptable to the Muslim League than was his previous effort, or to persuade Jinnah that it opened up better prospects than did the Lahore Resolution, anyone with some understanding of contemporary Indian politics would have told him that he was pursuing a mirage with so much misplaced vigour. It did not matter what new boundaries he drew, what fresh constitutional arrangements he made, what special concessions he gave to the minorities, what label he stuck on the packet he offered, and how loose an Indian union he proposed—the fact remained that he was bent upon retaining the unity of India as a country and as a state. All the

vagueness, ambiguity and evasive wording of the Lahore Resolution notwithstanding, it stood for two Indias, not one. With all the separatist thinking that had gone into the making of the final decision of the Muslim League, it was rather naive of Latif to expect the League to forget what had been happening in India during the past several years and to ignore the rising tide of Muslim opinion. The League had not reached the moment of decision lightly, accidentally or abruptly. In fact, it had been lagging behind the popular demand for some years.

#### The Fourth Latif Scheme (1941)

But Latif was persistent if nothing else. Undaunted by rebuffs and unmoved by rejections, he went on opposing the Lahore Resolution, fighting the case for the unity of India and producing one constitutional plan after another which could avoid a partition.

It appears that Latif really thought that the Muslim League would change its mind on the Lahore Resolution after having adopted it; its confused wording and imprecise phrasing might have led him to entertain such a belief. When, however, the Muslim League, far from retracting the Resolution, wrote it into its constitution at the 1941 annual session at Madras, he realized that the party was serious about Pakistan. But even then he did not give up his efforts to force the League to at least compromise on the Pakistan issue. His argument was that the passing of the Lahore Resolution had estranged the League from the Congress and diminished the chances of an agreement between them.

In the words of Nawab Nazir Yar Jung, "the deadlock seemed so unresolvable that it seemed to the author [Latif] imperative that some *modus operandi* should be devised on the basis of each conceding to the other the substance of their respective demands, viz., sense of security and sovereign status to Pakistan areas on the one hand and of political unity to the whole of India on the other".<sup>20</sup> With this impossible end in view (impossible because it sought to combine Muslim sovereignty with Indian unity), Latif prepared a rough draft of a new constitutional plan and circulated it on 15 May 1941 among the prominent leaders of the Congress and the Muslim League. Nawab Nazir Yar Jung does not produce any replies sent to the scheme by Muslim League leaders because they "were not intended for publication", but he

reports that they offered "their moral support to the proposal".<sup>21</sup>

In his covering letter to Jinnah, Latif said that "I have, during the last few years, in my own humble way, tried to support the cause of the League". On the Madras Resolution, which had made the Lahore Resolution a part of the League's constitution, he wrote: "... allow me to say that your Madras Resolution has saddened some of your best friends, including me. The Pakistan idea has served its purpose; it has roused the necessary political consciousness among the Muslims. But that consciousness now needs to run into practical channels . . . . I may repeat that the Pakistan scheme in its latest form will neither establish Muslim States properly so-called; nor get rid of the Hindu-Muslim-Sikh problem; nor afford any security to the Muslim minorities in the proposed independent Hindu India, unless a wholesale exchange of population is effected, which no one favours. I am not the only person to hold this view. A compromise on the *basis of complete separation* is unthinkable."<sup>22</sup>

The "Constitutional Plan for India" which was enclosed with this letter aimed at "finding a solution—not a patch-work compromise, but an agreeable and permanent solution". The "primary impulse", which had directed the Muslim League to reject the 1935 federal constitution and also other federal arrangements and had forced it to demand a partition, was "the fear of a strong Centre where Muslims would be submerged by non-Muslims". This fear had to go if any lasting settlement was to be reached. It was for the majority party, the Hindus, to show how this could be done; but "for aught I know, it seems to me that a solution is possible, if at least the *substance* of the Muslim League demand is conceded". This demand "amounts to no more than a strong desire for the utmost freedom from an external Centre in the internal administration of the provinces in the North-West and the North-East of India where the Muslims are in the majority". If that was the objective, the League should accept an arrangement under which these provinces, "as constituent Units in a new constitution, are assured, equally with other Units, the maximum or the utmost possible autonomy consistent with the safety of India as a whole". The units would have all the residuary powers and the centre would be "such as not to allow any particular party to dominate other parties". Such a plan "will afford to the contending parties the *substance* of their respective demands". If this principle was

accepted, the question of effective and adequate constitutional safeguards for the minorities, which was "the only other basic demand of the League", would not present any serious difficulty. If the two major parties were agreeable to such a settlement, the current deadlock could be resolved by setting up an "interim composite government" at the centre and similar composite governments in all provinces. The native states might be invited to enter the federation on "agreed terms" at the time of framing a new constitution.<sup>23</sup>

It was a sincere attempt to keep India united and at the same time concede *something* to the Muslims. But it came too late to make any sense to the Muslim League. (Though, the critics of Latif must remember that the Muslim League accepted the Cabinet Mission plan of 1946 which did not provide for a partition). Had it been suggested in, say, the early 'thirties, or even a little later, it might have had a chance of being seriously considered by the League. But now the adoption of the Lahore Resolution and the emotional associations of the Muslims with the concept and name of Pakistan had rendered such proposals obsolete. The fundamental mistake made by Latif was in his assessment of the Pakistan solution. He looked at it as a mere constitutional arrangement decided upon by a political party. In fact, by this time, it had become an "ideological" objective, an intensely emotional issue, which touched every feeling of the Muslims, and inspired them with happy dreams of a future which would bring them everything that their minority status had so far denied them. They were not demanding provincial autonomy or a weak centre: these demands had been made ten years ago at the RTC and rejected by the British and the Hindus. They did not want a fresh federal arrangement or a new constitutional structure. They were not asking for safeguards and political promises. They had been through all this in the last fifty years, and had discovered that such demands and such concessions constituted movement without progress. Now they wanted sovereignty and states of their own with no apparent connections or links with the rest of India. Pakistan was not to be a geographical re-distribution and nothing more: it was a concept with a whole background of associations, sentiments and values, which raised it from a constitutional suggestion to a national urge for freedom. Latif did not appreciate this, and therefore failed to realize that his proposal could be of no interest to the League.

It is possible that, living in south India, he was not aware of the strong grip Pakistan had secured on the minds of the Muslims in the north. His objections to the Pakistan solution were perfectly valid. It did not protect the Muslims of the minority provinces. It solved the communal problem within Pakistan only by an extraneous and unanticipated accident: the migration of Hindus and Sikhs from the north-west. The Hindu-Muslim issue remained present in East Pakistan and spread so much poison in the body-politic of the country that it ultimately contributed to the break up of Pakistan.

But Latif's scheme contradicted itself on the narrower, constitutional plane. He claimed that it conceded to the two parties the substance of their respective demands, and he defined this substance as "sense of security and sovereign status to each unit on the one hand, and political unity for the whole of India on the other".<sup>24</sup> But a sovereign Pakistan and a united India were incompatible. If each unit was given "sovereign status", the result could not be the "political unity of the whole of India". Moreover, even if by "sovereign status" he meant no more than maximum autonomy, he ought to have known that the Congress was not prepared to offer that to the Muslims. Whatever individual Congress leaders told him in private conversation or in letters, the Congress as a party did not, even once in all these years, commit itself to the establishment of a federation with such a weak centre and such strong provinces. Latif was arguing from a wrong major premiss, and the fact that this misconception put the Congress in a more favourable light (by trying to show that it was agreeable to a loose federation while the League was obstinately refusing to consider any alternative to the Lahore Resolution) made his *bona fides* suspect in sensitive League circles.

The Muslim League ignored him completely, and Jinnah did not think it worth his while to reply to his letter accompanying the 1941 constitutional plan. Rajendra Prasad evaded the responsibility of choosing between agreement and disagreement, by first saying that "I do not possess any status to speak on behalf of any group or party or community", and then making it clear that "any device which in any way jeopardises the unity and safety of India as a whole is not likely to be accepted by the vast majority of Indians".<sup>25</sup>

Neither silence nor evasion could discourage Latif. He continued

to repeat his opposition to the Pakistan plan and to prescribe his own solution to the ills of India. In a statement issued in October 1942, he said that "a Pakistan in isolation, such as Mr. Jinnah dreams of, is not a happy vision". The League should agree to his own scheme "under which India would be a Union of *sovereign* States including one in the north-west and one in the north-east". These states would enjoy the "largest measure of autonomy, residuary powers and the right of secession". The League should review its policy and "cease to feed the Muslim masses on blissful thoughts of a 'Pakistan in isolation'." The age of small sovereign states had gone. "The wiser course is to concentrate all energy on securing a Pakistan organically linked, on agreed terms, to the rest of India in the interests both of the Muslim majorities in the north-west and north-east, and of the Muslim minorities in Hindu areas." The conditions which had once warranted a demand for separation had disappeared. The Congress was now agreeable to let the federating units have the largest measure of autonomy, residuary powers and the right of secession.<sup>26</sup>

Latif's most detailed criticism of the Lahore Resolution in particular and of the Pakistan proposal in general is contained in the foreword which he contributed to *The Pakistan Issue*. It is dated 1 December 1943, which makes it his last word on the subject, for we have no available published record of his later opinions. A look at the contents of this foreword will bring this account of his proposals to a close.

He began by declaring that he was not an opponent of the Pakistan plan. "I do not oppose 'Pakistan' or the formation of sovereign states in the North-West and the North-East where the Muslims form a predominant majority in population. Let that be clear to everybody. Indeed, how can I, having been the first in the field, as admitted by the leaders of the League, to have nursed the idea of allowing to every cultural zone, Hindu or Muslim, a sovereign existence, and the first to outline a constitution for India on that basis." But he differed from Jinnah's interpretation of the Lahore Resolution, which was contrary to the spirit of the Resolution. "Mr. Jinnah insists that the Pakistan states should remain in isolation and should have no constitutional relation with the rest of India. I, on the other hand, hold that such an attitude will prove suicidal to the Pakistan states. I firmly believe that in the abiding interests of these states themselves and of the thinly



distributed Muslim minorities in Hindu zones, they should, while enjoying perfect freedom or autonomy in their internal affairs, link themselves to the rest of India to administer with others on terms of equality a minimum of subjects indispensably common to the whole of India . . . . The irresistible conclusion that has forced itself on me is that the proposed states, when isolated from the rest of India, will soon or late find themselves unable to maintain their independence, and in consequence will either lapse into the position of a dependency or protectorate of some foreign power or return chastened in spirit to the Indian Union. This is a prospect I have shuddered against."

The Pakistan of the Lahore Resolution was bound to result in the creation of an undesirable state of affairs. Under the principle enunciated in the Resolution the states of Pakistan would cover only those areas which had real or predominant Muslim majority. This would mean that the Muslims would get only half of the Punjab in the north-west and only eastern Bengal and the Sylhet district of Assam in the north-east. If, on the other hand, larger states are desired, this could be done either by exchanging a large population or by including non-Muslim areas with the free consent of their inhabitants. The first alternative was out of question. "Exchange of population is somehow disagreeable to you, you are earth-bound unlike the Muslims of old." If the second alternative is followed, the resulting states would be larger in size but certainly not Muslim in character. "They will be composite states and not 'Pakistan' and will have naturally to be governed by composite governments. You cannot, as is your dream and hope, establish therein *hakumat-i-ilahiyya* or the 'Rule of God' or of the *Shariyyat*." Moreover, these states would be miniature Indias with the same communal problem as then confronted the Muslims.

The creation of smaller but properly Muslim states presented serious difficulties of its own. These states would amount to nothing beyond the "two poverty-stricken patches" in which Muslims were truly in the majority—"patches torn from each other by vast spaces of land and sea, and incapable of evolving between them any unified life or federal administration". With their limited and undeveloped economic resources it was impossible to run a modern state or to meet the cost of defence without outside help. "And why should you deny yourselves the larger resources of India

when they are yours by every natural right?"

Another major weakness of the Pakistan solution, but of a different nature, was its abdication of all responsibility for the future of the Muslims living in the rest of India. Of what use would this Muslim state be to the millions of Muslims who would be left "eternal orphans" in an independent Hindu India? The "mandatory safeguards" spoken of by the Lahore Resolution would be futile. Who was going to be the mandatory authority? Who would apply the sanctions? What sanctions would or could be applied? Would an independent Hindu India agree to an external mandate? Retaliation would break down as a remedy if the Hindus of Pakistan were law-abiding and loyal citizens while the Indian government was oppressing its minorities.

The Muslim League solution would spell equal disaster in the realm of culture. There was much talk of a single Muslim nation in India. But the future of this nation would certainly be in peril if it was to be "parcelled out among several independent states or dominions having no organic relationship with one another". The cultural unity of Islam in India would be lost. "Will not some of us who will be left in Hindu Zones slowly succumb to the impact of a vivified and dominating non-Muslim culture zealously fostered by an independent and powerful non-Muslim state, and cut themselves off for ever from the main current of Islamic life in India?"

Still another thing which worried Latif was the future of Muslim princely states. He was deeply concerned with the failure of the Pakistan plan to offer any protection to the Muslim native states which were surrounded by Hindu areas and were predominantly populated by Hindus. In case of a partition they would be forced to live on terms of dependence on "Hindustan". In a united India they would occupy an honourable place.

It was in view of these difficulties, said Latif, that as far back as 1939 he had suggested "the formation of a Union of India composed of sovereign states". He was still of the same opinion, and could not see how any arrangement without a common centre would be workable or desirable for the Muslims. Recent developments had confirmed the truth of his view. There were meagre chances of the League realizing its objective of the Lahore Resolution. The Hindus were firmly opposed to it. The British were certainly not in favour of splitting India. He warned the League

that "if the Indian political parties do not reach a settlement between themselves in respect of India's future constitution, and Britain is eventually called upon to arbitrate, it will frankly decide in favour of the federal ideal". The British solution might not be of the orthodox variety with majority rule and a parliamentary executive, but it would undoubtedly create a united India.

If a union was thus inevitable, wisdom demanded that it should be grasped and bent to "our purpose". Instead of fighting on the issue of a "Pakistan in isolation"—which would be a "nightmare" and a "suicide" for the Muslims—the League should prepare its own plan of a "Union of Sovereign states" with a centre which could remove all Muslim fears, enable the Muslims to protect the interests of their minorities and their native states, and offer them terms of perfect equality with the Hindus.<sup>27</sup>

This critique of the Muslim League policy contains some very good arguments and some which are not so good. Among the latter is his persistence in the misuse of the word "sovereign". Throughout these pages, as elsewhere, he employs this adjective as the equivalent of autonomous. He does not seem to realize the meaninglessness and absurdity of such phrases as an "Indian Union of sovereign states". It is more than a matter of bad language, for the entire case rests upon what he is asking the League to accept in place of the Lahore Resolution. But we must remember, in fairness to Latif, that the Lahore Resolution indulged in a similar absurdity.

His emphasis on the economic poverty of the areas claimed for Pakistan echoed a general sentiment, and was theoretically and substantially correct. But it underrated the internal mechanics of nationalism. The lure of economic prosperity plays but little part in the upsurge of nationalism. If riches alone were to determine the future of nations, Burma would not have cut itself off from India, Canada would not have disregarded the certainty of material gain resulting from a merger with the immensely rich United States of America, Afghanistan would not have thought twice before throwing its lot with Iran or India, the continent of Europe would not have remained a collection of big and small national sovereignties, and the Arab world, with so many bonds of unity, would not have persisted in maintaining its several national fragments. The Muslims wanted Pakistan not in order to be rich but in order to be free.

Latif's concern for the future of the native states which had Muslim rulers can hardly be called an argument from democracy. He was not interested in the rights of the people of the princely states. What worried him was the future of the Muslim princes in an independent Hindu India. It is interesting to see that he does not even care to argue the point: to him it seemed self-evident that the failure of the League to work for the protection of these native states was a sufficient condemnation of its policy and plans.

So much for the weaknesses in Latif's approach to the Pakistan issue; but they should not be allowed to hide the good points he makes. The two alternatives he saw before the makers of Pakistan make up a valid picture. It had to be either a large Pakistan with a sizeable non-Muslim minority or a small Pakistan with an almost purely Muslim population. In the one case it could not be a truly Muslim country, and would have reproduced the Indian communal problem on a smaller scale. In the other it could produce a purely Muslim state where the fear of Hindu domination was permanently removed. Put like this it could confront the League with a real problem. But the League never saw the problem in this light. It made a demand on the basis of Muslim provinces (though the Lahore Resolution had spoken of Muslim-majority areas, not provinces), and if the result was a large non-Muslim minority in Pakistan, then what? A similarly large muslim minority would also be left in Hindu India. But one could not argue in this way. The League wanted a Muslim state where Islamic values and culture could flourish unhindered. This could not have been realized if the population of this state contained such a large Hindu and Sikh element. In fact, the final turn of events which translated Pakistan into reality eliminated the problem in one part of the new country, and removed the necessity of a choice by dividing the Punjab and Bengal and giving to Pakistan only the Sylhet district of Assam. But something that happened as an accident and at the last moment cannot relieve the League of the responsibility for demanding a Muslim state with a view to solving the communal problem while defining the state in such a way that the communal problem would survive the physical division.

The other dilemma to which Latif referred was far more serious and raises a fundamental problem. If all the Indian Muslims were a nation and if the Muslim League was fighting for the salvation of this nation (as it professedly was), then the creation of Pakistan

left a sizeable part of the nation in Hindu hands. How can we reconcile the achievement with the claim? This is a question of great historical importance and interest, and is related not only to Latif's criticism but to the very nature and background of the Lahore Resolution. Therefore, we would be better placed to discuss it at a later stage when we can look back over the whole panorama and see how history moved across it.

### The Public Reaction

For various reasons—his lack of contact with and remoteness from the Muslim north, his opposition to the Muslim League, his criticism of Jinnah, his non-participation in practical politics, his presentation of the Congress as an organization ready to concede all reasonable Muslim demands, his anxiety to avoid a partition of India at any cost, etc.—Latif's scheme did not appeal to the Muslim mind and therefore did not become an issue of public debate. It got some minor notices in contemporary newspapers and a few politicians cared to pass judgment on it. This reaction may be summarized as follows.

The *Madras Mail* called the Latif scheme of 1938 "fantastic".<sup>28</sup> About the 1939 version, the *Statesman* conceded that since it had been prepared at the request of the Muslim League and its general lines were known to be approved by the party's executive, "it cannot be brushed aside as a dream fantasy". It was honestly put forward as a means of holding India together and producing "not indeed the kind of nation that we have dreamt of but a nation comparable to that which the British and French in their separate areas agree in amity upon in Canada . . . . It is meant to be a constructive, not a destructive, proposal. Its object is peace . . . . Nevertheless we believe that there exists today an essential unity of Indian life from Peshawar to Comorin and a growing sense of nationality of which the Scheme takes far too little account. The Government of India Act of 1935 is therefore not only far better in ideal but is also, we believe, workable. We do not believe that in the existing state of the world it is either possible or desirable as the League scheme proposes to scrap the provincial self-government we already have, adopt reactionary measures at the Centre and in the provinces, and postpone a new form of federation for a long term of years. India has to find union

urgently, and this can be done by federating now."<sup>29</sup> A correspondent, presumably Hindu, wrote from Calcutta that it was impossible to see millions of Hindus migrating from one part of India to the other to appease the Muslims. The scheme was "akin to the Pakistan idea"; indeed, it was more utopian. The "absurdity of the scheme is so overwhelming that it would be waste of time to consider it".<sup>30</sup> Somebody writing a column in the *Statesman* under the name of "An Indian Observer" had some good words for the scheme. It was the result of "careful and painstaking study" and it was not possible to dismiss it as a belated piece of constitution making. When Latif claimed that Muslims were not so much a minority as a nation, "he states no more than truth".<sup>31</sup>

Hindu and Muslim opinion bifurcated. One Muslim Leaguer warned that if the Latif scheme did not find favour with the political India, there would be no alternative left to the Muslims but to suggest a partition of India as demanded by Rahmat Ali. If Burma could be separated from India, there was no reason to refuse the right of self-determination to the Muslims of the north-west, though the Congress might not like the idea.<sup>32</sup> When the *Amrit Bazar Patrika*, a Hindu paper, attacked the scheme on 26 April, one Shamsuddin Ahmad Muntaz of Calcutta declared it "an uncontradictable fact" that no possible solution other than that of Latif would allow the Indians a "perpetual peaceful living". The sooner it was put into execution the better.<sup>33</sup> The *Star of India* refrained from offering its views pending the decision of the League, but wrote: "It does, however, warmly commend itself to us in its conception—the practicability of its being carried out is another matter."<sup>34</sup>

A former Hindu minister of the Alwar state found the Muslim claim put forward by Latif to be "preposterous, irritating and misleading". The bogey of Hindu rule "is a bugbear that cannot stand scrutiny"; it only shows the "defeatist and slave mentality" of the Muslims. Latif's scheme was nothing but "a transparent version of the *Pakistan* day dream", and it was well known that the latter's ultimate aim was to conquer the whole of India with the help of Afghanistan and Iran.<sup>35</sup> A reply to this was given by one Sajjad Husain from Dacca.<sup>36</sup> Yusuf Ali, a former ICS officer and a scholar of Islam, found some attractive features in the scheme but rejected the "almost impossible exchanges of populations" implied in it.<sup>37</sup>



F.K. Khan Durrani saw much in it that was distasteful to the Muslims and detrimental to their long-term interests. From the religious point of view the scheme was faulty. Latif, said Durrani, "passes over the Islamic duty of proselytisation in silence. If the two cultures are to be segregated, the question of proselytising does not arise. There would be no room for it, for the man who wants to change his religion would have first to migrate from one zone to another. The scheme deprives Islam of one of its essential attributes. In fact, it puts Islam in jail." From the political point of view it left too much to Hindu promises of good behaviour. "There can be no peace or agreement between the two nations, until and unless the major community abandons the dream of Hindu Raj. The Muslims are not afraid for their culture. What they fear is political oppression, against which segregation in cultural zones is no protection. Dr. Latif leaves much to goodwill. He does not seem to understand that aggressive nationalism knows no goodwill, except such as a rival nationalism may command by force of arms, and Hindu nationalism has proved itself as aggressive as Fascist Italy or Nazi Germany." Nor was provincial autonomy, which formed the essence of Latif's plan, an adequate safeguard against the domination of a Hindu centre. "As the provincial armies will be under the supervision of the Centre and the navy will be entirely the Centre's affair, the overlapping, the waste, and the resultant utility so far as the protection of the federating units against an aggressive Centre is concerned, reduces the whole scheme to sheer absurdity."<sup>38</sup>

Hindu criticism was no less friendly. If Latif had hoped that his efforts to retain the political unity of India would endear him to the Hindu leaders or draw compliments from the Congress, he must have been disappointed. From the day he sent copies of *The Muslim Problem in India* to Hindu leaders up to the time of his last proposals he received no support, sympathy or approval from any Hindu organization or individual.

Jawaharlal Nehru's reply embodied his standard thesis that he did not see any Muslim problem in India, that the real problem was economic, and that all those who drew his attention to the Muslim problem had a medieval outlook. After having read the book he wrote to Latif: "I have read this book with interest and have tried to understand your argument. I am afraid I am wholly unable to appreciate it. You say in your letter that you are not a politician

but you have written as a politician, and accepted as facts many assertions which have yet to be proved . . . the inferences you draw do not seem to be justified . . . The fundamental problem of India today is not political but one of poverty and unemployment and low production and vested interests, both foreign and Indian, which prevent progress. There is nothing in your essay which touches these problems . . . I proceed from different premisses completely . . . I feel therefore that your background is somewhat medieval and does not fit in at all with modern theory or practice, and does not take into consideration the fundamental importance of the economic side." On the relationship of religion and state, Nehru saw in the development in certain Muslim countries a refutation of the ideals of the Indian Muslims, and was pleased with it. "Where democracy is creeping into the Islamic States, it is on the basis of modern scientific political theory which separates the State from religion, though keeping religion intact for the individual and the group. Turkey is an outstanding example of an Islamic State which has deliberately ceased to call itself Islamic as such. The same tendency is visible in the other Islamic countries more or less."<sup>39</sup>

Two months later he repeated his objections in still clearer language. "I fear that your approach to the Hindu-Muslim question is so entirely different from mine that I find it difficult to see any reality behind your proposals. That makes it difficult also to discuss them with any profit to you or me . . . Your proposals seem to me opposed to this world tendency [of inter-dependence] and are therefore reactionary. They proceed from a static conception of society which is singularly out of keeping with the modern dynamic age : . . . I am entirely in favour of all real cultural strands in a people to be protected and given full freedom of growth . . . I do not think your way is the way to remove these repressions or to tone down the conflicts that exist."<sup>40</sup>

There is no point in examining Nehru's criticism, for he offers no arguments, and his general approach to the Muslim problem, hardened into a dogma with years, is well known. But the optimistic tendency which he saw in Muslim states (which he wrongly calls "Islamic States") betrayed an ignorance of the problem of nationalism and minorities, which is surprising in a man of his education and political experience. Therefore, Latif's reply to him on this point is worth quoting. "Turkey whom you cite in your

favour turned a secular state only after she had got rid of her alien population. So far as I could understand the mind of the Muslim world, it is this: Where the Muslims are in the majority, as in most Muslim countries, their politics is their religion; but where they are in the minority, or have to live in the midst of an overwhelming non-Muslim population as in India, their religion or culture is their politics. They assume this attitude because religion with them is a way of living sanctioned by certain truths of life in which they believe, and they therefore let every circumstance subserve it. You know of Islam only in terms of feudalism, of Persianized-cum-Hinduized Islam. That marks a period of neglect and wastage. There is now a new spirit abroad among the Muslims. They are anxious to build their future on their democratic heritage, rather than their feudal, and live in peaceful relations with their neighbours, and thereby promote the united good of the whole country. You can easily negotiate with a people developing such an outlook. No hide and seek policy will bear fruit".<sup>41</sup> However, as we have seen above, this appeal failed to register with Nehru whose reply of 6 March 1940 was even more curt and dismissive.

Gandhi's reaction to the Latif scheme was also one of uncompromising rejection. After reading *The Muslim Problem in India* he wrote: "There are such fundamental differences between us that argument becomes useless. God will dispose of us and decide what is good for us."<sup>42</sup>

Rajendra Prasad's remarks on Latif's "Constitutional Plan for India" of May 1941 were evasive in the extreme. First he said that he could not say anything "because I do not possess any status to speak on behalf of any group or party or community". Then he was doubtful if "the discussion which you are initiating will lead to any result". Then came the general platitude repeated by every Congress leader on every occasion: "The Congress has never refused to discuss any scheme and any proposal for bringing about a settlement of the Communal Problem." After these general observations he went on to raise certain objections to the proposals.<sup>43</sup> But when Latif replied to these objections in some detail,<sup>44</sup> Rajendra Prasad's answer was a letter of eight lines saying that "I do not feel like carrying on a discussion through correspondence on a question like this. I do not see that correspondence between you and me is likely to lead to any result."<sup>45</sup>

Other expressions of Hindu disapproval can be mentioned more

briefly. *The Indian Annual Register* devoted four large-size pages to condemning Latif's suggestions contained in his *The Cultural Future of India*.<sup>46</sup> In later years it was a common practice with Hindu polemicists to refer to Latif as the originator of "Pakistan theory", and that was considered to be enough of a judgement. One such writer called him "one of the original inventors of the Pakistan theory"<sup>47</sup>; while another conceded that he could "justly claim to be the originator of the Pakistan idea".<sup>48</sup>

The Congress Muslims, as was their wont, went further than their Hindu colleagues in attacking Latif and imputing to him ulterior motives. One example of this kind of writing will illustrate the approach of this school. "We believe that there are other motives behind the scheme of Dr. Latif", said one Rezaul Karim from Bengal. "Otherwise, he would never have dared to think of partitioning India on such flimsy pretexts of cultural differences . . . . The motive that is working behind Dr. Latif's scheme is too obvious to need any mention."<sup>49</sup>

The one feature common to all Hindu criticisms is the absence of any constructive suggestions. The scheme is condemned or ignored, but never examined. The author is called reactionary and medieval minded, but his ideas evoke no answer. The Hindu mind was closed to every scheme, plan or proposal which did not echo the Congress point of view. So tightly were the doors shut that even outspoken opponents of the Pakistan solution could not gain entry. Ultimately it was this resolve not to consider any alternative to the Congress solution which made a partition of India inevitable.

### Asadullah's Amendments

In April 1939, one Asadullah, a lawyer of Calcutta, presented his own plan which was inspired by Latif. In fact, it was an attempt to improve the Latif scheme. Its significance lies primarily in the fact that it is the only plan, or an alternative to a proposal, suggested by a Bengali.

In a letter to the *Star of India* of 4 April he suggested: "It will be in the best interest of the Muslims of India if we form the Provinces of Bihar and UP into a Muslim Block, instead of the Delhi-Lucknow Block and the Deccan Block of Dr. Lattiff's scheme. The formation of the Deccan Block will be of very little

good to the Muslims, except the advantage of getting a sea-port either on the coast of Madras or of Bombay, which is of course of very great value from the commercial point of view. But this Block will ever remain isolated from the rest of the Muslim zones; and the formation of a Hindu Block with Bihar and the Eastern half of UP creates a barrier between the North-West and the North-East Zones, and this absence of a connecting link between the two great Muslim Blocks cannot be so easily left out of consideration. Moreover, a compact body of 3 crores of Muslims in Bengal and Assam should not be made to cut off all connections with the rest of the Muslim World . . . . Dr. Lattiff's scheme proposes the possibility of the transference of population from one province to another and so plans the transfer of the Muslim population of Madras, Bombay, CP and Berar, and probably Orissa also, into the Deccan Block. But why not let the Muslim population of the above-named provinces and Hyderabad shift to the UP and Bihar, for if the entire people move at all, it is all the same whether they are made to move 100 or 500 miles . . . . He has himself made the suggestion that some districts of the Northern Punjab may be given over to the Maharaja of Kashmir in exchange for the Western part of his territory which he wants to take away into the Muslim zone. But I say, why not let the Nizam of Hyderabad and the Maharaja of Kashmir exchange their respective territories. . . . So I again hold that the entire Muslim population of India living outside of the North-West and the North-East Blocks should migrate to the UP and Bihar. Then we could form a Federation of the Provinces: Baluchistan, Sind, the North-West Frontier, the Punjab, the United Provinces, Bihar, Bengal and Assam, together with Kashmir, and thus form a compact body of Muslims from West to East."<sup>50</sup>

When I contacted Mr. Asadullah in 1969 and asked him what had made him suggest this change in the Latif scheme, he told me that in fact his idea was not an amendment of the Latif proposal but an independent scheme which he had put before the people in a letter to the *Star of India* of 22 March 1939. As this letter was not available to me, he sent me a typed copy, from which the following is taken. "With the introduction of the All India Federation the position of the Indian Muslims will be much more serious, nay positively dangerous. The Congress will certainly accept and work the Federal plan. The Congress, which has captured

practically eight provincial governments, is puffed up with its newly-assumed power and will be out of reach of all appeal with the assuming of the control of the Central Government. Consequently, it is high time for the Indian Muslims to chalk out a plan for their salvation. The existence of the Muslims of India as a distinct community and national entity is at stake. Is there no way out of this impending calamity and national catastrophe? I have myself thought out a plan for the solution of this most difficult problem that ever faced the Muslims of India. The Muslims are in an absolute minority—possibly negligible minority—in Bombay, Madras, Orissa, Central Provinces, Bihar and United Provinces. I would like to suggest that all the Muslims (the entire population) living in Bombay, Madras, Orissa and Central Provinces should migrate (possibly) in equal numbers to Bihar and United Provinces. Of course there are great difficulties—economic, political, geographical and financial—in practically working out a plan like this. The few Muslims of Bombay and Madras, who are engaged in seaborne and international trade, may shift their abode to Karachi or somewhere near in Sind. It is obvious that the solution of such a serious problem can never be expected to be easy. In short, my suggestion is that all the Muslims in India should live within the space of land bounded by the Himalayas in the North and the Vindhyas in the South, or in other words no Muslims should live below the Vindhyas Range. Then we should form one Federation of the provinces—Sind; North-West Frontier Province, Punjab, United Provinces, Bihar, Bengal and Assam together with Baluchistan and Kashmir. Another federation of the four provinces of Bombay, Madras, Central Provinces and Orissa may be formed separately. The idea will be clear if you have before your eyes a map of India. We must, in the meantime, push on vigorously our missionary activities in Bihar and UP and also Assam. May I hope that all the leading Muslims of the land will give my humble suggestion the deep consideration that it deserves?"<sup>51</sup>

Whether offered as an original idea or as an amendment to Latif's proposal, Asadullah's suggestion was more logical than Latif's and would have given the whole of north India to the Muslims; but it was equally impracticable. It would not have pleased Latif because it ran counter to his plan to retain Hyderabad as a Muslim region. Both men prescribed a huge transfer of population across vast distances. Of course, Asadullah's scheme would have



brought much advantage and satisfaction to the Muslims by giving them nearly half of India in one large, contiguous whole. With so much territory under their occupation, and with the entire Muslim population living in it, perhaps the federal centre would have taken a shape more acceptable to the Muslims, for it would have corresponded to a meeting-ground of two equals rather than an uneasy alliance between two unequal communities. But there was no chance of its acceptance by the Congress or the British. Confronted with the question if this was really too great a price to pay for the unity of India, the Hindus would probably have replied that their strength and numbers were enough to guarantee the continuing unity of the country without the necessity of making any concessions to the Muslims. The suggestion for an exchange of Kashmir for Hyderabad made sense to some Hindus,<sup>52</sup> but otherwise Asadullah's plan did not attract any attention from Muslim or Hindu circles.

## NOTES

1. Jawaharlal Nehru, *An Autobiography with Musings on Recent Events*, London, 1936. Chapter LVI deals with the Hindu-Muslim problem.
2. All quotations in the above paragraph are from the Prefatory Note by Nawab Nazir Yar Jung Bahadur to his *The Pakistan Issue*, Lahore, 1943, pp. xix-xxiv. I have also taken the basic facts from him, but not his opinions. Nazir Yar Jung uses extravagant language in praise of Latif, e.g., "who has, from his seclusion in Hyderabad, powerfully affected and indeed given a new turn to Muslim political thought in India" (p. xix); he was regarded by "the Muslim intelligentsia all over the country. . . as a scholar and critic of outstanding merits" (p. xx); his address to the Muslim Culture Society "created a stir in every political circle, and raised in the Muslim mind a sense of dignity and pride and of new hopes and new aspirations" (p. xxii); *The Cultural Future of India* "caught the imagination of the Musalmans in particular as nothing else had done before" (p. xxiv); "he has established his position in the country as an institution by himself" (p. xxxv).
3. S.A. Latif, *The Cultural Future of India*, Bombay, 1938, pp. 1-18.
4. Haji Sir Abdullah Haroon, Introduction to S.A. Latif, *The Muslim Problem in India*, Karachi, 1939, p. iii. This is wrongly quoted in Nazir Yar Jung, *op. cit.*, pp. xxiv-xxv.
5. Full text was pub by *The Statesman* and *TSI* of 30 March 1939; a brief summary had already appeared in *CMG*, 19 March. *IAR* 1939, Vol. I, pp. 366-370, also carried the full text. Latif replied to some of the outstanding criticisms of his plan in a statement issued from Hyderabad and pub by *CMG*, 7 May 1939.
6. S.A. Latif, *The Muslim Problem in India*, pp. 1-3.
7. *Ibid.*, pp. 4-9.
8. *Ibid.*, pp. 10-12. Italics in the original.
9. *Ibid.*, pp. 13-18. Latif's italics.
10. *Ibid.*, pp. 19-22.
11. *Ibid.*, pp. 23-29. Emphasis in the original.
12. *Ibid.*, pp. 30-38.
13. *Ibid.*, pp. 39-50.

14. S.A. Latif to Rajendra Prasad, 12 January 1940, Nazir Yar Jung, *op. cit.*, pp. 29-36.
15. Abdullah Haroon to S.A. Latif, 5 January 1940, *ibid.*, pp. xxv-xxvi.
16. Quoted in *ibid.*, p. xxvi.
17. H.J. Fells, "Indian Moslem Plans", *The Empire Review*, July 1939, p. 38.
18. Nazir Yar Jung, *op. cit.*, pp. 68-72. Latif does not mention the date on which this note was sent to the Foreign Committee.
19. *Ibid.*, "A Broad Outline of the Union or Commonwealth of India", pp. 50-57.
20. *Ibid.*, Nazir Yar Jung's introductory note to Section V, p. 101.
21. *Ibid.*, p. 101.
22. S.A. Latif to M.A. Jinnah, 16 May 1941, *ibid.*, pp. 102-103. Italics in the original.
23. *Ibid.*, "Constitutional Plan for India: Dr. Syed Abdul Latif's Circular addressed to Select Leaders of the Congress and the League", pp. 104-107. Italics in the original.
24. *Ibid.*, p. 106.
25. Rajendra Prasad to S.A. Latif, 22 May 1941, *ibid.*, pp. 107-110.
26. S.A. Latif's statement issued from Hyderabad Deccan, 2 October 1942, *ibid.*, pp. 144-146. The word "sovereign" bears italics in the original. The date is not correct because the statement is supposed to be a commentary on a speech delivered at Caxton Hall, London, by L.S. Amery, Secretary of State for India, on 29 October. One of the two dates given is certainly wrong.
27. Foreword by S.A. Latif, *ibid.*, pp. vii-xvii.
28. *TMM*, editorial, 6 October 1938.
29. *The Statesman*, editorial, 30 March 1939.
30. J.L.C., letter, *ibid.*, 31 March 1939.
31. Our Indian Observer, "Political Comments", *ibid.*, 2 April 1939.
32. M.R.T., letter, *ibid.*, 20 April 1939.
33. Shamsuddin Ahmed Mumtaz, letter, *TSI*, 4 May 1939.
34. *TSI*, editorial, 5 May 1939.
35. Alakh Dharl, "Moslem Plan for Federation viewed from a

- Hindu Standpoint", *The Statesman*, 16 May 1939.
36. Syed Sajjad Husain, letter, *ibid.*, 26 May 1939.
37. Abdullah Yusuf Ali, "The Muslims of India, the War, and the Political Field", *Asiatic Review*, April 1940, pp. 226-239.
38. F.K. Khan Durrani, *The Meaning of Pakistan*, Lahore, 1946 rep, pp. 120, 121, 122.
39. Jawaharlal Nehru to S.A. Latif, 25 December 1939, Nazir Yar Jung, *op. cit.*, pp. 19-23.
40. Jawaharlal Nehru to S.A. Latif, 6 March 1940, *ibid.*, pp. 37-38.
41. S.A. Latif to Jawaharlal Nehru, 10 January 1940, *ibid.*, p. 26.
42. Quoted in S.A. Latif to Rajendra Prasad, 12 January 1940, *ibid.*, p. 36.
43. Rajendra Prasad to S.A. Latif, 22 May 1941, *ibid.*, pp. 107-110.
44. See S.A. Latif to Rajendra Prasad, 11 June 1941, *ibid.*, pp. 110-112.
45. Rajendra Prasad to S.A. Latif, 9 July 1941, *ibid.*, p. 113. However, Rajendra Prasad had actually made a detailed criticism of the Latif Scheme before writing this letter; see his *Pakistan*, Bombay and Calcutta, September 1940, pp. 41-50. He again studied the scheme in his *India Divided*, Bombay, 2nd ed June 1947, pp. 192-194.
46. See *IAR 1938*, Vol. II, pp. 48-52.
47. B.G. Kaushik, *The House that Jinnah Built*, Bombay, June 1944, pp. 117-118.
48. Virendra, *Pakistan: A Myth or A Reality*, Lahore, 1946, p. 8.
49. Rezaul Karim, *Pakistan Examined*, Calcutta, 1941, see pp. 7-17; this passage is on p. 12.
50. Asadullah, letter, *TSI*, 4 April 1939.
51. Asadullah, letter, *ibid.*, 22 March 1939, as enclosed in his letter to me of 3 November 1969.
52. On this Gulshan Rai commented: "If I were in the position of the Maharaja of Kashmir, I would at once accept this exchange of territories. It would be more advantageous to the Hindu Maharaja than to the Muslim Nizam" ("Communal Zones in India", *CMG*, 23 April 1939).

# 10

## THE GOAL MARKED OUT: 1939

In order to deal together with all the schemes put forth by Sayyid Abdul Latif we traversed several years in the last chapter. Now we must get back to 1939 to maintain our chronological continuity. However strange it may appear, we do not hear a general debate about partition even in 1939, when so many proposals for a partition were produced and when the Lahore Resolution was only months away. Let us look very briefly at the climate of opinion in these twelve months.

### The Year 1939

The fear of Hindu rule was, as ever, the theme of all talk. These fears were difficult to put into words, said the *Statesman*, but "at bottom we think what Moslems are resolutely opposed to is a purely democratic Constitution based on majority rule".<sup>1</sup> An anonymous Muslim columnist of Lahore went further and demanded the creation of two Muslim states in the north-west and the north-east. These "separate national States" would be "far stronger numerically than any other existing Muslim State and likely to develop in course of time into first-class powers". He added that "no true Muslim, however great and tempting the allurements the Congress may offer him, will ever agree to accept the Congress political system and to lose his separate political and religious identity for the sake of a bigger India where Hindu interests will flourish at his expense".<sup>2</sup> Another Muslim, writing in a non-Muslim League paper, told his readers that the only right step to take was for them to declare themselves a nation (*qawm*) and then to demand an independent state on the basis of the right of self-determination.<sup>3</sup>

But the Hindus were not prepared to listen to any talk about

partition. Some of them suggested changes in the boundaries of Muslim provinces, but no more. For example, Gulshan Rai of Lahore was in favour of joining the Sylhet district of Assam with the Bengali Divisions of Chittagong, Dacca and Rajshahi, and making this area into a separate autonomous province. In the north-west, he advocated the separation of Ambala and Jullundhur Divisions from the Punjab, and the amalgamation of the Rawalpindi and Multan Divisions and a major portion of the Lahore Division with the NWFP to form a separate Muslim province. This would solve the Hindu-Muslim problem in Bengal and Punjab.<sup>4</sup>

This was far from what the Muslims wanted. For them the issue was to save the Muslims from being submerged in the Hindu majority from which they differed in culture, civilization, language, script, beliefs and traditions. In the existing circumstances, once they were sucked into Indian nationalism they would no longer remain Muslims.<sup>5</sup> Even some British observers agreed that the two greatest obstacles to the making of an Indian federation were the Congress attitude to the native states and Muslim fears of a Hindu rule.<sup>6</sup>

Muslim ambitions were described by a Hindu chronicler in these words in the spring: "The dreams of recovering the reigns of authority in the State in India which had slipped from Muslim hands are in the consciousness of many Muslims, modern-educated Muslims, realities of today, within the grasp of resolute men. It would be foolish for Indian public men and publicists to shut their eyes to the sinister possibilities of the schemes of federations outlined by Muslim thinkers and public men. These have revived ambitions, provoked particularistic conceits, and stimulated aggressive activities that would result in breaking up the unity and integrity that have been India's from beyond recorded times. Reformers and reactionaries among the leaders of the Muslim community in India appear to be helpless instruments in the hands of forces that are almost elemental in their sweep and violence."<sup>7</sup>

A *Times of India* commentator summed up the Muslim thinking on what he called the "Pakistan scheme" as follows: "The talk of a confederacy of culturally homogeneous units is the direct outcome of the community's state of mind. There is little new in it. It is just a revival of an old idea. The name of the late Sir Muhammad Iqbal was at one time associated with the *Pakistan*



scheme as it was called. The idea is to carve out for the Muslims regional units in which they will be masters of themselves, free to develop their cultural inheritance. Virtually it amounts to a secession of Muslims from present-day India and their formation into autonomous units willing to work together with similar independent Hindu units for common purposes. . . . There is, however, little support for the scheme at the moment outside the Muslim League leaders. It is still in an academic stage, as far as the Muslim leaders are concerned, while others describe it as fantastic, unpatriotic, extra-territorial in outlook and so on."<sup>8</sup>

A Bihari Muslim student leader announced that "a division of India is now the only means left for the Muslim community to live an honourable life in this country where they were rulers for eight centuries".<sup>9</sup> He did not mention any particular scheme, but the newspaper published his statement with the headline "Pakistan the Only Solution".

H.V. Hodson, who played an important part in behind-the-scene constitutional decisions in these years, analysed the Muslim predicament in the May issue of the *Fortnightly Review*. If the Congress-dominated federal centre materialized, he said, the Muslims would see "looming ahead that rule of the Congress which the Muslim League stalwarts identify with the detested 'Hindu raj'". They said they would fight it, but it was not clear on what front they would fight, or how literally the threat was to be taken. "If physical fighting is to be understood, then the Muslims might do any of three things: they might incite the Muslims in the army to mutiny, or they might stage a general armed uprising among the Muslim population of northern India, or they might plot with tribesmen beyond north-west frontier or with foreign Powers to let down the barriers against the invader (the third alternative would obviously imply the first also). It is extremely doubtful whether the Muslims are determined enough or desperate enough or well enough organized to attempt any of these methods, though they might perhaps invoke sporadic and isolated outbreaks of trouble. Nor is it out of the question that when the Hindu *raj* was once established, and British power had melted away from India's internal affairs, the Muslim areas in the north-west might attempt a forcible secession from the federal State. Indeed, some people think this highly probable."<sup>10</sup>

The Viceroy seemed to be ignorant of the facts known to his

advisers and assistants. On 19 May he wrote to the Secretary of State for India that Muslims would not be able to do anything and would join the federation. Zetland remarked on this: "I found the Viceroy's view, that the Muslims were in no position to torpedo the Federation scheme, not a little surprising. This was in fact the one major issue on which throughout our association as Viceroy and Secretary of State our judgement was at variance."<sup>11</sup> On 27 June, he wrote to the Viceroy: ". . . it would be difficult to contemplate with satisfaction a Federation which did not include let us say the Punjab and Bengal. Indeed what I had in mind . . . when I spoke of the Muslims making Federation unworkable, was the possibility that the Muslim Provinces might declare that the safeguards provided for their community in the Federation were wholly unsatisfactory and that they were not prepared therefore to enter the Federation on the present terms. I do not see how we could force the Governments of the Punjab, or of Bengal, to enter the Federation if they were determined not to do so."<sup>12</sup>

In May the Pakistan Association of Lahore demanded a separate Muslim federation.<sup>13</sup> Regular Muslim publicists were still coy and shied away from mentioning partition. "Shahed", who wrote a regular column for the *Statesman* and was generally credited with an up-to-date knowledge of the opinions of Muslim leaders, wrote on 16 June: "The Moslem League is pledged to secure the Moslems the fullest protection for their political, cultural and religious rights. If in an 'Independent' India, with the British out of the picture, those rights are in jeopardy, Moslems cannot regard it as independence but worse bondage than the domination of 'imperialist' Britain. Such independence the Moslem League is bound to oppose."<sup>14</sup> What form this opposition would take and what would then be the goal of the Muslims were things which he kept to himself.

In spite of this hesitation to commit themselves on the part of the leaders and their official and unofficial spokesmen, the scheme-makers were busier than ever. Nineteen thirty-nine was truly the year of proposals for a partition of India. As Muslim public opinion veered more and more towards a solution by separation, schemes and suggestions and plans came pouring in from Muslim intellectuals and writers. The fact that the League, far from having a definite scheme of its own, had been asking for suggestions since October 1938 gave a fillip to this search for a

solution. As the year progressed it became clear to everyone that the federal part of the 1935 Act would never become operative and to most observers that the federal constitution was already obsolete. Therefore the conviction grew that a completely new constitutional arrangement would have to be found which fitted the Indian case and dealt once and for all with the Muslim problem.

Re-distribution, re-arrangement, a loose union or alliance, division, partition—these were the directions towards which the scheme-makers now turned their attention. The idea of Muslim separation was an old one and, as we saw in earlier chapters, many proposals had been made in the past on which new recommendations could be based. But so far only Rahmat Ali had put forward a concrete and practicable scheme which stood for a clear division of India. His plan had had immense influence, and the name he gave it quickly won universal currency. In a strange, undefinable, but definite way the Muslims were asking for a Pakistan long before the Lahore Resolution was passed and even longer before the Resolution came to be known as the Pakistan demand. After Rahmat Ali, it was Latif who presented a distinct plan, or rather a series of plans; but his objective was at odds with the current trend towards separation. His insistence on retaining the unity of India and his consistent opposition to the League policy guaranteed that in the circumstances of the time his suggestions would not be acceptable to majority Muslim opinion.

So the search continued. It was as if everyone knew that the sands of time were falling too quickly to afford a long respite. If a solution was to be found, this had to be done without further delay. It was common knowledge that the Muslim League was in the process of reaching a decision. Those who wanted to avert a partition hastened to air their views in order to influence the League. Those who believed that a division alone could lead to freedom were also quick to put their opinion on record, and this with a double purpose. They wanted to throw their weight on the side of the partitioners lest the League might choose anything less than a division; they also wanted to prescribe a solution in the hope that ultimately the League would select *their* scheme for adoption.

This background gives much historical interest to the alternatives which came in quick succession in 1939. But these plans

also possess an inherent significance of their own. They certainly exerted an influence, in some cases positive and in others negative, on the minds of the League leaders. Some of these scheme-makers (like Latif and M.A.H. Qadri) were members of the special Muslim League committee which was charged with the task of examining the various proposals which aimed at bringing security to the Muslims. Others, like Sir Sikandar Hayat, were front-rank statesmen whose ideas could not be rejected out of hand. There is no doubt that collectively these proposals moulded the Lahore Resolution; had they not been made, the League's official demand would certainly have been different from what it actually turned out to be.

Finally, we have another important reason for making a close study of these proposals. They open a unique window on the Muslim thinking of this period. If we were to set out to study the Muslim mind of these days we would not get much information from the public activities of the Muslim League; nor would the public statements of Muslim leaders be very illuminating. Jinnah's negotiations with Congress leaders during 1938 and 1939 were bogged down in controversial, but in the long run significant, details like the representative status of the League and the Congress treatment of Muslim minorities in Hindu provinces. On the other side, his talks with the Viceroy concerned themselves with the severely short-term questions of an indefinite postponement of the application of the federal part of the 1935 Act and with League's involvement in the making of any constitutional plans for the future. These were important issues, and it was imperative that the League views were made clear to other parties. But they gave no clue to what the Muslims were planning for their future. From a long-term point of view, therefore, if there is anything that throws light on contemporary Muslim thinking, it is these proposals and schemes. They reflect the agitation and agony of the Muslim mind. They show that a new spirit was abroad, anxious to find fresh solutions to an old problem. They demonstrate that the search for a secure future was not limited to the followers or sympathisers of the League. They attest to a general and sharp awareness that the conventional moulds of thought had to be broken before a reasonably sure avenue to freedom was discovered.

### Muhammad Sharif Toosy (February)

The first scheme to appear with the opening of the year came from a school master of Wazirabad in the Punjab. *The Tribune* (a Hindu daily of Lahore) of 23 January had carried an article by Razaul Karim, arguing for the merger of all Muslims in the Indian nation and the abandonment of the idea of a separate political existence of the Muslims. Toosy replied to it in the *Eastern Times* of 10 February. India was a heterogeneous sub-continent, inherited by different races and communities, and could not become a single national state. "It must be split up into separate, compact geographical parts where the Muslim minority of 90 millions may be able to hold its own and develop in its own way." The "final solution" of the problem was to divide India into three distinct parts: north-west, comprising the Punjab, Kashmir, NWFP, Sind and Baluchistan; north-east, comprising Eastern Bengal and Assam; and Hindu India, comprising the remainder. In the first two areas, out of a total population of over 80 million, Muslims would number over 66 million or over 75%. Separately each of the two areas would contain about 40 million people, of whom not less than 75% would be Muslim. The rest of India would have a population of 240 million, of which Muslims would number 20 million or less than 10%. "Thus the question of Muslim minority will in this way be reduced to its proper limits and Muslims will find two separate States where they will have unhampered chance of developing their own culture and civilization."<sup>15</sup>

On 24 March, in another article in the same paper, he added: "If the Muslim provinces are reconstituted into Pakistan and Eastern Bengal and Assam and are granted full autonomous powers with the right of secession, the Muslims may agree to join [a] federation at the centre in a transitional period."<sup>16</sup> It will be noticed that in the first article he does not name the two states to be created in the north-west and the north-east; in the second, he calls the north-west state "Pakistan" and the north-east one Eastern Bengal and Assam (the title by which the eastern part of Bengal was known from 1905 to 1911).

### Abdus Sattar Kheiri (February)

In February Dr. Abdus Sattar Kheiri presented his own scheme

for dividing India. He prefaced it with the statement that "it can be said without fear of contradiction that the Indian Muslims are the most compact and harmonious group of persons living anywhere on the face of earth. . . . They have one language, Urdu, understood not only by all the Muslims of India, but also by the large portion of population in Afghanistan, Iraq, Muskat, Aden and Hedjaz". (This was a gross exaggeration). They shared a common early history, a common list of heroes, a common code of morality, common principles of social intercourse, a common feeling of solidarity and unity, and the consciousness of a common aim and a common destiny. "If all these common ties and bonds do not make of the Muslims in India a true nation, what other things do?" Rights of a nation were never safe except in their own hands. The Muslims should be grateful to the Congress for doing its best to create among them the will to form their own state. No agreement or understanding was conceivable between the Congress and the Muslim League. Now nothing was left for the Muslims but to demand their right of self-determination in the provinces and the states where they were in a majority. There should be a separate federation for these areas.<sup>17</sup> No details were mentioned, and no name was given to the projected federation.

### Asadullah (March)

On 22 March came the proposal from Asadullah (already discussed in the last chapter) for dividing India into south and north and handing over the entire north to the Muslims so as to make a compact, large federation of provinces, whose population would be made predominantly Muslim by large-scale migration of Muslims to it from the rest of India.<sup>18</sup>

### Choudhry Khaliquzzaman (March)

Another suggestion made in the same month for a partition of India on religious lines and the creation of two Muslim states was brought to public notice for the first time in 1961, when Choudhry Khaliquzzaman related in his autobiography how he had come to propose it in the course of a conversation at the India Office in London.



Khaliquzzaman and Abdur Rahman Siddiqui were in London in March and on the point of returning home when they read in the daily press that Col. Muirhead, the Under-Secretary of State for India, had just come back from an Indian tour. Khaliq wanted to know the official's impressions, specially about the strength of the Muslim League and the Muslim policy in general. On their request an interview was arranged, and they met on 14 March. On Khaliq's inquiry, Muirhead said: "Yes, I have met your leaders and have heard their case. We have got great sympathy with you but we do not know how to help. You say that the British democracy does not suit you and I see that it does not, but we do not know of any other kind of democracy. We apply the same principles in India which we apply in our own country, and you do not suggest any alternative."

In the words of Khaliquzzaman, "as soon as he finished this sentence, I went up to the map of India which was hanging in his room, and pointed out the two areas, north-west and east, which were Muslim areas and which might be separated from the rest of India. When I returned to occupy my chair he said with a smile: 'Yes, that is an alternative. Have you talked about it to Lord Zetland?'" They had not met the Secretary of State, but now, on Muirhead's assurance that a meeting could be arranged before they left the country, they wrote to Zetland and got an appointment for 20 March, the day before they were to return to India.

The proceedings of the interview should be reproduced as reported by Khaliquzzaman. "Lord Zetland was very cordial and after a few preliminary exchange [*sic.*] of views about the weather I started by giving him a brief survey of the Muslim relationship with the British Government extending over one hundred and fifty years and brought it down to the Government of India Act, 1935. Thereafter I said, 'Now that you are transferring more powers to India, you are doing it in such a manner that one hundred million Muslims might find themselves the slaves of the majority when you have completed the task'. At this stage he interrupted me and made the same remark which was made by the Under-Secretary, namely, 'But you do not suggest any alternative'. It did not require any searching of my brain for I had already suggested the alternative to Col. Muirhead. Therefore, as soon as Lord Zetland raised the question of an alternative, I immediately replied, 'You may partition the Muslim areas from the

rest of India and proceed with your scheme of federation of the Indian provinces without including the Muslim areas which should be independent from the rest.'

Lord Zetland: What would happen to the States?

I: They ought to follow their geographical situation. If they are in the Hindu Zone, they must go with them and if they are in the Muslim Zone they must go with that Zone.

Lord Zetland: What about Defence?

I: For what period, my Lord? If you want to know for the period that you are associated, in some form or the other, with the administration of India there would be no difficulty in the defence of India, because you can use the armies of both these areas, according to your needs. But if you want to know for the period that you are not in any way connected with the administration of the country, then I beg to your Lordship not to put that question to me, for God only knows what would happen to us then.

Lord Zetland: Do you want an answer from me?

I: It would be presumptuous on my part to ask for an answer to this big question just after mentioning it to you. I have brought it to you notice that this is going to be the stand of the Muslims in the next session of the Muslim League. There is ample time for you to think about it."<sup>19</sup>

Zetland's account of this interview, as given in his letter of 28 March to the Viceroy, Lord Linlithgow, confirms Khaliq's narrative. He wrote: "They talked a little vaguely about the Palestine problem and then turned to what they obviously wished to discuss with me, namely, the position of the Muslim community in India in the event of a scheme of federation in accordance with the provisions of the Act of 1935 coming into existence. They spoke very strongly on the question and told me that they did not think that it would be possible for the Muslims to acquiesce in the introduction of the scheme. I asked them whether in these circumstances they had any alternative suggestion of a constructive character to put forward? They replied that they had, and that what they would propose would be the establishment of three or four federations of Provinces and States which would be co-ordinated by a small central body of some kind or another. The whole object of the scheme was, of course, to give the Muslims as great a measure of control at the centre as the Hindus. They were very vague when they came to the details of the scheme, but, I rather

gathered that what was in their minds was a federation of the Muslim Provinces and States in North-West India, a further federation of Bengal and Assam and possibly Bihar and Orissa in the east, and a further federation, or possibly more than one, of the other Provinces and States in the remaining parts of India. It was clear that they had failed to consider the practical difficulties in the way of such a scheme; but, I gathered from them that many Muslims were thinking on these lines, and what they told me confirms to some extent the view which I expressed to you not very long ago to the effect that we should probably have greater difficulty in bringing the Muslims into the Federation than the Congress."<sup>20</sup>

Khaliquzzaman returned to Bombay on 12 May, and he and Siddiqui saw Jinnah in the evening of the same day. They narrated to him the talk that they had had with Muir and Zetland, and "gave him our impression that the British would ultimately concede partition". Khaliq also "gave him my view as to why I had opposed to use the word Pakistan for the scheme. He carefully heard every word of the talk, at times asking me to repeat certain words, and thereafter he said, 'Have you weighed the consequences?' I replied, 'There being no alternative open to us we cannot go on talking on the old basis without any result'. He assured us that he was not opposed to it but it had to be examined in all its bearings."<sup>21</sup> Jinnah's evasive reply will be discussed in chapter 13, when we examine the Muslim League's approach to the idea of Pakistan.

### "A Punjabi" (July)

By far the most comprehensive and far-reaching scheme aimed at furthering and elaborating the idea of Pakistan was published in July 1939 in a book entitled *Confederacy of India*, written by one who chose to call himself "A Punjabi".

First, a few words about the author and how he came to write the book. The pseudonym belonged to Mian Kafayet Ali, who was born in 1902 in a middle-class Rajput family of Batala in district Gurdaspur, now in the Indian Punjab. After taking his B.A. degree from Islamia College, Lahore, in 1926, he joined the Law College in the same city, but was soon compelled to give up his legal studies by the death of his father who was a tahsildar in the Punjab.

In 1928 he secured a subordinate appointment in the office of the Punjab Legislative Council. Sir Fazli Husain, who was his father's first cousin and at this time Revenue Minister in the Punjab, tried hard to get him nominated as a tahsildar, but the British officials in the revenue department postponed matters until Fazli Husain had gone to Delhi as Education Member of the Viceroy's Executive Council. Some time later Kafayet Ali once again tried to get a job in the Punjab civil secretariat with the help of a letter of recommendation from Fazli Husain. He was again disappointed, and was forced to continue in his position in the office of the Legislative Council. During this period, and it was then that he wrote the *Confederacy of India* and other works of the same kind, he was much influenced by the ideas of Iqbal, the debates in the Punjab legislature, his close association with Fazli Husain, the Punjab politics of those days, and the arrogance of the English civilians which had entered his personal experience. He remained a bachelor until 1941 when he married, through the efforts of Hamid Nizami (a journalist of Lahore), a niece of Fatima Begum, a well-known Muslim League worker of Lahore. In 1942 he joined the Inter-Services Public Relations Directorate at the Indian military headquarters in New Delhi, and worked there until 1947. He continued in a similar appointment with the Pakistan armed forces for about a year, and was released in 1948 at his own request. At the time of release he held the honorary rank of a Major.

Between 1936 and 1942 he wrote seven books and pamphlets on the Muslim problem in India and on separation. The earliest book, *Hindustan awr Milliyyat*, was published in 1936; then came five pamphlets between 1939 and 1942: *Pakistan, Pakistan: The Critics' Case Examined*, *Sir Sikandar's Regional Scheme under Searchlight*, *Separation, Socialism and Islam*, and *Separation: A Reply to its Critics*. All these appeared under the pseudonym of "A Punjabi". It was necessary to hide his identity because he was in government employment and could not have been permitted to publish political literature. He borrowed his *nom de plume* from Fazli Husain who had written his pamphlet on *Punjab Politics* under the same pen-name.

After many years he once again put his pen at the disposal of political controversy when in 1955 he wrote several pamphlets in English and Urdu in favour of One Unit, i.e., the decision of the

government of Pakistan to consolidate all the areas of West Pakistan into one province. These were: *West Pakistan: Its Political and Administrative Integration*, *Wahdati Nizam-i-Hakumat*, *One Unit: Palladium of Independence*, *Pakistan in Retrospect and Prospect*, *Consolidation of West Pakistan*, *Financial Advantages of One Unit*, *Nazm-o-Nasq ki Wahdat*, *Pakistan's Defence Potential and Security Problems*, *A Review of the Report of States Reorganization Committee of India*, and *Political Background of Pakistan and its Provinces*. After a silence of 12 years, in July 1967, he again entered the political lists by writing *Shaikh Mujibur Rahman's 6-Point Formula X-Rayed*.

The background of the writing of the *Confederacy of India* is given by Kafayet Ali himself in these words: "Sir Fazli Husain died in 1936. Dr. Iqbal died in 1938. Their deaths caused a dangerous gap in the ranks of Muslim leadership. The loss was acutely felt by the Muslim intelligentsia all over India. It perturbed me too. In that melancholy state of mind I had a dream. I dreamt I was in the company of Dr. Iqbal in the Barkat Ali Islamia Hall, Lahore. In fact it had been converted into a hall of the dead. In it only myself and Dr. Iqbal were alive. A number of dead bodies were laid in two parallel rows and among them I also saw certain Unionist leaders who were still alive. To reach Iqbal who was sitting at the other end of the hall, I had to walk through those two rows of the dead. I sat down by his side on a wooden chair with a wooden seat in front of a wooden table. Without a word to me he placed on the table before me two *tannuri* loaves wrapped in a piece of coarse cloth and a bowl of gravy of potatoes and meat. While I ate he sat silently looking away from me. That was my first and last meeting with Iqbal. During life I had seen him frequently but had never met him. It was perhaps [because] I was in the opposite camp.<sup>22</sup> Strangely enough after that dream Pakistan became an obsession with me. Until then my ideas about it had been nebulous but now they acquired a new lustre and lucidity. The urge they released found expression in *Confederacy of India* and the six pamphlets which followed it. I also became a sworn enemy of the Unionists. I laid aside all my past associations with them and started a campaign of invective against them in a Lahore weekly, *Monday Morning*, edited by Mr. Bedi and Mrs. Freda Bedi jointly. The same dream was also responsible for my dedicating *Confederacy of India* to Dr. Iqbal jointly with Sir Fazli Husain".<sup>23</sup>

On my inquiry about who first suggested the writing of the book and whether anybody had actually asked him to do so, Kafayet Ali wrote to me: "The book *Confederacy of India* was not written on anybody's instance. It was my own initiative and urge which produced it. Nawab Sir Shah Nawaz Khan of Mamdot had agreed to foot the bill of its publication and to distribute it to the public free. I am grateful to him for his generosity. The book was ready for publication by the middle of 1938. The idea was suggested to me by the late Ch. Rahmat Ali's writings and I developed it to an extent to which no one had done earlier."<sup>24</sup>

When the book was ready in manuscript, Kafayet Ali approached some leaders for help in its publication and free distribution. In certain quarters his appeal met with an insolent response. One gentleman, who later became an important personage in independent Pakistan, "pushed a waste-paper basket with the toe of his shoe towards me to consign the manuscript of the *Confederacy of India* into it when I called upon him to request him to arrange for its publication".<sup>25</sup> After several such rebuffs, finally Seth Abdullah Haroon of Sind and the Nawab of Mamdot offered to bear the cost of the publication. Though the first offer had come from Haroon, Mamdot's argument that "the Punjab had a preferential right to the honour of serving the Muslims in this respect" prevailed, and the book was financed and published by him. Throughout the writing of the book Kafayet Ali had received much moral support from Haji Rahim Bukhsh. Dr. Muhammad Din Taseer and his wife revised the manuscript. Ghulam Rasul Mehr and Dr. S.M. Akhtar (later Professor of Economics at the University of the Punjab and at that time on the staff of the Islamia College, Lahore) made valuable suggestions, while Mrs. Akhtar outlined the maps contained in the book.<sup>26</sup>

When the book had been printed, copies were sent out with the compliments of the Nawab of Mamdot and with a covering letter from him dated 2 July 1939. The contents of this letter deserve some notice because Mamdot was at that time the most prominent Muslim League leader of the Punjab and one of the few men of his day to have the complete confidence of Jinnah.

Mamdot declared a complete rejection of the constitution laid down by the 1935 Act, and expressed his belief that its non-acceptance by the Hindus was "only a stunt to force the British Government to make such changes in it as may remove the few



safeguards that exist under the present scheme for the minorities". The native states, too, were opposed to the federal constitution. This led him to think if there could be a scheme which would appeal to the British Government, the Muslims and the princes. He saw no point in trying to please the Congress or the Hindus in general, because "no scheme, howsoever reasonable, would be acceptable to them so long as it does not promise to establish absolute Hindu Raj in India". He commended the scheme propounded in the book by saying that "by such a partition the Muslim provinces and the Indian States will become immune from the crushing political influence of the all-powerful Congress at the centre". He added that "such a Confederation will safeguard the interests and rights of all parties without breaking the geographical unity of the Indian sub-continent". He saw two main advantages in the suggested arrangement. It would remove the domination of the Hindus at the confederal centre, thus making for Muslim security. Moreover, the re-adjustment of some of the boundaries of the Muslim provinces would, on the one hand, reduce the communal problem to manageable proportions and, on the other, decrease the political influence which the local non-Muslim minorities unduly exercised. In the end, in an obvious effort to win the sympathy of the Muslims of the Punjab Unionist Party, the Nawab reminded the readers that the views expressed in the book had had the blessings of the late Sir Fazli Husain, the founder and guiding spirit of the Unionist Party.<sup>28</sup>

During and after the writing of the book, Kafayet Ali expressed his views in several articles published in Muslim English-language newspapers.<sup>29</sup> In one of these, published in February 1939, he summarized the evolution of the idea of separation. He said that all schemes aimed at creating a single Hindu-Muslim nation and instituting lesser control by the centre would ultimately prove failures. The Muslims would have to seek refuge in separation. "This is the only harbour which is open to them. They should better enter it at once instead of wandering into it after a criminal wastage of national time and energy." The idea of separation was not a new discovery made in the heat of the moment; it went back to the time of Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan. "The ideal of seeking union with the Hindus is a physical impossibility, for the Hindus seek unity and not union with the Muslims. By unity they understand complete oneness with them, that is complete absorption of

the Muslims by the Hindus."

Iqbal had read the Indian political situation in its true perspective. "He alone arrived at the right conclusion, namely, their complete separation, and not their union, was the proper remedy of the complicated political situation in India. He suggested this remedy to the Muslims but they criticized him harshly and called the ideal of separation as presented by him as impracticable and unsound. They little realized, at the time they were criticizing him, that they were not finding fault with the ideal but only doubting their own ability to achieve it. This ideal is not a physical impossibility. It is neither abstract nor unsound. It is also not a logical incongruity. If to some Muslims it appears impracticable, it is not because of any inherent defect in it but because of their own debility as a nation. This ideal has developed regularly through various stages, and we find that all through the period of Indian political history of modern times, the Muslim thought has been subconsciously working up to it and evolving it. In itself it is perfect. What is required is that an intellectual revolution must precede it among the Muslims".<sup>30</sup>

### Confederacy of India

After this general background, we can now proceed to give a summary of the arguments and suggestions put forward in the *Confederacy of India*. Throughout this section I have tried to convey Mian Kafayet Ali's views in his own words and, in order to make the account readable, quotation marks and footnotes have been avoided as far as it was possible.

The fundamental question is: what is the aim of Muslim politics in India? The answer is twofold: to maintain the integrity of the Muslims as a separate community and to ensure their economic welfare. The first depends upon keeping intact the four constituents of their separate existence: their faith (that is, Islam), their civilization, their culture, and their languages. The second can be secured by legislation, and pacts between Muslims and non-Muslims, with a view to checking the latter from accumulating all the wealth and the means of production of the country in their own hands. But ultimately the securing of economic interests serves merely as a means for the achievement of cultural ideals. After a community has satisfied its primary needs, it tends to seek

self-expression through the realization of cultural and religious ideals dear to it. The main object of Muslim politics is, therefore, to safeguard the separate existence of the Muslims as an independent community for the sake of their cultural and religious values.

Legislation and pacts may help an economically weaker community in securing its economic interests against an economically stronger community, but they can never become a guarantee against the subtle influence which the culture of the latter continuously exercises on the former. So far the Muslims have been trying to secure their economic position as well as cultural interests through legislation and pacts concluded with the Hindus. But these methods have failed. They do not hold out any prospects for success in the future. After this failure the only alternative left to the Muslims is that of separating themselves from Hindu India.

So far four schemes have been formulated by different Muslim individuals, all to a greater or lesser degree based on the principle of separation. The first is the Latif scheme, which from the theoretical point of view is perfect but on the practical side is open to serious objections. It involves an exchange of population which will affect at least two-thirds of the total population of India. It ignores the fact that, India being climatically so diverse, the climate of one region may not suit the migrants from another. Indian revenues will not be large enough to finance this exchange of population. By retaining the identity and status of the native princely states and by contemplating a transfer of population between British Indian areas and native states, the scheme creates a morally dubious situation in which a people so far governed by the democratic principle would have to pass under autocratic rule. It includes certain Hindu-majority areas in the proposed Muslim zones, which is not only against the principle of democracy but against the reality of the situation in so far as the Congress and other Hindu parties will never agree to it. By a complete withdrawal of the Muslim population from Hindu zones, it will stop the further spread of Islam in India. In the north-west zone, the line of demarcation drawn in the scheme will leave the canal heads of some important irrigation projects of the Punjab in the adjoining Hindu zone. Thus some features of the Latif scheme are not practicable, while others have no moral justification.

The second scheme is the one generally known as the Regional Federation scheme and usually attributed to some dignitaries of

the Punjab Unionist Party. It includes the Muslim-minority tracts of the Punjab in the north-western regional unit. This will mean the retention of a permanent element of friction within our body-politic. Further, it is apologetic in nature and fails to remove or even reduce the difficulties which are facing the Muslims at present.

The proposal brought forward by Asadullah assumes a large-scale exchange of population which is not a practical proposition. Like the Latif scheme, it is "aggressive" and lacks moral justification.

The fourth scheme is a combination of the tripartite confederation of three federations (proposed in the *Confederacy of India*) and the improvement upon it suggested by the Nawab of Mamdot. This will result in the creation of five federations in India: the Indus Regions' Federation, the Hindu India Federation, the Rajistan Federation, the Deccan States' Federation, and the Bengal Federation. To translate this scheme into reality, only some provincial boundaries will have to be altered. It has several merits. It is simple and can be carried out without much difficulty. It involves no injustice to any party. It promises to restore the balance of communal powers without being in any way aggressive. It ensures Muslim cultural and economic interests against all dangers at the hands of the Hindus. And it simplifies politics on both sides.

The principle of a confederation of federations may be novel and unprecedented in history, but it is not impracticable. Strange maladies yield to stranger remedies. The political problem of India is unique, and therefore the solution must also be unique.

But confederation depends upon the will of the parties concerned. If one party does not agree with the confederation plan, it has no moral right to stand in the way of the others if they seek complete separation of their regions. Self-determination in their own regions is the birth-right of the Muslims. Constitutionally and morally no power can deprive them of this right. If the Hindus object to the confederation scheme, the Muslims will have no alternative to demanding complete separation. And if the Hindus oppose such separation, the Muslims will be within their rights in going to all extremes and in trying all methods open to them to achieve it.

The scheme of confederacy is based on the principle of

separation, yet it avoids the disintegration of India. It is a defensive measure, not an offensive step against the Hindus. It does not mean breaking up the geographical unity of the sub-continent by tearing it up into pieces and assigning them to the communities on population and cultural bases. It simply means an internal partition, effected between the various members of a joint family without breaking their mutual bond of relationship. Consequently, separation means assigning different parts of the sub-continent to different communities on a cultural basis and their reunion in a confederacy. The purpose of separation in this sense is not division but union, to be achieved by simplifying the present complicated political situation, in which each community is too much in the way of the other's cultural and economic progress.

But if the scheme of a confederacy fails because of Hindu opposition, Muslims should demand complete separation as their right and not as a favour that may depend on the good wishes of anybody. In that case they should be prepared to separate their regions without maintaining any link between them and Hindu India.<sup>31</sup>

All attempts to build up a national India rest on a wrong assumption, namely, that India constitutes one country and Indians form a single nation. The very presence of communalism shows that Hindus and Muslims are not one nation, but two nations. And since all past and present attempts to suppress communalism have miserably failed, we cannot expect that some future day shall see the communities united into a single nation. Communalism is the violent expression of the general will of the two communities that they are two different entities and that they must separate.

The accident of the conquest of India by the British cannot be pleaded as an argument for the existence of one Indian nation. Subjugation of two or more nations to another nation can never make them a single nation, even if the conquering nation, for its own convenience, may call them as one people. European precedents should open British eyes to this truth. Austria and Hungary had remained united under the Hapsburgs from 1526 to 1918. The statesmen who decided to break up the political unity of the Austro-Hungarian Empire knew very well that the various races which inhabited it had lived together for centuries as one people, and were also uniform in respect of the system of laws which governed them and the culture and religion which they followed.

These different races had in fact more in common with one another than Muslims and Hindus have in India. In spite of this Austria-Hungary was dismembered in order that each of the races might have a separate home. Similarly, in the Baltic block, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Poland and Lithuania became independent national states after the first World War, although prior to it they were treated as mere minorities.

The Muslims fail to understand why such European precedents, well known to British statesmen, were not followed in the case of the Muslim north-west and Muslim Bengal at the time of deciding their destiny and linking them with Hindu India in an all-India federation. Why was the democratic principle of self-determination, so much applauded in the West, not adhered to in the East when the future of the Muslim regions of India was at stake?

Of course, the British could not do much for the minorities scattered all over India. But the extension of the federal scheme to regions which were definitely Muslim in population and character is incomprehensible. The Muslim regions of the north-west and of Bengal could easily have been constituted as separate states. It was forgotten that in each of these regions the Muslims formed separate nations, and that in respect of area and population they stood comparison with some of the biggest states in Europe and Asia. There is no precedent in the modern world of a nation that has been converted into a minority community by its inclusion in another nation numerically stronger than it.

In the past Hindus and Muslims lived together in India in the same way as the English are living with them today. Does the Englishmen's living together with the Hindus and Muslims in India make them nationally one with the latter communities, or will it make all three of them a single nation if India happens to be conquered by another nation, say the Japanese or the Germans? Similarly, if the British were to annex Afghanistan to their Indian Empire, it would not make the people of that country a single nation with the Hindus of India. There are several examples in the history of the modern world where minorities, even smaller than the Muslims of north-western and north-eastern India, were provided with homelands and granted the right of self-determination. The myth of a single Hindu-Muslim nation in the Indian sub-continent is unprecedented in the history of the modern world.<sup>32</sup>



A study of the principles of nationalism in their application to India shows that every element that goes into the formation of a nation is missing, except a common country and the yoke of foreign rule.

The racial differences in India are so glaring as to need no comment. A Bengali, a Punjabi and a Marwari cannot be put into the same category, however loosely we may define race. Ethnologically the Indian population is so diverse that the general claim of the Indians that they are pure Aryans cannot be admitted. Racially India is anything but one.

At present three civilizations prevail in India: Hindu, Islamic, and Western. Each of them is hostile to the other. Some educated classes among both Hindus and Muslims have adopted Western values and mores, but it is evident that the influence of the West is only skin deep. Hindu culture is based on the Hindu social system, the most prominent feature of which is the institution of caste which does not admit of equality between man and man. On the contrary, the underlying principle in both the Islamic and Western cultures is the equality and brotherhood of man. The culture of the West is very near to that of Islam, but it has become too materialistic to attract the Muslims. Hindu culture finds nothing valuable in the Islamic or Western. In any case the Western system of values is an importation in India, and is incapable of serving as a link between Hindus and Muslims. And neither of the Indian communities is in a position to go over to the cultural *milieu* of the other. Thus cultural unity is not only non-existent in India, but is a dream which will remain unfulfilled.

The language problem is even more serious in India. Almost every province has a tongue of its own. This not only presents difficulties so far as Hindus and Muslims are concerned, but also poses a grave problem among the Hindus of different provinces. The Bengali Hindu is not ready to accept Hindi as the state language. The Madras Hindu has already formed an Anti-Hindi Language. The diversity of opinion regarding the question of an Indian *lingua franca* is creating divisions and disturbances among the socially and religiously homogeneous Hindus. The problem is absolutely insoluble as far as the Hindus and the Muslims are concerned, for there is nothing common between their religions and cultures.

The Hindi-Urdu controversy may on the surface appear to be

one about scripts. In fact it goes much deeper. Hindi literature, which is the expression of Hindu culture, is published in the Nagri script with which the Hindus have cultural and historical associations. Urdu literature, which is the expression of Islamic culture, is published in the Persian script. The adoption of one script against the other will help the cause of the culture it represents. The decision of the Congress to recognize both scripts does not settle the question: in fact, it amounts to an admission that the two communities are in reality two different nations and that their cultural differences cannot be obliterated.

Above all there is the clash between the two religions. Islam and Hinduism are so far apart that the principles of one are a negation of the other. Whereas Hinduism is flexible, conciliatory and vague, Islam is rigid, uncompromising and clear-cut. There cannot be any "approach" between the two. Hinduism has been able to absorb other religions of Indian origin whose followers were culturally similar to the Hindus. But it cannot accommodate any religion of foreign origin, like Islam or Christianity. Moreover, the numerical strength of the followers of these two religions is so large that no solution can be found in the wholesale conversion of one group to the other.

Some people think that Hindu-Muslim relations will improve by the spread of education. By this they mean either of two things. Education will remove the ignorance of the common man, and with it the chances of his being exploited by the interested persons with the object of straining his relations with the followers of another religion. Or, education will mean complete Westernization, so that the communities will sink their differences and become uniform; the factors which create discord between them, namely, their religions and cultures, will disappear. The argument assumes that adherence to religion and culture amounts to ignorance, so that education, in the sense of making them non-religious and weaning them away from their particular culture, will improve their relations.

On the other hand, complete Westernization is physical impossible, and no hope of improvement can be put in this development. No matter how much the Hindus are Westernized, they will continue to be Hindus. The present tendencies among them show that they want to adopt only the political ideas and creeds of the West and nothing else. Different cultures, creeds and

religions have swept over India in the past without bringing about any change in the outlook or values of the Hindus. As far as the Muslims are concerned, further Westernization will in the beginning create among them a revulsion against Islam, which will in reality be against the Islam of the *mulla*, for in real Islam there is nothing which could be said to be against the ideal human nature or nature in general. This superficial wandering away from Islam will in reality be their discarding the Islam of the uneducated *mulla* class. Education will be able to help to deepen their understanding of true Islam. And the more they understand the Islam of the Quran the more they will try to keep away from the Hindus. Hence the hope that the spread of education or the influence of the West will bring the two communities closer is illusory.

The Islamic conception of nationality (*millat*) is quite different from that current in the West. It rests on certain definite beliefs about the ultimate end of life and the nature of the universe, participation in the same historical tradition, and the sentiment of fraternity based on the idea that all Muslims, wherever they happen to be, are members of the society founded by the Prophet. They are in relation to one another equal as brothers, and, in relation to their God, His servants. This conception is non-racial and non-spatial. The bond of Islamic nationality is further strengthened by Islamic civilization, which is a product of cross-fertilization of the Semitic and Aryan ideas and represents the characteristics of both the parents. Islam produces a particular type of individual. This stamp of Islam on their character is borne by all Muslims and distinguishes them from all non-Muslims. The Muslims all over the world are therefore a single nation, just as the Jews are a single nationality whether they be German, Russian or English. The concept of forming a common nation with the Hindus or any other non-Muslim people is, therefore, quite alien to the Muslim mind.

Both Hindus and Muslims have participated in making the history of India for the last one thousand years. Yet their traditions and heroes have always been different. The defeats of one have been the victories of the other. What one has registered as a wrong against the other, the other has recorded as its brilliant success. The strength and tenacity of this antagonism are reflected in the fact that the periods of their friendly relations have been forgotten while the incidents of mutual hostility are remembered.

Shivaji and Awrangzeb always remain in their minds, while Akbar and Todar Mall are figures that only exist in history books. This is an index to the ineffaceable enmity existing between the two communities.

In spite of living side by side for so long in the same country their economic interests are not the same. In the north-west, the Hindus are the capitalists and the Muslims wage-earners. The interests of the Muslims are mainly agricultural, and those of the Hindus mainly industrial and commercial. The Muslims are chiefly the consumers, while the Hindus are either ruddlemen who sell foreign goods or mill owners who market their finished product. A protectionist tariff may be ruinous to the Muslims of the north-west, but very helpful for the Hindu industrialists of the south and the south-east.

There are people who believe that strained Hindu-Muslim relations are due to particular class interests in the communities, and that a unification of India on an economic basis will eliminate this discord. But, will the disappearance of class interests and the achievement of an economic unity bring the two communities to an equal footing in the economic sphere? How will the Muslims achieve this economic parity with the Hindus in the face of so many handicaps and disabilities? Will the Hindus show so much generosity as to allow them to come up to their own standard? Will socialism provide the solution? The fact is that keeping intact our integrity as well as seeking economic equality with the Hindus as members of the same nation are two contradictions which no logic can reconcile. In the process of economic levelling up or down (as the case may be) of the communities, at last a stage will intervene when one community will be the master and the other the subordinate, and no one can say how long this stage will last.

The only thing which is common to the two communities is India, which is wrongly supposed to be one country. The very size and extent of India are an argument against the development of a mutual understanding or a sentiment of nationalism. All efforts of Hindu and Muslim social and religious reformers have been as futile in making one country out of this sub-continent as the political propaganda and endeavour of the Congress during the last fifty years.

One could say that the two communities had at least one common cause to bind them together, viz., gaining freedom from

foreign domination. They have in the past attempted to form a united front against the foreign rulers. But it has been proved that this one uniting factor lacks the force to counteract the influence of disintegrating tendencies caused by other disruptionist elements. Their common grievance against British rule has failed to bring them together.

Histories of other countries may illustrate the principle that subject people always join on the issue of winning freedom, but Indian history proves an exception to this rule. When India was under Muslim rule, the Hindus never made a united effort to become free. There were always Hindu princes who sided with the Mughals or the Afghans in suppressing Hindu rebellions. One reason for this was that the Hindus of one region had no sympathy with the Hindus of another region. One could almost say that the various Hindu regions considered themselves to be separate countries and not parts of the same country. The reality about India is, therefore, that it is not a single country but a sub-continent comprising many countries. As it is not a single country, it does not allow the establishment of that close contact among its people which is possible in other countries. Lack of close contact has resulted in want of mutual understanding and sympathy among the inhabitants of various parts of India. With the development of modern communications and increased intercourse among the various provinces, the Hindus and Muslims have developed separate unities, so that today India contains two different nations instead of one united nation.

The failure of the Hindus and Muslims to stand together against the British becomes easily understandable against this background. The present is determined by the past. When the British conquered India, the Hindus of the regions which had been under the Muslims were happy to get rid of their Muslim rulers. The Muslims of the parts which had been under the Hindus were jubilant on having been saved by the British from the humiliation of living under a people whom they had conquered and ruled for hundreds of years. It is well known how the Muslims of the southern and central India welcomed the British as rescuers from Maratha rule, and those of the Punjab and the frontier applauded the British for vanquishing the Sikhs. With such mutual jealousies, how could the two communities combine against the British? Had there been more occasions like the Jallianwala Bagh, where they were made to

suffer jointly, perhaps their union against the British might have been possible. But as the British seldom give a common cause of complaint against themselves at the same time, it is not possible that the shared cause of gaining freedom would ever erase from their memory the fears which they entertain of each other on account of their past animosities. Foreign rulers of every community-ridden country are always shrewd enough to select only one community at a time for slapping. While slapping one community, they pat the other on the shoulder.

In these circumstances there are only two methods by which the communities can hope to achieve independence. One is to forget the sufferings which they caused to each other in the past and remember only the ills done to both of them by the foreigner. This is impossible because it requires a very long period of inter-communal harmony undisturbed by any outbreak of communal animosity to keep their mind fixed on the common object of driving out the foreign ruler. The other method is that of separation. Let the two communities separate in different regions assigned to them so that they may mutually feel secure against each other. Separation will also help them to forget their past rivalries. The absence of the other community will make for peace.

If separation is not effected, the Hindus and Muslims will either have to submit to perpetual enthrallment to a foreign power or, in the case of their acquiring freedom, to remain under the strain of an unpleasant, everlasting condition of communalism, marked by intrigues and counter-intrigues against each other and a consequent state of fear of once again passing under a foreign rule.<sup>33</sup>

Indian "nationalists" lay much stress on the necessity of separating religion from politics, and on the certainty of achieving Hindu-Muslim unity if this advice is heeded. To the Muslims such counsel is not only unacceptable but disagreeable. They cannot divorce their religion from their politics. In Islam religious and political beliefs are not separated from each other. It speaks of this world as well as of the world to come. Muslims cannot be first Indians and then Muslims or *vice versa*. They are born into a system. The system is not thrust upon them. Therefore Hindu-Muslim unity, signifying homogeneity between them in all non-religious matters, is unimaginable. The idea of a common state with heterogeneous membership is alien to Islam, and can never be fruitful. An all-India federation, no matter how many safeguards and con-



cessions it may carry with it, cannot be a permanent basis of settlement. Unity between the communities will be impossible in a federation, because one of the parties to it cannot separate religion from politics and the other is very strict with regard to matters which relate to its social system. Hence, in their own interests, the two communities will have to separate.<sup>34</sup>

Independence of India means different things to the Hindus and the Muslims. To the Hindus it is a national necessity. They want it for the restoration of national self-respect, and all the other national, social and economic benefits which accrue from it. To the Muslims independence is a religious necessity: it will lead to the achievement of the spiritual and worldly benefits which Islam promises. They want it for the sake of their religious and cultural ideals, for these cannot flourish under foreign rule. Under an alien state or even in a state formed in alliance with a non-Muslim community, the individual's Islamic personality cannot develop because there are no opportunities of self-expression. Only an Islamic state can provide these opportunities.<sup>35</sup>

Separation can be justified on several other grounds, too. The right spirit of Islam cannot be developed or allowed to flourish without hindrance until the Muslims are their own masters. The integrity of Islam will not be safe in India unless the Muslims wield unimpaired political power in those regions which are theirs by numbers.

Nor can the Muslims depend on the Hindus for the protection of their cultural interests. A community which could for centuries enforce untouchability on the Muslims even when the Muslims ruled the land cannot be expected to respect the integrity of the Muslim faith after coming into power. Even today Islamic culture is being endangered by such subtle but powerful means as Hindu-produced films which propagate Hindu cultural values. Apart from this the very contact with the Hindus has produced undesirable effects on Islam. The influence of Hinduism has tainted the beliefs and practices of the Muslims. Three historical factors have combined to produce this outcome: the close contact of the Muslim civilization with the Hindu civilization; the natural affinity which developed between them as a result of this contact; and the fact that Islam won a large number of its followers from Hinduism, who brought with them certain elements of Hindu civilization and who were permitted to retain some of the Hindu usages, customs, traditions and associations.

All the constituents which make the Muslims a separate entity in India have lost their true quality. It is feared that the more Hindu culture is revived the more Muslim culture will become modified and merged into Hinduism. The first to revert to the fold of Hinduism will be the Hindu converts to Islam. In a federated India the Hindus will be able to damage Muslim culture even more seriously than they have so far done. The culture of a politically superior nation often dominates other cultures in the country. The masses unconsciously copy the customs and habits of the dominant community.

In the economic field, too, the Hindus have such a grasping control over every economic activity that the Muslims find it impossible to enter this closed society. All trading and industrial concerns are Hindu. The banks, and the insurance companies from whom they borrow capital, are Hindu. The middlemen who control the marketing of goods are Hindu. Even the great majority of the petty shopkeepers is Hindu. Hindu companies and firms employ only Hindus, just as Hindu mills and factories give jobs to Hindu hands alone. Thus so closely do the Hindus control economic enterprise of every variety that no Muslim efforts to improve their economic position will ever succeed. The Hindu monopoly will continue to flourish, and the Muslim will be permanently relegated to a situation of economic slavery.

In the public services Muslim representation is pitifully inadequate. Efforts have been made to set things right, but little has been achieved. Even in Muslim provinces government employment is almost a monopoly of the non-Muslims. Senior Indian officials, most of whom are non-Muslim, have evolved such techniques of appointment, recruitment, promotion, fixation and revision of salaries, transfer, annual reports, and preparation of seniority lists, that the few Muslims who stray into government service find a bleak future before them.

To sum up, at present the trade and industrial interests of the Muslims are but nominal. In a federated India dominated by Hindu capitalists and industrialists it will not be possible for them to have their proper share in the economic life of the country. Their representation in public services is meager. Their agricultural interests are in danger. In short, no economic or cultural interest of the Muslims is safe. All their interests can be safeguarded only by a separation of their regions from Hindu India.<sup>36</sup>

From the Muslims' point of view the ideal solution of the Indian problem will be one in which their territorial loyalties and their allegiance to their faith find a happy compromise, and their economic and cultural interests are fully ensured through the exercise of absolute political power. This will remove the present division among their ranks, and also the chaos from which their politics have suffered during the last three hundred years. Only the separation of their regions from Hindu India can fulfil this ideal. The proposition is sound and practicable. It is their legitimate heritage to enjoy full state power in all those parts of India where they are in an overwhelming majority. The revival of Islamic culture and orthodox Islam, the betterment of the Muslim masses, and the restoration of their self-respect depend upon their having separate states of their own, whether within or without the Commonwealth of Nations.

The causes of Muslim demoralization and repeated failures of the past can be traced to their loss of power. The one great need of the moment is to focus all attention on the real problem, which is the recapture of political power, at least in their homes. Had they successfully isolated their homes, the north-west Muslim block and Bengal, from alien interference after their downfall in India, they would not have been a disorganized and undisciplined people. There would not have been any clash between their religious and political ideals. Their extension of the conception of motherland even to Hindu parts of India, simply because a small population of their co-religionists happened to live there, has been responsible in a large measure for the confusion and complications of their politics. If they had considered only the far eastern province of Bengal and some portions of Assam and the north-western tract of India as their motherland, and had successfully reserved these parts for themselves, their position would not have been what it is today, and the clash of ideals and loyalties, which dissipated their energies and contributed towards their failures, would not have occurred, and today they would not have found themselves in a cleft stick.

The Hindus and Muslims are two absolutely different entities. Their civilizations are opposed to each other. Their habits and customs, social systems, moral codes, religious, political and cultural ideals, traditions, languages, literatures, architectures, arts and outlook on life are completely different from. nay, hostile

to, one another. Their basic differences, their memories of the past, and their present rivalries form an unbridgeable gulf between them. The only thing common between them during the last few centuries has been the yoke of a foreign rule. As soon as the cord which binds them in common allegiance to a foreign state snaps, they will disintegrate. These factors, as also the experience gained from the failure of unity talks and attempts at concluding pacts, point to the serious necessity of separation.

An all-India federation is bound to be a failure because it is based on the wrong assumption that Hindus and Muslims are one nation. It can never be the solution of the internal problem of India. To agree to be linked with the Hindus in a common federation dominated by the latter for the sake of the Muslim minorities in Hindu provinces, will ruin the cause of Islam and Islamic culture in the Muslim parts of India. It will not guarantee the safety of the Muslim minority and of Islamic culture in Hindu provinces. It may also adversely affect the programme of the Hindus in reviving Hindu culture even in the definitely Hindu provinces, for every attempt by them in this direction will evoke strong protests from Muslims in all parts of India.

Homogeneity is an essential condition for the development of a parliamentary system of government. If we look at the opposing interests and uncompromising elements of which the proposed federal government shall be composed, we can anticipate its failure as certain. Self-government will always remain a distant dream for both communities: if the governor general interferes too much to save minority interests, the majority will have no self-government; if he allows the majority to have its way on all issues, the minority will be deprived of it. Hence it will not be a democratic government, but a despotic one, depending upon the powers of interference of the governor general to save the minorities from the majority. The same will be true of all provincial governments. The Muslims will soon discover that the autonomy of their provinces has been vitiated beyond recognition.

India will never achieve self-government until a new constitution is made based on the real facts of the sub-continent, viz., that it consists of many countries inhabited by various nations, whose interests are opposed to one another. The parts inhabited by homogeneous people should be allowed to set up their own states.

The idea of separation has not been moulded in the heat of disappointment; it has developed over a considerable period of time. The principles of separate electorates and weighted representation indicated a parting of the ways. The logical conclusion to which their acceptance and long practice lead is the complete separation of the communities in different states. Iqbal was perfectly right in arguing that their complete separation was the only proper remedy of the existing political situation.

The idea of separation has been present in the Muslim mind throughout the modern period of history. If to some Muslims it appears impracticable, it is not because of any inherent defect in it but because of their own debility as a nation. In itself the ideal is faultless. What is required is an intellectual revolution which should bring it to the consciousness of every Muslim.<sup>37</sup>

A consideration of the question of possible British reaction to the Muslim demand for separation leads to five conclusions. First, the demand for separation should be made at once without any future delay. Secondly, separation should take place while the British are still ruling India. Once they are gone, the Hindus will never agree to it. Thirdly, the risks of a civil war should be avoided, for an internal upheaval of that proportion will probably throw India into the arms of some new expansionist power. Fourthly, the British will lend their support to the idea of separation with ulterior motives, for their interests demand that they should keep India under their control, whether as one country or as two countries. Lastly, the Muslims should not try to make an alliance with the Congress in order to achieve independence first and demand separation afterwards; for it is possible that the Congress may never wish to sever the imperial link, or it may sever it when it has become strong enough to suppress the Muslim separatist tendency by militarizing Hindu India and reducing the Muslims to an impotent entity half-absorbed by Hinduism.<sup>38</sup>

The Congress will certainly oppose all Muslim demands for separation. It will not like Hindu India to be sandwiched on all sides by Muslim states, even if they happen to be member states of an Indian confederation. It will naturally prefer to have all Muslim zones under its direct control and authority in order to reduce to a minimum the dangers to Hindu India.<sup>39</sup>

The implications and consequences of the formation of a Muslim federation in the north-west should be made clear to the

Muslims of this area. It will be a Muslim state, not the usual Western-style state to which Indian Muslims have become accustomed. It may be a state governed by Islamic law as contained in the Quran. It may mean that the Muslims shall have to purge themselves of all un-Islamic influences which they have contracted during their close association with non-Muslims. It may well require Muslim agriculturists to forego the protection which the Land Alienation Act provides them in the Punjab and the NWFP against expropriation at the hands of the non-agricultural tribes. It may require some Muslim communities of Sind, like the Khojas and Kachi Memons, to give up the Hindu law by which they are at present governed, and some communities of the Punjab to discard customary law in favour of the Muslim law of inheritance. Such things must be told to the Muslims, not to terrify them but to put before them an honest picture of what the future may be like.<sup>40</sup>

It is obvious that the creation of Muslim states in the north-west and north-east will not completely solve the problem of Indian Muslims. After excluding the Hindu areas of eastern Punjab, the Muslim population of the north-western federation will be about 25 million. About twice that number of Muslims will be left in Hindu India. It may well be asked if it will be in the interests of the Muslims as a community that 25 million of them in the north-west should enjoy self-government, while 50 million of their co-religionists should continue to live under Hindu rule. The answer to this is that, in the first instance, we want to separate from India because we are anxious to save as much of the Muslim population and their interests from the danger of Hindu domination in India as may be possible by the method of separation. In the second instance, separation not only denotes the separation of the north-west Muslim block alone but also the separation of all those parts which happen to be predominantly Muslim. It also implies an exchange of population.

The exchange of population between the Muslim western Punjab and the Hindu eastern Punjab will bring over one million Muslims from the eastern part into the north-western Muslim state. Similarly, an exchange between Muslim Bengal (plus some parts of Assam) and Assam, Bihar and Orissa will bring nearly 35 million Muslims into the north-eastern Muslim state. In all, therefore, separation will be able to save about 62 million Muslims



out of the total Indian Muslim population of about 77 million. This will leave nearly 15 million Muslims in central and south India whose withdrawal into Muslim regions is not a practical proposition.

These figures show the huge scale on which the exchange of population will have to be effected if a great majority of the Muslims is to be saved from Hindu rule. Obviously such a gigantic project cannot be undertaken. Therefore separation will have to come without any exchange of population. In that case, with a divided Punjab and a divided Bengal (with the districts of Goalpara and Sylhet of Assam), the two Muslim regions will accommodate over 48 million Muslims: 25 million in the north-west and 23 million in Bengal. This will leave nearly 29 million Muslims in Hindu hands, as compared to 15 million if populations are exchanged. Apart from the fact that this cannot be helped, the presence of such a large Muslim minority in Hindu India will have two desirable results: it will help to restore a balance of communal powers in India, and it will allow Islam the prospects for further proselytism.<sup>4 2</sup>

It is hoped that the Muslims living in Hindu provinces will understand the situation, and will not try to hang round our necks merely in order that they should be kept company in the vortex of a federated India under the domination of the Hindus, who are our rivals culturally as well as economically. They must understand the difference between British rule and the nominal British rule combined with internal Hindu domination or complete Hindu domination. They must realize the dangers to the whole Muslim community and to Islam in an India dominated by the Hindus. With them, in a common federation, we shall be as helpless as they. While out of it, we shall be strong and able to exert our influence in their favour, ready to exchange courtesy with courtesy and ill turn with ill turn.<sup>4 2</sup>

What will be the attitude of the neighbouring Muslim countries to Indian Muslim separation? Afghanistan alone may pose a problem. It had not welcomed the 1935 reforms for India for it feared that the more India became self-governing the more the subsidies paid to Afghanistan by the government of India would be reduced. When a new state is established in the north-west of India there will be no justification for paying any such subsidy. For this reason Afghanistan may not like the idea of Muslim separation in India.

On the other hand, the fact that the new state will be a Muslim state may persuade the Afghans to surrender their self-interest to the cause of Islam in India. They may also derive other advantages from the creation of a Muslim state at their door-steps. The people of Afghanistan should be jubilant at the prospects of a new Muslim state in their close neighbourhood in place of the present non-Muslim colony.

Similarly, the tribal leaders of the frontier who have been in receipt of political allowances from the government of India may not approve of the new state, but their Muslim followers are sure to welcome it.

The other Muslim states, like Turkey, Egypt, Arabia and Persia, will regard the establishment of the north-west Muslim state as the first practical step towards the liberation of Asia from European rule. It will mean to them the dawn of the long-cherished ideal of pan-Islamism.<sup>4 3</sup>

However excellent the arguments in favour of separation, the ultimate question is whether the Muslims will have the ability and courage to reach the objective. Who is going to achieve this ideal for a community which is showing all the signs of exhausted national energy and a defeatist outlook? Can the morale of the Muslims be restored to them? Can they be reclaimed as a people with all the qualities of a progressive nation?

The history of the Muslims during the last 150 years shows that every political movement started by the community was a failure. The Wahabi movement of Sayyid Ahmad Khan, the *jihad* undertaken by Sayyid Ismail Shahid, the mutiny of 1857, the protest about the Cawnpore mosque issue, the Lucknow Pact of 1916, the Khilafat movement with the *hijrat* fiasco, the Mopla rising, the agitation against the Kashmir durbar, the Shahidgunj campaign, the pro-Arab campaign for the liberation of Palestine—all these proved to be futile movements. But it is a fact that on all these issues the Muslim masses gallantly responded to the call of their leaders, supplying funds which they could ill afford, sacrificing their comfort, and courting imprisonment and death. A people who could show such fortitude in bearing the strain of a series of failures with magnificent courage cannot be said to be decadent and past all hope of reclamation. What is required for the flowering of their latent abilities as a people and as a nation is a less complicated political situation, an atmosphere in which their

national energy may work unhampered in moulding their destiny in the way best suited to their national genius. In order that they may go forward, new paths in Indian politics must be discovered and old ones abandoned. It is baffling for any people to be confronted with a multiplicity of problems, like representation in services, clash between agricultural and industrial interests, friction between capital and labour, separate and joint electorates, reservation of seats in legislatures and other elective bodies, preservation of language and script, protection of personal law, etc. This simplification can be brought about only by putting before them one single issue of separation.

To achieve this separation it is also necessary that Muslim leadership should be overhauled so that it springs from amongst the people instead of being thrust upon them from above. The leaders should have no personal interests as distinguished from public interests. They should be able to create among the Muslims a feeling of self-respect and self-importance so as to release them from the pernicious effects of the oppression and defeatism which have been their lot during the last few centuries. They should be able to form a habit of success in the nation. To acquire political power, the masses will have to be trained, organized and disciplined. Further, such Islamic institutions as were set up to make Islam a living force and a successful social, political and economic system will have to be revived.

Such a leadership should not find it difficult to demonstrate that separation is the only solution of our complicated problems. This is the only way in which politics and religion can be assigned equal places in a state, and the division of allegiance between a country and a faith avoided. So far Muslims have been divided over this question. Some have been giving priority to the preservation and propagation of Islam, others to the freedom of the country. This clash between their loyalty to their religion and allegiance to their country has been causing a good deal of confusion in Muslim politics, dissipation of their national energy and disruption in their ranks. The new leadership will bring about a revolution by presenting to the masses the ideal of separation which is a happy compromise between these two schools of thought.

The outlook is not as discouraging as a contemplation of past history makes it appear. The dark clouds on the national horizon are showing a silver lining. The Muslims have begun to realize

that the present complicated situation will but lead them to a blind alley. They want a simple solution to get them out of this predicament. There is a strong desire among them for a saviour. The number of their intelligent is on the increase: this will not only raise the standard of their culture but also facilitate their organization and reform. Instead of being disheartened by past failures, the leadership should take courage from the new spirit of the present. The soul of the Muslims as a nation is not dead. It is alive, and only a little exhausted. Once resuscitated, it is capable of volcanic energy. Once organized and disciplined, the nation can be led into the toughest battles. In the past it has never failed; it is the leaders who have failed them. With new leaders in the van and a new ideal to beckon them, there will be nothing that they will find impossible to achieve.<sup>44</sup>

Now about the details of the areas to be claimed for the two Muslim states. The north-west region will be called Indusstan, after the river Indus, and will contain Sind, Baluchistan, NWFP, Kashmir and a major portion of the Punjab. Here the only item needing attention is the line of demarcation separating Muslim western Punjab from Hindu eastern Punjab.

There is a difference of opinion on this point among the Muslims. Some regard the river Jumna or the ridge separating the plain of the Indus from that of the Ganges as a natural boundary. Others believe in excluding all the eastern Hindu tracts of the Kangra district, some portions of the Hoshiarpur district and the whole of the Ambala division. The first view will of course increase the area of Indusstan, but by bringing into the Muslim state a large number of Hindus it will not really solve the communal problem. The considerable rise of Hindu percentage in our population will be detrimental to our own interests. Such a boundary will not allow us to seek cultural isolation from Hindu India. The sympathy of these Hindus within our frontiers will always be with Hindu India. For these reasons it is safer to accept the second alternative and not to include in Indusstan any area which is overwhelmingly non-Muslim in population.

The existing communal balance in the Punjab is artificially maintained by the make-weight of the Ambala division. Before the British occupation of the Punjab, this division did not form part of the province. In fact, it never ought to have been included in the Muslim province. It is this unnatural link-up which has been

at the root of all communal troubles of the Punjab, making it an Ulster of India.

Another factor should also be kept in mind. Communalism is more rampant in those parts of India where the communities are more or less evenly balanced than where one of them happens to be in an overwhelmingly large majority. It is surprising why the Muslim delegates to the RTC did not ask for such a re-adjustment of the boundaries of the Punjab as would have given them an overwhelming majority instead of the present marginal majority. Perhaps, in view of the promised provincial autonomy, they believed that by maintaining the existing boundaries they would be keeping the Hindus of the province as hostages in their hands for the safety of the Muslim minorities in Hindu provinces. But this was a serious mistake. In all the Hindu provinces the Muslims are weak, economically and numerically, and cannot raise their head against the Hindu majorities. On the contrary, the non-muslim minorities in Muslim provinces are not only numerically strong but also economically superior to the Muslim majorities. Therefore, the non-Muslims in the Muslim provinces can never be treated as hostages against the security of the Muslim minorities living in Hindu provinces. Thus, the exclusion of the eastern tracts from the Punjab will make the position of the Punjabi Hindus in Indusstan to some extent similar to that of the Muslim minorities in Hindu provinces.

The total Hindu population in the Punjab is 5,763,164, out of which 3,171,004 live in the eastern tracts. The total Muslim population is 14,000,000, out of which 1,262,970 live in the eastern tracts. By the exclusion of these areas the population percentage of the Muslims will increase from the present 56.7 to about 66, that of the Hindus will decrease from the present 24 to about 14. The Sikh percentage will actually rise from the present 12.9 to about 15. This small increase will be of no great consequence to the Muslims, though it may bring considerable advantage to the Sikhs.

The present area of the Punjab is 99,265 sq. miles. The area of the eastern tracts comes to 20,196 sq. miles (made up as follows: Ambala division 15,113, Kangra district 3,882, and Una and Garhshankar 1,201). After their exclusion the Punjab will have an area of 79,069 sq. miles.

Some people may argue, now or in the future, that an exchange

of population should take place between the Punjab and the separated Hindu tracts. This will save the Muslims of that area from Hindu domination. Another healthy result will be a further rise in the percentage of Muslim population in the Punjab, which may be from 66 to 70. But exchange of population is not in the interests of Islam and should not be favoured.

One objection that may be raised against this fixation of boundaries is that it would leave Muslim historic buildings of the Delhi area in Hindu India. But, as has been stated above, the expansion effected by extending Indusstan to the Jumna will be disastrous to the consolidation of the Muslim north-west. By retaining the root-cause of communalism, such an arrangement will mean the loss of the real purpose of separation. It is much better to forego our claims to Delhi and its suburbs than to accept such an evil as may lead to dire consequences. Moreover, many other buildings of world renown, like the Taj Mahal, cannot be included within our boundaries, and for their sake we cannot agree to delay the fulfilment of Islamic ideals. In order to possess a few historic buildings we should not try to weaken our majority, and consequently our power, at home.

With the question of the Punjab boundary settled in this way, the Indusstan federation will be constituted by the following regions: the Punjab (minus the eastern tracts), NWFP, Sind, Baluchistan (with its agency and state territories), Kashmir, Bahawalpur, Khairpur, the northern states of Amb, Dir, Swat and Chitral, Kapurthala, and Malerkotla. The total area of Indusstan will be 398,838 sq. miles. The total population will be about 33,000,000; the community-wise percentage being, Muslims 82, Sikhs 6, and Hindus 8. The total length from north-east to south-west will be about 1,400 miles, the greatest width from south-east to north-west about 700 miles, and the smallest width about 300 miles. The total coast-line will stretch to nearly 900 miles.<sup>45</sup>

In Bengal the following sub-divisions are predominantly Muslim: Dinajpur, Rangpur, Malda, Bogra, Rajshahi, Murshidabad, Pabna, Mymensingh, Nadia, Jessore, Faridpur, Dacca, Tippra, Noakhali, Bakargunj, Khulna, and Chittagong. Their combined area is about 50,472 sq. miles. The adjoining districts of Goalpara and Sylhet in Assam, which are predominantly Muslim, stretch over 9,292 sq. miles. The total area of these two comes to 59,764 sq. miles. Tripura, other native states in political relation with



the Bengal States Agency, Eastern Bengal and the predominantly Muslim Assam can set up their own federation. The total area of this federation will be about 70,000 sq. miles, and its population will be nearly 31,000,000. In the provincial unit of Muslim Bengal there will be 20,500,000 Muslims and 10,100,000 Hindus.

In case it is found necessary to effect an exchange of population between Muslim Bengal and the neighbouring Hindu provinces, it will not present any insurmountable difficulties because the distances intervening between them are not prohibitive.

It is hoped that the Bengal and Assam Muslims, realizing the gravity of the situation, will try to stand on their own legs and themselves find the way of escape from Hindu supremacy. We can only suggest to them the way to escape, and if it suits their purpose, as it does ours, both of us can join hands and fight for it. If the Muslims of Bengal and Assam feel that separation will help them they should press its necessity on the attention of those who happen to be in control there. Instead of trying to make a common cause with the Muslims of the Indus region (separated from them by two thousand miles) against the Hindus in a common federation, it would be better and more practical for Muslim Bengal and Assam to fight their own battle and demand their exclusion from an India federated under the 1935 constitution. There is no reason for their not trying to establish a state of their own, separately from Hindu India. Their case is almost analogous to that of the Muslim north-west, except that they lack contiguity with Muslim States, unlike the latter. (The meaning of this is not clear. Is the reference to Muslim princely states, like Kashmir and Kalat and Las Bela, or to independent Muslim neighbours, like Persia and Afghanistan?) But they are at the same time not bound on both sides by Hindu regions. They have a good sea-coast and a first class harbour. In minerals they are richer than the north-west.

Thus the north-eastern region has some clear advantages if it makes up its mind to separate from Hindu India. It will not lose anything by secession. But, on account of our limited knowledge of the local conditions, we are not in a position to discuss questions relating to its separation. It is the business of the Muslims of that area, who have first-hand information of the circumstances obtaining there, to explore the possibilities of their exclusion from Hindu India.<sup>46</sup>

There is little doubt that the existence of the Muslims in India

as an honourable and self-respecting people is impossible without separation. To achieve it they will have to fight without getting dismayed by the difficulties that stand in the way.

The first thing to do for the realization of this ideal is to organize themselves strongly under the aegis of a political party which should have a two-fold policy. It should safeguard the present position of the Muslims, whether economic, cultural or religious; and it should aim at the establishment of a federation of the north-western Muslim block. The latter part of the programme should have five main items: to popularize the idea of separation among the Muslim masses by lectures, speeches, debates and literature; to establish centres all over the Indus region which will undertake the task of popularization; to assist the Muslim separationists in England to carry on the propaganda of separation there, for the constitutional battle for separation has to be fought more in London than in India; to agitate for a re-adjustment of the eastern boundary of the Punjab so as to exclude Hindu tracts from the province; and to send deputations with a view to promoting this point of view to all the provincial governors in the north-western region, the governor general of India, the king, the heads of various native states situated in the north-west, all the Muslim countries of the world, and Japan and other non-Muslim countries who may be sympathetic to Muslim aspirations.

If the Muslims of Bengal and Assam agree to the necessity of separation, they can join hands with the Muslims of the north-west in carrying out a similar programme in respect of their own areas.

It must be made clear that the separation of Muslim regions from Hindu India is not an end in itself, but only a means for the achievement of an ideal Islamic state. Separation will undoubtedly lead to our emancipation from the economic slavery of the Hindus, but as our object is the establishment of an ideal Islamic state, it also denotes complete independence. After independence has been achieved, it will be impossible for us to maintain for long, in an un-Islamic world, our ideal of an Islamic state. Therefore we shall have to advocate a world revolution on Islamic lines, and that must be considered our ultimate ideal.

It has to be realized that while other backward nations are burdened with only political slavery, the Indian Muslims are suffering from a double servitude: political slavery of the British

and economic slavery of the Hindus. In addition they are intellectually backward and are dominated by a severe class system. In the past all their efforts at self-improvement were frustrated by the absence of a middle class among them. Now such a class has come into existence and revived the expiring embers of hope. The masses, who constitute the bulk of the nation, cannot be dragged into line with other nations with a jerk. They have to be raised little by little with patience and perseverance. The first step is to awaken them intellectually, and this can be done only by imparting sound political education. This all-important means of national development has so far been neglected, and it is high time that energies were devoted to this. We should organize a band of selfless political workers with a crusading spirit to undertake this task. Without depending upon public funds, each of these workers should earn his own living so that the group works as an order of political ascetics.

This group should divide itself into three categories according to the duties to be performed. The first should be of writers who will produce literature; the second of preachers who will disseminate the literature among the masses; and the third of organizers who will organize the nation and, by removing decadence, make it a healthy social and political unit.<sup>47</sup>

### Some Minor Misunderstandings

Before scrutinizing the salient features of the Punjabi scheme, it is advisable to remove certain minor misunderstandings.

As the *Confederacy of India* was published pseudonymously, its real authorship has confused several historians. Some ascribe the scheme to the publisher, the Nawab of Mamdot; others make no effort to seek the man behind the pen-name. As the Nawab of Mamdot had a scheme of his own, which was an amended version of the Punjabi scheme and was made public along with it (it is discussed in the following chapter), some writers have failed to distinguish between the two schemes.

Sir Reginald Coupland was the first important historian to recall the Punjabi scheme and connect it with Mamdot in an otherwise remarkably well-informed book. "In the summer of 1939", he wrote in the second part of his Nuffield College report on India, "Nawab Sir Muhammad Shah Nawaz Khan, an eminent

Muslim of the Punjab, published on his own account a booklet entitled *Confederacy of India* and anonymously ascribed it to 'A Punjabi'."<sup>48</sup> Other commentators also confused the publisher with the author. For example, a Hindu author on Muslim politics relied on his imagination and nothing else in saying that "Sir Muhammad Shah Nawaz Khan who in his *Confederacy of India* carved India into five separate states. . .".<sup>49</sup> Another Hindu historian of the Indian Muslims attributed the Punjabi scheme to Mamdot.<sup>50</sup> A recent academic study by an Indian Hindu makes the same mistake.<sup>51</sup>

Muslim references have been no less inaccurate. The revised published version of a doctoral dissertation states that "Mamdot, President of the Punjab Provincial Muslim League, published his scheme, *The Confederacy of India*, in the summer of 1939", and repeats it in the second edition.<sup>52</sup> Another doctoral thesis on the years 1928-40 presents the Mamdot scheme of five federations as the Punjabi scheme.<sup>53</sup> Other writers, including text book authors, attribute the *Confederacy of India* to Mamdot.<sup>54</sup> Foreign experts repeat the inaccuracy.<sup>55</sup>

It is a little surprising to find that no attempt has been made by these students of the Punjabi scheme to identify the man behind the pseudonym. The Pakistani scholars in particular should not have met insuperable difficulties in this search. As far as I can recall, it was in the early 'fifties that *Mah-i-Naw*, an Urdu monthly published by the Government of Pakistan from Karachi, carried an article by Major Kafayet Ali in which he stated that he was "A Punjabi" who had produced a scheme for separation in 1939. Apparently no notice was taken of this by the historians, for in 1964 Waheeduzzaman referred to him as "an unidentified writer"<sup>56</sup>, and in 1968 a newspaper article called him "somebody under the name of 'A Punjabi'".<sup>57</sup> It was not until March 1968 that Syed Sharifuddin Pirzada mentioned his real name among the makers of the various schemes of 1939.<sup>58</sup>

To add to the general confusion, at least one Pakistani author has given an incorrect date of the publication of the Punjabi scheme. He says that it appeared in 1936.<sup>59</sup>

The only serious Hindu criticism of the Punjabi scheme came from Rajendra Prasad, and from his objections to it appears that he completely misunderstood the recommendations. "It ultimately aims", he wrote, "at the disruption of the country,

and an Islamic revolution which means establishment of Islamic rule over the whole country under the Muslims of the Punjab and Bengal. This is not likely to be accepted by the country as a whole, and it is doubtful if even the Muslims in other provinces will submit to this."<sup>60</sup> Punjabi had made it clear that he stood for a confederation, a sort of an internal division, and not for a disintegration of the country. He had also stated that the Muslim states might be Islamic in character, and for this and other reasons he had insisted on excluding all Hindu areas from them. Rajendra Prasad's curious interpretation of an Islamic revolution as the establishment of Islamic rule over the whole of India under the Muslims of the Punjab and Bengal shows how hysterical was the reaction of even intelligent and well-informed Hindus to any proposal which came from Muslim separationists.

### Strong Points of the Punjabi Scheme

Anyone who has read the *Confederacy of India* with some care will agree that Punjabi's proposals occupy an outstanding place among the schemes contemplating Pakistan. On almost every aspect of the Muslim problem he has a detailed and reasoned case to present. He does not avoid or ignore sensitive issues like the future of the Muslims of the Hindu provinces; nor does he pursue impracticable plans in an attempt to protect their interests, as the Aligarh dons were doing at this time. His firm resolve to reject any exchange of population, howsoever small, shows a grasp of the realities of the situation. His insistence on excluding all Hindu areas from the proposed Muslim states, and particularly from the Punjab, attests to the inherent soundness of his approach; his arguments on this make an effective reply to Latif's objection that the advocates of partition had to face the Hobson's choice between a large but not fully Muslim Pakistan and a small, fully Muslim but far from viable Pakistan. His scheme is also an improvement on other proposals in as much as it emphasizes the economic necessity of avoiding Hindu rule. It also proves itself to be more farsighted by anticipating the post-1947 debate on the desirability or otherwise of making Pakistan into an Islamic state. On some other points, too, like the fear of Afghanistan's hostility to the creation of Pakistan, he shows himself to have been very

well acquainted with the contemporary political situation and its implications. Some mistakes in his treatment of history are unfortunate,<sup>61</sup> but we must remember that he was not writing a piece of historical scholarship. It is possible to have a few dates and facts wrong and still possess an insight into the broad problems and movements of history. Punjabi's analysis of the Lucknow Pact and his severe criticism of Muslim delegates to the RTC for having failed to demand a partition of the Punjab demonstrate his understanding of the Muslim problem and raise him above the level of his contemporaries. By and large, therefore, the Punjabi scheme makes a most valuable contribution to the history of the idea of Pakistan, and a close study of some of its features will repay the effort.

One of the great merits of the scheme is that it starts on the right foot. The whole case for separation is constructed on the foundation of the two-nation theory. He stresses the general Muslim desire to be rid of the fear of Hindu rule, as most Muslim intellectuals and politicians were then beginning to state. He also does not ignore the cultural factor, but does not make it his sole concern, as Latif had done. He knows that Muslim separation is essential if the community wants to live and practise Islam; Iqbal had said so in his letters to Jinnah. But he goes beyond and deeper than all this in rooting the demand for separation in the context of nationalism. The Muslims want to separate on the simple but comprehensive ground that they are a separate nation.

Before Jinnah began to expound the two-nation theory two persons had set out its main arguments. Rahmat Ali was the first to point to this new feeling among the Muslims, and he based his concept of Pakistan on Muslim nationalism. Without going into too many details he covered the ground quite thoroughly; he even used words which Jinnah himself was to repeat at the Lahore session of the Muslim League and so often afterwards. But it is in the *Confederacy of India* that we meet the fullest exposition of the theory. Every ingredient of modern nationalism is taken up and its relevance to the Muslim position established. Culture, economics, political independence, historical background, religion, civilization, language, literature, law, moral code, social custom—every item which goes to make a nation is considered, exemplified and proved to distinguish the Muslims from other Indians. All the earlier efforts, and particularly the 1935 federal scheme, to



solve the Indian problem on the assumption of one Indian nationhood were bound to fail because they were based on an historical falsehood. Once you concede that there are two nations in India, the problem solves itself. By demanding separation on the ground of nationhood, Punjabi forestalls all the objections that could possibly be raised against his solution. Practical difficulties were there, and they would remain, but by giving his demand the sanction of an intellectual and generally accepted concept he imparted to his cause a strength which mocked the minor inconveniences of a radical solution.

Once the case for Muslim nationhood was established, the next logical step was to demand its political and constitutional manifestation, viz., separation. As two nations, like two kings, could not live in one state, another state must be created to house the other nation. As nations separate, so do their territories. Here again the Punjabi scheme has the great advantage of spelling out to the smallest detail the areas demarcated for the Muslim nation and the reasons for drawing the said boundaries. Several pages are devoted to settling the question where the frontiers should lie. Alternative suggestions and possibilities are considered, but are rejected for practical or ideological reasons. A smaller area is accepted because it is judged to be more in consonance with the needs and interests of the nation, and also because the Hindus cannot have any objection to such a rightful division of territory. Several more pages are written to prove the economic and financial viability of the areas demarcated for the new state in the north-west. This was in reply to those who thought that a smaller Muslim state which did not coincide with existing provincial boundaries would not have enough material resources.

Punjabi's acceptance of a division of the Punjab and of Bengal not only brings his solution nearer to what was actually done in 1947 but also shows a realism uncommon among the scheme-makers of his time. However unpalatable this prospect might have been to the Muslims whose enthusiasm looked forward to as large a realm as could be had, it was a rational solution. We cannot run away from the fact that the demand for separation was made on the ground that Muslims were a separate nation and did not want to live under a different nation in the same state. From this it logically followed that the Muslim nation could not want such areas as had a large non-Muslim population. If the Muslims

wished for a separate world of their own where they could live as Muslims, under their own laws and social principles, it was desirable that this new world should contain the least possible number of non-Muslims. Both logic and justice favoured this conclusion. Another important consideration led to the same solution. One of the major reasons for separation was the economic slavery of the Muslims. If a large number of Hindus were included in the Muslim state they would continue in some measure to control the economic life of the Muslims, and with their history of economic activity and enterprise it was doubtful if their stranglehold over the economic life of the Muslim state would ever be broken. In any case, you cannot hope to establish an Islamic state and at the same time insist on including large Hindu areas in that state. For these reasons it was quite proper and natural for Punjabi to reject all proposals for including eastern Punjab in the north-west Muslim state and western Bengal in the north-east Muslim state.

Another feature which distinguishes the Punjabi scheme from other contemporary plans is its sensible treatment of the problem of the future of the Muslims living in Hindu provinces. These Muslims are told that no practicable solution of the Indian problem can help them as it can help their co-religionists in their own provinces. Their small number scattered among a multitude of Hindus does not lend itself to any feasible alternative. They have to realize that the future does not, cannot, hold out any prospect for them except that of a minority in a Hindu land. The sooner they understand this the better. This is not done to break their spirit, but to bring them face to face with the brutal reality. Far-fetched, even fantastic, schemes could be drawn up which promised some protection to them; but this was a futile exercise. Once a settlement on the national and country-wide level was reached and carried out, no matter what suggestions had been made by Muslim planners and what promises given by Hindu politicians, the fact was that their future would be in the hands of the new Hindu India. The Muslim League or any other party or individual could not do anything for them. This was a great misfortune for Indian Islam, but it was a fact which wisdom said should be recognized and accepted.

In adopting this approach Punjabi was expressing a point of view which was as different from that of Rahmat Ali and of Iqbal as from that of the planners belonging to the Hindu pro-

vines. This difference is significant. Schemes enunciated from Hyderabad and the United Provinces were naturally deeply concerned about the Muslims of the minority provinces, and made sincere but generally impracticable suggestions for safeguarding their position in the new dispensation. Latif was so much carried away by the need of protecting these Muslims that he opposed the freedom of the Muslim provinces out of the fear lest this might leave the areas like his own at Hindu mercy. The Aligarh dons (to be studied later) laid down a long list of do's and don'ts for the Hindus on the future treatment of their Muslim minority, as if their inclusion in a scheme would be enough guarantee of their execution.

Some planners from the Muslim-majority provinces, on the other hand, pretended completely to relieve themselves of all responsibility for the Muslims of Hindu provinces. Iqbal is a good exponent of this school. In 1930 he was advocating the convening of a separate conference to deal with the affairs of the Muslim north, believing that the interests of the Muslims of that area were different from those of the Muslims of other areas. This was not an unreasonable point of view, but it came oddly from the lips of a president of the All India Muslim League. In his letters to Jinnah, however, which he wrote towards the end of his life, he had made the startling suggestion that the Muslim League should cease to concern itself with the Muslims of any area except the north-west, and confine its efforts to bringing freedom to the north-western Muslims. For reasons which have already been given Jinnah did not find this advice to be reasonable and ignored it; though ultimately Iqbal's word came true and in the 1947 decision the Muslim League could do nothing for millions of Muslims living in Hindu lands.

Rahmat Ali, who also came from the Punjab, went to the other extreme and, in addition to laying claims to the whole of the Punjab and the whole of Bengal, wanted to set up sovereign Muslim "strongholds" and "national homes" in Hindu India, so that Muslims of the minority areas could be brought together and given complete freedom. This was an impossible suggestion, but it appealed to the planners from Hindu provinces because it appeared to give them a hope; though a little reflection should have told them how remote and unrealizable his hope was. The influence of Rahmat Ali on the Aligarh scheme illustrates this.

Punjabi was also impressed with Rahmat Ali's ideas and wrote the *Confederacy of India* under their inspiration. But he had the sense to see that Rahmat Ali's suggestions about Hindu areas lay beyond practical limits. Therefore he accepted his Pakistan and Bang-i-Islam schemes, but firmly rejected the rest of the proposals. On the other hand, he did not argue, like Iqbal, that the Muslim League should have nothing to do with the Muslims of Hindu areas.

He also set his face against an exchange of population as a complete or partial solution of the difficulty arising from the fact of leaving behind the Muslims of the minority provinces in Hindu India. He was not in favour of migration, even on a much smaller and perhaps manageable scale in the Punjab. His opposition to exchange was absolute and unqualified. It is true that he said that an exchange in the north-east *might* be feasible, but this was vague speculation, not a definite suggestion. And he added that he did not possess enough first-hand or comprehensive information on that area to be able to make firm proposals. This resolute rejection of the exchange of population was dictated by two factors. Experience had shown that it was a costly and inconvenient operation, bringing much misery to the people involved. Moreover, a complete withdrawal of Muslims from Hindu India would be against the interest of Islam, which was essentially a proselytizing religion.

One exceedingly valuable point made by Punjabi concerned the use of the idea of separation in simplifying the Indian problem and uniting the Muslims. So far all attempts to solve the Indian problem, and the Muslim problem which lay at its heart, had failed because the multiplicity of solutions had created a barrier of confusion between the problem and its understanding. Moreover, the prescribed solutions were in the most part superficial and mechanical devices which did not touch the real issue. Loose federation, close federation, strong centre, provincial autonomy, provinces with residual powers, separate electorates, weighted representation, adequate share of public services, special powers for the government to protect the minorities, safeguards in cultural matters, minority representation in provincial and central executives, one-third Muslim strength in the federal parliament, composite cabinets, special legislative procedure for communal law-making, etc.—the passing years had piled safeguard upon safe-

guard and provision upon provision until the real problem had disappeared under a heap of proposals and counter-proposals. Everyone was lost in this constitutional maze, above all the Muslim who was the first cause of this colourful patch-work. Instead of finding any comfort in the existence of so many dispensations, concessions and compensations, he saw only a mist of confusion which turned thicker with every new recommendation.

How to get out of this labyrinth? The solution was easy and breathtakingly simple. Let the Muslim forget everything about concessions, safeguards, protective measures, the goodwill of the majority, and the generous promises of a constitution. These were all mirages or snares which would bring nothing or sore disappointment. Let him proclaim that he belonged to a separate nation which demanded nothing less than a separate territory of its own. No constitutional tricks, contrivances or devices will satisfy him. No political promises will meet his wishes. The issue is plain and simple: the demand of a nation to be free. The demand is just: no nation can be forced to be a slave to the other. Put in these stark terms the situation simplifies itself. Freed from his confusion, the Muslim will know what he is aiming at. The clearing of the mind will create unity. Individuals may differ on the right safeguard or dispute the correct constitutional solution to be demanded. But the force of nationalism will dissolve all differences and will bring to the nation a solidarity which will guarantee the achievement of separation.

This is how Punjabi argued, and there was a strong element of prophecy in it. In a great measure the secret of Jinnah's success lay in his single-minded devotion to the ideal of Pakistan. He built up the Pakistan campaign on one single issue which ruled out all ambiguity, misunderstanding, contention or hesitation. There was but one fact which needed to be stated: the Muslims are a nation. That the nation wanted to be free followed from the first premiss. The strength of this strategy lay in its simplicity. For the first time the Muslims realized where they were going, and they chose to go there as a united people. The clarity of the ideal had produced unity among its seekers. Anyone who has the slightest doubts about the spectacular results of this approach should compare the disunited crowd that was the Muslim community in the mid-thirties with the solid phalanx that was the Muslim nation from the late-thirties till independence.

In another respect, too, Punjabi foresaw a coming change. To formulate, follow and achieve the new ideal Muslims must have a new leadership. Partly by political convention and partly by the social tradition of a powerful class system, Muslims had so far been led by their aristocracy. A great majority of their political leaders had been members of the feudal class: the Bengali landholders, the Punjabi nawabs and the rajas and taluqdars of the United Provinces, with the immensely rich Aga Khan always in the reserve for important occasions. This was probably unavoidable in an age when Muslims could not boast of a middle class, and the "natural" leaders of society emerged on the top in every field by a natural process. Two new developments made this scheme of things out of date. The Muslims had now a middle class which, though not so numerous as among the Hindus, was beginning to expand and assert itself. The nucleus of a new kind of leadership was now available and should be allowed to come forth and take over the management of national affairs. Of course, that did not mean that all upper-class leaders should be retired or disowned. They had their uses and must continue to work. But real power should be transferred to others who were better qualified to understand and lead the community.

The other factor was the increasing strength of the Muslim League. It was fast becoming a mass party, and this kind of party does not easily accept class leaders. In the past, politics were mainly a game between the British authorities and the Indian politicians. In this game the class leaders were useful, for they belonged to the same world as did the governors, the viceroys, the higher civil servants and the London politicians. British politics were then a class affair, too, in which a few ancient families, inter-related by matrimony, ruled the country irrespective of the party in power. But this also was beginning to change, and the process of social levelling-up and the rise of the Labour Party held promise of a new kind of British politician who would in all likelihood prefer to talk to an Indian of an equivalent class. The changing ideals of the Muslim community also demanded a new leadership. The age of petitions, appeals and respectful requests addressed to the British rulers by the leaders of a minority community was gone. The politics of safeguards, concessions and protective legislation were a thing of the past. With the new changes in its policy, now the Muslim League would have to



address its own masses instead of the British rulers. For this purpose a different leadership was required which could communicate the spirit of the age to the people, and to whom people would listen because they found an affinity with it.

How prophetic Punjabi's emphasis on the need for new leadership was is shown by Jinnah's ascendancy in Muslim politics. It was finally a middle-class leader who overthrew the traditional aristocracy from its entrenched positions of power, re-created a new Muslim League out of its own dying embers, gave a new ideal to the nation, and went on to achieve it with a triumph unparalleled in the history of Indian Islam.

Some other elements in the later policy of the League were also successfully foreseen by Punjabi. For instance, he was quite sure that the issue of the separation should be settled and the actual operation carried out before British withdrawal, instead of the League uniting with the Congress in winning independence for the whole of India and then relying on Hindu goodwill to effect a partition. Once the British left, the Hindu would never agree to divide the country. This was precisely the point on which the Gandhi-Jinnah talks of 1944 were to break down. Gandhi was prepared to *consider* the Pakistan demand after India was free, while Jinnah told him that the Muslim wishes must be met before independence came, for the simple reason that if the Muslims had as much confidence in the Hindus as to rely on their promise of conceding Pakistan after the British had withdrawn they would not, in the first place, have asked for separation.

Another example is Punjabi's assertion that the ultimate aim of the Indian Muslims in demanding separation was an Islamic world revolution. The creation of Muslim states and the freedom of Indian Islam were not an end in themselves, but a means to a world-wide re-vitalization of Islam. Here again Rahmat Ali's influence was at work. The movement for the independence of Indian Muslims was to be considered as a part, or rather a harbinger, of the urge to freedom among the world community of Islam. The final ideal remained pan-Islamic. Not much was said about this by the League in the pre-1947 days, partly because the hectic activities of that period left it no time to formulate a long-term policy. But soon after independence it began to cast a wider net and, under the presidentship of Choudhry Khaliquzzaman, a serious effort was made to bring together a large number of

Muslim countries on an Islamic platform. The attempt was a failure, but it was a reminder that the League had not given up the hope of bringing about, or at least participating in, a world-wide renaissance.

Finally, the Punjabi scheme stands apart from other proposals in as much as it chalked out a detailed future programme. Far from contenting itself with drawing an outline of a settlement which would satisfy the Muslims, it went on to show how the nation was to be prepared for the coming struggle, how the ideal of separation was to be popularized and what changes in leadership had to be brought about to suit altered conditions. In this respect the proposals amounted to much more than a mere scheme and took on the shape of a long-term plan, a programme of action, which covered most aspects of the problem.

### Weaknesses of the Punjabi Scheme

In spite of the care which Punjabi took with the details, or perhaps because of it, his scheme suffered from some weaknesses. A few words about them will help us to form a balanced view of his proposals.

There are clear hints in his treatment that he envisaged the Muslim state or states to be Islamic, but he preferred to use such qualifying words as "might be", and did not lay it down as a definite recommendation. Either he was not sure in his mind if the Muslim masses would insist on this, or he wanted to leave the final choice to the decision of League leaders. But his personal preference seems to have been for an Islamic political system. If that is so, he should have given some attention to a related problem. If the Muslim state was going to be Islamic and if all non-Muslims were not made to leave it through an exchange of population, how was this state to deal with its non-Muslim citizens? This was a question as important for the state as for the non-Muslims who chose to live in it. It is true that the concept of an Islamic state is highly controversial and agreement even on its essentials has rarely been obtained in Islamic history.<sup>62</sup> Yet the argument for separation would have gained in strength had Punjabi given his readers a clearer picture of the proposed Muslim state in case it decided to follow the Islamic principles of statehood.

In talking about the attitude that the Congress might adopt

towards the Muslim demand for separation, Punjabi is more optimistic than past history or contemporary circumstances warranted. Several suggestions for a partition of India had been made before his time, and he must have known how resolutely, almost savagely, the Hindus and the Congress had reacted to them. Of course, he tried to soften the blow of his proposals by calling them by the name of "confederacy", but, as we will see, this was an after-thought and did not change the fundamental character of his solution. The Hindus could not have been taken in by the transparent veil of confederation which covered the (to the Hindus) ungainly face of partition. On the whole, he does not consider properly the possible and probable Congress opposition to separation. The fact which overwhelmed all political thinking was the Congress determination to rule all India. Any Muslim move towards autonomy or freedom had to be an obstacle to the realization of this ambition. Punjabi omitted to mention the sober truth that the Congress did not want the Muslims to be free.

Punjabi's hope that when the time came to give India her independence the British would favour separation did not indicate a correct reading of the British mind. He underrated British obsession with the concept, however imaginary, of a united India. They knew that it was their rule which had for the first time given to India a semblance of unity, and they were anxious that when they withdrew this unity should be left behind intact as the only permanent legacy of imperialism. The unity imparted by them was a mere facade concealing gaping cracks, but so tenaciously did they hold to their illusion that any Muslim suggestion for partition evoked their immediate and total disapproval. If Muslim aspirations could be satisfied only by a division of the country, a British alliance with the Hindus in opposition to it was to be taken for granted. The policy of the British Labour government and the way in which the partition of 1947 was carried out bear this out.

Yet there was an element of truth in Punjabi's argument that if the choice lay between keeping a divided India in the Commonwealth and losing a united India to the Commonwealth the British, in the interests of their Commonwealth, would prefer the former course. That was the only contingency in which they would support partition. This explains the bargain struck between Mountbatten and Nehru and Patel, by which the partition plan prepared by the Viceroy and sent to London for final approval was scratch-

ed out and a new plan drawn up by V.P. Menon was adopted which retained India as a dominion on the Hindu condition that the new plan did not divide India but allowed certain areas to secede.<sup>63</sup>

One major weakness, if it can be called that, of the Punjabi scheme was the cursory way in which it treated with the future of the north-east Muslim India. In the main the future of the Bengali Muslims was considered to be their own business. No detailed case was presented on their behalf. It was merely suggested that they too might be interested in separation, like the Muslims of the north-west, and might want to start a campaign on that basis. It was frankly confessed that the author had scant knowledge of their area and was therefore unable to present more than a broad outline of how they should begin to think of separating themselves from Hindu India. Punjabi's main interest lay in the future of the north-west, and he made no secret of it. In this he was following in the footsteps of Rahmat Ali and Iqbal. Rahmat Ali had advocated an independent north-west in 1933, but had not extended the same principle to Bengal till several years later. Iqbal, too, in his letters to Jinnah had talked of the north-west and had mentioned Bengal almost as an after-thought.

It would not be fair to attribute this exclusively regional interest to parochialism or to an indifference to the future of Bengal. This attitude explains itself if we look at three contemporary developments. Of all the schemes and proposals made for a re-distribution of India and involving autonomy, regional independence or complete freedom for the Muslims, only one had emanated from Bengal; and that too was so brief and casual that it could hardly be called a scheme. This could reasonably be taken as an indication of a want of interest in separation among Bengali Muslim leaders and intellectuals. If the Muslims of the rest of India gathered from this that Bengal should better be left out of their calculations concerning Muslim separation, they could hardly be accused of ignoring Bengal or failing to consider it a part of Muslim India. This impression was strengthened and raised to the level of conviction by the absence of any separatist sentiment among the Bengali Muslims. If their politicians had failed to give a lead in that direction, public opinion could have made its preference known through newspaper articles and other means. But Bengali Muslim public opinion in the 'thirties seems to have showed no interest at all in separation. With the Bengali reaction, or rather the lack of it,

to the concept of separation so unmistakably reflected in their political thinking and public feeling, the advocates of separation would well have considered it presumptuous to include Bengal in their schemes. A third factor encouraged this policy. The separatists, all of whom belonged to the north-west or to the minority provinces, were not completely familiar with the conditions obtaining in the north-east. In order to draw future boundaries and to consider if exchange of population would be practicable or desirable, it was necessary to have full and up-to-date information about the geography, the population statistics, the communal strength and the economic conditions of the area. Without this knowledge, schemes of division were liable to become an academic exercise in frontier making.

A more serious weakness of the Punjabi scheme is to be found in its failure to indicate the precise nature of the separation it advocated. Throughout the *Confederacy of India* the word used for the Muslim objective is "separation", not "partition" or "division". The title of the book, which should and usually does sum up the point of view of the writer, shows that the solution being suggested is a confederation of India consisting of two Muslim federations and one Hindu federation. In the body of the book also we find references to a confederal centre and to statements, made to assure the Hindus, that the Congress would be well advised to accept such a confederation rather than see India partitioned. A careful reading of the whole book shows that Punjabi was really asking for a division of India on Hindu-Muslim lines and envisaging two sovereign Muslim (and probably Islamic) states in the north-west and north-east. As an after-thought he inserted a few sentences which proposed a confederation between these two Muslim states and the rest of India. At one or two places he clearly says that if the Hindus do not accept this confederation, Muslim regions will break away and form their own independent states. His language shows that he himself had no hope of the confederation materializing, and therefore what he was really suggesting was an outright partition. If that was so, and if, as he says, he was doing this under Rahmat Ali's influence, why did he not use the word "Pakistan" for the proposed north-western Muslim state?

In other words, we have to ask two questions to clarify the meaning and nature of his scheme: Why was the scheme called a "confederacy", when in reality it was a proposal for partition?

Why was the name "Pakistan" not used for the Muslim state to be created in the north-west?

The answer to both questions lies in Jinnah's opposition to the original scheme prepared by Punjabi. The title Kafayet Ali had given to the book was *Pakistan*, and it contained no reference to a confederation. After having agreed to finance its publication and free distribution and to act as its publisher, Mamdot sent a typed copy of it to Jinnah. This step might have been taken for several reasons. Jinnah was the supreme leader, and it was but proper that all important schemes should be sent to him. The League was then inviting suggestions on constitutional alternatives to the 1935 Act, and Mamdot might have forwarded Punjabi's manuscript to Jinnah as the president of the AIML; though strictly speaking in this case it should have been sent to Haroon, who was the chairman of the special committee dealing with these suggestions. Mamdot was president of the Punjab Provincial Muslim League, and possibly he thought it wise to send to Jinnah an advance copy of a book which was going to be published by him.

Whatever the reasons, the fact is that the typescript went to Jinnah. In the meantime the book had gone to the printers (the Ripon Printing Press of Lahore). Before printing was finished, Mamdot received a telegram from Jinnah saying that he did not want the book to be called *Pakistan*. "Just to give it another name", explains Mian Kafayet Ali, "I prepared an outline of a confederal constitutional scheme for the sub-continent and incorporated it in the Introduction to the book. Hence the name *Confederacy of India*. In fact I had been told to present my spade as a spoon. But I took care to give even the spoon a sharp edge. In the scheme I proposed to split up India into five federations to be linked together by a confederal centre. The seven Hindu majority provinces, the Congress provinces, were put in the Hindu federation. The Muslims had two federations, one in the north-west and the other in north-east. The Princely Indian states were formed into two federations. The provinces put in the Hindu federation lacked contiguity with each other. They were given access to each other by narrow strips of land which could be cut asunder or occupied easily in the event of any trouble with the Congress."<sup>64</sup>

A part of the mystery is solved by this explanation. The original scheme was for a clear partition of India into a Hindu India and a



Pakistan. To meet Jinnah's wishes it was at the last moment changed into a confederal plan of five federations. The change was mainly embodied in the Introduction of the book, and a few sentences were inserted into the body of the text mentioning confederation as the desired solution. The title of the volume was changed from *Pakistan* to *Confederacy of India*.

But two problems still remain. One is that in the Introduction Punjabi attributed the 5-federation scheme to Mamdot, clearly distinguishing it from his own 3-federation scheme. In his communication quoted above he told me that it was he himself who had made this change in order to make the proposals acceptable to Jinnah. Probably it is this confusion which has led some scholars to present the 5-federation scheme as the real Punjabi scheme, ignoring the fact that the original plan contained in the body of the book was that of a 3-federation partition. They have chosen to present what Punjabi himself calls the Mamdot scheme as his own scheme.

The second problem concerns the word "Pakistan" and its rejection by Punjabi. This was done under Jinnah's instructions, who did not like the name, and did not accept it till some time after the adoption of the Lahore Resolution. But Punjabi's explanation for not using this word does not carry conviction. In the Introduction to the *Confederacy of India* he writes: "We should also make it clear to those Muslim separationists, who want separation in order to link their destinies with states outside the Indian sub-continent, that in demanding separation we should not be inspired by any such extra-territorial ideals, ambitions, or affinity. We should be separationists-cum-confederationists, and if the Hindus disagree with the idea of a confederacy of Hindu India and Muslim India, then we should be simply separationists, demanding secession of our regions from Hindu India without any link between them. . . . The foreign element amongst us is quite negligible and we are as much sons of the soil as the Hindus are. Ultimately our destiny lies within India and not out of it. And it is for this reason that we have abstained from using the word 'Pakistan' and have instead used the word 'Indusstan' to denote the North-West Muslim Block. 'Pakistan' is a term which has somehow or other gathered round itself some unwholesome and alien associations which are far from our mind."<sup>65</sup>

Evidently Jinnah, in the brevity of a telegram, could only have

asked for the dropping of the word "Pakistan" from the title of the book, and not given detailed reasons for it. The above explanation should therefore be taken as Punjabi's own. His objections to the word are hard to reconcile with his claim that he was inspired by Rahmat Ali's ideas. Further, which and whose concept of Pakistan is he talking about? If, as he says, the ultimate destiny of the Muslims lies within India and not out of it, what kind of separation is he advocating? In the body of the book, as set apart from the Introduction, he has been consistently arguing in favour of a two-nation theory and asserting that two such different nations cannot co-exist in one state, and further that the Muslim states would probably be Islamic states. In the Introduction he adds the vital rider that if the Hindus do not accept confederation, the Muslim regions will in any case have to separate and go out. If separation is his ultimate ideal, and the whole argument of the book sustains this view, how does it differ from Rahmat Ali's proposal, except in a few details about the boundaries to be fixed? And, what were the unwholesome and alien associations of the word which make him reject it?

Is he indirectly quoting Jinnah or trying to read his mind? In a later letter he told me: "The title *Pakistan*, as was originally conceived for the book under discussion, was later given up at the instance of the Quaid-i-Azam. By 1939 the word 'Pakistan' had become a red rag to the Hindu press and public. They called it 'vivisection of the sacred cow', a phrase highly provocative to the Hindu mind. It would have been highly impolitic to incite and enrage the Hindu masses against Pakistan at a time when it was too weak to meet the Hindu challenge to it."<sup>66</sup> This does not answer the question of why Jinnah was against the use of the word.

Let us, for a moment, suppose that Punjabi was here arguing against a clear partition merely to please Jinnah. But that does not bring our difficulties to an end. In 1939 Jinnah was not in favour of declaring that the Muslims wanted nothing less than sovereign independence. If Punjabi was just trying to meet Jinnah's wishes, he should have, after 1940, given up this expediency of presenting his objective of separation in the guise of a confederation, for by that date the Muslim League itself, under Jinnah's unquestioned leadership, had put in a claim for complete separation. But in 1941 Punjabi was still arguing for a confederation in India. He was

writing: "Moreover, division of the Indian sub-continent into smaller states will not amount to a vivisection of the country, because a co-ordinating centre of a representative character, based on a multilateral agreement among the Hindu and Muslim States, will have to be set up to uphold the unity of the Indian sub-continent as against any third power and to look after any other subjects of common interest to the States."<sup>67</sup> This time, as far as we know, there was no outside pressure on Punjabi to alter his views or to present them in an amended version. Therefore it must be taken as his genuine position that, at least up to 1941, he preferred a confederal, or some other co-ordinating, centre to a clear partition of India.

This insistence on a confederation and opposition to partition are incompatible not only with the general tone of his *Confederacy of India* (where, apart from the Introduction which was added later, he was arguing for separation) but also with his political activities and associations. He was closely affiliated to the Majlis-i-Kabir-i-Pakistan, a society established in 1938, under the inspiration of Rahmat Ali and the patronage of Mamdot, to propagate the Pakistan movement. Barring the *Confederacy of India*, all the books and pamphlets written by Punjabi during these years were distributed by the Majlis.<sup>68</sup> On most points the Majlis's stand was the same as Rahmat Ali's, particularly on the creation of a sovereign Pakistan in the north-west. Other members of the Majlis were writing and speaking about an independent Muslim state. Punjabi stood alone in this group in advocating a confederation for India. Only one explanation comes to my mind. The Lahore Resolution itself was worded so confusingly that Punjabi might well have believed that Jinnah still did not want a clear separation.

### Conclusion

In the end, we must recognize that, if the contents of the *Confederacy of India* are interpreted as a case for complete separation, the Punjabi scheme comes very close to the Lahore Resolution. Waheeduzzaman is quite right in saying that "in effect his solution differed but little from that proposed by the Muslim League in March 1940".<sup>69</sup> Though the Lahore Resolution did not speak of a division of the Punjab and Bengal, which is an essential

feature of the Punjabi scheme, yet the exact words of the Resolution— "geographically contiguous areas are demarcated into regions which should be so constituted with such territorial readjustments as may be necessary"—can have no meaning except a division of these two provinces. One minor difference between the two may be noticed. The Punjabi scheme explicitly dealt with the native states, enumerated the ones which would form parts of the north-west Muslim State, and specially mentioned Kashmir. On the other hand, though the Lahore Resolution did not distinguish between provinces and states and used the comprehensive word "areas", which may be interpreted to cover both entities, League policy from 1940 till 1947 was one of scrupulous non-interference with the autonomy of the states, which did not allow the consideration of the question of their inclusion in Pakistan or Hindustan. I have called it a minor difference because, in spite of the official League policy of aloofness from the states question, in the popular mind it was clearly understood that the states falling within the Pakistan territory would be a part of Pakistan and Muslim states lying on its borders and having Muslim majorities, like Kashmir, would join Pakistan.

## NOTES

1. *The Statesman*, editorial, 16 January 1939.
2. A Muslim Correspondent, "What Muslim India Thinks: Are the Muslims a Minority in India?", *CMG*, 3 February 1939.
3. Baybak (fearless) (pseud.), in an article in *Medina*, 21 February 1939, p. 225, quoted in Waheed Qureshi, *Pakistan ki Nazryati Bunyadayn*, Lahore, 1973, pp. 142-143.
4. Gulshan Rai, "The Muslim Minority in India", *CMG*, 22 February 1939.
5. Baybak, in an article in *Medina*, 28 March 1939, pp. 252-253, quoted in Waheed Qureshi, *op. cit.*, pp. 143-144.
6. "Obstacles to Indian Federation", *Round Table*, March 1939, pp. 352-364.
7. *IAR* 1939, Vol. I, p. 66, "India in Home Polity" by Suresh Chandra Dev.
8. Candidus, "Indian Political Notes: Muslim Outlook on Country's Future", *TTI*, 5 April 1939.
9. M. Nasim, Vice-President, Muslim Students Federation, Motihari (Bihar), *TSI*, 17 April 1939.
10. H.V. Hodson, "The Struggle for Power in India", *Fortnightly Review*, May 1939, pp. 556-557.
11. Marquess of Zetland, "Essayer": *The Memoirs of Lawrence, Second Marquess of Zetland*, London, 1956, p. 250.
12. Zetland to the Viceroy, 27 June 1939, *ibid.*, p. 251.
13. *CMG*, 23 May 1939.
14. Shahed (pseud.), "Dar-el-Islam", *The Statesman*, 16 June 1939.
15. Muhammad Sharif Toosy, "Misreading of History of Turkey: Real Lessons for Indian Muslims: Salvation in Separation from Hindu India", *TET*, 10 February 1939.
16. "Are the Muslims a Minority in India?", *ibid.*, 24 March 1939. The author's name printed in the newspaper is "M. Abdullah Khan, President, Municipal Committee, Wazirabad". On the clipping of this article in the Rahmat Ali Papers a line in red ink has been drawn across the author's name and address, which have been substituted by the following written in black ink in Urdu: "az Muhammad Sharif Toosy, Headmaster, M.B. High School, Wazirabad" As Rahmat Ali was in touch with all prominent Muslim

leaders and intellectuals of the Punjab and regularly received newspapers and letters from them, it is quite possible that the author of this piece was Toosy. It may be mentioned here that Toosy later compiled or wrote two books under the pseudonym of "M.R.T."

17. Abdus Sattar Kheiri, "90 Million Muslims Form Biggest Nation in India", *TSI*, 25 February 1939.
18. A Muslim Lawyer (Asadullah), letter, *ibid.*, 22 March 1939. See last section of the previous chapter.
19. Choudhry Khaliquzzaman, *Pathway to Pakistan*, Lahore, 1961, pp. 204-206. Khaliquzzaman got this confirmed from London. In 1953 he wrote to the Deputy High Commissioner for the United Kingdom in Dacca to try to check with the British Government to confirm the substance of this talk from their records. The Deputy High Commissioner did so, and in his letter to Khaliquzzaman of 5 September 1953, he said that the Commonwealth Relations Office confirmed that after the said talk Zetland had "recorded the main points of his talk with Mr. Siddiqui and yourself in a letter which he subsequently sent to the Viceroy". In this letter to the Viceroy, Zetland had reported, among other things, the following: "(iii) that in response to Lord Zetland's request for alternative suggestions of a constructive character you replied that you would propose the establishment of 3 or 4 federations of Provinces and States which would be co-ordinated by a small Central Body, the object of this scheme being to give the Muslims as great a measure of control at the Centre as the Hindus. (iv) that Lord Zetland gathered that the idea in your minds was of a federation of Muslim Provinces and States in North-West India; a further federation of Bengal and Assam, and possibly more than one further federation of the other Provinces and States in the remaining parts of India. (v) that you reported that many Muslims were thinking on these lines."

Commenting on this report, Khaliquzzaman writes: "He also rightly reported that, on this occasion, I talked of more Federations than two. It was necessary for me to do so at that stage, because I wanted to bring in Assam and Bengal in one Federation and NWFP, Punjab and Sind in another



and to leave the rest of India for the Congress to decide. Now it becomes clear from the document that Lord Linlithgow knew before the Pakistan Resolution was passed what next step the Muslim League was likely to take. My own impression, after the talk with these two British officials, was that they would not oppose the demand seriously because it was in itself a democratic right of particular areas to keep themselves out of a Federation to which they were opposed. I could not help being thankful to Col. Muirhead for having given me encouragement to discuss the question with Lord Zetland who in his turn was quite sympathetic." (*ibid.*, pp. 206-208).

20. Zetland to Linlithgow, 28 March 1939, Zetland, *op. cit.*, pp. 248-249.
21. Khaliquzzaman, *op. cit.*, p. 211.
22. Being a nephew of Sir Fazli Husain, Mian Kafayet Ali was naturally considered to be a Unionist, while Iqbal was a Muslim Leaguer; and there was no love lost between the two camps.
23. The information on which this and all preceding paragraphs are based was sent to me by Mian Kafayet Ali on my request. I am grateful to him for this help.
24. Mian Kafayet Ali's letter to me, dated 5 September 1968.
25. Mian Kafayet Ali's letter to me, dated 10 October 1968.
26. See A Punjabi, *Confederacy of India*, Lahore, 1939, Preface, pp. vi-vii.
27. About 10,000 copies were printed (a large number in those days); Mian Kafayet Ali's letter to me, dated 10 October 1968. An Urdu summary of the book, entitled *Talkhis*, was issued a little later by the Majlis-i-Kabir-i-Pakistan; see inside back-cover of A Punjabi, *Pakistan: The Critics' Case Examined*, Lahore, 1941.
28. "Covering letter by Muhammad Shah Nawaz Khan, Kt., M.L.A., Nawab of Mamdot, 2 July 1939". It is in my private Collection.
29. See his articles on "Hindu-Muslim Relations: Pakistan the Only Solution" in *The New Times*, 8 November 1938 (reproduced in full by *TSI*, 10 November 1938), 3 February, 8 and 14 November, and 4 December 1939.
30. A Punjabee (variant spelling in the original), "The Hindu

Muslim Problem", *TSI*, 20 February 1939.

31. *Confederacy of India*, Introduction, pp. 1-20.
32. *Ibid.*, pp. 56-60.
33. *Ibid.*, pp. 63-85.
34. *Ibid.*, pp. 88-90.
35. *Ibid.*, pp. 98-99.
36. *Ibid.*, pp. 119-141.
37. *Ibid.*, pp. 147-171.
38. *Ibid.*, pp. 173-179.
39. *Ibid.*, pp. 179-180.
40. *Ibid.*, pp. 198-199.
41. *Ibid.*, pp. 201-205.
42. *Ibid.*, pp. 212-213.
43. *Ibid.*, pp. 213-214.
44. *Ibid.*, pp. 222-230.
45. *Ibid.*, pp. 243-266.
46. *Ibid.*, pp. 208-211.
47. *Ibid.*, Appendix, "Programme", pp. 267-272.
48. Reigndald Coupland, *Indian Politics, 1936-1942*, London, 1943, p. 203.
49. B.M. Chaudhuri, *Muslim Politics in India*, Calcutta, 1946, p. 60.
50. Ram Gopal, *Indian Muslims*, Bombay, 1959, p. 271.
51. N.N. Gidwani, "Genesis and Growth of Pakistan", in S.P. Varma and Virendra Narain (eds), *Pakistan Political System in Crisis*, Jaipur, 1972, p. 4.
52. K.B. Sayeed, *Pakistan: The Formative Phase*, Karachi, 1960, p. 119; 2nd ed London, 1968, p. 110.
53. Waheeduzzaman, *Towards Pakistan*, Lahore, 1964, pp. 165-168.
54. Some examples: Zafar Ahmad Ansari (Assistant Secretary, AIML, 1942-47) ("Pakistan: Mazi, Hal awr Mustaqbil", *Cheragh-i-Rah, Nazrya-i-Pakistan Number*, December 1960, p. 212); Rashiduzzaman ("Demand for Pakistan", *Pakistan Observer*, 14 August 1968); Muhammad Rafi Anwar and Hasan Askari Rizwi (*Tahrir-i-Qyam-i-Pakistan*, Lahore, 3rd ed 1974, p. 209 fn; a text book); M. Reza Khan (an old Muslim Leaguer) (*What Price Freedom*, Madras, 1969, p. 56).
55. For example, Craig Baxter, "The People's Party vs. the Punjab Feudalists", in J. Henry Korson (ed), *Contemporary*

- Problems of Pakistan*, Leiden, 1974, p. 18.
56. Waheeduzzaman, *op. cit.*, p. 165; in the bibliography, his note on the *Confederacy of India* runs "author not identified", p. 239.
  57. Akhtar Waqar Azim, "Tasawwur-i-Pakistan, Manzil be Manzil", *Imroz*, 14 August 1968.
  58. S.S. Pirzada, *The Pakistan Resolution and the Historic Lahore Session*, Karachi, 1968, p. 11.
  59. A.S.M. Abdur Rab, A.K. Fazlul Haq, Lahore, n.d., p. 101.
  60. Rajendra Prasad, *Pakistan*, Bombay and Calcutta, September 1940, p. 34, and his *India Divided*, Bombay, 2nd ed June 1947, pp. 179-181.
  61. For example, "Muslims co-operated with the Hindus wholeheartedly when the All-India National Congress came into existence in 1885" (p. 25); the Simla Deputation saw the Viceroy "in 1908" (pp. 26, 167); in 1908 the Congress "endorsed the point of view of the Muslim League in demanding separate representation for the Muslims" (p. 27); all page references to the *Confederacy of India*.
  62. For this problem see *Report of the Court of Inquiry constituted under Punjab Act II of 1954 to inquire into the Punjab Disturbances of 1953*, Lahore, 1954 (Munir Report); H.A.R. Gibb, *Modern Trends in Islam*, Chicago, 1947; Albert Hourani, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 1798-1939*, London, 1962; I.H. Qureshi, *The Future Development of Islamic Polity*, Lahore, 1946; H.K. Sherwani, *Studies in Muslim Political Thought and Administration*, Lahore, 1942; W.C. Smith, *Islam in Modern History*, Princeton, 1957; Manzooruddin Ahmed, *Pakistan: The Emerging Islamic State*, Karachi, 1966; T.W. Arnold, *The Caliphate*, London, 1924, rev ed 1965; E.I. Rosenthal, *Islam in the Modern National State*, Cambridge, 1965; Leonard Binder, *Religion and Politics in Pakistan*, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1961; Z.H. Faruqi, *The Deoband School and the Demand for Pakistan*, London, 1963; Freeland Abbott, *Islam and Pakistan*, Ithaca, N.Y., 1968; K.K. Aziz, *Party Politics in Pakistan, 1947-1958*, Islamabad, 1976; G.E. von Grunebaum, *Modern Islam*, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1962; Muhammad Asad, *The Principles of State and Government in Islam*, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1961; Abul Ala Mawdudi,

*Islamic Law and Constitution*, Lahore, 1955, 2nd ed 1960; Muhammad Iqbal, *Six Lectures on the Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, London, 1934; W. Montgomery Watt, *Islamic Political Thought: The Basic Concepts*, Edinburgh, 1968; Syed Ramadan, *Islamic Law: Its Scope and Equity*, London, 1961; Kenneth Cargg, *Counsels in Contemporary Islam*, Edinburgh, 1965; Mufti Muhammad Shafi, *Basic Principles of the Quranic Constitution*, Karachi, 1953; Donald E. Smith (ed), *South Asian Politics and Religion*, Princeton, 1966, and relevant articles in *The Middle East Journal*, *Muslim World*, *Islamic Studies*, *Islamic Review*, *Islamic Culture*, *Studies in Islam*, *Islam and the Modern Age*, *Middle Eastern Studies*, *Islamic Quarterly*, *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, *Revue des Etudes Islamiques*, *Revue de Monde Musulman*, *Studia Islamica*, *Orient*, *Die Welt des Islams*, *Der Islam*, and other specialized journals.

63. For details of this see Leonard Mosley, *The Last Days of the British Raj*, London, 1961, pp. 125-126; Lord Ismay, *The Memoirs of General the Lord Ismay*, London, 1960, p. 421; V.P. Menon, *The Transfer of Power in India*, Calcutta, 1957, pp. 390-394; H.V. Hodson, *The Great Divide*, London, 1969; K.K. Aziz, *Britain and Muslim India*, London, 1963, pp. 177-181; and *The Transfer of Power, 1942-47: The Mountbatten Vicereignty: Princes, Partition and Independence, 8 July-15 August 1947*, London, 1983.
64. Information supplied to me by Mian Kafayet Ali in writing. He added that in the early 'sixties, when he tried to find out more about Jinnah's telegram to Mamdot, he was told by Nawab Iftikhar Husain Khan, Sir Shah Nawaz's son, that all correspondence between Jinnah and Sir Shah Nawaz "was no longer available". Hearing this, I made an attempt to contact the Mamdot family and make inquiries about the existence and availability of the Mamdot papers; nothing came out of these efforts.
65. *Confederacy of India*, Introduction, pp. 17-18.
66. Mian Kafayet Ali's letter to me, dated 12 April 1976.
67. A Punjabi, *Pakistan: The Critics' Case Examined*, Lahore, 1941, p. 18.
68. Mian Kafayet Ali's letter to me, dated 26 May 1976; see

also the inside back cover of *Pakistan: The Critics' Case Examined*. The date (1939) for the establishment of the Majlis given by Muhammad Baqir ("The Pakistan Movement—In Retrospect", *TPT*, 23 March 1961) is incorrect. It was founded in 1938.

69. Waheeduzzaman, *Towards Pakistan*, Lahore, 1964, p. 168.

# 11

## A COMPROMISE FROM ON HIGH: 1939

### The Mamdot Scheme (July)

During our examination of the Punjabi scheme in the last chapter we saw that several contemporary and later commentators confused it with what was considered to be a different plan proposed by the Nawab of Mamdot. It is open to considerable doubt if there ever was a scheme which we can call the Mamdot scheme. Both Punjabi and Mamdot contributed to this confusion.

In the Introduction of the *Confederacy of India*, in the course of considering some of the schemes already before the public, Punjabi mentions one which he attributes to Mamdot. "The fourth scheme which claims our attention", he says, "is the result of the combination of our proposal of a tripartite confederation of three federations, namely, the Muslim North-West, the Muslim Bengal and the Hindu India, and the improvement suggested upon it by Nawab Sir Muhammad Shah Nawaz Khan of Mamdot, which is to the effect that two more federations, one comprising the Rajistan states and the other constituted by some of the Deccan states, may also be created in addition to the three federations mentioned above so that there may be a quinquartite instead of a tripartite confederation."<sup>1</sup> From this it is clear that it was Mamdot's own idea, based of course on an attempt to improve the Punjabi scheme.

But then later Punjabi tells us that when Jinnah's telegram of disapproval arrived, he amended his original tripartite confederal scheme and prepared a new version of it which was put in the Introduction. "In the scheme I proposed to split up India into five federations to be linked together by a confederal centre."<sup>2</sup>

These two statements cannot be reconciled. The reference to Jinnah's telegraphic instruction makes the problem more



difficult to disentangle. According to Punjabi himself, Jinnah had merely objected to the use of the word "Pakistan" in the title of the book. Punjabi could have changed the title without altering his recommendations. Why did he substantially change his proposal? And then why did he attribute the amended scheme to Mamdot? We have no information on which these questions can be answered. It is possible that Mamdot, after having read the manuscript of the book and before or after hearing from Jinnah, suggested a 5-federation confederation in place of Punjabi's 3-federation scheme. But this is mere speculation.

In the covering letter which accompanied copies of the book Mamdot used words which helped to deepen the confusion. After a brief statement of the political situation then obtaining in India, he wrote: "This has *led me to think* that there can be such a scheme as may appeal to the British Government, the Muslims and the Rulers of the Indian States". About the book and its author he said: "In the accompanying book 'Confederacy of India', which *I am submitting* for your careful perusal, *our author* has discussed the Indian political situation from various points of view and shown the need of dividing the Indian sub-continent into various regions. . . ."<sup>3</sup> This is vague language and does not make it clear, as it should have done, that the scheme contained in the book is the author's and that it was neither inspired by himself nor owed anything to his own suggestions.

In these circumstances it was not very far-fetched for some people to conclude that Mamdot was the real author of the scheme and that he had merely used a pseudonym in order not to commit the Muslim League, of which he was the president in the Punjab, to the solution suggested in it. Some historians have chosen to adopt this position and to ascribe the Punjabi scheme to Mamdot.<sup>4</sup> Apart from the contents of the book (especially the Introduction), the name of its publisher and the covering letter by Mamdot, there was also a contemporary news item in a Lahore English daily which attributed the scheme to Mamdot without any doubts or reservations.

Mamdot's covering letter bore the date of 2 July 1939. But it seems that copies of the book were released to the press a few days earlier, or perhaps an enterprising reporter on the staff of the newspaper had managed to secure an advance copy. Anyhow the *Civil and Military Gazette* of 29 June carried a prominently-placed

5-column report, with a double-column headline, with the titles: "Five Federations Proposed: Scheme of Nawab Sir Mahomed Shah Nawaz Khan of Mamdot".

After putting the following passage from the Introduction of the book in clarendon type: "Self-determination in their own regions is the birthright of the Muslims. Constitutionally as well as morally no power can deprive them of this right. In the case of there being unreasonable opposition even to the separation of the Muslim Regions from Hindu India, the Muslims will be within their right in going to all extremes and in trying all methods open to them to achieve it"<sup>5</sup>, the report went on to say: "With these striking words, Nawab Sir Mahomed Shah Nawaz Khan of Mamdot, a leading landlord and a member of the Punjab Legislative Assembly, has forwarded a scheme of 'redistributing India on religious, cultural and linguistic affinities' to the Constitution Sub-Committee of the All-India Muslim League, which will meet in Bombay on July 2 to discuss and finally to adopt one of the various schemes, which have been proposed as alternatives to the federal scheme contained in the Government of India Act." Next it reproduced two more paragraphs from the book, and then misquoted a paragraph from Mamdot's covering letter (which it called a "note attached to this scheme" by the Nawab).

It prefaced a description of the scheme by saying that "the original scheme, prepared by a 'punjabi', contemplated a tripartite confederation of three federations", and that "the Nawab of Mamdot suggests what he considers an improvement in so far as he advocates the creation of two more federations. . . so that there may be a quinquartite instead of a tripartite confederacy". Then the report went on to describe the scheme by reproducing pp. 10-13 of the Introduction to the *Confederacy of India*. The rest of the report, running to over a column and a half, quoted revenue and expenditure figures from the book in support of the contention that Sind would be self-supporting, NWFP would be no burden on the new federation as its deficit would be shared by all the states in the confederation, and Indus-tan as a whole would be financially sound. Throughout this part of the report Mamdot was made out to be the author of whatever was being quoted or stated. Again and again we come across the phrases "the Nawab suggests", "the Nawab of Mamdot has taken the figures of expenditure", "states the Nawab", and "the Nawab

of Mamdot has worked in round figures".<sup>6</sup>

Thus there was no doubt lurking in the mind of the person who wrote this report that Mamdot was the author of the scheme. In this way the myth or half-myth of a Mamdot scheme was created. Unfortunately there are no means of discovering the truth about the exact part played by Mamdot in the emergence or alteration of the scheme propounded by Punjabi, or about the precise contents of the telegram received by him from Jinnah, because, according to Sir Shah Nawaz's son, the Mamdot papers are not available. As far as my own information, derived from usually reliable sources, goes there are no such papers in existence for the simple reason that the Nawab did not preserve them.

In spite of the big question mark which the foregoing facts put against the existence of a separate Mamdot scheme, it may be useful, for the sake of completeness of record if for nothing else, to give a short account of its contents.<sup>7</sup>

The five federations suggested by Mamdot were to be: The Indus Region Federation, with the Punjab (minus its eastern Hindu tracts), Sind, NWFP, Kashmir, Baluchistan, Bahawalpur, Amb, Dir, Swat, Chitral, Khairpur, Kalat, Las Bela, Kapurthala and Malerkotla as its federal units; the Hindu India Federation, with the United Provinces, Central Provinces, Bihar (with some portions of Bengal), Orissa, Assam, Madras, Bombay, and the native states other than the Rajistan and Deccan states included in the States' Federations, as its federal units; the Rajistan Federation, with the various states of Rajistan and Central India as its federal units; the Deccan States' Federation, with the Hyderabad, Mysore and Bastar states as its federal units; and the Bengal federation, with the Muslim tracts of Eastern Bengal and Goalpara and Sylhet districts of Assam as its provincial units, and Tripura and other states lying within the provincial unit or cut off by its territories from Hindu India as its state units.

The consequent reshaping of India would involve the following six steps: either the creation of a new province consisting of the Hindu areas excluded from the Punjab and the chief commissioner's province of Delhi, or the inclusion of all these areas in the United Provinces; the inclusion of the Hindu parts of Bengal in Bihar or Orissa; the inclusion of the districts of Goalpara and Sylhet of Assam in Muslim Bengal; the creation of a corridor in the north of the present district of Goalpara of Assam in order

to connect the Hindu province of Assam with the Hindu India Federation; the creation of a similar corridor to the Deccan States' Federation through the Hindu India Federation in order to provide a link between Hyderabad and Mysore; and, finally, the creation of a corridor in the Rajistan Federation so that it could be connected with its federal units of Patiala state, half of this corridor to be taken from Hindu India Federation and half from Indusstan.<sup>8</sup>

Each of the five federations would have a governor general supervising the work of the governors of its provincial units. He would be responsible to the "central confederal" authority in relation to the confederal subjects and matters relating to the rights and obligations of the Crown in respect of the native states lying within this federation. The confederal authority would be vested in the viceroy, assisted by a confederal assembly consisting of members drawn from the various federations. Representation in this assembly would be determined by the importance of a federation to the confederacy "as regards its geographical situation in the sub-continent", population, area, economic position and other factors. The governor general would be vested with powers over subjects like foreign relations, defence, water supply from the common natural resources, and rights and obligations of the Crown in relation to the native states. The federations could either directly contribute to the revenues of the confederacy or assign some portions of their revenues for certain specific heads towards its expenditure.

But under no circumstances was the Muslim north-west to consent to assign customs as a source of the confederal revenue. This for an obvious reason. Such an assignment would mean that Indusstan would have no control over tariff policy. This would permanently ruin its future prospects for industrialization, and would otherwise adversely affect its economic interests.

Such a quinquupartite arrangement could have several advantages. "A reduced Hindu minority and Kashmir state with a Muslim population and a Hindu Raja in the federated North-West, will form a guarantee, for the security of the Muslim minority and Hyderabad State with Hindu population and a Muslim Nizam in Hindu India and *vice versa*." It would also hold out an assurance of safety and autonomy in the native states, which were then hesitating to join the federation as envisaged under the 1935

Act, because the confederation would remove their fear of too severe a control by the centre.

Perhaps because it was prepared in much haste, this scheme suffers from at least four weaknesses from which the original Punjabi scheme was free. It provides three corridors whose existence would have complicated the proposed federal and confederal arrangements. Agreement on the dimensions and status of the corridors would have been difficult to procure. The political and constitutional status of the people living in the corridors would have added another difficulty: unless the corridors were envisaged as highways connecting certain areas and covering no other territory.

The shape of the Hindu India Federation was, as Punjabi admits with an unholy glee, deliberately distorted. It was given six regions separated from one another by other federations. Did the maker of the scheme, whoever it was, seriously believe that the Congress would look twice at this plan? A party which refused to consider the most reasonable proposals for separation could not be expected to give a second thought to a scheme which split up Hindu India into arbitrary units which were not even contiguous.

The act of balancing a Muslim Kashmir with a Hindu ruler with a Hindu Hyderabad with a Muslim ruler was meaningless. What security could the Nizam afford to his negligible Muslim minority in the overwhelming Hindu population of his dominions? In any case, the setting up of two separate federations for the princely states had neither the warrant of democracy nor the sanction of common sense. It could only have been proposed with two motives: to discomfit the Hindus by destroying the unity of Hindu India, and to maintain the existence and entity of some prominent Muslim native states like Bhopal and Hyderabad. It is difficult to see how the second object would have been achieved unless the princely system was considered an eternal dispensation. This part of the scheme shows a not disinterested concern with the future of a set of reactionary regimes.

Finally, the scheme does not appear to contemplate independence for India or any part of it. Its constitutional machinery is assembled on the conventional lines of a viceroy, a few governor generals and several governors. The Crown figures as of old in its rights and obligations in relation to the native states. Even the status of a dominion looks beyond its calculations.

## The Summer of 1939

In this rich year the summer was particularly productive. In March, when the Indian summer is already in, Asadullah had presented his scheme of a Muslim north. In June-July came the Punjabi and Mamdot schemes. Mid-July saw two more proposals: the Eastern Afghanistan and the Pakistan Caliphate. July was not yet out when Sir Sikandar Hayat Khan came out with his plan. August began with a suggestion from the Faqir of Ipi and ended with another from two Aligarh dons. By the end of August the high tide had passed, though some trickles still came in and continued to contribute to the stream until the Lahore Resolution, by making the final momentous decision, put a stop to this meandering search.

### Abdul Wadud (July)

It was reported in the middle of July that Mawlana Abdul Wadud of the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Sarhad (Frontier Society of Divines) envisaged an independent Muslim state to be called Eastern Afghanistan. The *Tarjuman-i-Afghan*, a weekly paper published from Peshawar, claimed that his scheme had found support among many tribes on the frontier: the Mohmands, Afridis, and Waziris. Various tribal areas had elected their Amirs who were to meet in August to take a final decision on their attitude towards this proposal. A number of *ulema* and chieftains in the trans-border area and parts of the NWFP were also stated to have given their approval to the scheme. The Red Shirt<sup>9</sup> leaders were, however, strongly opposed to this movement. They were taking the line that it was meant to keep India in perpetual slavery.<sup>10</sup>

No details of this suggestion are now available. Apart from the newspaper report from which the above is taken, only one other reference has come to us, and that is nothing more than a sentence-long summary of what we already know.<sup>11</sup> I have not been able to find the Peshawar weekly in which the plan was originally published.

Such scant knowledge rules out useful comment. So many questions come up for an answer. Who was Abdul Wadud? How strong was the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Sarhad? Was it in touch with or under the influence of the Muslim League? What did the scheme



amount to? Why was it given the name of "Eastern Afghanistan"? How much real support did it enjoy in the province and on the tribal border? These are important questions, but we have no evidence on which they can be answered.

About one thing, however, we can be sure. There is much significance in the fact that this scheme came from the Frontier Province. It is the second proposal for separation to emerge from the land of the Pathans; but even more important is the fact that at this time, as for many years in the past, the Frontier Province was the stronghold of the pro-Congress Red Shirt organization of Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan and Dr. Khan Sahib. The Muslim League was so weak in these parts as to be practically non-existent. Not many people shared the general anxiety of the Indian Muslims about their future in a Hindu-controlled India. The Pathan's own traditions of freedom and the overwhelming Muslim majority in the province made him laugh to scorn the possibility of Hindu rule. He had always looked after himself very well, even in the face of the mighty forces of British imperialism; he was confident of his capacity to deal effectively with Hindu domination if and when it arrived. That explains the ascendancy of the Red Shirts in the province, and also the fact that the Congress dared not act in that area in its own name but used a Muslim, Pathan organization to do its work.

In these circumstances it is a little remarkable that a separatist sentiment should have shown itself in the Frontier Province. It would not be unreasonable to take this as a testimony of a new feeling among the Pathans. Even the cocksure frontiersman was beginning to see some sense in the League claim that independence without some special arrangements for the Muslims could only be a change of masters from the British to the Hindus. This was the beginning of the end of Congress influence in the north-west corner of India, which was to lead by stages to the culmination of 1947 when, in spite of the Red Shirt instructions to the contrary, the Pathans were to vote themselves into Pakistan.

Why was the scheme called "Eastern Afghanistan"? Why did Abdul Wadud not use the word "Pakistan" for his state? It may be possible to explain this. Though nearly every scheme-maker was to a greater or lesser extent influenced by Rahmat Ali, none from Iqbal to Mamdot had called his solution by the name of Pakistan.

For reasons which we will discuss later, Rahmat Ali's ideas exerted more power than his terminology; though in the end his designation for the Muslim state triumphed despite the opposition of the League leaders. So the Mawlana's failure to call his state after Rahmat Ali's suggestion is understandable. But the name he chose is still in need of explanation. In all probability, he wanted a word which would have the greatest appeal for the Pathans. "Afghanistan" could do the trick, for the people of the frontier called themselves Afghans, and should have welcomed a term which underlined their racial origin. But as there was already a country of that name, it had to be qualified in some way. Therefore it was called "Eastern Afghanistan". The name might have caused some suspicion that he wanted to take the frontier areas into Afghanistan so that all the Afghans could have a common homeland and country. But this would have had no foundation, for both reports agree that what was suggested was an "independent Muslim State". So there was to be no merger with Afghanistan; the two states, Afghanistan and Eastern Afghanistan, were to live side by side.

We are not told anything about the areas intended to be included in this state. It is safe to assume that, in spite of the name adopted for it, the new state was not going to be confined to the NWFP and the tribal belt, and perhaps Baluchistan. The area was too small and its resources too meagre to make a viable state. Nor did it solve the problem of the future of the Indian Muslims, not even of the Muslims of the north-west. We may be justified in concluding, though we have no evidence to prove it, that the Wadud scheme aimed at making the north-west of India into an independent Muslim state, like most other schemes of the time, but chose to call it by a new appellation. Further, coming from an association of divines, it is probable that the proposed state was meant to be an Islamic state, not merely a Muslim one.

### The Pakistan Caliphate Scheme (July)

Simultaneously with the Wadud scheme there appeared another proposal prepared by the Punjab Muslim Students Federation. After Rahmat Ali, this is the first scheme on our list to use the word "Pakistan" for the state it wanted to see established.

In fact, the idea of such a state goes back to 1937 when Ibrahim Ali Chishti founded the Tahrik-i-Khilafat-i-Pakistan and in the same

year published his scheme and a map to go with it. The Punjab Muslim Students Federation adopted it in 1939 as its goal, and presented a detailed scheme of Khilafat-i-Pakistan to the Muslim League Constitution Committee. A Pakistan Khilafat Conference was held by the Federation in 1940.<sup>12</sup>

The Federation claimed that the Muslims of northern India had a birth right to their "homelands". Declaring themselves arch enemies of geographical nationalism and western democracy, the framers of the scheme believed in establishing the sovereignty of the *shariyyat* in northern India and in other parts of the sub-continent where Muslims were in a majority. Pakistan Caliphate, their name for the proposed state, was to be ruled by a spiritual dictator, who would be the shadow of God on earth in accordance with the injunctions of the Quran. He was to be both the spiritual and the temporal head of the state. The "unbelievers" living in Pakistan Caliphate were to be treated as *zimmis*; they would pay the *jizya* in lieu of military service.

Pakistan Caliphate was to consist of Sind, Baluchistan, NWFP, Kashmir, the Punjab, and parts of the United Provinces, the Central Provinces and Bihar; the boundary was to run along the Ganges right up to Bengal and Assam. The flag of the state was to be a rectangle divided into four equal portions, each coloured differently, with the pole as a palm tree in green. The four colours were white, green, red and black. A crescent in white was embossed on the two portions (green and black) nearer the pole. Across the whole flag, in two equal lines, was ascribed the first declaration of Islamic creed in Arabic: "I testify to the fact that there is no god but Allah and Muhammad is His apostle".

It was reported that the Federation was enlisting supporters, and planning to give military training to all Muslim students. The idea was to form a body of *mujahids* which would fight for the creation of the new state and, when that had been achieved, serve as its protectors and guardians.<sup>13</sup>

As the students of the Punjab were the most enthusiastic supporters of Rahmat Ali in India, it is quite natural that their proposal should show a deep imprint of his ideas. It accepts and adopts his name of "Pakistan" for the Muslim state, and makes it even more Islamic than he had indicated. But on two points the students show their own mind. The country is to be called Pakistan Caliphate (*Khilafat-i-Pakistan* in Urdu), not merely Pakistan,

probably in order to emphasize its Islamic character. The territories demarcated for the new state are not the same as found in Rahmat Ali's plans for India. The area of his Pakistan is extended to cover parts of three Hindu provinces. This was unmistakably aimed at the creation of a corridor linking Pakistan Caliphate with Bengal and, in the bargain, saving a fair number of Muslims of these areas from Hindu rule. The idea of the corridor might or might not have come from the quinquepartite scheme of Punjabi (or Mamdot). In 1947, just before the actual division of India, Jinnah too was to make a demand for a corridor connecting West Pakistan and East Pakistan.

It would be a mistake to deem this scheme less important than others because it was the work of students. For a number of reasons—the early influence of Rahmat Ali, Iqbal's hold on the youth of the province, the strong national spirit inculcated by and at the Islamia College of Lahore, the presence of a large number of intelligent and patriotic young men with the ability to organize the students, the failure of the Congress and the Unionist Party to influence or tempt the Punjabi youth, the size and quality of the Muslim Urdu press in the province, the large number of schools and colleges, the rather frightening seriousness with which the Punjabi intelligentsia took itself, the fact of Lahore being the intellectual and literary centre of Muslim India, and the incredible regard and deference which Jinnah enjoyed among the Punjabi students long before the province as a whole went over to the Muslim League—the students of the Punjab played a much more significant part in the Pakistan movement than is generally appreciated. Had they not identified themselves with the Pakistan idea so wholeheartedly and at such an early stage, it is doubtful if the League movement of the 'forties would have captured the imagination and votes of the north-western Muslims as easily and completely as it did.

In issuing this scheme the PMSF was not merely adding one more plan to the swelling list, but sending a signal to Jinnah that, no matter what other groups and leaders said or thought or planned, the young among the nation had decided where they desired to go, and wanted him to lead the way. In the history of the idea of Pakistan and the movement for its realization this was a major development. In a way it was the Punjabi student who forced Jinnah to adopt the idea of Pakistan and subscribe it on the

League charter as the goal of Muslim India.

### Sir Sikandar Hayat Khan (May)

If a scheme be judged by the reputation and high office enjoyed by its maker, then the most important of all these proposals appeared at the end of July. It was the work of Sir Sikandar Hayat Khan, the Prime Minister of the Punjab, the leader of the Unionist Party in the province, and a prominent member of the Muslim League.

The Sikandar scheme was issued to the press on 29 July<sup>14</sup>, but Sikandar must have been thinking for some time about the issues involved, and we know that by early May he had come to certain broad conclusions which were to form the basis of his proposals. Obviously he was convinced in his mind of the validity of these conclusions because he referred to them in a public speech. No man holding such a responsible and sensitive office would have announced a set of new suggestions and radical views unless he was quite sure of their abiding value or relevance to current issues and problems.

It is therefore necessary to look at certain passages of his presidential address delivered before the Bombay Presidency Muslim League Conference at Sholapur which clearly foreshadow his later scheme. He firmly rejected the federation contained in the 1935 Act, emphasized the necessity of finding an alternative to it, and enumerated the requirements which a new solution ought to fulfil. "Speaking personally", he said, "and in the light of the experience of the past two years, I am convinced that the scheme of Federation as embodied in the Government of India Act, 1935, has ceased to be suitable, having regard to the rapidly changing circumstances and requirements of the Indian people. I am equally convinced that some sort of Federation suited to the peculiar needs and conditions of India, is essential for the ordered progress of our country. But to be acceptable and workable it must *inter alia* fulfil the following basic conditions: a) that it secures to India the unfettered right of rising to its full political stature, b) that the autonomy and integrity of the units is [*sic.*] effectively guaranteed and that neither the centre nor any unit nor any outside subversive movement shall be allowed to interfere with the internal autonomy and the integrity of individual units, c) that the financial provisions

of the proposed federation shall have free scope for the development of the units, d) that the important minorities and interests in the country shall be effectively guaranteed the fullest possible protection and unhampered development of their political and cultural rights, and their due share in the governance and the administration of the country, and e) that the powers of the Centre shall be confined to a few essential subjects and functions and that the residue shall vest either in the individual units or groups of units as they may desire."<sup>15</sup>

These five principles became, so to speak, the terms of reference within which he prepared his scheme. Therefore they merit some notice. But first the remarkable nature of the whole statement must be recognized. It is true that in 1935 and 1936 both the Congress and the League had rejected the 1935 constitution,<sup>16</sup> and the Congress had pledged itself to "break the constitution from within", whatever that meant. Leaders of all parties were going up and down the country declaring their opposition to the new federal scheme and promising the public that it shall never be implemented in full. Yet, the premiers of Congress provinces expressing such views was one thing, the spectacle of the prime minister of a Muslim province, who did not head a League government and whose loyalty to and sympathy with the British were well known, so utterly rejecting the constitution under which he held his office was another. Such events prove that apart from other factors—like the failure of a required number of native states to enter the federation, and later the outbreak of the war—the 1935 constitution had made itself unacceptable to every one in India, though for different reasons.

Coming back to Sikandar's five principles, the first looked forward to a day of complete independence for India. This is rather important because he was generally criticized for sacrificing the thought of independence at the altar of his loyalty to the British. The popular image of him, as of his other colleagues in the Unionist Party<sup>17</sup>, was that of a formidable supporter of the British *raj* for whom imperial favours carried more weight than public approval or national interest—a picture as unkind as it was untrue. But it must be acknowledged that under this principle independence was not judged to be an immediate objective: the new order of things should be such as would give India the right of "rising to its full political stature".



Secondly, provincial autonomy and integrity were to be jealously safeguarded and no compromise or bargain made that would barter them away. Thirdly, this autonomy was to be made secure by giving to the units sufficient financial freedom and material resources. Fourthly, the "important minorities" were to receive guarantees that their political and cultural rights would be fully safeguarded, and further that they would receive their due share in government and administration; the latter assurance obviously resulting in composite executives and communal representation in public services. Lastly, the new federal centre was to be a weak one with only a few powers, the residue to belong to the units. The suggestion that some units might decide to combine in order to exercise the residue opened the possibility of a three-tier structure (as was later prescribed by the Cabinet Mission). It might also be construed as a hint that the Muslim provinces of the north-west would come together to form one large unit in the Indian federation, which had been Iqbal's solution in 1930, or a sort of sub-federation in federal relationship with the centre.

### The Sikandar Scheme (July)

After having worked for some months on a scheme embodying these principles, Sikandar put the finished product before the public on 29 July, and most Indian newspapers carried a very full summary of the proposals in their issue of the following day. The scheme was contained in a 35-page pamphlet entitled *Outlines of a Scheme of Indian Federation*, published by the author himself and printed at the Mufid-i-Am Press of Lahore.

What follows in this section is a summary of this pamphlet, as far as possible in the words of the author. I merely add or omit a few words to provide connecting links. The language throughout is Sir Sikandar's, though to bring out the special significance of certain phrases or sentences I may put them in quotation marks.

The scheme opens with a brief statement of reasons which render it necessary to frame a new federal plan to replace the one prepared by the British in 1935.<sup>18</sup> Without going into details, the fact is recognized that the 1935 constitution is unacceptable to a vast majority of the people in India. At the same time it is admitted by every one that a federation of some kind is not only desir-

able but indispensable for the order and peaceful progress of the country. Any alternative scheme to be generally acceptable must be so devised as to allay the reasonable doubts and apprehensions of the minorities and the native states, and at the same time meet the criticism levelled on the score of inadequacy of political power which it is proposed to transfer to the representatives of the people under the present scheme. The problem is undoubtedly difficult and complex, but it should not be beyond the ingenuity of British statesmen to plan a revised federal scheme which, if not universally acceptable, would at least command a much larger measure of support, and be free from some more serious defects which have shown themselves in the working of the 1935 constitution in the provincial sphere. It is my fixed conviction that any scheme which does not rigidly and specifically circumscribe the authority of the centre to matters of all-India concern is not likely to work. Both the minorities and the native states have made the point that the present scheme does not afford adequate protection against interference from the centre. It is feared that a domineering central government might undermine the authority and independence of the units and reduce provincial autonomy to a farce. The safeguards contained in the constitution would prove ineffective in curbing such a tendency. The operation of the provincial part of the constitution has already demonstrated the hollowness of the claims made on behalf of these safeguards. In my opinion, any federal scheme to be successful in India must take into account the legitimate desire of the minorities to safeguard their religious, political, cultural and economic rights and interests, and must secure complete autonomy to the provinces, and complete immunity to the princely states from undue interference by the centre or by the British Indian provinces. In the absence of such guarantees willing co-operation will not be forthcoming, and the federal machinery will not be able to work smoothly or successfully.

The salient features of the scheme I am going to recommend may be mentioned here. First, instead of bringing British Indian provinces and native states into the federation as two distinct components, it will provide for their entering it together on a regional basis. This will be conducive to the solidarity of the country and the stability of the central government. Secondly, it will encourage collaboration among contiguous units, whether

they be provinces or states, on grounds of geographical proximity, common language, and affinity of economic and other interests. Two examples of this collaboration may be given. In administrative matters, and particularly in the fields of law and order, it will encourage the various units in a zone to make reciprocal arrangements and, when necessary, to devise a common line of action. In the economic sphere it will enable the units to share in common arrangements for the establishment of institutes for industrial and agricultural research, for experimental and demonstration farms and other similar matters. Thirdly, such collaboration will tend to reduce causes and occasions for friction between provinces and states which would be inevitable if the two kinds of units are kept separate in watertight compartments.

Fourthly, by confining the jurisdiction of the centre to a few specified subjects of common concern, it will enable both the provinces and the states to enter the federation on a uniform basis. At the same time it will also allay the apprehensions of the units by eliminating the possibility of undue interference by the centre in their internal affairs. Fifthly, it will ensure the willing and loyal co-operation of the units with the centre and thus avoid the growth of fissiparous tendencies among the units. Sixthly, it will effectively safeguard the integrity and autonomy of provincial and state units. Lastly, it will give to the minorities a greater sense of security.

The first step in the formation of the new federation will be the demarcation of the country into the following seven zones:

Zone 1: Assam and Bengal with Bengal states and Sikkim. One or two western districts of Bengal will be excluded in order to reduce the size of the zone.

Zone 2: Bihar and Orissa, with the area transferred from Bengal to Orissa. This will benefit Orissa which at present has limited resources and a small area.

Zone 3: the United Provinces and their states.

Zone 4: Madras, Travancore, Madras states and Coorg.

Zone 5: Bombay, Hyderabad, western Indian states, Bombay states, Mysore, and the states of the Central Provinces.

Zone 6: Rajputana states (but not Bikaner and Jaisalmer), Gwalior, Central Indian states, Bihar and Orissa states, the Central Provinces and Berar.

Zone 7: the Punjab, Sind, NWFP, Kashmir, the Punjab states,

Baluchistan, and Bikaner and Jaisalmer.

The composition of the zones suggested here is only tentative, and can be altered if necessary in consultation with the various interests concerned.

Each zone will have a legislature of its own, containing representatives from both the provinces and the states included in the zone. The share of each unit in the zonal legislature will be the same as allotted to it in the federal assembly under the 1935 Act. (Sikandar calls the zonal assembly "regional legislature"; for the sake of clarity, in this summary it is throughout called "zonal legislature"). This legislature will deal only with the subjects included in the zonal list. But if two or more units of the zone make a request to that effect in the interest of uniformity and facility of administration, it may legislate on subjects falling in the provincial list. With a view to giving additional security to the smaller units, it is provided that no measure relating to a subject included in the zonal list shall be considered to have been passed unless two-thirds of the house vote for it. The zonal legislatures can authorize the federal legislature to legislate on subjects included in the zonal and provincial lists, but at least four out of seven zones must ask for this to make the authorization effective. Yet, unless this is done by all the zones the enactments passed under this provision shall have force only in those zones which have expressly asked for such legislation. Moreover, any law passed by the federal legislature at the request of the zones and by the zonal legislatures at the request of the units shall be repealed if in the case of the federal legislature at least three zones and in case of the zonal legislatures at least half the units in that zone ask for its repeal.

The federal legislature shall not be a separately elected body. All the members of the various zonal legislatures shall collectively constitute the "Central Federal Assembly", which will consist of 375 members: 250 from the provinces and 125 from the states. One-third of this total strength shall be Muslim. The other minorities will be allotted the share apportioned to them in the federal assembly under the 1935 Act.

Zonal legislatures will be elected in the following manner. In the case of the provinces, the procedure will be the same as laid down by the 1935 Act for the election of provincial representatives in the federal assembly. The method for the native states is a little

complicated. During the first ten years from the date of inauguration of the new constitution, three-fourths will be nominated by the Ruler and one-fourth "selected" by the Ruler out of a panel to be elected by the State Assembly or other similar institutions. During the next five years, two-thirds will be nominated by the Ruler and one-third "elected" as laid down above. After fifteen years, one-half will be nominated and one-half elected. After twenty years and thereafter, one-third will be nominated and two-thirds elected.

The federal legislature will be unicameral. If it is desired that room must be found for "special interests", which were given seats in the Council of State by the 1935 Act, then the strength of the house may be increased to accommodate them. In case this arrangement is agreed upon, the additional seats should be equally distributed among the seven zones, say, 14 for each zone or 98 in all. Of these, 60 should be reserved for provinces and 38 for states, provided that the distribution is so arranged as not to affect the over-all one-third representation of the Muslims and the fair representation of other minorities.

The federal executive will consist of the Viceroy and Governor General and a Council of Ministers. The membership of the Council will, as far as possible, not exceed eleven or be less than seven, including the prime minister. The Viceroy will be the representative of the King. The prime minister will be appointed by the Viceroy from among the members of the federal legislature, and the other ministers also from among the assembly in consultation with the prime minister. But four qualifications will govern this procedure. Each zone shall have at least one representative in the cabinet. At least one-third of the ministers shall be Muslim. At least two, if the number of ministers is nine or below, and at least three, if the number is more than nine, shall be chosen from among the representatives of the states. During the first fifteen or twenty years, the Viceroy may nominate two of his ministers either from the assembly or from outside, and entrust to them the portfolios of defence and external affairs.

A tentative allocation of portfolios and designation of ministers will produce this list: prime minister, minister for defence, minister for external affairs, minister of finance, minister of interior (home), minister of communications, minister to look after minority interests, minister of co-ordination (to arrange co-ordination

and uniformity among the zones in matters of common concern), and minister of commerce and industries. The minister for external affairs may also be in charge of the "affairs of the Indian States".

The normal term of office of the ministers will be the same as the tenure of the federal assembly, i.e., five years. They will retain office "at the pleasure of His Majesty's representative, i.e., the Viceroy and Governor General". A minister will be removed if he loses the confidence of the majority of the representatives of his zonal legislature. The ministers as a body will resign if a vote of no-confidence in the ministry is carried in the federal legislature.

The Federal Railway Authority, first created by the 1935 Act, will be so constituted as to include at least one representative from each of the seven zones. In addition, the constitution will contain effective safeguards on the following subjects: protection of the legitimate interests of the minorities, prevention of racial discrimination against British-born subjects, violation of treaty and other contractual rights of the native states, protection against interference by the federal executive or legislature in the internal affairs of the provinces or states, safety of India against foreign aggression and the peace and tranquillity of the country, prevention of subversive activities by the citizens of a unit or zone against another unit or zone, and protection of the culture and religion of the minorities.

The community-wise composition of the Indian Army as it stood on 1 January 1937 shall not be altered. If its peacetime strength is to be reduced or increased, the 1937 proportion of the various communities will not be disturbed. This condition may be relaxed in the event of a war or other grave emergency.

As regards the division of powers between the centre and the units or zones, only those subjects the retention of which is essential in the interests of the country as a whole and for its proper administration shall be allocated to the centre, e.g., defence, external affairs, communications, customs, coinage, and currency, etc. The remaining subjects which are at present included in the federal list will be transferred to the units or zones. All powers not specifically mentioned in the federal list "shall vest in the units, and, in the case of the subjects allocated to zones, in the regional legislatures". The concurrent list of the 1935 Act will be revised, and legislation under it limited by two conditions: that



the federal legislature will not undertake legislation on any subject in this list unless at least four zones have applied for it, and that any legislation so enacted will apply only to the zones which have asked for it. On all points of doubt or difference of opinion about the meaning or contents of the federal, concurrent, zonal, provincial or state lists, the decision of the Viceroy "in his discretion" will be final.

Adequate and effective machinery shall be set up both at the centre and in the provinces to look after and protect the interests of the minorities. One way of doing this may be to create statutory committees consisting of representatives of the minorities.<sup>19</sup>

### Defects of the Sikandar Scheme

The weaknesses of the Sikandar scheme are too obvious and too many to be missed by the reader. Space does not permit a detailed examination of each, and we must be content with a brief reference to an average reader's first reactions. More points will emerge when we deal with the reception accorded to the scheme by the Indian press and the various political groups.

Sikandar's premisses and conclusions were not in alignment. He started with two propositions which gave no cause for quarrel. The 1935 constitution had become totally unacceptable to nearly every section of public opinion in India. A new constitution was required which must, above everything else, fulfil two requirements: it must provide a weak centre, and it must afford full protection to the minorities. In general terms this was the Muslim position. But the constitution he produced did not follow the principles which he had adopted at the outset. The centre was made weaker but not weak enough to give satisfaction to the Muslims. The scheme also did not contain any special or effective suggestions for the protection of minorities; it merely laid down a few general statements which were no more convincing than oft-heard platitudes, and a few provisions which were too vague to bring any change.

Ignoring the minority problem for the moment (though that was the very *raison d'être* of the scheme), the suggested plan is not even a passable exercise in constitution making. So many loose ends are left hanging in the air that it is almost impossible, and certainly improbable, that it would have worked in practice. A

few examples will show this.

The federal ministers are held accountable to three different, and possibly mutually antagonistic, authorities: the Viceroy who represented the British Crown, the federal legislature which spoke for the whole country, and the zonal representatives in the federal legislature who would reasonably be expected to consider the zonal interests above the federal. The result would be an exceedingly complicated situation, which would be further aggravated by the communal composition of the cabinet and the Hindu-Muslim clash inevitable in a composite government. In a government split like this both horizontally and vertically the Viceroy would always have an upper hand. Similarly, the provision for the division of subjects between the centre and the various kinds of units is so confused that no clear picture emerges of what the position would be like in practice. Further, the suggested constitution contains no provision for its revision and amendment.

A more serious objection to which the scheme generously exposes itself is its refusal to contemplate an independent future for India. The "viceroy and governor general as representing His Majesty the King" is cheerfully placed at the head of the federal executive. And far from being a constitutional or formal head of state, he is armed with some very real powers. The ministers are going to be in office at his pleasure. The external affairs minister will also act like the old foreign secretary of the Government of India. On all differences of opinion about the division of subjects the Viceroy will have the final word "in his discretion". According to one provision, the Viceroy will appoint his external affairs and defence ministers from outside the legislature "during the first 20 (or 15) years". Not to speak of complete independence, even dominion status is ruled out for many years to come. India is declared firmly to be a colony and judged confidently to continue as such for a long time.

After British India it is the native states which are put in their place. There is a paradox here, but one to be easily resolved. The native states are given much importance. Zones are created so that states may associate themselves with the federation on an equal footing with the provinces. Their representation in the zonal and federal legislatures is subjected to a number of safeguards. Their quota of the federal executive is protected by a constitutional provision. But all this is to help and protect the ruler, not his

people. Even at the end of twenty years, when the constitution will be fully democratized, the representatives of the states are not to be fully elective. One-third of them would be for ever nominated by the ruler. Democratic elections in one part of the federation were thus ruled out for all time to come. That an association of democratic provinces and half-democratic states in the same federation might create strange and difficult problems did not occur to Sikandar.

By retaining a powerful Viceroy, protecting the rulers of the native states, borrowing the system of elections from the 1935 Act and following the "unacceptable" old constitution in so many other ways, Sikandar justified the taunt of his critics that his scheme was no more than a set of amendments to the Act of 1935, and therefore beneath notice.

Sir Sikandar had apparently presented his scheme in an attempt to solve the Muslim problem. And judged by this standard it is a complete failure. He might well have been sincere in his intentions, but from the contents of his pamphlet it is clear that he had misunderstood the situation. We look in vain for a practicable solution of the communal problem. Like other problems, this one too had its phases. By 1939 it had travelled beyond the reach of ordinary safeguards and conventional protective measures. The talk was no longer of separate electorates and adequate share in political power. The central issue now was the fact of Muslim fear of Hindu rule. This Sikandar did not even touch. People were now thinking of separation, and the idea of Pakistan, in its various forms, had been before them for nine years. Sikandar failed to say a word about it. If one reads his pamphlet without the context of what was going on in 1939 and what had gone before, one is carried back to the 'twenties when the League, and particularly Jinnah, had first begun to think of an Indian federation with the residue vested in the provinces and with some special safeguards for the Muslims. It seems as if for Sikandar time had stood still, and the future of the Muslims presented no new problems. His only acknowledgment of changed conditions is his suggestion for the creation of zones. This could hardly be a solution, for it did not add anything to Muslim security. The north-west zone had already figured in nearly every scheme, and Sikandar's failure to exclude the eastern Hindu areas from the Punjab ignored the dangers so well expressed by Punjabi. The Bengal and Assam zone in the

Sikandar scheme did not exclude the whole of the Hindu area of eastern Bengal or the Hindu districts of Assam, and brought in a curious partner in the body of Sikkim. No rational principle or practical consideration lay behind the creation of other zones.

Apart from zones, every other recommendation of the scheme had been suggested or considered at the RTC. It could have had some value had it been presented in mid or late 'twenties, or, at the latest, during the RTC discussions. Even in the early 'thirties some Muslims might have considered it too conservative and inadequate to their purpose. Now that separation was the major issue, it could not excite any interest among the Muslims. Even for those outside the Muslim community who appreciated the grave problem posed by the Indian situation it brought no new message, either of hope or despondency. In short, it was out of date.

### Non-Muslim Reaction

It is reported that Sikandar sent a copy of his proposals to the Viceroy one week before they were released to the press, before Lord Linlithgow left Simla on his tour of Orissa. It seems that he had not sent copies officially to the Marquess of Zetland, the Secretary of State for India, or to other men at the India Office. But the pamphlet was dispatched to "certain friends in London who are likely to bring it to the notice generally of all those who are likely to be interested in the scheme".<sup>20</sup>

We do not know what Linlithgow thought of the scheme, or with what comments he forwarded it to the British government. We know, however, that the "friends in London", or at least those among them who recorded their opinion for the public, did not receive it with enthusiasm. A few words of mild approval marked the short review which appeared in an unimportant London journal.<sup>21</sup> In a much longer study Sir Louis Stuart, who was quite familiar with India, pointed to one of its chief failings. "The retention of the present form of provincial administration will create difficulties", he wrote. "In the first Zone non-Congress Bengal with a complete majority is to work with Congress Assam. In the seventh Zone the Congress NWFP will be in a minority against the non-Congress Punjab and Sind. There will be further friction as between Provinces and States. In the fifth Zone the

Bombay Congress province will be controlled by States, as will be the Central Provinces and Berar in the sixth Zone. The United Provinces States may object to the control of the Congress Province in the third Zone as may Travancore to the control of the Madras Congress Province in the fourth Zone. Homogeneity will be obtained only in the second Zone."<sup>22</sup>

Professor Sir Reginald Coupland, who wrote a most perceptive analysis of modern Indian politics, fully understood Sir Sikandar's insistence on a weak centre, and characterized it as "a striking illustration of the extent to which the prospect of a Congress Raj had undermined the conception of Indian unity". He acknowledged that this kind of centre, which he called "Agency Centre", was "a new constitutional idea". But he doubted if even a centre of Sikandar's conception would be acceptable to the Muslims as creating complete security. "However 'minimal' the scope of the Centre's authority, would the Muslims in their present mood tolerate its exercise by so great a Hindu majority? Would they tolerate *any* Hindu majority in *any* Centre? In other words, was any form of federal union, however tenuous, now practicable, or must the knot be cut by sheer Partition?"<sup>23</sup>

It is true that this was written in 1945 or 1944, when the course of Muslim politics had become unmistakably clear and its objective firmly fixed at complete separation. There might have been an element of hindsight in this criticism of Sikandar's federal centre, but the different schemes appearing in 1939 showed that even then the prospect of a centre with a permanent Hindu majority was becoming a nightmare for the Muslims. Coupland put his finger on the one feature of the scheme which made it utterly unacceptable to them. Of what comfort could it be to the Muslims to possess a one-third share in the federal assembly when the entire machinery of government, legislative, executive, administrative, local and judicial, would be dominated by an unalterable Hindu majority?

The Congress leaders and the generality of Hindu observers saw nothing good in the scheme. The weak centre was not to their liking. The demarcation of zones earned their disapproval. The safeguards for the protection of minorities won only qualified support. The governmental machinery provided in the scheme was rejected: it was either unworkable in practice or merely a copy of the hateful 1935 Act. Sikandar was not complimented on his

efforts to save the unity of India or on his refusal to go over to the separationist Muslim camp. It is amusing to find some Hindu critics calling him a "Pakistani"; while the Muslims were puzzled at his failure to understand, or provide for the solution of, the Muslim problem.<sup>24</sup> He received the treatment reserved for those in politics who point to the middle way and to the follies of embracing the extremes. But practical politics are not the same thing as philosophical speculation; and in the peculiar Indian situation of that time it is very doubtful if the middle way could command the virtues of either practicability or acceptance.

The Indian press gave wide coverage to the scheme, devoting many columns to its description and editorial and other commentary. But notice is not approval. As the Simla correspondent of *The Times* reported: "The scheme has had a lukewarm reception. The attention it has attracted is traceable to respect felt for the man who inspired it rather than the merits of the project, which is generally regarded as impracticable."<sup>25</sup>

It is instructive to look at the reaction of some of the better-known Indian newspapers of different shades of thought, for it provides a faithful, though journalistic, picture of contemporary public opinion. Let me take two of the British-owned and British-edited English language newspapers to illustrate the views of this sector of the press. The *Times of India* of Bombay asked why Sikandar should have evolved a scheme which he knew had little chance of being seriously considered and almost none of being accepted. Disputing his premiss that the 1935 constitution was not acceptable to any major party in India, the paper believed that if "some concessions of detail" were offered the Princes would accept the federation, that the Congress was now "by no means eager" to oppose the federation, and that it was only the Muslim community whose antagonism was likely to be stubborn and which, therefore, would be most inclined to consider this alternative proposition. Was the new plan reasonable or workable? The regional arrangements implied in the creation of the zones were not likely to appeal to either states or provinces. Zonal assemblies would create the same suspicions as were earlier created by a fully federal centre. The zonal machinery would, in practice, if not in original purpose, threaten provincial autonomy. The Congress and the Princes would probably oppose the scheme. It would be interesting to see if it was officially adopted by the Muslim League.



Alarmed at the possibility of finding themselves a permanent opposition party at the centre, the Muslims "may understandably be attracted by a plan which insists on three Muslims in the federal cabinet and would appear to ensure, at least for some time, Government by a coalition ministry". Some critics saw a possible birth of Pakistan in the creation of the seventh zone in so far as, if the Muslims were dissatisfied with the working of federal government, the administrative nucleus would be already at hand upon which to build up a separate political unit. "Although we are reluctant to read so much into Sir Sikandar Hayat Khan's scheme, there is no doubt that until a more convincing explanation has been given of why it was produced at this late and critical time, controversy will continue to fasten on to the motives for its introduction rather than upon the intrinsic merits of the plan itself."

After having devoted one full column to rejecting the premisses on which the scheme was based and questioning the motives for its presentation at that particular time, the leader-writer finally condescended to examine the contents of the plan. By aggravating communal and regional divisions, it struck at the essential unity of India, "which is the ideal everyone should have in mind". It was merely the work of one man. On the other hand, the 1935 constitution was evolved by representatives of all communities and of British India, the native states and Great Britain; "its position as an agreed plan is therefore unassailable". The goal of a federal India outlined by Sikandar was "fundamentally sound and practicable"; his method of achieving the goal was neither.<sup>26</sup>

It would be criminal to let such ignorance pass without comment. To say in the middle of 1939 that the Princes were almost ready to join the federation, and that the Congress's rejection of the 1935 constitution was only a "show" in order to maintain its bargaining power, shows how grossly misinformed the leader-writer was. The possible connection between the setting up of a north-western zone and the ultimate creation of a Pakistan was bound to strike anyone who was aware of the different schemes then being propounded by the Muslims. No question of motives was involved in this: Sikandar was merely trying to present a compromise between the conventional federal solution and the Muslim demand for complete separation. The attempt might have been clumsy and inapt, but that was no reason to doubt his good

faith. The paper was perturbed by the timing of the scheme, and that was either ignorance or hypocrisy. This was the time when Muslims of different schools of thought were looking for a solution, and the League was soliciting advice on possible alternatives to the 1935 federal arrangements. The writer of the editorial should have been aware of the other schemes in the field. If he was not, he was letting his ignorance suspect the motives of Sir Sikandar: an inexcusable practice. Nor did he explain how the plan aggravated communal divisions.

Obsessed, like all Englishmen, with the "essential unity of India", he prescribed it as the ideal that everyone should keep before himself. Repeating this advice might have been a motion which every upholder of British rule had to go through, but it turned a blind eye to a lot that was then going on around him in the country. To call the Sikandar scheme the work of one individual was correct. To call the 1935 constitution "an agreed plan" was not; for it was an Act made and enacted by the British Parliament without much regard for what had been talked of at the RTC. To say that the 1935 constitution was not unacceptable to the Congress was a palpable falsehood, for the party had officially pledged itself to "break it from within". As a whole the editorial was a typical example of the British habit of closing their eyes to all realities which were unpalatable, and opening them when it was just a little too late to do anything about them.

The *Civil and Military Gazette* of Lahore was more understanding and better informed, though it, too, rejected the scheme as practical politics. Sikandar's proposal demanded consideration for two reasons: the maker held "an eminent position in the Islamic world of India" and was the prime minister of the premier Muslim province in the sub-continent; it must, presumably, be a synthesis of the good points of all similar schemes which had gone before. The reasons given by Sikandar for the rejection of the 1935 constitution were sound, and his view that no imposed federation would work smoothly was correct. The paper was "fully in accord" with the suggestion that more powers should be delegated to the provinces by the centre.<sup>27</sup> It was also significant that Sikandar had "very carefully graduated the increase of influence of the States' peoples in the affairs of the zonal assemblies and the federal legislature". Time might well prove that the scheme "contains the seeds of that mutual confidence between States

and provinces which is essential to the success of any all-India federation and which is so conspicuous by its absence at present". The Congress would certainly reject the scheme because its plan is "definitely anti-national". It glorified the units and the zones at the expense of the federation. "It is on the rock of Congress opposition that Sir Sikandar Hayat Khan's plan will be reeked, but it may be that it will force the Congress to come into the open with some constructive plan as yet another alternative to the Act of 1935." It was obvious that the scheme's adoption would mean a large rewriting of the 1935 Act, and "the British Government would not venture to place it before Parliament save on the urgent representation of the Government of India that it had secured the unanimous support of all parties and interests in this country. In our view that is a forlorn hope; and for this reason, while we welcome the scheme as a constructive effort to solve many of the problems with which India is beset, we must relegate it to the sphere of academic discussion rather than of practical politics."<sup>28</sup>

The Hindu-cum-Congress press reacted with unreserved condemnation. Apart from criticism of details, the general approach was that it was an insidious attack on federation, that Sikandar was in reality playing Jinnah's game, and that it was a subtle attempt to create a Pakistan. The *Amrit Bazar Patrika* asked whether the almost simultaneous publication of the scheme and of Jinnah's statement on federation was a mere accident or part of a pre-arranged plan of attack on the federation. The *Hitavada* drew attention to the fact that Jinnah had left it to Sikandar to provide an alternative to a scheme (the 1935 federation) which the former had roundly condemned. "One is almost tempted to think", it wrote, "that the two almost simultaneous gestures of the Muslim league spokesmen can only be treated as a bargaining counter".

It was widely believed that Sikandar's object was to improve the position of the Muslims at the centre by a regrouping of the constituent units. This charge was levelled not only against Sikandar but also against Jinnah and all the leaders of the League who were expressing lack of faith in the principles of democracy and majority rule in their application to India. The *Tribune* of Lahore, for example, announced that if India was to have a democratic *swaraj* she must for ever shed her communalism. "The worst

thing about Sir Sikandar's scheme", it said, "is that it entirely ignores this sovereign truth and contains no provision for the development of a democratic nationhood in India. . . . The sole drift of his scheme is on the one hand to perpetuate communalism in British India and autocracy in the States and on the other to place in the hands of a party combining in itself the evils of communal obscurantism and princely autocracy and reactionaryism the supreme authority for the government of India." The *Amrit Bazar Patrika* saw the League as "out to convert the Hindu majority for all-India into a minority and raise the Muslims to the status of a privileged majority". In an angry comment that revealed the Congress mentality it said: "If anything is calculated to make the acceptance of the Federation scheme by a large body of Hindus or even by the Congress a possibility, it is the attitude of the Muslim communalists." In the same vein the *Sind Observer*, spokesman of the Hindus of Sind, considered the zonal legislatures of the Sikandar scheme as serving no other useful purpose than "that of introducing the Raj of the minorities", but did not explain how this would come about.

The most devastating condemnation came from the *Hindu*. It lamented that the operation of the scheme would prevent the emergence of a united India. It called it an obsession of Sikandar that the 1935 federal constitution did not provide for the protection of the minorities; on the contrary, it was so excessively solicitous for minority susceptibilities as to make democratic government impossible. It described the zonal legislatures as "a fifth wheel to the coach", and firmly believed that the creation of the zones would lead to the achievement of Pakistan. The country would be parcelled out into seven zones among whom there would be at least three dominated by the Muslims. "It would be obviously impossible to frame a reasonably satisfactory scheme under the influence of the strange political mathematics that would convert a majority into a minority"; and this was the main purpose towards which the scheme was directed.

Sikandar's overwhelming anxiety to establish a supreme position for the Muslims and the princes was underlined by several Hindu papers. The *Searchlight* thought that he had been more anxious to provide for the British power and for the minority and the princes than for the people and the country as a whole. The *Tribune* regretted that he had placed the Hindu community, which con-

stituted 68% of the population of India, into a position of subordination to the minorities and the princes. "If the persons claiming to represent 80 millions of people make a deliberate and unblushing attempt, in association with the Princes claiming to represent another 64 millions, to impose their political yoke upon the large majority of the people... is it any wonder if a few of the majority community should lose their heads and claim for the majority community the right to rule over the minorities?"<sup>29</sup>

The *Partap*, an Urdu Hindu paper of Lahore, asserted that Sikandar's aim was nothing but to strengthen the Muslim position, and to protect the rulers of the native states against any democratic demand or tendency from among their subjects. The *Milap*, another Hindu Urdu paper of Lahore, called it "another form of the Pakistan Scheme"; the only difference between these two was that while the Pakistan scheme was "like a crude carving knife which repelled India at the outset", the Sikandar scheme was like "a sharp and invisible sword which will cut India into several pieces, but the cutting will be painless".<sup>30</sup>

We have looked in some detail at the Hindu reaction not because the scheme deserved so much notice but because the attitude of the Hindu press was indicative of the way in which the Muslim problem was being viewed by Hindu public opinion. Any proposals aimed at ameliorating the Muslim condition were suspect in Hindu eyes. It would have been understandable if the Hindu press had turned its guns against a plan which contemplated a disintegration of India or the creation of a Muslim state in the sub-continent. But Sikandar had, as it were, gone out of his way to placate the Indian (Hindu) nationalists by retaining a federal framework for India and definitely rejecting a separation or secession of Muslim areas. He had, in fact, done this with so much emphasis that he had lost Muslim sympathy.

But the Hindus had a case. Sikandar's federation was a poor facade covering a strange mixture of federal, confederal, zonal, regional, provincial and other arrangements. He might have thought that this would make Muslim life easier; only time would have showed its efficacy. But he made sure that the Hindu provinces should be so cut up and their different portions attached to a number of native states in such a way that no Congressman or Indian nationalist would agree to read his scheme twice. Therefore, the Hindus had some justification for adopting such an attitude.

Quite apart from the communal heat engulfing all parties at this time, no Indian nationalist could be expected to give serious thought to the scheme at any political stage.

### Muslim Reaction

The Sikandar scheme was the most unfortunate of all the plans presented in 1939 in the sense that it attracted rejection like a magnet. No party or group gave it support. No recognizable section of public opinion blessed it. Neither the British, to whose dominion in India it granted a long lease<sup>31</sup>, nor the princes, to whose rule it brought a measure of permanence, chose to say a favourable word. Above all, the Muslims, in whose interest it was apparently prepared, turned it down with a unanimity which must have broken Sikandar's heart or at least inflicted a serious injury on his *amour propre*.

The journalist on the staff of the *Times of India* who collected press reactions to the scheme, and who was quoted in the previous section, wrote: "I am told that Muslim papers have generally supported Sir Sikandar's proposals and that the Hindu journals have expressed opposition; but frankly I have not come across any journal which has applauded the scheme, although I have perused the columns of representative newspapers of all provinces." The *Star of India*, which was then the best-known English language spokesman of Muslim interests, was "distinctly enthusiastic".<sup>32</sup> There might have been a few Urdu newspapers, particularly in the Punjab, which extended a welcome to the scheme, partly out of a habit to support every Muslim alternative to the 1935 Act and partly out of personal loyalty to the Punjab premier. But if this was so, it did not reflect the general Muslim attitude, which was one of unmistakable and almost unanimous disapproval and hostility.

The language of Muslim rejection was polite and restrained, because Sikandar was a highly respected person, because he was holding high office, because he was an important member of the League, because he had done much in his province to improve the condition of the Muslims, because his proposal claimed to protect Muslim interests throughout the sub-continent, and because it weakened the dreaded Hindus. Yet, reading between the lines, we can see that the scheme was dismissed with finality, though with courtesy.



On 1 August, the *Star of India* said that it had not studied the scheme in detail "but at the first glance it appears to be a revolutionary scheme". One of its good points was that it planned to bring about "a greater cohesion between culturally contiguous tracks [*sic.*] and people in various parts of the country, although from a Muslim point of view, we have some misgivings as to its desirability". Sikandar should be congratulated on his "constructive effort". "We may not see eye to eye with some aspects of his scheme but, as we have said, there is something very substantial to build up between the Latif and Sikandar schemes although one is based on cultural zones and the other on regional zones."<sup>33</sup>

The *Ehsan* of Lahore deplored that there was no provision for the complete separation of Muslim India from Hindu India. "We are, however, of the opinion that Muslims should accept this scheme as an alternative to the Government of India Act."<sup>34</sup> The *Inqilab* believed that it could not effect any beneficial change in the condition of the Muslims. It failed completely to protect their rights. Therefore "Muslims cannot accept it".<sup>35</sup> The only thing that the *Eastern Times* of Lahore had to say was that "it has a value all its own".<sup>36</sup>

Sir Shafaat Ahmad Khan supported the scheme in very lukewarm terms. Sikandar "occupies a unique position in Muslim India, and his authority, influence and prestige in his own community are undoubted". In expressing his views on provincial autonomy he had "interpreted the Muslim view-point with great lucidity and clarity". The scheme "should be examined with the greatest care and attention, coming as it does from a person who wields considerable influence in his community and holds a position of great responsibility". On Pakistan, Shafaat Ahmad was curt and dismissive: "Whatever sentimental regard one may have for the so-called Pakistan scheme, all experienced men must dismiss it as impracticable."<sup>37</sup>

Sikandar received strong condemnation from a Punjabi journalist. Ahmad Bashir was dismayed that his scheme did not allay the doubts and apprehensions of the Muslims. Judged "only from the Pakistanian point of view", it was entirely opposed to the cultural and economic interests of 30 million "Muslims of Pakistan". It struck at the root of the Pakistan National Movement. Coming to details, he asked Sikandar how he would serve the

agricultural interests of the Indus region by handing over the main activities of distribution of wealth and the modern means of economic development such as communications, coinage and currency to the centre. "So there is every likelihood of the entire economic structure of Pakistan tottering to its fall." Pakistan would never be economically viable until it was completely separated from India; any link with the sub-continent would doom it to the position of "a mere serf of industrial India". "The Pakistanis cannot for ever remain ignorant of the heavy burden already imposed on them, or of the causes of the continued low prices of their produce and of the removal of markets from their reach; it is difficult to visualize how, when realization comes, India will be able to escape from the demand for secession."<sup>38</sup>

An enthusiastic member of the Punjab student community compared the Sikandar scheme with what he called the Mamdot plan and raised a number of objections against the former. Sikandar's north-west zone would actually increase the non-Muslim population percentage by 16. Among the seven regions to be created by the plan, there would not be even one where "the strength of the Muslim majority will be fully reflected". Sikandar had ignored the fact that the Muslims rejected the 1935 federal scheme not only to escape the excessive control of the centre but also to reduce the influence of the non-Muslims to a minimum in their own areas. If the subject of communications were handed over to the centre, this would reduce the importance of Karachi as a key port and the benefit accruing from it by the exclusive control of customs.<sup>39</sup>

Only one Bashir Ahmad came out in support of the scheme. But he prefaced his study with a statement on the two-nation theory which put him more on the "Pakistani" side than on the federal or confederal side. "It would be too much of a truism to say", he began, "that the Hindus and the Muslims, owing to their basically different cultures, have never been able to unite themselves into a single nation; and if we keep in view the realities of the present situation it is clear that the ideal of a common single nationality materializing in the future is an impossibility." The Sikandar scheme embodied the latest development of Muslim political thought, namely, a desire "to have at least two separate homelands for the Muslims, the one, Pakistan on the north-west, and other, what may be called Bengasam (Bengal plus Assam) on

the north-east". The scheme went a long way "to answer the aspirations of the Muslims, though it falls short of their ultimate goal of completely independent Pakistan and Bangasam, having no association with Hindustan at all".<sup>40</sup> This and the two previous comments testify to Rahmat Ali's influence.

A south Indian observer felt that the scheme lacked completeness, and the safeguards were not clearly formulated. "To my mind there is nothing like complete separate Federation for the Muslims wherein they can play their part in an efficient manner with treaty rights with the Hindus on the type of confederation. . . . The Muslims cannot realize their mission unless they form a separate State."<sup>41</sup>

F.K. Khan Durrani, writing later, expressed his dislike for a plan which "could not look beyond 'Dominion Status' which he [Sikandar] regarded as the highest stage of political development possible or even desirable for India", and which, by giving the Viceroy the authority to determine all controversies about the division of powers, put "the federating units effectively under the thumb of the Centre". Further, the structure proposed for the zones "would have the effect of diluting Muslim majorities in the North-West, without in any way affecting the power of the provinces of Hindu majority". His final verdict was that "the scheme offers no solution of the Hindu-Muslim problem".<sup>42</sup>

Muslim League spokesmen made no secret of their opposition from the day of its publication.<sup>43</sup> In a carefully-worded statement, whose diplomacy did not conceal disquiet of the mind, Malik Barkat Ali, a member of the AIML Working Committee and a leading lawyer of Lahore, tried to defend Sikandar against his Hindu critics without coming out in support of his scheme. He said that it required careful study. He was not prepared to commit himself on its merits at this stage. But he was unable to appreciate the outcry raised by Hindu communalists against it, as many of the facts bearing on Hindu-Muslim relations mentioned in the prefatory note by Sikandar were too substantial to be controverted. In one respect it was a definite improvement on the 1935 Act: it sought to put an effective curb on the power of the centre to interfere in provincial matters. But there were seamy sides, too. However, Sikandar deserved credit for having applied his mind to the wider question of federation, and his contribution, original as it was to a degree, should be carefully studied by all those who

were interested in the unity of India and the progress of its people.<sup>44</sup>

Whether this qualified disapproval (or approval!) was born of a natural hesitation to condemn a fellow-Punjabi and a personal friend who was doing so much for the Muslims in his province or was caused by genuine doubts about the scheme's merits, other League leaders shared neither the hesitation nor the doubts. Sayyid Ali Muhammad Rashdi of Sind, who was then secretary of the Muslim League Foreign Committee, at once issued a statement condemning the scheme and declaring its inability to solve the Muslim problem. As his Committee was engaged in collecting and examining the various proposals aiming at solving the problem, he ought to be quoted in full. "We have to bear in mind as to what were the basic considerations which actuated the Muslims to devise alternative schemes of reforms. They were that the opportunities of exploitation which the Hindu majority will have at the Centre should be minimized and the concurrent list of powers to legislate should be curtailed and these powers should be vested in the provincial legislatures; secondly, that the democratic constitution in the provinces should be so altered that the majorities do not oppress the minorities; and, lastly, that the two major 'nations' of India should have separate homelands of their own where they should develop and progress independently of others as the final solution of the Hindu-Muslim tension in India. Although it [the Sikandar scheme] foreshadows a distinct improvement on the present situation, I am afraid it does not satisfy any of these basic considerations. Under the Scheme the Centre would continue to be in the hands of the Hindu majority, and although efforts have been made to break the Hindu majority by bringing its position at par with the Muslim States, yet when there is anything involving a common interest of the Hindus the Muslim minority will not be able to escape a hostile verdict. The question of separate homelands being assigned to Muslims, which has now taken the shape of a definite Muslim demand, has not been solved in the scheme. The Muslim League will take no official cognizance of such a scheme in view of the fact that it is essentially at variance with its creed. Nor do I think that the Muslim League, constituted as it is today, can subscribe to many of the statements and views expressed by the author in the introductory chapter of his scheme."<sup>45</sup>

This statement was issued in the course of an interview given by Rashdi at Lahore on 31 July. On the following morning the press interviewed Ghulam Rasul Khan, secretary of the Punjab Provincial Muslim League, and during this exchange Ghulam Rasul enumerated the defects of the scheme and used strong language laced with sarcasm in rejecting it. He said that he was particularly concerned with the lowering of the League's political ideals which envisaged the establishment in India of full independence, while the scheme proposed Dominion Status. This was a retrograde step. It ran counter to the creed of the AIML. It ill-suited Sikandar who was a "pillar of the All India Muslim League". Another objection was that the multiplication of legislatures which it proposed did not tend to solve any of the problems it had set out to discuss. The zonal legislatures without the executives were constitutional innovations, serving no useful purpose. They would neither allay the fears of the princes nor satisfy the provincial minorities in any way. They seemed to have been designed to promote a better combination between the capitalist and the aristocratic landed classes of the different units, and to thwart the democratic aspirations of the masses. The claim made that the proposals would entail very few changes in the 1935 Act was untenable. As a matter of fact, the Act would require complete re-writing if the proposals were to be embodied in it. He concluded with a taunt: "The different Muslim knights were producing new schemes at a rapid speed. It was strange that they had kept silent during the long and tortuous constitutional discussions of the Round Table Conference. Perhaps the object was to frighten the Congress into an acceptance of the original scheme."<sup>46</sup>

The Muslim League also found fault with Sikandar for his alleged "disloyalty" to the party. It was maintained that he was a member of the AIML Constitution Sub-Committee which was charged by the Working Committee with formulating a scheme as an alternative to the all-India federation suggested by the 1935 Act. But, instead of submitting his scheme to the Sub-Committee, Sikandar first got it published in an Indian newspaper and then got it issued in pamphlet form and circulated it among a large number of prominent Hindu, Muslim and British figures. All this was done without the Sub-Committee's permission, knowledge or information. That was not all. Without telling Jinnah or the Sub-Committee, he took his scheme to Gandhi and tried to

convince him of its rightness. But Gandhi spurned him contemptuously.<sup>47</sup>

More League criticism was contained in a collection of articles representing the party's opinions. It was pointed out that the scheme did not meet "the party's view-point", and was "ambiguous" as to the proper role of the centre. "If the Centre is merely to exercise the agency functions of the autonomous units, it should better be left to the discretion of the latter what matters of common interests they want to assign to it. Such a Centre cannot be entrusted with important problems like defence, foreign affairs and railways. It is just like asking Germany and Italy to have a co-ordination Committee for the protection of their common interests. The very fact that the Centre should not dominate over the units but be subject to their control obviates the necessity of having any Centre at all."<sup>48</sup>

Such downright and widespread condemnation by League leaders of a scheme prepared by a member of the AIML Working Committee is a matter of some significance. It shows that Sikandar had produced his proposals purely in his personal capacity, neither as a League leader nor as the prime minister of the Punjab. He must have made this clear to his colleagues in the League, otherwise the party, which had not yet taken an official stand on what should replace the 1935 Act, would certainly have expressed its displeasure in a formal statement reprimanding him and disowning his plan. No such step was taken.

Choudhry Khaliqzaman<sup>49</sup> has asserted that the AIML Working Committee rejected the Sikandar scheme in its meeting of 4 February 1940. This statement is surprising as Khaliqzaman was at this time in the centre of things. There is no record of any such decision in the official published proceedings of the Muslim League.<sup>50</sup> The AIML Council passed a resolution on 27-28 August 1939, saying that "the opinions and sentiments expressed by the Hon'ble Sir Sikandar Hayat Khan in his statement to the press on the 25th of August 1939 in no way represents the views of the Musalmans of India".<sup>51</sup> But as the Sikandar scheme was published on 30 July, this resolution could not have related to it. On the other hand, the Working Committee meeting of 3-4 February 1940 appointed a delegation, consisting of Fazlul Haq, Khawaja Nazimuddin, Sir Sikandar and Choudhry Khaliqzaman, which was to visit England "as soon as possible in order to put the



case of Muslim India before the British people, the Parliament and His Majesty's Government".<sup>52</sup> Here is clear proof that Sikandar continued to enjoy the fullest confidence of the League after having made his proposals.

But this does not mean that the scheme had the tacit approval of the League. The party did not take official notice of it, just as it took no notice of other schemes appearing at this time. Or, strictly speaking, we should say that the party had left the business of taking cognizance of these schemes to its Foreign Committee to which they were usually submitted by the authors. Instead of passing judgment on each plan as it came out, the League waited for the final report of the Committee. Nevertheless, the views expressed on the Sikandar scheme by men like Ali Muhammad Rashdi and Ghulam Rasul Khan are a pointer to the party's thinking at this time. Their criticism of the centre proposed by Sikandar and their references to separate Muslim homelands show how strongly the current flowed in the direction of separation, and how swiftly the idea of Pakistan was approaching the stage of a formal acceptance by the Muslim League.

## NOTES

1. A Punjabi, *Confederacy of India*, Lahore, 1939, Introduction, p. 10. My italics.
2. Mian Kafayet Ali's communication to me. I have added the emphasis.
3. "Covering Letter by Muhammad Shah Nawaz Khan, Kt., M.L.A., Nawab of Mamdot, 2 July 1939"; my italics.
4. Among others, see Aziz Ahmad, "Remarques sur les origines du Pakistan", *Orient*, no. 26 (1963), who says that "Nawwab Shah Nawaz Khan Mamdot qui preconisait la division de l'Inde en cinq zones", p. 24.
5. *Confederacy of India*, Introduction, p. 16.
6. *CMG*, 29 June 1939. The *Islamic Culture* (M.A.C., "North-West India", October 1939, p. 500) also called it the "Mamdot Scheme".
7. These are taken from the *Confederacy of India*, pp. 10-15. Most of these were reproduced in the *CMG* report under the name of the Mamdot Scheme.
8. There is a map facing page 12 of the *Confederacy of India*, showing the "distribution of India on the basis of quinquenpartite confederacy".
9. The Red Shirt or the Khudai Khidmatgar movement was a Pathan organization, which first functioned as a close ally of the Congress and later became a part of it in fact, but not in theory. For its history and programme see S. Gopal, *The Viceroyalty of Lord Irwin, 1926-1931*, Oxford, 1957, pp. 68-69; John Cumming (ed), *Political India, 1832-1932*, Oxford, 1932, pp. 243-246; W.C. Smith, *Modern Islam in India: A Social Analysis*, London, 1946, pp. 220-224; J.S. Bright, *Frontier and Its Gandhi*, Lahore, 1944; Abdul Qaiyum, *Gold and Guns on the Pathan Frontier*, Bombay, 1945, pp. 26-45; Muhammad Yunus, *Frontier Speaks*, Lahore, n.d. (a very full account); Muhammad Mujeeb, *The Indian Muslims*, London, 1967; Arthur Swinson, *North-West Frontier: People and Events, 1839-1947*, London, 1967; Pyarelal Nair, *A Pilgrimage for Peace*, Ahmedabad, 1950; D.C. Obhari, *The Evolution of the North-West Frontier Province*, Peshawar, 1938; S. Mitra, "Ghaffar Khan", in E.A. Brown (ed), *Eminent Indians*, Calcutta,

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- 1946, pp. 91-100; and Yusuf Meherally, *Leaders of India*, Bombay, 5th ed 1944, pp. 45-50.
10. *CMG*, 16 July 1939.
  11. See M.A.C., "North-West India", *Islamic Culture*, October 1939, p. 500.
  12. Abdus Sattar Khan Niazi, *Khalifat-i-Pakistan* (in Urdu), Lahore, February 1970, pp. 25-26. The 1937 pamphlet is not available to me, nor the 1939 one. According to Dr. Ziaul Islam, a former president of the Punjab Muslim Students Federation, the scheme was written up by Niazi; his letter to me, dated 13 August 1970.
  13. *CMG*, 16 July 1939, which also carries a map issued by the scheme-makers, showing the areas demanded for the new state, and its future flag. See also *TTI*, 18 July 1939, and *Islamic Culture*, October 1939, p. 500.
  14. It "was published in the Indian press on the 30th of July 1939", *IAR 1939*, Vol. I, p. 67.
  15. Sir Sikandar Hayat Khan, Presidential Address, Bombay Muslim League Conference, Sholapur, *CMG*, 7 May 1939; also available in *IAR 1939*, Vol. I, pp. 378-381.
  16. For Muslim League see *IAR 1939*, Vol. I, pp. 293-299; for the Congress, P. Sitaramayya, *The History of the Indian National Congress, Vol. II, 1935-1947*, Bombay, 1947; in general, Shafaat Ahmad Khan, *The Indian Federation: An Exposition and Critical Review*, London, 1937, N. Gangulee, *The Making of Federal India*, London, n.d., and G.N. Joshi, *The New Constitution of India*, London, 1937, 2nd ed 1940.
  17. For the Punjab Unionist Party see A.B. Rajput, *Punjab Crisis and Cure*, Lahore, 1947, pp. 13-39; Humayun Kabir, *Muslim Politics in India, 1906-1942*, Calcutta, 3rd ed 1944; Sajjad Zaheer, *Light on League-Unionist Conflict*, Bombay, July 1944, pp. 3-9, 29-35; and above all Azim Husain, *Fazli Husain: A Political Biography*, Bombay, 1946. The party still awaits an historian; a fascinating subject long ignored.
  18. Sir Sikandar Hayat Khan, *Outlines of a Scheme of Indian Federation*, Lahore, 1939.
  19. The reader who wants an exposition of the scheme by the author himself will find it in Sikandar Hayat's speech deliver-

- ed in the Punjab Legislative Assembly on 11 March 1941, see *Official Report of the Proceedings of the Punjab Legislative Assembly*, Vol. XVI, No. 8.
20. Report in *CMG*, 1 August 1939.
  21. See L.F. Rushbrook Williams, "Alternative Federal Schemes", *Great Britain and the East*, 17 August 1939, p. 181.
  22. Louis Stuart, "An Alternative Scheme", *Indian Empire Review*, November 1939, pp. 425-432.
  23. Reginald Coupland, *India: A Re-Statement*, London, 1945, pp. 190-191. Italics in the original.
  24. For Hindu (and Congress) criticism, or rather condemnation, see Gulshan Rai, "Sir Sikandar Hayat Khan's Scheme", *CMG*, 3 August 1939; A Hindu Correspondent, "Sir Sikandar's Scheme of Federation", *ibid.*, 4 August 1939; a general report on initial Hindu and Congress reaction, *ibid.*, 14 July 1939; Rajendra Prasad, *Pakistan*, Bombay and Calcutta, 1940, pp. 51-57, and his *India Divided*, Bombay, 2nd ed June 1947, p. 199; K.T. Shah, *Why Pakistan and Why Not*, Bombay, n.d., pp. 180-183; and Gulshan Rai, "Punjab Premier's Pakistan", *CMG*, 27 March 1941. For the "nationalist" Muslim viewpoint see Rezaul Karim, *Pakistan Examined*, Calcutta, 1941, pp. 24-27.
  25. Simla Correspondent's dispatch, *The Times*, 2 August 1939.
  26. *TTI*, editorial, 31 July 1939.
  27. *CMG*, editorial, 6 July 1939.
  28. *Ibid.*, editorial, 30 July 1939.
  29. This account of Hindu editorial comments is based on Candidus, "Indian Political Notes: Reactions to Punjab Premier's Scheme", *TTI*, 9 August 1939.
  30. Both quoted in *CMG*, 2 August 1939.
  31. Cf. a recent comment. It "was anything but the model of a democratic constitution. It retained much power in the hands of the viceroy, who would head the executive and serve also as an arbiter among the various communities in India" (Craig Baxter, "Union or Partition: Some Aspects of Politics in the Punjab, 1936-45", in Ziring, Braibanti and Wriggins (eds), *Pakistan: The Long View*, Durham, N.C., 1977, p. 50).
  32. Candidus, *op. cit.*
  33. *TSI*, editorial, 1 August 1939.



34. Reported in *CMG*, 2 August 1939.
35. *Inqilab*, editorial, 13 August 1939, quoted in Ashiq Husain Batalawi, *Hamari Qawmi Jidd-o-Jehhad: from Janwari 1939 to Dasamber 1939*, Lahore, n.d., p. 162.
36. *TET*, editorial, 4 August 1939.
37. Sir Shafaat Ahmad Khan, statement to the press, Simla, 10 July 1939, *CMG*, 11 July 1939; also carried by *TMM*, 11 July 1939.
38. Ahmad Bashir, "Sir Sikandar Hayat's Scheme", *CMG*, 5 August 1939.
39. A.S. Khurshid, letter, *ibid.*, 10 August 1939.
40. Bashir Ahmad, "Sir Sikandar's Federal Scheme", *ibid.*, 27 August 1939.
41. Syed Nazir Ahmad, "80 Million Indian Muslims are a Nation by Themselves", *TSI*, 1 September 1939.
42. F.K. Khan Durrani, *The Meaning of Pakistan*, Lahore, March 1944, rep March 1946, p. 125.
43. For a set of questions raised against the scheme (and the Latif and Punjabi schemes) see Tajuddin Pir, letter, *CMG*, 21 July 1939.
44. Malik Barkat Ali, statement to the press, 1 August 1939, *ibid.*, 2 August 1939.
45. Sayyid Ali Muhammad Rashdi, special interview, Lahore, 31 July 1939, *ibid.*, 1 August 1939; a summary of it was carried by *TSI*, 4 and 10 August 1939.
46. Ghulam Rasul Khan, interview, Lahore, 1 August 1939, *CMG*, 2 August 1939; see also *TSI*, 10 August 1939.
47. See Ashiq Husain Batalawi, *op. cit.*, pp. 155-156; this is confirmed by a letter from Sardar Patel to Jawaharlal Nehru, see Jawaharlal Nehru, *A Bunch of Old Letters*, Bombay, 1958, 2nd ed 1960, p. 377. It was reported that Ashiq Batalawi had planned to introduce a motion of censure in the autumn 1939 meeting of the AIML Council against Sikandar for circulating his scheme which was "contrary to the declared policy of the League", see *CMG*, editorial, 11 August 1939.
48. M.R.T., *Pakistan and Muslim India*, Bombay, 2nd ed 1946, p. 62.
49. Choudhry Khaliquzzaman, *Pathway to Pakistan*, Lahore, 1961, p. 234.

50. See *Resolutions of the All India Muslim League from December 1938 to March 1940*, Delhi, n.d., Text of Resolutions of the meeting of the Working Committee of the All India Muslim League held at Gul-i-Rana, Hardinge Avenue, New Delhi, on the 3rd and 4th of February 1940 under the Presidentship of Mr. M.A. Jinnah, pp. 33-35. None of the eleven resolutions passed contains any reference to the Sikandar Scheme.
51. *Ibid.*, Text of Resolutions passed at the meeting of the Council of the All India Muslim League held at Delhi on the 27th and 28th of August 1939 under the Presidentship of Mr. M.A. Jinnah, Resolution no. 9, p. 20.
52. *Ibid.*, Text of Resolutions of the meeting of the Working Committee. . . held on the 3rd and 4th of February 1940 . . . , Resolution no. 6, p. 34.

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# 12

## THE END OF THE TETHER: 1939-1940

### The Climate of Opinion: August - December 1939

The leading article in the *Star of India* of 25 August declared that "the consensus of Muslim opinion is that in the complete cultural and political, if not zonal, separation between the Hindus and Muslims lies the only hope of peace in India". After dilating on the cultural differences, it proclaimed that "a division into separate entities for political purposes is the natural step, the only step. . . . Therefore Muslim India rejects Federation and will no longer tolerate Democracy. Hindus and Muslims must part company and dwell apart. Only then can they be friends. Hindu India and Muslim India must divide to unite."<sup>1</sup> This was the first time that the paper had opted for a clear division. The cue was now taken by others, and we find a number of people in India and Britain pointing towards the impending separation.

"We are going to unite and have a home for ourselves where we can live an honourable life", wrote one Anwar Bakhshi from Jul-lundhur at the end of August.<sup>2</sup> A Punjabi Muslim declared that "the Muslims throughout India represent no doubt a single religious, cultural and social entity. They may even be called a single nation".<sup>3</sup> The *Round Table* was now convinced that the Muslims sought a different kind of federation. They "wish to link all the Muslim areas into a federation and associate them with some sort of central government in a way that has never been clearly explained".<sup>4</sup>

The Hindus continued to offer opportunities to the Muslims to justify their fear of Hindu rule and their determination to separate. In the Central Provinces Legislative Assembly J.J. Kedar claimed that constitutionally the majority community alone had the right of framing a constitution, and that if a minority comm-

unity carried its patriotism beyond India it had no *locus standi* in formulating the constitution of the country.<sup>5</sup> As if in answer to this challenge, the *Star of India* thundered: "We, speaking for the Muslims of India, emphatically state today that there can be no question of India's political advance within or outside the British Empire without a settlement of the communal question."<sup>6</sup> The *Civil and Military Gazette* put the same thing in softer accents: 'Until the Congress has abandoned its extravagant claims to speak for the whole of India and to mould single-handedly the destiny of the country in the future, there will not be found either a solution of the problem of the Muslims and the minorities or an atmosphere favourable for India's advance towards its goal of Dominion Status.'<sup>7</sup> The analysis of *The Times* was not very different. Congress policy had consolidated the Muslims in opposition to the Hindus, and "the scheme which Muslims have propounded for creating a Pakistan of their own has been given a fillip out of all proportion to its value". Muslim leaders now asserted that their community was a nation 'directly affiliated with their Moslem brethren from Delhi to Istanbul'. "To ensure a contented Moslem community the Congress Party must come to terms with the Muslim League."<sup>8</sup>

When Gandhi wrote in the *Harijan* that the Indian Muslims were not a separate nation but a part of a composite Indian nation, and strongly deprecated their ideal of their own free and sovereign states, a group of Allgarh dons gave him the Muslim reply. "We want to assure Mr. Gandhi and our Hindu brethren that the ideal of having free sovereign Muslim states in India, which now inspires a very large number of Muslims, is not actuated by a spirit of hatred or revenge. It is initiated by an earnest desire of solving the Hindu-Muslim problem on an equitable basis and epitomizes the natural desire of the Muslims of India to determine their future independently in the light of their own culture and history . . . . The political experience of the last fifty years, more especially of the last two years, has strengthened the faith of the Muslim in the above ideal which is now their paramount national resolve. Neither the fear of the British bayonets nor the prospects of a bloody civil war can discourage them in their will to achieve free Muslim states in those parts of India where they are in majority."<sup>9</sup>

The *Round Table* returned to the question in December. "There is indeed", it wrote, "a tendency for Muslims to exercise a right



to veto any constitution that may be devised. While Congress still aims at a unified India, which will associate British India with the Indian States, the Muslims are moving more and more towards separation and the creation of a Muslim Ulster in the country as a means of protecting Muslim interests and culture. It is clear that the Congress will have to do something to meet the Muslim case, otherwise the vision of a unified India will evaporate."<sup>10</sup>

When Sir Stafford Cripps came to India in the same month, his exploration of Indian opinion and sentiment showed him that "there were great difficulties in the way of such a constitutional advance as Congress wished". Though he was certain that an attempt should be made to bring the Congress and the League into co-operation, current communal rioting and his talks with Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan "had led him towards the idea that some separation of Hindu and Muslim dominions might be necessary".<sup>11</sup> On his return he expressed the belief that partition would be "a necessary part of a new Indian constitution".<sup>12</sup>

At the same time, the Pirpur Committee, which had been appointed to inquire into Muslim grievances in Congress-ruled provinces during 1937-39, spelt out the Muslim fear of Hindu rule in these words: "The Indian National Congress conception of nationalism is based on the establishment of a national state of the majority community in which other nationalities and communities have only secondary rights. The Muslims think that no tyranny can be as great as the tyranny of the majority and they believe that only that state can be stable which gives equal rights and equal opportunities to all communities no matter how small. They attach great importance to this principle, which alone can safeguard the rights of the Muslims and other minorities."<sup>13</sup>

It is clear that by late 1939 "people who had earlier laughed at the first suggestions for some kind of Pakistan were now earnest proponents of the idea".<sup>14</sup> This is the estimate of T.G.P. Spear, the Cambridge historian. Other contemporary British observers of the Indian scene have recorded similar impressions.<sup>15</sup>

### The Faqir of Ipi (August 1939)

We can now turn our attention to the rest of the schemes presented in 1939, and thus complete our survey of the idea of Pakistan up to the time of the passage of the Lahore Resolution

in March 1940.

In the month of August the NWFP made its third contribution to Muslim scheme-making. Unfortunately, the information available is so scanty that nothing can be said about it beyond what appeared in a brief news-item in a Lahore English daily.

Sayyid Ali Muhammad Rashdi had been touring the frontier on the instructions of the League to study the repercussions of Gandhi's recent visit to that area in so far as they related to the trans-border tribes. On his return to Lahore he told a representative of the *Civil and Military Gazette* that "the Faqir of Ipi has organized a network of jirgas within the tribal area in order to be able to enforce more effectively on an organized basis his scheme for the constitution of a Muslim State in North India".<sup>16</sup> No more details are given, and I have not come across another reference to an Ipi scheme elsewhere.

It may be that Ipi was in touch with Abdul Wadud and was organizing the *jirgas* in support of the plan launched by the latter a little earlier. It is also possible that Ipi's efforts were directed towards creating among the border tribes a sympathy for the idea of a separate Muslim state in the north which, according to most people, was soon bound to become the proclaimed objective of the Muslims. Or, it may be that he was really working for the establishment of an independent Pathan state, which had nothing to do with any Pakistan plan; for this is what he tried to do after 1947 with the blessings of Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan and Afghanistan and the support of India.<sup>17</sup> No definite or even plausible conclusions can be drawn from the little we know about Ipi's programme as described by Rashdi.

### The Aligarh Scheme (August 1939)

On the 15th of August 1939 (exactly eight years before the creation of Pakistan) the last major scheme appeared from Aligarh. Prepared by two dons of the Muslim University of Aligarh, Professor Sayyid Zafrul Hasan and Dr. Muhammad Afzaal Husain Qadri, and published by the university press, it has always been known as the Aligarh scheme.

At the outset the authors laid down five principles on which their plan was based and on which, they said, every Indian Muslim "must insist persistently and strenuously".<sup>18</sup> The first was that the

Muslims of India were a nation by themselves. "They have a distinct national entity wholly different from the Hindus and other non-Muslim groups." The second stated that they "have got a separate national future and their own contribution to make to the betterment of the world". The third said that their future "lies in complete freedom from the domination of the Hindus, the British" and of "any other people". The fourth stipulated that the Muslim majority provinces could not be permitted "to be enslaved into a single all-India Federation with an overwhelming Hindu majority in the Centre". The fifth laid down that the Muslims living in Hindu provinces "shall not be allowed to be deprived of their separate religious, culture and political identity, and that they shall be given full and effective support by the Muslim majority Provinces".

A practical application of these principles could produce only one result: partition. The Muslim nation in India could only be saved by a "repartition" of the country carried out on the "only fundamental and valid principle", viz., nationality. This meant a division of India into a Muslim India and a Hindu India. As such a division would split the Muslim nation, it logically followed that the interests of "our nationals living in Hindu India" must be properly safeguarded.

To attain these ends the authors suggested a division of British India into three "wholly independent and sovereign states". The first they called North-West India, and it was to cover the Punjab, NWFP, Sind and Baluchistan. The second called Bengal was to consist of the presidency of Bengal (excluding the south-western districts of Howrah and Midnapore and the north-western district of Darjeeling), the Purnea district of Bihar, and the Sylhet division of Assam. The third was Hindustan, comprising the rest of British India.

In order to afford as much protection as possible to the Muslims left behind in Hindustan two suggestions were offered. First, two new autonomous provinces were to be created in Hindustan: Delhi province, including Delhi, Meerut division, Rohilkhand division, and the district of Aligarh of the Agra division; and Malabar province, consisting of Malabar and the adjoining areas on the Malabar coast. Secondly, "all the towns of India with a population of 50,000 or more shall have the status of a borough or free city".

Turning to the native states the scheme foresaw only two situations arising from a partition of British India, and provided for both. The states lying inside the boundaries of any of the three proposed States or exclusively on the frontier of one of them would be attached to that State. Those bordering on more than one of these States would have the option of joining any one of the adjoining States. But one exception was to be made to these arrangements. Hyderabad was to be a sovereign state with its old dominions of Berar and Karantia restored to it.

The North-West Muslim State was rather vaguely given the name of "Pakistan"—"with the inclusion of Kashmir it may well be called 'Pakistan' as it has been for some years past". (The inclusion of Kashmir, the "k" of Pakistan, was to take place on the above-prescribed principle that any native state situated "exclusively on the frontier" of one of the three proposed States shall be attached to that State). This "Pakistan Federation" would include a large number of native states in addition to Kashmir, e.g., Kalat, Bahawalpur, Khairpur, Patiala, Jindh, Nabha, Kapurthala, Malerkotla, Faridkot and the Simla Hill States. Thus constituted, it would contain about 25 million Muslims, i.e., more than 60% of the total population of the area. "Pakistan will form the north-western wing of Muslim India." The Hindu and Sikh minorities of Pakistan would have the same cultural, religious and political safeguards granted to them as the Muslim minorities would have in Hindustan.

Bengal would also be a Muslim State, containing more than 30 million Muslims, i.e., 57% of the whole population of the area. As it would have no component provinces, it would not be a federation. It would constitute "the eastern wing of Muslim India".

Hindustan would be a Hindu State, with a population of 245 million. It would include about 23 million Muslims, i.e., a minority of about 10%. The protection of this minority would, as was indicated above, take two forms. They would enjoy all necessary safeguards. But, more important, the creation of two new provinces in Hindustan would bring them much benefit. In the Delhi province there would be more than 3.5 million Muslims. This would make them a minority of only 28%, but three factors would strengthen their position. Their number would not be so small that the Hindu majority could sweep them aside. They would be highly cultured and educated with the Aligarh university as their promi-

Muslims of India were a nation by themselves. "They have a distinct national entity wholly different from the Hindus and other non-Muslim groups." The second stated that they "have got a separate national future and their own contribution to make to the betterment of the world". The third said that their future "lies in complete freedom from the domination of the Hindus, the British" and of "any other people". The fourth stipulated that the Muslim majority provinces could not be permitted "to be enslaved into a single all-India Federation with an overwhelming Hindu majority in the Centre". The fifth laid down that the Muslims living in Hindu provinces "shall not be allowed to be deprived of their separate religious, culture and political identity, and that they shall be given full and effective support by the Muslim majority Provinces".

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nent educational centre and intellectual fount. Geographically their province would lie close to Pakistan, a situation which should give them much moral support and satisfaction. The Malabar province would have a Muslim population of 27%. Their numerical strength, their large trading interests, their eminent cultural position, and the virility of their race should count in favour of self-reliance and confidence.

That still left millions of Muslims living in Hindustani towns and villages. Could anything be done to improve their lot as a scattered minority? Most of them were to be found in cities and large towns. "All that can be done for them at present is to eliminate the undue interference of the Provincial and Central Hindu Governments." This could be done by giving the status of free cities or boroughs to large towns of a population of 50,000 or more. These towns would have their own police and magistracy, and they might be given wide powers of legislation and execution on local matters. This arrangement would protect the interests of about 1.25 million Muslims of Hindustan.

In the rural areas of Hindustan the problem would have to be tackled in a different way. The Muslims living in villages would have to be "induced to aggregate in villages with a preponderant Muslim population". This was the only way to stop them from continuing to be negligible minorities, and to protect their cultural and economic interests.

The three States of Pakistan, Bengal and Hindustan would enter into a "defensive and offensive alliance", which would contain five stipulations. First, all the three States would recognize each other on a basis of reciprocity. Secondly, Pakistan and Bengal would be recognized as the homeland of the Muslims and Hindustan as the homeland of the Hindus. Each nation could migrate to its own homeland if and when it desired. Thirdly, "in Hindustan the Muslims are to be recognized as a nation in minority and part of a larger nation inhabiting Pakistan and Bengal". Fourthly, the Muslim minority in Hindustan and the non-Muslim minority in Pakistan and Bengal would have representation according to population and under a system of separate electorates, together with effective religious, cultural and political safeguards guaranteed by all the three States. Other "considerable" minorities, like the Sikhs and the untouchables, might be given separate representation in proportion to population. Finally, "an accredited Muslim

political organization will be the sole official representative body of the Muslims in Hindustan".

Further, the three States would have separate treaties of alliance with Great Britain and, if need lies, separate Crown Representatives. A Joint Court of Arbitration would be set up to settle disputes that might arise among the three States or between them and the Crown.

The scheme concluded with some arguments in favour of the sovereignty of Hyderabad. It was a special ally of the British Government. Its ruler enjoyed exceptional powers and titles. "In truth it is a sovereign state by treaties". By the restoration of Karnatic, Hyderabad would get a sea coast and a port. "Now when the British are giving the control of India to its rightful owners, they must return to Hyderabad its territories, and recognize Hyderabad expressly as a sovereign state, at least as sovereign as Nepal." Hyderabad would become the southern wing of Muslim India.

Here we have quite a different picture from Latif's. In fact, the Aligarh dons went further than even the later Lahore Resolution. The influence of Rahmat Ali is clearly indicated in the general trend of the scheme. Let us once again go over the major provisions of the plan and see what we can make of them in the light of contemporary developments and earlier suggestions made by other people.

The five principles on which the scheme stands break new ground and reflect the League thinking more closely than any other proposal made during this period. This is the second proposal after Rahmat Ali's (the first was Punjabi's) to be based on the two-nation theory. In doing so it actually forestalls the League, for the League had yet not started expounding a separate nationhood for the Indian Muslims, though some of its leaders, particularly Jinnah, had just begun to make statements to this effect. The assertion that the Muslims of India had "a separate national future" flowed from the prior claim that they were a separate nation, and prepared ground for the demand for complete political separation. This separate national future was then defined as complete freedom from the domination of the Hindus, the British and any other power. Such freedom was impossible in an all-India federation, where a Hindu-dominated centre would have nullified provincial autonomy. So far the argument concerned the Muslim provinces,

for whom alone it was relevant in practical terms. But the scheme was equally anxious to protect the interests of the Muslims of Hindu provinces, who would not be in a position to share the sovereignty claimed by other Muslims. It will be noticed that a good part of the scheme is devoted to the problem of the future of these Muslims of Hindustan. It is to be remembered that the authors of the scheme belonged to the United Provinces, a Muslim-minority province, and their deep interest in the question is therefore understandable.

The outcome of all these assertions is the demand for a partition of India on the principle of nationality. The details of the proposed partition are significant in so far as they differ from what the League was going to demand in the following year. The Aligarh scheme, unlike Rahmat Ali's proposal and the Lahore Resolution, accepts a division of Bengal on religious lines and adds to the Muslim part one district from Bihar. Similarly, it does not lay claim to the whole of Assam, but only to one administrative division (Sylhet) of it. The suggestion for the creation of two new provinces (Delhi and Malabar) in Hindu India is a novel one; probably an inspiration from Rahmat Ali's proposal for the establishment of a number of "national homes" for the Muslims of the minority areas. The provision made for solving the problem of native states sounds quite reasonable; it will be recalled that this principle was later made a part of the June 1947 partition plan, though its equitable application and operation were vitiated by Mountbatten's partisan initiative and India's actions in Junagadh, Kashmir and Hyderabad.

As for the two Muslim States demarcated by the scheme, their boundaries follow neither those of the Lahore Resolution (which did not specifically provide for a division of Bengal or the Punjab) nor those of the actual division of 1947. But what is of greater importance is the Muslim strength in these States. In Pakistan it was to be only 60%, and in Bengal only 57%. This is the point where the criticism of Latif's scheme appears relevant and valid: that a large Pakistan would contain so many non-Muslims that it could hardly be called a Muslim state.

On Hyderabad the scheme follows Rahmat Ali and Latif in demanding a sovereign status for it, and in discarding democracy or nationalism as a basis for the claim. The arguments advanced are, however, different. No mention at all is made of its alleged

cultural importance for the Muslims of India, or of the historical background which was supposed to make it a part of the Muslim "tradition" on the sub-continent: points which had first been made by Rahmat Ali. Nor do the authors base their claim on the ground that the creation of a sovereign Hyderabad was the only way to save and protect the Muslims of south India: the main argument propounded by Latif. However, irrespective of the details of the case, the fact that everyone was looking forward to an independent Muslim Hyderabad in the south bears out the general Muslim attachment to the Nizam's dominions and the general Muslim concern with their future. That also explains why in 1948 the government of independent India was so anxious to break the Nizam and to incorporate his state into India by the force of arms, and why this action evoked so much resentment and bitterness in Pakistan.

The least defensible part of the Aligarh scheme is that which deals with the future of the Muslims left in Hindustan. Practically every step recommended for their protection militates against the sovereignty of Hindustan. The government of Hindustan is asked to do a number of things which it may or may not like to do. The creation of Delhi and Malabar provinces is stipulated as if Pakistan and Bengal would have the right or the power to influence the making of the constitution of Hindustan. The provision for granting the status of free cities or boroughs to all large towns is as one-sided as it is constitutionally outrageous and administratively undesirable. In any case, this innovation would have been of no use to the Muslims at all: there were few cities in which they were in a majority, and where they could have profited by this concession. It is difficult to see how the widest possible local autonomy given to cities like Bombay and Madras could have brought any protection or comfort to their small Muslim populations. Similarly, the Aligarh recommendation for the bringing together in large villages of the scattered rural Muslim population of Hindustan would have involved considerable uprooting and migration, and even if effected could not have made much difference to those in whose interest it was prescribed.

But the most serious weakness of these efforts to protect the Muslims of Hindustan is their one-sidedness. All these responsibilities were put upon Hindustan, without any reciprocal obligations on the part of the Muslim States. If the Muslim minority of

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But the most serious weakness of these efforts to protect the Muslims of Hindustan is their one-sidedness. All these responsibilities were put upon Hindustan, without any reciprocal obligations on the part of the Muslim States. If the Muslim minority of



Hindustan, a mere 10% of the total population, was in need of so many far-reaching provisions, it was only reasonable to expect that Hindustan would also be interested in the vastly larger non-Muslim minorities living in Pakistan and Bengal.

There is still the further problem of how the government of Hindustan was to be persuaded or compelled to carry out these recommendations. Once the partition of India had been effected and the sovereign states established, who was to guarantee that the sovereign state of Hindustan would do such and such a thing to please the people of Pakistan and Bengal? Even if some outside authority could be discovered and then persuaded to provide this surety, what power and sanction would it possess to get its will translated into action? Even if an agreement to take these steps was to be made a part of the general settlement at the time of partition (a remote assumption), the question of guarantees would still remain. It is one of the essential attributes of sovereignty that a state has the authority to repudiate any agreements made or guarantees given. Once sovereignty has been achieved, power politics take over and promises of goodwill and written undertakings lose their validity unless the other state is big or strong enough to force compliance with superior armed resources. This is a fact of political life which the makers of the scheme should well have kept in mind.

The final part of the scheme contains more elements of unreality. The three States were to enter into "a defensive and offensive alliance" on certain bases. What happened to Hyderabad here, for it does not figure in the alliance? What is an "offensive" alliance? Under the alliance Pakistan and Bengal were to be recognized as the "homeland" of the Muslims. Why homeland in the singular? There is no indication in the scheme that Pakistan and Bengal were to unite in a federal or some other arrangement; then, how can two independent, sovereign and distant states be called *one* homeland of a nation? Further, in Hindustan the Muslims are to be recognized as "a nation in minority and part of a larger nation inhabiting Pakistan and Bengal". It is difficult to find any sense or meaning in this proviso. Why should Hindustan agree to such a recognition? And even if it does, what responsibilities and obligations does that incur? In any case, what is "a nation in minority"? And, once again, no corresponding duty is placed upon Pakistan and Bengal to recognize their Hindu population as "a nation in minority"

and part of a larger nation inhabiting Hindustan.

The last provision of the alliance is impossible to defend on any principle, not even one of unashamed selfishness. According to it, "an accredited Muslim political organization will be the sole official representative body of the Muslims in Hindustan". Not only constitutional but even political decisions are to be imposed upon Hindustan. The provision has a topical background: the Muslim League's insistence that the Congress should recognize it as the only authoritative and representative Muslim organization in India. But how this insistence could be carried over to a sovereign Hindustan is a point which the authors of the provision do not care to explain. Nor do they stipulate a reciprocal status for the Indian National Congress in Pakistan and Bengal. Further, such a provision assumes that for all times to come the Muslims of Hindustan would consent to be organized in one political party. Conditions might change, new political creeds might attract them, their own interests might demand alliance or merger with other bodies—but they must always continue to be members of one party because the alliance said so. What moral authority Pakistan and Bengal had to determine the political will of the Muslims of Hindustan in the times to come is not explained. Such foolish ideas make one doubt the sincerity of the makers of the scheme. Did they really believe that a partition on their conditions would be possible?

Again and again we find the impress of Rahmat Ali's ideas on the scheme; though it must be pointed out that the irrational and wanton methods employed to protect the Muslims of Hindustan owe little to the Cambridge movement. Among the major points where Rahmat Ali's influence is evident are: the declaration that Indian Muslims are a separate nation; the demand for a clear partition of India on the principle of nationality; the creation of certain new provinces in Hindustan for the comfort and protection of the Muslims of that country; and the establishment of a sovereign Hyderabad in the south.

The authors of the Aligarh scheme accept the name of "Pakistan" for their Muslim State in the north-west, but surprisingly they do not do so in a definite and straightforward way: "it may well be called 'Pakistan' as it has been for some years past". Here was an unmistakable borrowing from a single individual whose authorship of the name was uncontested. Yet the adoption

of the name is suggested in the form of a mild recommendation; it is not laid down finally and firmly. At the same time they do not accept Rahmat Ali's designation for Bengal. Instead of calling it *Bangistan* or *Bang-i-Islam* after him, they retain the traditional name, though the state they propose was to cover only a part of the presidency and was to include some areas from Assam and Bihar.

The influence of Rahmat Ali is easy to explain. One of the authors of the scheme, Afzaal Husain Qadri, was a member of Rahmat Ali's Pakistan National Movement, and since his return from England to India in 1938 he had been working as a lieutenant of Rahmat Ali among Indian Muslims. It seems that he tried to incorporate into the Aligarh scheme as many of the ideas of his mentor as he could, but as he was not the sole author he could not make the plan as fully reflective of his own views as he would have liked. He was conscious of this and wrote to Rahmat Ali on 8 March 1940: "In the interests of truth and for welfare of 'Iman', and with a view to removing any possibility of misapprehension, I deemed it imperative to place these few lines before you in such a manner that nobody, neither now nor in the future, could think that the issuance or the publication of the pamphlet was, in any way, done by me in my personal capacity or that I was responsible for evolving its contents".<sup>19</sup>

This repudiation is astonishing, not only in its disingenuity but also in its completeness and firmness. The Aligarh scheme was not prepared by the Aligarh University, or by any other institution or organization. It was the joint work of two teachers who signed and published it in their names. Therefore, Qadri's denial that he did this in his personal capacity is as puzzling as his assertion that he was not responsible for its contents. These repudiations are difficult to sustain, because they do not fit in with the confessed authorship of the scheme, and also because they were made in a private letter which came to be published by chance three years later. Qadri was working as a representative of the PNM in India. He had issued a scheme under his name which borrowed several features of Rahmat Ali's plan and used the word *Pakistan* for the Muslim state in the north-west. He did all this without Rahmat Ali's knowledge or consent. When Rahmat Ali read the pamphlet and protested to Qadri and demanded an explanation for this act of disloyalty to the Movement of which he was an accredited

spokesman in India, Qadri replied by repudiating his role in the making of the scheme. Even this repudiation was not honest, for till his death he took credit for having proposed the creation of *Pakistan* in his 1939 scheme.

The significance of the Aligarh scheme lies in the nature of its recommendations and its influence on the shaping of the Lahore Resolution. It was the only important proposal made at this time which stood for a partition of India without any links between the Muslim states and Hindu India, and based the proposal on the simple but yet not generally accepted proposition that Indian Muslims were a separate nation.<sup>20</sup>

### Ranjee G. Shahani (1939)

By August or September 1939 Muslim planners of the future of India had apparently reached the end of their tether. No more detailed schemes appeared after this date. Everyone now sat back and waited for the League to choose from the feast spread before it, and to make up its mind on what it was going to adopt as its final and agreed objective. However, this silence was broken by a few rather muted voices, which should be noticed in passing.

Sometime in 1939 Ranjee G. Shahani, a Hindu journalist, suggested in passing that "regionalism" was the only solution of the Hindu-Muslim problem of India. It would not destroy the unity of the country and would at the same time minimize Muslim fears of a Hindu-dominated and Hindu-controlled supreme government of India. But he offered no details and made no concrete proposals.<sup>21</sup>

As he was visiting India after an interval of many years the impact of her new politics on him is revealing. He realized the extent to which the unity of India was being put in jeopardy by Congress insistence on a strong central government, and the Muslim anxiety to escape such permanent domination of one community. His suggestion of regionalism indicates his awareness of the gravity of the problem. As his book was published in London in 1939, it is reasonable to suppose that it was written in 1938 or, at the latest, in early 1939. This is significant because it means that his regional solution was proposed before the various Muslim schemes of 1939 were made public or even put together.

## The Climate of Opinion: January-March 1940

The general contours of the Muslim problem during the first three months of 1940 were not very different from those of the earlier period. There was the same general talk about Muslim fear of Hindu rule, the same occasional references to the possibility of separation, and the same Hindu refusal to assure the Muslims that their apprehensions were unfounded.

On 9 January, the *Civil and Military Gazette* wrote: "After all the basic influence at work in Indian politics today is the deep-rooted suspicion of the Muslims (as of other minorities). . . as to what the Congress, with its overwhelming Hindu membership and its Socialist tendencies, would do with any constitution which they were enabled to impose upon India. . . Yet every statement made by Congress leaders. . . is tending to enhance that suspicion instead of removing it."<sup>22</sup> On 22 January, the *Madras Mail* drove home the same point. "The minorities would not be fearful did they not apprehend that the majority would use the power given to them by the introduction of further constitutional reforms for the purpose of suppressing or thwarting minorities."<sup>23</sup>

At this time some leaders were trying to bring about a Congress-League rapprochement, and one of the suggestions made by the Muslims related to the desirability of creating coalition ministries in all provinces so that the minorities might be assured of their participation in the administration and governance of the country. The Congress leaders spurned the idea as if any sharing of power was an anathema to them. In a statement issued from Madras on 30 January, a leading Congress politician and member of the central legislature, S. Satyamurti, gave the opinion that coalitions were against the principle of democratic government. "Now I should like to know", he said, "how a coalition government is consistent with any democratic government. . . The Congress cannot, and even Great Britain cannot, accept this theory of coalition governments because it goes entirely against the theory of responsible democratic government."<sup>24</sup> Gandhi agreed with this, and told the Viceroy on 5 February that he did not think that there was any hope in that direction. Coalitions would mean satisfying office-seekers and place-hunters.<sup>25</sup> It may be mentioned here that in 1946 the Congress entered into a coalition in the Punjab with a handful of Unionist landowners in order to keep the

Muslim League out of office, though the League had won an overwhelming victory in the election and had been cheated of an over-all majority by the mechanism of the Communal Award which did not give the Muslims the number of seats warranted by their percentage in the population of the province.

In early February, a professor of economics at the Islamia College of Lahore reiterated the Muslim desire to separate. "If a common state does not ensure them these elementary necessities of existence [due economic and political power, separate electorates, proportional share in the administrative and economic machinery] they would be absolutely justified in demanding even territorial separation."<sup>26</sup> But there was no further reference to separation in the article.

*The Times* reported on 10 February that the Congress demand for a British declaration about the future of India had given a "distinct fillip to the Pakistan scheme, long cherished by those Muslims who aim at segregating their community into self-contained areas of their own."<sup>27</sup> Four days later the *Civil and Military Gazette* underlined the Muslim fear of Hindu rule which sprang from Congress policy. "It is impossible to resist the conclusion", it wrote, "that the stress laid by the Congress and political organizations championing the cause of the Hindus on the rights of the majority has, to a large extent, persuaded Mr. Jinnah and a considerable section of the Muslim population in India that the Hindus are employing democracy only as a means to gain political mastery over all other communities. The insistence of the Congress on the acceptance by the British Government of its formula of the constituent assembly as the solvent of all India's political problems has further confirmed the suspicion of Muslims and other minorities of a deep-laid Hindu plot to establish Hindu rule in India."<sup>28</sup>

Congress leaders continued to make statements which proved that such an estimate of their mentality was correct. A former chief parliamentary secretary of Madras, A. Kaleswara Rao, told an audience in Kurnool that "Mahatma Gandhi should be the sole leader of India as Hitler is in Germany and Stalin in Russia."<sup>29</sup>

Three days before the League opened its annual session in Lahore and five days before the Lahore Resolution was passed, A. I. Kalam Azad delivered his presidential address at the Congress annual session at Ramgarh. The whole of India was by now talking (hopefully or fearfully, depending on who was talking)



of separation and division, but the Congress president did not even mention such a prospect in his lengthy speech. In reply to all Muslim statements of fear of Hindu rule the only thing Azad could say from the official platform was: "The thousand years of our joint life has moulded us into a common nationality. This cannot be done artificially. Nature does her fashioning through her hidden processes in course of centuries. The cast has now been moulded and destiny has set her seal upon it. Whether we like it or not, we have now become an Indian nation, united and indivisible. No fantasy or artificial scheming to separate and divide can break this unity."<sup>30</sup> He brushed aside all Muslim fears in one sentence: "Can such a vast mass of humanity have any legitimate reason for apprehension that, in a free and democratic India, it might be unable to protect its rights and interests?"<sup>31</sup>

### The Toosy Scheme (January 1940)

The first scheme to appear in 1940 was that of Muhammad Sharif Toosy, whom we have met before. He began by saying that if final independence was the goal of India and the severance of the British connection was a possibility, then the Muslims had every right to demand "a full and equal share in the distribution of ultimate political power". It was for them to judge whether their interests could better be served by remaining a minority under a future Indian government or by "forming independent sovereign states in the North-West and North-East where they constitute compact areas with distinct geographical limits". Muslims living in the Hindu-majority areas were a real minority and had no alternative but to accept Congress assurances of goodwill, but other Muslims were not bound by any such consideration to leave their ultimate political and economic interests in provinces where they were in a majority to the mercy of a hostile Hindu majority at the centre.

The Muslims numbered 28 million in the north-west out of a total population of 42 million. This proportion in the areas of the Punjab, Sind, Baluchistan, NWFP and Kashmir could be raised further by a re-adjustment of the eastern frontiers of the Punjab. If Ambala division and eastern Hindu and Sikh states were excluded from the Punjab, its population would be reduced from 28½ million to 21 million, but the Muslim percentage would go up from

55 to 70. This Muslim percentage "will further be raised if the entire Muslim North-West is taken together as a whole".

In Bengal a similar re-adjustment of boundaries would raise the Muslim proportion in population to 80% or more. At present the Muslims formed an overwhelming majority of 75% in eastern Bengal and the Goalpara and Sylhet districts of Assam. They were also in a majority in some districts of western Bengal which were contiguous to eastern Bengal. If this Muslim population was to come together under a new province of "Eastern Bengal and Assam", Muslims would be placed in a permanent majority of 80% in a total population of 40 million.<sup>32</sup>

The details of this plan came very near to what actually happened in June 1947.

### Abdullah Zakaullah Khan (January 1940)

In its issue of 10 January the *Star of India* carried a long article by one Khan Bahadur Abu Abdullah Muhammad Zakaullah Khan. The editorial by-line said that it was a "paper" originally entitled "Hindu-Muslim Relations and the Future Constitution of India"; it did not indicate where it was first published or delivered and at what date. Nor did it provide any information about the author. From his name and the fact that the article was reproduced in a Calcutta paper we may with some confidence judge him to be a Bengali.

He began by saying that it was the duty of both Hindus and Muslims to put forward some alternative scheme (to the 1935 Act) which would carry with it the approval of the bulk of the members of the two communities. This had not been done. It was true that some plans of division or zonal distribution had been presented but "these have been characterized as fantastic and impracticable". His own scheme was not of partition, but of parity. "I can say, without fear of contradiction, that if any scheme for the future constitution of India can be devised which will ensure equal partnership of Hindus and Muslims in the future governance of India that will be wholly acceptable to the Muslims and it is for the Hindus to say whether such a scheme would be acceptable to them." He was clear and firm on the impossibility of the Muslims acquiescing in a Hindu domination. "We do not want to help in the framing of a constitution which will enable the majority

community to dominate over us for all time. We do not want to help in forging the chains that would keep us down for ever."

He suggested as follows. The autonomous powers of the provinces with the weightage for minorities as given under the 1935 Act would continue. "There should be no need for division of India into Hindu or Muslim zones or for any exchange of population which in a country as thickly populated as India with the present level of the education of the masses is not a practical proposition." There was every hope that Hindu-Muslim differences would "adjust themselves in course of time", provided that *"the majority community in a Province is not backed and supported in its misbehaviour towards the minority community by its majority in the Centre and this can only be secured if Hindus and Muslims are given equal representation in the Centre"*. The scheme, therefore, was that *"after allotting a certain number of seats, with a certain weightage if necessary to smaller communities such as Parsees, Indian Christians, Sikhs and others, divide the remaining seats at the Centre between the two main majorities—Hindus and Muslims—leaving the representation in the Provinces as it is at present"*. If the Hindus opposed such an arrangement that would mean that they mistrusted the Muslims. And "if the majority party can be justified in mistrusting the Muslim parity at the Centre, are Muslims very much to blame if they cannot trust the Hindu majority at the Centre?"<sup>33</sup>

This was perhaps a sensible way of solving the problem short of a partition, but it had its own weaknesses. It would not have been acceptable to the Hindus. How could they give up their majority right for all times to come? The fact is that if they were given only two choices—a division of India or a permanent parity at the centre—they would have preferred division to any arrangement under which they were to be politically and constitutionally the equals of the Muslims who formed but a quarter of the total population. And for good reasons. Nor would the British have agreed to put such a formula in any constitutional plan drawn up under their aegis. From the Muslim point of view, too, the scheme did not solve all the problems. It did not touch the myriads of major and minor difficulties cropping up in the administration and politics of the provinces. For example, how could equal representation at the centre help the Muslims of Bengal and the Punjab, who had demographic majorities which were not reflected in the legislative

representation, or of the United Provinces and Bihar, where their number was small but their ambitions large?

### C.R. Reddy (February 1940)

On 3 February 1940, the *Madras Mail* carried a short, almost telegraphic, article by a Hindu leader prescribing a confederation for India to solve the Muslim problem.

He made six "reconciliatory" suggestions:

1. The 1935 constitution had to be replaced both in its central and provincial parts by a "new type".
2. The central government would have to be a confederation "with sovereign status vesting in the states and provinces" which would be its members.
3. "Government with a fixed tenure and irremovable by vote of the Legislature should take the place of the present Unitary party Cabinets."
4. Party executives should be replaced with composite cabinets.
5. Government would not be wholly based on population. The provincial basis would supplant the population basis, at least in the executive.
6. The central executive would be as follows: (a) Hyderabad would have a permanent seat to be filled according to its constitution or by nomination of the Nizam. (b) Baroda, Mysore, Kashmir and Travancore would have two seats between themselves by rotation. (c) One representative of minor states would be elected by the Princes' Chamber. (d) One member from each province would be appointed by the Viceroy on the recommendation of the provincial government concerned.<sup>34</sup>

Reddy did not elaborate his scheme, which rules out informed criticism. His description is confined to the executive he visualizes; it leaves unexplained the details of the more important and complicated legislative structure of the centre. Was he aware of the difficulties inherent in running a confederation? Were all provinces and states, irrespective of their size and resources, to be equal members of this set-up? How was the communal problem to be solved in the constituent units? Were the native states to be democratized? Who was going to fill in the details of the confederal system and prepare the constitutional draft?

### Abdullah Haroon (February 1940)

Writing to the Aga Khan in November-December 1938, Abdullah Haroon had pointed out that the League circles had begun to drift in the direction of "a separate federation of Muslim States and Provinces so that we are free, once and for all, from the Hindu molestation".<sup>35</sup> Now in February 1940 he circulated a scheme of his own which "envisaged the division of India into two separate Federations, each drawing its major support from one of the major communities. . . . The Muslim Federation was to comprise the North-Western part of India and Kashmir".<sup>36</sup>

We have no further details of the proposal. Obviously it was different from what has sometimes been called the "Haroon Committee Scheme", i.e., the scheme prepared for the League by its Foreign Committee which had Haroon as its chairman, for according to the Committee Scheme there were to be two Muslim States, one in the north-west and another in the north-east. What Haroon is reported to have proposed was nothing but what Rahmat Ali had said in his first leaflet in January 1933.

### Three Vague Reports (Undated)

Three more Muslim proposals were made in early 1940, but to these our reference must be bare and brief because of lack of information.

Mawalana Abdul Qadir Azad Subhani of Cawnpore was in favour of a separate Muslim state which he called "*Hakumat-i-Rabbani*" (divine government). Afzal Huq Kashmiri proposed the same thing under a different name, "*Hakumat-i-Ilahiyya*" (God's government).<sup>37</sup> Sayyid Rizwanullah, a Muslim League politician from the United Provinces, suggested a division of India into a Hindu and a Muslim state, but the division was not to be complete as the two states would be joined at the top in some sort of relationship;<sup>38</sup> probably he had a confederal solution in mind.

### Zafar Ali Khan (March 1940)

On 8 March, Mawlana Zafar Ali Khan, a well-known Punjabi leader and editor of the famous Urdu daily *Zamindar* of Lahore, speaking in the Indian Legislative Assembly, suggested the creation

of a buffer state running from the Makran coast right up to Chitral. He did this in the course of his speech while moving a cut in the estimates in order to discuss the "forward policy" of the Government of India on the north-western frontier. He made a rapid survey of the frontier history up to the beginning of the operations then being carried out in the Ahmadzai salient. He criticized the official forward policy, and declared that the only wise course to follow was "to carve out this buffer state which had a population of 3,000,000 and would be India's defence against a march by Russia to the south".<sup>39</sup>

Apparently, he was not suggesting an independent state in the north-west, but provincial status for the tribal belt running along India's frontiers with Afghanistan and Persia. It had little to do with the communal issue or the creation of Pakistan.

### Abdullah Yusuf Ali (March 1940)

On the eve of the passing of the Lahore Resolution, Allama Abdullah Yusuf Ali prescribed a new remedy for the communal ills of India. The interesting aspect of his suggestion was that it neither envisaged radical political changes nor necessitated territorial alterations. It was a plea for the creation of a new party system which would cut across communal differences and thus solve the main problem of Hindu-Muslim rivalry.

Claiming that this approach would achieve a "permanent and radical solution of the minority problem", he recommended a two-party system for India "in which individuals can and do change over from one party to another at different times". He knew that this was impossible as between Hindus and Muslims as communities, but it was practicable as between the Congress party as such and a coalition of groups opposed to the Congress. The largest and most important group in this coalition would be the Muslims. Some Muslim individuals, like Abul Kalam Azad, might follow the Congress; and some Muslim groups, like the Khaksars, the Ahrars, the Red Shirts and a part of the Jamiat-ul-Ulema, might pursue their own independent ends. But the great majority of the Muslims would stand together.

On the other hand, among the Hindus, taking the word in its widest generic sense, there were groups which were opposed to the Congress. The most numerous among them were the untouchables.



Another group, not numerically strong but containing men of the highest standing and education, was that of the National Liberal Federation. Then there were Congressmen who belonged to extreme sections at either end and held views essentially opposed to the will of the party as a whole. The "extreme Socialist (or Communists)" thought that the Congress was bourgeois. The conservative elements in the Congress ranks would, when their allegiance was subjected to a practical test, find themselves more at home with the Liberals than with the Congressites of the school of Subhas Chandra Bose.

What did this analysis show? "The upshot of this analysis is that there are many incipient lines of cleavage in Indian politics, which can be appealed to for the formation of true political parties, as opposed to purely religious or communal groups. And I look to the Muslims—with their past history, their political experience, and their present insecure position—to take the lead in evolving a composite party which will safeguard legitimate interests and be available—when the need arises—for forming an alternative government. . . . The formation of federations of parties, each federation being of sufficient cohesion to be a possible alternative government with a definite programme, is the only way that I can see of solving the minority problem in India. Without it there can be no modern constitution, no democratic assemblies, no progressive legislation, no really effective road to self-government."<sup>40</sup>

This was a perfectly sensible and reasonable solution. But time and political events have a way of making many sensible things impossible and reducing reason to incoherent hysteria. This was the solution of a competent political scientist working in his study from dead figures and lifeless statistics. The moving facts of the realities of politics did not bear out the calm, cool academic analysis made from a distance. Yusuf Ali forgot the one overwhelming fact of Indian politics: that religion ruled the political impulse. However excellent the two-party system which gave enviable stability to the British political machinery, however commendable the advice for confronting the Congress with a powerful coalition of opposing forces, however correct the diagnosis which discovered common ground between the Muslims and some non-Muslim groups, however virtuous the ultimate ideal of replacing communal groups with true political parties, and however true the final warning that without such a step all talk

of democracy and self-government was but empty words—the overpowering fact remained that in India neither the premisses nor the conclusions of this argument held water.

Religious politics were not a symbol or result of Hindu-Muslim rivalry but a condition of Muslim existence in India. Similarly the Hindu basis of Congress politics was not a consequence of Hindu-Muslim competition but of the unalterable circumstance that a Hindu was a Hindu. By no other argument could we explain the past developments of Indian politics—Congress opposition to separate electorates for Muslims, communal riots on music before the mosque and cow killing, Hindu movements of shuddhi and sangathan, Muslim counter-movements of tabligh and tanzim, Gandhi's proud statement that he was asking the Hindus to support the Muslim Khilafat movement because this was the only way to save the cow from the Muslim knife, Congress provincial governments' treatment of the Muslim minority, and so many other things which had gone into the making of the minority problem. Yusuf Ali's own experience of Indian administration and politics should have told him how unreal and obsolete was his analysis of the situation. He had spent several years in the ICS and seen the maddening difficulties of district administration as an eye-witness. He had been the president of the All India Muslim Conference and fought the case of Muslim safeguards before the Joint Parliamentary Committee.<sup>41</sup> He had also been a president of the All India Tanzim Conference,<sup>42</sup> and had, in his utterances, asked the Muslims to counteract the dangerous Hindu movements of shuddhi and sangathan. Did his own experience hold out any hope for the possibility of the emergence of "true political parties" and the disappearance of religious groups? Or, had his long stay in England made him so unfamiliar with Indian conditions that he could recommend such unrealistic measures to deal with a situation which was now beyond any remedy but the most revolutionary?

His picture of the Congress party as an alliance of divergent elements was only superficially true. Of course there were men and groups in the Congress which did not agree with everything that the party did or decided. But that applied to all parties and political movements. The unanimity of the Congress in its dealings with the Muslims and the British was a more important factor (in fact, the only important factor) than its internal difference on details of programme. The only thing that interested the Muslims

was whether the Congress as a party was or was not prepared to give reasonable assurances, backed with action, that they would occupy an honourable place in the future free India, and whether its present conduct was or was not in keeping with its proclaimed policy of toleration and reasonable co-operation. On both these points they found its behaviour to be at odds with its claims. It was no consolation to them to be told that there were differences within the Congress, or that there were outside it some small, ineffectual groups which might be more amenable to a satisfactory solution of the communal problem.

In any case, Muslim politics had gone far beyond the stage where such gentle idealism and pleasing optimism could have any appeal or attraction. For many years now the Muslims had been contemplating the cheerful prospects of separation and independence. Within a few days of Yusuf Ali's lecture they were to take the final leap and declare for Pakistan. At the best of times his plan would have been difficult of fulfilment; at this hour it was painfully irrelevant.

### Conclusion

At this stage I may be allowed to make a few brief observations on the proposals recorded and examined in this and the previous two chapters, postponing a fuller analysis of the idea of Muslim separation to the chapters that follow.

The first thing to strike us in these proposals is that most of them (the Sikandar scheme being the only major exception) were influenced by Rahmat Ali's ideas. This was quite natural, as Rahmat Ali's plans had been the only detailed and clear-cut attempt to divide India on Hindu-Muslim basis and create Muslim states in the sub-continent. The idea of a partition and the concept of a separate Muslim nationalism were far older than Rahmat Ali's exposition of them, but he was the first to argue the two-nation theory, to tackle the practical aspects of its application, to provide details of the proposed division, and to give a name to the north-western Muslim state. Anyone coming after him could hardly escape his influence or ignore his arguments and conclusions. It may not be an exaggeration to say that had there been no Rahmat Ali or had he not presented his ideas at the time when he did, the proposals examined in these three chapters would have been

neither so many nor so detailed nor so emphatic.

Thus the deep and pervasive influence of the Cambridge movement is clear, but the acknowledgement of it is not. It is odd that over a dozen schemes should have been presented in the course of three years under the direct or indirect influence of Rahmat Ali, and yet not one of them should refer to him or acknowledge the debt owed to his ideas. It is possible that one or two of these scheme-makers were unfamiliar with his plans and the affinity between their proposals and his was a coincidence, or a matter of two separate but similar manifestations of a feeling which was then current in the Muslim community. This, however, will not explain the unanimous silence on the point of mentioning his name. In two cases we have definite and certain knowledge that the planners were not only fully aware of his ideas but also loyal to them. Punjabi was not a member of the Pakistan National Movement, but he was so deeply impressed by its message that he spent several years in spreading and popularizing it in the Punjab. He also borrowed the word Pakistan for his own scheme, but was disallowed by Jinnah to use it. One of the two Aligarh dons was not only a follower of Rahmat Ali since his student days at Cambridge but one of his important and trusted lieutenants in India. Yet neither mentions Rahmat Ali or acknowledges his lead or inspiration. In fact, Punjabi refers to "Pakistan" in rather derogatory terms and argues against the adoption of the name. Even if the name "Pakistan" was rejected out of respect for Jinnah's views there was no occasion for denigrating it on grounds which were neither true nor reasonable.

It is hard to find a satisfactory explanation of the failure of these Muslim planners to mention Rahmat Ali. It may have been due to a natural human infirmity: the wish to sound original, to win credit for presenting new ideas, but suppressing the source of one's influence or knowledge. Rivalry in the art of drawing up schemes, for that is what the whole operation had nearly come to be, particularly in 1939, and the jealousy which so often enters all competitive efforts, may also have played a part. It is possible that some of the schemes deliberately omitted any reference to Rahmat Ali in order not to frighten the Hindus too much, for they knew exactly what he stood for. It is also possible, even probable, that the planners did not want to offend the League which was at this time (and in fact in all later years) not sympathetic to the

Cambridge movement or was at least reluctant to be seen to follow its ideals.

As for the name "Pakistan", only two schemes accept it for the proposed Muslim state in the north-west. Even this is done with qualifications. The Punjab Muslim Students Federation adopted the name with an amendment of its own: its state was to be called "Pakistan Caliphate". But this is not a significant departure from Rahmat Ali's idea, because in Urdu it read as "Khilafat-i-Pakistan", meaning that Pakistan would be an Islamic or Muslim state. The Aligarh scheme stated that the north-western Muslim state *might* be given the name of Pakistan. It was no more than a suggestion and the final decision was left to the Muslim League.

As we will see later, the Muslim League did not want to use or adopt the name Pakistan for its objective. In 1939 Jinnah had asked the Nawab of Mamdot to tell Mian Kafayet Ali not to use the word in the title of his book *Confederacy of India*. Thus it was at Jinnah's instance that the Muslim League avoided the use of the word at the time of the passing of the Lahore Resolution, and abstained from mentioning it in any official declaration or public statement. Later, of course, the popular appeal of the name and the fact that the common man referred to the partition scheme as Pakistan forced the League to accept the title and incorporate it into its constitution and programme.

Other features which mark these schemes may be noted here in the form of questions to which we will try to find answers when we come, in the following chapters, to analyze the whole story of the idea of separation.

With one or two exceptions Bengal stayed firmly outside this long and intense search for a solution of the Muslim problem. This raises many questions. Were Bengali Muslims not interested in their future? Did they feel that in their geographical and demographic circumstances any move towards separation was bound to be futile? If so, what were these circumstances, and how did they differ from those obtaining in the north-west? Did they give any thought to separation at all? Was their sense of separateness from the Hindus not so well marked because of the deep imprint of Hindu culture on them? Did the old idea of a Bengali nationality transcending religious differences—a Hindu idea of which much use was made during the agitation against the partition of the province during 1905-11 and again briefly in March-August 1947

and once again in 1970-71—have such a strong appeal for them as to dissuade them from thinking on separatist lines?

A majority of these schemes came from the Punjab. Why? Was it because there was a greater sense of separateness in the province in spite of, or probably because of, the evenly mixed population of Muslims and non-Muslims? Is it true that while there was greater political awareness among Bengalis there was greater intellectual awakening among the Punjabis? Or, were the Punjabis more attached to Islam than the Bengalis? Islam had come to the Punjab several centuries earlier and time had moulded a tradition which could not be resisted. Was it Rahmat Ali's influence which gave shape to the Punjabi Muslim opinion in favour of separation, while his name and ideas were less known in Bengal? Had Iqbal's poetic message worked a spell and given a new turn to Punjabi thinking? Was it the Punjab's contiguity to Afghanistan and the north-west's proximity to Muslim countries running through vast spaces till the European frontiers of Turkey which made the province more keen to support the idea of Muslim separation from Hindu India?

If we look at the background of the authors of these schemes, we see a new avenue of approach opening before us. A majority of them were intellectuals rather than politicians. Why was it so? Because the intellectuals have more imagination? Because they always lead the politicians—or should? Because Muslim politicians of the 'thirties were divided among themselves, and at least some of them were ready to compromise with the Hindus if a reasonable measure of security for the Muslims could be procured, while the intellectuals, unencumbered with narrow and short-term political considerations, were willing to explore different possibilities?

Another important clue to the changing aspect of Muslim politics is provided by the fact that at least two of the schemes came from the NWFP. This was very significant, because the province was ruled by the Congress, its Muslim League branch was virtually non-existent, and the influence of the Red Shirts was supreme. The province had such a large Muslim majority that the communal problem as such had no meaning for the Pathan. If in spite of this there were people who were thinking of a separatist solution to the Indian Muslim problem, it indicated that neither the strength of Congress control and propaganda nor the absence of communal rivalry could keep the Muslims away from the idea of separation.



The only important proposal in our list which does not speak of separation at all (cultural or political or territorial) as a contemporary issue is the Sikandar scheme. Is it because Sikandar, as the leader of a party which had the support of all communal groups in the Punjab, did not want to sound a separatist note lest he forfeited the loyalty of his non-Muslim followers? But then he was also, since October 1937, a Muslim Leaguer, and the Muslim members of his party were, under the terms of the Jinnah-Sikandar Pact, also members of the provincial Muslim League. Was he anxious to please, or at least not to offend, the British whose influence on him was considerable and for whom his party had much sympathy? Was he trying not to alienate the Congress by prescribing a federal rather than a separationist solution? For, there is not a word of criticism of the Congress in his proposal. But, then by suggesting a weak centre he was putting himself in direct opposition to the Congress, though perhaps he did not realize how strongly the Congress was wedded to the idea of a close federation. On the other side, Muslim opinion had by now travelled so far on the road to separation that his scheme was out of date before it was published. If he believed that in the conditions obtaining in 1939 his proposal would win the general approval of any side, he was out of touch with the situation in the country.

The strong criticism which his scheme encountered at the hands of the Muslim League is a pointer to the growing League sympathy for a separationist solution and to its reluctance to consider any suggestions falling short of it. It seems that by August 1939 the League had almost made up its mind that a federal India, particularly one of the Congress design, was out of the question as a solution of the Muslim problem, and that it must be ready for a much more radical approach. Some of its spokesmen had now begun to talk of "homeland" or "homelands" for the Muslims, and to reject the necessity or desirability of a centre. Anyone who observed this current of thought and looked for the signs of new times could have seen the future without the help of a crystal-ball. The whole course of Muslim political thinking, which had begun with certain hazy glimmerings in the mid-nineteenth century, was coming to fruition; the idea of separation was now mature enough to command the allegiance of the biggest Muslim political party in the country; and the popular feeling in favour of Pakistan was soon to emerge as the formal demand of a nation.

The importance of these schemes in the growth of the idea of Pakistan is therefore undeniable. And yet it is surprising that most historians have treated them with an indifference which is hard to justify or even explain. They have either neglected them or dismissed them with a short reference which gives a misleading and distorted picture. For example, Palme Dutt, the half-Indian leader of the Communist Party of Great Britain who wrote much on Indian politics without letting his Marxism-Leninism weaken his Hinduism, attributed these schemes to "the activities of these communal organizations", and summarized them as "the demand . . . for the State separation of the Muslims by the establishment of a Confederation of Muslim States to cover four main areas— a North-Western Group, a North-Eastern Group, a Delhi-Lucknow Group, and a Deccan Group, including parts of Hyderabad State".<sup>43</sup> Both his comments are untrue. The authors of the schemes did not belong to "communal organizations"; in fact, most of them did not belong to any party, communal or otherwise. Nor did they suggest a confederation of Muslim states. Anyway, what does "State separation of the Muslims" mean? In another work, which represents the official Soviet view of Asian history, two modern historians have indulged in the sweeping generalization that the authors of all the 1939 schemes "did not want full independence and urged that the Indian states of the future should remain part of the British Empire".<sup>44</sup> So much for foreign comment.

Pakistani historians could not have given such misleading accounts for the simple reason that they did not take any notice of these schemes. With the exception of Sharifuddin Pirzada whose pioneering effort first drew the attention of the historians to this vital chapter in the making of Pakistan,<sup>45</sup> and Waheeduzzaman who was obliged to treat with them in his doctoral research covering the years 1928-40,<sup>46</sup> I know of no other Pakistani scholar who has made a careful study of these plans or appreciated and assessed their importance for and relevance to the evolution of the idea or the demand of Pakistan. In recent years there have appeared two major works on the history of Indian Muslims and their gradual political and national separation from the Hindus. Both neglect these schemes. I.H. Qureshi mentions the Sikandar and Latif schemes in a footnote and does not refer at all to the others.<sup>47</sup> Abdul Hamid, who is dealing specifically with Muslim separatism,

gives a detailed account of Muslim fear of Hindu rule and of Congress refusal to consider the Muslim sentiment, but provides no analysis of the various schemes born of this fear.<sup>48</sup>

An attempt will be made to answer these and many other questions in the rest of this book.

## NOTES

1. *TSI*, editorial, 25 August 1939.
2. Anwar Bakhshi (from Jullundhur), letter, *CMG*, 30 August 1939.
3. A Punjabi Muslim, "Sidelights on Muslim Politics-II", *ibid.*, 10 September 1939.
4. *Round Table*, no. 116, September 1939, p. 773.
5. For this and the debate on it see *CMG*, 9 November 1939.
6. *TSI*, editorial, 6 November 1939.
7. *CMG*, editorial, 14 November 1939.
8. India Correspondent, "India and the War: Congress Demand: The True Way to Satisfaction", *The Times*, 5 December 1939.
9. Joint statement issued by Dr. Muhammad Afzaal Husain Qadri, Dr. Zakiuddin, Dr. Burhan Ahmad, and Ubaidullah Durrani, from Aligarh, *TSI*, 12 December 1939.
10. *Round Table*, no. 117, December 1939, p. 161 E.
11. Colin Cooke, *The Life of Richard Stafford Cripps*, London, 1957, pp. 255-256.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 288 fn.
13. *Report of the Inquiry Committee appointed by the Council of the All India Muslim League to inquire into Muslim Grievances in Congress Provinces*, Delhi, n.d., p. 3. (Pirpur Report).
14. T.G.P. Spear, "Public Opinion in India, 1924-45: Some Personal Impressions", A Paper read at the Study Conference on the Partition of India, 1947, held at the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, July 1967 (Mimeo).
15. For example, Sir William Barton, *India's North-West Frontier*, London, 1939, p. 13.
16. Reported in *CMG*, 9 August 1939; see also *TSI*, 17 August 1939. The *CMG* wrote an editorial on it on the same day, 9 August.

17. For the Faqir of Ipi see G.T.G. (probably G.T. Garratt), "The Faqir of Ipi", *CMG*, 3 September 1939, and the obituary notice of him in *The Times*, 20 April 1960. A rather good, full-page photograph of Ipi may be seen among the plates following p. 140 in J.G. Elliott, *The Frontier 1839-1947: The Story of the North-West Frontier of India*, London, 1968. One aspect of his wartime activities is referred to in U.S. Department of State, *Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945*, Series D, Vol. XIII, Washington, D.C., 1964, pp. 136-137; for the Italian efforts to recruit him to create trouble on the north-west frontier of India, see Pietro Quaroni, *Il mondo di un ambasciatore*, Milan, 1965, pp. 120-128. The only scholarly and detailed, but congress-oriented, study of the politics of the province is Erland Jansson, *India and Pakistan or Paktunistan: The Nationalist Movements in the North-West Frontier Province, 1937-47*, Uppsala, 1981.
18. Syed Zafrul Hasan and Muhammad Afzaal Husain Qadri, *The Problem of Indian Muslims and its Solution*, Aligarh, 1939. All quotations are from this pamphlet. The title page bears no date. The printer's colophon contains the date 14 August 1939, and this is repeated by Qadri in his letter to Chourhary Rahmat Ali of 8 March 1940 (see Khan A. Ahmad, *The Founder of Pakistan: Through Trial to Triumph*, London, n.d.? 1942, p. 24). In the footnote on the same page Ahmad says that the date of the covering letter issued with the pamphlet was "September 1939", which should mean that it was printed in August and circulated in September. An Urdu summary of the scheme is available in *Jadid Science*, August-December 1978 (special Afzaal Husain Qadri issue), pp. 137-141.
19. Muhammad Afzaal Husain Qadri to Chourhary Rahmat Ali, 8 March 1940, Khan A. Ahmad, *op. cit.*, p. 24. The letter which was in Urdu is reproduced in photostat in this book (pp. 22-23), and the English tr given in full. I have quoted Ahmad's tr.
20. For Hindu criticism of the Aligarh Scheme see Rajendra Prasad, *Pakistan*, Bombay and Calcutta, September 1940, pp. 13-14, 35-40, and his *India Divided*, Bombay, 2nd ed June 1947, pp. 183-184; and K.T. Shah, *Why Pakistan*

- and *Why Not*, Bombay, n.d., pp. 172-177. For a Muslim reference see F.K. Khan Durrani, *The Meaning of Pakistan*, Lahore, 1946 rep. For a contemporary British-Indian comment see *CMG*, editorial, 27 September 1939.
21. See Ranjee G. Shahani, *Indian Pilgrimage*, London, 1939, pp. 209-211.
22. *CMG*, editorial, 9 January 1940.
23. *TMM*, editorial, 22 January 1940.
24. S. Satyamurti, statement to the press, Madras, 30 January 1940, *CMG*, 31 January 1940.
25. V.P. Menon, *The Transfer of Power in India*, Calcutta, 1957, p. 77.
26. S.M. Akhtar, "Communalism or Nationalism?", *CMG*, 2 February 1940.
27. India Correspondent, "India's Many Voices", *The Times*, 10 February 1940.
28. *CMG*, editorial, 14 February 1940.
29. Quoted in *TMM*, editorial, 26 February 1940.
30. Abul Kalam Azad, Presidential Address, INC, Ramgarh, 19 March 1940, *JAR 1940*, Vol. I, p. 300.
31. Quoted in *TMM*, editorial, 19 March 1940.
32. M.R.T., "Protection versus Separation: Alternatives before Muslims in Independent India", *TET*, 5 January 1940, reproduced in full in *India's Problem of Her Future Constitution*, Bombay, n.d., pp. 33-38.
33. *TSI*, 10 January 1940. Italics in the original.
34. C.R. Reddy, "A Confederation of India: Essentials of a New Constitution", *TMM*, 3 February 1940.
35. Mian Ahmad Shafi, *Haji Sir Abdoolah Haroon: A Biography*, Karachi, n.d., pp. 138, 140, quoted by K.B. Sayeed, *Pakistan: The Formative Phase*, Karachi, 1960, p. 120.
36. K.B. Sayeed, *op. cit.*, p. 120.
37. *Cheragh-i-Rah*, Pakistan Number 1960, p. 212, cited in S.S. Pirzada, *Evolution of Pakistan*, Lahore, 1963, p. 193.
38. *Ibid.*, p. 193.
39. *The Statesman*, 9 March 1940.
40. Abdullah Yusuf Ali, "The Muslims of India, the War and the Political Field", *Asiatic Review*, April 1940, pp. 226-239. It was a lecture delivered by him in London in March.
41. See "Memorandum on behalf of the All India Muslim Con-



## BORROWED PLUMES

The reader must have noticed that none of the schemes examined in the previous chapters emanated from the All India Muslim League. In a very few cases the planners were members of the party (e.g., Sikandar Hayat Khan and M.S. Toosy), but they published their suggestions in their private capacity. The League did not put forward any ideas. It did not even give its opinion on them. Did it really ignore all these efforts to find a solution of the Muslim problem? If so, why? Why was it so indifferent to these plans? Why did it finally follow public opinion instead of leading it in the first place? We *might* get an inkling into the mind of the League by casting a brief glance at its policy and attitude during the 'thirties and observing how it was gradually, reluctantly but irresistibly drawn towards a solution by partition.

## Muslim League Policy: 1930-1938

Speaking before the Aligarh Muslim University Union on 5 February 1938, Jinnah said: "But I received the shock of my life at the meetings of the Round Table Conference. In the face of danger the Hindu sentiment, the Hindu mind, the Hindu attitude led me to the conclusion that there was no hope of unity."<sup>1</sup> He might have felt that, but it left no mark on his RTC speeches, later pronouncements or his letters of those years.

But some writers have constructed an elaborate image of Jinnah the originator of Pakistan on scanty evidence. One of them recounts the story of Jinnah's visits to Cambridge in 1931-32, and then abruptly concludes that he was converted to the idea of Pakistan. On the invitation of the Cambridge Muslim Association he addressed it on 6 June 1931 in the Old Combination Room of Trinity College. He spoke on the current Indian problem "as a

- ference and the All India Muslim League to Joint Committee on Indian Constitutional Reform, 1933, 1 August 1933", in Joint Committee on Indian Constitutional Reform (Session 1932-33), Vol. IIC, *Minutes of Evidence given before the Joint Committee on Indian Constitutional Reform*, London, 1934, pp. 1475-1478; and "All India Muslim Conference and All India Muslim League Evidence before the Joint Committee on Indian Constitutional Reform", 1 August 1933, *ibid.*, pp. 1481-1550. Both items reproduced in full in K.K. Aziz (ed), *The All India Muslim Conference, 1928-1935: A Documentary Record*, Karachi, 1972, pp. 128-281.
42. See Abdullah Yusuf Ali, *Tanzim: Its scope and Objects*, Amritsar, December 1925; this is the text of his presidential address at the All India Tanzim Conference held at Aligarh on 29 December 1925.
  43. R. Palme Dutt, *India Today*, London, 1940, p. 413.
  44. Y.V. Gankovsky and L.R. Gordon-Polonskaya, *A History of Pakistan*, Moscow, 1964, p. 72.
  45. S.S. Pirzada, *Evolution of Pakistan*, Lahore, 1963.
  46. Waheeduzzaman, *Towards Pakistan*, Lahore, 1964, pp. 153-168. However, in another and later work he goes to the other extreme when he says that the authors of the scheme published "after 1937" were "distinguished Muslims" (in I.H. Qureshi (ed), *A Short History of Pakistan*, Karachi, 1967, Book Four, p. 213, though it is possible that this claim is an editorial interpolation).
  47. I.H. Qureshi, *The Muslim Community*, The Hague, 1962, p. 298 and fn.
  48. Abdul Hamid, *Muslim Separatism in India*, Lahore, 1967.

nationalist but one who understood the Muslim case and still thought the best way was understanding with the Hindus". The second occasion, of which no date is mentioned, was a tea party at St. John's College, where he was more frank, and "there was a note of pain and dismay as he expressed doubts about Congress views about accommodating the Muslims". His last visit was on 20 February 1932 as the guest of honour of the Indian Majlis annual dinner. He gave "fuller expression of his view on the Muslims' demand". He "was positive about the fairness of the Muslim demand for guarantees and said that if the Congress could not give them (the Muslims) their legitimate due they might have to go alone [sic.]". And then comes the final conclusion: "It was in these eventful days that the idea of Pakistan took root in the Quaid's mind."<sup>2</sup>

The abruptness of the conclusion might well be the doing of the newspaper which published this piece. The author's name is not printed under the title of the article, as is the common practice, but at the end, in the shape of "Adapted from an article by M.A. Hussain". We are not told where the original article first appeared, who the author is, and what changes or abridgements have been made by the editor. Further, how could the "idea of Pakistan" have taken root in Jinnah's mind one year before the idea itself was for the first time presented by Rahmat Ali? Does the reporter mean to allege that the original idea was not Rahmat Ali's but Jinnah's? Unless we have the complete text of the dinner speech, it is difficult to relate the narrator's conclusion with Jinnah's words.

An Indian Muslim scholar indulges in similar speculation. "One theory is that ever since 1930 when Dr. Iqbal for the first time put forward the idea of a separate Muslim state, Mr. Jinnah had started thinking seriously about it", says Dr. Abid Husain. But Jinnah had no hope during the RTC years that the Congress or the British government would take the Pakistan proposal seriously. Therefore, he "did not want to commit himself to it".<sup>3</sup>

Rushbrook Williams is more confident. "It was during this period, I am sure, that he began to re-think his position on what the future of the Muslims ought to be. I sat with him through the sessions of the Round Table Conference in London (1930-32); and his disillusionment about the prospects of the Muslims receiving a fair deal from the Congress became visibly stronger

as the proceedings went on."<sup>4</sup>

It is quite true that Jinnah was as unhappy with the RTC's handling of the Muslim issue as with the Congress's obduracy. He was also disillusioned with the Muslim League and the Muslim Conference, and therefore decided to settle down in England. But that does not imply that he was, at this time, a believer in a solution of the communal problem by partition or division. Sir Muhammad Shafi had told the RTC in January 1931, on behalf of the entire Muslim delegation, that if Iqbal's Allahabad address meant the creation of a separate Muslim state it was unacceptable to the Muslims. Jinnah had not dissented from this view. None of the letters of this period available to us shows that Jinnah was thinking on separatist lines. More importantly, Jinnah's policy from the time of his return to India in 1934 till early 1940 clearly shows his anxiety to reach a settlement with the Congress, to form coalition governments with it, and to work the provincial part of the 1935 constitution.

Far from embracing the Pakistan idea, the League did not talk of "two nations", the first premiss of separation, till the spring of 1936. Even this was a qualified statement. In his presidential address at the Bombay session of AIML on 12 April 1936, Sir Wazir Hasan declared that "the Hindus and the Muslims inhabiting this vast continent are not two communities but should be considered two nations in many respects". He went on to elaborate. "So that when the British Parliament is withholding the inauguration of full responsible government in this country, it is resisting two great nations of the world and not only two communities."<sup>5</sup> There is no mention of separation or partition.

In September 1937, when the Punjab Muslim Students Federation sat down to determine its goal it found that the League objective did not satisfy the wishes of the youth and therefore, in consultation with Iqbal, the Federation named its goal as "the establishment of a Muslim national state in the north-west of India comprising the Punjab, NWFP, Sind and Baluchistan". By this, it was made clear, the students meant a separate state and a division of India.<sup>6</sup> In spite of Rahmat Ali's great influence in the Punjab, the word "Pakistan" was not used, probably to avoid Jinnah's displeasure.

The first reference to separation by a League body that I have been able to discover occurred on 26 September 1937, when the

Calcutta Muslim League Conference passed a resolution recommending that "the attainment of complete independence and the creation of a free Islam within a free India should be adopted as its creed and ideal at the coming session of the League".<sup>7</sup> Two points about this should be noticed. First, it was still a vague demand for something "within a free India"; separation was implied, division was not. Secondly, AIML took no notice of this resolution.

Jinnah still refused to commit himself. When Iqbal suggested to him in 1937 that the time for demanding a Muslim state or states had come, he did not answer the poet's letter.<sup>8</sup> At the October 1937 triumphant League session at Lucknow, Jinnah's presidential address warned the Congress, the Hindus, the British and everybody else in strong words against planning to deprive the Muslims of their just rights<sup>9</sup>, but separation was not even hinted at.

In the same month the *Star of India* of Calcutta wrote three long leaders entitled "Not an Ulster" on 1, 4 and 6 October. The newspaper was not an official spokesman of the League, but its financial backers were sympathetic to the party point of view, and in general its opinion may safely be taken to reflect the League thinking. Moreover, at this time it was the finest Muslim paper in India in the English language (though an "evening") with a comprehensive coverage of news from all parts of the country and an impressive panel of regular or casual writers and contributors.

The first editorial declared: "It is not an Ulster that Muslims seek to establish in India, but a free and independent State in which no community shall tyrannize over another community".<sup>10</sup> This free state was not going to be Muslim, otherwise the question of communal tyranny would not arise. The second leader pointed out an irremovable difference between Hindus and Muslims. "To the Hindu, his religion is intimately and wholly concerned with India alone. To this he adds his love of the land he lives in . . . Therefore, the Hindu concept of Nationalism is different from the Muslim concept of Nationalism and the Muslim cannot, like the Hindu, regard India as the be-all and end-all of his political as well as of his spiritual existence. Herein lies the difference—which constantly leads to the different attitudes in the Hindu and the Muslim."<sup>11</sup>

"And yet", continued the third editorial, "it is possible for

them [the Muslims] to love the strip of the earth's territory which is their home, to strive for its good, to fight for its liberty and even to die for it, if need be . . . But the great impediment in their way is the inability of their Hindu countrymen to realize the plain fact that even while Muslims are fighting their country's cause, shoulder to shoulder with their Hindu brethren, they must yet maintain a certain separate entity, on the cultural and spiritual plane. . . . But if the present state of things continues, there will not be a repetition of an Ulster in India, but an enacting of scenes much worse than the conflict between the North and the South of Ireland ever witnessed. . . if the leaders of Hindu India can muster sufficient statesmanship, foresight and reasonableness, and learn to view the Hindu-Muslim question in its true perspective, conceding to the minority Community the fundamental rights and safeguards they seek—and if they show by their conduct that they mean honestly and sincerely—then the Imperialist can be made to capitulate in twenty-four hours."<sup>12</sup>

No reference is made in these lengthy editorials to political separation or its approaching prospects; only spiritual and cultural separation is mentioned. The leader-writer did not even refer to the fact that several Muslims had been, and currently were, suggesting separation. Why? Was he waiting for a signal from the League before extending his support to the separationists or the partitionists? Even if this be true, what stopped him from mentioning *en passant* that there was a drift in that direction among certain circles? Or, was the newspaper, at this stage, wedded to the ideal of an Indian federation, like the League?

In 1938 the League made its first cautious approach towards separation. Jinnah was re-thinking his policy, but for the time being he preferred to show his changing mind only in private conversations. When the Congress provincial government of Bombay refused to include a Leaguer in the ministry, the Governor expressed his inability to intervene under the rules of the constitution, and Jinnah's behind-the-scene efforts to set the matter right failed, he reacted with indignation. "That means", he blew up, "that we of the Muslim League who represent the Muslims are to have no further say in the government of this province or of any other province in India where the Congress are in a majority. That is the end." Thumping the table in front of him, he told Sir Francis Low, "There is nothing more to do except to get



a State of our own for the Muslims of this country."<sup>13</sup> But he said nothing about this in public for almost two years.

The editor of the Muslim League's official Urdu newspaper (*Manshur* of Delhi) tells a different tale. Sayyid Hasan Riaz, the story-teller, had a long meeting with Jinnah, in which he argued against the League's current campaign of procuring further concessions and safeguards from the British government and the Congress. Jinnah asked "with much interest" what solution Riaz had to offer. Riaz gave "the quick and apt" reply that the Muslim majority areas should be made completely independent and sovereign (*kulli tawr par azad awr khud-mukhtar*). Jinnah asked thoughtfully how the Muslims of the minority provinces could be protected. Riaz replied that this would be done through friendly treaties or a balance of power between the governments of the two new parts of India. He insisted that Jinnah should say something about partition as the president of AIML and thus guide the nation, and asked, "Tell me your opinion as the Muslim League president; that will suffice to guide me". The rest of the account should be reproduced in a literal translation of Riaz's words. "The Quaid-i-Azam stood up. He extended his hand towards me; in response I extended my hand towards him. The two hands met, and the Quaid-i-Azam said, 'Come, let us make a solemn promise today that, as long as we are alive, we shall struggle for this goal'. I, too, repeated the words of this undertaking, and the promise was sealed (*awr ahad-o-payman ho gya*). The Quaid-i-Azam sat down and made a long enthusiastic speech, 'I had made up my mind ten years ago that this was the thing to be done. The Hindus have made it impossible for us to live together'."<sup>14</sup>

It is impossible to accept the story as it stands; it is too large a morsel to swallow. Jinnah's behaviour as shown here is completely out of his character. All who knew him well speak of his reserve, self-control, reticence, personal dignity and absence of the slightest signs of intimacy. Did he really stand up, shake hands to seal a promise, sit down, and then make a long speech? Did this pantomime actually occur? Did a few sentences spoken by Riaz cast such a spell over Jinnah that he at once changed his mind and became a convert to the idea of Pakistan? Did Riaz really speak to Jinnah in the down-to-earth, blunt and curt phrases recounted in the dialogue? As the editor of a League newspaper he was a small fry. During this period of Jinnah's supremacy the

highest among the party leadership approached him with a respect bordering on awe. Nobody could take liberties with him, or dispute a point with him in the language Riaz claims to have used. Jinnah might have told him that he had come to favour the idea of partition under pressure of circumstances. But that is the only portion of this story which we can accept. The rest is so fanciful that it is either a gross exaggeration and a distortion of what took place or a plain fabrication.

The fact seems to be that Jinnah was still in the process of making up his mind. Or, if he had finalized his opinion, he thought it was not yet prudent to proclaim it in public. The weight of evidence supports the former probability.<sup>15</sup> Had he committed himself to the idea of partition and conveyed his conviction to the party leaders, at least some of them would have issued statements or made speeches or written letters to their friends and colleagues. But no such evidence is available for the year 1938.<sup>16</sup>

### The Karachi Conference: 8-13 October 1938

The League made its first move towards partition in October 1938 through the instrumentality of its Sind provincial branch. The AIML was still not ready to commit itself, but it allowed one of its subordinate organizations to float the idea. There are two possibilities here. Either the central organization instigated the Sind branch to air such a view to test the reaction of the British, the Hindus and the Muslims themselves; or the initiative was wholly the Sindhi leaders'. Whatever we know about this conference favours the latter alternative.

There was practically no League branch in Sind, and efforts to organize one began in May 1938. Partly to increase the party's following and partly to restore political power to Sindhi Muslims, the League leadership decided to convene a provincial conference in Karachi and to invite to it the top echelons of the party, including Jinnah himself. Sir Abdullah Haroon took the preparatory work in hand, appointed a reception committee under his own chairmanship, collected considerable funds from his wealthy friends to finance the gathering, and invited a large number of top-ranking Muslim leaders from all parts of India.

The conference opened on 8 October and lasted till the 13th. Among those who attended it were Jinnah, Sir Sikandar Hayat

Khan, Fazlul Haq, Liaquat Ali Khan, Shawkat Ali, Sir Currimbhoy Ibrahim, Raja of Mahmudabad, Nawab Sir Jamal Khan Leghari, Mawlana Hamid Badayuni, Ghulam Bhik Nairang, Ghulam Husain Hidayatullah, Shaikh Abdul Majid Sindhi, M.A. Khuro, Mir Bunde Ali Khan, Sir Sultan Ahmad, and Abdullah Haroon himself.<sup>17</sup> The provincial League's general secretary, Ali Muhammad Rashdi, claimed that over 20,000 delegates were present in the assembly,<sup>18</sup> and that "for its grandeur, majesty and attendance" it was "never equalled in the history of the Muslim League movement".<sup>19</sup> This is obvious exaggeration. The *Daily Gazette* of Karachi estimated the number of delegates at 10,000.<sup>20</sup>

The conference opened with an address of welcome by the chairman of the reception committee, Haroon, which was bigger with consequences than Jinnah's speech that followed it. Haroon surveyed the political situation then obtaining in India, blamed the Congress and the Hindus for their indifference to Muslim demands, and appealed for unity in Muslim ranks. These were common ingredients of every Muslim Leaguer's public utterances of that time. But he broke new ground when he warned the Hindus (and the British) of the possibility of a division of India on religious lines if Muslim interests were ignored. "India can never present a united front as long as the majority community is determined to annihilate the individuality of minorities. I warn the majority community that if it does not concede our demands Czechoslovakian happenings would find an echo in India as well. If the Germans in Czechoslovakia, who numbered hardly 35 lakhs, could assert themselves, there is no reason why 9 crores of Indian Muslims and the other minorities would not be able to protect themselves against the evil intentions of the majority. . . . We have nearly arrived at the parting of the ways and until and unless this problem is solved to the satisfaction of all concerned it will be impossible for anybody to save India from being divided into Hindu India and Muslim India, both placed under separate federations."<sup>21</sup>

The suggestion for a partition is still conditional: if adequate safeguards are forthcoming and general assurances given, the division would not materialize. There is no clear statement that the Muslims have decided to separate, only a threat that they might. Still, it was so far the most radical pronouncement to come from the League platform. The idea of separation, suggested by so many

persons in the preceding years, had at last found voice in the party gathering. The largest Muslim party had at long last agreed to consider it as a practicable solution, and that marked a revolutionary change in its thinking.

But Jinnah did not encourage such wanderings along new avenues. In his presidential address, delivered immediately after Haroon's speech, he largely ignored the Sindhi leader's provocative challenge to the Congress. He attacked the Congress in severe words for its "arrogance, opportunism and oppression", for its false propaganda against the League, and for its unwillingness to come to terms with the Muslims. He defended the League as a national body, capable of speaking for Muslim India, and a progressive organization devoted to protecting Muslim interests. Only twice did he refer vaguely to what Haroon had presented as a possibility or a threat or a warning. At one point he said that some in the Congress were helping to create "a serious situation which will break India vertically and horizontally". At another, he made a pointed reference to the Sudeten Germans and declared that "just as the Sudeten Germans were not defenceless and survived the oppression and persecution for two decades, so also the Mussalmans are not defenceless and cannot give up their national entity and aspirations in this great continent". He asked the Congress to "mark, learn and inwardly digest" the lesson taught by the situation in Czechoslovakia.<sup>22</sup> He did not endorse, ratify, confirm or support Haroon's statement that Muslims were thinking of a separate independence.

Sikandar Hayat made a moderately worded speech, in which he expressed his inability and unwillingness to concede to Congress claim to represent an Indian nationalism.<sup>23</sup> Fazlul Haq, the Bengali leader who was given to making extravagant and inciting statements, could not let the occasion pass without making a provocative contribution of his own. He began by saying that the Muslims had no desire to obtain independence of the kind in which they might become "free of the white bureaucracy but submit to black bureaucracy under the Congress rule", and concluded on a belligerent note: "If Mohamed Bin Kassem, an eight-year-old [*sic.*] lad, with 18 [*sic.*] soldiers could conquer Sind, then surely nine crores of Muslims can conquer the whole of India."<sup>24</sup>

If Jinnah's refusal to defend or even repeat Haroon's suggestion

was meant as a deliberate snub, it failed to curb Sindhi enthusiasm. The determination of the Sindhi Leaguers to get their wishes officially approved and recorded appeared in the shape of resolution no. 5 entitled "Communal Settlement". It was the main political resolution, and was moved by Shaikh Abdul Majid Sindhi, who took nearly half an hour to read it. Then he explained that it aimed at effecting a permanent unity among Muslims and Hindus and preventing either community from perpetrating oppression on the other. He "held out a threat that if the Congress did not concede Muslim rights, Muslims would have no alternative but to fall [back] upon the Pakistan scheme".<sup>25</sup> The resolution was seconded by Nawab Mushtaq Ahmad Gurmani of the Punjab, and supported by Haroon of Sind and Sayyid Abdur Rauf Shah of the Central Provinces.<sup>26</sup>

The resolution began by condemning the Congress for having "established purely Hindu rule" in the minority provinces. Then it criticized Congress attempts "to render the power of the Muslim majorities ineffective and unimportant" in the Muslim provinces of the Punjab, Sind, NWFP and Bengal by "trying to bring into power or by supporting coalition ministries not enjoying the confidence of the majority of Muslims and the Muslim masses of those provinces".<sup>27</sup> This was the preamble.

The relevant portion of the text read as follows: "The Sind Provincial Muslim League Conference considers it absolutely essential in the interests of an abiding peace of the vast Indian Continent and in the interests of unhampered cultural development, the economic and social betterment and political self-determination of the two Nations, known as Hindus and Muslims, that India may be divided into two Federations, viz., the Federation of Muslim States and the Federation of non-Muslim States. [Para] This Conference therefore recommends to the All-India Muslim League to devise a scheme of Constitution under which Muslim majority provinces, Muslim Native States and areas inhabited by a majority of Muslims may attain full independence in the form of a federation of their own with admission to any other Muslim State beyond the Indian frontiers to join the Federation and with such safeguards for non-Muslim minorities as may be conceded to the Muslim minorities in the non-Muslim Federation of India."<sup>28</sup>

The Subjects Committee objected to the demand embodied

in the text; some members felt that it was "an extreme and untimely statement of the League's position".<sup>29</sup> Accordingly, the text was changed to read as follows: "This Conference considers it absolutely essential, in the interests of an abiding peace of the vast Indian continent and in the interests of unhampered cultural development, the economic and social betterment and political self-determination of the two nations, known as Hindus and Muslims, to recommend to the All India Muslim League to review and revise the entire conception of what should be the suitable constitution for India which will secure honourable and legitimate status to them."<sup>30</sup>

Contemporary reaction to the resolution is a matter of confusion, because both texts were published by the newspapers, and we are not sure which is being commented upon. However, the *Star of India* called it a document "with far-reaching consequences", and left it at that.<sup>31</sup> The *Madras Mail* felt that India "is faced with the prospects of Hindu provinces and Muslim provinces and, possibly, of a Muslim, if not also of a Hindu, confederation".<sup>32</sup> The Hindu commentator of the *Indian Annual Register* wrote: "The hopes, the dreams and ambitions of Muslim separatism in India seek and find expression, a consistent expression, in this resolution. . . . If this scheme is to be accepted as representative of facts in Indian life, we have to recognize that it symbolizes two just causes in conflict with each other which it is difficult to reconcile. The scheme is the product of hopes and ambitions simmering in the mind of the Muslim community since their representatives ceased to be rulers in the country."<sup>33</sup> A later Muslim critic of the League connected it with the Latif Scheme; it "gives a shape and form to the ideas discussed and supported" in the *Cultural Future of India*.<sup>34</sup>

Thus, division or Pakistan was rejected by the conference; yet, the resolution made two new points. For the first time a Muslim League resolution declared the Hindus and the Muslims to be two different and separate nations. And, for the first time, the party claimed the right to exercise "political self-determination". These were important advances in the context of League thinking, but they were out of date in the context of what the exponents of some kind of a "Pakistan" were putting forward.

Two major questions demand an answer. Why was the original text introduced? Why did the Subjects Committee, or rather



Jinnah, want the radical suggestion of partition to be removed? No research has been done on the Karachi conference, and private papers of the leaders who were responsible for the resolution are either gone with time or are not available for consultation. The only scholarly scrutiny we have is by Allen Jones. I follow him in seeking answers to the two questions.

The first draft of the resolution, which contained the partition suggestion, was drafted by Haroon and Ali Muhammad Rashdi in close collaboration with Shaikh Abdul Majid Sindhi. In consultation with others leaders, Haroon and Majid had prepared the first section of the draft "in a conscious effort to demonstrate Muslim solidarity between the two Muslim blocs"; I think what is meant here is the solidarity between the north-western Muslim provinces and Bengal-Assam. Their feeling represented their disillusionment with the Congress attitude. "So deep was their sense of anger and frustration with Congress's treatment of Muslims in both blocs that they abandoned hope of ever reaching a settlement with the Congress in the future. In this way, their profound hatred of Congress produced in them a new awareness that Muslims by themselves must discover their own political destiny. These two impulses combined to find natural expression in the radical version of the resolution's latter portion. Thus the Sindhi leaders' empathy with the Muslim leaders from elsewhere in India both in their opposition to Congress and in their desire for a new League goal provides an explanation for their adoption of a radical posture in Resolution no. 5."

A second reason for their "militant approach" was "their aspirations for recognition and respect and even a position of leadership within the larger Indian Muslim community". They had recently won a great victory in the teeth of Sindhi Hindu opposition: the separation of Sind from the Bombay Presidency. In consequence, "Sindhi Muslims were immensely proud and elated with their victory", and their leadership began to feel that their success had "earned for them a place of leadership among Indian Muslims". "Thus they saw in Resolution no. 5 an opportunity to achieve the leadership they felt they deserved. By drafting a radically worded resolution, they would attract attention at the conference and if they were able to secure its passage, they would be elevated to the leadership they desired. This idea is implicit in Rashidi's summation of the conference proceedings in

his report when he says: 'I have no doubt that it [Resolution no. 5] will serve as a prelude to the Muslims declaring finally to go in for a separate federation of their own and will thus get Sind a very conspicuous place in the history of new India'. . . . Thus a combination of factors: anger with Congress, impatience for a new League goal and ambition for Sindhi leadership had compelled the Sindhi leaders, with the support of other provincial Muslim leaders, to give Resolution no. 5 its radical stamp."<sup>35</sup>

A third reason emerges if we put the resolution in the context of the development of the idea of Pakistan. Politicians and public men of Sind were not living in isolation. They were in constant touch with public opinion in other parts of Muslim India, particularly with that in the neighbouring Punjab. Haroon had agreed to finance and sponsor the book by Punjabi. Some in the province might have read Rahmat Ali's pamphlets. Seen as a stage in the evolution of the concept of separation the resolution fits into the spirit of the time. (Jones does not mention this aspect because he was studying the Karachi conference as an isolated phenomenon).

To return to the League attitude, Jinnah was opposed to the radical and operative portion of the Resolution. Not only that. It "is virtually certain that he would have been most pleased if such a controversial resolution—declaring what the League's ultimate future goal should be—had never been tabled at the conference at all". Why did he take this stand? Why did he obstruct the will of the Sind provincial League and probably of Sindhi Muslim public opinion?

One reason was his anxiety to build up a strong, disciplined and tightly-knit organization, which could rightfully claim to speak for a great majority of the Indian Muslims, before making any definite demand of a concrete nature. His speeches of 1936-38 abound in this line of thinking. His order of priorities was different from that of the sponsors and supporters of the resolution. He wanted the League to grow strong roots in the community and only then to support any radical solution. "Thus, Jinnah felt that these immediate goals of strengthening the League in Sind by forming a ministry and by lending support to AIML should be foremost in the minds of the Sindhi Leaguers. Hence, he was disappointed when the Muslim Leaguers in Sind indicated by their strong advocacy of Resolution no. 5 that their first priority was to

formulate the League's ultimate goal. He feared they would shirk the League's badly needed organizational work in their impatience to find a goal."<sup>36</sup>

Another reason was his conviction that the resolution was too hasty and immature. He remarked at the conference: "The Government is still in the hands of the British. Let us not forget it. You must see ahead and work for the ideal that you think will arise 25 years hence."<sup>37</sup> Still another reason might have been his fear that once such a radical solution of the Indian problem was adopted by the League, all chances of a League-Congress settlement would disappear. He still wanted an agreement with the Hindus within the bounds of a united India. In fact, a year later, he told the Osmania University Old Boys Association that "I still remain a nationalist. I have always believed in a Hindu-Muslim pact".<sup>38</sup>

Jinnah made his displeasure known to all and sundry at the conference. According to Yusuf Haroon (Abdullah Haroon's son), who was present at the conference, Jinnah did not even participate in the debate after the resolution had been tabled. Pir Hissamuddin Rashid (Ali Muhammad Rashdi's brother) recalls that Haroon and Abdul Majid continued to prevail upon Jinnah at informal moments during the conference and particularly on the third day, and it was under their constant pressure that he finally agreed to let the amended resolution go through. Obviously, a compromise was reached by which Haroon and Majid consented to substitute the radical version with a more "moderate" draft, and Jinnah agreed not to obstruct the resolution's passage at either the subjects committee stage or before the whole conference.<sup>39</sup>

Jones's opinion is that "It is doubtful if Jinnah would have been inclined to let the resolution pass if the Karachi conference had been an annual session of the League". Yusuf Haroon told him that Jinnah himself had drawn attention to this point and said that, since the Karachi conference was only a regional affair, all the resolutions passed by it would have to be adopted by an annual session of the League before they gained the authority of being the party's official policy.<sup>40</sup> In fact, Abdul Majid introduced the controversial resolution at the next AIML annual session in Patna, but it was not passed.<sup>41</sup>

## Muslim League Policy: 1939

Though AIML did not commit itself to any plan or proposal involving separation or a division of India, its leaders and accredited spokesmen continued, throughout 1939, to drop hints indicating the coming of Pakistan. Occasionally they spoke out with a candour which mocked the party's official taciturnity and coyness. A selection of these statements, both direct and oblique, is recorded in this section to illustrate the unsteady and confused thinking of the central party.

Haroon was in Lahore on 28-29 January, and on the 29th at 9 A.M. he met the representatives of the Majlis-i-Pakistan of Lyallpur and the Majlis-i-Pakistan of Lahore at the Nedou's Hotel. During the conversation he said that he hoped to see "Pakistan" realized in the near future. He pointed out that the educated Muslims believed in Pakistan with both their hearts and heads. It was the duty of all "Pakistanis" to propagate the message of the "Pakistan Movement" among all those who were yet unconverted to the ideal. His secretary, Ali Muhammad Rashdi, promised that during his tour he would properly acquaint "the people of Pakistan" with this movement, and would in particular create in Sind the right atmosphere for its growth and development.<sup>42</sup>

Which Pakistan were the two talking about? The League had not adopted partition (of any name, model, variety or origin) as its policy. The only plan called Pakistan was that of Rahmat Ali. Were they setting out to propagate the Cambridge ideal? Haroon had used the words "Pakistan Movement", which makes it certain that he had Rahmat Ali's campaign in mind. Then, why was Rahmat Ali's name not mentioned? The Karachi conference resolution had not opted for partition. Yet, within three months the Sindhi sponsors of the resolution were talking of a Pakistan. A few months later Jinnah was to ask Punjabi not to use the word Pakistan in his book. Why did he allow these leaders of his own party to use it and to speak in public in favour of it?

On 25 March, Liaquat Ali Khan, the AIML general secretary, told the Meerut Divisional Muslim League: "Whatever scheme is finally adopted, it is obvious that if Hindus and Muslims cannot live amicably in any other way, they may be allowed to do so by dividing the country in a suitable manner. . . . If this is done, a limited and a specific Federation would not only be easy but

desirable."<sup>43</sup> There is a mere hint about division here. His reference to "a limited and specific" federation is confusing. Was this federation to be between a Muslim India and a Hindu India, or among the Muslim provinces themselves? Anyway, what is a "limited and specific" federation?

On 1 May, Haroon, speaking in Hyderabad Sind, announced that an Indian federation "would lead to Hindu domination to which Muslims would never submit".<sup>44</sup> A week later, the Raja of Pirpur addressed the following words to an Allahabad Muslim League conference: "Let me tell you that the Muslim League is the expression of the determination of the Muslim nation to have full and unfettered freedom in a free India."<sup>45</sup> There is no mention of separation or Pakistan in these speeches.

On 10 May, Ali Muhammad Rashdi was asked a straight question in Lahore about the policy of the League on the Pakistan movement. He replied: "I can say only this much, that the Muslim League refuses to agree to the Muslims being placed under any Hindu majority. In view of such a decision, the Muslim League is considering the various schemes which have been placed before the Sub-Committee appointed at Meerut for that purpose. The main feature of these schemes is that they all aim at the creation of separate homelands for Muslims and Hindus in order to avoid repetition of present conflicts. This automatically solves the question of Pakistan also, because the North block of Muslim provinces will constitute one of the Muslim zones which these schemes propose to create. The final programme of the League in this respect has yet to be settled, though what I have just explained has been agreed to."<sup>46</sup>

Still there is no mention of a separate Muslim state or states, only of a zone and a homeland. The League was considering the various schemes and had not yet reached a decision. Fair enough, but then why had he announced in January that he was setting about the task of propagating the "Pakistan movement" among the Muslims?

The first political conference of the Bindiki branch of the League (in Deccan) was held on 20-21 May. On the opening day, the president, Mawlana Muhammad Faruq, a member of the Legislative Assembly, briefly outlined the Pakistan scheme, and his speech was continually greeted by the cry of "Pakistan Zindabad" (Long Live Pakistan) by the audience. The conference

adopted a resolution on the second day "approving and commending" the Pakistan scheme?<sup>47</sup> Which Pakistan were they approving? Luckily for them, there was no Jinnah amid them to curb their enthusiasm.

In June, Sir William Barton reported the broad details of a scheme of division which, he said, was then under the consideration of the League and "it is believed has its general approval". The projected partition was described like this: "The immediate outline would comprise various Muslim blocs beginning with the north-west with a bloc of 30 millions of Muslims in the Frontier Province, Sind, Kashmir, the Punjab, and the principalities of Khairpur and Bahawalpur. Next in order would come a bloc of 12 million Muslims in a strip of territory from Delhi to Lucknow; farther to the east would be a bloc of 30 millions in Bengal and Assam. In the south Muslim culture and traditions will be enshrined in the great Muslim state of Hyderabad, with territorial accretions that would give it an outlet to the sea. There would be a transfer of population between the Muslim and Hindu zones. The underlying idea is to build up a confederation of culturally homogeneous Hindu and Muslim States in India in which each of the great nationalities would live their own lives, combining only for defence and other general purposes. The sponsors of the scheme recognize that it would be impossible to give it immediate effect. A transitional Constitution is required. This would take the form of a kind of federation, in which, for safety's sake, the powers of the central government would be strictly circumscribed. There would be no majority rule, because that would mean Hindu rule. . . . The ministry must be chosen from all groups. Another safeguard is demanded in the immediate setting up of a new Muslim province with Lucknow as its centre. A quota representation of Muslims from the States for the temporary federal scheme is also stipulated. During the transitional period the zones would be defined, and the exchange of population effected."<sup>48</sup> This looks more like the Latif scheme than any other.

A Lahore newspaper reported on 1 August that a special session of AIML Council was being summoned in Delhi towards the end of the month to consider the various alternative schemes of federation submitted to the party.<sup>49</sup>

In August or September, the Viceroy, Lord Linlithgow, warned K.M. Munshi, a member of the Congress ministry in Bombay,



"Tell Mr. Gandhi that we cannot do without the Congress and the Congress cannot do without us. . . . Let me introduce the Federal part of the constitutional Act, and Congress will be in power at the Centre. If you do not heed my advice, I tell you Jinnah will break the country into two."<sup>50</sup> By this date, therefore, the British Government and the Viceroy were convinced that Jinnah had made up his mind to demand a division. But the League had not yet taken an official step towards such a decision.

It is reported by I.H. Qureshi that "in the fall of 1939" (why couldn't a trained historian like him be more specific?) Jinnah told a small delegation of Muslim students from Cambridge, who were advocates of Pakistan, "I am getting more and more convinced that you are right *in spite of myself*".<sup>51</sup> He gives no details of the meeting, nor the names of these students. But if the report is correct, it means two things. Jinnah was still in September-October undecided on the issue, and his inclination towards a solution by partition was neither willing nor certain.

Jinnah's public statements of September-November confirm that he was not in favour of a partition. As we noticed above, on 28 September he had told the Osmania Old Boys of his belief in a Hindu-Muslim pact. About the same time he told the Muslim youth: "Muslim League, as you know, stands for complete freedom of India, not for one community only but for all the peoples comprising this great sub-continent; and stands for free and independent Islam."<sup>52</sup> In October, he told the *Manchester Guardian*: "Therefore, in my judgment, apart from other reasons into which I need not go in detail, democracy can only mean Hindu raj all over India. This is a position to which Muslims will never submit. . . . Muslim India wants to be free and enjoy liberty to the fullest extent and develop its own political, economic, social and cultural institutions according to its own genius, and not to be dominated and crushed."<sup>53</sup> On 5 November, he sent the Viceroy a list of Muslim demands, the two most important of which were: as soon as circumstances permitted or immediately after the war "the entire problem of India's future Constitution shall be examined and reconsidered *de novo*", and "no declaration shall, either in principle or otherwise, be made or any Constitution be enacted by His Majesty's Government or Parliament without the approval and the consent of the two major communities in India, viz., the Musalmans and the

Hinsus."<sup>54</sup> He mentions free and independent Islam and the wish of Muslim India to enjoy full liberty, but partition is not demanded. In his letter to the Viceroy, he does not even refer to any separatist trends in his community.

On 18 November, the Raja of Mahmudabad broke new ground and demanded complete separation. Addressing the Assam Provincial Muslim League Conference, he said: "India of today is assuming a distinct shape—Muslim India and non-Muslim India . . . . The provinces in the north, predominantly Muslim, are instinctively and now actively aspiring for a freer and fuller life—a life unhampered, unrestricted by forces which the people regard as unhelpful, if not opposed, to the growth on the lines of their choosing. The people want, that is to say, to work out their own destinies. Here then is the genesis of that idea which is known generally as the Pakistan Movement. India will federate, but not on the lines chalked out for it by the British Parliament, the British nation or the Hindu politicians. There must and will be more than one federation, each independent, but at the same time complementary of the other."<sup>55</sup> After the Bindiki conference of May, this was the first time when the word Pakistan was used in a speech from a League official platform.

On 24 November, Liaquat Ali Khan told the Darbhanga Muslim League Conference that Hindu refusal to share power "has led to the idea of partitioning India into Hindu and Muslim zones. It was stressed at the Karachi and Meerut Conferences and is still considered as the ~~best~~ panacea of the Indian solution [*sic.*]"<sup>56</sup> His terminology is vague: India is to be partitioned into Hindu and Muslim zones, not states.

On 15 December, the leader of the Muslim League party in the Madras Legislative Assembly, Abdul Hamid Khan, said in a statement that "the future of this country depends entirely on the harmonious relationship that should exist between the two great nations—the Hindus and the Musalmans of India."<sup>57</sup> Future harmonious relationship means living together, not separating politically or territorially.

According to a British ICS official posted in NWFP, in December 1939 the League was "already considering partition of India as one road to independence, but the partition must take the form that India would be one unit and the five predominantly Muslim provinces—Punjab, Sind, Bengal, Assam and the

NWFP— should each be separate units in direct relations with the British Crown".<sup>58</sup> How could each of these provinces be severally in direct relation with the Crown? And, Assam was not a predominantly muslim province, though soon the League was going to include it in the areas demanded for the Muslim states.

Till the end of 1939, even early 1940, Jinnah did not indicate in any public statement or utterance that he wanted a partition. The comments of the *Madras Mail* on the Jinnah-Nehru correspondence of late 1939 truly sum up his stand: "The Muslims cannot ask that they should decide India's future constitution. The most they can demand is that they shall be given the guarantees they deem necessary to the enjoyment of recognized rights. There is nothing in Mr. Jinnah's letters to suggest that more is demanded".<sup>59</sup>

### Muslim League Policy: January-March 1940

Either Jinnah was holding his cards very close to his chest or was yet undecided on the issue of partition. About two months before the AIML Lahore session, he submitted to the Viceroy five conditions on which an agreement with the Congress could be negotiated. All of them assumed a united India: Congress should abandon the Bande Mataram song as a national anthem; the Congress flag should not be flown from public buildings; Congress should stop trying to "wreck" the League; coalition ministries should be formed in the Congress provinces; and no measure should be passed by any provincial assembly if two-thirds of the Muslim members opposed it.<sup>60</sup> Thus, by this time he was still prepared to co-operate with the congress in running a united, federal India.

As we will see later, the Foreign Committee of the Muslim League met on 2 February to discuss the schemes submitted to it with their authors; finally it passed a resolution asking the party's Working Committee to take a decision with regard to the future. The Working Committee met on the following day and decided in an extremely vague and involved manner to demand a partition of India. The crucial point here is to see how the League was viewing events in the month of January. The League papers have not yet been published and are not available to me at the time of writing this account. No study of the party or of Jinnah's mind has been made by anyone who has consulted the party

archives. It is possible that there is nothing definite in the archives to clarify the exact occasion on which the League decided for a division of India. But we have a definitive account of the meetings of Sikandar Hayat Khan, Fazlul Haq and Jinnah with the Viceroy in January and February, and from this source it appears that the Lahore Resolution was the result of the Viceroy's pressure on Jinnah to present a concrete scheme enshrining the League's demand. The details of these interviews follow.

The Viceroy met Sikandar on 25 January and complained to him that the Muslim position as maintained by Jinnah was "static to a dangerous degree" because it did not convey what the League wanted. Linlithgow warned Sikandar that unless the League made a constructive proposal it would be very difficult for its policy to be explained to Great Britain or for it to be understood by the British. A few days later he met Fazlul Haq who complained that the League policy was not being fully comprehended or appreciated either in India or Britain, but at the same time stated that the League was prepared to work with the Congress if the latter accepted the principle of coalitions in the provinces with joint policies to execute a common programme. Referring to the Muslim position, Fazlul Haq said, "The Muslims were in the constant difficulty of being on the defensive. They could not recommend any recession from the present position in regard to constitutional advance or publicly reject the principle of Home Rule or Dominion Status."

Linlithgow reported the trend and content of these two meetings to the Secretary of State for India in these words: "I said . . . whether I had thrown away the Muslim, or the minority case in any respect, and if so how? They both replied at once 'No', Sir Sikandar later amending his reply to 'Not yet!' I said that I had listened with interest to Mr. Huq's exposition of the position as he saw it. . . . I would take only one point which he had raised. He had made the complaint that the Muslim case had not been properly presented. Why was that? Who was to blame? . . . I went on to say that if he and his friends could secure that the Muslim case was better understood nobody would be better pleased than I would."

When Jinnah met the Viceroy on 6 February (after the League Working Committee had decided (?) in favour of a partition) he did not tell Linlithgow about the League's decision made three

days earlier; Khaliquzzaman states in his autobiography that Jinnah did, but the official record of the interview contradicts the assertion. The Viceroy listed the advantages that would accrue to the League if it made up its mind and offered a definite proposal to solve the Indian constitutional problem, and repeated before Jinnah what he had told Sikandar and Fazlul Haq. When Jinnah asked him what the League should do in the circumstances, Linlithgow said that it should have a positive scheme of its own, adding that a negative attitude would not help its case. Jinnah's reply was that as all efforts to reach a compromise with the Congress had ended in a failure now the Viceroy should make it clear to the Congress "without undue delay that there was nothing doing and this nonsense had to stop, in the same way as Lord Willingdon had done some years ago". Pressed to disclose the League policy, Jinnah said that he was not in a position to present in detail "the considered opinion of his colleagues and himself on this very important subject and that he would be very shortly ready to do so". Linlithgow again stressed the point that this attitude of Jinnah's would not ease the situation as he could not educate public opinion at home or tell anything to the members of the British Parliament. Writing to the Secretary of State for India about this talk Linlithgow recorded: "If he [Jinnah] and his friends wanted to secure that the Muslim case should not go by default in the United Kingdom it was really essential that they should formulate their plan in the near future. At the risk of wearying him I was bound to repeat what I had often said before that I was convinced that it was quite useless to appeal for support in Great Britain for a party whose policy was one of sheer negation." Jinnah's reply was that he and his friends would "make public at any rate the outlines of their position in time to enable him to explain the Muslim position in Great Britain and in India".<sup>61</sup>

We don't know why Jinnah did not convey to Linlithgow the Working Committee's decision of 3 February. He left no record of any kind of his life and the question will remain unanswered. What is even more odd is the fact that he did not refer to the party's decision in his public statements. Even in his address to the Muslim League Council on 25 February the only thing he said was: "People ask me what is our goal. . . . The whole question is very simple. Great Britain wants to rule India. Mr. Gandhi and the

Congress want to rule India and the Mussalmans. We say that we will not let either the British or Mr. Gandhi rule the Mussalmans. We want to be free."<sup>62</sup> There is no mention, however oblique, of partition or division. A little later he declared that Western democracy was "totally unsuited for India and its imposition on India is the disease in the body politic".<sup>63</sup> In an article written for the British magazine *Time and Tide*, he asserted that "a constitution must be evolved that recognizes that there are in India two nations who must both share the governance of their common motherland".<sup>64</sup> Speaking before the Aligarh University Union on (probably) 6 March, he declared: "One thing is now obvious, that we are by no means a minority but a solid and distinct nation by ourselves with a destiny of our own. . . . There can be no settlement [with the Congress] except on equal terms and on a footing of perfect equality".<sup>65</sup>

In his meeting with the Viceroy on 13 March, Jinnah told him that if the British government could not improve upon its present solution for the Indian constitutional development, "he and his friends would have no option but to fall back on some form of partition of the country". At the end of the conversation he said that "he was in favour of a Muslim area run by Muslims in collaboration with Great Britain. He was fully aware that this would mean poverty, that the lion's share of the wealth would go to others, but the Muslims would retain their self-respect and their culture and would be able to lead their lives in their own way".<sup>66</sup>

Two things are noticeable. Jinnah did not take the nation in his confidence, and in no public speech or statement did he indicate that the League was considering, or had already adopted in the Working Committee, or would be making an official demand regarding, a division of India. Even in his private talk of 13 March with the Viceroy he did not drive home the point that he wanted a definite division; he said he might call for "some sort of partition". To use the word Pakistan was of course out of the question; it went against his temper and taste.

During January-March, over a hundred articles appeared in the English-language newspapers of India, written by Leaguers and stressing the point of Muslim separation from the Hindus. None talked of partition or division or a Pakistan.<sup>67</sup> The only exception was Abdullah Haroon's appeal of 3 March issued to the people of



the United States in regard to the Indian situation. It ended with this paragraph: "Our demand is simple. Our 90 millions of people want the right of self-determination and separate homelands of our own, where they are already in majority and where they want to follow their own pursuits of life without molestation from anybody, even though it may mean establishment of more than one federation."<sup>68</sup> Here, too, one can see a note of hesitation in the last clause.

### The Foreign Committee

The formation, working and ultimate fate of the AIML Foreign Committee provide another study in confusion and contradiction. Who appointed it? When was it appointed? What was it asked to accomplish? What did it actually do? When was its work finished? On all these points there are more than one version, and on some of them no information at all.

According to one source, it was the Sind Provincial Muslim League Conference of October 1938 which appointed a committee "for the purpose of examining the question of demanding effective safeguards for the Muslims". Later this committee recommended the creation of a separate Muslim state as the only effective safeguard, and the suggestion was endorsed by AIML Working Committee.<sup>69</sup> This does not answer the question why it was called the "Foreign" Committee. Another version is that it was formed on 4 December 1938 at Delhi, with Haroon as president, with a view "to disseminating literature and information regarding the position of the All India Muslim League". By August 1939, it had established an office in London, and centres at Basra, Baghdad, Beirut, Damascus, Constantinople and Cairo.<sup>70</sup> This fits in with the name of the committee, but not with what we know about its functions and activities as described below.

Then, on 25 March 1939, AIML Working Committee met at Meerut and appointed a Constitutional (or Constitution) Sub-Committee (or Committee) to examine and report on the various draft schemes of constitutional reforms presented to the party (or the Foreign Committee?). It had seven members: Jinnah, Sikandar Hayat Khan, Sayyid Abdul Aziz, Khwaja Nazimuddin, Abdullah Haroon, Sardar Awrungezeb Khan, and Liaquat Ali Khan.<sup>71</sup> Ashiq Batalawi says the strength was nine, not seven;

and that it was asked to study and report on only five schemes: those of Latif, Punjabi, Rahmat Ali, Sikandar, and the Aligarh dons. (He adds that all the five schemes had one thing in common: they stood for a confederation of India and not a total separation of Muslim areas. This is incorrect; Rahmat Ali did not want any link between Pakistan, Bang-i-Islam and Hyderabad on the one hand and the rest of India on the other).<sup>72</sup>

When the appointment of this committee was put before AIML Council at New Delhi in April for endorsement, Jinnah told the Council: "In regard to Federation, there were several schemes in the field including that of dividing the country into Muslim and Hindu India. These schemes were before the Committee which had been set up by the Working Committee of the League. The Committee was not pledged to any particular scheme. It would examine the whole question and produce a scheme which, according to the Committee, would be in the best interests of the Muslims of India."<sup>73</sup>

On 11 May, Ali Muhammad Rashdi told a news-reporter that the "principle that governs all Muslim League schemes is that Muslims should decline to live under a Hindu majority. Another common feature of all these schemes is that they envisage the assigning of separate homelands for Muslims and Hindus in order to avoid all possibility of a repetition of communal conflicts. The schemes embody the Pakistan proposal because the northern block of Muslim provinces will constitute one of the Muslim zones which these schemes propose to create". Asked how Muslims could avoid living in Hindu-majority provinces, he said that the schemes "implied a transfer of Muslim population from the Hindu provinces to Muslim zones". He suggested that Muslims from the Central Provinces, Bihar and Orissa could easily move into Hyderabad State, Bengal or the Punjab. He added that it was possible that in the final draft of the League scheme Hyderabad might have to be given up; it was "rather difficult" to demand Kashmir, which was ruled by a Hindu prince, and Hyderabad, which was ruled by a Muslim prince, at the same time.<sup>74</sup>

It was reported that the Committee was to meet in Bombay on 2 July, and according to the agenda issued to the members there were "3 schemes of any consequence" to be examined. One was Rahmat Ali's, the second Latif's, and the third the "Regional Federation Scheme".<sup>75</sup> Which was the last one? Was it the Punjabi

plan, or the Sikandar proposal, or the Mamdot scheme?

On 2 February 1940, the Foreign Committee held a meeting at New Delhi with the authors of the schemes submitted to the League. Abdullah Haroon presided. The meeting examined nine schemes, and then passed a resolution asking the Working Committee "to state its mind in unequivocal language with regard to the future of the Indian Muslim nation and prepare the latter also for launching a struggle to achieve the following fundamental rights about which the Muslim nation of India is absolutely definite and clear in its mind". The five "rights" were formulated as follows:

1. The Muslims of India who constitute 90 millions of people are a separate nation entitled to the same right of self-determination which has been conceded in respect of other nations;
2. The Muslims of India shall in no case agree to be reduced to the position of a minority community on the basis of extraneous and foreign considerations or for the sake of any political convenience or expediency;
3. That in order to make the Muslim right of self-determination really effective the Muslims shall have a separate national home in the shape of an autonomous State;
4. That the Muslims living in the rest of India shall be treated as the nationals of the aforesaid Muslim State and their rights and privileges shall be fully safeguarded;
5. That any scheme of Indian reforms interfering with these basic principles shall be stoutly resisted by the Indian Muslim nation till it has achieved the aforesaid objective."<sup>76</sup>

This meeting also appointed a 9-member sub-committee which was to hold daily sessions and draft a "detailed constitutional scheme" incorporating the five "rights". It was made up of Haroon, Ghulam Rasul Mehr, Ali Muhammad Rashdi, Chaudhri Akhtar Husain, Dr. Abdul Latif, Sayyid Rizwanullah, Dr. Afzaal Qadri, Dr. Abdus Sattar Kheiri, and K. Ali. The nine schemes on which the final plan was to be based were those of Mamdot, Latif, Punjabi, Rizwanullah, Afzaal Qadri, Khan Bahadur Kifaitullah, Asadullah, Pakistan Scheme, and the Muslim Students Federation's Khilafat.<sup>77</sup>

The Working Committee met on 3 February. It decided to send a delegation consisting of Fazlul Huq, Sikandar Hayat Khan, Khwaja Nazimuddin and Khaliquzzaman to London to put the Muslim case before the British prime minister and the Secretary

of State for India. But which scheme or objective was the delegation to present and defend? How the final decision came to be taken is related by Khaliquzzaman (who was a member of the Working Committee and present on the occasion) in the following words:

"I asked the President to give the members of the proposed delegation to London some definite guidance in regard to the matters which it was to place before the British Government for its acceptance. I informed the members of my suggestion to Lord Zetland, for separation of Muslim areas from the rest of India, and told them that the views expressed by me on that occasion were my personal views. But now, I said, the Muslim League should give this delegation its considered view as to the future status of Muslims in India. . . . Personally, I said, I would suggest confining our demand to the separation of Muslim zones, viz., NWFP, Sind, Baluchistan and Punjab in the north-west and Bengal and Assam in the east and would leave the rest to the Congress to deal with. At this stage Sir Sikandar who was sitting to the right of Mr. Jinnah started pleading for his confederal scheme and Mr. Jinnah opposing it [*sic*]. The discussion went on for about two hours when finally, with the concurrence of the members, Mr. Jinnah rejected Sir Sikandar's scheme and entered in his notebook my suggestion with approval. I do not know how many people realize when it was that for the first time the Muslim League Working Committee decided to claim the division of India."<sup>78</sup>

On 13 February, Haroon, in his capacity as chairman of the Foreign Committee, wrote a letter to *The Times*, reproducing the resolution passed by the Foreign Committee on 2 February, and calling it the Muslim demand.<sup>79</sup> He did not quote any decision of the Working Committee, which indicates that the executive of the party had reached no agreement or taken a final decision in its meeting of 3 February.

This confusion continued even after the Resolution had been passed by the AIML Lahore session on 24 March. In a statement to the press from Karachi on 16 April 1940, Haroon criticized the general non-Muslim attacks on the Resolution as premature and reminded the public that the League had yet to evolve the final plan. The scheme which his Committee wanted to place before the Working Committee did not envisage any transfer of

population; it also did not "entirely preclude the possibilities of the Muslim States confederating with the other Indian States for certain common purposes, as for example has been done in Switzerland where the 22 States, while retaining their individual sovereignty, have entered into a central arrangement for purposes of defence, etc." (This was very misleading; the Swiss cantons are not sovereign, the title of the Swiss Confederation notwithstanding). He proceeded to make another incorrect assertion that "even in America and Soviet Russia the Central Federal arrangements do not in any way interfere with the internal freedom of their various States or regions". He asked the Congress and other Hindu critics to wait till the "entire scheme" was published.<sup>80</sup>

Haroon's Foreign Committee continued its work on the scheme, and in December 1940 produced a plan which recommended the creation of two Muslim states: one in the north-west, comprising Sind, Baluchistan, NWFP and the Punjab, together with Delhi; the other in the north-east, comprising Bengal and Assam, minus the districts of Bankura and Midnapore and plus the district of Purnea from Bihar. The north-west state would have 20 million Muslims in a total population of 32 million (63%); the north-east state would have 31 million Muslims in a total population of 57 million (56%). The Committee also considered it "desirable to perpetuate Muslim influence wherever it predominates in any form in non-British India", and recommended that "all Indian States, large or small, ruled by Muslim Princes, should be regarded for purposes of the Muslim constitutional plan as Sovereign Muslim States". Hyderabad should regain its lost territories and become an independent country. "Who knows that in the fulness of time the Muslims of India might find it to their advantage to make Hyderabad their rallying point and the centre of their growing strength." The Committee did not say a word about Kashmir. The two proposed Muslim states were to be in an "organic relationship" with the rest of India, through the instrumentality of a common agency for defence, foreign affairs, communications and customs.<sup>81</sup>

The *Statesman* of 19 February 1941 carried a report that the Foreign Committee had published the details of its proposal on the previous day. Its summary coincided with the description given above.<sup>82</sup>

It appears that the Committee had sent its report to AIML

in December, and when the Working Committee and Jinnah refrained from considering or approving it Haroon, after waiting for two months, leaked it to the press. Immediately Jinnah disowned it.<sup>83</sup> But AIML did not take any positive step of its own by preparing a new and different plan. Speculation about the shape of things to come was allowed to flourish by this silence.

These developments raise a host of questions. Who authorized the Foreign Committee? What was the relationship between the Foreign Committee and the Constitution Committee? Why was not the latter appointed by the former, rather than by the Working Committee? Did the Constitution Committee report to the Working Committee or to the Foreign Committee? Why did the Foreign Committee not submit a proper report to the Working Committee on 2 February, instead of formulating a set of "rights"? Why were these called "rights", though actually they were principles or claims? In this meeting of the Foreign Committee and the authors of the schemes what part did the Constitution Committee play? Why did the Working Committee not take a final and clear decision on the proposed scheme? Was the decision reached as casually as Khaliqzaman says it was? What did the Working Committee expect the delegation to present in London? In his letter to *The Times*, why did Haroon quote the resolution of his own Committee and not one of the Working Committee? Was his letter authorized by the Working Committee or by Jinnah? In short, when and how was the Muslim League decision to demand a partition made? Was such a decision ever made at any definite moment of time?

Another squadron of questions assails the historian when he comes to consider the finality or otherwise of the Lahore Resolution. Was the Resolution a decision on principles, not on details? Did these principles amount to a partition? Was the Foreign Committee authorized to work out the details? If it was, why was its report of December 1940 neither published nor considered nor rejected, but merely disowned? Was it expressly asked to continue its work on different lines? If so, on which lines? If the Committee had been asked to follow the principles laid down in the Lahore Resolution, why did it go beyond them in its recommendations on Hyderabad and other native states? Why did it include Assam in its north-east state when it had a small Muslim minority? What did it mean by saying that Muslims living in the rest of India would be the "nationals" of the Muslim states? (This silly demand had



been made by the Aligarh dons). Why did Haroon, in his statement of 16 April 1940, mislead the public about the Swiss, American and Soviet constitutional systems? Was it ignorance? Was it a deliberate ploy to prepare the Muslims for an Indian confederation or federation? Why was it generally understood that the Lahore Resolution meant a clear partition of India? Haroon's scheme provided for a common agency and an "organic relationship" between the Muslim states and the rest of India. This was not division, but a kind of confederation. Did this not conflict with the post-Resolution speeches of Jinnah and other Muslim League leaders which said that the Muslims had decided to opt out of India and seek their independence in separate sovereignty?

### The Lahore Resolution

An analysis of the contents of the Lahore Resolution falls outside the scope of this work. Our concern has been with the growth of the idea of Pakistan. With the passing of the Resolution the idea had come to maturity. What followed during 1940-47 was not a part of the evolution of the idea, but an exercise in political bargaining and negotiating. However, there are a few peculiarities of the Resolution which intrigue the biographer of the idea and may be briefly touched upon.

The simple matter of the date on which the Resolution was *passed* has been constructed into a national and historical falsehood. All contemporary newspapers and compilations of current developments and facts and figures agree on the following timetable of AIML's 27th annual session at Lahore. The proceedings opened on 22 *March* at 3 P.M. The Nawab of Mamdot delivered his address as chairman of the reception committee. Then Jinnah gave his long extempore speech. That was the end of the first day. On 23 *March* the session began at 3 P.M. Fazlul Huq introduced the Lahore Resolution and made a speech on it. Khaliquzzaman seconded it and spoke for a while. Then Zafar Ali Khan, Sardar Awrungleb and Abdullah Haroon made short speeches in support of the Resolution. The proceedings were then adjourned till the following day. On 24 *March* the session began at 11.15 A.M. Speeches on the Resolution were delivered by Nawab Ismail Khan of the United Provinces, Qazi Isa of Baluchistan, and Abdul Hamid of Madras. At this stage Jinnah arrived, who had been engaged

elsewhere that morning, and occupied the presidential chair. Speeches on the Resolution continued, with Ismail Chundrigar of Bombay, Sayyid Abdur Rauf Shah of the Central Provinces, and Dr. Muhammad Alam of the Punjab expressing their enthusiastic support. Then Jinnah intervened, and let Abdur Rehman Siddiquie introduce his resolution on Palestine. Sayyid Raza Ali and Abdul Hamid Badayuni spoke in support of it, and it was adopted by the assembly. The session adjourned to meet again at 9 P.M. The night meeting opened with two remaining speeches on the Lahore Resolution by Sayyid Zakir Ali and Begum Muhammad Ali. It was then put to the vote and declared to be unanimously carried. Two more resolutions (on the Khaksars and on amendments to the party constitution) were quickly moved and adopted. Finally, the session elected office-bearers for the ensuing year. Jinnah made a short speech winding up the proceedings, and the session concluded at 11.30 P.M.<sup>84</sup>

Thus there is no room for the slightest doubt about the fact that the Lahore Resolution was passed on 24 *March*.<sup>85</sup> In 1962, Mian Bashir Ahmad of Lahore, who was present at the session, told the press that the Resolution had been adopted on 24, not 23, *March*.<sup>86</sup> Choudhry Khaliquzzaman (*Pathway to Pakistan*), Sharifuddin Pirzada (*Evolution of Pakistan*) and myself (*The Making of Pakistan*) have given the correct date, but of this no notice has been taken. All historians, scholars and popular writers of Pakistan and other countries,<sup>87</sup> and the Government of Pakistan, consider the 23rd as the correct date, and the nation continues to celebrate the "Pakistan Day" on the wrong date. I cannot think of any plausible explanation for such massive repudiation of an historical fact.

The operative section of the Resolution read: "Resolved that it is the considered view of this session of the All India Muslim League that no constitutional plan would be workable in this country or acceptable to the Muslims unless it is designed on the following basic principles, viz., that geographically contiguous units are demarcated into regions which should be so constituted, with such territorial readjustments as may be necessary, that the areas in which the Muslims are numerically in a majority, as in the North-Western and Eastern zones of India, should be grouped to constitute 'Independent States' in which the constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign."<sup>88</sup>

In such brief a space five territorial terms of different shades of meaning are employed in the text—units, regions, areas, zones, states. No attempt has been made to define them. Probably this proliferation is as much due to the bad drafting as to the various terms used by the different schemes on which the Resolution was professedly based. The words "Independent States" are put within quotation marks. Why? Were the drafters of the text doubtful about their being independent? Could there be a state which was not independent? Were they emphasizing the point that the demand was for independent States, not for states or provinces in an Indian federation? The last ten words present another political conundrum, or rather a constitutional contradiction. The constituent units of each of these States "shall be autonomous and sovereign". The word "shall" makes it a definite and binding declaration. How can a state be made up of sovereign units? Taking the north-west as an example, was each of the four provinces (the Punjab, Sind, NWFP and Sind) to become sovereign? In that case, there would have been four States in the north-west and two in the north-east. Are autonomous and sovereign synonymous words?<sup>89</sup> The word "federation" is not used in the Resolution. Were the north-western and north-eastern States to be unitary structures? The demand is for States in the plural. No figure is given. Were the two zones to become *two* states or more?

The only statements we can make with certainty are that the League demanded more than one Muslim State, that no provinces or areas were mentioned by name in the Resolution, and that territorial readjustments were assumed (which means the Punjab and Bengal were to be divided, and only the Muslim-majority areas of Assam which were contiguous to Bengal were to be claimed). But a host of commentators, scholarly and otherwise, have read much more (all of it imaginary) in the Resolution.

Some writers have attributed details to the document which are not to be found there. According to two of them, the Resolution "demanded the separation of the Muslim-majority provinces of the Punjab, Sind, NWFP, Baluchistan and Bengal from the rest of India, and their regrouping as an independent State under the name of Pakistan".<sup>90</sup> Three factual errors in one short sentence: these provinces are not mentioned in the Resolution; the document does not demand one state; the word Pakistan is not used in the text. A historian insists that the Resolution "recommended the creation

of independent Muslim states consisting of the Punjab, NWFP, Sind and Baluchistan in the north-west and Bengal and Assam in the north-east".<sup>91</sup>

Did the Resolution demand one State or two States or more? The text is pure, and clear on the point. Yet a very large number of Pakistani writers, including respected scholars and university teachers have asserted that its claim was for *one* State.<sup>92</sup> I have not come across any text of the Resolution reproduced in a collection of documents or elsewhere which is corrupt. So the mistake can only be due to a failure to look at the document before writing about it.

Was it the League which was possibly responsible for popularizing and perpetuating this mistake? The resolutions of AIML Working Committee dated September 1940 and February 1941 and that of the annual session of April 1941 speak of *two* States. Jinnah also spoke of two States on several occasions during the years 1940 to 1943.<sup>93</sup> But on 14 August 1942, in a special interview to the *Daily Herald* of London, he said: "Our aim is that those areas where Muslims outnumber Hindus shall become a separate Dominion or *even Dominions*".<sup>94</sup> By 1944 he had changed his mind completely. In a message to the nation on 18 September 1944, he referred to "the homeland comprising Pakistan".<sup>95</sup> On 14 October, in an interview with the *Daily Worker* of London, he remarked: "It is in these zones that Muslims wish to establish Pakistan as an independent State".<sup>96</sup> After that he never mentioned the "States" of the Lahore Resolution; he talked of one Pakistan.

Finally, in April 1946 a convention of all legislators elected to the central and provincial assemblies on the League ticket met in Delhi and passed a resolution defining the party's demand as one state. When a member pointed out that this was inconsistent with the "States" of the Lahore Resolution, Jinnah is said to have remarked that the word "States" "was a mistake and had cropped up probably as a result of a typographical error". When another member reminded Jinnah that even the published records of AIML central office carried the word in the plural, he replied that "what really mattered was the intention and not the word. In fact, he directed that the records be rectified. Thus, this minor controversy on the words 'State' and 'States' was put to rest by him".<sup>97</sup> Could a legislators' convention amend the resolution of an AIML

annual session? Could Jinnah himself, through a mere verbal order, change the text of a document passed by the party? Why did it take the League six years to discover a typographical error in the text of the most important resolution it ever passed? Why was Jinnah himself speaking of two states for four long years?<sup>98</sup>

One minor but significant omission in the Resolution may be mentioned here. In his presidential address at the Lahore session Jinnah had repeatedly declared that Muslims were a separate nation. But no such statement or assertion found a place in the Resolution. Why? When the whole case for a partition centred on the argument of separate nationhood, this omission is intriguing. Haroon had made it one of the five "rights" in the resolution passed by the Foreign Committee on 2 February. Jinnah had made it the major, in fact the only, theme of his address. Then what stopped the party from putting it in the preamble or some other place in the Resolution? In fact, the first AIML resolution to contain such an assertion was not passed till September 1940 (Working Committee resolution no. 3, para. 2).

Press reaction to the Lahore Resolution varied from joyful welcome to bitter indignation. The *Star of India* acclaimed it as the "only solution".<sup>99</sup> The *Times of India* called it vague and far from being a complete solution of the Muslim problem; but added that "Mr. Gandhi and his colleagues will be more to blame than anybody if the extreme view now held by the Muslim League is propagated and developed until it becomes an article of faith among Indian Muslims".<sup>100</sup> An anonymous columnist in the same paper remarked that the Resolution "has brought to the forefront an idea which dreamers have dreamed in the past and with which constitutional theorists have toyed".<sup>101</sup> The *Civil and Military Gazette* dismissed the demand as unnecessary. There were "already four Muslim States of the future in the federal plan" of the 1935 Act. "Under the federal plan, these States are to have autonomy, and so far as the Muslim States are concerned, there is no bar to these States pooling their resources and in other ways combining to promote their common interests." Thus, "the ceremonial creation of Muslim States is not necessary because they already exist".<sup>102</sup>

The *Times* deemed it worth its while to publish two pieces on the Resolution. A report from the Delhi correspondent said that "objective commentators unhesitatingly place the responsibility

[for the Resolution] on the Congress Party. The resurgent mood which is now sweeping throughout Moslem India can be traced to Moslem suspicion of the policy of the Congress".<sup>103</sup> An article of the following day recorded that "the majority of the politically conscious Moslems" supported the League, and no other Muslim party "could produce a leader to supersede Mr. Jinnah".<sup>104</sup> The journal understood the Muslim problem of India, but was not prepared to lend support to the idea of dividing the country. The Resolution, it said editorially, "would mean an end to Indian unity".<sup>105</sup> Three weeks later it reiterated that its demand was "manifestly unacceptable".<sup>106</sup>

The rest of the British quality press condemned the decision in harsher tones. The *Manchester Guardian*, often a supporter of the Congress and what it chose to call "Indian freedom", believed that Jinnah, by getting the Resolution passed, had "re-established the reign of chaos in Indian politics", and the plan struck at the heart of "Indian nationalism".<sup>107</sup> The *New Statesman*, another friend of the "Socialist" Congress, reacted by asserting that Indians did not divide on the lines of creed but on economic issues and that communal division had been recognized and exaggerated by the British government for its own ends.<sup>108</sup> The *Daily Telegraph* neither published the news nor commented upon it.

Three British comments were less hostile and more understanding. The *Economist* said that it was foolish to suppose, as the Congress did, that divisions of race and culture, which had created fundamental political cleavages all over the world, could in India be slurred over by denying their existence.<sup>109</sup> The *Observer* appreciated that a new phase of the Indian problem had opened, and read in it the implied warning that the Congress must revise its policy of "a crude democratic constitution" for all India if it wanted other Indian communities to co-operate with it.<sup>110</sup> The most favourable review of the Resolution appeared in a highly respectable scientific weekly (*Nature*) which sometimes took notice of political and social developments. "Apart from the fact that the voice of a minority of some 80 million or more, sectional differences, for once, forgotten, cannot be ignored, it is based upon a very real difference in a cultural tradition, as every student of Indian civilization is aware; for the Muslim tradition fosters democratic outlook, while fearing and resenting Hindu



domination in an independent India, which would from its immemorial tradition of caste be essentially oligarchic in practice. However impracticable the Muslim demand may be, no solution will secure the future of India in world affairs or internally which attempts to ignore or override these fundamental differences of culture and tradition."<sup>111</sup>

## NOTES

1. *Some Recent Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah*, ed by Jamiluddin Ahmad, Lahore, 1952 ed, Vol. I, p. 43. Hereafter cited as *Jinnah's Speeches and Writings*.
2. M.A. Hussain, "Quaid's Three Visits to Cambridge (1931-32)", *TPT*, 25 December 1958.
3. S. Abid Husain, *The Destiny of Indian Muslims*, Bombay, 1965, pp. 120-121.
4. L.F. Rushbrook Williams, *The State of Pakistan*, London, 1962, p. 20.
5. Sir Wazir Hasan, Presidential Address, AIML, Bombay, 12 April 1936, quoted in A.A. Ravooof, *Meet Mr. Jinnah*, Lahore, 2nd ed 1947, p. 79; see also *IAR* 1936, Vol. I, pp. 293-299.
6. A.S. Khurshid, *Way Suratayn Elahi*, Lahore, 1976, pp. 55-56.
7. *TSI*, 27 September 1937. My italics.
8. Hector Bolitho, *Jinnah: Creator of Pakistan*, Lahore rep 1969, pp. 114-115.
9. See *IAR* 1937, Vol. II, pp. 402-409; for full text see *Addresses of Quaid-i-Azam M.A. Jinnah delivered at the Sessions of the All India Muslim League*, Delhi, 1946; the first address reproduced is the Lucknow speech.
10. *TSI*, editorial, 1 October 1937.
11. *Ibid.*, editorial, 4 October 1937.
12. *Ibid.*, editorial, 6 October 1937.
13. Full details of this incident are recounted by Sir Francis Low, "Memories of the Quaid-i-Azam", *The Pakistan Society Bulletin*, no. 17, Autumn 1962, pp. 17-18. This was a speech delivered on 5 January 1962 at the Society's annual meeting held at the Over-Seas House, London, to celebrate Jinnah's birthday.
14. Sayyid Hasan Riaz, *Pakistan Naguzir Tha*, Karachi, 2nd ed 1970, pp. 241-243; a shorter version in his "Qarardad-i-Pakistan", *NW*, 23 March 1979.
15. See Abdul Hamid, "On Understanding the Quaid-i-Azam: The Crucial Years (1928-1940)", in *World Scholars on Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah*, ed by A.H. Dani, Islamabad, 1979, p. 171. Hereafter cited as *World Scholars*.

16. Muslim League top leadership which made all decisions, when Jinnah himself was not making them, sat in the party's Working Committee. Those nominated by Jinnah in June 1938 were: Liaquat Ali Khan, Seth Abdullah Haroon, Shawkat Ali, Shaikh Abdul Majid Sindhi, Sayyid Abdur Rauf, Malik Barkat Ali, Sir Currimbhoy Ibrahim, Sardar Awrungleb Khan, M. Saadullah, Sir Sikandar Hayat Khan, Nawab Muhammad Ismail Khan, Raja Amir Ahmad Khan of Mahmudabad, Choudhry Khaliquzzaman, Abdus Sattar Seth, Abdul Matin Chaudhry, Sir A.M.K. Dehlavi, A.K. Fazlul Huq, Abdur Rahman Siddiqui, Khwaja Nazimuddin, Sayyid Abdul Aziz, and M. Ashiq Warsi. Later, due to changes occurring from time to time, the following entered the Committee: Qazi Muhammad Isa, M.A.H. Ispahani, Nawab Sir Shah Nawaz Khan of Mamdot, Chaudhry Karamat Ali, Mian Bashir Ahmad, Begum Muhammad Ali, Sayyid Husain Imam, G.M. Syed, I.I. Chundrigar, Sardar Abdur Rab Nishtar, Mawlana Akram Khan, Latifur Rahman, Ghulam Husain Hidayatullah, M.H. Gazdar, M.A. Khuro, and Khan Bakht Jamal (list taken from Choudhry Khaliquzzaman, *Pathway to Pakistan*, Lahore, 1961, p. 192 fn). Of these 38 leaders none is on record as having supported the idea of partition in 1938, except on the occasion of the Sind Muslim League Conference in October (which is studied in the following section).
17. *IAR* 1938, Vol. II, p. 352.
18. Pir Ali Muhammad Rashdi's report on the conference, quoted in Allen H. Jones, "Mr. Jinnah's Leadership and the Evolution of the Pakistan Idea: The Case of the Sind Provincial Muslim League Conference, 1938", in *World Scholars*, p. 182. Jones's is so far the only detailed and documented study of the conference.
19. Allen H. Jones's interview with Rashdi, Islamabad, 3 June 1975, *ibid.*, p. 182.
20. *Daily Gazette*, 19 October 1938.
21. *TSI*, 15 October 1938, which is probably the full text of the address. A summary was pub in the issue of 10 October. See also *IAR* 1938, Vol. II, p. 352, for important extracts.
22. *IAR* 1938, Vol. II, p. 354.
23. *TSI*, 10 October 1938.
24. *Ibid.*, 10 and 12 October 1938.
25. *CMG*, 12 October 1938.
26. G. Allana, *Quaid-i-Azam Jinnah*, Karachi, 1967, p. 312.
27. Full text in the *Amrit Bazar Patrika*, 11 October 1938 (with a silly misprint, substituting "minorities" for "majorities" in the last sentence quoted by me); *TSI*, 11 October 1938; *Texts of the All India Muslim League Resolutions passed . . . from October 1937 to December 1938*, Delhi, n.d., Annexure, pp. 65-68; *The Indian Empire Review*, January 1939, pp. 3-6; and Jamiluddin Ahmad (ed), *Historic Documents of the Muslim Freedom Movement*, Lahore, 1970, pp. 255-258.
28. *TSI*, 11 October 1938. A slightly different version was carried by *The Statesman* of the same date.
29. Allen H. Jones, *op. cit.*, p. 187. I am quoting Jones, not the Subjects Committee.
30. This became the official text of the resolution, and it is this which is given in the Muslim League official resolutions, and also in Jamiluddin Ahmad, *op. cit.* *The Indian Empire Review*, however, carries the resolution as it was introduced. However, in 1965, Shaikh Abdul Majid Sindhi, who had drafted the first text and introduced it in the conference, said that he had been in favour of a common though limited centre, which would have administered certain specified subjects, such as foreign affairs, defence, safeguards for minorities and settlement of disputes between the two federations (interview in *Jang*, 23 March 1965). This means that he had not wanted a clear partition, but a confederation between the Hindu federation and the Muslim federation. But the text that he had prepared does not admit of this explanation.
31. *TSI*, editorial, 12 October 1938.
32. *TMM*, editorial, 13 October 1938.
33. Suresh Chandra Dev, "India in Home Polity", *IAR* 1938, Vol. II, p. 48.
34. Rezaul Karim, *Pakistan Examined*, Calcutta, 1941, p. 125.
35. Allen H. Jones, *op. cit.*, pp. 188-189.
36. *Ibid.*, p. 190.
37. Quoted in S.R. Mehrotra, "The Congress and the Partition of India", in C.H. Philips (ed), *The Partition of India*:

- Policies and Perspectives, 1935-1947*, London, 1970, p. 207.
38. Speech at the Annual Dinner of the Old Boys Association of the Osmania University, 28 September 1939, *Jinnah's Speeches and Writings*, Vol I, p. 96; also quoted in M.H. Saiyid, *Mohammad Ali Jinnah : A Political Study*, Karachi, 1970 ed, p. 216.
  39. Allen H. Jones, *op. cit.*, p. 191. He has interviewed Yusuf Haroon and Pir Hissamuddin Rashdi.
  40. *Ibid.*, p. 191 fn.
  41. See S.S. Pirzada (ed), *The Foundations of Pakistan*, Karachi, 1970, Vol. II, pp. 311-324. There is no evidence at all for an Indian historian's remark that "it was only in 1938 that Mr. Jinnah began to demand the vivisection of India" (R.R. Sethi, "The Last Phase, 1919-1947", in *The Cambridge History of India, Vol. VI: The Indian Empire, 1858-1918*, Delhi, 1964, p. 621. Apparently, the Cambridge University Press, the original publishers of this well-known work, allowed this Indian ed to be issued from Delhi with an additional section).
  42. *Inqilab*, 1 February 1939.
  43. Liaquat Ali Khan, Presidential Address, Meerut Division Muslim League Conference, Meerut, 25 March 1939, *TTI*, 27 March 1939.
  44. Abdullah Haroon, speech at a public meeting held under the auspices of the Muslim League at Hyderabad Sind, 1 May 1939, *TSI*, 4 May 1939.
  45. Raja of Pirpur, Presidential Address, Allahabad District Muslim League Conference, Allahabad, May 1939, *ibid.*, 9 May 1939.
  46. *Ibid.*, 11 May 1939. Urdu report in *Zamindar*, 12 May 1939.
  47. *The Deccan Times*, 11 June 1939.
  48. Sir William Barton, "Indian Muslims Reject Hindu Tyranny", *National Review*, June 1939, pp. 751-758.
  49. *CMG*, 1 August 1939.
  50. Quoted in Francis Watson, *The Trial of Mr. Gandhi*, London, 1969, pp. 218-219. See also K.M. Munshi, *The Changing Shape of Indian Politics*, Poona, 2nd ed 1946, p. 42.
  51. I.H. Qureshi, in W. Theodore de Bary (ed), *Sources of Indian Tradition*, New York, 1964 rep, Vol. II, p. 282. My italics.
  52. Message to the Muslim Youth of India, not dated, *Jinnah's*

- Speeches and Writings*, Vol. I, p. 97.
53. Statement in the *MG*, not dated, *ibid.*, Vol. I, pp. 99-100. It is said that during 1939 Jinnah's articles and statements for British and American journals were ghosted by Rashid Baig and sometimes revised by Frank Moraes (see Frank Moraes, *Witness to an Era*, London, 1973, p. 59).
  54. *Speeches and Statements of the Marquess of Linlithgow, 1936-1943*, Delhi, 1945, pp. 399-400.
  55. Raja of Mahmudabad, Presidential Address, Assam Provincial Muslim League Conference, 18 November 1939, *TSI*, 27 November 1939.
  56. Liaquat Ali Khan, Presidential Address, Darbhanga Muslim League Conference, Darbhanga, 24 November 1939, *ibid.*, 28 November 1939.
  57. Abdul Hamid Khan, statement from Madras, 15 December 1939, *CMG*, 16 December 1939.
  58. N. Mitchell, *Sir George Cunningham: A Memoir*, Edinburgh and London, 1968, p. 82. Mitchell served in the NWFP in 1934-40 and 1946-47, and might have got this information from Cunningham, the governor of the province.
  59. *TMM*, editorial, 8 January 1940.
  60. Official record of Viceroy-Jinnah meeting, quoted by R.J. Moore, "British Policy and the Indian Problem, 1936-40", A Paper read at the Partition of India, 1947, Study Conference held at the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, July 1967 (Mimeo).
  61. Enclosure 2 to letter dated 30 January 1940 from Linlithgow to Zetland: Note of a Conversation between Linlithgow and Sikandar Hayat Khan at Delhi on 25 January 1940; Note of a Conversation between Linlithgow and Sikandar Hayat Khan and Fazlul Haq, 14 February 1940; Note of an Interview between Linlithgow and Jinnah, Enclosure 3 to letter dated 6 February 1940 from Linlithgow to Zetland; all in *Linlithgow Collection*, Eur. Mss. File 125, India Office Library and Records, London.
  62. Speech at the AIML Council, Delhi, 25 February 1940, *Jinnah's Speeches and Writings*, Vol. I, p. 152.
  63. *Ibid.*, Vol. I, p. 131.
  64. M.A. Jinnah, "Two Nations in India", *Time and Tide*, 9 March 1940. It must have been written in middle or late



February.

65. Speech at the Muslim University Union, Aligarh, probably 6 March 1940, *Jinnah's Speeches and Writings*, Vol. I, pp. 154-155.
66. Full details of this talk in V.P. Menon, *The Transfer of Power in India*, Calcutta, 1957, pp. 81-83.
67. A very good example is the regular column written anonymously by Altaf Husain in *The Statesman* of Calcutta during these months: Shahed, "Dar-el-Islam", *The Statesman*, 21 February and 8 March. Other instances: Abdullah Haroon, "Muslim League and Indian Muslims", *CMG*, 1 February; and Muhammad Azam, "A Constituent Assembly", *ibid.*, 8 March.
68. Full text in *TSI*, 4 March 1940.
69. Pakistan History Board, *A Short History of Hind-Pakistan*, Karachi, 1955, rep. 1960 and 1963, p. 435.
70. *CMG*, 1 August 1939.
71. *IAR* 1939, Vol. I, p. 366.
72. Ashiq Husain Batalawi, *Hamari Qawmi Jidd-e-Jehad*, Lahore, n.d., pp. 143-144.
73. *IAR* 1939, Vol. I, p. 374.
74. *CMG*, 11 May 1939.
75. *Ibid.*, 2 July 1939.
76. *TSI*, 3 February 1940.
77. *Ibid.*
78. Khaliqzaman, *op. cit.*, pp. 233-234.
79. *The Times*, 19 February 1940.
80. *TSI*, 17 April 1940.
81. *Quarterly Survey of the Political and Constitutional Position of British India*, no. 8, 19 December 1940, pp. 32-33, a British Government paper, quoted in Kuldip Nayar, *Distant Neighbours*, Delhi, 1972, p. 17; see also E.P. Moon, "Mr. Jinnah's Changing Attitude to the Idea of Pakistan", in *World Scholars*, p. 269.
82. *The Statesman*, 19 February 1941.
83. E.P. Moon, *op. cit.*, p. 269.
84. This day-by-day and almost hour-by-hour account is based on the relevant issues of *The Statesman*, *The Tribune*, *CMG*, *TSI*, supplemented by *IAR* 1940, Vol. I, pp. 307-316.
85. Lal Bahadur, the historian of the Muslim League, is wrong

in saying that the *Indian Annual Register*, 1940, Vol. I, p. 53, gives the date of the passing of the Resolution as 23 March (*The Muslim League*, Agra, 1954, p. 268 fn). The *IAR* records on pp. 53-54 that the Resolution was adopted by the Subjects Committee on 23 March and passed by the session on 24 March.

86. See his statement, *TPT*, 24 March 1962.
87. A full listing of such people will make a book-length index. I give a selection here arranged in seven categories:  
*Eye-Witnesses*: M.H. Saiyid, *Mahomed Ali Jinnah*, Lahore, 2nd ed 1953, p. 432; Mian Muhammad Shafi, "The Historic League Session", In Jamiluddin Ahmad (ed), *Quaid-i-Azam as Seen by His Contemporaries*, Lahore, 1966, p. 124 (he calls this session the 34th, which is wrong); Sayyid Hasan Riaz, "Qarardad-i-Pakistan", *NW*, 23 March 1979; F.K. Khan Durrani, *The Meaning of Pakistan*, Lahore, 1944, pp. 129, 135 (he makes it 26 March); Ashiq Husain Batalawi, "23 March ko Barr-i-Saghir ke Musalmanon ne apne liye aik Alehda Watan banane ka Ahad kya Tha", *Imroz*, 23 March 1969; and dozens of articles in the Pakistani Urdu and English newspapers of 23 March every year written by persons who claim that they attended the session.  
*Jinnah*: his Pakistan Day Message of 23 March 1944, in *Jinnah's Speeches and Writings*, Vol. II, p. 93.  
*Reference Works and Official Publications*: G. Allana (ed), *Pakistan Movement: Historic Documents*, Karachi, 2nd ed 1968, p. 226; *Pakistan 1973: Year Book*, ed by Rafique Akhtar, Karachi, 1973, p. 33; Government of Pakistan, *Struggle for Independence, 1857-1947*, Karachi, n.d., p. 63, and Appendix p. 40; and *Chronology of Pakistan Movement*, Islamabad, n.d. (?1982), p. 3, and its Urdu version, *Pakistan Manzil be Manzil*, Islamabad, n.d. (? 1982), p. 3, both prepared by the Department of Archives.  
*Pakistani Scholars*: Aziz Ahmad, "Remarques sur les origines du Pakistan", *Orient*, no. 26 (1963), p. 24 (he makes it 26 March), his *Islamic Modernism in India and Pakistan, 1857-1964*, London, 1967, p. 171 (again 26 March), his "L'Islam et la democratie dans le sous-continent Indo-Pakistanis", *Orient*, nos. 51-52 (1969), p. 12 (again 26 March); I.H. Qureshi, *The Muslim Community*, The Hague, 1962, p. 299;

K.B. Sayeed, *Pakistan: The Formative Phase*, Karachi, 1960, p. 104, 2nd ed London, 1968, p. 101; G.W. Choudhury, *Pakistan's Relations with India, 1947-1966*, London, 1968, pp. 5, 25; G. Allana, *Quaid-i-Azam Jinnah*, Karachi, 1967, p. 319; K. Sarwar Hasan, *The Genesis of Pakistan*, Karachi, 1950, p. 23 (he makes it April); Abdul Qaddus Hashmi, *Tashrihat-i-Pakistan*, Hyderabad Deccan, 1946, p. 30; S.A. Vahid, "Allama Iqbal", in *A History of Freedom Movement*, Karachi, 1963, Vol. III, Part II, p. 535; Javid Iqbal, *Maey Lalafam*, Lahore, 2nd ed 1973, p. 196; Sharif al Mujahid, *Founder of Pakistan, Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah (1876-1948)*, Islamabad, 1976, p. 23; S.F. Mahmud, *The Story of Indo-Pakistan*, Karachi, 1969 (first pub in London, 1963), pp. 252, 266; Shafique Ali Khan, *Two Nation Theory*, Hyderabad Sind, 1973, p. 720; Safdar Mahmud, *Mutalea-i-Pakistan*, Lahore, 1973, p. 24; *Islamic Culture*, Hyderabad Deccan, October 1943, p. 466; Chaudhri Muhammad Ali, *The Emergence of Pakistan*, New York, 1967, p. 38 (he was not a scholar but a former prime minister of Pakistan; however, I know that he did a lot of research for writing this book).

*Indian Writers*: Asoka Mehta and A. Patwardhan, *The Communal Triangle*, Allahabad, 1942, p. 47; B.R. Ambedkar, *Pakistan or Partition of India*, Bombay, 2nd ed 1945, p. 3 (he makes it 26 March); D.P. Singhal, *Pakistan*, New Jersey, 1972, p. 63; Virendra, *Pakistan: A Myth or A Reality*, Lahore, 1946, p. 19 (he makes it 26 March); Rajendra Prasad, *Pakistan*, Bombay and Calcutta, 1940, p. 59; Beni Prasad, *Communal Settlement*, Bombay, 1944, p. 3 (he makes it 26 March); H.R. Aiyer, *Why Pakistan?*, Trivandrum, 1944, p. 3 (he makes it 26 March).

*Foreign Scholars*: W.C. Smith, *Modern Islam in India*, London, 1946, p. 255, Lahore ed 1947, p. 308; Hector Bolitho, *Jinnah: Creator of Pakistan*, London, 1954, p. 127; D.N. Wilber, *Pakistan: Yesterday and Today*, New York, 1964, p. 100; P.H.L. Eggermont, "The Pakistan Concept: Its Background", in *World Scholars*, p. 236; M.T. Titus, *Islam in India and Pakistan*, 2nd ed, Madras, 1959, p. 220; John A. Teta, *Pakistan in Pictures*, New York, 2nd rev ed 1970, p. 25.

*Popular Writers*: Sardar Iqbal Ali Shah, *Pakistan: A Plan for India*, London, 1944, pp. 1, 17 (he makes it 26 March); Absar Alam, in *Cheragh-i-Rah*, Nazrya-i-Pakistan Number, December 1960, Karachi, p. 190; A.S.M. Abdur Rab, *A.K. Fazlul Haq*, Lahore, n.d., p. 103; Muhammad Ilyas Farani, *Barr-i-Saghir men Muslim Qawmiyyat ke Tasawwur ka Irtiqa*, Karachi, 1968, p. 181; Muhammad Yusuf Khan, *The Glory of Quaid-i-Azam*, Multan, 1976, p. 98; Iftikhar-ul-Huq, *Pakistan and Constituent Assembly*, Lahore, 1946, p. 4 (carries a foreword by the Nawab of Mamdot); Altaf Husain, *India: Last Ten Years*, London, n.d., p. 5 (says the session was held in April); Pakistan Muslim League, *Qiyam-i-Pakistan ka Tarikhi Pas Manzar*, Rawalpindi, 1964, pp. 6, 50; and all articles appearing in every Pakistani newspaper's special supplement pub on 23 March every year from 1948 till the present.

88. *Resolutions of the All India Muslim League from December 1938 to March 1940*, Delhi, n.d., Resolution no 1, pp. 47-48.
89. The confusion of "autonomous" and "sovereign" could not have been a typographical error or an oversight of drafting. On 1 April 1940, Jinnah said: "The Punjab, in any case, would be an autonomous unit. . . . The Muslim Homeland constituted of the Western Zone of the Federated Autonomous States, including the Autonomous Sovereign State of the Punjab. . ." (quoted in *India's Problem of Her Future Constitution*, Bombay, n.d., p. 30).
90. Rafiq M. Khan and Herberts Stark, *Young Pakistan*, London, 1951, p. 4. This book is written for secondary school students, and Mr. Khan was a member of the Information Department of Pakistan's High Commission in London.
91. Waheeduzzaman, in L.H. Qureshi (ed), *A Short History of Pakistan*, Karachi, 1967, Book Four, p. 214. This was a prestigious text book, prepared under the instructions of President Ayub Khan by a panel of leading national historians and scholars, and had a much better get-up than the usual run of Pakistani text books.
92. For instance, Abdur Rauf, *Islamic Culture in India and Pakistan*, Lahore, 1975, p. 65; Masudul Hasan, *Short Encyclopaedia of Pakistan*, Lahore, 1975, p. 54; Chiragh Hasan Hasrat, *Quaid-i-Azam* (in Urdu), Islamabad, 1976, p. 68;

- Kalim Siddiqui, *Conflict, Crisis and War in Pakistan*, London, 1972, p. 14; M.M. Junaid, in *TPT*, 28 July 1970; Aziz Ahmad, "India", in Joseph Schacht and C.E. Bosworth (eds), *The Legacy of Islam*, Oxford, 1974, p. 140; Ziauddin Ahmad, *Quaid-i-Millat Liaquat Ali Khan*, Karachi, 1970, p. 48; A Punjabi (Mian Kafayet Ali), *Pakistan: The Critics' Case Examined*, Lahore, 1941, p. 27; Government of Pakistan, *Struggle for Independence, 1857-1947*, Karachi, n.d., p. 69 (immediately after saying this, it quotes the correct text of the Resolution!); K. Sarwar Hasan, *The Genesis of Pakistan*, Karachi, 1950, p. 23; S. Hyder, *Progress of Pakistan*, Lahore, 1947, p. 8; Waheeduzzaman, *Towards Pakistan*, Lahore, 1964, pp. 122, 153, 196; M.A. Butt, "Kashmir and Etymology of Pakistan", *TPT*, 23 March 1965; and an eye-witness account, Abu Said Anwar, "Tahrik-i-Pakistan ka Pas Manzar", *NW*, 23 February 1979, and his "23 March ke Ijlas-i-Lahore ka Ankhnon Dekha Hai", *ibid.*, 23 March 1979. Among the Indians: V.B. Kulkarni, *Is Pakistan Necessary?*, Bombay, 1944, p. 1; and S. Abid Husain, *The Destiny of Indian Muslims*, Bombay, 1965. Among the Soviet scholars: A.M. Dyakov, in V.V. Balabushevich and A.M. Dyakov (eds), *A Contemporary History of India*, New Delhi, 1964, p. 381; and Y.V. Gankovsky and L.R. Gordon-Polonskaya, *A History of Pakistan*, Moscow, 1964, p. 72 (who add that an "Islamic" state was demanded).
93. See his message to Bombay Presidency Provincial Muslim League Conference, Hubli, 26-27 May 1940, *Jinnah's Speeches and Writings*, Vol. 1, p. 188; speech at Muslim Students Conference, New Delhi, November 1940, *ibid.*, p. 206; speech at the Muslim University Union, Aligarh, 10 March 1941, *ibid.*, pp. 264, 267; Presidential Address, AIML annual session, Madras, April 1941, *ibid.*, pp. 273, 277, 280; Foreword to M.R.T., *Nationalism in Conflict in India*, Bombay, n.d., unpaginated; interview to W.W. Chapman of the International News Service of America, sometime between April and June 1942, *Jinnah's Speeches and Writings*, pp. 419, 420; speech at the AIML Council, Delhi, 9 November 1942, *ibid.*, p. 464; and interview to the foreign press, Bombay, 24 September 1943, *ibid.*, p. 576.
  94. *Jinnah's Speeches and Writings*, Vol. 1, p. 448. My italics.
  95. *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 236.
  96. *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 224. My italics.
  97. M.A.H. Ispahani, *Quaid-e-Azam Jinnah as I Knew Him*, Karachi, 2nd ed 1967, pp. 144-145.
  98. On this see K.B. Sayeed, *op. cit.*, pp. 122-124; Choudhry Khaliquzzaman, *op. cit.*, pp. 341-343; S.S. Pirzada, *The Pakistan Resolution*, pp. 20-21, 66; and the statements and counter-statements of Mawlana Abdul Hamid Khan Bhashani, Abdul Waheed Khan, Mian Ziauddin, Mian Bashir Ahmad, Z.H. Lari and Khaliquzzaman in *TPT* and *Dawn*, 2, 3, 13, 14, 18, 19, 21 and 27 September 1969, and 27, 29 and 30 March 1970. The latest volume of the "authorized" Pakistani history of the nationalist struggle does not touch upon any of the points raised here about the Resolution; see "The Lahore Resolution (1940)", in Pakistan Historical Society, *A History of the Freedom Movement, Vol. IV, 1936-1947*, Parts I and II, Karachi, 1970, pp. 72-115 (ed. by I.H. Qureshi, A.B.A. Haleem and S. Moinul Haq).
  99. *TSI*, editorial, 25 March 1940.
  100. *TTI*, editorial, 26 March 1940.
  101. Candidus, "Implications of Muslim League Demand", *ibid.*, 27 March 1940.
  102. *CMG*, editorial, 30 March 1940.
  103. Report from Delhi Correspondent, *The Times*, 26 March 1940.
  104. "Muslim India on Guard", *ibid.*, 27 March 1940.
  105. *Ibid.*, editorial, 27 March 1940.
  106. *Ibid.*, editorial, 18 April 1940.
  107. *MG*, editorial, 2 April 1940; see also editorial, 3 April.
  108. *New Statesman*, editorial comment, 30 March 1940.
  109. *Economist*, editorial comment, 30 March 1940.
  110. *Observer*, editorial, 31 March 1940.
  111. *Nature*, 6 April 1940.



# 14

## IN THE FULNESS OF TIME

### Plans, Assertions, Reports and Decisions

On the evidence examined in this volume the idea of a separate Muslim state in India appears to have evolved over a period of nearly 82 years. Every report, suggestion, thought, proposal, plan or scheme from John Bright's speech in the House of Commons on 24 June 1858 to the Lahore Resolution of 24 March 1940 marks a stage in this development. Several valuable conclusions can be drawn from this survey of the growth of the idea, but before that is done it will help the reader and myself to summarize the various landmarks in this evolution in tabular form. Besides acting as a quick reminder of what we have been looking at, it will indicate the nature of evidence that we have in support of the item offered. Table I gives a bird's-eye view of the history of the idea.

This makes up a total of 170 proposals and reports presented during a period of 82 years; which works out to an average of over two proposals per year. This impressive frequency of incidence is not without significance. It means that the Muslims had begun to experience a feeling of separateness at least as early as in the middle of the nineteenth century, and that their leaders and intellectuals were consistently giving expression to this feeling throughout this era. The sentiment was coterminous with the beginning of British rule (dating it from the transfer of power from the East India Company to the British Crown). To bring out the importance of this statement we should rephrase it: they began to stress their separate identity as soon as they experienced the loss of formal power (dating it from the final disappearance of the last Mughal emperor immediately after the Mutiny).

TABLE I

### LANDMARKS IN THE HISTORY OF THE IDEA

Sr. No.	Date	Author	Proposal or Report	Nature of evidence
1.	1858 (24 June)	John Bright	5 or 6 large presidencies with complete autonomy, ultimately becoming independent states.	Clear
2.	1867	Sayyid Ahmad Khan	Hindus and Muslims are two nations; they will never join together in anything.	Quoted by Hali
3.	1877 (11 December)	John Bright	After British withdrawal India will have 5 or 6 great independent and sovereign states like those of Europe.	Clear
4.	1879	Jamaluddin "Afghani"	A Muslim Republic comprising Muslim Central Asia, Afghanistan, and Muslim-majority areas in north-west India.	No direct evidence
5.	1883	Sayyid Ahmad Khan	One of the two nations, Hindus and Muslims, must conquer the other; the two cannot remain equal.	Clear
6.	1883	Sayyid Ahmad Khan	India contains many nationalities and is, therefore, unfit to have representative institutions.	Quoted by Khali-quzzaman

7. 1883 (December) W.S. Blunt Divide India into 2 parts: the north under a Muslim government and the south under a Hindu government. Clear
8. 1887 Theodore Beck Muslims are a separate nation; majority rule is impossible; Muslims will never agree to be ruled by the Hindu majority. Clear
9. 1887 (28 December) Sayyid Ahmad Khan Muslims will always be outvoted by the Hindus in the proportion of 1 to 4. Clear
10. 1888 Sayyid Ahmad Khan India is not a nation and can never become one. Clear
11. 1888 (14 March) Sayyid Ahmad Khan The Congress has no right to speak on behalf of the Muslims. Clear
12. 1888 (April) Sayyid Ahmad Khan Muslims, by joining the Congress, will become the slaves of another nation. Clear
13. 1888 (19 May) Muharram Ali Chishti Muslims are a nation by themselves, and will not allow themselves to be dominated by another nation, the Hindus. Clear
14. 1890 (23 August) Abdul Halim Sharar Rearrange India into Hindu and Muslim districts to avoid communal riots. Quoted by A.S. Khurshid
15. 1899 Theodore Morison Muslims do not regard themselves as Indians; the establishment of an independent united Indian Government is impossible; Muslims have all the makings of a nation except a territory. Clear

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16. 1904 Bhal Parmanand Divide India on Hindu-Muslim lines. Humayun Kabir, cited by Waheeduz-zaman.
17. 1905 Akbar Allahabadi India north of Jumna to be given to the Muslims. Quoted by Naqi Muhammad Khan
18. 1907 Two Turkish Statesmen Sub-divide India into a Hindu India and a Muslim India. Mentioned by S.A. Valid
19. 1911 (14 January) Muhammad Ali No faith in a united India, but a marriage of convenience should be tried. Clear
20. 1911 (28 January) Muhammad Ali The problems of India are international, not national; Muslims could claim equality with the Hindus. Clear
21. 1911 (2 September) Shaikh Zahur Ahmad Hindu-Muslim parity in all legislatures. Clear
22. 1912 (6 January) Muhammad Ali A united India does not exist, but we have to create it. Clear
23. 1912 Joseph Stalin India will, with the further course of bourgeois development, split up into innumerable nationalities. Quoted by R. Palme Dutt

24.	1912	Bhai Parmanand	In a free India Muslims will be pushed across the Indus river.	Quoted by Abdul Hamid.
25.	1913 (10 May)	Bambooque	Hindus and Muslims should be segregated: northern India to be assigned to the Muslims and the rest to the Hindus.	Clear
26.	1914	Lovat Fraser	Muslim north India may join with the rest of the Muslim world in the middle east.	Quoted by I.H. Qureshi
27.	1915	Rahmat Ali	The north of India should be made into a Muslim State.	His own word
28.	1916	F.K. Khan Durrani	The Muslim youth dream of a division of India on Hindu—Muslim lines and exchange of population.	His own word
29.	1917 (2 June)	Lord Curzon	India will never be a single autonomous unit, or even a federation of autonomous states; disintegration is a good possibility.	Clear
30.	1917 (June)	E.S. Montagu	India may end up as a commonwealth of self-governing provinces or countries.	Clear
31.	1917 (September—October)	Kheiri Brothers	Partition India into a Hindu India and a Muslim India.	Clear

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32.	1918	The Aga Khan	A United States of India with fully autonomous provinces or self-governing states of the size of medium European states; the Punjab to be enlarged; Sind, Baluchistan and NWFP to make up one large Indus Province with Quetta as its capital; this Indian federation to be gradually expanded into a huge South Asian Federation.	Clear
33.	1919	A.B. Keith	Muslims are thinking about a Muslim state based on Afghanistan and embracing all north-western areas of Muslim majority.	Personal observation
34.	1919	Beni Prasad	Some Muslims entertain an idea of an Islamic State in the north-west.	Personal observation
35.	1920 (March—April)	M.A.Q. Bilgrami	A division of India into a Hindu State and a Muslim State in order to safeguard religious ritual of cow-killing. (Demarcation foresees the 1947 boundaries).	Clear
36.	1921	Nadir Ali	A partition of India as a method of settling the Hindu-Muslim problem.	Quoted by Khali-quzzaman
37.	1921 (December)	Hasrat Mohani	A federal republic in which a set of Muslim provinces will balance another set of Hindu provinces.	Clear
38.	1923	Wahabuddin Kamboh	North-west India minus Kashmir to be an independent state called Nuristan.	Related in <i>Sayyara Digest</i>

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39. 1923 Bhai Parmanand Hindu-Muslim unity is unthinkable; there should be a complete severance between the two peoples; India to be partitioned so that Islam and Hinduism become supreme in separate zones. Quoted by S.S. Pirzada
40. 1923 Sardar Gul Khan The area from Raskumari to Agra to be given to the Hindus, and that from Agra to Peshawar to the Muslims; the population to be exchanged. Clear
41. 1924 Obaidullah Sindhi India to be a federation of republics. Reported by Muhammad Sarwar
42. 1924 Joseph Stalin In the case of a revolutionary upheaval in India, many hitherto unknown nationalities will emerge on the scene. Quoted by S.S. Pirzada
43. 1924 Hasrat Mohani India to be a bi-communal federal state in which Hindu states and Muslim states will join under a Supreme National Government. Quoted by Rahmat Ali
44. 1924 (14 December) Lajpat Rai Continuation of separate electorates is irreconcilable with Indian nationalism; Muslims are not prepared to give them up; a civil war will again mean the domination of one community; the solution: give the Muslims four States of their own—NWFP, Western Punjab, Sind and eastern Bengal. Clear

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45. 1924 (December) Muhammad Ali Muslims are in a majority in an area stretching from Constantinople to Saharanpur (repeating Lovat Fraser). Clear
46. 1925 (22 May) Muhammad Ali Muslims have no desire to rule over Hindu areas. Clear
47. 1925 (5 June) Muhammad Ali Give the right of self-determination to various provinces and areas; no portion to be forced to join the future Indian state; separation is justified on economic, strategic, religious and cultural grounds. Clear
48. 1925 (July) Patrick Fagan Muslims will fight for their domination in north India. Clear
49. 1925 (July) W.A.J. Archbold There will be a powerful Muslim combination in the north-west in alliance with Afghanistan. Clear
50. 1925 "Cheiro" One day India will be divided equally between the Muslims and the followers of Buddha. Clear
51. 1925 Some teachers of Aligarh University Muslim-ruled provinces to be a part of an Indian federation; special centres for religious communities to be created. Unclear and doubtful

52. 1928 (14 March) *The Times* (J.M. Ewart) Muslims want effective Muslim rule in the north-west, with a partition of the Punjab; this will secure the interests of the Muslim majority and also protect the Muslims left in Hindu India. Clear
53. 1928 (June) Ashraf Ali Thanawi A separate Muslim state should be created in India. Quoted by M.A. Rahman Khan
54. 1928 (13 October) The Aga Khan India to be a loose alliance of Free States demarcated on the basis of religion, nationality, race and language; Muslim provinces of north and west may join together to make one free state. Clear
55. 1928 (December) M.A.K. Maikash A Muslim national homeland should be created, consisting of the Punjab, Sind, Baluchistan and NWFP; this demand is sanctioned by the internationally recognized right of self-determination. Quoted by A.S. Khurshid
56. 1928 (December) Citizens of Delhi Create a new Delhi province consisting of Delhi, and Agra, Rohilkhand and Meerut divisions of the United Provinces and Ambala Division of the Punjab. Clear
57. 1928 (December) All India Khilafat Conference Create a federation of free and united states of India with the centre enjoying only those powers which have been given to it by the constituent units. Clear

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58. 1928 Sayyid Sardar Ali Khan Every concession to the Hindus must be matched by an equal one to the Muslims; Muslims should be placed on an absolute equality with the Hindus. Clear
59. 1928 Srinivasa Sastri Muslims are demanding the creation of autonomous Muslim States along the north-west border of India. Quoted by S.S. Pirzada
60. 1929 (1 January) All India Muslim Conference Create a federation with residuary powers vested in the provinces. Clear
61. 1929 (February) F.K. Khan Durrani Hindu-Muslim unity is impossible; either the Hindus should convert all Muslims to Hinduism or all Hindus should become Muslims; States are based on power, not on pacts; elimination, not assimilation, is the solution; Muslims should make a bid for an empire in India and establish a Muslim India. Clear
62. 1929 (probably middle of the year) Zulifqar Ali Khan and Abdullah Suhrawardy All Muslim provinces should have Muslim governments and the rest of the Indian provinces Hindu governments, thus creating a balance of power in India. Clear
63. 1929 (late) Ross Masud Muslims are contemplating a federation of Afghanistan, Persia and north-west tribal areas, and a union of northern Punjab, Sind, Baluchistan and Afghanistan. Clear

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| 64. | 1929<br>(31 December) | Zulfiqar Ali Khan  | Nationalism is based on religion; India cannot become one nation until all Indians belong to one religion, which is impossible; the Punjab and Bengal should be divided on religious lines; Muslims should be given an area in the north where they are 80% of the population, and another in the east with similar preponderance; this is a demand for a separate country and homeland. | Clear |
| 65. | 1930<br>(29 December) | Muhammad Iqbal     | The Punjab, NWFP, Sind and Baluchistan to be amalgamated into a single state; this will bring to India an internal balance of power; the creation of autonomous states is the only possible way to secure a stable constitutional structure for India.   | Clear |
| 66. | 1931<br>(12 February) | Anonymous          | Divide India into a Hindu state, a Muslims state and a tiny state for Europeans and Anglo-Indians.   | Clear |
| 67. | 1931<br>(March)       | <i>Round Table</i> | It is certainly possible that India might break up, first into a Muslim and a Hindu India, and later into a number of national states, as Europe did after the Renaissance and the Reformation.  | Clear |
| 68. | 1931<br>(June)        | Theodore Morison   | A Muslim national state in the north of India is possible, even probable.  | Clear |

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| 69. | 1931<br>(June)         | <i>Manchester Guardian</i><br>correspondent in<br>India | There is a strong tendency among the Muslims to form a large northern block of provinces; many Muslims foresee a Muslim state in the north stretching from Karachi to north Bengal.                              | Clear |
| 70. | 1931<br>(July)         | Lord Zetland  | A chain of Muslim provinces stretching across the north-west of India will be a basis of great strength and influence to the Muslims generally.  | Clear |
| 71. | 1931<br>(25 September) | British Cabinet<br>Paper                                | Muslims' primary object is to create a Muslim India, and then secure Muslim interests elsewhere by the operation of the hostage theory.  | Clear |
| 72. | 1931<br>(8 October)    | The Punjab Sikhs  | Divisions of Rawalpindi and Multan (minus Lyallpur and Montgomery districts) to be joined with NWFP, which can then be made a governor's province.   | Clear |
| 73. | 1931<br>(12 October)   | Geoffrey Corbett  | Ambala division (minus Simla district) to be separated from the Punjab, the United Provinces to be divided into a Western Province of Agra (which will take up Ambala division) and an Eastern Province of Oudh. | Clear |
| 74. | 1931<br>(30 October)   | Muhammad Yaqub  | Redistribute India into small homogeneous provinces with full autonomous powers, leaving only defined and limited powers with the centre.  | Clear |

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75.	1931 (7 November)	<i>Economist</i>	Muslims want effective control of the entire Indus basin and of Eastern Bengal and a corridor linking the Punjab with Bengal.	Clear
76.	1931 (3 December)	Alfred Knox	There is no hope of the Hindus and Muslims ever coming into one organic whole.	Clear
77.	1932 (16 April)	Lord Irwin (Viceroy)	Foresees some division of India to settle the communal difficulty.	Clear
78.	1932 (29 April)	Walter Lawrence	There are great and well-defined nationalities in India; the only hope of natural and healthy growth lies in recognizing them.	Clear
79.	1932 (19 May)	H.T. Lambrick	India may be divided on religious lines.	Clear
80.	1932 (8 August)	<i>Manchester Guardian</i>	Hindu and Muslim attitudes to life are so utterly opposed that such remedies as Pax Britannica, education and self-government are useless.	Clear
81.	1932	A.R. Banerji	Indian Muslim nationalism, if encouraged or allowed to develop unhindered, will one day result in a feeling of Pan-Islamism and Islamic empire.	Clear
82.	1932	John Coatman	Foresees a powerful Muslim state in the north and west.	Quoted by Shaukat Ullah Ansari and Rajendra Prasad

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83.	1932	John Coatman	Muslims want to control north or at least north-western India.	Clear
84.	1932	John Coatman	It may be that Muslim India in the north and north-west is destined to become a separate Muslim State or part of a Muslim Empire.	Clear
85.	1932	Reginald Craddock	With European history before us, how can we expect that the great diversities and divergent racial elements to be found in India can be welded into one self-governing and democratic whole?	Clear
86.	1933 (28 January)	Rahmat Ali	A homeland for the 30 million Muslims of the north-west should be an independent Muslim state, consisting of the Punjab, NWFP, Kashmir, Sind and Baluchistan, to be called PAKISTAN.	Clear
87.	1933 (February)	G.T. Garratt	Within a short period the projected federal government will be faced with a strong separatist movement.	Clear
88.	1933 (May)	Elliott Colvin	The creation of a union of national union between Hindus and Muslims is likely to be a matter of a century's duration.	Clear
89.	1933 (15 June)	Haji Rahim Bakhsh	India must be divided into Muslim and Hindu states; but partition not demanded.	Clear

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90.	1933 (September)	F.E. Hofsinger	Split up India into several independent dominions; Muslim districts of the United Provinces with Lucknow as the capital to be one dominion; NWFP and Muslim districts of the Punjab to be another; the Muslim part of Bengal to be still another; 13 dominions in all to cover British India; 12 of the bigger native states to become kingdoms.	Clear
91.	1934	Henry Gidney	The Anglo-Indians must have their own separate state.	Reported by V.R. Gaikawad
92.	1934-1935	Fazli Husain	Create Muslim-majority zones as a counterpoise to Hindu-majority areas.	Quoted by Durga Das
93.	1935 (29 January)	Gulshan Rai	Divide the Punjab on communal lines.	Clear
94.	1936 (June-July)	Calvert	Create a new federation of the Punjab, Sind, NWFP, Baluchistan and Kashmir.	Quoted by Gulshan Rai
95.	1936	John Coatman	A large Muslim state in the north-west of India and parts of Central Asia may materialise.	Clear
96.	1937 (20 March)	Muhammad Iqbal	Muslims are a distinct political unit in India.	Clear
97.	1937 (28 May)	Muhammad Iqbal	Redistribute the country, and provide one or more Muslim states with absolute majorities.	Clear

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98.	1937 (21 June)	Muhammad Iqbal	Muslims of north-west and Bengal are nations entitled to self-determination; a separate federation of Muslim provinces should be created.	Clear
99.	1937 (10 July)	M.H. Gazdar	Make a separate federation of the Punjab, Sind, NWFP and Baluchistan.	Clear
100.	1937 (7 August)	Ahmad Yar Daultana	Congress policy may result in the creation of Pakistan.	Clear
101.	1937 (26 September)	Calcutta Muslim League Conference	Create a free Islam within a free India.	Clear
102.	1937 (September)	Punjab Muslim Students Federation and Inter-collegiate Brotherhood of Lahore	Muslim students shall struggle for the creation of Pakistan in the north-west.	Mentioned by A.S. Khurshid
103.	1937 (October)	Ali Jawwad	Partition India on Hindu-Muslim lines.	Quoted by S.S. Pirzada
104.	1937	F.K. Khan Durrani	Muslims are a nation; co-operation with the Congress is impossible.	Clear

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105. 1937 Rahmat Ali Bengal and Assam to constitute a separate Muslim state under the name of Bang-i-Islam. Not clear
106. 1938 (13 October) Sind Muslim League Conference Divide India into a Muslim federation and a Hindu federation. (Disallowed by Jinnah). Clear
107. 1938 (4 November) Abdus Samad Rajisthani NWFP, Sind, Baluchistan, Punjab, United Provinces, Bihar, Bengal and Assam should form a Muslim state. Clear
108. 1938 (end) Jamiluddin Ahmad Divide India into a Muslim and a Hindu federation. Clear
109. 1938 (October-December) Abul Ala Mawdudi Three alternatives:  
(a) India to be an international federation of States of Federated Nations. Clear  
(b) Latif's cultural zones to be converted into autonomous states under a weak centre; exchange of population within 25 years.  
(c) Two separate National Federal States of Hindus and Muslims joined in a confederation.
110. 1938 (November-December) Abdullah Haroon Muslim League is beginning to drift towards demanding a separate federation of Muslim provinces and states. Quoted by K.B. Sayeed

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111. 1938 (5 December) *The Times* Muslims want a Pakistan. Clear
112. 1938 (21 December) *The Times* Muslims are aiming at a Pakistan. Clear
113. 1938 M.Y.Y. Khairati North-west to be a Muslim state called Islamabad. Clear
114. 1938 Majlis-i-Pakistan Founded by the young Muslims of Lahore to propagate and struggle for the fulfilment of the idea of a Muslim state in the north-west. (The Majlis had branches in several towns of the Punjab). Clear
115. 1938 Silsilah-i-Jamiat-i-Vahdat Umam Islam (Turkey) Three independent Muslim states to be created in India: Hyderabad, Bengal and north-west India. Mentioned by Punjabi
116. 1938 S.A. Latif India to have 15 cultural zones, 11 for the Hindus and 4 for the Muslims; each zone to be a state within a loose Indian federation; large-scale transfer of population. Clear
117. 1938 M.A. Jinnah We must have a state of our own. Quoted by Sir Francis Low

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118.	1938	Harry Hodgson	The north-west Muslim India may split off and associate itself with other Muslim countries.	Quoted by Kanji Dworkadas
119.	1939 (29 January)	Abdullah Haroon	We want Pakistan	Clear
120.	1939 (29 January)	A.M. Rashdi	We want Pakistan.	Clear
121.	1939 (10 February)	M.S. Toosi	Create a Muslim state in the north-west and another in Bengal and Assam.	Clear
122.	1939 (21 February)	"Baybak"	Muslims are a nation and should demand their own state.	Quoted by Waheed Qureshi
123.	1939 (22 February)	Gulshan Rai	Create a small Eastern Bengal plus Sylhet; join some parts of the Punjab with NWFP to make a Muslim province.	Clear
124.	1939 (25 February)	A.S. Kheiri	Muslim-majority provinces and states should form a separate federation.	Clear
125.	1939 (early March)	S.A. Latif	A slightly revised version of No. 116.	Clear
126.	1939 (14 & 20 March)	Khaliquzzaman and A.R. Siddiqui	Separate Muslim areas from India and reconstitute them into two federations.	Clear

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127.	1939 (22 March & 4 April)	Asadullah	Create a range of Muslim blocks from the north-west to the north-east; whole of the United Provinces and Bihar to belong to Muslims; Nizam to become ruler of Kashmir and Maharaja of Kashmir to take over Hyderabad; all Muslims from the rest of India to migrate to this Muslim north.	Clear
128.	1939 (24 March)	M.S. Toosi	If Pakistan and Eastern Bengal and Assam are given full autonomous powers and the right of secession they may agree to join an Indian federation for a transitional period.	Clear
129.	1939 (25 March)	Liaquat Ali Khan	Division of India is probable.	Clear
130.	1939 (17 April)	M. Nasim	A division of India is the only solution of the Muslim problem.	Clear
131.	1939 (10 May)	A.M. Rashdi	Muslims want a zone and homeland of their own.	Clear
132.	1939 (20-21 May)	Bindiki Muslim League Conference	Muslims want Pakistan.	
133.	1939 (22 May)	Pakistan Association, Lahore	We want a separate Muslim federation.	Clear

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134. 1939 H. V. Hodson The north-west will possibly split off after British withdrawal. Clear  
(May)
135. 1939 "A Punjabi" India to be a confederation of three federations: Bengal, Indusstan (the north-west) and Hindu India; no exchange of population; the Punjab to be divided. Clear  
(2 July)
136. 1939 Nawab Sir Shah Nawaz Khan of Mamdot India to be a confederation of five federations: Bengal, Indusstan, Hindu India, Hyderabad states, and Rajistan states. (Doubtful if Mamdot suggested this; most probably Punjabi's own amended version of his above scheme). Clear  
(2 July)
137. 1939 Punjab Muslim Students Federation A Muslim state, called "Pakistan Caliphate", to cover Sind, Baluchistan, the Punjab, NWFP, Kashmir and parts of the United Provinces, the Central Provinces and Bihar. Clear  
(16 July)
138. 1939 Sikandar Hayat Khan India to have seven zones, each zone with its own legislature but not executive; the centre to be weak; one-third Muslim share in the federal council of Ministers; native states to enter the federation on an equal footing with the provinces, but the rulers to nominate a portion of state representatives in the zonal legislature; British rule to continue indefinitely. Clear  
(29 July)

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139. 1939 Abdul Wadud Create an independent Muslim state to be called "Eastern Afghanistan". Reported in the press  
(July)
140. 1939 William Barton Muslim League wants a partition; gives details. His own observation  
(July)
141. 1939 Faqir of Ipi Create an independent Muslim state in north India. Reported at second hand in the press  
(9 August)
142. 1939 Two Aligarh Dons Muslims are a separate nation; divide India into three sovereign states: north-west India (or Pakistan), containing the Punjab, NWFP, Sind and Baluchistan; Bengal with the district of Purnea from Bihar and the division of Sylhet from Assam, but excluding the districts of Howrah, Midnapore and Darjeeling; and Hindustan, covering the rest of India; Hyderabad to be a sovereign state; other native states to join the state contiguous to or surrounding them. Clear  
(15 August)
143. 1939 *Star of India* Divide India on religious lines. Clear  
(25 August)
144. 1939 Anwar Bakshi Muslims want their own home. Clear  
(30 August)
145. 1939 Lord Linlithgow If Congress does not behave, Jinnah will break India into two. Quoted by K.M. Munshi  
(August — September)

146.	1939 (28 September)	M.A. Jinnah	Muslim League stands for a "free and independent Islam".	Clear
147.	1939 (September)	M.A. Jinnah	I am coming round to the idea of Pakistan "in spite of myself".	Quoted by I.H. Qureshi
148.	1939 (18 November)	Raja of Mahmudabad	We want Pakistan.	Clear
149.	1939 (24 November)	Liaquat Ali Khan	A division of India is a probability.	Clear
150.	1939 (12 December)	Five Aligarh Dons	Our ideal is free sovereign Muslim states.	Clear
151.	1939 (December)	<i>Round Table</i>	Muslims are moving more and more towards the creation of a Muslim Ulster in India.	Clear
152.	1939 (December)	Stafford Cripps	Some separation of Hindu and Muslim dominions may be necessary; partition would be a necessary part of a new Indian constitution.	Reported by his biographer, Colin Cooke
153.	1939 (December)	N. Mitchell	Punjab, Sind, Baluchistan, NWFP, Bengal and Assam would be separate units in direct relation with the British Crown.	His own observation
154.	1939	Ranjee Shahani	Solve the Indian problem through regionalism.	Clear

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155.	1940 (5 January)	M.S. Toosi	Create independent states in north-east (with a divided Bengal) and north-west (with a divided Punjab).	Clear
156.	1940 (10 January)	Zakaullah Khan	Hindu and Muslim parity at the centre; no division.	Clear
157.	1940 (early)	Azad Subhani	Create a Muslim state under a government to be called Hakumat-i-Rabbani.	Cited by S.S. Pirzada
158.	1940 (early)	Afzal Huq Kashmiri	Create a Muslim state under a government to be called Hakumat-i-Ilahiyya.	Cited by S.S. Pirzada
159.	1940 (early)	Sayyid Rizwanullah	Divide India into several states with some sort of a federal centre.	Cited by S.S. Pirzada
160.	1940 (2 February)	S.M. Akhtar	Territorial separation is the last resort.	Clear
161.	1940 (3 February)	C.R. Reddy	Create a confederation of sovereign provinces and states with a composite confederal executive.	Clear
162.	1940 (3-4 February)	All India Muslim League	The Working Committee opts for a partition of India.	Clear
163.	1940 (February)	Abdullah Haroon	Divide India into two separate federations; the Muslim Federation to comprise the north-western Muslim provinces and Kashmir.	Cited by K.B. Sayced

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164.	1940 (3 March)	Abdullah Haroon	Muslims want partition and their own homelands.	Clear
165.	1940 (8 March)	Zafar Ali Khan	Create a buffer state in the north-west.	Clear
166.	1940 (13 March)	M.A. Jinnah	<p>Informs the Viceroy that the Muslim League will demand a partition if Britain cannot produce an acceptable constitutional solution.</p> <p>Establish a new two-party system, with all parties (including the Muslim League) opposed to the Congress forming one grand coalition.</p>	Clear
167.	1940 (March)	Abdullah Yusuf Ali	A sovereign Hyderabad, to be called Osmanistan, to be added to the Muslim states already suggested by him.	Clear
168.	1940 (22 March)	Rahmat Ali	The Lahore Resolution is introduced at the Lahore annual session.	Clear
169.	1940 (23 March)	All India Muslim League	The Lahore Resolution is adopted at the Lahore annual session.	Clear
170.	1940 (24 March)	All India Muslim League		

The widely-held view that Muslim insecurity took its birth from British attempts to introduce western democracy and majority rule in India is only a partial truth. The implications of the coming of democracy entered the Muslim consciousness very early, as is shown by Sayyid Ahmad Khan's opposition to the introduction of representative institutions and open competitive recruitment of public services. But this was a symbol, not a cause, of Muslim disquiet. As soon as Muslim political power, as embodied in the Mughal court at Delhi, was broken and the revolution confirmed by the establishment of British rule, the Muslims lost no time in warning the new masters of India against the unwisdom and the perils of looking upon all Indians as one people. Sayyid Ahmad was the first to draw British attention to it. Later Ameer Ali did so even more effectively because he wrote in English and had closer and better contacts with the British. Other Muslim spokesmen followed the lead. The assertion received added credence when certain British observers, like Bright and Blunt and Beck and Morison, reached the same conclusion.

### The Idea and Some Historical Assumptions

If this analysis is true, and all the facts assembled in this volume appear to give it life, several things become clear or emerge into a new light. It amounts to a formidable refutation of at least five affirmations which have been made by the critics of an Indian Muslim nationalism and the opponents of Muslim separation. These are: that Muslim separateness was a result of the clever policy of "divide and rule" practised by the British rulers and administrators with a view to prolonging their imperial rule; that the Muslims generally co-operated with the Congress, and the schism appeared later with the coming of more and more reforms; that the Muslim sentiment of separateness was of a much later growth, and could neither be taken as a permanent feature of modern Indian politics nor be anticipated and therefore counteracted in time; that it was only a few Muslim individuals and groups, generally without influence or following, who created this sentiment and fanned it into flame, and that it had no popular support until Jinnah emerged as the supreme Muslim leader; and that the final Muslim demand for separation came as a shock to the Hindus and the British because neither had expected it.

The simple answer to the charge of "divide and rule" is that the Muslims needed no telling by the British that they were separate from the Hindus, and that they had begun to say this before some British administrators might have thought of dividing the communities by deliberate acts of policy. Their past history in India, their religion and their culture were enough to convince the Muslims that nature had meant to set them apart from the Hindus. There was no need to wait for this revelation until a few Englishmen brought it with them from a distant island. The facts that the Hindus alone have propagated this theory and that only those among the British have believed in it who professed to be anti-imperialist in their own country demonstrate that it has been used as a political argument, a weapon of controversy, and not offered as an historical truth. The theory had many excellent uses for the Hindus: it created the comforting illusion that the Muslims were not really different from them, it enabled them to brand all those Muslims who refused to come over to the Congress's side as willing stooges of British imperialism and therefore beneath notice, and it made it easier for them to see in British rule all the evils of a satanic dominion. But these were temporary assurances and made the hour of final realization the more painful. Their fond belief in the theory had blinded them to the strength, even the existence, of Muslim nationalism; and when this nationalism matured and demanded fulfilment they found disillusionment the harder to bear.

In Britain it was the political left—the Communists, Socialists and extreme Liberals—which made it a part of its anti-imperial posture to accept this Hindu-made theory. It gave them a convenient weapon to beat their own empire-builders with. It encouraged them to believe that religion, which most of them regarded as primitive and harmful, was no issue in India (they refused to see the Hindu nature of Indian nationalism), that all Indians were really brothers to one another, and that the unity of India, their very own creation, was safe from any separatist or secessionist threats. They did not notice the glaring contradiction involved in this thought process: in fact their so-called anti-imperialism did not stop them from taking pride in the British creation of a united India; to them there was nothing wrong in attacking British rule in India and at the same time applauding the results of this rule. Disillusionment recognizes no national or racial fron-

tiers. It is a common human experience. When finally the Muslims declared for a Pakistan the British Left was as much shaken as were the Hindus. Long years of fealty to one particular dogma had made it difficult to contemplate the existence of any other possibility. They could have saved themselves the shock had they listened to their Hindu friends less uncritically and observed the ways of Indian life and politics more objectively.

It is a sad thought that human beings are incapable of learning from experience. They create history and record it; they do not pay heed to it. Even today, when the fact of a partitioned India has been before the eyes of the world for so many years, most Hindus and many among the British go on believing that the division of India was an evil, a mischief, a tragedy, a disaster, brought on, at least in part, by British encouragement and instigation.<sup>1</sup> Historical views can be changed and corrected by arguments and facts, but myths continue to stalk the imagination of nations until one day they wake up and find that they had been living in a nightmare.

Many historians paint a long vista of Muslim-Congress co-operation in which agreed demands for reforms stand on one side and a united nationalism on the other. This is an agreeable prospect in which all is peaceful, quiet and pleasing to the eye. There were no major or noticeable differences between the communities. They had common aims. They demanded the same reforms. Their leaders made similar speeches. Their parties passed identical resolutions. All of them were Indians clamouring for more autonomy, more rights, a little more freedom. Ultimately they all wanted independence. But as these demands were fulfilled in easy instalments the Muslims shifted away from the Hindus. Every fresh reform gave a little more scope to communalism. Every step towards democracy made the Muslims a little more anxious. Every move towards majority rule alienated their sympathies from a principle and a system which entrenched a permanent majority in a position of everlasting power.

There is some truth in this argument. Fear of Hindu rule played a very important part in the emergence of Muslim separatism. But to make out this fear as a purely political phenomenon is to misunderstand the Muslim mentality. Political domination of the Hindus was a dreadful prospect. But there were other reasons, too. Hardly any reform was yet in sight when some Muslims began to

assert their separate status. The first major instalment of reforms came in 1909, but several Muslim and British observers had made the Muslim position clear many years before that. Substantial reforms did not come till 1935 and the actual experience of their (partial) operation not till 1937-39, but several proposals for Muslim separation, even schemes of actual partition, had appeared long before that. Even some Hindus had seen the coming divide years before the issue of federation was settled. Had Muslim separatism been caused by the coming of majority rule and by nothing else, there would have been no idea of Pakistan before 1939.

The other part of the assertion is also without foundation. Muslim-Congress co-operation was the rare exception of Indian political life, not the general rule. There are figures to prove that from its inception till the annulment of the partition of Bengal and the early beginning of the Khilafat movement the Congress was almost exclusively a Hindu body, or at the most represented an infinitesimal portion of the Muslims.<sup>2</sup> It was only during the Khilafat days, which in the broadest sense did not cover more than five years, and for some time before that, including the Lucknow Pact, that the Congress and the Muslim League may be said to have co-operated with each other. In all, and by a liberal reckoning, this comes to about ten years of friendly co-existence in a total period of 62 years (if we come up to independence) or 55 (if we stop at 1940). It must be emphasized that this was co-existence, and neither union nor unity. Even during the most friendly years, when emotion and enthusiasm overtook both sides, when slogans like *Hindu Muslim bhai bhai* (Hindus and Muslims are brothers) sat on all lips, and when fanatical Hindu leaders like Swami Shardhananda were invited to speak from the pulpit of mosques, the Muslim League did not merge itself in the Congress. Not only that. Even those Muslims who were best disposed towards the Congress did not join it, but organized themselves in separate parties, like the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Hind and the All India Khilafat Conference, which worked quite independently of the Congress and frequently made declarations opposing or criticizing its policies. At Lucknow the Muslim League met the Congress at a perfectly equal footing and the two parties made a pact, like two nations entering into an agreement or two states signing a treaty. Purists might well hesitate to call it even by the name of co-

operation. It was more of a marriage of convenience, a coming together of old enemies, to exploit the advantages of time and harass the British. Verbal recrimination and violent bloodshed in which the co-operation ended would support the purists.

Nor is it true to say that the Muslims and the Congress had common aims or wanted the same reforms at the same speed. Muslims wanted separate representation in all elected bodies through separate and exclusive electoral colleges. The Congress opposed it throughout its life, with the single exception of the Lucknow Pact when it struck a bargain with the League. Muslims demanded an adequate share in the public services. The Congress opposed it without exception. Muslims welcomed the partition of Bengal. The Congress stood against it and did not rest till it had been annulled. Muslims claimed special protection of their religious and cultural rights. The Congress refused to satisfy them, and when acts passed by the British parliament accepted some claims it condemned the concessions as deliberate imperial moves to pamper the minority at the expense of the majority. Muslims wanted a loose federation; the Congress was bent upon having a strong centre, even if attempts to have it would destroy their cherished goal of a united India. Muslims desired to have effective governments of their own in their provinces. The Congress answered it by enumerating the evils of narrow communalism. The list is unending, but enough has been said to show that on every substantial point of policy, aspirations, aims and programme the Congress stood against Muslim wishes. This not only broke Muslim confidence, if they ever had any, in Congress promises and professions, but encouraged the rise of separatism. When the lack of trust between a majority and a minority reaches such proportions and touches such depths, the minority is bound to let its thoughts run towards revolutionary solutions. The idea of Pakistan was the solution which promised to settle the majority-minority question once and for all.

There is no need to say much about the third assertion, viz., that the idea of separation entered Indian politics very late, and therefore by the time it appeared there was nothing much that anybody could do about it. It was certainly not of recent growth. From 1867 till 1888 Sayyid Ahmad Khan was delivering the principles on which later politicians were to build the two-nation theory. The idea of Pakistan is implicit in statements like these:



Hindus and Muslims are two nations which will never unite in achieving anything, one of these nations must conquer the other as the two cannot remain equal. India is not fit for representative institutions because it is made up of many nationalities, India is not a nation and can never become one, the Congress cannot speak for the Muslims, if the Muslims join the Congress they will make themselves the slaves of another nation. In 1888 the *Rafique-i-Hind* declared that Muslims were a separate nation and would never allow themselves to be dominated by the other nation, the Hindus. In 1890 Sharar called for a territorial re-arrangement of India so that Hindus and Muslims inhabited separate districts. Durrani recalled that Muslims were dreaming of a partition with exchange of population in as far back as 1916. In 1917 the Khelri brothers proposed a division of India. In 1920 Bilgrami claimed specific areas for separate Muslim states, and told Gandhi that no other solution would satisfy the Muslims. During the years of the Khilafat movement, when Hindu-Muslim accord and friendship are said to have been beyond doubt, there were at least seven Muslim proposals for some kind of re-distribution or partition, one of them by no less a person than Muhammad Ali, a great admirer of Gandhi and a president of the Congress. In this very period of communal amity two prominent Hindus, Parmanand and Lajpat Rai, made definite suggestions for a division of India. After that, of course, the separationists came rushing in. With these statements, declarations and schemes on record, it is difficult to accept the claim that the idea of Pakistan emerged rather late and all of a sudden, and came as a surprise to the Hindus and the British. History should not be falsified in order to excuse Hindu and British inability to take the Muslim claims seriously.

Had the sentiment of separatism been identified and acknowledged as an important facet of Indian politics, there was much that could have been done. Muslim claims for special treatment and for the recognition of their separate identity within the Indian milieu could have been met with better grace and perhaps greater success. The Congress did not take notice of them, believing, wrongly, that this would damage its image as the only repository of Indian nationalism. The British met them to some extent, but generally their policies and decisions were half hearted, tardy and inadequate. There was no point in pleading that Muslim wishes were unknown or vague. They were embodied in the annual

resolutions of the Muslim League and other Muslim parties, spelt out most clearly during the several conversations, talks, exchanges of correspondence and negotiations between the Muslims and the Hindus and the British, repeatedly put before the Round Table Conference, and, at the last stage, laid down in a number of non-separationist proposals like those of Latif and Sikandar. There seemed to be no insuperable difficulties in meeting them, provided that they were met in time. Had the Hindus genuinely wanted an agreement with the Muslims, without insisting on a regimented uniformity, by accepting the plural character of the Indian society, and had they not made a fetish of the principle of majority rule, a united India might have been possible. Had the British not been over-anxious to please the majority by forcing the purest version of western democracy upon a heterogeneous land like India, and had they not sacrificed Muslim interests for the sake of maintaining an imaginary unity of India engendered by their presence, they might have solved the Indian problem at the right time and on the right lines.

But as both the Hindus and the British believed or pretended to believe that there was nothing much that anybody could do about the idea of separation, they chose to oppose it. Opposition is generally a negative course of action, but it can easily degenerate into positive hostility. By opposing the idea, the British were taking sides in the Indian political fight. In this sense the opposition was disastrous for British reputation: it broke the Muslim faith in their promises of protecting the minorities (just as the settlement of 1947 broke the Princes' faith in their written treaties and undertakings relating to paramountcy). The opposition was disastrous in another sense, too. It did not solve the Indian or the Muslim problem. India presented exceptional difficulties to all parties interested in her future. The special problems involved should have drawn everybody's attention to possibilities of a special kind. To oppose or reject an idea simply because it was new or ran counter to certain presumptions was to make the problem more intractable.

The fourth claim—that separatist tendencies were confined to a few Muslims, and that the idea of Pakistan was not worth a glance until Jinnah came on the scene and made it popular and powerful—will not stand scrutiny if the information brought together in this book is correct. Even if they be regarded as nothing more than

broad hints, the assertions, declarations, proposals and schemes totalling 170 in 82 years cannot be wished away. Even if only a few persons continue to harp on a certain solution over such a long period, statesmanship and political sagacity should not be blind to its potentialities. It is true that no Indian political party officially endorsed the idea before 1940. It is also true that it did not feature on the manifesto of any major group. But ideas do not depend on the goodwill of a party. They make and unmake parties; parties do not make or unmake them. The idea of Pakistan created a new Muslim League after 1940, a League so new that it had little in common with the old organization except its title. Ideas do not grow in parties; they have their being among the people. They come from reformists, intellectuals, scholars, people who think about issues and do not need a platform to make their opinions known. Rahmat Ali had no platform at his disposal, and yet the idea he floated and the name he gave it had so great an appeal that Jinnah was forced, against his will, to accept both.

The idea of Pakistan came from many directions. One man here threw out a vague hint. Another there made a veiled suggestion. Somebody else repeated it and passed it on. A few more came to know of it and made their contribution by amplifying it, broadening it, announcing it in an obscure journal or putting it in a letter to the press. A few intellectuals got together, pondered over the problem, and reached the same conclusion. Some students made themselves into a group and undertook to propagate it among their colleagues. And so it grew, almost imperceptibly, generally among the intellectual classes, often among the youth who were less shackled by conventional thinking, sometimes among the masses when a newspaper opened its columns to it. Nobody can say when it became a popular sentiment, for nobody can define "popular" with scientific precision. There is little doubt that by the mid-thirties it was exerting considerable influence on the Muslims of northern India. Some politicians had acknowledged its existence; a few had surrendered to its power. Yet no party had owned it, though several knew of its popular appeal. If observers of political developments wait until an idea has become a demand, they will always be out of date. Public sentiment is an integral part of political life. To ignore it on the ground that no party has written it into its constitution is to see the husk for the reality.

The claim is also open to assault from another angle. If the Hindus and the British ignored the idea in its earlier stages because it was put forward by a few persons only, did they give it serious attention after Jinnah had put his name and party behind it and made it the declared objective of a nation? The answer is an unmistakable and tragic "no". The Congress persisted in its usual course of dismissing Muslim demands by a laugh or a sneer. Gandhi called it a "falsehood", and thought that he had left the problem behind him. Jawaharlal Nehru could not bring himself to believe that Muslims really wanted separation, not even after the 1945-46 elections in which the Pakistan vote was something like 80% of the Muslim electorate; he still thought that the Muslims did not realize what they were doing, and therefore their demand could be ignored. British opinion took it even less seriously, in spite of the views and warnings and prognostications of people like Morison and Coatman and at least one Secretary of State for India. It looked at it as a passing phase, a bargaining counter, an impracticable dream, a primitive solution, a fanatical scheme, but scarcely as an alternative proposal or the demand of a people who had a right to make it. It was considered to be such a silly suggestion that at least two reputable journals (*Manchester Guardian* and *New Statesman*) asked the government to hand over power in the sub-continent to the Congress and leave it to deal with the Muslims, and several members of parliament were horrified at the prospect of a divided India.

All this took place, not in the early 'forties when the strength of the Muslim League could have been doubted because of the absence of elections, but towards the end of British rule when the will of the Muslims was known to everyone. One is driven to the conclusion that it was no more than an excuse to say that the idea came too late to warn the Hindus and the British of the urgency and gravity of the Muslim problem. The time factor is irrelevant. It is a question of intentions. For reasons given in previous pages, neither the Hindus nor the British were prepared to tolerate, approve or accept the idea of Pakistan. The argument that they did not realize its importance is a piece of special pleading which is not only false but does them little credit.

The answer to the fifth assertion—that the Pakistan demand came as a surprise to the Hindus and the British—has been partly given in the foregoing paragraphs. Anyone with his eyes open to

the Indian political scene should have anticipated the demand without any call upon his powers of divination. A current was flowing in Muslim politics in a certain direction, and had been flowing for decades. It was bound to hit the shore one day, and that day was approaching fast. By mid-'thirties the outcome was clearly visible. The Lahore Resolution came late, rather than early. If it astonished everyone except the Muslims, the cause must be found in the ignorance of the observers rather than in the precipitancy of the Muslims.

### Early Origins: The 19th Century

Apart from the total number of proposals for the whole period, a break-up of the period into decades and the number and character of the proposals made in each 10-year unit of time show interesting results. Considering the entire period of 82 years (1858-1940), only 15 proposals came in the 42 years of the 19th century, while 155 were made in the 40 years of the 20th.

The relatively small number of the proposals of the 19th century should not mislead us into underrating the significance of their contents. Out of the 15, nine were by Indian Muslims; and among these, while only two suggested a partition, all the remaining seven were explicit in arguing the separationist case by expounding the two-nation theory and declaring Muslim resolve not to be ruled by the Hindus.

Sayyid Ahmad Khan is the outstanding figure in this period, not only because he repeated these assertions on behalf of the Muslims, but also because he was a pioneer and had immense influence on the Muslim mind. This was decidedly the Sayyid age in modern Muslim history; the only other period that matches its revolutionary fervour and far-reaching results is that of 1940-47 when Jinnah formulated and achieved the Pakistan ideal. There are no definite and clear schemes of partition in this period; nor could there have been any. Before Muslims could come to demand physical separation, they had first to convince themselves and others of their spiritual and national separation. The theory of two nations and the idea of a separate Muslim nationalism were to be propounded before a territorial division could be claimed. The 19th century was thus the seed-time of the idea of Pakistan. The idea was not yet there, but all the forces which were to create,

develop and shape it were being marshalled, ordered and strengthened. Once this had been done by the Aligarh movement, by Ameer Ali's efforts to strengthen the fibre of Islamic thought and practice, by the stirring of the national memory of a proud past, by the creation of an urge to recapture that past, and by the Hindu nature and background of the various Indian nationalist movements—the appearance of the idea was only a matter of time. The foundations had been laid. The Aligarh school had done its work well. It is a distinguishing mark of Sayyid Ahmad Khan's movement that he achieved his limited (but pregnant) goals outside the political arena. By keeping the Muslims away from politics he gave them an opportunity for organization, self-discipline and self-examination. A long, deep inward look was necessary before plunging into the stormy waters of practical politics. The risks and perils of politics would have less terror if first the objectives were determined and the directions of movement mapped out. Muslims must be sure in their mind what they were and where they wanted to go. This was the wise counsel of the Sayyid and the Muslims did well to heed it. Preparation gave confidence, and confidence solved many difficulties and avoided many pitfalls.

Sayyid Ahmad and his colleagues must have been elated by the confirmation that their ideas received from the outside sources. John Bright did not believe in the future possibility of a united India. Blunt favoured the establishment of a Muslim government in the north, leaving the south to the Hindus. Jamaluddin, as the myth ran, went still further in proposing a Muslim state in the north-west which also encompassed Afghanistan and Muslim Central Asia. Sayyid Ahmad Khan was not yet ready to go all the way with these prophets of partition. But they must have brought him deep satisfaction and a warm, pleasurable feeling that he was leading his people towards a path which would prove neither perilous nor arduous.

### A Decade-by-Decade Analysis: 1901-1940

With the coming of the 20th century we can concentrate on shorter periods, taking up each decade and exploring what it contributed to the development of the idea.



## 1901-1910

The years 1901 to 1910 are the most unproductive in the history of the idea. There are only three items to be considered; all issue from uncertain sources and without details. The only significant point is that we meet the first Hindu who wanted a partition of India (Bhai Parmanand), but lack of detail makes the encounter frustratingly brief.

The aridness of this decade is not a little puzzling. In the early history of Muslim practical politics these ten years were undoubtedly the most important. The huge presidency of Bengal was divided in 1905, thus giving the Muslims a new province with an overwhelming majority. In 1906 the Simla deputation demanded and won from the Viceroy the vital concessions of separate electorates and weighted representation. In the same year the All India Muslim League was founded and the age of politics began. In 1909 the Morley-Minto reforms confirmed the victory of the Simla deputation. Each of these developments was a milestone in the political history of modern Muslim India. In no other period, except the last five years of British rule, did things happen at such a bewildering speed. And yet not a single Muslim came out with a proposal for partitioning the country, or did anything else to further the idea of Pakistan. (Akbar Allahabadi's reported plan is too vague to count for much). Can we explain this silence?

Part of the answer lies in the continuing influence of Sayyid Ahmad and his school. It is true that his admonition to eschew politics was now rejected on the plea that changed circumstances made it obsolete. But his other advice still held good. Muslims should not demand anything until they had examined all its aspects and implications. The two-nation theory was still in the process of striking root in Muslim consciousness. It had to go deeper before the tender plant came to the bud.

Another factor which inhibited the Muslims from making any revolutionary suggestion was the general conviction that the British were dependable friends of the minorities, and that therefore, at least during the tenure of their rule, Muslims had little to fear for their future. If the partition of Bengal had been an earnest of this friendship, the official acquiescence in the grant of separate electorates had been the favour which sealed it. Minorities under colonial rule are apt to magnify the kindnesses received,

and read too much in the favours bestowed upon them by foreign rulers. In their obsession of the fear of the majority any protective measure gives them much aid and comfort. This may be a short-sighted policy, but that is how the mind of the minority works. Muslims were thus reassured by the sympathy of the powers that were and therefore, for a time, they did not allow their thoughts to wander along the path of separation. It would be wrong to deduce from this that they had ceased to believe in the two-nation theory or lost faith in their separate identity. They had merely postponed the further development of their beliefs because the march of events did not sound a signal of alarm.

Viewed from a different angle, however, this decade represented a logical development of what had been said and thought in the 19th century. A truer interpretation of these years might be that Muslims were now reaping the harvest sown by the Sayyid Ahmad and Ameer Ali schools of thought. It was indeed the hour of fruit gathering. They had claimed to be a separate entity with no wish to be ruled by the Hindus. Now Bengal had been split up to create a new province which they could, more confidently, call their own. They had given themselves the title of a separate nation. Now they had a political party of their own devoted to upholding their national cause. They had said that, being a separate people, they could have no confidence in those who pretended to represent them but were not from amongst themselves. Now the system of separate electorates had met this objection, and ensured that they would be represented by their own people elected by them through exclusive colleges. Seen in this light, all political and constitutional steps taken in this decade seem to be an extension of the idea of Pakistan. Separation was no more a mere theory or a dogma. It had become a reality with the foundation of the Muslim League. Political separation of a kind had been acknowledged by no less an authority than the imperial parliament, the ultimate repository of all sanctions and the final bestower of all favours.

This does not mean that the task of providing a philosophical defence of the sentiment of separatism was neglected or considered unnecessary. League resolutions and annual addresses continued to argue the cause, particularly when they dealt with the controversy about separate electorates. Among the theorists Ameer Ali stood out as the most perceptive, persuasive and influential writer. His reasoning was without blemish because it came from a judicial

brain of long training; his knowledge was deep because it was rooted in his extended and varied Indian experience; and his influence was wide because of his high position, his close contacts in the British governing classes, and his standing as a scholar and historian. The Aga Khan came into prominence at this time as the foremost spokesman of the Muslim case. Though intellectually no match for Ameer Ali, his influence was greater than the latter's because no door, however august, was closed to him, and many among the high and mighty were his intimate friends. Both Ameer Ali and the Aga Khan continued the work of Sayyid Ahmad in stressing the Muslim feeling of separateness to the uttermost limit, short only of demanding a partition. They frequently referred to the Muslims as a "nation" or a "nationality", and pointed to the impossibility of applying the principle of western democratic theory to the heterogeneous and diverse British Indian empire.

A like lesson was being taught by a very different kind of body of persons. Sayyid Ahmad had established the All India Muhammadan Educational Conference which met in a different city every year and strove to protect, advance and consolidate the cultural interests of the Muslims. It continued to be lively after his death, and played a leading part in strengthening the cultural basis of Muslim nationalism. By persuading the traditional-minded Muslims to send their daughters to school, by opening new Muslim schools and madrasahs, by extracting from the government more financial aid for Muslim educational institutions, by fighting for the use, purity and spread of the Urdu language, the Conference did much to unite the Muslims, awaken them to their cultural heritage, and create among them a powerful national spirit.<sup>3</sup> It was not an accident that the decision to establish the Muslim League was taken at a meeting of this Conference, and for many years the same leaders guided the deliberations of both organizations. If culture is admitted to be one of the important factors in the making of nationalism, then the activities and achievements of the Conference in this decade must be counted as a major contribution to the development of the idea of separation. All those who later demanded partition made the cultural future of the Muslims one of their main arguments, while some who could not bring themselves to suggest a divided India (like Latif of Hyderabad) still insisted on demarcating the country into cultural zones.

## 1911-1920

In the next decade, 1911-20, the movement towards partition began earnestly. In these ten years there were 17 proposals in all, 9 of them by Indian Muslims of which 5 were for a clear partition. The trend towards separation is unmistakable. It is paradoxical that this should have happened in a decade which saw the beginning of a Congress-Muslim League alliance and the signing of the Lucknow Pact. But this can be explained.

In the first place, the accumulative effect of the teachings of Sayyid Ahmad and his Aligarh band, Ameer Ali and his Central National Muhammadan Association, and other early spokesmen of Muslim separatism was now beginning to show. The two-nation theory was generally accepted, though no political group had yet put its allegiance to it in so many words. In the second place, the developments of the previous decade had not only confirmed the Muslim's faith in his separateness but also encouraged him to believe that the next step was not impossible of achievement. The establishment of the Muslim League and the winning of separate electorates were looked upon as sure endorsements of his claim to a separate status. The partition of Bengal and the British refusal to annual it in the teeth of Hindu opposition had whetted his appetite for a clear demarcation of Muslim provinces and the establishment therein of an effective Muslim rule. In the third place, the fanaticism, violence and religious character of the Hindu agitation against the partition of Bengal had removed his last, lingering doubts about the impossibility of a *rapprochement* with the Hindus. If the Hindus could launch a savage campaign against the creation of a province with a comfortable Muslim majority, what would they not do to stop the Muslims from enjoying an honourable and secure place in a free India where there would be no imperial power to contend with? In all these respects the significance of the incidents and decisions of the previous decade was now making itself felt among the Muslims.

This legacy of the immediate past would have been enough to drive the Muslims further into the arms of separation; but the present, too, came full of ominous signs and portents.

The decade opened on a shattering note. The partition of Bengal was repealed in December 1911, in spite of all the official assurances given to the Muslims that it would stand and all the

official warnings to the Hindus that no amount of violence or agitation would unsettle the "settled fact". The Muslims saw in the decision an act of gross betrayal, a testimony to the power of the bomb, and a demonstration of the unreliability of British promises. In one unfortunate stroke the carefully nurtured trust in the British word was blown to pieces. The Muslims learned a valuable lesson: never again to lean upon imperial support in matters of national interest.

A re-thinking of political issues became inevitable. So far the Muslims had depended upon the "impartial" outsider for protection against the designs of a hostile majority. Now that this protection was withdrawn, the search for a new solution became urgent. Hence the five definite proposals for partitioning India. But before the whole nation committed itself to such a revolutionary goal, a new experiment could be tried. A minority is always acting on a trial and error basis. There were three parties to the Indian problem. Being a minority which was yet unable to stand by itself, Muslims could ally themselves either with one party or the other. The British had been tried and found wanting. Now the other possibility of trying the Hindus could be tested. The result was a Congress-League alliance and the Lucknow Pact.

This move towards a temporary peace with the Hindus was facilitated by two other developments which appeared in the middle years of the decade. One was the expectation of another instalment of reforms. As British friendship was now considered to be a weak reed, the Muslims decided to join with the Hindus in preparing a joint charter of demands. It was hoped that a concerted effort might extract more from the imperial dispenser of favours than separate attempts by each community. The outcome was the Lucknow Pact and the Congress-League scheme of reforms. The Pact should therefore be seen more as a joint conference to hammer out agreed constitutional proposals than as a political union.

The second development which drew the Muslims and the Hindus together was the Turkish and Khilafat issues. The outbreak of hostilities in the Balkans was a signal of warning. British refusal to come to the aid of their former ally, Turkey, was interpreted by the Muslims as one more proof of their anti-Muslim policy. When the war broke out in Europe and Turkey chose to side with Germany, Muslim anxiety turned sharper and the burden of divid-

ed loyalties became unbearable. By the end of the war the question of the future of the Ottoman Empire and the Khalifa was made a burning issue by the defeat of Turkey and the contradictory statements of policy falling from the lips of Lloyd George, the British prime minister. In this predicament the Muslims welcomed Hindu sympathy, just as the Hindus used it to bring the Muslims into the mainstream of Indian nationalism.

Thus we see that there were a number of cross-currents flowing in this decade. The motives of each party were a tangle of contradictions, shifting positions, search for allies, new goals, thinly-disguised rivalries, and anxiety about the future. The outstanding event was the estrangement between the Muslims and the British, with the major consequence that a new experiment of Hindu-Muslim fellowship was put into operation. Generally historians have drawn an over-optimistic picture of these years, emphasizing the new *rapprochement* and ignoring the still existing differences. They have not cared to bring out the strictly provisional and tentative character of the alliance or the sharpness and importance of the differences which lay submerged, but not a long way below the surface. They have attached too much importance to the Lucknow agreement and too little to the expediency and the unexpected circumstances which gave birth to it. Above all, they have failed to explain, often even to notice, the continuing Muslim conviction in their separate destiny throughout these halcyon years of friendship and communal amity. History will take on a more correct perspective if we remember that during these very years there were several Muslim expressions of exclusive nationalism and a few of definite separation. Such statements indicate that the Muslim sentiment of separatism had by now become so much a part of their life and thought that it could not be curtailed or overwhelmed by all the enthusiasm engendered by communal peace and political co-operation.

1921-1930

This reading of the years 1911-20 gains support from what happened in the next decade, 1921-30. In the latter period the total number of separationist assertions and proposals jumps to 30 (as compared to 17 in the previous decade). Twenty-one of them were made by Indian Muslims, and ten of these argued for a clear



partition of India. Three other features mark this period. Some Hindus, too, were now coming round to appreciate the virtues or uses of Muslim separation. Two of them made definite suggestions for dividing India on religious basis; one of them even naming the territories to be handed over to the Muslims. Secondly, we now find some British newspapers reporting Muslim plans for separating themselves from India into a separate state. Thirdly, for the first time, some Muslims begin to use the term "homeland" for the areas they should like to see separated and allotted to them.

Evidently the trend of opinion in favour of separation was fast becoming a swing. We do not have to go far in search of what caused the movement. The explanation is more straightforward and simple than in the case of earlier decades.

The major development was Muslim disillusionment with the experiment of friendship with the Hindus. This had been tried after they had found the British to be bad friends. But the new ally turned out to be equally faithless. The hectic Khilafat movement had banded the two communities together, but it was a friendship of convenience, not a meeting of hearts. The moment the Turkish crisis was over, old enmities reappeared in unparalleled virulence, and throughout the rest of the decade India experienced communal riots on an unprecedented scale. The toll of life and property was high. Hopes of another peace dimmed and soon disappeared beyond recall. One Indian was at the throat of another, and a civil war was averted by the presence of foreign bayonets. The terror of the common man engulfed the politicians, and all the concordats and treaties of friendship were buried under the smoke and debris of communal frenzy. People were quick to see that this was not a passing phase, not a temporary insanity, but a reversion to the old dispensation.

This was to be the last disillusionment for Muslim politicians. So far they had resisted the call of separation and left its expression to the intellectuals, the newspapermen and others. Now they began to lend a more sympathetic ear to such words. Some of them, like Muhammad Ali and Hasrat Mohani, came out with plans which fell only a little short of complete partition. This is significant because both were old Congressmen, both had been in the front rank of the campaign for a Hindu-Muslim co-operation, and both had for long believed in the sincerity of the Congress leaders. Their change of opinion was ominous for the unity of India,

for if such consistent friends of the Hindus could now find no hope in a united India, the common Muslim, who was already thinking of separation, was bound to look upon partition as the only solution.

The Muslims found much in Hindu politics to strengthen their faith in an ultimate division, and to encourage them to redouble their efforts to achieve it. The appointment and visit of the Simon Commission showed up the divergence between Hindus and Muslims. Though the Muslim League was split on the question of co-operating with the Commission, it was soon re-united under the shock of the Nehru Committee recommendations. If the Nehru Report embodied the maximum concessions that the Congress and other non-Muslim parties could make to the Muslims, it followed that the Indian problem could not be solved on the basis of a Hindu-Muslim agreement. Differences were not on details or percentages, but on fundamental principles. The Report deprived the Muslims of separate electorates. The protection of minority interests that it promised was not only inadequate but failed to match the provisions of the current constitution. On the larger question of the shape of the future constitution it rejected Muslim views in a language which ruled out compromise or agreement. The Muslim demand for a loose federation with a weak centre was riposted with a close federation with a strong centre. It answered the Muslim plea for leaving the residue with the provinces with a contrary recommendation. In short, it made it plain that in a free India the Muslims would be a helpless minority at the centre, and their provinces would be at the mercy of a powerful Hindu federal centre.

The Congress had shown its hand, and it held nothing for the Muslims. The Hindu concept of friendship was the same as the British. Muslims had now tried both avenues of escape and found them leading to servitude. The problem of the majority-minority had to be solved by themselves in their own way, not by the majority or by the one-day-to-depart rulers. If no friends were available, they would rather stand on their feet and fight out their battle as best as they could. This was the signal lesson they learnt in this decade, and it explains the large number of separatist proposals made and the high proportion of those which suggested a clear division of the country.

The three features of the decade, to which a brief reference

was made above, attest to the changing and changed mood of Muslim India. Hindu proposals for a partition of "mother India" were unexpected, but they bore out the truth of the Muslim contention that under no conditions would the Hindus agree to share power with them. They would prefer a disintegration of India to any weakening of Hindu rule over as much area as possible. Even the unity of India was not a big enough prize for trying to reach an agreement with the Muslims. Lajpat Rai's argument made it clear that India was for the Hindus and Hindus alone, and that if the Muslims could not make themselves a part and parcel of "Indian nationalism" it was good for India if they left it. No more cogent support for the Muslim case for separation could have come from a Hindu.

It was also a sign of the diffusion and strength of Muslim sentiment that now the world was taking notice of it. *The Times* report of Muslim resolve to have a state of their own in the north or north-west reflected the widely-held opinion that circumstances and pressures had closed every other alternative route to security. The fact that the newspaper's correspondent felt it worth his while to report this in his dispatch shows that separation had become an issue with which the British ought to be made familiar. Had the account appeared in a Muslim newspaper, it could have been dismissed as propaganda. In a Hindu journal it could have been taken as a warning to the Hindus against Muslim plans of disrupting India. But in a British newspaper of *The Times'* standing and general accuracy it meant that the existence of a new dimension in the Indian problem had been acknowledged.

The clarity and precision which the idea of Pakistan took on in this decade are demonstrated in the birth of a new terminology. In the closing years of this period we find certain separationists using the word "homeland" for the Muslim state they are proposing. This is indicative of an important development in the theory of two nations. Earlier exponents of separation had argued that it would solve the communal problem or save the Muslims from a permanent Hindu rule. But here is a new conception of "homeland", with the obvious implications that India as such is not their home and that the nation wants a home of its own. In the decade that followed Rahmat Ali was to employ the same word to demand Pakistan, and after 1940 Jinnah was to make it a slogan in the Pakistan campaign. With the arrival of this word, and the

concept that lay behind it, the two-nation theory came to its logical conclusion and the separationists reached the end of their argument. The case was now complete.

### 1931-1940

The last decade in our story, 1931-40 (shortened by nine months, as we stop on 24 March), produced 105 items in all: 66 of them by Indian Muslims, 33 of which proposed a clear partition. The huge number of reports and plans proves that the idea of separation had at last attained maturity. It was the period of picking up loose ends and knotting them into the fabric. The arguments were refined, objections were answered, some more witnesses were brought forward to testify. These developments show seven distinct features.

First, and this was without doubt the most important, a name was given to the state (or rather one of the states) demanded by the Muslims. This was entirely the achievement of one man: Rahmat Ali. The idea grew out of many minds, and it is impossible to single out any one individual as *the* originator, but the credit of giving it a name decidedly belongs to Rahmat Ali. The significance of this step should not be underrated. Slogans are a vital part of political and national movements. They symbolize the national demand. They are politics in the shorthand. They summarize the whole idea which a people or a movement is pursuing. The adoption of the word meant that, instead of talking about separation, division, partition, secession, creation of an independent state, etc., etc., Muslims could now communicate the entire gamut of their wishes and aspirations by mentioning one word, "Pakistan". It facilitated the spread of the idea. The popular, unsophisticated mind accepted a name far more easily than it did an abstract concept. The newspapers found it a nice word to go into the headlines. Processionists and demonstrators could chant and shout it to make their meaning clear. Above all, the sentiment, the movement, the goal, could now be called by a name which did not create confusion. The Hindus wanted freedom. So did the Muslims. But their concepts of freedom were different. The Hindus wanted freedom from British rule. The Muslims wanted freedom as much from British as from Hindu rule. It is difficult to put such distinctions into slogans and short phrases. Slogans do

not explain or propound or elaborate: they sum up the demand, they evoke a whole picture, they recreate an entire scene. Now it became possible for the Muslims to put across their demand and everything associated with it by pronouncing one word. This was, indeed, a great step forward. It gave the masses a definite goal to fight for. By heightening the popular appeal of the idea it might also have helped to remove the doubts of many Muslim politicians who stood on the brink, unable to make up their minds.

Secondly, this period saw the swift spread of the idea among the Muslims of northern India and especially the young and the educated community. Several factors combined to bring this about: the appeal of the name "Pakistan", the enthusiasm aroused by Rahmat Ali among the students who came in contact with him in Britain, the great influence of Iqbal, the publicity provided by the Urdu newspapers of Lahore, the tendency among the youth to take up radical ideas and thus keep themselves several steps ahead of the more circumspect politicians, and the zeal and organizational ability of the student leaders in the north-west, particularly in the Punjab. The knowledge that the Muslim League leaders were in two minds and apparently unable to take a final decision about the future of Muslim India must have acted as a spur to the efforts of the students. By working a little harder, by diffusing the idea a little wider, by moulding the public opinion a little more, they might succeed in convincing the reluctant politicians that there was no alternative to Pakistan. Of course, there were other pressures too working on politicians; but no party which was in the process of regenerating itself and in search of a permanent solution could ignore the will of the youth. Jinnah always listened to the voice of the young with attention and affection, and this must have encouraged the students to redouble their efforts. The taking over of the idea by the young compensated for the failure of any political party to adopt it officially in the 'thirties. This explains the remarkable phenomenon of an idea being upheld, propagated and popularized without any party giving it formal backing. It also explains the immense strength of the League in the 'forties: the general conversion had taken place *before* the League owned the idea. Those who were puzzled and astounded by the loyalty commanded by Jinnah (once he had accepted the Pakistan idea) had apparently failed to keep an eye on the Muslim mind in the 'thirties.

The third development was that areas outside the north-west began to enter Muslim calculations. So far there had been two kinds of suggestions: a general and vague one for dividing the country between Hindus and Muslims, and a specific and definite one for creating a Muslim state in the north-west. Only the second proposal had so far received adequate attention. But now consideration began to be given to the Muslim majority in the north-east. Gradually Bengal, with the whole or parts of Assam, began to take shape as a second Muslim state or federation. Its designation was still confused. Some did not give it a separate name and, by implication, included it in the wider concept of Pakistan. Some called it Bengal and reserved the name Pakistan for the north-western state. Only one, Rahmat Ali, thought of a different name for it: Bang-i-Islam and later Bangistan. But this was a minor detail. The important point is that the separationist outlook widened so as to provide for the freedom of the large mass of Muslims living in the north-east. At least six schemes expounded in this period went even further and embraced Hyderabad. Though an independent dominion of the Nizam was not to form a portion of Pakistan, it was somehow considered a part of Muslim heritage in the sub-continent, an historical centre of Muslim culture, which should not be allowed to revert to Hindu control. Probably this demand was not serious, but it showed that the idea of Pakistan was being stretched to provide shelter to as many Muslims as was possible.

This brings us to the next characteristic of the decade, which was the interest aroused in the future of the Muslims living in Hindu-majority areas or provinces. So far little thought had been given to this problem, perhaps because partition had seemed a remote possibility. Now that the idea of Pakistan was gaining strength and specific proposals were being made, it was realized that the establishment of one or more Muslim states was bound to leave a large number of Muslims in Hindu hands. No matter where the lines of division were drawn, all Indian Muslims could not be saved from Hindu domination. It speaks well of the realistic approach of the separationists that they did not try to run away from this predicament. It was a difficult and sensitive issue, and could arouse deep emotions among the Muslims who would be left behind. Some of the scheme-makers were frank enough to say it plainly that nothing practicable could be done about them, and the best course was to concentrate on achieving the possible instead



of chasing the impossible. Some others believed that the Hindus living in Pakistan would serve as hostages for the good treatment of the Indian Muslims by the Hindu majority. A few, like the Aligarh dons, made specific recommendations for the future protection of these people, though the arrangements raised the knotty problem of guarantees. Rahimat Ali alone went forth to save the entire *millat*, but the creation of several national strongholds by which he proposed to achieve this was impracticable. Durrani prescribed a different remedy, but one equally impossible: a re-conquest of India by Islam and the establishment of an Islamic empire over the whole sub-continent. Whatever the merits of the several proposals, it was obvious that the problem of the future of the Muslims of Hindu areas was agitating the Muslim mind, and means were being explored to solve it.

These years also witnessed a debate among the Muslims themselves on the uses and virtues of separation. There were people who genuinely believed that a partition would neither solve the Muslim problem nor protect Muslim interests. Some pointed out that the projected Muslim states would be too small and weak to be viable; others said that the existence of large non-Muslim minorities in Pakistan would not allow the Muslim state(s) to be really Islamic or even Muslim; still others argued that the creation of separate Muslim state(s) would seal the fate of the Muslim minority in Hindu India. There were some, like Latif and Sikandar, who were of the view that Muslim interests could be secured to their satisfaction through a loose Indian federation or some sort of confederal arrangements. The separationist reply to all these arguments was that the confidence of the Muslims in the Hindus was so completely and irrevocably gone that no sharing of power, however finely demarcated, was possible, that the Muslims were so different from the Hindus in every way that it was for the good of each community to tread the path of its own destiny, that being a separate nation by all normal standards the Muslims wanted a homeland of their own, and that in any case a people's demand for freedom could not be rejected merely because it did not suit certain political conveniences or resulted in small sovereignties.

The outcome of the debate was a foregone conclusion. The separationists were immensely strong, for they enjoyed all the advantages of a nationalist movement. Their cause was more popular, their case better argued, their ideas better vested, and

their public support infinitely wider. But the result of the debate was less important than the fact that it took place. People do not carry on a protracted and at times bitter discussion on minor, obscure or hopeless issues. The debate was a proof of the maturity of the idea of Pakistan. It had made itself into a major problem, fit for a national discussion. It had come of age. It also showed that the idea was in good health. Had it been weak or effete it would have received an immediate worsting in the polemical contest, and no more of it would have been heard. It also showed that the ultimate victory of the idea was won, not by default, but through competition. All these were important results of the debate, but even more significant was the fact that it enabled the Muslims to make a deliberate choice. Before the debate began Muslims had to choose between separation and merger, between a separate state and a closely-knit Hindu-controlled India. The alternatives scarcely offered a choice, and separation was the obvious and automatic winner. But when alternatives to Pakistan were put before them the choice became meaningful. Did they want an irrevocable separation or some new arrangement which would avert the catastrophe of complete Hindu rule and yet maintain India as a unit, independence or a loose federation, secession or a confederation? With these different courses placed before them they were in a position to explore all possibilities, to examine all aspects of the problem, and to see where their interest lay. At the end when the final decision was taken they knew that they had made a deliberate choice with all their wits about them.

Among the external factors operating in this period the most significant was Muslim experience of Congress rule in a majority of the Indian provinces. Their worst fears were confirmed by the conduct of the Congress governments. If the Muslim minority could be suppressed so completely under a constitution which yet did not give all power to the Indians and under the eyes of a foreign ruler who had the moral and constitutional duty to protect the rights of the minorities, the Muslims shuddered to imagine the state of affairs which would obtain in a free India under unrestricted Hindu majority rule. Their last doubts about the virtues of separation departed in haste. The argument for Pakistan was finally clinched by the evidence of the working of the 1935 constitution. Nothing could now convince them that a federation, however loose and however replete with safeguards, would bring

them any security. Nor could the (few) champions of a confederal India persuade them to try a new system which none in the world had found to be either workable or enduring. One could be reluctant in the face of an argument, but not in the face of such an event. Their mind was made up and they hugged the idea of separation closer to their breasts than ever before.

Finally, it was in this decade that the Muslim League officially adopted the two-nation theory, finally rejected the 1935 federation, and instituted an inquiry into what could or should take its place. If the idea of Pakistan was to become more than an idea—a goal, an objective, a programme—it had to win over the League, the largest and oldest Muslim political organization in the country. The Hindus and the British could be dealt with later. The primary requirement was to adopt it as the national ideal in a formal ceremony. In this sense the idea won its first victory in October 1938 when the Sind Provincial Muslim League Conference declared the Muslims to be a separate nation and asked the AIML to invite and examine proposals for a new constitutional structure that would meet Muslim needs. It is true that the original resolution of the conference demanding a partition was not passed by the session because Jinnah opposed it; but the press published both resolutions, the one introduced by the Sindhi leadership and the one finally adopted. The idea had at last arrived at the official headquarters, though a formal endorsement of its entry was delayed till March 1940.

## CONCLUSION

The following table summarizes the growth of the idea between 1858 and 1940, counting the 19th century as one unit and the 20th broken up into four decades:

TABLE 2

### GROWTH OF THE IDEA: 1858–1940

Decade	Total no. of Reports and Plans	Definite Proposals for Sepa- ration or Partition	Proposals for Sepa- ration	Proposals for Partition
(Number of proposals/reports coming from Indian Muslims in parentheses)				
1858-1900	15 ( 9)	15 ( 9)	7 ( 3)	4 ( 0)
1901-1910	3 ( 1)	3 ( 1)	0 ( 0)	3 ( 0)
1911-1920	17 (10)	17 ( 8)	6 ( 3)	5 ( 2)
1921-1930	30 (21)	25 (15)	10 ( 5)	11 ( 5)
1931-1940	105 (66)	66 (55)	16 ( 8)	33 (15)

As the decades succeed each other the number of proposals in each column increases (except for the period 1901-10). Among the authors, the number of Indian Muslims rises sharply in each column as the years advance: an eloquent testimony to the growing appeal of the idea of separation. If those Indian Muslims who wanted some kind of a separation are distinguished from those who desired a clear partition, the goal of partition was clearly in the ascendant after 1921.

## NOTES

1. There is vast material to illustrate this. A small selection is cited here.

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S. Sinha, *Indian Independence in Perspective*, Bombay, 1964, pp. 144, 261; P.D. Kaushik, *The Congress Ideology and Programme, 1920-1947*, Bombay, 1964, p. 284; Balraj Madhok, in *Organizer*, 21 September 1965; D.V. Thaman-  
kar, *Sardar Patel*, London, 1970, p. 207; and Baburao Patel, "Conquering India for Islam", *Mother India*, December 1970.

For the British see: *Daily Telegraph*, editorial, 4 June 1947; *The Times*, editorial, 31 May, 5 June and 15 August 1947; *MG*, editorial, 20 May 1946, 24 February, 3 and 21 May, 5, 16 and 25 June 1947, and 15 August 1949; *Daily Herald*, editorial, 15 August 1947; *Sunday Times*, editorial, 1 June 1947; *Economist*, editorial comment, 17 May 1947; *New Statesman*, editorial comments and articles, 9 March, 29 June and 10 August 1946, 15 February, 15 March and 10 May 1947; *The Listener*, 22 January 1959; *Round Table*, March 1946 and September 1947; *Asiatic Review*, July and October 1947; *Foreign Affairs*, October 1947; parliamentary debates in the House of Commons and the House of Lords from March 1946 to July 1947, *HC 420 5S*, *HC 422 5S*, *HC 431 5S*, *HC 439 5S*, *HC 440 5S* and *HL 150 5S*; *The Memoirs of General the Lord Ismay*, London, 1960, p. 431; Richard Symonds, *The Making of Pakistan*, London 1950, pp. 168-169; Dorothy Woodman, *Himalayan Frontiers*, London, 1969; Bernard Shaw, quoted in Jawaharlal Nehru, *A Bunch of Old Letters*, Bombay, 2nd ed 1960, p. 517; George Woodcock, *Asia: Gods and Cities*, London, 1966, p. 18; T.G.P. Spear, *India: A Modern History*, Ann Arbor, 1961, pp. 355, 411, and his *A History of India: Volume Two*, Harmondsworth, 1965, p. 236; Michael Edwardes, *Raj: The Story of British India*, London, 1967, p. 339; E.P. Moon, *Divide and Quit*, London, 1961, pp. 286, 288, 291; Hugh Tinker, *Experiment with Freedom*, London, 1967, p. 157; C.H. Philips, *The Partition of India*, Leeds, 1967, p. 2, and his (ed), *The Partition of India*, London 1970, Introduction, p. 12; and John Masters, *Pilgrim Son: A Personal Odyssey*, London, 1971, p. 34.

2. See *The Times*, 19 and 26 December 1887; *Quarterly Review*, October 1895, p. 432; Reginald Coupland, *The Indian Problem, 1833-1935*, London, 1942; H.D. Gupta,



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# 15

## THE MEN AND THEIR MEASURES

Now we should study in some detail the men who reported or proposed the various measures which gave shape and substance to the idea of Pakistan. Unless we know these persons well we cannot assess their contribution to the evolution of the idea nor the motives which impelled them to participate in its development.

### National Origins of the Authors

Counting the journals and newspapers as well as groups and associations as individuals, we find that the 170 items in our master table (Table 1) were the work of 119 authors. By their national origins they divide themselves into five categories as follows:

TABLE 3

### NATIONAL ORIGINS OF AUTHORS

Nationality	Number
British	33
Other Foreigners	2 (excluding Muslims)
Indian Non-Muslims	10 (7 of them were Hindus)
Foreign Muslims	4
Indian Muslims	70

Thus a great majority of the proposals came, naturally enough, from the class directly involved, viz., Indian Muslims. But, significantly, the search for a radical solution was not limited to them. About a quarter of the authors were British, by a long way the largest group after the Indian Muslims. The British list is dominated

by those who had either a long experience of Indian administration or an up-to-date knowledge of Indian conditions. All the three British principals of the MAO College, Aligarh, figure in this category. Several others had spent their entire working lives in the sub-continent. Six of them had held or were currently holding such high offices as Secretary of State for India, Cabinet Minister and Viceroy. However, what strikes us in the contribution of the British is the want of presentation of any concrete proposal. Apart from Bright Blunt and a couple of obscure persons, none among the rulers of India went beyond issuing reports and warnings that a divided India was not an impossibility and might even become a probability in the near or remote future.

The appearance of seven Hindus among the non-Muslim Indians is also worthy of notice. The gravity of the Muslim problem had impressed itself upon a group among them, though it was admittedly a small one. But the two Hindus who favoured partition were men of influence throughout the country and had a wide following in the Muslim north. One of them, Lajpat Rai, was closely connected with both the Congress and the Hindu Mahasabha. It is to be remembered, however, that both of them belonged to the orthodox extremist Hindu class, which means that in prescience and an understanding of the basic issue of Indian politics the extremist non-liberal Hindu politicians were superior to the so-called secular minded, liberal Congressmen.

The four foreign Muslims who suggested some kind of a Muslim state in India present an unclear picture. Their reported plans might convey the impression that the Islamic world was taking a benign interest in the fate and future of Indian Muslims. There is not the least warrant for such a comforting conclusion. In the first place the sources from which their views have reached us are uncertain, doubtful and infirm. In the second place, the most important and best-known of the four, Jamaluddin "Afghani", expressed such contradictory opinions and made such provocative statements in and on India that, on the evidence of his own words, it is difficult to accept him as a sympathiser of the Indian Muslim separationist school. But even if we assume, for the moment, that these four persons upheld the Indian Muslim aspirations to carve out a separate destiny of their own, it does not amount to much. Four vague messages of sympathy in 82 years do not offer a bright record of Islamic solidarity. Moreover, three of these came from

Turkey and one from Iran. There was none from the Arab world which has always claimed to be the flag-bearer of Islam. We know that in the years 1940-47, when the Muslims of India were fighting their last battle for freedom and would have greatly appreciated any support from their foreign co-religionists, they received no word of encouragement. The Arabs, in particular, assumed a posture of indifference, which was painful because it went beyond honest neutrality when some of them chose to support the Hindu claims of an "Indian nationalism" in preference to Muslim appeals for help.

It is a perfectly valid conclusion that the idea of Pakistan was almost entirely the work of the Indian Muslims from its earliest inception to its ultimate execution. (This theme is enlarged in the following chapter). It is a searing irony of Muslim history that the people who talked the most about pan-Islamism and the unity of the world community of Islam were left alone to struggle for their existence as Muslims. The effectiveness of British and Hindu propaganda is a partial explanation of this. Muslim League failure to project its image in the Muslim world explains a little more. But for the fullest explanation we must go to the Arab mentality which puts Arabism above Islam and insular pride above Muslim brotherhood. The tenor and drift of relations between the Arab and non-Arab Muslim countries during the last thirty years confirm this interpretation.

### Indian Muslim Authors: Territorial Affiliations

As the idea of Pakistan was essentially a product of the Indian Muslim thinking, we must narrow our gaze and look closely at the last group of 70 in our list. There were a few in this group who were deeply concerned with the future of the Muslims but, for various reasons, did not approve of any radical change in Muslim policy or suggest any revolutionary step to solve the Muslim problem. In fairness they should be excluded from further consideration. That leaves us with a group of 46 persons, who advocated a partition of India on Hindu-Muslim lines or some other radical re-arrangement or re-distribution of the sub-continent with a view to securing Muslim interests. A more careful study of these men should help our understanding of the nature and development of the idea.

The first step is to know the provincial or regional affiliations of these authors. The picture we get is like this:

TABLE 4

PROVINCIAL AFFILIATION OF INDIAN MUSLIM AUTHORS

<i>Province</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>Authors</i>
Delhi and United Provinces	19	Sayyid Ahmad, Sharar, Akbar, Muhammad Ali, Bambooque, Kheiri brothers (2), Bilgrami, Nadir Ali, Thanawi, Ross Masud, Jawwad, Jamiluddin, Mawdudi, Khaliquzzaman, Zaf-rul Hasan, Afzaal Qadri, Sub-hani, Rizwanullah.
Punjab	12	Chishti, Rahmat Ali, Durrani, Kamboh, Maikash, Zulfiqar Ali, Iqbal, Toosy, Kafayet Ali, Mamdot, Sikandar, Pun-jab Muslim Students Federa-tion.
Sind & Rajastan	7	Gazdar, Haroon, Majid, Syed, Rashdi, Yaqub, Samad.
NWFP	3	Gul Khan, Wadud, Ipi.
Bengal	1	Asadullah.
Bihar	1	Nasim.
Bombay	1	Aga Khan.
Kashmir	1	Afzal Huq.
Hyderabad	1	Latif.

The major contribution of Delhi and the United Provinces immediately strikes us. A little less than half of the entire group (19 out of 46) belonged to these provinces. Five things explain the leading role of this region in the development of the idea.

One is the special place it held as the centre of Muslim power, education and culture. Here the traditions of the Mughal court had lasted the longest. The recent history of the Kingdom of Oudh had added to this imperial memory. The establishment of Aligarh

had made it the proud possessor of the only Muslim university in India (Osmania of Hyderabad came much later). Secondly, the span of Muslim politics was longer in the United Provinces than in any Muslim-majority province (politics came earlier to Bengal, but for long it was not really Muslim politics). As a result of the first factor the Muslims of this province were the earliest to wake up to the realities of the Muslim position. Thirdly, the influence of Sayyid Ahmad and his Aligarh movement had made its way most deeply into the heart and mind of the U.P. Muslim. He took a leading part in the Muhammadan Educational Conference, in organizing the Simla Deputation and in founding the Muslim League. Fourthly, the province contained a large number of wealthy landholders who owed their estates to Mughal grant and not to British favour (though the continuation of several of these grants was the result of their owners' loyalty to the British during the Mutiny). These people were relatively enlightened in outlook, influential in politics, and on the whole popular among their farmers and tenants. They were moved by philanthropy and gave generously to all Muslim movements from the MAO College Fund Committee to the Muslim League. The Mahmudabad family alone gave more money to the Muslim League than many provinces put together. In the days of non-mass politics these men were the natural leaders of the Muslim population, and most of them chose to support the ruling power or the Muslim League or both; only a handful were in the Congress camp. Finally, the U.P. was a Muslim-minority province in which the Muslims were never allowed to forget their minority status. Because of their early political awaken-ing, their deep attachment to their culture and their more fresh memories of Muslim rule, they were the first to realize the depth of Hindu-Muslim differences and to experience the vexation of being a permanent minority. They felt their predicament the more be-cause of their cultural predominance and their wide influence which went far beyond their numerical strength in the population.

For these reasons — there may be more — the largest number of separationist proposals came from the U.P. They also continued to come throughout the period. It is an intriguing and notable fact that separation should have been advocated so consistently and enthusiastically by those Muslims who apparently stood to gain nothing from its realization. Theoretically, it might have attested to their selflessness and also to the inherent strength



of the Muslim feeling of separateness. It did not matter if they themselves were fated to live for ever under the Hindus; it was more important to plan for the salvation of a majority of Indian Muslims. Practically, however, (and this is confirmed by their migration to Pakistan since 1947) their attitude was not so high minded. It was the elite which made these separationist proposals, and it was the bulk of this elite that left the province for Karachi after partition; thus leaving the common U.P. Muslim leaderless and creating serious social tensions in Sind. Some U.P. scheme-makers made untenable recommendations for their own protection in the event of a partition.

The next largest group of authors came from the Punjab. The province made 12 proposals in all, and it is interesting to observe that an overwhelming majority of these were made in later years —after 1920; in fact, exactly half of its quota came in the last nine years, 1930-39. The delayed development of this concern for the future of the Muslims was due to certain peculiarities of the history of the Punjab and to the outlook of the Punjabi Muslim.

In the Punjab the British had not succeeded an imperial or local Muslim rule. The Sikhs had been the overlords before it was annexed to the British Indian empire. This had a direct impact on the Muslim attitude. Unlike some other provinces, the Muslim Punjabi welcomed the advent of the British as a deliverance from an oppressive tyranny. For many years thereafter he looked upon the British as liberators. Loyalty continued to be a strong feature of the community even after the province had become political minded. That is why the Punjab was quiet during the Mutiny and in fact helped Britain to defeat the insurgents and re-establish its power.

Two related factors moulded the character of Muslim life in the Punjab. One was the strength of British administration in the province. Treating the area like a border stronghold and running it on semi-military lines through officers seconded from the army, the government made it a close preserve of imperial power. It does not necessarily mean that the tone of administration was harsh: in fact, the deputy commissioner ruled his district with affection, sympathy and interest, and had little occasion to bring into play his limitless armoury of authority.<sup>1</sup> But he possessed immense power, and he let it be known that in case of trouble he would not tolerate the slightest deviation from the straight path of dutiful

co-operation worked out by himself and his superiors. This strict control enforced by a corps of determined and exceptionally able officers was an excellent training in allegiance to authority. The Muslims had already been demoralized by the savage incursions of the Afghans in the 18th century and the unscrupulous Sikh rule in the 19th. The British rule was far less oppressive, but it inculcated the habit of obedience with equal vigour.

The second factor was that a majority of the Muslim aristocracy in the province was of British creation. This had many implications. It was a new aristocracy, with no traditions of its own and no pride in the past. It had no culture which it could pass on to other classes. It had had no time to develop the philanthropic instinct, with the result that the community benefitted little from its wealth or influence. It also put loyalty to the foreign master above the interest of the community. It also meant that in the earlier period of non-existent or weak political activity there were no Muslim leaders to command respect or fealty.

Two further aspects of the history of the Punjabi Muslim should be considered here. He had only a hazy memory of Muslim imperial rule as the Sikh period had intervened between the Mughal empire and the coming of the British. Unlike the Bengali, Sindhi and U.P. Muslim, he could not look back to an immediate happy past in which he had been his own master. This made him less patriotic, less disposed to answer the call of nationalism and too apathetic to respond to the spirit of the times. His political awakening was retarded. Another aspect worked in the same direction. There were no traditions of Muslim education in the province. The loot and rapine of the Pathan invasions had destroyed much and disrupted normal life. The Sikh rule had obliterated what had been left of the signs and marks of the Mughal educational system. So thoroughly was this done that few Muslims were even aware of the Mughal achievements in the fields of letters and general enlightenment. When the British came they found the Muslims almost denuded of all intellectual equipment. In most areas the community was not even literate. Partly as a result of this and partly because of the Khalsa spoliation, the Muslims were economically depressed. Their morale had touched bottom, and the absence of traditional leaders made the situation as bad as it could be.

The outstanding result of all these factors was that politics came

late to the Punjab (generally it came late to the entire Muslim India because of Sayyid Ahmad Khan's admonition). But political thinking, which precedes practical politics, arrived in the Punjab later than it did in the U.P. and Bengal. In Bengal Ameer Ali had taught the Muslims to think political thoughts without entering the political arena proper, and his Central National Muhammadan Association had achieved much in that no-man's land which lies between culture and politics. He received valuable help from some distinguished men like Nawab Ameer Ali (no relation of his) and Nawab Abdul Luteef Khan. In the U.P., Sayyid Ahmad was the towering figure who left a creative impress on the social, educational, literary and political values of the Muslims. He was fortunate in having a band of remarkable men around him—Shibli Naumani, Wiqarul Mulk, Mohsinul Mulk, Mawlawi Nazir Ahmad and others—who spread his message, organized his movement and tendered sound advice. In contrast, the Punjab was as poor in resources as it was in manpower. In the early period Justice Shah Din stood alone as the spokesman of the Sayyid school, the intellectual leader of the community (he founded the famous literary journal, *Humayun* of Lahore), the upholder of educational reform, and the first exponent of the idea of establishing a Muslim political organization. He had no colleagues and worked without assistance.<sup>2</sup> The landed barons continued to live on their farms and showed no inclination to improve their community or give money for good deeds. There was practically no middle class upon which the few reformers that there were could call for help, understanding and support.

Thus the 19th century is virtually a blank in the history of Muslim Punjab. When politics began at the turn of the new century the Muslims still did not foresee the problems and dangers implicit in their status as a marginal majority. It is possible that they were over-confident of their slight numerical majority and neglected the political arithmetic of percentages. It is also possible that the contemplation of their martial virtues (exaggerated by the British) buoyed them up so much that they were unable to imagine any danger to their position. It may be that they did not look beyond the immediate present, thinking that British protection combined with their own marginal majority would guarantee their superiority for all times. It may also be that the sight of so many Muslim landholders of influence and vast wealth assured them that all

was well. Their geographical position might also have been a source of comfort. Looking westwards from somewhere near Lahore they saw nothing but Muslim lands stretching to thousands of miles. With solid Muslim territories on their north, north-west and west, they might well have believed that the great mass of Hindus in the rest of India could bring them no harm.

This, I think, explains why the Punjabi Muslims entertained no thoughts of separation till the last stages of the development of the idea of Pakistan. Today we might say that it was a short-sighted policy. They should have realized the precariousness of their small majority. They ought to have known that numerical strength was impotent if it was not backed by economic power. They should not have counted so much upon their martial qualities, for modern politics had replaced bayonets with votes: educational advance and political consciousness were better guarantees than a larger-than-usual share in the army. They were also unwise to put too much trust in their feudal politicians for whom politics were a pastime, a gentleman's game to give a whiff of adventure to an otherwise placid and eventless life—like the 19th century British peers of the realm who divided their time between grouse shooting and the House of Lords. Their westward look which saw the pleasing sight of a Muslim land rolling away beyond the horizon showed a commendable faith in Islamic solidarity, but it could not have solved the problem of their own province. The fact remained that the administrative, territorial and constitutional unit was the province, and within it they were too small a majority to entertain complacency.

We can say all this and much more, but we must remember that today we have the advantage of hindsight on our side. It is against the principles of historical analysis to interpret or judge one period by the standards and values of another. Events always wear a different look when viewed from a later age. Let us therefore be content with a knowledge of the factors which might have kept the Punjabi Muslim away from being a separatist in the early period without condemning him for sins which were no sins in the world in which he lived and had his being.

No people can go on slumbering indefinitely. In fact, the later they wake up the more mercilessly the past catches up with them. The hour of awakening was bound to come, and it came to the Punjab with a shattering stroke in the late 'twenties. Partly as a

reaction to the Nehru Report and partly as a result of the swift pace of reforms, the Punjabi Muslim realized that the everlasting, solidly Muslim Punjab which he had been taking for granted was too imaginative a picture and would soon dissolve into a dream unless he stirred himself into activity and did something to safeguard himself.

The modern psychology of sleep and dreams says that we go to sleep to solve the problems to which our waking life has found no key, and that our dreams unravel these problems through the action of the unconscious and the subconscious. Something like this seems to have happened to the Punjabi Muslim during his long political sleep. The voices of Muharram Ali Chishti (1888), Rahmat Ali (1915) and Durrani (about the same time) had come from the unconscious deep of the communal brain. The community went on sleeping and dreaming, but a part of the brain continued to emit waves. When the community finally woke up the solution had arrived "as if in a dream". Like a man waking up fresh and vigorous from a long, relaxed sleep the Punjabi Muslim began to think furiously. As if to make amends for his earlier inactivity he began to act in a flurry. In less than nine years he produced eight schemes, six of which advocated clear partition.

There was no more talk of majorities, large or marginal. The Punjab was a Muslim province, and that it must remain. Some said that the Hindu areas on the east should be excluded so that the province became fully and unmistakably Muslim. Others included the whole province in the proposed Muslim state. A few sought to bring Delhi into the projected Muslim dominion. But there was none who favoured the continuation of the *status quo* or the subservience of the province to a Hindu-controlled federal centre.

One point of contrast between the United Provinces and the Punjab was the attitude of their respective student community to the idea of separation. Without under-estimating the services of Aligarh to the Pakistan movement, it must be recorded that the Punjabi students were the first to welcome the idea and to adopt it formally. Rahmat Ali wrought this miracle, and it was his influence and the loyalty and zeal of his messengers which inspired the Punjabi Muslim students to accept the idea and inscribe it on their banners. By doing this they made the Punjab the vanguard of the national struggle and justified the choice of Lahore as the city where the Muslim League passed the resolution demanding Pakistan.

Sind made its contribution in one completely unexpected, swift dash. Excluding Samad's proposal (which came from Rajasthan), Sind presented six scheme-makers. Gazdar in 1937, and all the rest at one moment in October 1938, when the Sind Muslim League demanded a partition but came up against Jinnah's wishes. This late and brief interest in separation may have its roots in the modern history of the province.

Sind had been ruled by the Muslim dynasty of the Mirs before the British wrested it from them and tagged it on to the Bombay presidency. For nearly a century it existed as an administrative appendage of a distant, unsympathetic and entirely different unit. It was only in 1937 that, after a prolonged and persistent Muslim campaign and in the teeth of vigorous Hindu opposition and British reluctance, it became a province in its own right. Muslim politics in the area were badly organized, generally unsettled and inefficiently led. Almost till independence the province had boasted a bewildering variety of political parties producing a succession of governments whose brief tenure and lack of principle were the despair of all observers. A few big landlords with personal retinues had turned the province into a series of private constituencies where vendetta, personal rivalry and lure of office determined the fortunes of cabinets and assemblies. There was no room for ideas in this free-for-all. The air reeked of disorder and irresponsibility. The old generation of leaders was dead or dying. The new was too inexperienced to see beyond the immediate present. The Congress was strong. The Hindus controlled trade, commerce and banking. The Muslim League was weak and split into factions. There was no Muslim middle class on whose foundation a strong party system could be built. Education had come too late to the province, and had been controlled by officers, mostly British and Hindu, sitting in the distant Bombay and often ignorant of the needs and conditions of the area. The landed gentry and aristocracy were more cultured than that of the neighbouring Punjab, but were too immersed in its own class problems to remould provincial politics. To a great extent, therefore, the misfortunes of Sind may be ascribed to the British decision of keeping it tied to Bombay: it was a case of giving priority to the convenience of a few officers over the interests and requirements of a few million people.

The mind of the Sindhi Muslim could also have been influenced



by another factor. He had a comfortable majority in the province which might have made him complacent about the future. There is an obvious connection between the number of Muslims in an area and the popularity of the idea of Pakistan. The greater the Muslim strength, the greater their confidence in themselves, the less the fear of Hindu rule, the weaker the appeal of separation. The analysis that we are making now illustrates this. In the United Provinces, the Muslims were in a small minority but enjoyed a special position for historical and cultural reasons. They were the most ardent supporters of the idea. In the Punjab, Muslim majority was only marginal and this made them anxious about their future, but this development was delayed. In Sind, their majority was comfortable, therefore few worried about the things to come. In the NWFP, their predominance was complete and therefore they saw no cause to be agitated by any possible threat to themselves.

And yet the Sindhi Muslim, once he had realized his plight and seen the advantages of separation, swore allegiance to the new formula with a unanimity and a gusto that should have shamed the Punjabi and the Pathan. In 1938 the entire Muslim League leadership embraced the idea of partition with such zeal that Jinnah had to labour hard to dissuade the province from formally adopting this decision. Thus morally Sind enjoys the distinction of having been the first province (Muslim or non-Muslim) which tried formally to adopt the idea of Pakistan from a united public platform.

The case of Bengal is, indeed, curious. Only one Bengali Muslim proposed a solution on separatist lines, and even that was not an original suggestion. It was instigated by, and was an amended version of, the Latif scheme. The fact must be faced, therefore, that Bengal made no contribution at all to the origin or the growth of the idea we are studying.

I must mention, in passing, that I cannot read Bengali, and therefore have not been able to consult Bengali newspapers and other contemporary literature in that language. But I don't think that this inability invalidates the conclusion I have drawn. Had any Bengali proposals been made, there must have been references to them in the English and Urdu press (specially the Muslim newspapers) and other writings of that or later period. The *Indian Annual Register* should have recorded them. Hindu writers would not have allowed them to go unnoticed or uncommented. Pakistani historians from East Pakistan should have brought them to our

attention. In the mid-and-late 'thirties the best Muslim newspaper in the English language appeared from Calcutta, and its coverage of Muslim politics and opinion was impeccable. Had there been anything in this field in the Bengali press, the *Star of India* must have reproduced it. Its correspondence columns were full of letters from all over India; but with the single exception of Asadullah there is no communication from any Bengali on the idea of separation. In the light of all this, it is reasonable to assume that Muslim Bengal was not a participant in the evolution of the idea, only a witness, and, it appears, only an indifferent witness.

Can we solve this mystery? Here was a large mass of Muslim population living in the north-east amidst the Hindus. Its total strength was greater than that of all the north-western Muslim provinces put together. The area was neither small nor landlocked. It had the experience of an earlier partition to guide it—a partition which had produced a solid Muslim province, which had been welcomed by the Muslims, which had been savagely opposed by the Hindus, and which had worked very well as long as it lasted. Dacca had been the capital of a Muslim province for six years. It had a university of its own; an advantage which no other Muslim province except the Punjab enjoyed. Going further back, the Bengali Muslims could recall the memories of Mughal times and of later local independence. Bengal had been one of the first areas to come under British rule, and this had brought some benefits like education, relative peace and quiet, and all the lessons to be learnt from a long exposure to foreign imperial rule. The British presence had worked on the Bengali temperament to produce a remarkable surge of political awakening which often led to violent, extremist action. Modern social and political movements were well established in Bengal when the north-western Muslim provinces were still new colonies captured by the advancing tide of British imperialism. Men like Nawab Abdul Luteef and Ameer Ali had successfully created a revolution in the Bengali Muslim mind at a time when north-west Muslim India was still without any leadership and without any positive ideas to guide it. Thus all the conditions, antecedents and circumstances which move a people, inspire them to have ideals and make them think of their future destiny, were present in Bengal at least since the early part of this century.

But nothing came out of all this. All the ingredients of nationa-

lism were there, but somehow they did not mix to produce an active compound. The Hindu Bengalis often raised the slogan of a Bengali nation, and at the time of the 1905 partition they spoke of a "motherland" which had been demonically vivisected. Their Muslim co-provincials did not share this belief, but then neither did they shout the counter-slogan of a Muslim Bengali nation. They felt that they were not a part of the Bengali Hindu community, but they never took the next step of calling themselves a separate entity. They were aware of the differences which set them apart from the Hindus, but not of the unities which made them an entity in themselves. The negative factor working towards separation was present, the positive one which would have achieved separation was absent. And without the inter-action of both, the Muslims of Bengal remained in the twilight of uncertainty, knowing that they were different from the Hindus but not knowing what they themselves were. They never took the final, decisive step of raising themselves from the position of a provincial majority to the status of a nation.

What were the reasons for this? One was the deep and pervasive influence of Hindu culture on their lives. This does not mean that they were not good Muslims, or that Islam appealed to them less than it did to other Indian Muslims. In some respects they showed deeper Islamic influence than was visible in the north-west. If the number of mosques and the existence of a well-established *madrasah* system of education are any indications, Islam had a powerful hold over them. And yet in every-day life they carried the marks of Hindu impulse and ascendancy to an extent unknown elsewhere. Probably they themselves were not conscious of this, but an outsider was immediately struck by the number of ordinary things of life they shared with the Hindus. Possibly this factor inhibited them from making a clean break with their Hindu environment and impetus.

Another reason might have been their devotion to their language. This is one thing which betokened a major distinction between them and the Muslims of the rest of India. In spite of their own local and provincial languages, most of them bearing some impact of Islam, other Muslims had broadly agreed upon one language, Urdu, as the common medium of understanding one another and as the major literary vehicle of expression. It was the mother tongue of a few, but possessed sufficient Muslim background and

content to serve as a "national" language. As the Hindi-Urdu controversy developed and waxed more bitter in the north with the growth of Muslim separateness, the dividing line was drawn as firmly between the two languages as between the two nations. But the position of the Bengali language was quite different. It was strictly a provincial language. It was used by both Hindus and Muslims. It was essentially a Hindu language: a child of Sanskrit, created and reared by Hinduism. Its script was unreadable to those used to the Persian alphabet. In vocabulary, imagery, traditions, associations and literary qualities it was Hindu. It had been the major channel of Hindu influence on the Muslims throughout the centuries of Bengali history. And it had produced results like the popularity of Tagore among the Bengali Muslims—a phenomenon completely incomprehensible to the non-Bengali Muslims, for Tagore's writings were soaked in Hindu religion, culture and beliefs. When one speaks the same language as another people, it is hard to disown them as outsiders.

The third reason was purely geographical. Bengal had no Muslim neighbours as north-west India had. This had two results. It made the Bengali Muslim better conditioned to accept Hindu influences. Had one or two Muslim countries touched Bengal's boundaries, that would have brought in reinforcing currents of Islam and countered the overpowering Hindu environment. Secondly, the absence of Muslim neighbours was bound to make the Bengali Muslim a little insular, less responsive to the call of solidarity with outside Muslims, and less conscious of the currents and cross-currents of the Islamic world community. This was a misfortune for which Muslim Bengal cannot be blamed. The Muslims of the north-west had the good luck to be contiguous to Afghanistan and Iran and not too far away from the Arab countries. Moreover, Persian and Turkish influences had moulded their life far more intimately than they had touched Bengali thought and action. Naturally the idea of secession from India came more easily to the north-west than to Bengal.

Of course, it can be argued that the isolated position of the Bengali Muslim should actually have made him more conscious of his separateness. Surrounded by the Hindus, cut off from other Muslim communities of India and unable to depend on any neighbouring Muslim states, he should have felt the danger of Hindu rule more strongly and fought against it on the principle of nation-

alism. But he did not, and we are trying to account for it.

Another factor should also be kept in mind. There was very little contact between the separationists of the north-west and Muslim Bengal. It appears surprising that those who claimed to work for the freedom of the Indian Muslims ignored the huge portion of them living in the north-east. But we must not forget that there was no school of separationists, no proper movement for separation, no party or organization with separation as its ideal. There were only individuals who made proposals and drew up schemes. It was neither possible nor necessary for these individuals to consult Bengali Muslims or to get their suggestions approved by them. All the same, it does not fully explain the failure of a majority of proposal-makers to include Bengal in their schemes.

All this may help us to understand the Bengali situation, but it does not go far enough to solve the puzzle of Bengali silence on the issue of separation. Granted that there were good reasons for the inability of the Muslim Bengali to originate the idea of separation. But once the idea had appeared, he must have known about it and also about the large variety of proposals aiming at the creation of an independent Muslim area. And yet he made no suggestion of his own; he did not even take part in the debate on a complete *versus* partial separation or on the precise nature of the projected state(s). He did not criticize the schemes which ignored Bengal; he did not welcome those which took notice of it. He made no alternative suggestions for linking his province with the north-west. He just kept quiet until everything had been settled and the Muslim League had adopted a particular, but vague, scheme as the official Muslim solution. Bengalis are not usually given to allow others to fight their case, but on this crucial issue they seem to have made an exception. It must be confessed that this exceptional behaviour remains an unexplained mystery of modern Indian history, though the breaking away of East Pakistan in 1971 tends to reinforce the conviction that they were not really interested in being or continuing to be a part of the Indian Muslim community.

The NWFP contributed only three schemes. Of two of these we have only vague outlines. Only Sardar Gul Khan's proposals have reached us in detail and on incontrovertible evidence. It is not at all surprising that this province should have taken a lukewarm interest in a separationist solution of the Muslim problem. Muslim majority was so large and well entrenched that few saw

politics in communal terms. Irrespective of what happened in the rest of India, the Pathan was supremely sure that nothing could threaten his overwhelming position. There was also an element of disdain in the Pathan's racist view of other Indians, Hindu or Muslim, who were just "Hindustanis", while the men across the Indus were different and did not really belong to India. The Muslim League had practically no existence in the province until the very last years before independence, and as separation often appealed to those who were sympathetic with the League, there were few to suggest or uphold it in this area of Red Shirt hegemony. The Congress, which controlled provincial politics through men like Dr. Khan Sahib and Ghaffar Khan, also saw to it that the Pathans did not cultivate a Muslim outlook and, in Congress terminology, did not become "narrow communalists".

In these circumstances, the appearance of even a few separationist hints is of considerable significance, for they came from the heartland of the enemies of the idea. It is a proof of the inherent strength of the idea that when the final hour of decision came even the Pathans, who had always and overwhelmingly voted for the Hindu Congress, realized the impossibility of linking their destiny with the Hindus.

Unfortunately we have little knowledge about the one separationist proposal which emerged from Kashmir. Apart from the name of the man who made it and the fact that he belonged to Kashmir we know nothing. Even this solitary case is surprising, for in Kashmir no politics were allowed by the ruler. The Muslims eeked out a difficult existence under a Hindu Maharaja whose hatred for 80% of his subjects had unrestricted play in the iron rule he imposed upon them. For a long time no political parties were allowed. The slaughtering of cows was a serious criminal offence, often carrying a death penalty. The huge Muslim majority lived in daily terror under an administration run by a tiny group of Kashmiri Brahmins. Under these conditions it was impossible to expect a Kashmiri Muslim to suggest publicly that Kashmir should be a part of a proposed Muslim state.

The cultural zones scheme which originated from Hyderabad is interesting, not because it had any inherent merit, but because it emphasized the issue of Muslim culture and exaggerated the role of the Muslims of Hindu areas in determining the future of Muslim India. Every proposal for separation mentioned the problem of



protecting Muslim culture and made it an argument in favour of a radical solution. But Latif's scheme was unique in making culture the sole basis of a zonal re-grouping of India. The matter was so important to him that future political arrangements took a second place in his calculations. It is an irony that the generality of Muslims rejected his scheme on the ground that the arrangements prescribed by him would, among other things, completely fail to protect their culture.

Latif also made rather too much of the Muslims living in Hindu-majority areas. His principal objection to complete separation was that it would betray these Muslims and leave them at the Hindu mercy. But in presenting his own solution he went to the other extreme of not allowing the Muslim areas to be completely free while making the Muslim-minority Hyderabad a near-independent state.

The one proposal from Bihar came from a student leader, and needs no comment. Bombay appears on our list merely as a category of convenience. The scheme (or schemes) issuing from it was (or were) the work of the Aga Khan, who was less a Bombayite than a cosmopolitan citizen.

### Professional Background of Indian Muslim Authors

A study of the territorial affiliations of this group of 46 authors has led us to the above observations. We may learn a little more about the idea and its makers by looking at the professional background of the same group. By this test we get the following picture:

Every classification of this kind is bound to be more or less arbitrary. Every author makes his own categories, and in some cases his placing of a certain person in a certain class may be open to difference of opinion. But this is unavoidable in this kind of approach or analysis. What I have done in an attempt to make this exercise more meaningful is to apply each principle of categorization to every person who is being analyzed. By this repeated application the element of arbitrariness has been minimized. That is why a majority of our authors figure twice or more in the table and the total number far exceeds their actual strength of 46.

Human personality has several facets, and, however wide the categories we employ, some overlapping is inevitable. Few indivi-

TABLE 5

### PROFESSIONAL BACKGROUND OF INDIAN MUSLIM AUTHORS

<i>Professional Category</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>Authors</i>
Intellectuals	19	Sayyid Ahmad, Sharar, Akbar, Muhammad Ali, Durrani, Kheiri Brothers (2), Rahmat Ali, Thanawi, Ross Masud, Jamiluddin, Mawdudi, Zulfiqar Ali, Kafayet Ali, Zafrul Hasan, Afzaal Qadri, Iqbal, Latif, PMSF.
Politicians	13	Muhammad Ali, Aga Khan, Zulfiqar Ali, Iqbal, Khaliquzzaman, Gazdar, Haroon, Majid, Syed, Rashdi, Mamdot, Sikandar, PMSF.
Journalists	11	Sayyid Ahmad, Chishti, Sharar, Muhammad Ali, Bambooque, Rahmat Ali, Durrani, Maikash, Rashdi, Majid, Mawdudi.
Lawyers	8	Akbar, Bambooque, Bilgrami, Nadir Ali, Iqbal, Rahmat Ali, Gul Khan, Asadullah.
Religious Thinkers and Leaders	8	Sayyid Ahmad, Durrani, Thanawi, Mawdudi, Iqbal, Wadud, Latif, Ipi.
University Teachers	6	Sattar Kheiri, Jamiluddin, Zafrul Hasan, Afzaal Qadri, Iqbal, Latif.
Men of Letters	4	Sayyid Ahmad, Sharar, Akbar, Iqbal.
Student Leaders	2	Rahmat Ali, PMSF.
Islamic Missionary	1	Durrani.
Tribal Leader	1	Ipi.

duals confine their interest to one sphere so rigidly that we can call them politicians or lawyers or journalists and nothing else. The group we are studying illustrates this very well. Sayyid Ahmad was an intellectual; he was also a journalist because he founded, edited and wrote for the *Tahzib-ul-Akhlaq*; he was also a religious thinker and leader in the sense that he held and expounded certain new and radical religious views which influenced a large number of Indian Muslims. Sharar was not only a literary figure but also the founder and editor of a whole series of journals and magazines. Muhammad Ali's versatility eludes all attempts at classification. He was an intellectual, a prominent politician for many years, and a well-known journalist who edited *Comrade* and *Hamdard*; some may reasonably argue that he was also a religious thinker and leader because of his leading role in the Khilafat movement, though here I have not included him in this category. Mawdudi was an intellectual, an experienced editor and journalist, and a religious thinker. Iqbal was an outstanding intellectual figure, a man of letters, a politician for a few years, a lawyer by profession, a teacher of philosophy for some time, and the greatest religious thinker in modern Islam. Rahmat Ali was an intellectual, a student leader and a journalist. Akbar Allahabadi was an intellectual, a lawyer and a man of letters. Barring 17 authors, all others fall into more than one category.

The first thing that emerges from this classification is the preponderance of the intellectual class. Nineteen out of our 46 men definitely belonged to this category; a few more might possibly have been included in it. "Intellectual" is a difficult word to define. In recent years it has come in for much misuse; and in some circles, which do not care about the correct meaning of the terms they so fondly and so often use, it is bandied about as a sarcastic missile and a pejorative epithet. It has become fashionable to call someone an "intellectual" when what is really intended is "civilized" abuse or calling of names without sounding vulgar. Neither etymology nor educated use supports this meaning. And the word has not been used in this sense in our classification. An intellectual is one who uses his intellect in observing things and reaching conclusions, who has a cultivated mind and applies it to the problems which ask for solution, who thinks for himself instead of borrowing ready-made opinions and prejudices, who judges issues rather than men, who appreciates the play of ideas in

human affairs, who abides by certain values in his approach to things and strives to make others adopt or at least see the significance and relevance of this scale of values.

If the word is understood to have this sense, and none other, it is easy to see why the intellectuals dominated the group responsible for the origin and development of the idea of separation. This was as it should have been. Ideas are the property of the intellectual class. Without them it is powerless and idle; with them it rules the minds of men and changes human history. Without an intellectual class ideas lose their authority and direction; they may lie dormant and neglected, but they play no active part in moving a people or a nation. With it they come into their own, mould the outlook of millions, force the readers to re-think their problems, inspire the commonality to have ideals, give a purpose to life, and create a new spirit which is capable of working miracles.

Like all ideas, the idea of Pakistan was essentially a mental construction achieved at the end of a thought process. It was the joint effort, not always consciously co-ordinated or even simultaneous, of several minds which produced the idea. A number of men were working separately and sometimes independently of one another to solve a problem which agitated them. Each contributed something to the solution; and once it had come in the shape of an idea, each again put something of his own into its development. In less abstract language we may say that the idea of separation was itself a compound of several smaller ideas, like the two-nation theory, the fear of Hindu rule, the anxiety to save Muslim culture, the wish to re-create a successful past, the desire to assert Muslim identity, the determination to escape majority rule, and the aspiration to belong to the Islamic world community rather than to a Hindu India. Both the creation of these smaller ideas and their gradual coming together to form the supreme idea of separation were the task of the intellectuals. They alone were capable of producing the minor ideas, appreciating their connection with one another and their relevance to the major issue, and finally weaving them into a pattern and giving it the shape and substance and power of a great idea. This was their contribution to the solution of the Muslim problem, and none but they could have made it.

When we come to the next largest class, politicians, we find an artificial inflation in their numerical strength. In formal terms 13

of this group of 46 were certainly politicians; a closer examination shows how misleading first appearances can be. In the first place, some of them, like Iqbal, were in politics for only a short time; their major interest lay elsewhere; practical and active politics had only a temporary attraction for them. In the second place, only six of them were politicians and nothing else. Others were intellectuals, journalists and religious thinkers who had entered politics at the behest of circumstances or in search of some temporary advantage. In the third place, except the Aga Khan and Muhammad Ali there was no leader who commanded a national following over a length of time. Technically Zulfiqar Ali and Iqbal were all-India leaders because they presided over the annual sessions of all-India organizations like the Muslim Conference, the Muslim League and the Khilafat Conference. But every president of a national party is not a national leader. Abdullah Yusuf Ali was a president of the All India Muslim Conference, but few will admit his title to all-India leadership. The rostrum of Muslim League presidents from 1907 to 1937 (after which Jinnah became the permanent president) contains several names which were unknown outside their own provinces, and some which were not top figures even in their provincial politics—Peerbhoy, Bhurgari and Mian Abdul Aziz are some examples of obscure men elected to this high office. If we make a distinction between politicians and leaders, only the Aga Khan, Muhammad Ali and Sikandar Hayat would qualify as leaders.

Far from being a disappointing finding, this is quite in keeping with the pattern of growth that we have been indicating. The national leaders were not in the forefront of the separationist trend. They encouraged it, and helped it to grow by underlining the minor ideas which led to separation. But they did not publicly uphold it because they did not consider it wise to commit their parties to a certain pre-defined course of action. Their position demanded that as many options should be kept open as could be arranged within reason and consistency. Only a shortsighted leader will deny himself all avenues of escape before they have been tried and found blocked, or before his followers have demonstrated their wishes with a unanimity which leaves no margin for doubt.

In like manner and for similar reasons, the politicians did not play a significant part in the growth of the idea. First, they were

not brilliant men endowed with an exceptional foresight or an extraordinary ability. Most of them followed rather than shaped public opinion. Secondly, they were subservient to the will of the national leaders and the discipline of their political parties. They recognized the danger to their position posed by the expression of independent views which did not meet the approval of the national leaders or the party bosses. Thirdly, they were so absorbed in organizational work, parliamentary duties, local intrigues, struggles for office and political bargaining that, even in the rare cases of inclination being present, there was no time or opportunity for relaxed thinking and speculation. Fourthly, it must be admitted that the generality of politicians lacked the mental and intellectual equipment for thinking up new solutions and throwing out fresh ideas. A majority of them were big or middling-size landholders with little education or lawyers of ordinary education. The former had all the leisure in the world but no means of using it profitably. The latter, or at least the best among them, possessed the skill to think but the twin goddesses of law and politics made too heavy a call upon their time and effort to allow them the luxury of meditation and inquiry into larger issues.

Thus it was quite natural that politicians should have failed to make a major contribution to the idea. They were not expected to do so. This was the business of the intellectual class, and it may be a sad thing but it is true that in every country and under every system there are only a few intellectuals who come into politics and stay there.

The number of journalists in our group, though the third highest, is not a correct indication of their importance. Next to the intellectuals (and most of them were intellectuals themselves) they contributed the most to the idea; or rather we should say that they played such an important part because their approach was intellectual rather than political. A good journalist is an intellectual, and in one respect he is better placed to play with an idea. The intellectual may take a long time to draw a conclusion from his cogitation. Presenting the conclusion to the public may take a little more time. Even then his audience is limited, for only a few read books and often it is the intellectuals who read one another's books. In a country like India and specially in a community like the Muslims reading books was not a widespread habit, for educational standards were poor and the capacity to buy books low.



In this world of narrow opportunities the journalist triumphed. He became an efficient broker of ideas between the intellectual and the newspaper-reading public. He summarized, abridged, simplified, elaborated and annotated the thoughts of the poets and thinkers, and put them before his readers in digestible instalments. Without him the intellectual would not have found such a large audience. But he was more than a broker. He thought for himself and, besides commenting upon the ideas of others, presented his own thoughts in the columns open to him. Often his presentation was well-dressed borrowings. Sometimes he stole the thoughts of others and shamelessly put his name to them. But sometimes he was a genuine thinker himself and entered the intellectual lists in his own right. Once he was able to do this, his superiority over the intellectual was incontestable. He had no high reputation to guard. He could break the shackles of convention and let his mind wander adventurously, even recklessly. He did not mind earning a bit of odium, some derision, even a reasonable amount of abuse. That was a professional hazard. He could surprise his readers, shatter their complacency, stagger their imagination, shake them up, and make them talk or even think. Above all, he had the great advantage of speed. He could think up a new idea in the evening and let his readers have the privilege of sharing it with him the following morning. Time was not permitted to stand between the idea and the audience. If the intellectual had depth, the journalist had speed. If one commanded more weight, the other claimed more freshness for his wares.

It was this ability to communicate his ideas with great speed to a large audience that made the journalist a powerful vehicle in the spread of the idea. Sayyid Ahmad influenced the social, literary, moral and religious opinions of the Muslims more through his short articles and notes in his journals than through his more solid writings, like the commentary on the Bible, which few read and even fewer understood. What Muhammad Ali said about the Hindu-Muslim problem, the precarious unity of India and the need for a large-hearted Hindu effort to accommodate Muslim wishes, was read by the bulk of the Muslim intelligentsia, several British civil servants and some Hindus. Bambooque's column in the *Comrade* wore a light-hearted look, but some of its shrewd comments on the future of Muslim India had a deeper meaning which was clear to its Muslim readers. Mawdudi's editorials and other

contributions to the *Medina* of Bijnore and the *Tarjuman-ul-Quran* of Hyderabad Deccan presented an orthodox Islam to their traditional-minded and puritanical subscribers and buyers. Rahmat Ali's tracts and leaflets spread the gospel of separation and popularized the concept of Pakistan among the Muslim student community in Britain and Germany and some political circles in India. Durrani's intensely Islamic approach and his deep anxiety to revive the imperial Muslim past in India communicated themselves to a large audience in northern India, thus creating in it a pride in its traditions and a determination to re-capture them. It was Maikash, a Punjabi journalist, who made a definite suggestion for partition before Rahmat Ali's call for the creation of a Pakistan. It was Rashdi, a Sindhi journalist, who repeatedly demanded a Pakistan when Jinnah and the Muslim League were still hesitating to commit themselves to any kind of partition.

Considering the fact that throughout this period Muslims had a weak press in India, even in their majority provinces (except the Punjab from mid-twenties onwards), the role of the journalists in the growth of the idea is truly impressive. Their small number was compensated by their enthusiasm and the free play of their rich imagination. They circulated and popularized the idea before any political or other group took it up. Had the Muslim community been more literate and the habit of newspaper reading more widespread among it, there is little doubt that the idea would have gained popular support much earlier.

The lawyers made up a small portion of this group: 8 out of 46. In one respect this was unusual and untypical, for in India they dominated all levels of politics. Most of the local and provincial leaders were pleaders and advocates practising before district or high courts. National leadership in all parties was also recruited in the main from the legal profession. Even those who did not practise law had had legal training or qualifications. Politics were thus chiefly the preserve of the lawyer class.

In the life of the idea of separation, however, the lawyers as such seemed to have played no important part. Numerically they were nearly equal to university teachers (whose absence from Indian politics was almost complete) and religious thinkers (whose number was not really large at any period). In some respects even this figure of 8 is misleading. Akbar Allahabadi did not express his views as a lawyer but as an intellectual. Bambooque did not write

for the *Comrade* because he was a lawyer, but because he was an old Aligarian, a friend of Muhammad Ali and an educated Muslim with a lively imagination who felt about the future of his people. Similarly Iqbal's part in the growth of the idea can hardly be ascribed to his legal profession or training. In fact, there was none among them who drew up a scheme for a division as a constitutional lawyer (except perhaps Rahmat Ali) or presented a purely legal defence of the separationist proposals. It was an unimportant coincidence that these men were lawyers by profession, just as it was an accident that some others had legal training but did not practise law. It is interesting to recall that of the three detailed schemes which described the constitutional structure (those of the Punjabi, Latif and Sikandar), none was by a lawyer—though Punjabi had read some law but left the college without a degree in the subject.

Yet we may ask the question why the legal or rather the constitutional aspects of separation were neglected. It is true that the idea as such was abstract: all ideas are. Its real foundation was the spirit of nationalism which has the excellent but exasperating habit of laughing the legalities to scorn. But once the idea began to take on the shape of certain specific proposals for dividing India and creating separate Muslim sovereignties or for setting up a confederal or loosely federal structure to take the place of the existing arrangements, it was reasonably expected that the lawyers would then come forward with definite schemes and alternative constitutions. Such detailed proposals did appear, but the point is that, with the possible exception of Bilgrami, none of them was the work of a lawyer. Precisely formulated constitutional alternatives were produced by the non-lawyers.

It is difficult to explain this failure or inability of the lawyers to give serious consideration to the idea or re-present it in legal terms. However, two factors might have had something to do with it. First, all the lawyers in public life were committed to some political party and probably found it imprudent to be seen to advocate an idea before their party had decided to bless it. Some of them might have been sympathetic to it (in fact, we know that it was so), but private sympathy did not go far enough to vanquish party discipline and loyalty. Secondly, some of them who were not inhibited by party allegiance might have been confused by the variety of shapes in which the idea was being dressed up. As

lawyers are given to clear thinking and removing ambiguities (or at least they think so), they might have waited for the time when the multiplicity and diversity of suggestions would have sorted themselves out and a broad agreement reached before lending a hand in clarifying things and drawing up a neat, ship-shape scheme. It is possible that considerations such as these kept them away from what would have been a useful activity. But we must remember that even after 1940, when such inhibitions had been totally removed, no Muslim lawyer drew up a juristical defence of the Lahore Resolution or prepared a constitution for the proposed Pakistan; though it could be said in reply that the vagueness of the Resolution and the wavering attitude of the Muslim League itself did not encourage such attempts.

Religious leaders did not have the impact that one expected from them. In a community whose identity was determined by its religion, whose nationalism was but an aspect and a dimension of its faith, and whose politics were not separate from its beliefs, the idea of separation should have come from its religious leaders. It should have been the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Hind and not the Muslim League which founded and led the Pakistan movement. It should have been the *mawlawis* of Deoband and the *mawlanas* of Farangi Mahal, not the western-educated and worldly leaders of modern political parties, who propagated the two-nation theory and upheld a partition on religious lines. In fact, the roles were reversed. The modern thinkers and the westernized lawyers opted for separation, while the orthodox *ulema*, the protectors of the *sharia* and the leaders of the religious parties opposed it as vigorously as did the Hindus. Moreover, once the demand for a Muslim state had been voiced, a great majority of the religious spokesmen of the community should have insisted on the Islamic character and basis of the proposed state. But that was not to be. Even among the religious leaders in our list it was only Mawdudi who belonged to the orthodox school, and his proposal for separation was hedged about with a plethora of qualifications. Iqbal declared that a Muslim state was essential because the Islamic way of life could not be realized without it, but he did not go into details and did not present a blueprint of the Islamic state he was suggesting. Of all the separationists it was Punjabi alone who thought that the Muslim state might be an Islamic one and pointed to some of the changes and reorientations which Muslims would have to make

to adjust themselves to new conditions. He was not a religious leader by any means. Nor was Rahmat Ali one, though at times he spoke of an Islamic state and the necessity of its realization if Indian Islam was to be saved from the assimilative tentacles of Hinduism.

This was an interesting situation. Religious nationalism, religious separation and a Muslim state were being advocated by and under the inspiration of secular-minded intellectuals and leaders, and opposed by and under the influence of religious leaders and upholders of orthodox opinion. This leads to two conclusions. First, that Muslim politics in India were essentially secular in approach, outlook, character and leadership. From the foundation of the Muslim League (and even earlier, when Sayyid Ahmad emphasized the importance of western education, modern science and a "natural" interpretation of Islam) till the achievement of freedom, Muslim leadership was political rather than religious minded, its views were liberal rather than puritanical, and its background more western than orthodox Islamic. Sayyid Ahmad, Ameer Ali, Muhammad Ali, Iqbal and Jinnah were national, not religious, leaders, who were as vigorous in trying to liberate Islam from the obsolete and misleading teachings of the half-educated *mulla* as in saving the Muslims from perpetual slavery under the Hindu. There was no Tilak or Gandhi in Muslim politics who made religion the determining factor of his politics and then pretended to fight for a "secular Indian" nationalism which was nothing if it was not Hindu revivalism. Tilak and Gandhi were religious leaders who moulded the political life of their nation and succeeded in making the Indian National Congress in their image.<sup>3</sup> There were no corresponding figures in Muslim politics.

In the second place, every major orthodox Muslim group, party or movement was allied with the Congress. The Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Hind (until its split towards the end), the Jamiat-ul-Ahrar, the *mullas* of Deoband—all were "nationalists", i.e., in the strange terminology made current by the Congress they were supporters of the Congress and upholders of an "Indian" nationalism. The Congress was anxious to retain their sympathy and loyalty, for the purely political motive that it offered the Congress an excuse to claim that, far from being a Hindu body, it spoke for the Muslims as well. What the Congress failed to notice in its impetuous state of excitement was that these orthodox groups were

wholly unrepresentative of Muslim sentiment, and that by welcoming their support and exaggerating their importance it was aligning itself with the most reactionary and illiberal elements of Indian Islam. It is possible that this is what the Hindus wanted to do: to give a bad name to Islam by bringing these traditionalist schools of thought into prominence and subtly conveying the impression that they voiced the beliefs and opinions of Muslim India. The suspicion that the Congress was using these "nationalist" groups to further its own cause is confirmed by their disappearance from Indian political life after the achievement of independence.

It is not a coincidence that the two greatest figures in modern Indian Islam, Sayyid Ahmad and Iqbal, should have helped so much in the progress of the idea of separation. The idea was a child of the new outlook which had been imparted to Islam by these two revolutionary thinkers. The outstanding characteristic of this outlook was liberalism. It gave birth to what some western scholars have called "new Islam". The influence of the teachings of Sayyid Ahmad and Iqbal was not confined to India. It was a major contribution to the revolution which caught up with religious thought throughout the Islamic world in the nineteenth century and has been with us to this day. Unknown to each other, or at least unconscious that they were travelling the same road, Shaikh Abduh in Egypt, Jamaluddin "Afghani" in several countries, Sayyid Ahmad in India, Ameer Ali in India and England, and Iqbal in India, were tolling the bell for the old and ringing in the new. The idea of separation in India was thus a part of the worldwide Islamic revolution, and a product of the new liberal spirit. Seen in this perspective it is natural that men like Sayyid Ahmad and Iqbal should have sired it and equally natural that the conservative spokesmen of outdated thinking should have opposed it.

In another sense, too, the religious leaders of the modern school helped in the spread of the idea. By talking about Islam as a natural, rational system of beliefs, by defending it against ignorant and interested attacks from the West and by emphasizing the necessity of freeing it from undesirable accretions which were corrupting its beliefs and practices, they made the Muslims conscious of their religious background, gave them a renewed confidence in the values of their faith, and mapped out for them a path which led to self-



respect and salvation. Without this new religious outlook, this self-reliance, this uplifting optimism, the birth of the two-nation theory would have been difficult and its acceptance by a great majority of the Muslims impossible.

Ideas do not come out of a vacuum. They are created by forces which might not be immediately recognizable and which might be at work in the unconscious depths of the mind. But forces there have to be, for in their absence the mind will not function and ideas will not evolve. Men are not ordinarily aware of these forces, but they feel the impact of the end-product, the idea, when it comes. The common Muslim was not conscious of the new forces let loose upon him by the teachings of these religious thinkers (and, in fact, before them by men like Shaikh Ahmad Sirhindi, Shah Waliullah and Sayyid Ahmad Bareilvi). Slowly and imperceptibly, his mentality was undergoing a change. The father of a family in mid-19th century was as much unlike his father of the early years of the century as his son in the later years was to be different from himself. The man who saw the turn of the century and attended Sayyid Ahmad's funeral was to become a completely different self in thirty years. Thus one generation merged into the other and passed on the message. The individual was as little conscious of the forces under which he lived as he was of the air he breathed. But when these forces produced an idea, men were ready for it. The forces had prepared the mind and thus assured a welcome for the idea. This explains the origin of the idea, its internal strength and the speed with which it gained acceptance.

The number of university teachers, like that of the journalists, comes as a happy surprise. Under the pressure of the requirements of a foreign rule Indian universities were strangers to internal freedom and academic autonomy. They were quasi-official institutions with the provincial governor as the *ex-officio* chancellor, a vice-chancellor appointed and controlled by the governor, and a large number of provincial officials on their governing bodies. Even non-government universities, like Aligarh, were subject to close official supervision. University teachers were therefore in the position of being half civil servants with all the responsibilities and restrictions of that status without its privileges. Government colleges, of which there was generally one in each district headquarters, were state institutions run and staffed by members of the provincial education department. In this system of higher educa-

tion politics were out of bounds to university and college teachers. That is why we find the teachers playing no part in Indian politics. A few "professors" whom we meet in the political field were either ex-teachers who had resigned from their academic appointments to enter politics, or men from private Hindu, Muslim and Christian colleges who were not subject to official regulations.

This was the general picture. As for the Muslims, the situation was even more discouraging. There were not many Muslim teachers on the staff of the universities, including those in Muslim provinces. Some Muslim provinces, like Sind, NWFP and Baluchistan, had no university of their own. As higher appointments were often in Hindu hands, Muslim lecturers were firmly kept in their place. Private Muslim colleges were fewer in number, poorer in resources and inferior in the quality of their staff than comparable Hindu institutions. Thus it was far more difficult for Muslim teachers to enter politics or to air their political views.

Against this background the number of teachers in our table emerges as very significant. But it is relevant to point out that with one exception all these men belonged to the Aligarh and Osmania universities. The exception is Iqbal, whose name appears in the group because he was for some time a lecturer in philosophy at Government College, Lahore; but that was long before he came to suggest separation for Indian Muslims. Similarly Abdus Sattar Kheiri joined the Aligarh University long after making his partition proposal. The other four men were actually teaching at the time of presenting their schemes. Latif was at Osmania in Hyderabad, a university run by the Nizam's government on the revolutionary principle of teaching every subject to the highest level in Urdu. He himself had a doctorate from London and lectured on English literature (in Urdu?). Zafrul Hasan and Afzaal Qadri were at Aligarh. Qadri was one of those Muslim students of Cambridge who had been converted by Rahmat Ali to the Pakistan idea, and on his return to India he became one of his chief lieutenants entrusted with important missions on behalf of the Pakistan National Movement. Both Zafrul Hasan and Qadri came over to the Karachi university after independence.

The four men of letters making up the next category figure in the table as a matter of record only, not in their own right. They belonged to this group, but their contribution to the idea was not made in the capacity of *litterateurs*. Only Iqbal's creative work

helped in the advance of the idea, but in an indirect way. There is no entry of "Pakistan, idea of, plan for" in the index of any history of Urdu literature or any other literature of the sub-continent. I have found no poem, novel, short story, play or essay of the pre-1940 period which made the idea of separation its major or minor theme, or even mentioned it in passing. Books were written in favour of it and hundreds of articles appeared in the daily newspapers and in some magazines. But this was an exercise in polemics, not in polite letters. There is nothing in the *belles-lettres* of this age to show that the creative writer was attracted by it. Probably the reason was partly literary and partly psychological. An idea or thought must go deep in the psyche of a people before it can inspire its literature. The idea of separation was under study and discussion for a few decades, but the creative writer viewed it as a purely political phenomenon and so considered it unfit as a theme for literary treatment. Still, it remains an unanswered question: why did an idea which was engaging the attention of so many intellectuals for so long and of most of the nation for over a decade fail to make an appearance in verse or fiction (the two strong suits of Urdu literature)? Coming to later history, the same question can be asked about the partition of 1947. Here was a cataclysm which brought freedom to several millions, uprooted a few millions, and killed hundreds of thousands (some put the figure at two million) in unspeakable circumstances. Millions of human beings who evaded death suffered worse horrors: mothers saw their sons murdered cruelly before their eyes, fathers were made witnesses of their daughters' public rape, small children were parted from their parents and brides of a few days or weeks from their husbands, people attached to their lands by centuries-old ties had to abandon everything and move to new, inhospitable surroundings, hearths and homes were left behind for ever, many among the rich became poor and many among the poor experienced an unexpected prosperity. The revolution teemed with great themes which literature could work upon and transmute into words of permanent merit—human suffering, personal grief, memories of past events, nostalgia, euphoria, dependency, intoxication with freedom, fresh experiences, deeply stirred emotions, heightened sentiments. For some reasons, which literary historians and critics might one day discover, no literature on partition appeared. We have nothing except half a dozen short

stories by Saadat Hasan Manto and Intizar Husain, and three or four *ghazals* by Nasir Kazim. So little in 36 years on an event that changed the life of millions! If Urdu literature has been so insensitive to such an upheaval, what could one expect from it on the more placid and extended theme of the idea of separation?

Only two authors appear in our next category (student leaders), but one of them was a body not an individual. The Punjab Muslim Students Federation, along with its allies, the Inter-Collegiate Brotherhood and the Majlis-i-Kabir-i-Pakistan, was the first organization in India to adopt the idea of separation and to issue an official declaration that it would work for its attainment. The importance of this development cannot be over-estimated.

The youth of a nation is its most active, tireless and enthusiastic arm. It is always the vanguard of nationalist movements. It is over-zealous, sometimes irresponsible, often unruly. But it is also uninhibited, keen to try new ideas, anxious for change. It can break conventions without bringing the world over its head. It can defy traditions without humiliating the old generation. It can adopt new ideas without involving the national leaders. Because its number is large and spread out over the land it can broadcast an idea more effectively than party propagandists. Because it is vociferous by nature, voluble by habit and contentious by temperament, it can deal with the opposition more swiftly, more effectively and sometimes more violently than the party spokesmen who have certain conventions of the system to observe and their own reputation to guard. Thus the value and strength of the student community make themselves felt in every popular movement. Only an impudent leader will ignore its voice or refuse its co-operation.

In the history of the idea of separation the Punjab students played a very interesting role. Instead of taking the idea from an established political party and popularizing it on its behalf, they picked it up from certain individuals and tried to tie the hands of the Muslim League by spreading it so widely among the people that no party could afford to ignore it. They were doing three things at the same time: familiarizing the public with the idea, showing the direction in which the mind of the youth was working, and acting as a pressure group on the Muslim League to accept and own the idea. That they succeeded in all three was as much due to their zeal, industry and organizational ability as to Jinnah's wisdom

in listening to the voice of the future.

Looking at the Muslim student community all over India it is a matter of some surprise that the enthusiasm for the idea should be limited to the Punjab. Aligarh was to play a crucial part in the Pakistan movement, but that came later when the Muslim League had adopted the Lahore Resolution. In Bengal, Sind, NWFP and Baluchistan the students did not come out in support of the idea. Nor did the young of the United Provinces, where Muslim culture was well established and a number of persons had proposed separatist and partitionist schemes.

The situation can be explained in several ways. The Punjab, and especially its capital Lahore, was the biggest and most important educational centre in northern India. It had an old university and a very large number of colleges. It was also the cultural centre of Muslim India, with ancient traditions going back to Ghaznavid times, a surprisingly large number of publishing houses, dozens of journalists and creative writers, and several Urdu dailies and journals (some enjoying all-India reputation and circulation and definitely belonging to the "quality" category). It was also Iqbal's home from where the rays of his influence radiated. The peculiar communal composition of the province, with a marginal Muslim majority, heightened the appeal of the idea. The Muslims were the masters of the province, and yet they were not. They were the majority community and historically they looked at it as a Muslim province, but their majority was too small to afford security. This must have made the idea of separation and the creation of a Muslim state in the north-west very attractive indeed.

But the overpowering factor which shaped the attitude of the Punjab Muslim students was the influence of Rahmat Ali. Partly because Rahmat Ali himself was a Punjabi and partly because a large number of Muslim Punjabis went to England for higher education or as ICS probationers in the 'thirties and there came in touch with him, his influence was the greatest in the Punjab. With a background moulded by the factors mentioned in the preceding paragraphs, the Punjabi youth was already in search of a radical solution, and when Rahmat Ali gave them the name and the concept of a Muslim state they welcomed it as a panacea of all their maladies and as a noble ideal worth fighting for. They were fortunate in having among them several youngmen who were good in organizing the Federation, persuasive in communicating the idea,

sincere in their loyalty to Rahmat Ali and his teachings, and self-sacrificing in the pursuit of the ideal. They held meetings, issued leaflets, circulated pamphlets, organized discussion groups, delivered lectures and public speeches, wrote articles for the press, brought out processions, influenced their parents and elders, and finally convinced the national leaders that Pakistan was the only alternative to Hindu rule. That they did this in a province where the Muslim League was almost non-existent and where an overwhelming majority of Muslim voters had put a Unionist government into office in 1937 makes their achievement still more impressive.

There is only one missionary in this list, but his solution, like that of all missionaries, was the most radical, wholesale and extremist. Durrani realized that there was no constitutional, political or mechanical solution of the Hindu-Muslim problem. If the Muslims wanted to live in honour and freedom in India they had to re-conquer it, as his own ancestors had done, and establish the supremacy of Islam once again. The Indian problem would not be solved by a partition, but by the creation of an Islamic empire embracing the entire sub-continent. It is an irony of history that the most "Islamic" solution was proposed by a member of a sect which was later to be outlawed from the pale of Islam by the Government of Pakistan.

Such remarks may give the impression that Durrani was a fanatic. But that is not true. His case was very well argued (fanatics don't argue). He examined other alternatives, studied their implications, and found that none of them dealt with the essential fundamentals of the problem. In some respects he emerges as the greatest realist of all the scheme-makers. The different variations on the theme of federation suggested by many people did not go far enough to satisfy the Muslims. The confederal proposals were impracticable and nobody could see where they would lead; the same applied to the regions and zones prescribed by some others. Partition seemed to fulfil all requirements and was finally adopted as the solution, but the years since 1947 have shown that the old communal problem has not disappeared but taken on a different shape. Instead of a Hindu-Muslim problem now there is an India-Pakistan problem; communal rivalry has become international friction; the Hindu ambition to rule the sub-continent has reappeared in the Indian aspiration to weaken and then destroy



Pakistan. Indian armed interventions in Hyderabad, Kashmir and Bangladesh are official policies pursued in implementing this aspiration. This takes the problem back to where Durrani picked it up and demonstrates the strength of his argument. Pakistanis can hardly be accused of perversity if sometimes they think that Durrani's plan had much to commend itself. It was of course a drastic solution, but it left no problems behind it.

The last category in our table relates to an area where politics were unknown and unnecessary. The tribal belt lying between Afghanistan and the "settled" districts of the NWFP was a centre of mystery to the rest of the world (except in stories of exaggerated romance written by the Pathan-loving British). Technically it was a part of British India, but only in the sense that it appeared in the Durand treaty and was marked in red on the maps. In all other respects it was an independent area; in fact, it was popularly referred to as the *azad ilaqa*, free or independent area. The Afghans who lived in these ragged and bald valleys were primitive, brave and fanatically jealous of their independence. Their hospitality was proverbial. Their contempt for the British was legendary. Their greed and love of loot were also parts of their character. They did not consider themselves Indians and looked upon the people of the settled districts with unconcealed disdain.

Because they were Muslim to a man and because they had successfully defended their freedom against the might of the British Empire, a communal problem had no meaning for them and a Muslim fear of a Hindu rule evoked in them nothing but a guffaw of hearty laughter. Their self-confidence, their history of uninterrupted independence, their feeling of not belonging to India, their lack of interest in what went on across the Indus—all this made them supremely indifferent to the Muslim problem in India and incapable of understanding the difficulties and apprehensions of their co-religionists living among the followers of a different faith. They lived in a world of their own where inter-religious conflict was inconceivable, independence was taken for granted, concessions were not demanded but extracted, political debate was unknown, and the conception of a Hindu was that of a fat money-lender who cowered and cringed but charged an interest of 500%. They could not believe that any Muslim could be afraid of a man who fled trembling at the sight of a dagger.

The idea of separation was therefore foreign to the understand-

ing of these people. But slowly the news and rumours of what went on in India reached their ears. A traveller to the distant land of the Punjab came back and told his friends of what he had seen and heard. A vague impression spread that Indian Muslims were in some sort of danger, that Islam was not as free in India as it was on these mountain slopes, and that this time the enemy was not the white man from the West but the Hindu from the Indian plains. Some Muslim Leaguers visited the tribal belt and imparted some more information. Gradually their ignorance was breached and their indifference broken down. Still the line of communication was not fully open, for there were psychological barriers which only time and more mixing could dismantle.

There was one way, however, to appeal to their sympathy, and that was to base the approach on two concepts: Islam and independence. Religion went deep into their consciousness and a call in the name of Islam was bound to be answered. Mawlana Abdul Wadud adopted this means and got some support for his idea of an Islamic state in the north-west. The Faqir of Ipi put the emphasis on independence and received promises of help from some tribes in the establishment of a Muslim state. Owing to the conditions sketched above the idea of separation could not flourish in the tribal area, but even these minor winds of change are significant, for they showed that with a little more education and propaganda the idea of Pakistan could be made more attractive for these ancient and undisciplined defenders of the northern frontiers. The fact that the Congress-ruled NWFP stood between the tribal belt and the rest of Muslim India made these minor victories even more promising. Soon the idea began to grow more rapidly and in later years its popularity was not doubted by those who knew the area. Jinnah paid a highly successful visit, and Jawaharlal Nehru was roughly handled when a Congress ministry was in power at Peshawar and Mountbatten was the Viceroy.

Can we draw any broad conclusions from this detailed study of the 46 persons who proposed a radical solution of the Muslim problem? A few things may be said with confidence. First, that Muslims who favoured a new solution covered many walks of life and represented a large section of the thinking public. Secondly, that the intellectuals were in the forefront of this quest, and were in the end successful in converting the political leaders to the idea of separation. Thirdly, that the creative writers ignored the idea in

whatever they produced. Fourthly, that the youth, particularly of the Punjab, helped a great deal in spreading the idea and winning over the public before the League declared its hand. Fifthly, that by and large the idea came from and was developed by the liberal, secular-minded, modern school of thought and earned the disapproval of the orthodox, religious, traditionalist establishment. Finally, that there were differences within this separationist group on the practical manifestation of the idea, i.e., on the nature of the proposed re-distribution, demarcation, re-arrangement or division.

### The Partitioners

It will be noticed that the idea of separation was interpreted by this group of 46 in more ways than one. Some took it to mean a provincial or regional separation which did not split India completely. Others applied it to create some clearly-demarcated zones which would be joined together at the top in a loose federation or a tenuous confederation. Some others took the argument of separation to its logical end and laid down that India should be partitioned into Hindu and Muslim states. In the strict sense of the meaning it is only this last group which could be given the name of separationist. And it is to them that we now turn for a closer look.

All those who talked of separation in academic terms or proposed merely federal, confederal, regional or zonal solutions may now be dismissed as unfaithful dissidents, revisionists, or whatever the modern jargon for them may be. This excludes 30 of the 46 men with whom we began this inquiry. Thus we are now left with a smaller group of 16 persons who were, so to say, pure separationists, partitioners, who made a clear demand for a partition leading to the creation of one or more sovereign Muslim states. They were:

TABLE 6

### THE PARTITIONERS

<i>Name</i>	<i>Date of Proposal</i>
Bambooque	1913
Kheiri Brothers (2)	1917
Bilgrami	1920
Gul Khan	1923
Maikash	1928
Zulfiqar	1929
Rahmat Ali	1933
Iqbal	1937
Sind Muslim League	1938
Yusuf Yaqub	1938
Khaliquzzaman	1939
Kafayet Ali	1939
PMSF	1939
Aligarh Dons (2)	1939

Some information about the background of these men may be useful. Their provincial affiliations were as follows:

TABLE 7

### THE PARTITIONERS : PROVINCE-WISE

<i>Province</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>Authors</i>
United Provinces	7	Bambooque, Kheiri Brothers (2), Bilgrami, Khaliquzzaman, Zafrul Hasan, Afzaal Qadri.
Punjab	6	Maikash, Zulfiqar, Rahmat Ali, Iqbal, Kafayet Ali, PMSF.
Sind	2	Yusuf Yaqub, Sind Muslim League.
NWFP	1	Gul Khan.

The United Provinces led the way and claimed more partitioners, while other areas had had more separationists. The smaller provinces made their small contributions. There was no partitioner from Bengal.

If we apply our earlier professional categories to this smaller group, we get this result :

TABLE 8

THE PARTITIONERS : PROFESSION-WISE

<i>Profession</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>Authors</i>
Intellectuals	9	Kheiri Brothers (2), Zulfiqar, Rahmat Ali, Iqbal, Kafayet Ali, PMSF, Zafrul Hasan, Afzaal Qadri.
Lawyers	6	Bambooque, Bilgrami, Gul Khan, Rahmat Ali, Iqbal, Kafayet Ali.
Politicians	5	Zulfiqar, Iqbal, Sind Muslim League, Khaliquzzaman, PMSF.
University Teachers	4	Sattar Kheiri, Iqbal, Zafrul Hasan, Afzaal Qadri.
Journalists	3	Bambooque, Maikash, Rahmat Ali.
Student Leaders	2	Rahmat Ali, PMSF.

On some points this analysis produces the same results as were obtained when we dealt with the larger group of separationists. The intellectuals dominate; the lawyers are there but do not produce detailed schemes; the politicians are weak and do not come from the national leadership; the journalists are fewer, but produce the landmarks; and both the student leaders come from the Punjab. On other points we meet a different situation. There are no religious leaders in this group. We miss the single missionary, though he was alive throughout later years. No partition proposal comes from the tribal area.

By social class the partitioners divide as follows (the Sind

Muslim League partitioners are here treated as individuals):

TABLE 9

THE PARTITIONERS : A SOCIAL ANALYSIS

<i>Social Class</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>Authors</i>
Landed Aristocracy	1	Zulfiqar Ali.
Medium Landholding	3	Gul Khan, Syed, Majid.
Wealthy Business	1	Haroon.
Middle Class	12	Bambooque, Kheiri Brothers (2), Bilgrami, Maikash, Rahmat Ali, Iqbal, Rashdi, Yaqub, Khaliquzzaman, Kafayet Ali, PMSF.

This shows how solidly middle class this group was. In this respect the partitioners present a stark contrast to Muslim political leadership in general which was, and had been in the past years, aristocratic, feudal, wealthy and upper class.

Along with social class we should consider the educational background of this group. For want of information on two persons, the result is incomplete:

TABLE 10

THE PARTITIONERS : EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENTS

<i>Academic Status</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>Authors</i>
Graduates or Doctors of British Universities	5	Zulfiqar, Rahmat Ali, Iqbal, Zafrul Hasan, Afzaal Qadri.
Graduates of Indian Universities	6	Bambooque, Bilgrami, Gul Khan, Khaliquzzaman, Kafayet Ali, PMSF.
School Education or Unknown	5	Kheiri Brothers (2), Maikash, Sind Muslim League, Yaqub.



On the whole the group was highly educated, and in this respect much superior to the general run of Muslim (or other Indian) politicians.

The general picture that we get of these 16 partitioners is not only impressive in itself but indicative of the nature and force of the idea they were expounding. It was an intellectual, liberal-minded, highly-educated, middle-class group. There had been nothing like this in Muslim political life since the Aligarh movement. But the Aligarh band had enjoyed three big advantages which were denied to this group. It had a great leader in Sayyid Ahmad; it operated from a valuable centre; and it worked in concert. On the other hand, the partitioners were unorganized, worked as individuals separated by time and distance, possessed no centre which could co-ordinate or integrate their disparate activities, and had no supreme leader to set the pattern or inspire further effort. In spite of this they triumphed, which is as much a testimony to the inherent attraction of the idea as a proof of their own liberal outlook, high education, intellectual approach and middle-class origin. Had the idea not touched a sensitive chord in the Muslim heart, or had these people not been properly equipped to rear the idea to maturity, it would certainly have been difficult, perhaps impossible, for the Muslim League to formulate and win a demand within seven years and a half. It is to their persistence and sincerity that the League owes much of its final victory.

### General Proposals and Their Authors

So far we have been looking at the proposals and the men who made them in relative isolation. By integrating the two—the men and their measures—it may be possible to determine some sort of connection between the nature of each proposal and the background of its author or authors. The method followed in preparing the following table has been to classify the proposals into six broad categories and then to indicate the authorship of each category by its national origin (Table 11).

It is necessary to clarify some points about the inclusion of the same person in more than one category. There were some who made a suggestion which led to two or more conclusions. For instance, Blunt believed that the Muslims were a separate people and could not live with the Hindus, which puts him among the

people suggesting the second category of solutions. But from this belief he concluded that India ought to be divided between a Muslim north and a Hindu south, and for this reason he is also included among the authors of the last category of proposals. On similar grounds, some Indian Muslims make more than one appearance. For example, Muhammad Ali stated in 1911 that the Muslims were a separate entity, therefore he is noted in category number two. A few years later he hinted at a partition when he talked of the right of self-determination being exercised by parts of India, and of the inadvisability of forcing unwilling Muslim areas into an Indian state, which brings him into category number four. Nawab Zulfiqar Ali Khan is mentioned twice because at one time he advocated a set of fully autonomous Muslim provinces balancing another set of Hindu provinces so that a balance of power was created in India, and at another time he came out in favour of a clear division of the country. F.K. Khan Durrani gets double notice because at one place he merely recalled an old memory that Muslims were thinking of separating themselves from India, while at another he suggested a definite course of action resulting in the establishment of an Islamic empire in the sub-continent. Iqbal is the best example of this multiplicity of suggestions and, accordingly, he figures in four categories. He argued in favour of the Muslims being a separate people in his 1930 Allahabad address; in the course of the same pronouncement he spoke of a new territorial arrangement to improve the Muslim position; and at the same time expressed himself in words which could be interpreted as a hint for a possible separation. Though made at the same time, these three distinct suggestions put him in three different categories of our table. A few years later, in his letters to Jinnah, he proposed the creation of two Muslim states, and this new scheme brings him into the last category of partitioners.

### Specific Proposals and Their Authors

This analysis will become more meaningful if we shorten our sights and give closer attention to the proposals embodied in the last three categories only and their authors. This narrower study will enable us to concentrate on the idea of separation as far as it led to proposals of partition. A large variety of suggestions were made about how to apply the idea in practical terms,

TABLE 11

## GENERAL PROPOSALS AND THEIR AUTHORS

<i>Proposal</i>	<i>British</i>	<i>Other Foreigners</i>	<i>Hindus</i>	<i>Foreign Muslims</i>	<i>Indian Muslims</i>
India will or should break up.	Bright, Morison, Craddock, Garratt	Stalin			
Muslims are a distinct people in India. They will never join the Hindus in anything. They fear Hindu rule.	Blunt, Beck, Morison, Knox, Colvin				Sayyid Ahmad, Chishti, Zahur Ahmad, Muhammed Ali, Sardar Ali Khan, Iqbal.
New political, cultural or territorial arrangements without destroying Indian unity but improving Muslim position.	Zetland, Lawrence		Shahani, Reddy		Aga Khan, Hasrat Mohani, Aligarh team (1925), Ubaidullah Sindhi, Zulfikar Ali, Suharwardy, Iqbal, M. Yakub, Rahim Bakhsh, Fazli Husain, Mawdudi, Asadullah, Punjabi, Mamdot, Sikandar, Rizwanullah, Yusuf Ali, Zakauallah.

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<i>Proposal</i>	<i>British</i>	<i>Other Foreigners</i>	<i>Hindus</i>	<i>Foreign Muslims</i>	<i>Indian Muslims</i>
Hints of possible separation.	Lovat Fraser, Fagan, <i>The Times</i> , Archbold, <i>Round Table</i> , <i>Manchester Guardian</i> , British Cabinet, <i>Economist</i> , Lambrick		Banerji	Two Turkish Statesmen	Sharar, Muhammad Ali, Ross Masud, Iqbal.
Reports of above.	Curzon, Montagu, Keith		Beni Prasad, Sastri		Durrani.
Demands for or prophecies of partition.	Blunt, Morison, Holsinger, Irwin, Coatman, Calvert, Hodgson, Hodson	Cheiro	Parmanand, Lajpat Rai	Jamaluddin, Atatürk	Akbar, Bambooque, Rahmat Ali, Kheiri brothers, Bilgrami, Nadir Ali, Kamboh, Gul Khan, Thanawi, Maikash, Durrani, Zulfikar Ali, Iqbal, Khaliquz-zaman, Siddiqui, Wadud, PMSF, Gazdar, Ipi, Aligarh dons, Subhani, Afzal Haq, Jawwad, Sind ML, Samad, Jamiluddin, Kheirati, Haroon, Toosy, Nasim.

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ranging from vague re-arrangements through broad unspecified separation to definite partition with demarcated boundaries. These various suggestions can be classified under eleven heads according to their specific contents. The table that follows (Table 12) lists these eleven categories of proposals along with the authors of each who are then sub-divided into national groups on the pattern of the last table:

Here too, as in the previous table, it will be noticed that some persons are mentioned more than once, and for the same reason. Durrani once dreamed, in company with his fellow-students, of a divided India in which Muslims would have their separate independence; this was a concept of general, unspecified division, and therefore he appears in that category. Later he made his own proposal for Muslim sovereignty over the whole of India, and this puts him in a different category created for him because none else made a similar suggestion. Like Iqbal's in the previous table, in this one Rahmat Ali's name has to be repeated four times because as he developed and enlarged his plans he included more and more areas in the proposed Muslim states. He started with north India in 1915, then demanded a Pakistan for the north-west only, still later added Bengal and Assam to the north-west, and finally brought in a sovereign Hyderabad.

### The Areas Demanded by the Partitioners

If we select those partitioners who clearly indicated the provinces or areas that they wanted to be constituted into one or more separate Muslim states, and arrange them in some logical pattern, we might be able to relate the background of the claimant to the area or areas he demanded, and to find out how much agreement existed and on which areas. For this purpose I have taken 15 suggestions or schemes of definite partition, named their authors along with their provincial affiliation and arranged their demands and schemes in a chronological order.

All the Muslim provinces of the north-west are treated; the Punjab twice, because some wanted the whole of it and some only the western part. In the north-east, Bengal makes one category, Eastern Bengal and the Sylhet district another, and the whole of Assam still another, because these represented the different claims about this part of India. Kashmir and Hyderabad, though not

TABLE 12

### SPECIFIC PROPOSALS AND THEIR AUTHORS

<i>Proposal</i>	<i>British</i>	<i>Other Foreigners</i>	<i>Hindus</i>	<i>Foreign Muslims</i>	<i>Indian Muslims</i>
General division on Hindu-Muslim lines.	Morison, Holsinger, Craddock, Garratt, British Cabinet, Lambrick	Cheiro	Parmanand, Lajpat Rai	Two Turkish statesmen	Durrani, Kheiri brothers, Bilgrami, Nadir Ali, Thanawi, Jawwad, Khaliqzaman, Siddiqui, Afzal Haq, Subhani, Sind ML, Jamiluddin.
Re-arrangement into Hindu and Muslim districts.					Sharar.
Muslims to be pushed across the Indus.					
Whole of India for the Muslims.					
North India for the Muslims.	Blunt, Fraser, Fagan, <i>Manchester Guardian</i>				Durrani.
					Akbar, Bambooque, Rahmat Ali, Gul Khan, PMSF, Ipi, Asadullah.



<i>Proposal</i>	<i>British</i>	<i>Other Foreigners</i>	<i>Hindus</i>	<i>Foreign Muslims</i>	<i>Indian Muslims</i>
North-West + Afghanistan + Muslim Central Asia for the Muslims				Jamaluddin	
North + East for the Muslims.					Zulfiqar Ali, Samad, Toosy.
North-West + Bengal + Hyderabad for the Muslims.				Ataturk	Rahmat Ali, Aligarh dons, Latif.
North-West + Bengal for the Muslims.					Rahmat Ali, Iqbal, Punjabi.
North-West + Afghanistan for the Muslims.	Keith, Archbold, Hodgson				Ross Masud.
North-West for the Muslims.	<i>The Times</i> , Zetland, Lawrence, Coatman, Calvert				Maikash, Kamboh, Rahmat Ali, Gazdar, Wadud, Haroon, Kheirati.

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British Indian provinces, are included for treatment because Kashmir was generally considered to be a part of the Muslim north-west (and assumed to be so even by those who did not refer to it specifically), and the future of Hyderabad agitated the Muslim mind and one-fifth of this group declared for its sovereignty. A new category, containing parts (and in one case, that of Asadullah, the whole) of the United Provinces, Central Provinces and Bihar, figures in the table because these areas were demanded by another one-fifth of our authors. Thus tabulated, the proposals show some interesting features, some of which had far-reaching implications (Table 13).

Thus there was complete agreement on the inclusion of the north-west (Punjab, Sind, NWFP and Baluchistan) in the proposed Muslim state. This was natural because the idea of a separate state had originated with the concept of a Muslim north-west, and several among the partitioners did not claim anything beyond this area. But there were differences on the definition of the term. Everyone agreed that the NWFP, Sind and Baluchistan formed part of it and, because of their large Muslim majority, would naturally make up the Muslim state. There was no such unanimity on the future boundaries of the Punjab. The overwhelming majority opinion (12 out of 15) was for the inclusion of the whole province as it then stood. But three proposals wanted a partition of the province. It is significant that the best-argued case for a Muslim state was the one which gave cogent, rational and detailed reasons for excluding the predominantly Hindu eastern districts. Mian Kafayet Ali (Punjabi), who himself belonged to the province, favoured such exclusion on strong grounds : justice demanded that Muslims should not lay claim to an area which had a majority of the other nation, the inclusion of the whole province would perpetuate the existing communal problem instead of solving it, and the exclusion of the Hindu areas was essential for making the proposed state fully Muslim or as near to that as possible. The fact that of the three persons who wished the Punjab to be divided two were Punjabis (Zulfiqar Ali Khan and Kafayet Ali) shows realism and a welcome freedom from parochial considerations. It is also significant that the case for a divided Punjab was better put than that for the inclusion of the entire province in the Muslim state.

Kashmir presented a different kind of problem. It was not

TABLE 13

## AREAS DEMANDED BY THE PARTITIONERS

Areas Demanded by	Bilgrami March- April 1920 (U.P.)	Kamboh 1923 (Punjab)	Malik 1928 (Punjab)	Zulfiqar Dec. 1929 (Punjab)	Rahmat All January 1933-39 (Punjab)	Iqbal June 1937 (Punjab)	Gazdar July 1937 (Sind)	Khel- rad 1938 (Sind)	Sind M.L. Oct. 1938 (Sind)	Samad Nov. 1938 (Rajasthan)	Toosy Feb. 1939 (Punjab)	Asad- ullah March 1939 (Bengal)	Punjab July 1939 (Punjab)	PMSF July 1939 (Punjab)	Allard August 1939 (U.P.)
North- west															
NWFP	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Baluchistan	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Sind	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Kashmir	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Punjab	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Western Punjab	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
North- east															
Bengal					x	x				x	x	x			x
Eastern Bengal															
Sylhet				x							x	x	x		
Assam (whole)	x				x					x	x	x			
North- east- East															
Parts of UP, CP and Bihar															
South					x					x		x	x	x	x
Hyderabad															

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mentioned as a part of the Muslim state by no less than 10 authors out of the 15; but probably that was not because they excluded it from the claimed area but because it lay outside British Indian territory. Even those who did not make a specific reference to it assumed that it was a part of the Muslim north-west: its very large Muslim majority and its contiguity with the Punjab and the NWFP assured that. Moreover, at least since Rahmat Ali's first call for a Pakistan, Kashmir had been an integral part not only of the proposed state but also of its name: the "k" standing for the state of Jammu and Kashmir. The failure of many schemes to mention Kashmir by name should not surprise us. Princely states lay outside the major issue of determining the future of British India. There was also a general belief that, in view of the oft-repeated principle of paramountcy, all native states would automatically become independent and sovereign areas the moment British rule was withdrawn from the sub-continent. Muslim public opinion argued that once the principle of separation on communal majorities was accepted, the native states would be subject to the same criterion. That explains why no scheme specifically mentioned Bahawalpur—a Muslim-majority, Muslim-ruled state—situated between the Punjab and the Rajasthan desert of Hindu India. That also explains why the Lahore Resolution did not lay claim to any specified provinces or states but to areas or regions with a Muslim majority.

When we come to Bengal we find that the margin of difference has widened. Here opinions vary, not only on whether or not to divide Bengal but also on whether or not to refer at all to the north-east in future Muslim plans. Six schemes make no reference of any kind to the north-east, and confine the application of the principle of separation to the north-west. We have already mentioned possible reasons for this omission. Among those who included Bengal in the Muslim state, or rather planned for another Muslim state in the north-east, opinion was equally divided between those who wanted the whole of Assam and those who wanted to annex only the Sylhet district of Assam to Eastern Bengal. The arguments given for excluding the western portion of Bengal and the major part of Assam were the same as in the case of a divided Punjab.

The controversy about the inclusion or exclusion of other areas was in a lower key. Only two schemes, those of Samad and

the PMSF, wanted to drag into Pakistan parts of the solidly-Hindu United Provinces, Central Provinces and Bihar; and one, by Asad-ullah, stretched the Muslim hand to the uttermost limit when it annexed the whole of these three provinces to the proposed Muslim state. We do not know the grounds on which these demands were made. It is obvious that the idea was to save a large number of Muslims of these provinces and, at the same time, to gain possession of certain important Muslim historical and cultural places and monuments. In the case of the PMSF, it is strange that this suggestion should have come from a body which did not concern itself with Bengal though the claimed areas could have made up a convenient corridor between Pakistan and Muslim Bengal. In fact, such a corridor was demanded by the Muslim League in 1947, but the demand was not pressed.

Hyderabad was neither a Muslim-majority area nor a part of British India. Yet its sovereign independence was demanded by at least three of our 15 scheme-makers, and some other public men and writers referred to it while talking about the future of the Indian Muslims. There seemed to have been considerable general sentiment in favour of saving the Nizam's dominions from passing under permanent Hindu rule. Though Muslims were only a small minority in the state, general Muslim Indian opinion considered it a part of Muslim India. Muslim culture flourished here. Historical memories were strong. The Nizam's court was regarded as the last surviving vestige of Muslim sovereignty and Mughal rule. It was a stronghold of the Urdu language and ran the only university in India where it was employed as the sole medium of instruction and research. The Nizam had all along provided refuge and gainful employment to a large number of Muslim administrators, intellectuals, journalists and teachers from British India who had fallen foul of British rule or failed to find jobs in their own provinces. He was also a patron of Islamic literature and art. Then there was a large group of Muslims in the south whose security would have been assured by an independent Hyderabad. It was also the largest Muslim native state and already in enjoyment of exceptional privileges and a special relationship with the British Crown. For these reasons Muslims were deeply interested in its future.

## NOTES

1. On British administration in the Punjab see G.R. Elsmie, *Thirty-Five Years in the Punjab, 1858-1893*, Edinburgh, 1908; Prakash Tandon, *Punjab Century, 1857-1947*, London, 1961; S.S. Thoburn, *Musalman and Money-Lenders in the Punjab*, London, 1886, and *Punjab in Peace and War*, London, 1904; H.K. Trevaskis, *The Punjab of Today*, Lahore, 1931; J.M. Wikeley, *Punjabi Musalmans*, Calcutta, 1915; Syed Muhammad Latif, *History of the Punjab from the Remotest Antiquity to the Present Time*, Lahore, 1889; and K.K. Aziz, *The British in India : A Study in Imperialism*, Islamabad, 1977.
2. On Justice Shah Din see *Indian Judges: Biographical and Critical Sketches*, Madras, n.d., pp. 446-456; "Justice Shah Din", *The Indian Review*, October, 1925, pp. 709-714; the only full-length study-cum-collection of his writings and speeches is by his son, Mian Bashir Ahmad, *Justice Shah Din: His Life and Writings*, Lahore, 1962.
3. For an acceptance of Tilak and Gandhi as leaders of Hinduism see K.M. Sen, *Hinduism*, Harmondsworth, 1961.



# 16

## THE LONE HAND

### The Variety of Minds Behind the Idea

We have now reached the end of our journey. We have had a fairly close look at the signposts which marked the twists and turns, the pointers which indicated the diversions and detours, and the warnings which directed attention to the dangerous spots. Our route has lain through a variety of paths, some narrow and winding, some wide and straight, here a stony stretch, there a smooth patch. Occasionally several footpaths have converged on a highroad; sometimes a few have continued to meander as if there were more joy in the journey than in the arrival. At times a road has petered out into a rough track, as though somewhere on the way a wrong turning was taken which carried the traveller far from his destination. Parts of the route were easy to traverse, for there were old footprints to show the way and leafy trees to give shade. But there were portions which bore no previous tread and the weary but adventurous traveller had to strike out a new path which promised no shelter from the wrath of natural elements, and yet held out a hope of fresh discoveries. Beginning with nothing better than a few rough tracks lying across unfamiliar country, passing through many crossways where one wrong turning could (and in some cases did) lead back to the starting point, the road to separation gradually emerged from treacherous ground and bleak woods which hid nobody knew what. The last part of the journey was done not only on better surface but also in good company. Sooner or later most of the by ways had curved in to meet the central highway. Only a few had lost themselves on the way, and they continued to go round and about for they refused to join the road to separation and failed to find another route.

Ours has been the story of a journey, a pilgrims' progress, and

the travellers we have met on the way had greater variety than even the paths they walked. Even when some took to the same road their starting points lay apart, their motives in moving were different, and the baggage they carried on their backs was diverse. There was the same final purpose in their quest, but their origins were divergent, their backgrounds different and their points of view occasionally contradictory.

There was much in common between Sayyid Ahmad and Jamaluddin "Afghani". Both aspired to free Islam from superstitions of centuries, both linked divine revelation with reason, both espied a scientific purpose behind the working of the Divine Will, both presented to the West an agreeable picture of Islam with its roots fixed in the needs of human nature. But their differences were no less marked and obvious. The major issue of their time, the rising tide of Western imperialism, evoked different reactions from them. While the sage from Aligarh favoured co-operation and collaboration and knew what dangers an "Indian" nationalism posed for the Muslim community in India, the peripatetic revolutionary from Iran believed in strengthening the fibre of pan-Islamism in the face of Western aggression. And yet each contributed in his own way to the birth of a Muslim nation in India: one by the wisdom of his message, the other by the memory of his myth.

No two men present such a contrast in personality as Muhammad Ali and the Aga Khan. Muhammad Ali, a poor son of an undistinguished family which had no money to spare, was able, by his own exertions, to give himself a good start in life, even to the extent of an Oxford education. The Aga Khan, the scion of an ancient aristocratic line, was brought up in the lap of luxury, educated by a succession of private tutors, but never entered a seat of learning. One turned out to be a man of the masses, a leader of irresistible appeal with flaming views on every subject, a facile pen and a silver tongue in two languages, a politician who led a highly agitated concourse of Muslims into the vortex of the Khilafat movement and as a consequence spent years in prison or detention, a Congressman who became the president of the party and yet refused to call Gandhi by the appellation of "Mahatma" in the face of a hostile Hindu crowd, a Muslim delegate to the Round Table Conference who warned the British Government that he would not go back to a slave India and fulfilled the threat

by dying in London and obtaining a grave in Jerusalem. The other was a cautious, careful go-between, respectfully transmitting the views of the Indian Muslims to their imperial masters, using his powerful connections and immense wealth to advance the Muslim cause, never uttering a single disloyal syllable, advocating moderation and co-operation, frequently winning concessions from the authorities, always preaching the virtues of organization, co-ordination and unity, sometimes expounding schemes which seemed to combine the perpetuation of the imperial sway with a measure of Muslim security, often employing his vast influence and native shrewdness in improving the Muslim position. Muhammad Ali was a confirmed anti-imperialist with a passion for everything Islamic in India and elsewhere. The Aga Khan was one of the greatest friends the British ever had in their vast colonial possessions and, notwithstanding his leadership of a religious sect, was neither a practising Muslim nor a devotee of Islam in the sense in which Muhammad Ali certainly was. And still both walked the same road, both realized that an Indian nation was a dream which no political or constitutional device, no gradual development or sudden catastrophe, could translate into reality, and both stood for some kind of re-arrangement of provinces and areas which would bring the Muslims the substance of freedom.

Fewer men could be as different from each other as was Nawab Sir Zulfiqar Ali Khan from Chaudhary Rahmat Ali. The Nawab came from a petty ruling family of Malirkotla, was for many years a member of the Indian legislative assembly, and presided over the All India Muslim Conference. Rahmat Ali was the son of a lower middle-class farmer, born in a village, schooled in a small town, and then let go to make his own way in life. A self-made man of unbelievable industry, he took himself to Britain for better education and chose to live in permanent exile. Except their university, Cambridge, the two men had nothing in common. One was a recognized leader, a senior legislator, a friend of Iqbal and other great men of his time. The other was an unknown student, cut off from home, spending his days in a distant, strange land, with little money in his pocket and no political support behind his words. Yet both worked towards the same end, both based nationalism on religion, both saw nothing but disaster in an undivided India, both reached the conclusion that complete separation was the only practicable and honourable solution of

the Muslim problem.

The profession of Islam provided the only definite link between Muhammad Iqbal and Abul Ala Mawdudi. In everything else they were poles apart: even in their understanding of Islam. Educated at Cambridge and Munich in philosophy, trained in London in law, with an intimate knowledge of the West and a remarkably deep understanding of the Quran, with some political experience in the legislative assembly and at the Round Table Conference, with the presidentship of the two best-known national organizations behind him, with some teaching experience in his youth and considerable legal practice in middle years, with his unique reputation as a poet in two languages and as the author of the celebrated lectures on religious thought in Islam—with this background it is easy to see how Iqbal revolutionized Muslim thinking by his philosophy, gave a new turn to Islam by his dynamic interpretation, inspired the Muslim masses with his heart-lifting poetry, and took Islam a very long step further towards a renaissance which had originated with Shah Waliullah, had been given a practical shape by Sayyid Ahmad Bareilvi, had been vouchsafed a new stance by Sayyid Ahmad Khan, and had received much impetus from Sayyid Ameer Ali.

Mawdudi was a man of an entirely different stamp. Incompletely educated under the old religion-dominated system, denied the benefit of a college or university training, without any opportunity of or inclination for coming into contact with the West, with no knowledge of any European language, influenced and moulded by the most orthodox schools of thought in Islam, he grew up to be that contentious, retrograde and dry-as-dust *mulla* about and to whom Iqbal had so many sharp things to say in his poetry. Shunning liberalism as if it were heresy, disapproving of reforms as though they would lead to irreligiosity, advocating a puritanism of the most rigid variety in the belief that ritual was the heart and core of faith, interpreting Quran in the most reactionary manner possible and condemning all other interpretations except his own as un-Islamic—Mawdudi was a perfect foil for Iqbal. While the philosopher sharpened the edges of Muslim nationalism, the *faqih* pontificated that nationalism was a sin and a curse in Islam. While the poet pointed to the pristine democracy of Islam, the *mulla* made the *amir* of an Islamic state a ruler with unlimited powers and no accountability. One was a

revolutionary thinker, the other a fundamentalist theologian. One rekindled the ancient flame of pure Islam with its pulsating, vitalizing and eternal message of change and renewing life. The other killed the spirit of the faith and harped on the virtues of imitation.

But ultimately both met at a point which was situated on the road to separation. Iqbal gradually developed his theory of communalism and Muslim identity into a demand for a separate Muslim state. Mawdudi was forced by circumstances to suggest two separate national federal states of Hindus and Muslims with only a confederal nexus joining them at the top.

The reader can draw up his own list of such "fellow-counterpart" pairs. The point I am making here is that the idea of separation was a joint product of a large number of people who made up a very variegated group. It was not like a party or an organization established deliberately and specifically to work for a certain objective. Scattered all over the country, separated by time, working under different influences, moved by dissimilar forces, impelled by unlike motives, moulded by diverse backgrounds, these people were faced by one problem, the future of the Indian Muslims, and they solved it in one way—separation. However much they differed from one another, however far removed the parties to which they belonged, however different the reasons they adduced, however varied their points of view, they all agreed that a united India of the Congress's conception was not worth a straw, that Muslims could not be fobbed off with the shadow of independence, and that Muslim sovereignty in parts of India was not only desirable and right but also inevitable.

### The Hindus and the Idea

The present narrative also leads to another conclusion. The movement towards separation was a Muslim movement and the idea behind it came from the Muslims. The future of Indian Islam was a Muslim problem. This was obvious and needs no arguing. But the Muslim question did not exist in a vacuum. It was a part of the larger Indian problem and therefore should have been the concern of all parties to the issue, especially of the Hindus who were the majority community, and of the British who had the primary responsibility for working towards a just and practicable solution.

But, as we have seen, nearly all the proposals and suggestions for the future of India were made by the Muslims.

To take the Hindus first, Bhai Parmanand and Lala Lajpat Rai alone showed an interest in solving the Indian problem on the assumption that the question of the future of the Muslims was the cardinal issue in India. What Parmanand suggested was rather vague and has reached us through secondary sources. Thus we are left with Lajpat Rai alone who made a definite proposal for the separation of the Muslim areas from India. One single contribution to a debate which touched the heart of the matter and went on for over eighty years is an irrefutable proof of Hindu indifference to the Muslim problem. It may be urged that for many years the Hindus did not feel the force of Muslim separatist feeling and therefore could not give it serious attention. This may or may not have been correct: Lajpat Rai's partition scheme shows that it was not. But from the opening of the third decade of the present century onwards none could reasonably pretend that Muslim separation was an unimportant issue. Radical separationist solutions were falling pell mell from so many lips and from so many directions that it would not have been difficult to realize that the Indian deadlock could only be broken by affording the Muslims a reasonable measure of satisfaction. Yet not a single Hindu came out with a suggestion which differed from the standard Congress stand for a federal India with a strong centre enshrining all the hopes of an "Indian" nationalism.<sup>1</sup>

It is absurd to argue that as the problem concerned the Muslims alone it was no business of the Hindus to try to help in its solution. The Muslims posed a problem in India simply because they were in a minority and they had no trust in the majority which was Hindu. Had India been a Muslim country, there would have been no Muslim problem. The problem was created by the simultaneous presence in India of two different communities or nations. It was a Muslim problem in so far as it concerned the future of the Muslims. It was a Hindu-Muslim problem in so far as it was caused by the unhappy relations between the two peoples. It was an Indian problem in so far as it encompassed the future of the sub-continent. If it was an Indian problem, every Indian should have given his best in seeking a solution to it. If it was a Hindu-Muslim problem, both the communities were morally obliged to try to resolve it. But the Hindus absolved themselves from any responsi-



lity, apparently on the ground that the future of the Muslims was no concern of theirs. This was as much moral cowardice as political ineptitude.

The whole Muslim question arose from the presence of a Hindu majority in India. The Muslim fear of Hindu rule was not a Muslim problem: it was a Hindu-Muslim problem. A problem is always created when two or more questions, nations, countries, parties, ideologies or points of view place themselves in opposite positions and threaten to, or actually do, clash. Like love or war or peace, it always takes two to make a quarrel. And it becomes the equal duty of both to try to settle the quarrel. The entire course of modern Indian history is a witness to the fact that the Muslims tried to settle the quarrel and the Hindus did not. The Muslims suggested a separate electoral system as a device to assuage their feeling of insecurity. The Hindus opposed the proposal and, when it was accepted by the British, continued to attack it. The Muslims wanted other safeguards, like adequate share in the public services and protection of their religious and cultural rights. The Hindus were against the granting of such measures, and showed displeasure when some of them were enacted into law by the British parliament. The Hindu attitude did not change in later years when the issues were much clearer. Every Muslim suggestion about the future constitution was systematically turned down. It was always the Muslim who was presenting alternatives: provincial autonomy, possession of residual powers by the provinces, re-drawing of provincial boundaries, a loose federation, a confederation, a zonal arrangement, a regional structure, etc. The Hindu not only rejected each one of them but refused to make any suggestion of his own. It was not that his mind was infertile or that he was incapable of seeing the gravity of the situation. It was sheer political stubbornness and a belief, ill-founded as it turned out to be, that silence would make his point of view prevail.

Why did the Hindus refuse to help in solving the problem? Why did they fail to see that the problem existed, if that is what happened? It is not easy to read the mind of another people. The full explanation must come from the Hindus themselves; though there is little chance of that. A non-Hindu historian can only speculate on the basis of his own view of developments.

There is no doubt that the Hindus were too sure of their numerical strength to pay adequate attention to the Muslim

minority. They were in a majority of one to four, and that ensured their domination for ever in any democratic system. They also knew that their majority was not merely political, and therefore in no danger of being turned into a minority through any change in their political fortunes. It was a religious majority and therefore eternal. Further, they knew that in material prosperity, economic enterprise and educational attainment they were far superior to the Muslims. If this superiority could be translated into numbers, their majority would go up from four to something like ten to one. With so much of their strength visible and with so many built-in advantages, it is no wonder if they saw their future to be as bright as the noon-day sun. Nothing, absolutely nothing, they believed, could ever cloud it. It was as inevitable as destiny.

But is destiny really inevitable? Does history not tell us that there are forces, not supernatural but shaped by our own hand, which change the destiny of mankind? Are there not things which can reduce the most assured future to ashes, break the strength of the mighty as if it were straw, and raise the unknown weak to pinnacles of glory? This has happened before and shall happen again. Great civilizations have declined of causes which historians are still striving to discover. Powerful empires have been humbled by some weakness which the arrogance of their builders hid from their eyes. Overbearing majorities have been broken on the wheel of pride, and their seat of authority occupied by men who confuted the force of numbers with the strength of genius. Every observer of the rise and fall of nations knows these things, and if he is wise he will learn what they teach.

Apparently the Hindus did not know this, or, if they did, cared not to heed its lesson. Sure of the strength which numbers gave them, they ignored other forces which human thinking lets loose. One such force is religion, which takes no note of numbers. Everything is possible for those who have faith. Another is nationalism which makes a mockery of majorities and minorities. When these two forces work in unison their strength is incalculable. The divine and the human, the sacred and the profane, join together to work the miracle. To ignore such a phenomenon is to invite disaster; to stand in its way is to challenge a power which has several hidden sources of strength. In ignoring the rise of Muslim nationalism in India the Hindus committed a grave mistake. In thinking that its spirit could be broken by the weight of numbers they forgot a

most important lesson of history.

If the Hindu was convinced that his majority would be his bastion, the Congress was confident that this majority would guarantee its superior position and make it the sole arbiter of India's fate. The Hindus formed the major portion of the country's population, and the Congress was not only overwhelmingly Hindu in membership but steeped in Hindu beliefs, culture and general background. It was the largest political organization and expounded the dogma of an Indian nationalism which was supra-communal. It could well afford to do that because an "Indian" nationalism was bound to be Hindu in character. It spoke the language of secularism because it suited it to do so, knowing that the rule of the Hindu could be presented more agreeably as the democratic rule of the majority. When it praised the Western representative system, asked the Indians to make it their goal because it was "good", and impressed the West with its readiness to borrow all "progressive" ideas, it was really playing a political game; for the "Indians" to whom it appealed were really Hindus, and the representative system which it upheld was really Hindu rule. That is why it never succeeded in winning over the Muslims. How could it, if its declared objective was to put the Hindus in the place of the British?

The point is not that the Congress was a Hindu body and therefore wanted Hindu rule—that was obvious and logical—but that far from making any attempt to solve the Muslim problem it denied the very existence of it. The general attitude of the Hindu community was understandable. It was in the majority and wanted to stay there. But the Congress was a respectable political party with highly intelligent leaders, and it had no excuse for saying that there was no such thing as a Muslim problem. It is impossible to imagine that men of the ability, intellectual grasp and political experience of Tilak, Gandhi, Jawaharlal Nehru and Radhakrishnan really believed that there was no Hindu-Muslim question and that peace and quiet would reign in India once the imperial power was gone. Even the Hindus knew that this was not so, and that British withdrawal would bring in an era of unparalleled turbulence. Clearly then such statements must have been made for foreign consumption. But men who repeat a falsehood, no matter to whom it is addressed, soon come to believe in its truth. Whether the British, who were the recipients of this infor-

mation, were convinced or not, the Congress had certainly put its faith in the illusion that the Muslims offered no difficulties in the way to independence.

This illusion was an unmitigated disaster. From it flowed a long line of situations and events which saddened the later years of British rule. To it must be ascribed the failure of the Congress to present any scheme alternative to the established system and to give serious thought to the various Muslim proposals made to resolve the deadlock, its inability to accept the Muslim League as the representative spokesman of Muslim India even when general elections had confirmed the title and the reality, its rejection of the Pakistan plan as a solution of the Indian problem, and finally its refusal to accept the 1947 partition as permanent. The last years of Hindu-Muslim and Indo-British negotiations and of the transfer of power would have been less tragic, perhaps quiet and peaceful, certainly less murderous, if the Congress had given up this illusion and seen the realities of the situation. It is true that many in Britain and some British authorities in India encouraged the Congress to persist in the illusion, and they must take part of the blame for it. But the final responsibility lay with the Congress leaders who were so dazzled with the Western dogma of majority rule, and saw in its application to India such a golden opportunity to put the Hindus into perpetual power that they forgot Islam, Muslim nationalism, rights of the minorities, cultural pluralism, historical memories, provincial loyalties, rights of the native states—in short, everything that went to make the Indian problem one of the most challenging issues of modern history.

Another possible reason for Hindu failure to participate in the discussions about the future shape of India was that neither the Congress, nor the Hindu Mahasabha, nor any other Hindu party, took the Muslim talk of partition seriously. Several factors, some good and some bad, contributed to this inability. To a great extent it was an act of deliberate policy. To take part in any scheme-making which entertained the possibility of a division was to acknowledge the Muslim sentiment of separation. To do that was, directly or indirectly, to admit that there was a great divide between the Hindus and the Muslims, that Muslim nationalism did exist, that the Muslims were not with the Congress, that Indian nationalism was really a Hindu nationalism, and that partition was at least possible even if extremely undesirable and distasteful. The

Congress was not prepared to admit any of these things. It was not in its interest to do so, for each of these admissions cut at the root of its claims and declarations.

In this sense the policy of ignoring the Muslim idea of separation was deliberate and well thought out. To take note of the idea would lead to an involvement which could be dangerous to the Hindu and Congress position. Therefore the best strategy was to pretend that it did not exist. But unpleasant realities cannot be wished away by making opposite assertions or by shutting the eye to them. When at last the idea forced itself upon Hindu attention, various explanations were brought forth to belittle it or to damn it with dubious and dishonourable ancestry. The news was spread around that it was the child of the unholy British policy of divide and rule, that Muslims had been deliberately set against the Hindus to break the strength of Indian nationalism, that the British had instigated the Muslims to demand a partition by, among other things, bribing Rahmat Ali to propose his Pakistan scheme, and that generally the British were behind Muslim separationists. This could have been a good argument but for two things. Not a shred of evidence was or could be produced in support of the allegation. And, further, it was irrefutably answered by the British anxiety to maintain the unity of India, the overwhelming British condemnation of the partition plan, and the almost universal British regret at the creation of Pakistan. Had the British secretly instigated the Muslims to ask for a partition, they could not have possibly criticized or attacked their own suggestion.

Complementary to this accusation was the statement that the Muslim idea of separation was merely the opinion of a few extreme communalists which a great majority of the community neither shared nor approved of. This was an old argument which was employed whenever the Muslims put in a claim that was not to Hindu taste. Muslim plea for separate electorates had once been dismissed in a similar fashion, though the deputation which asked for them at Simla was one of the most representative in Muslim political history. Muslim support for the continuation of the partition of Bengal had been treated in the same way, though the resolutions of every Muslim organization and the increasing tempo of communal riots had made it clear that Muslims were as anxious to maintain the partition as Hindus were to see it annulled. So now it was said that the idea of separation did not represent the real will

of the community, that it was the silly dream of a small minority of a minority, and that the Muslims themselves had given no proof of their support for the idea. The argument was an admission of ignorance. Every important Muslim leader from Sayyid Ahmad onwards had contributed to the growth of the idea. To dismiss all of them as unfit to speak for the Muslims was to say that the Muslim community never had a leader. On the other hand, if the Hindus were so ignorant of Muslim politics that they did not know how and over how many years and with the help and encouragement of how many leaders the idea had originated and developed, they had no right to speak a word about it. The reasoning is absurd from whatever side we look at it. If it be assumed, for the sake of argument, that the Hindus genuinely believed that the idea was not acceptable to a majority of the Muslims, the adoption of it by the Muslim League and the League victory in the 1945-46 elections, which were fought on the single issue of partition *versus* unity, should have been enough to correct the Hindu view. But after an electoral decision in which over 80% of the Muslim voters had voted for Pakistan, Jawaharlal Nehru said in a public statement that he was still not prepared to admit that the Muslims wanted a partition and that they had voted for it without realizing what they were doing. This is the kind of mentality which had, in the first place, produced the Muslim problem. Obviously nothing could convince the Hindus that the reality was different from their illusion.

Another explanation has been suggested: that the idea of separation was so primitive, in so far as it combined religion and politics, that the secular-minded, modern Hindus could not take it seriously. Enough evidence is available to show the Hindu background of the Congress and the Hindu character of Indian nationalism. The Congress was a Hindu body in everything but name; other Hindu parties were more loyal to their credentials but hardly less flexible.

Stubbornness on this scale in the face of an idea which was changing the entire character of Indian politics can never be fully explained. It shows Hindu inability to understand the Muslim mind, to estimate Muslim feeling and to judge the course of Muslim politics. The Congress placed so much reliance on the views and following of the "nationalist" Muslims that it forgot what the great majority of the community felt and thought. The "nationalist"



Muslims were a handful and therefore very precious in Congress eyes. Their support was not to be forfeited at any cost because it enabled the Congress to pretend to be a national body. These "nationalist" Muslims also greatly valued their connection with the Congress, for without it they were nothing. In the longer perspective this alliance cost the Congress too much. By presenting these Muslims as the real spokesmen of their community, it rendered itself incapable of understanding the views of the vast majority of that community. By accepting a handful of yes-men as the authoritative spokesmen of Indian Islam and thus claiming to represent the Indian Muslims, it cast doubts on its own integrity.

But here it is more relevant to point out that these "nationalist" Muslims encouraged the Congress to neglect the Muslim problem, to ignore the Muslim feeling of separateness and to under-rate the force of the idea of separation. Naturally these Muslims did not want the Congress to take any notice of the separatist tendency in the Muslim community. Had the Congress acknowledged this tendency and gradually come to accept the fact that the Muslims did not believe in an Indian nationalism, the position of these "nationalists" would have become untenable. The Congress Muslims presented themselves in false colours in order to strengthen their position in the Congress; in doing this they not only misled the party but also brought much harm to Islam.<sup>2</sup> The Congress sacrificed the long-term interests of India to the comfort of winning a temporary advantage, thus complicating a situation which was already getting out of hand. Had it listened less to the deeply-satisfying but completely misleading advice of its Muslim members and more to the words coming from the generality of the Muslims, it would have made contact with genuine Muslim feeling and changed its policies in accordance with the realities of Hindu-Muslim politics. Had this come about, the last years of imperial India would have been less turbulent and the country would have been divided and made free in an atmosphere of courteous co-operation, if not warm friendship.

The idea of separation was rooted in the two-nation theory, and even a partial acceptance of the idea entailed an acknowledgement of the existence of Muslim nationalism. However co-operative the Congress would have turned under the stress of political events, it could not bring itself to accept that the Muslims were a nation by themselves. This was because it believed not only in the rule of

the majority but also in the nationalism of the majority. The assumption was that nationalism was the exclusive preserve of the majority and that a minority could not have a national sentiment. All kinds of arguments were unsheathed to prove the truth of the assumption. It was pointed out (by Gandhi among others) that most Indian Muslims were converts from Hinduism. This was a dangerous line of thought, for it subtly suggested that in some strange way they were still Hindus; and it created the *shuddhi* movement aimed at bringing back the converted Muslims into the fold of Hinduism, though the Hindu religion does not allow conversion. It was also said that Muslims had lived side by side with the Hindus for hundreds of years, as if living in proximity obliterated all differences and automatically created brotherly love. This also ignored the central fact of Indian history that Muslims had been either the rulers of India or fellow-subjects with the Hindus under British domination, never the subjects of a Hindu government. Then it was claimed that there was much in common between the two communities in their ordinary daily life. This was true as far as it went, but it did not go far. All Europeans wear the same dress and eat the same food, live in similar houses, and have similar social customs and manners, and, above all, profess the same religion. But nobody has ever suggested that the people of Europe are a nation or that the continent should form one nation-state. Nor was the statement wholly true in its application to India. The Pathan did not eat the food of the Madrasi; the Bengali did not dress like the Punjabi; Muslim ceremonies, rituals and mores at funerals, births, marriages and other social and religious rites were quite different from those at similar Hindu occasions.

The basic fact is that the Hindu had no idea of how much the life of a Muslim was moulded by his religion, although in his own life Hinduism was an equally pervasive influence. It is true that the Hindu and the Muslim had lived together for a thousand years, but if after such a prolonged acquaintance the Hindu could still be so ignorant of the life of the Muslim, this was an argument for their fundamental separateness not for the birth of a united nation. But the Hindu chose not to look at the problem in this way, for that would have weakened his case for an Indian nationalism of which the Muslim was said to be an integral part. Muslim protestations to the contrary carried no weight with him. He had made up his mind that all Indians were a nation and that the Muslims

must not be excluded from this nation. Perhaps it never occurred to him that the first quality of a nation is its voluntariness. A forced nationalism is a spurious concept.<sup>3</sup>

### The British and the Idea

The British abstained from the search for an alternative to a united India partly for the same reasons which actuated the Hindus and partly for others peculiar to themselves.

In the ignorance of how the Muslim mind worked and in the adoption of a generally unsympathetic attitude towards the Muslims, there was little to choose between the Hindus and the British. It is true that a few Englishmen suggested a re-arrangement of India on religious lines, and several others predicted or warned that some kind of split was coming; but the number of such individuals was very small, and, anyway, predictions and warnings are not signs of sympathy. Like the Hindus, the British believed that religion should be kept out of politics, that religious nationalism was a pernicious, primitive phenomenon, and that Muslim politics in India was something which they could not support because it was neither "modern" nor secular. They failed to see that what they called Indian politics was nothing but Hindu politics. They also ignored the fact that they themselves took every opportunity to assert and admire the Christian inspiration, roots and character of their own civilization and way of life. Religion was a humanizing, civilizing influence if it was Christianity; it was a primitive, degrading influence if it was Islam. This was a contradiction in their attitude which they did not notice. Again like the Hindus, the British were wont to allege that the idea of separation was current only among a tiny minority of the Muslims and could therefore scarcely represent general Muslim opinion. Accepting the Hindu-fashioned terminology, they, too, called the supporters of the idea "communalists" and other names which were dirty in the vocabulary of Indian politics. There were also some among them who echoed the Hindu charge that Muslims had been deliberately set against the Hindus by imperial rulers in their own interests. The accusation of divide-and-rule was as popular among the Hindus as among the British centre and left, and each was content to repeat it without adducing proof.

Besides this large-scale ignorance and prejudice, there were two

major factors which kept the British away from understanding the Muslim position and sympathizing with the idea of separation. The first was purely political, but went deep into British conviction and experience as these had evolved in their own society and country. This was the principle of majority rule, of one-man-one-vote, of the obligation of the minority to accept the rule of the majority without demur. They applied this principle, which for them had the authority and prestige of a revealed message, to India without a thought to the entirely different conditions obtaining there. Because the rule of the majority as embodied in the parliamentary system had been such a great success in England, it could not be but an equally resounding success in India. Was it not their duty to give to India the best of themselves, and was not the Westminster type of government the most beautiful gift they could bring to her? This conviction was, as it were, confirmed when the Hindus themselves yearned for this gift. The Muslim position was totally opposed to such convenient conclusions. To the Muslims the principle of majority rule was an irrelevant ritual in a country so diverse and heterogeneous as India. It assumed a united nation which did not exist. It also assumed political majorities and minorities, while in India these were replaced by religious majorities and minorities which were fixed, unchanging and unchangeable. This was the most serious mistake the British committed: they strove to transfer to India a system which was not meant to resolve a situation where religious communities had taken the place of political ins-and-outs.

Of course, the British were entitled to their opinion. But the tragedy of the situation was that in all its implications this conviction worked against the Muslims and in favour of the Hindus. Since they believed in the rule of the majority, they had to accept the Hindu point of view that India was a nation, that the Hindus, as the majority of that nation, had a prescriptive title to rule over the country, and that the Muslim minority possessed no exceptional rights or prerogatives. Given the premiss of majority rule no other conclusions dared follow. Thus the British had entrenched themselves in a rigid position even before the complexities of the Indian problem appeared on the scene. When the Muslim question rose to challenge these assumptions, the British could not see it in its true perspective without going back on their previous theory. They were not prepared to change their attitude because

that would have injured their pride in the perfection of their institutions. The result was that they continued to back the application to India of their own principle of the rule of the majority through an elected parliament, even when they knew that the Muslims offered a serious obstacle to the realization of this ambition.

The belief in the right of the majority to rule led to a virtual though unwritten Hindu-British alliance. As the British were convinced that the majorities should be allowed to rule everywhere and as the Hindus were the majority in India, logic demanded that they should support the Hindus in all their aspirations. How could the upholders of the principle of majority rule see any virtue in the protests of a minority? The rest followed automatically. India was a nation; it ought to be governed by the standards long accepted and practised in the West; the Muslims had no right to declare their separation; a division of India was out of question if it was to be based on the theory that Muslims were a separate nation; liberalism, democracy and political prudence dictated that the Hindus should be supported because they were the majority. The defects of this line of argument are glaring and need not detain us. It is enough to say that the British faith in the rule of the majority did not permit them to comprehend, appreciate or support the Muslim idea of separation.

The second major factor was the British attitude towards the unity of India. Acutely conscious of the inherent disunity of the country, the British believed that it was under their rule that for the first time India had been given a substance of unity. This they took to be a great achievement, and they were anxious that it should stand for ever as a witness to the reconstructive character of their imperial effort. Without considering the precarious nature of the unity they had effected, failing to notice the dangerous cracks hidden by the stucco facade of a foreign domination, confusing the semblance with the reality, they attributed a sacredness to their handiwork like an artist who comes to worship his own creation. Nothing could convey to them the hollowness of the fabric they had built. Anything that pointed to the weakness of the entity that they had so laboriously put together was rejected as insignificant, temporary, valueless and spurious.

Apart from an element of self-congratulation in the contemplation of what they considered to be a unique triumph (which it

was not, as India had been united by some of the Mughal emperors and earlier by one or two Hindu monarchs), there was another reason for British insistence on the unity of India. They believed that it would be their only permanent contribution to Indian history. Once they were gone, what would remain of the memory of their rule? The English language? No, because sooner or later Indians would revert to their own language or languages as all ex-colonial peoples did. The common law? Again no, because every society has its own ethical and social standards and norms which it embodies in its laws. The parliamentary system of government? Again no, because artificial transplants rarely flourish. The only hope was that India would remain one and this unity would be a permanent memorial to British rule.

This was a fond belief, and like all such beliefs unfounded. Nobody reminded the British enthusiasts that unity is never born of force. If the waving of the imperial sword could unite the subject peoples as if it were a magic wand, the Muslim middle east would have been one state, the greater part of Africa one country, and the seventeenth-century Ottoman Empire would have been with us today. Imperial rule is by its nature a foreign force, and, however binding it may be as long as it lasts, the moment of its departure is a signal for springing back to the original diversities. India was kept together under British rule by instruments which were wholly foreign and therefore artificial — a foreign tongue, a corps of white officers, an unfamiliar civil service, an alien legal and judicial system, an army led and equipped by strangers. To imagine that this forced unity would outlast its imperial links was to live in a dreamland. Attempts at unity in much more encouraging circumstances and among infinitely more homogeneous peoples (as in Ireland, Scandinavia, the Arab world, and the pre-1971 Pakistan) had ended in failure. To expect that a hundred odd years of British rule would make one people and one country out of the vast racial, religious, linguistic and cultural varieties of India was a hope which history did not sustain and common sense did not encourage.

But neither history nor common sense will stop an imperialism from claiming virtues which it does not, cannot, possess. The British went on believing that they had united India, continued to compliment themselves on the achievement, and abode by the hope that it would survive their rule. For our present purpose the



unwisdom of the belief is less important than its impact on the British attitude towards the Muslim idea of separation. So dear was this unity to the British that they did not want even to contemplate the remotest possibility of a partition. This explains a lot in their dealings with the Muslims.

First they did not take any notice of Muslim separatist feeling. When at last they did, they disapproved of it. Every measure they enacted for the governance of India refused to acknowledge the plural nature of the Indian society. Muslim demands for statutory requirements of composite provincial cabinets were rejected in the making of the 1935 constitution; this led straight to the trouble about the Congress ministries of 1937-39, and greatly contributed to the Muslim League's adoption of the Pakistan plan. They did not like Jinnah simply because he was, in their eyes, the arch destroyer of the unity of India. He was never forgiven for his sins. In 1942 the Cripps Mission rejected the Pakistan solution on such a ridiculous ground that it would disrupt the all-India communications system. In 1946 the Cabinet Mission proposed a plan for India which, by its complex provisions, multiple territorial units, artificial political arrangements and the rickety three-tier federal structure, only a miracle would have made workable, and that only in a country where political sophistication and the habit of toleration were present in ample measure. In 1947, when they discovered that there was no alternative to partition, they decided to stage a magnificent scuttle in an operation in which every dice was loaded against the Muslims. As if still dissatisfied with all that they had done, every speaker took it as his duty to stand up in the House of Commons and the House of Lords and shed tears on the creation of Pakistan and express hopes that one day this "artificial" division would disappear and India would once again be one.

Partly because of this obsession with the unity of India and partly because they had no experience of dealing with a country as large and diverse as India, the British were unable to contribute anything to the discussions on the future shape of things. It has been suggested by many Hindu writers and some British historians that British rule made difficulties for itself by taking too serious a notice of its responsibilities to the minorities and its obligations to the princely states. All the evidence we have points the other way. On certain occasions and for certain purposes the British

might have used the argument of minorities to delay reforms or to go back on their earlier promises. But they never really comprehended the nature and dimensions of the minority problem, and when the hour of final decision struck they let the Muslims suffer the injustices of a hurried and unfair division, washed their hands of all responsibility for the other minorities, and left the native states at the mercy of Indian politicians forgetting all the assurances and guarantees of a hundred and fifty years.

Let me illustrate this by reference to the Muslims. Since the middle of the 19th century the Muslims posed a special problem, and the British must have been familiar with at least some aspects of it and foreseen how it might develop in the future. But they did not take a single step to forestall the coming difficulties or to begin to tackle the problem. Every suggestion for easing the situation, every proposal for creating security among the Muslims, every request and demand for new constitutional measures, came from Muslim leaders, not from British officials or politicians. Separate electorates, weighted representation in elected bodies, a fair share in the public services, safeguards for cultural and religious rights, some representation in provincial executives, separation of Sind from Bombay, elevation of Baluchistan and the NWFP to the status of full provinces, provincial autonomy, one-third representation in the central legislature, a true federal arrangement in which the centre would not overshadow the provinces—all these were initiated by the Muslims themselves. Had the British been genuinely solicitous for the minorities and willing to give them due consideration in the political and constitutional plans made from time to time, at least some of these Muslim demands should have originated in the India Office or the Viceroy's Council. In actual fact, not only was it found necessary to draw British attention to the problem by hastily-gathered deputations, long petitions, protracted negotiations, noisy processions and sometimes a bit of violent action, but even after this had been done only a few Muslim suggestions were accepted, and that reluctantly, half heartedly and often tardily. As we have said above, it is not difficult to see why this happened: the British faith in the right of the majority to rule was too strong to allow them to look at the minorities as anything more than a troublesome nuisance. But it is not easy to see why the British should have continued to blame the minorities for their Indian difficulties, when they never took a serious

notice of them in their plans for the future of India.

According to some British apologias this inability was due to the British lack of experience of the minority problem at home. Had they been used to dealing with a minority question in Britain, the argument runs, they would have found it easier to see the true dimensions of the Indian situation and tackled it with more knowledge and greater skill. This is not only a piece of special pleading but is morally wrong and historically false. It is special pleading, because it has appeared only recently in British writings: in the imperial heyday no Englishman doubted the perfect wisdom of his rule. It is morally wrong, because even if the British had no experience of such a thing at home, their long career of empire-building and imperial administration should have told them how to get out of their narrow shell and appreciate the meaning and significance of novel situations. They have always prided themselves on their pragmatism, their freedom from dogma, and their ability to meet new situations with new solutions. It is historically false, because it is just not true that there was no minority problem in Britain. Of course it was not on the Indian scale; but the nascent nationalism of the Welsh, the separatist trends among the Scots, and, above all, the religious clash in Ireland, were indicative of the fissiparous forces operating in British political life. The Irish question is particularly pertinent because it was religious in nature, fairly large in size, long in history and a cause of repeated crises in modern British history. And it was finally solved by a partition (or was it?). One would have thought that the Irish experience had specially equipped the British for dealing with the Muslim problem in India; but this was a case of imperial ambition and dogmatic belief erasing the lessons learnt nearer home.

But there was a field in which the British had no experience. Their acquaintance with federalism was purely academic. This was unfortunate because in later years the Indian problem centred round the kind of federation suited to the country. The creation of a federation in India was the right step as her size ruled out the unitary system of government. But the makers of this federation had had no first-hand experience of the system and therefore made serious mistakes. Their intentions were good and their industry beyond praise. But the whole operation was like the writing of a scholarly tome by a man sitting in a library and pontificating on something which he had never seen, felt or

experienced at first hand. All the arguments were there, all the persuasive reasoning, all the fine theoretical framework, a well-assembled structure in which each part fitted into the other with lubricated ease. It looked very good on paper and was phrased in careful and clear language. These were immense virtues. But the highest academic excellence will not breathe life into a dead abstraction. It had no relationship with the people for whom it was fashioned. It did not take notice of the political values current in India. It did not solve the major problems it was intended to solve. It did not suit a plural society. It did not install a workable machinery. In short, it was a good constitution but not one that India could work. It was artificial, awkward and unrealistic.

It was bound to fail in India because it was not made to deal with the Indian situation. But because the British had worked from an abstract and purely theoretical model, and because they had devoted an immense amount of time and effort to it, they could not bring themselves to believe that it had failed. It pained them when all Indian parties rejected it. It dismayed them when the outbreak of the war prevented its full operation. It amazed them to see that such an impeccably drafted constitution should produce unresolvable deadlocks. It puzzled them to find that something which looked so nice had failed so miserably. It took them many years of frustrating thought and prolonged and bitter parleys to discover its basic defects: defects which if noticed in time should have saved them and India much trouble and worry. The assumptions behind the constitution were misconceived. India was not a nation and not a place where the rule of the majority would be acceptable to the minority. This was a simple proposition which the course of modern Indian politics had brought out and confirmed time after time. It was the failure to see this fundamental characteristic of Indian political life that caused so much misery in India and so much frustration in Britain.

This produced an important sequence. After the British had prescribed a federal solution they sat back thinking that they had done their best for India and could not do any more. Henceforth their hands were as empty as their minds were vacant. No alternatives occurred to them. No new schemes were drawn up, and no fresh proposals were made. They refused to play with unfamiliar ideas. The Indian problem was unparalleled and called for unprecedented solutions. But radical thinking was beyond their

grasp. They did not go far in search of new formulae; they had neither the will for it nor the ability. This explains their silence when Muslim India was producing scheme after scheme as an alternative to the 1935 constitution. Every possible form of government was suggested from re-arrangement of provinces through a confederation to an irrevocable partition. But the British seemed to have lost all interest in the Indian problem. They did not suggest anything of their own. They did not consider any of the proposals presented to them. They did not react, did not comment, did not accept. But one thing they went on doing doggedly and firmly. They opposed and condemned every move towards separation, thus showing that they were still thinking in terms of an Indian nationalism and a united India. But one must admit that they did this with a horrifying consistency.

### The Foreign Muslims and the Idea

To this Indian background of the idea of separation should be added an external feature to which I have already referred in passing: the failure of the non-Indian Muslims to come to the rescue of their Indian brothers in faith. Except a fictitious scheme attributed to Jamaluddin "Afghani" and two vague reports from Turkey no suggestions, advice, aid or comfort came from the Islamic world community. This requires some comment.

Among the immediate neighbours of India there were two Muslim countries from whom sympathy could have been expected. But conditions prevailing in both of them discouraged the growth of an extra-national interest or co-operation. Afghanistan had to fight three wars during this period with the British or, in this context, with British India. This might have influenced the Afghan attitude towards India and the Indian Muslims, whom the Afghans might have come to consider as British stooges and agents and therefore not worth their help or sympathy. Further, there was till quite late in the period no national feeling in Afghanistan which continued to be a congeries of battling tribes. To be of any use to a people struggling for national recognition and independence, the helpers themselves ought to be aware of the force and value of nationalism. The Afghans were not. To this may be added the general Afghan lack of respect for the "Hindustanis" (by which they meant everybody living on the other side of the Khyber pass

or in some cases the Indus river), who were an inferior race and content to live happily under the rule of the white man instead of fighting him.

Another facet of Afghan character is also relevant to this inquiry. If it suits their purpose or if the "reward" is sufficiently large, the Afghans have no qualms of conscience in selling themselves to the enemies of their religion or interest or well-being. In the 19th century they accepted—though only temporarily—a few rulers placed on the throne by the British. In 1947, when Pakistan applied for admission to the United Nations, the only country which voted against it was Afghanistan; and this was done at the instigation of India. During British rule the tribal leaders living on the Afghan-Indian border received regular, fixed allowances from the British in exchange for abstaining from any violent action. More recently, it was an Afghan government (how representative of the people of the country we don't know) which invited the Soviet army into the land. The Afghans of the NWFP voted solidly for the Hindu Congress and let it rule the province right up to the day of independence in 1947. On the other hand, Muslim India always took a benign interest in Afghanistan, worried for its future, sent its doctors, administrators and educators to help run the governments of Amir Abdur Rahman, Amir Habibullah and Amir Amanullah. Iqbal dedicated his finest volume of Persian poetry to Amanullah Khan, which opened with a magnificent tribute to the young king's sagacity, independent spirit and love of Islam. When Amanullah was dethroned and his *masnad* occupied by the son of a water-carrier, it was with the monetary help of some Indian Muslim families that Nadir Khan was able to defeat the rebels, reconquer the country and establish his rule. Must we conclude that the Afghans are not a grateful people?

When all these considerations and historical facts are added up it is no longer a matter of surprise that the Afghans had neither the inclination nor perhaps the opportunity to help the Indian Muslims in their efforts to win a separate and independent status.

For the other next-door neighbour, Iran, this was an age of unsettled conditions. Thanks to a series of interferences by European imperial powers, it was weakened and parcelled out into spheres of foreign influence, and parts of the country were occupied by the British and the Russians. Her economy was in ruins, her people demoralized and disheartened, her rulers under



the control and direction of imperial interests. The Iranians were so engrossed in the changing fortunes of their fate that they had not a moment's respite to look beyond their immediate interests or national frontiers. Their Shia faith might also have deterred them from interesting themselves in the future and welfare of a predominantly Sunni people. Geography aggravated this remoteness. A vast tract of burning desert lay between the inhabited portions of Iran and Indian Baluchistan. In spite of all the cultural links between Iran and Muslim India and their long historical associations during the Mughal rule, the two were now living in relative isolation.

Muslim countries lying towards the east of India were under foreign domination and not completely free to cultivate a pan-Islamic sentiment. Malaya, now under the British, and Indonesia, now under the Dutch, were areas where the message of Islam had been taken by the Indian Muslims, not by the Arabs. This should have persuaded the South-East Asian Muslims to take an active interest in the fortunes of their Indian co-religionists. But distance, colonial rule, ignorance of Indian conditions and involvement in their own affairs worked against common understanding. There were virtually no contacts between Muslim India and these areas; their people did not know each other, not to speak of supporting each other.

The Indian Muslims had greater hopes from the millions of Arabs occupying the lands between Iran and the north-western coast of the Atlantic. The Arab origin of the religion of Islam, the fact that Islam was first brought to India by the Arabs, the pride of every Indian Muslim in the achievements of the first Islamic empires which were Arab, the conviction that the Arabs were bound to come to the aid of every Muslim movement: all this made the Indian Muslims look towards the Arab lands for sympathy and understanding. Their hopes were disappointed. How did this happen?

In the first place, the Arabs were more interested in what they called Arab nationalism than in Muslim nationalism or Islamic awakening.<sup>5</sup> Secondly, they tended to look at the non-Arab Muslims as in some ways inferior, second-class, citizens of the world of Islam. Thirdly, they were at this time fighting for their own independence, first from Ottoman rule and then from British and French domination. From 1916 onwards many of them re-

belled against the Ottomans and put their trust in British and French promises. In this mood of hope and amity, they might have come to rely on the British for their knowledge and estimate of other Muslims, especially those of India. By the time they realized the consequences of their policy of co-operation with the British and treachery against the Ottomans, it was too late; and the next generation was kept busy by its own nationalist struggle against the new masters who had supplanted the Ottomans.

Fourthly, they were familiar with the close historical and religious relations between Muslim India on the one hand and Iran and Turkey on the other. This did not make them well disposed towards the Indian Muslims on the principle that "my enemy's friend is my enemy". The Arabs hated the Turks with the blind zeal of former subjects. They disliked the Iranians, partly for historical reasons, partly for their non-Arab character and partly for their Shia affiliation. Finally, Muslim India's successful protest against European plans for the dismemberment of Turkey and the humiliation of the Khalifa were interpreted in most Arab quarters as a move against Arab independence from Turkish rule. Thus there was much fuel present to fan the flames of misunderstanding, and when the Indian National Congress began to influence the Arab mind through a clever propaganda campaign the Arabs, not caring to scrutinize its credentials, accepted the Hindu theory of an Indian national movement working against foreign imperialism and for a free united India. The Muslims made little attempt to correct this one-sided view. They thought that the Arabs knew, or ought to have known, the Indian situation well enough to note the existence of a Muslim problem. The assumption was wrong and lost Muslim India the sympathy of the Arab world. Read Pakistan for Muslim India, and the position sketched above holds true for the post-1947 period.

Few historians have taken notice of one factor which, in my opinion, would explain (to a great extent if not completely) both the indifference of Muslim countries towards Indian Muslims and the different attitude adopted by Turkey. India was the only country in the world with such a large Muslim minority. It was unique as much as the former Muslim rulers were in danger of becoming the subjects of the followers of another religion over whom they had ruled for a thousand years. In other parts of the old Islamic empires the rulers had disappeared from view through

migration, conversion or forced deportation, as in Spain, Yugoslavia, Greece, Albania and Austria, or become the majority of the population, as in Turkey, Iran, North Africa and the Middle East, or conquered and enslaved by a larger and superior power, as in Central Asia. India was the only odd case. Here Muslim rule had departed, leaving the majority of the Indians in possession of their old religion, but also leaving behind a large and virile Muslim minority which could not rule the country again and would not let the majority rule over them. In other words, Muslim politics in India were minority politics and Muslim nationalism was minority nationalism. This was something which no Muslim country had ever experienced. It lay beyond the knowledge and understanding of the Muslim world. An Egyptian was an Egyptian first and a Muslim afterwards (or rather, in his case, an Egyptian first, then an Arab, then an African, and then a Muslim). An Iranian was an Iranian first and a (Shia) Muslim second. And so on in all Muslim lands. Because these lands were wholly, or very nearly wholly, Muslim, being a Muslim posed no special problem. Nationalism in these countries was as much territorial as it was religious, but its religious foundation was taken for granted and called for no comment. In India, on the other hand, there was no territorial nationalism because India was not a Muslim land. Still the Indian Muslims claimed nationhood, not on the basis of a territory, but on the ground of religion. This the foreign Muslim found hard to understand, because he himself had never been a minority and could not realize the predicament of being one. There can be no sympathy without understanding. Hence the general indifference shown by Muslim countries towards the Muslim problem India.

Turkey was the only Muslim country with an experience somewhat analogous to that of Muslim India. The roles of the majority and minority were reversed, but the essential underlying problem was the same. Indian Muslims found that they could not lead an independent, self-respecting and honourable life until the spectre of Hindu rule was lifted. The Turks discovered during the last 50 years of the Ottoman dynasty that Turkey could not be a fully independent country until the large non-Muslim, privileged minorities (the Greeks, the Albanians and the Armenians) were removed from the land. This was an internal danger as full of threat as any external aggression. Mustafa Kamal's speeches during the Turkish war of independence make it clear that for him Turkish soverei-

gnty meant as much the defeat of the European enemies who wanted to divide and occupy Turkey as the departure from the country of these foreign groups which had always operated as the handmen of European imperial powers interested in Ottoman downfall.

The Turks as a people were thus better placed than other Muslims to appreciate the plight and dilemma of the Indian Muslims, but unfortunately they were prevented from exploiting this advantage by Ataturk's anti-Islamic, inward-looking and obsessively European-Western opinions and policies.

## Conclusion

The conclusion which one must draw from the above analysis is that the Indian Muslims received no help or encouragement at all from any quarter inside or outside India in the formulation, pursuit and execution of their plans for independence. The Hindus occupied the opposite camp, and were naturally the most implacable enemies of the idea of separation. After more than a thousand years they had reached a point where sovereignty was not far from their grasp. For the first time in their history they were going to rule over the Muslims, and they were ready to go to any length not to let the opportunity pass by. Every Muslim who planned to escape this coming rule was their foe, and every Muslim who succeeded in escaping added to their humiliation. Therefore it was in the fitness of things that they should oppose the idea of separation and the creation of Pakistan.

The British were equally opposed to the idea, but with less animus and for different reasons. They had set their heart on maintaining the unity of India as the noble legacy of a wise imperialism, and so powerful was this love affair that no considerations of politics, nationalism, justice or good sense could break the romance. This attachment led the British into beliefs and opinions of doubtful validity (India is a nation), untenable assumptions (India is as fit as England for the rule of the majority), dangerous implications (the creation of Pakistan must be opposed), and fits of inane pique (the creation of Pakistan is a tragedy).

The foreign Muslims were not allowed to share or support the aspirations of Muslim India by ignorance, Hindu propaganda, British influence, colonial status, want of similar experience, racial

pride, absorption in their own national and local affairs, physical remoteness and other factors. It is a sad irony of the history of Muslim India that those very Muslims who were the most enthusiastic pan-Islamists, intensely conscious of being Muslim, and always in the forefront of all international Islamic movements and sentiments should have been so cold-shouldered by the Islamic world community. They made many sacrifices for the cause of the Khilafat, and some of their best leaders cheerfully went to prison and faced privation and danger for the sake of maintaining the integrity of the only independent Muslim empire then in existence and the status, honour and supreme position of the Khalifat-ul-Islam. So widespread and powerful was this protest that the British were forced to change their policy towards Turkey. The genius and the feat of arms demonstrated by Mustafa Kamal were undoubtedly responsible for the defeat of European designs, but the Indian Khilafatists also played a notable part in it of which they were rightfully proud. Muslim India was also deeply agitated by the Palestine problem, and from the 1920s onwards there was no Muslim organization or party which did not press the British government to give full protection to Arab rights and stop planting Jews in an Arab land. Indian Muslim newspapers wrote widely about this question, and the All India Muslim League passed resolutions on Palestine in every session. Every issue of the Muslim world occupied a prominent place in Indian Muslim thinking and planning, because they were a minority in their own country and, for that reason, obsessed with the consciousness of being Muslim. Islam had a special appeal for them because it was the only source of their comfort and hope. It also heightened their expectations, for they took it for granted that other Muslims would take as much interest in Indian Islam as they themselves took in world Islam. Their disappointment made them sadder, but unfortunately not any wiser.

Thus the Muslims of India fought their battle single handed, and if it was a difficult task it was also an invaluable school of experience. It gave them more confidence and taught them that every nation fights for its own freedom, like the individual soul which works out its own salvation. Those who look around for help look in vain, for the real strength comes from within. Faith is more important than allies and friends. Allies can disappoint and friends can betray, but faith, if it be sure and true, never sets a snare, never

gives a false hope, never deceives or misleads. Those who fight with faith on their side fight without fear, for faith is truth and truth is undefeatable.

## NOTES

1. There are hundreds of books illustrating the Hindu and Congress attitudes towards the idea of separation among the Muslims. A short but representative selection is given here (omitting the works cited in notes on previous chapters). B.D. Basu, *India under the British Crown*, Calcutta, 1933; Jawaharlal Nehru, *The Discovery of India*, New York, 1946, *An Autobiography*, London, 1936, *Recent Essays and Writings*, Allahabad, 1937, and *The Unity of India*, London, 1941; K.M. Panikkar, *A Survey of Indian History*, Bombay, 1947, 2nd ed 1954; Amaury de Reincourt, *The Soul of India*, New York, 1960; Hira Lal Seth, *India Between the Two Wars*, Lahore, 1945; D.N. Banerjee, *Partition or Federation?*, Calcutta, 1945; D.R. Gadgil, *Federating India*, Poona, 1945, and *The Federal Problem in India*, Poona, 1947; Gurmukh Nihal Singh, *Landmarks in Indian Constitutional and National Development, Vol. I, 1600-1919*, Delhi, 3rd ed 1952; B.M. Sharma, *The Indian Federation*, Lucknow, 1932; A. Mehta and K. Nair, *The Simla Triangle*, Bombay, 1945; R.R. Sahni, *To the British Cabinet Mission*, Lahore, n.d.; S. Radhakrishnan, *Education, Politics and War*, Poona, 1944; K.M. Ashraf (ed), *Pakistan: Foreword* [sic.], Delhi, 1940; D. Burman, *Indo-Muslim Relations : A Study in Historical Background*, Calcutta, n.d.; T.K. Dutt, *Grave Diggers of India*, Lahore, 1945; Radha Kamal Mukerjee, *An Economist Looks at Pakistan*, Bombay, 1944; S. Mukherji, *Communalism in Muslim Politics and Troubles over India*, Calcutta, 1947; K.M. Munshi, *Zonal Divisions of India*, Bombay, 1945; C.P. Pillai, *Pakistan and Its Implications*, n.p., n.d.; Ganpat Rai (ed), *Pakistan X-Rayed*, Lahore, 1946; Sachin Sen, *The Birth of Pakistan*, Calcutta, 1955; Hira Lal Seth, *Cloud over the Crescent*, Lahore, 1944; C.N. Vakil, *Economic Consequences of Divided India*, Bombay, 1950; K.C. Vyas, *The Social Renaissance in India*, Bombay, 1957; S.M. Jaffar, *An Outline of Leftism in India*, Bombay, 1944; A Hindu Nationalist, *Gandhi-Muslim Conspiracy*, Poona, 1941; M.C. Khanna, *Pakistan : A Hindu View*, New York, 1942; Atulananda Chakrabarti, *Hindus and Mussalmans of India*, Calcutta, 1940; S.M. Datar,

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2. On the "nationalist" Muslims see Z.H. Faruqi, *The Deoband School and the Demand for Pakistan*, London, 1963; Afzal Huq (Ahrar), *Pakistan and Untouchability*, Lahore, 1941; Ahad Husain, *Jinnah and League Politics*, Lucknow, 1940; Humayun Kabir, *Muslim Politics in India (1906-1942)*, Calcutta, 3rd ed 1944; Rezaul Karim, *For India and Islam*, Calcutta, 1937, and *Pakistan Examined*, Calcutta, 1941; H.B. Tayabji, *Why Musalmans should Oppose Pakistan*, Bombay, 1946, and *Badruddin Tyabji*, Bombay, 1952; S. Haider Imam, *It So Happened*, Patna, n.d.; Rezaul Karim (ed), *Muslims and the Congress*, Calcutta, 1941; S.P. Mookerjee, *Awake Hindustan*, Calcutta, n.d.; P.N. Chopra, *Rafi Ahmad Kidwai*, Agra, 1960; Muhammad Mujeeb, *The Indian Muslims*, London, 1967; Abul Kalam Azad, *Musalman awr Congress*, Lahore, n.d., *Khutbat-i-Abul Kalam Azad*, Lahore, n.d., and *India Wins Freedom : An Autobiographical Narrative*, Bombay, 1959; Shaukatullah Ansari, *Pakistan : The Problem of India*, Lahore, 1944; Abdullah Butt (ed), *Aspects of Abul Kalam Azad*, Lahore, 1942; S. Abid Husain, *The National Culture of India*, Bombay, 1961 ed; Husain Ahmad Madani, *Muslim League Kya Hai*, Delhi, 1945, *Pakistan Kya Hai*, Delhi, n.d., and *Makatib-i-Shaikh-ul-Islam*, Deoband, n.d., later enl ed, Azamgarh, 1952; Sayyid Muhammad Miyan, *Ulema-i-Huq awr un ke Mujahadana Karname*, Muradabad, 1946-48, 2 vols, and *Jamiat-ul-Ulema Kya Hai*, Delhi, n.d.; and M.A.H. Khalid, *Shaikh-ul-Hind Mahmud-ul-Hasan*, unpublished M.A. thesis, University of the Punjab, 1947.



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One still awaits an effective non-Arab Muslim riposte.

## EPILOGUE

In whatever way the Hindu and Indian critics of the idea of Pakistan may look upon modern history, the determinative and decisive factor was the alienation of the Muslims as a community from the faith, philosophy, ideals, values and ambitions of the majority group in the population of India. The Muslim felt that he was condemned to a permanent state of exile from power, to the profession of a religion which was not tolerated, and to the possession of a culture which was not to be recognized. He was the eternal alien in the Hindu concept of India.

Some Hindu historians and scholars are now coming round to the view that the Muslim feeling of separateness was as old as Indian politics. "Although the two-nation theory first originated in the forties", says Rafi Ahmad Kidwai's biographer, "yet, by and large, Indian Muslims had generally maintained an entity of their own not only in religion but also in politics and social matters."<sup>1</sup> He holds the Hindus responsible for this. "The Mussalmans' attitude had behind it the history of hundreds of years of social ostracism by Hindus. Even when Muslims were at the height of glory, Hindus had treated them as social outcasts."<sup>2</sup> In the words of a historian, "the caste-ridden Hindu society insisted on treating the Muslims as a distinct caste; it was the Hindu casteism which solidified Muslim religion into a separate social group".<sup>3</sup> This estrangement is obviously a permanent feature of Muslim life under a Hindu majority, as it has not disappeared from India after the coming of independence.<sup>4</sup>

Sir Jadu Nath Sarkar attributed this discord to the Muslim educated elite. The Muslim intellectual, according to him, was never able "to strike his roots deep into his native soil [India]"; he was "an intellectual exotic"; he "felt that he was in India, but not of it".<sup>5</sup> According to a scholar of Indian Islam, "Influential Muslim politicians in India had kept a separate and independent Muslim nation before them as their goal since many decades. The



problem was only how to devise the best method and timing for the demand."<sup>6</sup> Even a leading member of the "nationalist Muslim" group, in whose name the Congress claimed to speak for the Indian Muslims as well, confessed in 1940 that "one nationhood is a stunt of a few politicians, it has no significance as far as Hindus and Muslims are concerned". He was 'frankly of the view that Hindus and Musalmans do constitute the two separate nations at present but still I hope that once we manage to rise from beneath the foreign heel, India may be able to lead the world to peace and prosperity".<sup>7</sup>

Thus, as a French orientalist put it, "cependant malgre la diversite des reinterpretations caracterisque du reformisme musulman en Inde comme de tout reformisme sans doute, le sens de la communaute musulmane est toujours present".<sup>8</sup> It was this "feeling of being a community" that lay at the root of the idea of Pakistan.

With the Muslims thus opting out, and the smaller non-Hindu groups either sharing the Congress view of a future India or not counting at all in Indian politics, the phenomenon of "Indian nationalism" ripened into an incarnation of Hindu communal solidarity. I have produced a lot of evidence (some coming from the Congress leaders themselves) in support of this in the previous chapters. Modern Hindu historiography confirms this reading of the situation.

The doyen of the Indian historians, the Brahmin man of letters, Panikkar, wrote in 1955 that beyond the caste "the Hindu in practice recognizes no society or community. This is the widest social group that the Hindus have evolved . . . the bedrock on which Hindu social organization is built".<sup>9</sup> For him, therefore, Indian nationalism was not even a Hindu nationalism but merely a caste communal feeling, which fits the description given to it by Rahmat Ali in 1933. A well-known sociologist agreed with this. "In the past India has seldom enjoyed political unity, except under the Ashoka rule before the advent of the British. However, a sense of unity did exist and it was based on the universal culture of Hinduism."<sup>10</sup>

Indian nationalism "remained predominantly Hindu", said D.P. Singhal, "but in a predominantly Hindu country, such as India was, no national movement, irrespective of its political ideology, could be otherwise". This nationalism, he continued, had deep roots in Hindu ritual. "Daily prayers of a Hindu require him to worship the

image of the Mother-country as the land of seven sacred rivers and of seven sacred cities which between them cover the entire area of the modern Indian subcontinent. It was the resuscitation of this image which gave a definite meaning of nationalism for the Hindu, who recognized it at once and responded to the call with the required intensity of feeling, but it was an alien picture for the Muslims, whose opposition to idolism — *but-parasti* — verged on iconoclasm." In consequence, "Indian nationalism failed to pacify Muslim nationalism". Ultimately, "it must be admitted that the very strength of Indian nationalism, that is its heavy reliance on Hindu culture and Hindu symbolism, proved its greatest weakness".<sup>11</sup> Recent foreign investigators have also found and brought to light the close links between Hinduism and Indian nationalism.<sup>12</sup>

If once it is accepted that Indian nationalism was a Hindu nationalism, it follows that the Congress, the impersonation of this nationalism and its principal upholder, was a Hindu organization, its secular pronouncements and its tiny Muslim membership notwithstanding. I have already quoted the statements of Pandit Motilal Nehru and Gandhi, and the editorials of some Congress newspapers (like the *Ansari* of Delhi), in support of the thesis that the Congress was a Hindu body. More evidence can be adduced.

The founding fathers of the Congress made no secret of their views while disseminating the message of the party. Dayananda, Peary Mohan Mukherji and others were as much Congressmen as Hindu revivalists. Surendranath Banerjea had addressed the following words to the Calcutta Young Men's Association before he had become a Congress leader: "What Hindoo is there who does not feel himself a nobler being altogether, as he recalls to mind the proud list of his illustrious countrymen, graced by thrice-immortal names of a Valmiki and a Vyasa, a Panini and a Patanjali, a Gautam and a Sankaracharya? For ours was a most glorious past!"<sup>13</sup> In later years he saw no reason to change his views.

An incomplete list of newspapers owned or edited or managed or financed by Congressmen between 1885 and 1905 would include: *The Bengalee* (editor: Surendranath Banerjea), *The Hindu* (run by Subramania Iyer and Viraghava Ghose), *Indu Prakash* (editor: Man Mohan Ghosh), *Bande Mataram* (editors: Bipin Chandra Pal and Aurobindo Ghose), *Indian Mirror* (editor: Surendranath Sen), *The Sandhya* (editor: Brahma Bandhab), and the



*Sanjibhani* (editor: Krishn Kumar Mitra).<sup>14</sup> All of them were, directly or indirectly, organs of Hindu revivalism. R.C. Dutt, a civil servant and the president of the Congress session at Lucknow in 1900, wrote two novels in Bengali — *Maharashtra Jivan Prabhat* and *Rajput Jivan Sandhya* — which romanticized the two Hindu periods of Indian history and had clear Hindu overtones.

The first Muslim president of the Congress, Badruddin Tyebji, who had quarrelled with Sayyid Ahmad Khan on the latter's refusal to join or support the Congress, did not himself believe that India was one nation. In his letter of 18 February 1888 to the Sayyid he wrote: "Your objection to the Congress is that 'it regards India as one nation'. Now I am not aware of anyone regarding the whole of India as one Nation, and if you read my inaugural address you will find it distinctly stated that there are numerous communities or nations in India which had peculiar problems of their own to solve . . .".<sup>15</sup> Tyebji did not clarify which of these nations the Congress represented. When the Congress elected another Muslim, M.R. Sayani, as its president in 1897, a leading Muslim newspaper recorded the community's reaction in an outspoken editorial: "The Muslim community, in clear and unmistakable terms and in emphatic protests, had made known their view that he did not, would not and could not represent them."<sup>16</sup>

A few years later Gokhale, probably the most liberal-minded Congressman of any age, confirmed that Muslims were not Indians, at least not Bengalis. Speaking in the Imperial Legislative Council on the Seditious Meetings Bill on 18 October 1907, he said: "But surely it cannot be beyond the resources of statesmanship to devise a scheme whereby while the expected advantages of the partition of Bengal are fully secured to the *Muhammadans*, the people of Bengal may also have their grievances removed."<sup>17</sup> There is, thus, much justification for the judgment that between 1885 and 1909 the Congress "in reality was but the 'tip of the iceberg' of Hindu self-consciousness".<sup>18</sup>

The Congress did not change its colour or its views in later years, during some of which it was a formal and acknowledged ally of the Muslims. In 1920 Jawaharlal Nehru was complaining in private that Gandhi relied more on Madan Mohan Malaviyya's advice than on his own.<sup>19</sup> But why blame Gandhi alone? Throughout the 1920s the Congress was fully supporting and participating in the Hindu Sabha physical training programmes and institutions,

and among the Congress leaders who were prominent in this collaboration in the United Provinces were Sri Prakasa (General Secretary of the Provincial Congress Committee), Narendra Deo, Nand Kumar Deo Vasishth (Secretary, Congress Voluntary Board) and Birbal Singh.<sup>20</sup> The party's non-co-operation movement propaganda in the U.P. had such a clear Hindu slant that it "created special problems of identification with the nationalist movement for non-Hindu groups".<sup>21</sup> By the end of the decade "the mass of the Muslims in U.P. would no longer trust any Hindu leader or indeed any Muslim leader associated with the 'Hindu' Congress".<sup>22</sup>

The situation worsened with the passage of time. Between the Satyagraha campaign of 1920-22 and the civil disobedience movement of 1930-33 the Congress "lost virtually all of its Muslim support — and this was never to be regained".<sup>23</sup> The reason was the complete failure of the party leaders to "develop a mass appeal across religious (and caste) lines."<sup>24</sup> These are the documented findings of a Hindu historian.

By 1926 the Swaraj Party became "as good a Hindu body as one could want";<sup>25</sup> and the Viceroy, Lord Irwin, wrote to the Secretary of State for India that Nehru had become "a true Hindu".<sup>26</sup> This is on record in the British official reports and correspondence.

The Congress activities and statements and the views of its press corroborated this official assessment. A Congress liberal daily, *Bharat*, asked: "Is not this question of cow-protection sufficient in itself to inspire us to strive for the attainment of Swaraj?"<sup>27</sup> In 1930 the Hindu Kumbh Mela at Allahabad was used by the Congress to propagate its message, and a *sadhu*, Baba Raghavadas, who was a Congress leader of Gorakhpur, managed the show. Calls for freeing the country were made in the name of saving "75,000 cows slaughtered daily", and British rule was likened to the reign of Awrangzeb.<sup>28</sup> Many Congressmen who were concurrently members of the Hindu Mahasabha were allowed to hold office in the party organization despite a stipulation to the contrary in the 1934 Congress constitution.<sup>29</sup> In the mid-1930s and later some of the methods adopted by the party "served to heighten communal consciousness", and the result was that "the common Muslim, no less than his elite leaders, came in most provinces to stand apart from the Congress".<sup>30</sup> The Congress established a string of Seva Samitis whose activity was associated with Hindu religious fairs and festivals, and naturally not a single Muslim name is to be found

on the panels of the office-bearers of the Sanitis.<sup>31</sup> At the village level, where the common man came in the closest contact with his leaders, Hindu Sabhaites and Congressmen formed a team working for a common cause.<sup>32</sup> In the electoral campaign of mid-1920s the secular wing of the Congress appealed to overt Hindu sentiments.<sup>33</sup>

In consequence, the Congress lost virtually all Muslim votes. In 1934, Rafi Ahmad Kidwai and other close associates of Nehru "shared the feeling that no Muslim candidate put up by the Congress could win an election fought on the current basis".<sup>34</sup> In the election of February 1937 not a single Muslim standing as a Congress candidate won in the U.P. Kidwai himself, in a Muslim constituency, received 1,525 votes, a little-known Lucknow lawyer, Ghulam Hasan Butt (an independent), got 4,104, and another independent, Abdul Qadir Khan, 3,659 votes. "It was striking evidence of the way in which the Congress had lost all credibility among the Muslims".<sup>35</sup>

This record lent complete justification to the Muslim apprehension that "Gandhi's Swaraj would mean Hindu raj".<sup>36</sup> Anyway, the Muslim had never liked Gandhi and his Hinduism, as is now admitted by one of the leading intellectuals among the "nationalist" Muslims and a fervent Gandhite, Dr. M. Mujeeb.<sup>37</sup> A modern Hindu economic historian concedes that "Muslim fears were genuine" and Congress leaders like Nehru were "ignoring the reality" when they "labelled these medieval".<sup>38</sup> A Hindu scholar has summarized the Congress role in 1937-47 in one sentence: "Congress Hindus had somehow established their pretence to be an all-India force."<sup>39</sup> A Hindu social historian has this as his commentary on Congress endorsement of a Hindu cultural nationalism: Congress and Hindu leaders' glorification of a Hindu Indian past "could barely induce the Muslims to be inspired by the past that was being reconstructed unless it was to undertake a matching exercise of their own. This complicated the situation further. It meant that the projection of religious and sectional loyalties in terms of historical glorification of the Hindus would pass for cultural nationalism. But the projection of similar grandeur would be castigated as communal if undertaken by the Muslims".<sup>40</sup>

The Congress leadership, of pre- or post-independence period, has never admitted its Hindu connection. The mass of the common Hindu scholars try to explain the Hindu character of the party with the argument that this was unavoidable as the leaders could

reach the masses only by communicating their aspirations through familiar symbols.<sup>41</sup> To this a British student of nationalism adds the gloss that unless the nationalist leaders appealed to religion nationalism would have remained "limited to the small educated elite, and consequently more or less powerless".<sup>42</sup> This special pleading (also an after thought) has four weaknesses. First, it suppresses the fact that the Congress leaders not only *used* Hinduism for political purposes but also *advanced* Hindu revivalism for religious purposes. Secondly, if Hindu symbols and terminology were mere expedients, why did the Congress take a strong stand on such issues as cow protection, Hindi as national language, the Devanagiri script, denial of a separate electorate to the untouchables, etc.? Thirdly, if the Congress could combine religion and politics in both theory and practice, did its claim to be a secular body amount to nothing but an exercise in hypocrisy? Finally, there is no logic and a lot of bias in letting the Congress use of Hinduism pass as a national and political necessity while condemning the Muslim League's use of Islam as medieval obscurantism (Jawaharlal Nehru's words).

The tiny loop-hole that the Congress possessed and always flaunted was the handful of Muslim members in the organization and the small band of "nationalist" Muslims who had tied themselves to the chariot wheel of Indian nationalism. But even this convenience was of doubtful validity and value. The first prominent Muslim Congressman, Tyebji, did not believe in the existence of an Indian nation. His successors provided some temporary comfort to the party, but put it in a crippling awkward situation by forcing it to alienate itself from all other kinds of Muslims. Besides, this facade of Muslim support to the Congress began to crack in the 1920s. The Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Hind, devotedly loyal to the doctrines of Gandhi and Nehru, rejected the Nehru Report in 1928, and a little later split into a pro-Congress and a pro-Muslim League faction. Gradually the "nationalist" Muslims dwindled in number and power. By 1940 even they came to distrust the Congress promises of goodwill and security. Though still swearing fealty to the Congress, they now made demands which made nonsense of their association with the party.

The most revealing statement of the point of view of this group was the set of demands made in April 1940 by the Azad Muslim Conference which had been staged by the "nationalist"

Muslims at the instigation of the Congress as a riposte to the March session of the Muslim League in which it had asked for a division of India. The Conference insisted that the Muslims must have three concessions without which they would not be able to participate in the public and political life of a free India. "(i) The Federal Parliament should be composed on the basis of parity between the Hindus and the Muslims; for example, the proportion should be: Hindu seats 45%, Muslim seats 45%, and other minorities 10%. (ii) There should be established a Supreme Court composed of equal number of Muslim and non-Muslim judges who will be appointed by a committee having equal number of representatives from the Muslim and non-Muslim provinces. (iii) The future constitution of India should safeguard all the legislative interests of the Muslims in accordance with the recommendations of the Muslim members of the Constituent Assembly. The representatives of other communities or of an outside power would have no right to interfere in the determination of these safeguards".<sup>43</sup>

Till the Lahore Resolution (which had come without notice or preparation by the League and which did not seem to demand a clear partition) the Muslim League itself had never made such far-reaching stipulations as the Azad Muslim Conference was now making. The League, and before it the Muslim Conference, had been asking for only 33% representation at the Centre. The Azad Conference could only be content with 45%. In addition, it was bent on reducing the Hindu quota to less than half in the central assembly. The League did not demand parity till the Simla Conference of 1945, and that only in the Viceroy's Executive Council, not in the parliament of a free India. The "nationalist" Muslims also went further than the League in asking for parity in the Supreme Court. And, finally, they also wanted the ultimate guarantee of a Muslim veto on all legislation touching their interests.

By any standard the "Nationalist" Muslim friends and colleagues of the Congress were prescribing a solution which was more radical and more "Muslim" than all the League's suggestions. Taken seriously and followed logically, their demands could only result in a formal and constitutional partition of India. This decision of the Azad Conference makes its opposition to the Pakistan demand an absurdity. If the "nationalist" Muslims, who were in the confidence of the Congress and said to be trusted by the party and were also a source of great prestige to it, had convinced them-

selves of the fact that the free India of the Congress dreams carried no meaning for them without several steel-clad guarantees which the Congress had already rejected, it is evident that the Congress had already lost the support and faith of the last Muslim who had ever sided with it. And yet the Congress did not disown or criticize the resolution of the Azad Conference, and the "nationalist" Muslims did not see any contradiction between their considered demands of April 1940 and their continued loyalty to the Congress whose programme did not offer the smallest concession to the Muslims. This is a minor mystery of modern Indian history which should be cleared up by the present-day admirers of Abul Kalam Azad, Rafi Ahmad Kidwai and other such leaders.

So far I have made the points that the nature of the Muslim problem in India and the vitality of Hindu-Muslim antagonism left no choice to the Muslims but to demand a separate state, that the idea of a separate Muslim entity is very old and continuous, and that the Congress was in essence a Hindu movement working for an Indian nationalism which excluded the Muslims from its mainstream and its ambitions. I have quoted Hindu and other non-Muslim sources to substantiate my assertions. But it is possible to go further and argue, with historical tenability, that it was the Congress which was responsible for the creation of Pakistan. Enough has been said in the body of the book and in this Epilogue about the part played by the Congress in bringing the Muslims round to the idea of Pakistan. What I am saying now is that the Congress also did everything in its power to translate the idea into a state. Recent Hindu historians are now realizing the truth of this statement, and some Western scholars are making the same discovery. Lack of space does not permit detailed treatment, and I can only summarize the findings and conclusions of modern writing and research.

One line of argument adopted by some Hindu scholars is that the Congress leaders, and specially Gandhi, were responsible for the separation only in the sense that they were too soft to Muslims and pampered them too much, and finally surrendered to their demand for partition.<sup>44</sup> All the sources that I have used in this

Muslims at the instigation of the Congress as a riposte to the March session of the Muslim League in which it had asked for a division of India. The Conference insisted that the Muslims must have three concessions without which they would not be able to participate in the public and political life of a free India. "(i) The Federal Parliament should be composed on the basis of parity between the Hindus and the Muslims; for example, the proportion should be: Hindu seats 45%, Muslim seats 45%, and other minorities 10%. (ii) There should be established a Supreme Court composed of equal number of Muslim and non-Muslim judges who will be appointed by a committee having equal number of representatives from the Muslim and non-Muslim provinces. (iii) The future constitution of India should safeguard all the legislative interests of the Muslims in accordance with the recommendations of the Muslim members of the Constituent Assembly. The representatives of other communities or of an outside power would have no right to interfere in the determination of these safeguards".<sup>43</sup>

Till the Lahore Resolution (which had come without notice or preparation by the League and which did not seem to demand a clear partition) the Muslim League itself had never made such far-reaching stipulations as the Azad Muslim Conference was now making. The League, and before it the Muslim Conference, had been asking for only 33% representation at the Centre. The Azad Conference could only be content with 45%. In addition, it was bent on reducing the Hindu quota to less than half in the central assembly. The League did not demand parity till the Simla Conference of 1945, and that only in the Viceroy's Executive Council, not in the parliament of a free India. The "nationalist" Muslims also went further than the League in asking for parity in the Supreme Court. And, finally, they also wanted the ultimate guarantee of a Muslim veto on all legislation touching their interests.

By any standard the "Nationalist" Muslim friends and colleagues of the Congress were prescribing a solution which was more radical and more "Muslim" than all the League's suggestions. Taken seriously and followed logically, their demands could only result in a formal and constitutional partition of India. This decision of the Azad Conference makes its opposition to the Pakistan demand an absurdity. If the "nationalist" Muslims, who were in the confidence of the Congress and said to be trusted by the party and were also a source of great prestige to it, had convinced them-

selves of the fact that the free India of the Congress dreams carried no meaning for them without several steel-clad guarantees which the Congress had already rejected, it is evident that the Congress had already lost the support and faith of the last Muslim who had ever sided with it. And yet the Congress did not disown or criticize the resolution of the Azad Conference, and the "nationalist" Muslims did not see any contradiction between their considered demands of April 1940 and their continued loyalty to the Congress whose programme did not offer the smallest concession to the Muslims. This is a minor mystery of modern Indian history which should be cleared up by the present-day admirers of Abul Kalam Azad, Rafi Ahmad Kidwai and other such leaders.

So far I have made the points that the nature of the Muslim problem in India and the vitality of Hindu-Muslim antagonism left no choice to the Muslims but to demand a separate state, that the idea of a separate Muslim entity is very old and continuous, and that the Congress was in essence a Hindu movement working for an Indian nationalism which excluded the Muslims from its mainstream and its ambitions. I have quoted Hindu and other non-Muslim sources to substantiate my assertions. But it is possible to go further and argue, with historical tenability, that it was the Congress which was responsible for the creation of Pakistan. Enough has been said in the body of the book and in this Epilogue about the part played by the Congress in bringing the Muslims round to the idea of Pakistan. What I am saying now is that the Congress also did everything in its power to translate the idea into a state. Recent Hindu historians are now realizing the truth of this statement, and some Western scholars are making the same discovery. Lack of space does not permit detailed treatment, and I can only summarize the findings and conclusions of modern writing and research.

One line of argument adopted by some Hindu scholars is that the Congress leaders, and specially Gandhi, were responsible for the separation only in the sense that they were too soft to Muslims and pampered them too much, and finally surrendered to their demand for partition.<sup>44</sup> All the sources that I have used in this



book belie this claim. The Congress leaders did not understand the forces behind the idea of Pakistan and made no concessions to the Muslims at all, otherwise there would have been no partition. The above-quoted statement is an attempt to abstain from a severe criticism of the leadership and at the same time to attribute the creation of Pakistan to nothing else than the misplaced generosity, gallantry, large-heartedness, indulgence and cowardice of the Congress leaders. It also does not take notice of such statements as Jawaharlal Nehru is reported to have made in April 1940, viz., "he would say one thing very frankly that he had begun to consider them [Muslim Leaguers] and people like himself, as separate nations".<sup>45</sup>

Other historians are more forthright and nearer the truth. In 1971, when India-Pakistan relations were at their bitterest because of the trouble in East Pakistan, N.N. Gidwani wrote: "The Congress contribution towards the creation of Pakistan is not insubstantial. But for their lack of political foresight and total failure to understand the Muslim mind with its seething distrust and fear, the situation might have worked out differently."<sup>46</sup> Arthur Lall, an Indian diplomat, believes that everything that the Muslims did was done in collaboration with the British and on their orders, that most Muslims did not want Pakistan, and that Jinnah was incapable of doing anything right. And yet he is sure that Gandhi was more responsible than Jinnah for creating Pakistan. "In choosing Gandhi as its political strategist and paramount leader, instead of Bose or Nehru, it [Congress] served the cause of its own division . . . Gandhi's religious appeals had the effect of putting the communities of India into their separate religious compartments." Then he accuses the Congress leadership of Hindu fanaticism—"the trouble was that Jinnah was bargaining with Congressmen who were themselves often religious zealots"—and finally of political failure—"the Congress leadership failed to make a supreme effort to devise a new constitutional programme for India which could have been acceptable to a large section of Muslim opinion as well as to other elements in the country".<sup>47</sup>

These statements receive historical sanction at the hands of Dr. Uma Kaura of New Delhi, who has based her study of the emergence of the Muslim demand for a partition of India between 1928 and 1940 on official archives and the private papers and correspondence of Congress leaders. The Congress emerges from

this inquiry with its political and moral reputation sullied. It was "the failure of the Congress leadership to work out a settlement with the Muslim League" that led the Muslims to a search for an alternative scheme. One of the outstanding characteristics of this period was the "failure of the Congress leadership to satisfy Muslim aspirations regarding their sharing of power". In 1928, Motilal Nehru "was more concerned with placating the Hindu Mahasabha than giving satisfaction to the Muslims". Later the Congress leadership "did precious little to retrieve the situation", and Jawaharlal Nehru "maintained a self-complacent attitude for a long time". The adoption of the Pakistan demand by the League was "a fateful moment in Indian history" and flowed out of "the mistakes made by the Congress leadership".<sup>48</sup>

Among the Western scholars who charge the Congress with alienating the Muslims and thus causing a division of India are the Frenchman Georges Fischer, who wrote in 1966 that the Congress leaders "domines par la passion de l'unité, ne tiennent pas toujours compte des susceptibilités des musulmans"<sup>49</sup>, the American Margaret Case, who thinks that the "Congress represented a challenge to almost every aspect of their [the Muslims'] status and identity"<sup>50</sup>, the Briton A.J. Moore, who feels that the partition came about "largely because the Congress refused to co-operate with the Raj unless it was accorded plenipotentiary status, yet failed to secure a mandate from the Muslims"<sup>51</sup>, and the American J.A. Camilleri, who finds that "Hindu Indian insensitivity to Muslim sentiments had thus provided the League with a justification for its existence, and had forced it into an increasingly intransigent stand expressed in the demand for a separate Muslim state".<sup>52</sup> Such opinions and findings can be multiplied.<sup>53</sup>

The bitter irony of the situation lies in the Hindu charge that by dividing India the Muslims proved to be traitors to the country. "Pour les Hindous, c'était plus qu'une trahison, c'était un reniement de l'Islam. Malgré les discordes, malgré la guerre civile, ils ne pouvaient concevoir que l'Inde ne soit pas une".<sup>54</sup> After having created all the conditions necessary for the origin, growth and consummation of Muslim separatism, it does not now lie in the Hindu mouth to blame the Muslims for the disruption of their mother country.

However, the Hindu contribution — implicit, unacknowledged, but tremendous — to the evolution and perfection of the idea of Pakistan must not blind us to one fundamental weakness of the idea. Every exponent of separatism, from Sayyid Ahmad Khan to Jinnah, over-stressed the negative factor and played down the positive one. All make much play of Hindu domination, majority tyranny, threats to their culture, perils of assimilation, dreaded prospects of non-Muslim rule, a dark future in the absence of this or that, etc., etc. The differences with the Hindus are underlined, reiterated with the frequency and boredom of a slogan, magnified, even exaggerated. The future within a united India is painted as black as the devil. In this flood of recusations there is a famine of affirmations. The more important task of marshalling the positive arguments and points was neglected. The case for a separation based on fear and hatred and incompatibility was well established. The case for a separation on grounds of self-identification, homogeneity and national unity was not even attempted. The argument in favour of Pakistan was phrased in the wrong order of antecedents: instead of "we want Pakistan because we are a nation" they said "we want Pakistan because we are afraid of the Hindus", instead of "we are one united people" they said "we are different from the Hindus", instead of "we love one another" they said "we hate the Hindus", instead of "we aspire to create a Muslim country" they said "we have no place in a Hindu India". In logic, philosophy, politics and the vocabulary of nationalism the two sets of statements are totally different: the first denotes a positive assertion, the second repeats a negative sentiment; the first leads to unity, the second to mere separation; one shows aspiration, the other frustration; one stands for the creation of a new future, the other for an escape from a horrid prospect. Disavowals and disclaimers, rebuttals and parries, denials and repudiations, are the dice of polemic politics, not of constructive nationalism. Nullities do not build a people or a country; they only spell out a momentary, hollow, vaporous emotion. Positive entities, forces of unity, factors of identity and appeals for coalescence would have been the foundation stones of a vibrant and living nationalism had any Muslim leader cared to lay them. Had the positive factor been used to strengthen the fibre of the community a different kind of Pakistan would have come into existence. What happened was a deep satisfaction at escaping Hindu rule, which soon turned into a complacency.<sup>55</sup>

The makers of Pakistan took the achievement of independence as the end of their exertions and the fulfilment of their desires, not as the starting point of a new journey which could take them somewhere. Instead of saying "the real adventure begins now, let us work hard and build a beautiful future", they, like the Pope on the day after his election, said "now that we have got it, let us enjoy the office". Their real problems were before them; in their ignorance, they thought they had left them behind. Most of the misfortunes of the country since 1947 and the failures and blunders of its rulers are the child of this infirmity in the idea of Pakistan. The hatred for the Hindus and the fear of "the other ones" had become so much a part of our thinking, our psyche, that after independence these negative and destructive emotions were channelled in the direction of institutions and personalities within the new country. Forgetful of the openly expressed aspirations and predilections of Indian leaders of all parties, specially and more often of the Congress, for annulling the 1947 partition and putting an end to Pakistan,<sup>56</sup> the Pakistani in-fighting was endemic and without discrimination. Parties fought one another with a desperate and immoral animus. Provinces feared one another with the mentality of weak buffer states. Leaders abused one another with vicious glee and base abandon. National politics was conducted in an atmosphere where no holds were barred, no standards observed, no principles followed, no courtesies shown, no civilities respected, no respite given or taken. The free-for-all started with Jinnah's death and Liaquat's real ascent to power. Elections were postponed, constitution-making delayed, ministries dismissed, governors dethroned, provincial governments liquidated, parliament insulted, bureaucracy pampered, provincialism encouraged and freedoms suppressed. The coming of Ghulam Muhammad and Iskander Mirza deferred the flowering of democratic politics to the pleasure of the civil servants. The appearance of Ayub Khan on the scene signalled a return to the 19th century imperially-controlled system of local government of the days of Lord Ripon. Since then the country and the people have been stumbling from one crisis to another. Peace and quiet, freedom and human rights, democracy and popular representation, hollowed traditions and an accepted moral code, have become elusive ideals. This frustration has gone so deep that the failures of the *state* of Pakistan are now seen as flaws in the *idea* of Pakistan.

In 1981, the *Urdu Digest*, a right wing "Islam-loving" monthly magazine of Lahore, invited the intellectuals of the country to answer the question: Had Pakistan not been created where would we have been (*agar Pakistan na banta to ham kahan hote*)? Four of the replies received and published in the magazine ran as follows:

Ibnul Hasan (Rawalpindi): "The history of Pakistan is not one of ups and downs but of downs only. Once the country came into being we thought the battle had been won, and that we ought to put away our arms and acquire as much booty as we can. Right in the beginning power had gone to the higher bureaucracy which had had nothing to do with the Pakistan movement, and it was now, through the good offices of a religious minority in the country, being nose-led by Western imperialism. Bureaucratic intrigue encouraged the ambitions of the landowners, capitalists and political fortune hunters. The masses were backward. Soon provincial and religious loyalties overwhelmed our nationalism. Thanks to a religious minority, we got ourselves involved with India in a war in 1965, and thus, at last, after six years even this truncated Pakistan broke up. The creation of Pakistan has not resulted in the expected balance of power between Hindus and Muslims on the sub-continent. The Muslims of the Hindu provinces have been receiving dire punishment instead of protection of life and property, because of the creation of Pakistan. Pakistan, too, in the last 34 years, failed to achieve self-sufficiency in economy, industry, agriculture or defence. China, Korea, Indonesia, India, Israel and Pakistan reached the goal of freedom almost simultaneously. A comparative survey of these countries is no source of satisfaction to us. Perhaps, a new-born state like Pakistan, called into existence by given circumstances and geography, was incapable of discharging so many responsibilities."

Colonel (retired) Athar (Lahore): "I think we would have been better off. As a body, we would not have been divided as we are."

Sarwat Sawlat (Chicago): "One of the aims behind the demand for Pakistan was the creation of a country in which there would be no obstacles in the way of Muslim advance and progress, both material and spiritual. But now the situation is that, not to speak of spiritual advance, even our march to material improvement is impeded if not entirely blocked — as well in Pakistan as in India. That is why today the United States is filling up with Muslim

migrants from the two countries. In the city of Chicago alone 10 or 12 thousand Muslims attend the Eid prayers every year, and half of them belong to the sub-continent.

In my opinion, had Pakistan not been created the situation would have been like this: There would have been no religious studies in schools, though possibly the provincial governments might have formulated an educational system in which religious instruction for Muslim children figured. But surely the educational system would have been based on the principle of the separation of the religious and the worldly, and there would have been no scope within it to present Islam as an effective, moving social force. On the other hand, what we wanted has not been achieved on the official level even in Pakistan, though no law stands in the way. The struggle against Hindu power and domination would have continued, and consequently the Muslims would have felt a greater need to safeguard their religious values, and they would not have shown that indifference to matters of faith which today is common in Pakistan. Regionalism and provincial prejudice would not have been strengthened, and Muslims would have given more thought to unity in the face of Hindu rivalry."

Sayyid Qasim Mahmud (Karachi): "If the aim of the creation of Pakistan was the freedom to earn one's living (and even that we miss) and a demarcation of geographical boundaries, then it does not matter where we would have been today. At worst, we would have lived in India under the Hindus. Then what! Tens of millions of our brethren are already living there. We, too, would have been with them. Then, at least, we would have nursed an ambition to get rid of the yoke of the majority. But, didn't something beyond this lie in the creation of Pakistan? A genuine freedom of thought, a liberation of the spirit, to lead us to a higher and worthier life? If that was so, it is a pity that this ideal has departed from the land, and we are fated to go on seeking it before we can enliven with it the internal springs of our social existence. We had believed fondly that we have reached the goal. Now we know that it is yet far away."<sup>57</sup>

Parts of this frank critique may reflect the point of view of the magazine itself: normally a paper evokes greater response from its "ideological" sympathisers. As the *Urdu Digest* is generally regarded as the spokesman of the Jamaat-i-Islami version of Islamic fundamentalist thinking, the verdict may well represent the pre-1947 bitter opposition to the creation of Pakistan by Mawdudi

and his followers. But it is hard to dismiss the entire evaluation as a "hangover" of an old enmity. The discontent it sums up is more general. I am not writing a history of Pakistan, but of the idea that created it. Therefore the question to be posed and answered is: was this grand disillusion implicit in the idea of Pakistan?

Let us not confuse the idea with the creation. A good idea can produce a bad result just as a poor idea can show a sound result. In this case, the idea was good because it was based on the realities of the situation, because there was no alternative, and because it was true. The Muslims could not live together with the Hindus in one state as a permanent minority. The virulence of Hindu-Muslim hostility held out no hope of a *rapprochement*. All kinds of possible palliatives were suggested by the Muslims and rejected by the Hindus: some of them were tried by the British rulers much to the annoyance of the Hindus and the Congress. When each of them was found wanting and all avenues of compromise were blocked by the Hindu obsession with the concepts of Indian unity and majority rule, the Muslims opted for separation. Throughout these exciting and feverish years the Congress did not make any proposal, suggest any scheme, prescribe any solution, or in any other way show an interest in solving the Muslim problem. On the contrary it pursued policies and made pronouncements with the seemingly deliberate intention of pushing the Muslims out of a free India. Even Muslim suggestions for physical segregation or separate electorates, or mere redistribution of territories, or a loose federal structure, did not deflect the Muslims from their course; and this was so because ultimately partition was a response not to policies but to facts. Gradually a united free India became the Muslim's nightmare and the Hindu's dream, and conversely Pakistan became the Hindu's bugbear and the Muslim's passion. It is in this sense that I have called the idea a truth. The contributors to the *Urdu Digest*, and even more so its editors who posed the question, have a duty to explain their motives. Why was the question asked? In no other country do people question the virtue, merit or use of the act of achieving freedom. The magazine and its respondents should have indicated the alternatives available to the Indian Muslims in 1947, other than a united India with a large Hindu majority to be governed under a representative system in which each citizen had one vote and no special safeguards.

However, as I have said earlier, the idea did suffer from a weak-

ness which flawed the life of the creation. That was the failure of its upholders and propagators to give, or even to be seen to give, at least as much importance to the creation of a spirit of nationalism as they did to the creation of a hatred for the Hindus. In fact, the forces which sustained nationalism should have been mentioned and emphasized more often than the divergences which symbolized their separatism. The contrasts had moulded the past, but only unities could have safeguarded the future. The need was to give the past the minimum necessary attention and concentrate all effort on strengthening the bonds of subsistence. This was not done, and the results are before us.

In Pakistan everyone refers to 1947 as partition, not as independence. The fact that India was divided is of greater significance than that Pakistan became free. It is true that without the partition there would have been no Pakistan. But the vocabulary of a people reflects their mind. Once the partition had been effected, we should have looked back upon it as a milestone in an ongoing journey, not the end of our travels. We call the achievement of Pakistan our arrival at the *manzil*. It should have been the starting point of a new life, not the objective itself. Here the Muslim League must bear a good part of the blame. I have read every speech made by all important League leaders between 1940 and 1947. In all of them we find an exhortation to achieve the goal, to gain the end, to reach the *manzil*. Scarcely is there a reference to the intention or plan of starting a new career after the end was achieved. So well was this propaganda conducted that in 1947 every Pakistani, including the leaders, believed that the final ideal had been realized, and that that was the end of his battle. The League did not prepare its followers for what lay beyond the partition. In this it walked in the shadow of its intellectual predecessors, the people we have studied in this book, who had scared the Muslims of a Hindu rule without communicating to them the positive virtues of unity and nationalism. With the exception of Rahmat Ali and "Punjabi" nobody argued the case for Muslim nationalism. The fear remained stronger than the desire.

Thus we see that the positive component of the idea of Pakistan was frail in all the territories of Muslim India: hence the difficulties besetting the state of Pakistan; it was flimsy in Bengal: hence the break away of 1971. Had the makers of the idea held out greater assurances about the categoricals of a new nationalism and



had the creators of the country attended to the task of strengthening the unities of a new nation, the past and the present of Pakistan would have been different. It is easy to forget the imperatives of history. It is difficult to escape the consequences of the lapse. One generation neglects the political law of nature, the next pays the price for its elders' dereliction. That is how the past determines the present and the present sires the future.

## NOTES

1. A.P. Jain, *Rafi Ahmad Kidwai*, Bombay, 1965, p. 23.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 35.
3. D.P. Singhal, *Nationalism in India and Other Historical Essays*, Delhi, 1967, p. 23. For more views of the same kind see S. Nahar, *Some Aspects of the Hindu-Muslim Relationship in India, 1876-1892*, London, 1966; C.H. Smiley, *Hindu-Muslim Strife and Nationalism in India*, Chicago, 1930; Frederick I. Blue, *Some Factors of the Hindu-Muslim Tension in India*, Southern California, 1941; and Herbert Kondo, *Socio-Religious and Political Aspects of Communalism in Modern India*, Chicago, 1951 (all unpublished Ph.D. theses).
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5. Sir Jadu Nath Sarkar, *A Short History of Aurungzeb*, Calcutta, 3rd. ed. 1962, p. 445.
6. M.A. Karandikar, *Islam in India's Transition to Modernity*, Bombay, 1968, p. 255.
7. Chaudhri Afzal Haq, *Pakistan and Untouchability*, Lahore, May 1941, pp. 125, 155. The book was written during 1940 in Rawalpindi jail.
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11. D.P. Singhal, *op. cit.*, pp. 11, 12, 19, 20. More detailed treatments of the theme may be found in R.C. Nath, *A New Hindu Movement, 1886-1911*, Calcutta, 1981, S.C. Mital, *The Social and Political Ideas of Swami Vivekananda*, New Delhi, 1979, D.V. Athlaye, *Swami Vivekananda: A Study*, New Delhi, 1979, S.P. Sen (ed.), *Social and Religious Movements in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries*, Calcutta, 1979, A. Poddar, *Renaissance in Bengal: Quests and Confrontations, 1800-1860*, Simla, 1970, K.C. Chaudhry, *Role of Religion in Indian Politics, 1900-1925*, Delhi, 1978, B.R. Purohit, *Hindu Revivalism and Indian Nationalism*, Sagar, n.d. (?1965), S.R. Mehrotra, *Towards India's Freedom and Partition*, New Delhi, 1979 (esp. pp. 1-43), D.R. Goyal, *Rashtriya Swayam-sewak Sangh*, New Delhi, 1979, N. Deshmukh, *RSS: Victim of Slander*, New Delhi, 1979, D.N. Mishra, *RSS: Myth and Reality*, New Delhi, 1980 (a strong defence of the organization), K.R. Malkani, *The RSS Story*, New Delhi, 1980, and David Kopf, *The Brahmo Samaj and the Shaping of the Modern Indian Mind*, Princeton, 1977 (esp. pp. 157-216).
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  16. *Moslem Chronicle*, 16 January 1897.
  17. D.G. Karve and D.V. Ambedkar (eds.), *Speeches and Writings of Gopal Krishna Gokhale, Vol. II : Political*, Bombay, 1966, p. 35. My italics. I am grateful to Dr. Sudhir Chandra for drawing my attention to this passage in the speech.
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  19. See Jawaharlal Nehru, *A Bunch of Old Letters*, Bombay, 1958, pp. 6-7.
  20. See *Abhyndaya*, 19 January, 9 February, 20 July, 31 August and 14 September 1929.
  21. G. Pandey, *The Ascendancy of the Congress in Uttar Pradesh, 1926-1934*, Delhi, 1978, p. 80.
  22. *Ibid.*, p. 147.
  23. *Ibid.*, p. 205.
  24. *Ibid.*, p. 210.
  25. Police Abstract of Intelligence, U.P., 25 September 1926; see also R.A. Gordon, Aspects of the History of the Indian National Congress, with special reference to the Swarajya Party, 1919 to 1927, unpublished D. Phil. thesis, Oxford, 1970.
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  27. *Bharat*, 9 March 1929.
  28. Police Abstract of Intelligence, U.P., 1 February 1930.
  29. G. Pandey, *op. cit.*, p. 149 fn.
  30. *Ibid.*, p. 115.
  31. *Ibid.*, p. 36.
  32. *Ibid.*, p. 125.
  33. *Ibid.*, pp. 116-117.
  34. Rafian, "Life and Times of a Gadfly: Story of kafi Ahmad Kidwai", *National Herald*, 2 November 1972.
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  39. C.S. Venkatachar, "1937-1947 in Retrospect: A Civil Servant's View", in *ibid.*, p. 469.
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  48. Uma Kaura, *Muslims and Indian Nationalism*, New Delhi, 1977, pp. 135, 165, 168, 170; the whole book deserves a careful reading. More evidence of the same kind is to be found in D. Pandey, *The Arya Samaj and Indian Nationalism, 1875-1920*, New Delhi, 1972, Sampurnanda, *Memories and Reflections*, Bombay, 1962, Abul Kalam Azad, *India Wins Freedom*, Bombay, 1958, and Sunder Shyam and Savitri Shyam, *The Political Life of Pandit Govind Ballabh Pant*, Lucknow, 1960.
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  53. See, for example, N.G. Barrier (ed.), *Roots of Communal Politics*, Delhi, 1976, R.A. Gordon, "The Hindu Mahasabha and the Indian National Congress, 1915-26", *Modern Asian Studies*, Vol. 9, No. 2 (1975), David Page, "Muhammad Ali Jinnah and the System of Imperial Control in India, 1909-1930", in B.N. Pandey (ed.), *Leadership in South Asia*, New Delhi, 1977, pp. 632-652, and Stanley Wolpert, "Congress Leadership in Transition, Jinnah to Gandhi, 1914-1920", in *ibid.*, pp. 653-666.
  54. Jean-Paul Roux, *L'Islam en Asie*, Paris, 1958, p. 138.
  55. It was this sentiment and its repeated expression that led even sympathetic foreign observers to trace the origin of the country to nothing but hate. "The whole rationale of Pakistan's existence resided in her hostility to Hinduism and her continuing fear of India", J.A. Camilleri, *op. cit.*, p. 72.
  56. For Indian statements rejecting the June 3 plan for the partition of India and hoping and planning to annul the partition see *The Indian Annual Register*, Vol. 1, January-June 1947, pp. 122-123, 259, Larry Collins and Dominique Lapierre, *Freedom at Midnight*, London, 1975, p. 119, *Congress Bulletin*, 10 July 1947, A.K. Majumdar, *Advent of Independence*, Bombay, 1963, p. vii, Pyarelal, *Mahatma Gandhi : The Last Phase*, Ahmedabad, 1958, Vol. II, p. 321, D.G. Tendulkar, *Mahatma*, Bombay, 1951-54, Vol. VIII, pp. 57-58, *The Anurit Bazar Patrika*, 18 August 1947, John Connell, *Auchinleck*, London, 1959, p. 920, *The Tribune*, 18 September 1965, Abul Kalam Azad, *India Wins Freedom*, Bombay, 1958, p. 207, Michael Brecher, *Nehru: A Political Biography*, London, 1960, p. 377, William J. Barnds, *India, Pakistan and the Great Powers*, London, 1972, p. 55 fn., Rammanohar Lohia, *Guilty Men of India's Partition*,

Allahabad, 1960, pp. 17, 53, 60, Mehr Chand Mahajan, *Looking Back: An Autobiography*, Bombay, 1963, p. 240, Sasadhar Sinha, *Indian Independence in Perspective*, Bombay, 1964, pp. 144, 261, S.K. Majumdar, *Jinnah and Gandhi*, Calcutta, 1966, pp. 266, 303, 310, Lt.-Gen. B.M. Kaul, *Confrontation with Pakistan*, Delhi, 1971, pp. 3-4, S.R. Patel, *Foreign Policy of India : Inquiry and Criticism*, Bombay, 1960, p. 19, *Mother India*, December 1970, and Robin Blackburn (ed.), *Explosion in a Subcontinent*, Harmondsworth, 1975, p. 309, etc.

57. *Urdu Digest*, August 1981, pp. 33-47.

## BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES

ABDUL MAJID SINDHI (1889-1979). Born in Thatta, Sind. Provincial Muslim League leader. Initiated the 1938 partition resolution at the Karachi League Conference.

AFGHANI, JAMALUDDIN (1839-1897). Born in and belonged to Asadabad, Iran. Visited India, 1854-57, 1859, 1869, 1880-82. Lived in Afghanistan, Egypt, England, France and Turkey at different times. With Shaikh Muhammad Abduh, issued from Paris *al-Urwa al-wuthqa*, 1884. Died in Turkey. Severely critical of Sayyid Ahmad Khan's views and activities. Supported Indian nationalism. Facts belie his popular image of a pan-Islamist, liberal and anti-imperialist.

AGA KHAN III, THE (1877-1957). Head of Ismaili Muslims. Member, Imperial Legislative Council, 1902-04. Leader, Indian Muslim Deputation to the Viceroy at Simla, 1906. President, London Muslim League. One of the Founders of the Aligarh University. President, All India Muslim Conference, 1929-30. Leader, British Indian Delegation to the Round Table Conference, 1930-31. Leader, Indian Delegation to the League of Nations, 1932, 1934, 1935, 1936, 1937. President, League of Nations Assembly, 1937. Hon. LL.D., Cambridge.

AKBAR ALLAHABADI, SAYYID AKBAR HUSAIN (1846-1921). Belonged to Bara, district Allahabad, U.P. Munshi to a building contractor, 1863. Clerk in the railway department, 1864-66. Naib Tahsildar, 1869. Legal practice, 1873. Appointed Sub-Judge, 1880. Retired, 1905. Fellow, Allahabad University, 1907. Khan Bahadur, 1907. Urdu poet of wit and humour and some talent.

AMBEDKAR, BHIMRAO RAMJI (1893-1956). Leader of the Indian Untouchables. Educated at Elphinstone College, Bombay; Columbia University, New York; and London School of Economics. Called to the bar, 1923. Professor of Economics, Sydenham College of Commerce and Economics, Bombay, 1917-20. Legal



practice at Bombay, 1924. Founded and edited several Marathi weeklies, 1919-30. Professor, Government Law College, Bombay, 1928. Perry Professor of Jurisprudence, Bombay University, 1935. Member, Bombay Legislative Assembly, 1926-34. Delegate, Round Table Conference, 1929-31. Founded Independent Labour Party of India, 1936. Founded All India Scheduled Castes Federation, 1942. Member, Viceroy's Executive Council, 1942-46. Law Minister, India, 1947-51. Embraced Buddhism, 1956. Author of several books.

ASADULLAH (b. 1910). Born in Dacca. Graduated from Presidency College, Calcutta, 1930, and from Law College, Calcutta, 1933. Legal practice at Dacca, 1935. Joined Muslim League, 1937. Member, Bengal Muslim League Working Committee, All India Muslim League Council, Dacca District Board, and Dacca University Court. Member, Pakistan Constituent Assembly, 1950.

AZAD SUBHANI (b. 1873 ?). Born in Ballia, U.P., but belonged to Cawnpore. Teacher, Madrasa-i-Ishaat-ul-Islam, Cawnpore. Member, Anjuman-i-Khuddam-i-Kaaba. President, Ulema session of the All India Khilafat Conference, Bombay, 1920. President, U.P. Provincial Khilafat Committee. Moved a resolution demanding complete independence at the All India Muslim League session, 1922. Organized Mopla Relief Fund, 1922. Vice-President, U.P. Congress Committee. Supported the Shuddhi movement of the Arya Samaj, 1923. Organized Cawnpore labour agitation, 1924 onwards. Professed Communist views in mid-1920s.

BARTON, SIR WILLIAM PELL (1871-1956). Educated at Oxford and London. Entered ICS, 1893. Served on the north-west frontier, 1893-1919. Resident in Mysore, 1920-25, and Hyderabad, 1925-30. Author of several books and articles.

BECK, THEODORE (1859-1899). Educated at Cambridge. Principal, MAO College, Aligarh, 1884-99; Registrar for 2 years. Assistant Secretary, All India Muslim Educational Conference, 1886-99; institutionalized its Education Census, 1893. Treasurer, Sayyid Ahmad Memorial Fund Committee, 1898-99. Died in Simla.

BILGRAMI, MUHAMMAD ABDUL QADIR: QAZI MUHAMMAD AZIZUDDIN AHMAD BILGRAMI. Belonged to district Hardoi, U.P. Educated at Aligarh. In the U.P. Civil Service. Later Minister in Bharatpur State.

BLUNT, WILFRID SCAWEN (1840-1922). School education.

Married the daughter of the 1st. Earl of Lovelace. Diplomatic Service, 1858-70. Succeeded to the Crabtree estates on death of elder brother, 1872. Travelled in Arabia, Syria, Persia, Mesopotamia, etc., 1877-81. Participated in the Egyptian nationalist movements, 1881-82. Travelled in India, 1883-84. Breeder of Arab horses. Minor poet. Prolific author.

BRIGHT, JOHN (1811-1889). Son of a Rochdale miller, and started life as a mill worker. Led agitation against Corn Laws, 1842. Member of Parliament, 1843-89. President, Board of Trade, 1868-70. Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, 1873. Cabinet Minister, 1880. Resigned, 1882. Lord Rector of Glasgow University, 1880. Orator.

CHEIRO: COUNT LOUIS HARMON (1866-1936). Educated privately. Proprietor and editor, *Anglo-Colonial American Register*, 1900-14. Press correspondent at the Japanese-Chinese War, 1894-95, and Russo-Japanese War, 1904-05. Widely travelled. Author and scenario writer, Hollywood. Palmist of world fame. Author of over 20 books.

CHISHTI, MUHARRAM ALI (d. 1936). Belonged to Lahore, Punjab. Legal practice at Lahore, 1900. Became a Sufi. Founder-editor, weekly *Rafique-i-Hind*, Lahore, 1884. Poet in Urdu and Persian.

COATMAN, JOHN (1889-1963). Educated at Manchester and Oxford. Entered Indian Police Service, 1910. In Frontier Constabulary, 1914-19. Director of Public Information, Government of India, 1926. Member, Indian Legislative Assembly, 1926-30. Hon. Professor of Political Science, Delhi University. Secretary, Liberal Party Delegation, Round Table Conference, 1930-32. Professor of Imperial Economic Relations, London University, 1930-34. Chief News Editor, BBC, 1934-37; and North Regional Controller, 1937-49. Director of Research in Social Sciences, St. Andrews University, 1949-54. Author of several books.

CRIPPS, SIR RICHARD STAFFORD (1889-1952). Son of Baron Parmoor. Educated at London. Called to the bar, 1913. Member of Parliament, 1931-50. Solicitor General, 1930-31. Ambassador to USSR, 1940-42. Lord Privy Seal and Leader of the House of Commons, 1942. Minister of Aircraft Production, 1942-45. Chancellor of the Exchequer, 1947-50. President, Fabian Society, 1951. Fellow of the Royal Society. Front rank Labour Party statesman. Author.

DURRANI, FAZAL KARIM KHAN. Belonged to district Hoshiarpur, Punjab. Graduated from Islamia College, Lahore, 1914. Joined the Ahmadiyya Lahori community, and sent as missionary to England, West Indies and Germany, 1920. Imam of the Ahmadiyya mosque, Berlin, for some years. Returned to Lahore, 1930. On the staff of the *Muslim Outlook*. Founded Tabligh Literature Society, 1930. Founder-editor, *Truth* weekly. Wrote English grammars and compositions for school students to earn his living. Author of several books.

FRASER, LOVAT (1871-1926). On the editorial staff of *The Times*, 1907-22. Chief Literary Adviser, *Sunday Pictorial* and *Daily Mirror*. Author of several books.

GUL KHAN, SARDAR MUHAMMAD (1879-1929). Belonged to Dera Ismail Khan, NWFP. Educated at D.I. Khan and F.C. College, Lahore; left in his second year to join service. Judicial Assistant Commissioner, Baluchistan, 1899. British Representative at Kandhar, 1905. Served in Kalat and Las Bela, 1907-10. Served as King's Commissioned Officer, 1917-18, in Italy, France and Germany. Founder-President, Anjuman-i-Islamia, D.I. Khan, 1923.

HAR DAYAL, LALA (1884-1939). Born in Delhi but belonged to the Punjab. Educated at St. Stephen's College, Delhi; Government College, Lahore (M.A., 1905); and London University (Ph.D., 1930). Joined Oxford to study history, 1905, but gave up in 1907 in favour of the Indian students' terrorist group in London. Lived, worked and wrote in Oxford, Paris, USA, Berlin, Turkey, Switzerland, Sweden, London and again USA, 1907-39. Prominent role in the Ghadar Party politics. Editor, *Bande Mataram* and *Gadar*. In 1919 renounced his revolutionary ideas and activities and turned an admirer of the British Empire. Held strong anti-Muslim views. Author of several books.

HAROON, SIR HAJI ABDULLAH (1872-1942). Born in Karachi in a poor Memon family. Started life as a hawker and a chaprasi. Started grain trade, 1890. Opened a shop in Jodia Bazar, 1896. Developed into a prominent and wealthy merchant and industrialist. Joined the Congress, 1917. President, Sind Provincial Khilafat Committee. President, Sind Provincial Political Conference, 1920. President, Sind Muslim League. Member, All India Muslim League Working Committee. Member, Bombay Legislative Assembly, 1923-26, and Indian Legislative Assembly, 1926-42. President, All India Post and Telegraph Union. Delegate, Imperial

Economic Conference, Ottawa, 1932. Philanthropist. The first Muslim League leader to opt for the demand of Pakistan.

HASRAT MOHANI, SAYYID FAZLUL HASAN (1878-1951). Belonged to Mohan, Unao, U.P. From a petty zamindara family. Educated at Aligarh. Settled in Aligarh, 1903, and issued *Urdu-i-Mualla*. Joined the Congress, 1904. Member, Anjuman-i-Khuddam-i-Kaaba. Shifted to Cawnpore, 1920. Left the Congress, 1922. Chairman, Reception Committee, All India Khilafat Conference, Cawnpore, 1925. Founder-member, Khuddam-ul-Harmain, 1925. Chairman, Reception Committee, first Indian Communist Party Conference, Cawnpore, 1925. Founded the daily *Mustaqil*, 1928. Founder-member, Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Hind, 1919. Joined Muslim League, and member, U.P. Muslim League Board, 1936. Member, U.P. Provincial Muslim League Working Committee, 1937. President, Cawnpore branch, All India Progressive Writers' Association, 1936. Delegate, Palestine Conference, Cairo, 1938. Visited England, 1939. Member, Indian Legislative Assembly, 1946. Left Muslim League and joined the Forward Bloc, 1947. Shifted to Lucknow, 1950, and lived in Farangi Mahal, where he died and was buried. Urdu poet. Spent several years in prison.

IPI, FAQIR OF: MIRZA ALI KHAN (b. 1897 ?). Belonged to district Bannu, NWFP. Religious and tribal leader of North Waziristan. Came into prominence, 1924. Organized and led a running battle against the British, 1936-39. Supported Abdul Ghaffar Khan's Pakhtunistan demand after 1947.

JAMILUDDIN AHMAD (1911-1970). Belonged to U.P. Educated at Aligarh. Lecturer in English, Aligarh, 1936-48, and Emerson College, Multan, 1948-50. Public Relations Officer to the Prime Minister of Pakistan, 1950-55. Information Officer, West German embassy, Karachi, 1955-62. Adviser, USA embassy, Karachi, 1962-66. Staff Writer and editor of *Contemporary Affairs*, Bureau of National Research and Reference, Ministry of Information and National Affairs, Government of Pakistan, Rawalpindi, 1968-70. Author.

KAFAYET ALI, MIAN: "A PUNJABI" (b. 1902). Belonged to and born in Batala, district Gurdaspur, Punjab. Graduated from Islamia College, Lahore, 1926. Studied at the Punjab University Law College, 1926-27. Employed in the Punjab Legislative Council secretariate, 1928-42. Served in the Inter-Services Public Relations Directorate, Indian Army Headquarters, New Delhi, 1942-47.



and of the Pakistan Army, Rawalpindi, 1947-48, retiring with the rank of Major. Joined World Muslim Association, Karachi, 1949. Author.

**KAMBOH, WAHABUDDIN** (1882-1964). Belonged to Village Hir Kamboh near Amritsar, Punjab. Joined Punjab Police Department, 1900; retired as a sub-inspector, 1934. Settled down in his village from where he fled in 1947 to Pakistan and lived in a village in district Faisalabad. Active in the Majlis-i-Kabir-i-Pakistan.

**KHALIOUZZAMAN, CHOUDHURY** (1889-1973). Born in Chuniar, district Mirzapur, U.P. Educated at Aligarh. Member, Red Crescent Society Mission to Turkey, 1912-13. Education Secretary to the Raja of Mahmudabad, 1916. Joined Congress and Muslim League, 1916. Joint Secretary, All India Muslim League, 1916. Legal practice at Lucknow, 1917. Organized Khilafat Conference at Lucknow, 1919. Gave up legal practice, 1920. Joined Swarajya Party, 1923. Chairman, Lucknow Municipal Board, 1923. Member, All India Muslim League Working Committee. Migrated to Karachi after 1947. Held Ministerial offices in Pakistan.

**KHEIRI, ABDUL JABBAR**. Belonged to Delhi. Lived for many years in the Lebanon, Turkey and Germany. Indian Delegate, Socialist International Conference, Stockholm, 1917. Settled in London, 1935. Later returned to India and lived in Delhi, where he died in the early 1950s.

**KHEIRI, ABDUS SATTAR** (d. 1945). Belonged to Delhi. Went to Beirut sometime in 1908-11, and later to Turkey during the first world war. Indian Delegate, Socialist International Conference, Stockholm, 1917. Lived in Germany, circa 1925-35. On return to India taught French and German at Aligarh. Founded Aligarh University Muslim League branch. Interned in Dehra Dun, 1940-42. Died in Aligarh.

**LAJPAT RAI, LALA** (1865-1928). Belonged to Jagraon, district Ludhiana, Punjab. Educated at Government College, Lahore, and Punjab University Law College. Legal practice at Rohtak and Hissar, 1885-92, and Lahore, 1892-1928. Chairman, Reception Committee, Indian National Congress session, Lahore, 1893. Worked in USA, 1914-20. President, Indian National Congress Special Session, Calcutta, 1920. Member, Lahore Municipal Committee. President, Cow Protection League. Member, Indian Legislative Assembly. President, Punjab Congress Committee.

Founder of the Hindu Mahasabha. A leading Arya Samajist. Editor and journalist. Director of Punjab National Bank. Founded, with Hans Raj, DAV College, Lahore. Author of several books.

**MAHMUDABAD, RAJA OF: AMIR AHMAD KHAN** (1914-1973). Belonged to U.P. Educated privately and at La Martiniere College, Lucknow. Succeeded father, 1931. Chairman, Reception Committee, All India Muslim League session, Lucknow, 1937. Treasurer, All India Muslim League, 1938-42. President, Provincial Muslim League Conference, New Delhi, 1939, Bombay Muslim League Conference, 1941, and Malabar District Muslim League Conference, 1941. President, All India Shia Muslim Conference (twice). President, All India Muslim Students Federation. Member, All India Muslim League Working Committee. Member, Indian Legislative Assembly, 1946. Director, Islamic Centre, London, 1968-73. One of the biggest financial backers of the Muslim League.

**MAIKASH, MURTAZA AHMAD KHAN** (1899 or 1904-1959). Belonged to a Pathan family settled in Jullundher. Educated at home, in a Jullundher school and for 2 years in a Lahore college. Migrated to Kabul in the hijrat movement, 1920; returned, 1922. On the staff of *Zamindar*. Editor, *Ehsan* and *Shahbaz*. Founded daily *Insaaf*. Editor, *Nawa-i-Pakistan* and *Maghrabi Pakistan*. Lecturer, Department of Journalism, Punjab University. Member, Editorial Board, *Urdu Encyclopaedia of Islam*. Poet and writer in Urdu and Persian. Author of several books.

**MAMDOT, NAWAB OF: SIR SHAHNAWAZ KHAN** (1883-1942). Belonged to the Punjab. In the police service of Hyderabad. Succeeded to the estate and title, 1931. President, Punjab Provincial Muslim League. Member, All India Muslim League Working Committee. Member, Punjab Legislative Assembly, 1935-42. President, Pakistan Conference, Lucknow, 1941.

**MAWDUDI, SAYYID ABUL ALA** (1903-1979). Belonged to Delhi. Born in Aurungabad, Deccan. School education. Started journalistic career, 1918. Founder-editor, *Tarjaman-ul-Quran*, Hyderabad Deccan, 1932. Came to the Punjab, 1938. Founded Jamaat-i-Islami, 1941. Settled in Pathankot, 1942. Migrated to Lahore, 1947. Amir of his party, 1941-72. Opposed the Pakistan demand. Leader of Islamic reaction in India and Pakistan. Author of many books, including a commentary on the Quran.

**MORISON, SIR THEODORE** (1863-1936). Educated at Cam-



bridge. Teacher, MAO College, Aligarh, 1889; Principal, 1899-1905. Member, Viceroy's Legislative Council, 1903-04. President, All India Muhammadan Educational Conference, 1904. Member, Council of India, 1906-16. Member, Royal Commission on the Public Services of India, 1913-15. Served in the war, 1916-19. Principal, Armstrong College, Newcastle-upon-Tyne, 1919-29. Director, British Institute, Paris, 1933-36. Author.

MUHAMMAD ALI JAWHAR (1878-1931). Belonged to U.P. Born in Rampur. Educated at Aligarh and Oxford. In the service of Rampur and Baroda, 1901-10. Founded *Comrade*, 1911, and *Hamdard*, 1913. Imprisoned, 1915-19. Founder and first Vice-Chancellor, Jamia Millia, 1920. President, Indian Khilafat Conference and Indian National Congress. Leader, Indian Khilafat Delegation to London, 1921. Delegate, Round Table Conference, 1931. Died in London, buried in Jerusalem. Poet, orator and author.

PAL, BIPIN CHANDRA (1858-1932). Born in district Sylhet, Bengal. Educated at Presidency College, Calcutta. Embraced Brahmoism and renounced caste, 1880. Headmaster of high schools at various places in Bengal, 1879-86. Founded, edited and worked for several newspapers. Librarian, Calcutta Public Library, 1890-91. Visited England and USA, 1898-1900 and 1908-11. In Home Rule Movement, 1913. Member, Home Rule League and Congress Joint Deputation to England, 1919. President, Bengal Provincial Congress, 1921. One of the greatest Bengali leaders of his time. Author of several books.

PARMANAND, BHAI (1874-1947). Born near Chakwal, district Jhelum, Punjab. Educated at DAV College, Lahore, and Punjab University. Lecturer, DAV College, Lahore, 1902-05, 1908-09. Hindu missionary to Burma and South Africa, 1909-10. Imprisoned, 1915-20. President, All India Hindu Mahasabha, 1933. Member, Indian Legislative Assembly, 1934. Active Arya Samajist. Author.

QADRI, MUHAMMAD AFZAAL HUSAIN (1912-1974 or 1975). Born in Badayun, U.P. Educated at Aligarh and Cambridge. Taught at Aligarh, 1933-49. Forest Entomologist, Government of Pakistan, 1950-52. Taught at Karachi University, 1952-74.

RAHMAT ALI, CHAUDHARY (1897-1951). Belonged to and born in village Balachaur, district Hoshiarpur, Punjab. Educated in Jullundher and Islamia College, Lahore. Tutor, Aitchison Chief's College, Lahore, 1918-23. Studied at Punjab University Law

College, 1923-25. Legal Adviser and Private Secretary to Dost Muhammad Khan Mazari, 1923-30. Graduated from Cambridge, 1933. Called to the bar, 1943. Lived in Cambridge, 1931-51, and died there. Came to live in Pakistan in 1948, but expelled by the government. Creator of the word "Pakistan" and founder of the Pakistan National Movement. Author of several pamphlets and one book.

RAJENDRA PRASAD (1884-1963). Belonged to Bihar. Educated at Presidency College, Calcutta. Legal practice at Calcutta, 1911-16, and Patna, 1916-20. General Secretary, Indian National Congress. Member, Indian National Congress Working Committee. President, Indian National Congress, 1934, 1939, 1947-48. Minister of Food, India, 1947-48. President, Indian Constituent Assembly, 1946-50. President of India, 1950-61. Author.

RAU, ABDUL MAJID (1885-1936). Son of Diwan Bahadur M. Subramanyan Rau of Madras. Educated in Madras and Cambridge. Convert to Islam, 1926. Worked on the staff of several English newspapers in Madras and Bombay. Editor, *The Eastern Times* and *Muslim Outlook* of Lahore. Wrote in the *Civil and Military Gazette* a regular column as "But Shikan" and "Our Muslim Correspondent". Died and is buried in Lahore.

ROSS MASUD, SAYYID SIR (1889-1937). Belonged to U.P. Grandson of Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan. Educated at Aligarh and Oxford. Called to the bar. Entered Indian Educational Service, 1914. Director of Public Instruction, Hyderabad, 1916-28. Vice-Chancellor, Aligarh University, 1929-34. Member, Executive Council, Bhopal, 1934-37. Author.

SARDAR ALI KHAN, NAWAB (1879-1942). Belonged to Hyderabad. Educated privately. Entered Nizam's service, 1911. Postmaster General, 1922-29. Member, Indian Muslim Deputation to the Viceroy, Simla, 1906. Life Member, Anjuman-i-Islam, Bombay. Author of several books.

SASTRI, V.S. SRINIVASA (1869-1946). Belonged to Madras Presidency. School and college education in hometown. Joined Servants of India Society, 1907; President, 1915-27. Secretary, Indian National Congress, 1908. One of the founders of the National Liberal Federation, 1918. Member, Madras Legislative Council, 1913, Imperial Legislative Council, 1915, and Indian Council of State, 1921. Delegate, Imperial Conference, London, 1921. Delegate, League of Nations, 1921. Member, Indian South

Africa Conferences, 1922, 1932. Indian Agent General in South Africa, 1927-29. Delegate, Round Table Conference. Freedom of the City of London, 1921, and of Edinburgh, 1931. Privy Councillor. Companion of Honour. Orator. Author of several books.

SAYYID AHMAD KHAN, SIR (1817-1898). Belonged to Delhi. In East India Company's service, 1838-58. Munsif at Bijnore, Muradabad, Ghazipur, Aligarh and Benares, 1858-78. Member, Governor General's Council, 1879-86. Founded MAO College, Aligarh, 1875. Gave a new turn to modern Indian Muslim thinking. Author, historian, educationist, social reformer and thinker.

SHARAR, ABDUL HALIM (1860-1926). Born in Lucknow. Founder, writer and editor of several journals in Lucknow and Hyderabad, 1880-1906. Assistant Director of Education, Hyderabad, 1907-09. Visited England, 1893-96. A supporter of the Aligarh movement. Founder of the historical novel in Urdu. Social historian. Prolific writer.

SIKANDAR HAYAT KHAN, SIR (1892-1942). Belonged to the Punjab. Educated in Aligarh and London. Member, Punjab Legislative Council and Assembly, 1921-42. Acting Governor of the Punjab, 1932, 1934. Deputy Governor, Reserve Bank of India, 1935-37. Prime Minister of the Punjab, 1937-42. Leader of the Punjab Unionist Party. Member, All India Muslim League Working Committee.

SUHWARAWDY, SIR ABDULLAH AL-MAMUN (d. 1935). Belonged to Bengal. Educated in Dacca, London, France, Germany, Austria, Cairo and Constantinople. Tagore Law Professor, Calcutta University, 1911. President, Calcutta Khilafat Committee, 1924. Member, Bengal Legislative Council, 1910-26, and Indian Legislative Assembly, 1926-35. Author of several books.

TOOSY, MUHAMMAD SHARIF (d. 1983). Belonged to a Kashmiri family of Amritsar. Headmaster of Municipal Board High Schools at various places, 1926-65. Retired from Wazirabad and settled there. Political Secretary to Jinnah, November 1941 to May 1942. Persuaded Jinnah to publish Iqbal's letters to him. Leader-writer, *The Eastern Times*, Lahore, 1945-47. Member, Wazirabad Municipal Committee. Died in a traffic accident in Lahore and was buried there.

UBAIDULLAH SINDHI (1872-1944). Born near Sialkot, Punjab, in a Sikh family. Convert to Islam, 1887. Educated in Sind and at

Deoband. Lived in Afghanistan, Turkey, Russia and Arabia, 1915-39. Author and commentator of the Quran.

YUSUF ALI, ABDULLAH (1872-1953). Belonged to Bombay. Educated at Bombay and Cambridge. Entered ICS, 1895; retired 1914. President, All India Muhammadan Educational Conference, 1910. Lecturer in Hindustani, Hindi and Indian Religions, Manners and Customs, University of London, 1917-19. Revenue Minister, Hyderabad, 1921-22. Legal practice at Lucknow, 1922-24. Principal, Islamia College, Lahore, 1925-27, 1935-37. President, Sind Azad Conference, 1932, All India Muslim Conference, 1932, and All India Tanzim Conference. Member, Court of Aligarh University. Translator and commentator of the Quran in English. Author of several books.

ZAFAR ALI KHAN (1873-1956). Belonged to the Punjab. Educated at Wazirabad, Patiala and Aligarh. Editor, *Zamindar*, 1909. Interned in his village, 1914-19. Imprisoned, 1920-25. In the Ahrar party, 1929-32. Rejoined Muslim League, 1937. Member, Punjab Legislative Assembly, 1937-46, and Indian Legislative Assembly, 1934-40. One of the greatest Indian editors. Poet and orator.

ZULFIQAR ALI KHAN OF MALERKOTLA. NAWAB SIR (1875-1933). Belonged to the Punjab. Educated at Cambridge and Paris. Member, Indian Legislative Assembly and Indian Council of State. Scholar and patron of literature. Author.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

### 1. BOOKS

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 Afzal Haq, Chaudhri, *Pakistan and Untouchability*, Lahore, 1941.  
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 Ahmad, Ashfaq, *Mera Watan, Mera Pakistan*, Islamabad, n.d.  
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